Next I wish to refer to the suggestion made that I continued to be over optimistic as to the final result of the CIE reorganisation under the 1958 Act. I have already indicated that I was determined to exhort CIE to do their utmost to resist the efforts of pressure groups who might have held them back in their progress.
In fact I was in the position of not knowing whether CIE would be able to balance their budget in the end because of the complete absence of economic analyses within the organisation. This has indeed been reflected in Europe where only recently the International Railway Research Organisation began to assemble economic data which enable railways to engage in the science of transport econometrics after studying all these facts.
How could I or any other Minister know in advance whether, having been given freedom to engage in package deals, CIE would be able to get £500,000, £1 million or £2 million worth of package deals? Who could tell? They might have got only £500,000. In fact they got something like £1 million but at the time there was no basis of analysis by which I could tell whether they might be able to get £2 million or £2½ million in package deals which would have brought them much nearer paying their way.
That is a fact. There was at the time no traffic analysis of a modern kind. We did not even know what were the comparative costs of package deal traffic by CIE and the costs of carrying the same goods by private transport. One of the difficulties CIE had was that the very able sales staff employed by them to go around the country found it very difficult to get people willing to engage in a cost comparison. First of all the sales staff had to go to a great many firms and say: "Will you allow us to do a modern costings on your transport establishment if you have not done it? We shall show you how much it is costing you to take your goods at a given time and over a given period from A to B or from B to C and we shall offer you a package deal at what we can do it for."
CIE found in a great many cases that it was quite obvious it would pay the companies to continue their own transport. In other cases they found they could do the job more economically. In some cases, for prestige reasons, because of the publicity value of using their own lorries and vehicles, some of the companies refused to accept package deals. They preferred to have their own lorries even if it proved more expensive to them.
We did not know at that time what the cost would be when this tremendous effort was being made to secure traffic. It was impossible to tell in advance the results of CIE's competitive selling campaign, carried out for the first time on a modern basis in a transport service which had lasted for 100 years or more. Then again, during a great part of the period, it was impossible to say how the economy would expand. It took until 1959 for us to observe a very pleasant and startling growth in the national income. We did not know, we could not know how much of the growth would be reflected in very largely expanded CIE sales.
The transport services did expand but the nature of the new raw materials, where they were coming from and going to, how many of them would reach the larger towns, the seaports, how much processing of goods would be undertaken, was impossible to forecast. All we can say is that from 1959 CIE shared in the economy expansion. A number of international railway reports show that the growth in traffic in a railway does not follow proportionally the growth of national income. That is partly due to the fact that there has been a reduction in heavy bulk traffic owing to the setting up of heavy industries near seaports and because of a reduction in the weight of finished goods resulting from the use of new raw materials and the increasing trend towards factory finished products of high value but often of low weight.
Railway traffic forecasts are extremely difficult to undertake because of the changing pattern of industry, although they are now making a better effort at it. At that time we could not make a very definite prediction in that respect. I was quite determined, as long as this process of examination went on, to be optimistic and I shall be optimistic again if any State undertaking finds it necessary to engage in a similar reorganisation. I shall go on being optimistic unless, in advance, I get the kind of information which would make it very much easier to predict what would happen and which might alter the character of necessary legislation.
My final answer to this point is why did not the Coalition Government write the kind of Bill in 1955 that we provided in 1958? Why did they not set in train the forces of reorganisation which would enable the proper analysis to be undertaken and some predictions made so that in 1958 we could have observed the situation and might have produced a different type of Act providing different arrangements for the transport services?
I am not blaming the Coalition for not having done it because all this modern analysis is so recent. If I do not blame the Coalition for not having thought on the lines of modern transport econometrics and of the need for relating transport as a social service to the economics of the service, they can hardly blame me if during that five year period, with completely unknown quantities in front of me, I chose, and will always choose, to be optimistic in such circumstances.
Both the Beeching Report in regard to transport in Britain and the Pacemaker Report are very modern documents, acclaimed throughout Europe and elsewhere as such, so that the whole of this new analysis, of this new method of book-keeping and accountancy, is something that will enable us in future at least to be more realistic about CIE than we have been in the past. We are, all of us, jointly responsible for this rather traditional attitude towards the transport service.
The next statement made was that I went on refusing publicly to accept the principle of a subsidy until I was forced to do so. I make no apology for that either. If I had hinted at any time during this period of evaluation, of reorganisation, that a subsidy would be inevitable, all the people would have been seeking subsidies and, not having to vote for the money, would have been howling like wolves at CIE's feet and it would have been impossible to carry out the reorganisation that was so essential.
At the same time, I felt that as long as I could I should speak against the principle of an operating subsidy to cover the difference between current operating expenditure and receipts because I thought that would be a most undesirable form of subsidy, and still do, though I was compelled by circumstances to introduce this Bill. It does encourage inefficiency. There is no question that it does encourage inefficiency in any organisation. A deficiency subsidy is very different from capital grants.
