I move:
That Dáil Éireann approves the terms of the Fifth International Tin Agreement, signed by Ireland on 28th April, 1976, which has been laid before the Dáil.
With the Dáil's permission I will also be moving motions seeking Dáil approval of the terms of two further international commodity agreements, the International Coffee Agreement, 1976, and the International Cocoa Agreement, 1975. Dáil approval of the terms of the agreements is necessary before Ireland can proceed with ratification. It is necessary under Article 29.5.2º of the Constitution which stipulates that "the State shall not be bound by any international agreement involving a charge upon public funds unless the terms of the agreement shall have been approved by Dáil Éireann". In the case of these agreements the charge on public funds is in respect of Ireland's contribution to the cost of administering the agreements. Ireland's contributions for the year 1976-77 amount to a total of about £10,700.
The three international commodity agreements which are before the Dáil are striking examples of continuity in that they are successors to earlier agreements covering the same commodities. The tin agreement before the Dáil is, in fact, the fifth of its kind; the first was negotiated as long ago as 1956. The coffee agreement is the third of its kind; two earlier coffee agreements were negotiated in 1962 and 1968. The cocoa agreement is a successor to the first international cocoa agreement which came into force in 1972.
It would, however, be wrong to see the agreements as being simple renewals of their predecessors. There are a number of modifications in the substantive provisions of the three agreements. These, in fact, reflect the influence on the negotiators of the ongoing debate on economic relationships between developed and developing countries.
It is not surprising that, in the context of this debate, the developing countries place great emphasis on the need to change the structure of trade in raw materials. Their high dependence on commodity exports for foreign exchange earnings and the notorious instability of commodity markets which inhibits long term investment help to explain their preoccupation.
The basic aim of the three agreements which are before the Dáil today is to prevent excessive fluctuations in the price of the commodities in question. Each of the agreements employs different mechanisms to achieve this aim.
We must recognise, however, that, whatever the mechanisms employed, there can be exceptional circumstances in which a commodity agreement can be inadequate to deal with the problems of the market. For example, the coffee agreement is quite clearly not equipped to deal with the present rising price of coffee. It is doubtful whether any agreement could provide adequately for eventualities such as the 1975 frost in Brazil, which severely affected the output of the world's largest coffee producer. We are all aware of the unprecedented increases in coffee prices which have resulted. Agreements designed to cope with all eventualities are not economically feasible. The best we can hope for is a system which will reduce the uncertainties of a normal commodity market.
Explanatory memoranda on the three agreements have been prepared and are available to Deputies. These give a detailed account of the provisions of the individual agreements and cover the question of the costs involved in Irish participation in them. I propose to confine myself to making some general remarks on the three agreements.
I said earlier that the present tin agreement is the fifth agreement of its kind. Each has been of five years' duration and all have been negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. The International Tin Agreement has the distinction of being one of the oldest commodity agreements in continuous existence and it is the only international agreement covering a major metal commodity. Throughout its existence it has served as a model of producer/consumer co-operation in the field of commodities. However, the present agreement has not yet entered definitively into force. This is due to the fact that Bolivia—one of the principal tin exporters—has delayed ratification. The latest information available suggests, however, that Bolivia will now ratify the agreement in the near future and thereby ensure its definitive entry into force.
The main operational mechanisms are the use of a buffer stock and the application of export controls when necessary in order to adjust supply to demand. The operation of the buffer stock is related to floor and ceiling prices which are fixed at intervals within the Council by majority vote, or much more frequently by consensus, taking into account market conditions and production costs.
Tin is not produced in Ireland and Irish consumption of tin is the lowest of those states subscribing to the International Tin Agreement. However, the availability of tin and materials containing tin is important to Irish manufacturing industry, particularly to the can making and canning industry.
While many of the provisions of the 1976 coffee agreement are similar to those of its two predecessors, its emphasis has been changed. The new agreement is designed to deal more effectively with the complex trade relationships between developed and developing countries. To this end the agreement provides, inter alia, for a mechanism for the establishment of price ranges and price differentials for the principal types of coffee, a system of export quotas and a price mechanism for the adjustment of quotas.
The International Coffee Agreement would have implications for the Irish coffee processing industry whether or not we adhered to the agreement because about 98 per cent of the world's exports of coffee will be controlled by the new agreement.
The 1975 International Cocoa Agreement is, like its predecessor, based on a dual intervention mechanism for stabilising prices within a fixed range, that is, an export quota system, subject to adjustment, to maintain cocoa bean prices within the price range and complemented for this purpose by a buffer stock with a maximum size of 250,000 tonnes of cocoa beans. The buffer stock is financed by means of a small levy on cocoa beans, and, proportionally, on other products, payable on first export from a member country or first import by a member country from a non-member country.
The Irish cocoa and chocolate industry use a significant amount of cocoa beans for the home and export trade and generally imports its requirements from producing countries in Africa. The substantial increase in cocoa bean prices over the last 3 or 4 years, especially in the past year, has been a source of concern to the Irish industry and its counterparts in other countries. Adverse weather conditions and crop disease have been major contributory factors to the shortage of cocoa supplies and consequently to high prices. Market prices for cocoa beans are still considerably above the maximum of the price range in the 1975 cocoa agreement and, as in the case of the 1972 cocoa agreement, this has resulted in a situation where certain important mechanisms of the agreement, such as the export quota and buffer stock systems, are not yet operative.
These three agreements—on tin, coffee and cocoa—are going to influence our trade in these commodities whether or not we adhere to the agreements. By becoming party to the agreements, however, we are enabled to participate in the decisions made and to influence them. In addition, the adherence of all the member states of the Community is necessary if the Community, as such, is to participate fully in the agreements. Thirdly, and also of importance, is the fact that through participation in the agreements Ireland can demonstrate its readiness to co-operate with commodity exporting developing countries within commodity agreements. This is of particular significance at the present time in view of the developing countries' preoccupation with the establishment of an Integrated Programme for Commodities. I commend the motions to the House.