asked the Minister for Justice the number of persons granted bail by the courts since the 1966 Supreme Court decision on bail; and the number of such persons who were subsequently convicted of offences while on bail.
Ceisteanna—Questions. Oral Answers. - Bail Decision.
33.
In the ordinary course, statistics are not compiled in a way that would show the information sought by the Deputy. However, in the aftermath of the 1966 decision of the Supreme Court which is referred to in the question, the Garda Síochána maintained special records for a number of years, after which they asked to be relieved of the chore of keeping them as the work was exceptionally time-consuming and the figures they already had collected were sufficient to indicate what was happening.
The records in question covered the period 1st January, 1967, to 31st December, 1973, and show that in that period a total of 2,391 persons were found to have committed a total of 9,229 offences while on bail. These offences include cases in respect of which there were formal convictions, cases which were proved but no formal conviction was recorded pursuant to the Probation of Offenders Act, and cases "taken into consideration" by the courts when passing sentence.
What may be even more significant than the total numbers for the period is the trend that showed itself. In 1967 the figures were 183 persons on bail committing 590 offences. By 1973 the annual figure had jumped to 513 persons committing 1,775 offences. Deputies will no doubt have noted that all these figures relate to a period before there was any dispute about legal aid fees and cannot be explained by suggestions that the problem was a side-effect of that dispute.
No figures are available showing the total number of persons released on bail nor is that figure of any relevance to the proposal to recommend a constitutional amendment since there is no question whatsoever of any proposal to introduce a general restriction on the right to bail but only a provision that would enable the courts, in deciding whether to grant bail, to have regard in any particular case to the likelihood that the person will commit offences if allowed bail. It would, of course, still be a matter for the court's discretion. This was the accepted practice in this country up to 1966 and it is still the practice in Britain and in many other countries.
Am I right in assuming that the Minister has indicated that it is proposed that the courts will be entitled to take into account, whether or not the question of granting bail arises, whether or not there is a likelihood of an offence being committed when on bail? Is that all that is involved?
That is all that is involved.
Does the Minister think it is worth-while legislation and having a constitutional referendum on that single issue?
I do.
Does the Minister think that the figures he has given, which on his own admission are not very reliable, justifies that decision?
The figures I have given are extremely reliable. They are accurate up to 1973 but, as I indicated, it is a very time-consuming chore collecting these statistics and the practice was discontinued after 1973. I am satisfied from the Garda and their empirical observation of this area that the figures have been showing an increasing upward trend, that the trend which showed itself between 1966 and 1973, when the number of persons rose from 183 to 513 people has been continuing and that the present number would be very substantial.
The Minister used the phrase "empirical observation". Does he think that it is justifiable to engage in the process of a constitutional referendum on the basis of empirical observation by the Garda Síochána?
It is not empirical observation per se but empirical observation following a hard statistical situation.
On the Minister's admission he has no hard statistics for the last three years. Is that correct?
That is correct.
Does the Minister assert that at present a court could not take into account, in deciding whether or not to grant bail, the likelihood of a person committing an offence? Would a court not per se have that discretion as matters stand?
No. By virtue of the O'Callaghan case a court is specifically prevented from taking that into consideration.
Would the simple thing not be to adopt Deputy Gerry Collins's suggestion and in the next case where this comes up the State prosecution could take this matter to the Supreme Court and have it decided on that basis?
As I have already indicated, I consider that the proper constitutional procedure is to ask the people because it was on behalf of the people that the Supreme Court made the finding in question. The people should be asked and not the Supreme Court.
Would the Minister not accept that traditionally and very deeply rooted in our whole system of juris prudens is the matter that an accused person is in the custody of the courts and, therefore, from that point of view it is the courts who should be the ultimate deciders on whether or not bail should be granted? This matter deals with the operation of the courts and should properly be left to a decision of the Supreme Court.
The courts will continue to be the people deciding the question of bail. We are asking the people to give to the courts, if they so decide, power to take into consideration this question of the likelihood of the commission of other offences. The court does not have to accept that there is likelihood in any particular case. The matter will still entirely and completely be for the discretion of the court.
(Interruptions.)
This question is going on quite long. Order.
The very fine legal distinction involved here is the power of the courts. Will the Minister not reconsider putting the country and the people to the expense of a referendum on this comparatively minor issue when there is an alternative way of dealing with it?
It is not a minor issue for a start. Secondly, it is the people's right to be consulted in a matter such as this and, thirdly, it is expedient at this moment because a referendum, which everybody welcomes——
On a point of correction, I did not mean a minor matter. I meant a minor alteration of the powers of the courts, a very fine distinction.
Again, I disagree with the Deputy. It may be minor but it is of considerable significance so if one can have a minor matter with a lot of significance——
(Interruptions.)
Has the Minister ever considered giving the courts power to impose increased penalties in respect of offences committed while on bail? That would perhaps be a simple and more effective alternative and does not interfere with constitutional safeguards.
I would prefer to prevent the crime from taking place rather than have to impose heavier penalties afterwards.
(Interruptions.)
The real answer would be to bring those people to trial quickly.