The rural electrification scheme of the ESB is subsidised by this House in the form of interest. The repayment of capital for the subsidy to the ESB from my Department comes on the Estimate every year in this House. But, from the ESB's point of view, it is a once and for all capital subsidy that enables them to do the job well. It is very different from our saying to the ESB: "You are losing £1 million on the sale of current and we shall pay you the £1 million this year. You have lost £1 million and we shall pay for it." Everybody fully accepts the difference between subsidies to cover current deficits and capital subsidies.
Some subsidies are inevitable for services that are entirely social. The subsidies given to maintain the price of agricultural produce are, again, quite different. We guarantee the price of a product to a farmer. We are not going to farmer John Murphy and saying: "It cost you so many thousand pounds to run your farm last year and you made £1,000 less. Here is the money for you. We shall give you £1,000 every year." Psychologically, it is quite different to guarantee a price to a farmer rather than to provide him with a specific subsidy to cover a loss he may be making. The two things are quite different.
I very much dislike having to propose this subsidy. It is necessary because an arterial railway line is essential to this country for a considerable time not only to take peak traffics but to provide transport for tourists; to undertake speedy express services for passengers and for freight because the road conditions are totally unsuitable in this country for high speed traffic and will be for many years; because of the cost of changing over and because of the social effects, in any event, of very large-scale redundancy even although the redundancy would result in full compensation at the present rates.
Again, I should like to point out that I hope and expect that CIE will prove to be one of the exceptions— there are others. There are railways in Europe that are subsidised and that are efficient. I hope CIE will join with them and with efficient State companies such as the ESB and will resist all the influences of a subsidy covering an operating deficit. I hope they will be efficient. I hope the staff will realise the position they now face. CIE should live not only within the subsidy but should try to dispense with some of it or use some of it for capital purposes in the next five years.
I believe in the success of our people in engaging in new enterprises and in reorganisation. We have a splendid tradition in regard to the operation of State companies. The people manning them, the executives and staffs, are second to none in Europe. I have every hope that CIE can avoid all the temptations that a subsidy offers. I make no apology for having tried to resist it as long as I could for the reasons I have given. At no time during that five years was the sort of statistical information or analysis I desired available to me to show how far CIE could go in securing additional traffic with its newfound freedom.
Next, I want to deal with those Deputies who spoke of the subsidy level and who asked whether it would be sufficient. The subsidy of £2 million a year is based on a realistic estimate of the extent to which CIE can get by in its operations during the next five years. Effective management, increased efficiency and the avoidance of waste are all assumed in that connection. It is based on a minimum realistic level and there is no margin for feather-bedding. There is allowance for a reasonable increase in staff remuneration.
During the period of five years, if CIE get into temporary difficulties, they will be able to borrow up to £2 million under the temporary borrowing clauses of the earlier Act. But, in fact, they are obliged to break even during these five years. It is not a derisory subsidy, as suggested by some Labour Deputies: it is based on realities. Some unusual circumstances may arise that we could not foresee, but it is based on a realistic examination of the position.
I hope the staff will be wise in relation to the part they will play in CIE. I hope they will realise the very heavy character of the subsidy and that while seeking good conditions and reasonable wages they will do everything to help the Board and to enable this House to view with equanimity the payment of the subsidy.
As I have said, CIE are now in a position whereby they will be obliged to live on the £10 million. I was asked the question whether some allowance was made for redundancy payments. The redundancy payments will now be made by CIE. The whole of the £10 million assumes a certain level of redundancy to be met by compensation payments by CIE and that, equally, there will be corresponding economies. CIE obviously will have to adopt a slightly different attitude towards redundancy, now that they have to pay, whereas, when the State was paying, it was rather like the Government investing a capital sum producing an annuity over a period of years which resulted in a given level of redundancy being made available, the redundancy payments gradually decreasing as the years went by so that, if in the first year the economy effected was not equal to the redundancy payment, over a period of years, as the workers gradually retired, the final economy achieved was a net one.
Under the arrangement now, no longer does the House vote the money for redundancy. The character of CIE's negotiations in relation to redundancy payments will be different and the speed at which they effect reorganisation may have to change. But that was all allowed for in connection with the total subsidy offered.
As reported at column 1780 of the Official Report, Volume 209, Deputy McGilligan said he proposed that we bring public transport under the control of this House so that we shall be able to have an examination of even the day-to-day administration that is required. I could not quite make out from Deputy McGilligan's speech whether he was definitely going to do that or felt like it because of his reaction to my Second Reading speech on the Bill. Deputy Esmonde did not definitely propose that but he said he hoped I would give sufficient explanations and make a sufficient statement which, from his point of view, would perhaps eliminate the necessity for moving such an amendment.
Deputy Donegan spoke equally tentatively in regard to this. I should make it clear to the House that a great deal of the debate centring on the question of whether or not public transport should be brought under the control of the House was partly related to this endless controversy that takes place on the answering of questions in regard to the day-to-day administration of CIE. The Coalition Government in 1950 provided in the 1950 Act that the Board should furnish to the Minister such information "as he may from time to time require regarding matters which relate to its activities, other than day-to-day administration, and which appear to him to affect the national interest." That perfectly clear demarcation in regard to information supplied to the Minister is enshrined in the 1950 Act passed by the Coalition Government.