Last night we were discussing the amendment that nothing in section 2 should apply to a witness. Those who sponsored this amendment indicated that the wording that they used might not necessarily be the wording that was most appropriate and that perhaps the Minister, in his wisdom and greater knowledge, might find some more suitable words to get around the obvious anomaly in subsections (1) and (2) of the section. Some of the speakers supporting this amendment pointed out that it was rather strange that a witness to the commission of a crime or a person with knowledge or information about a crime that is proposed to be committed should be treated in the manner that is possible and likely under this section.
A witness may be brought into custody and kept for up to seven days plus the two days that it is possible under this and other measures. The likelihood of a witness or a person with the knowledge of a crime letting it be known, if this measure goes through, that he has such information or knowledge, with the threat that he may be pulled in and kept in custody, is very small. This is surely the greatest deterrent to any such person coming forward; indeed he would be an absolute clown to let it be known that he has any such information. It is more likely that a person with the sort of information that is intended to be covered in subsection (1) will make sure if at all possible that the authorities do not find out he knows anything, so that he will not come within the terms of this section and possibly be detained without charge or trial for a minimum of seven days, which may be added to by a further two days. I cannot accept the arguments on a previous amendment that the two days cannot be added to the seven days indefinitely. The Minister's assurances have been comprehensive and complete, but I am quite sure that the Minister is fully aware that his assurances have no value whatsoever. Any instructions not to apply a law that might be given to the members of the Garda, no matter how authoritative they may appear to be, does not, in my belief, bind any member of the Garda to carry out that instruction. As I understand the situation, nobody can with certainty instruct the Garda not to invoke any law on our Statute Book.
Therefore, no direction emanating from the Minister need be respected by members of the force. If what is proposed in this section becomes law it will rank the same as any other laws on our Statute Book and nobody will be entitled to tell any member of the Garda force not to invoke any particular section. Members of the Garda can enforce the laws on the Statute Book regardless of what any superior may tell them to the contrary. Any instruction to the Garda not to invoke this proposal in subsection (1) in so far as witnesses or persons having certain information or suspected of having certain information are concerned, will not be worth the paper it is written on. Therefore, the assurances given, backed up by the promise of such instructions, do not hold water and make no sense.
It is true that there will be, as the Minister has already admitted, innocent persons taken in and detained for 48 hours where a garda has reasonable cause to suspect that that person has been a witness to the commission of a crime, or is in possession of knowledge of the commission of a crime, or of the intention, of some person or persons to commit a crime: "suspects with reasonable cause". What is the difference, I wonder, between the phraseology used in this Bill and that used in previous legislation? In the 1972 Act, and probably in the 1939 Act as well, the words used are "reasonable grounds for believing". Why has it been found necessary—the Minister is prone to pointing back to the two previous Acts as justification for some of the things he is proposing in this Bill, some of the things to which objection is taken; the Minister says that these two previous Acts have proved themselves, or proved that they did or did not do some of the things we are afraid may happen under this Bill—to change the words "reasonable grounds for believing" to what appears in this Bill? Perhaps those well versed in the interpretation of the law may be able to elucidate this for us. The Minister should have given us some explanation. The phraseology is not the same as that used in the Acts to which the Minister has referred. Perhaps he will be able to indicate why the change had been found necessary, not alone in relation to this amendment but also as it applies to other provisions in the section, provisions which are many and varied, onerous and very dangerous. I would like to hear the Minister tell us what this change of wording is intended to mean.
I would also like to know whether those suspected of having knowledge will, in fact, be taken in in a series of two day-five day operations for an indefinite period. There was a suggestion earlier that the two measures would or could work independently and, therefore, would be capable of being worked consecutively and the setting aside, as it were, of section 30 of the 1939 Act while this measure would be in force would obviate the abuses of the two Acts to bring about a situation of having seven days' detention operating under this measure and immediately after the 48-hour detention under the 1939 Act. That has been dealt with but there does not appear to me to be any assurance with regard to the much more dangerous situation of the 48-hour and five-day detention in this measure being used consecutively or as near consecutively as would make no difference. If that can be done, and I believe it can, then it is not a 48-hour detention we are talking about, capable of being extended by direction of a chief superintendent or higher ranking officer, but a further five days amounting in all to a seven-day detention without charge or trial. Thereafter, and just how quickly is a matter of guesswork, the whole cycle can start all over again. There is at least an indication in the Bill of some termination to the period of detention but if the provisions are utilised to start the whole process again then this is not detention. It is internment, internment by subterfuge.