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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 9 May 1978

Vol. 306 No. 4

Private Members' Business. - Civil Legal Aid: Motion.

I move:

That Dáil Éireann calls for the immediate implementation of the comprehensive scheme for civil legal aid and advice recommended by the Pringle Committee; and calls on the Minister for Justice as a matter of urgency to take the necessary steps to ensure (a) that the remedies and procedures of the courts are simplified and made more accessible, and (b) that a broad review of provision of legal services and access to legal education in Ireland is undertaken without delay.

The purpose of this motion is to seek the commitment of the Dáil to the removal with all possible haste of a glaring, deep-seated inequality in the society for which we are the legislators. That access to the protection and remedies that the law provides should be available only in proportion to the amount of money in one's pocket must strike anybody who has spared even a passing thought for social justice as a truly monstrous situation.

Law is the fundamental, ordered basis of modern society and the legal process is the acceptable and practical means by which the citizen can protect his rights and by which he can seek redress when those rights are abrogated. That it should be available and accessible to all citizens on an equal basis is surely fundamental to the whole concept of justice as we see it.

In their submission to the Pringle Committee, the Free Legal Aid Committee had this to say:

Our system of justice is an adversary system in which it is the function of courts and tribunals to dispense justice between two contending parties. Where the contending parties appear before the courts or tribunal on fundamentally unequal terms, as is frequently and inevitably the case where one party has access to professional legal services and the other has not, the whole system is undermined. This gives rise to cases of grave injustice. It also creates a situation in which the law and judicial processes are regarded as hostile or unfair by a large section of the community. This must be a matter for serious concern in a society such as ours which relies on the law as an instrument of social justice and stability.

That view has been shared for many years by many people who thought seriously about social problems in society and by many Members of this House. For my part, my concern in this area has not been governed by the change of Government and it has not been brought about by the fact that I have been given some responsibility for subjects relating to the Department of Justice. I can recall a radio interview I gave when I was first elected to this House 13 years ago and I then instanced the fact that as access to the law was in proportion to one's capacity to pay it was a massive injustice in society. That has remained my position during the years.

The timing of this motion has been dictated by the publication of the Pringle Report. It is not a motion designed to censure the Minister in any way. It simply calls on him to implement the report in full. It was obvious that the Minister would await the findings of the Pringle Committee and the same applied to anyone seeking improvements or reform in this area. The findings of the committee were eagerly awaited by many groups, notably those fighting for women's rights. Their natural impatience at some stage manifested itself in seeking an interim report to cover the areas of law with which they were specifically concerned. Now that the report has been published and we can see the extent and scope of its work we must pay tribute to all concerned.

Personally I welcome greatly the clear indication in the Pringle Report that the committee favour the implementation of a full, comprehensive legal aid and advice system. It appears to me that only reluctantly and perhaps because they were asked to do so they propose the possibility of an interim scheme of a more limited nature. I urge the Minister to proceed forthwith with the necessary steps to ensure the implementation of the full, comprehensive scheme of legal aid and advice. There may be a temptation to settle for a more limited scheme, perhaps to yield to more obvious pressures, but that should be resisted.

I shall quote from the Fianna Fáil manifesto but not for the usual reasons. I accept as genuine the statement in the manifesto which states that legal aid will be extended to civil cases where necessary but I am concerned that the manifesto goes on to say that as a first step it will be introduced in the area of family law. Family law is a very deserving area and nobody is more familiar with the special needs in this area than I am. I understand there is need for civil legal aid in areas that, for instance, deal with the ill-treatment of one spouse by the other, in maintenance and desertion cases, and in cases dealing with the custody of children because in the majority of such cases the wife and children are the victims. In many instances the wife is the partner who has no income of her own and, therefore, she is at a disadvantage. On the other hand, the husband because he is the earning partner has the advantage.

Although I am not dealing with the question of a means test just now, I wish to say that in cases brought before the courts where legal aid and advice is sought by the wife there should not be any question of taking the husband's income into account or of assessing the wife's need on the basis of her husband's income. The Women's Representative Committee made that case very strongly and I wish now to reiterate what they said.

It is accepted that family law must be covered in an early scheme for civil legal aid and advice. The success of the case brought by the Cork woman, Mrs. Airey, at Strasbourg brings further pressure on the Government to make legal aid and advice available in such cases. It is very important that the scheme should not be limited to that area only, needy though it may be, nor should it be limited to the other areas recommended in the Pringle Report or in the interim report of the Pringle Committee. It should not be limited to family law, landlord and tenant matters and consumer protection cases. Confining it to those areas would defeat the whole purpose of the scheme.

In the 1978 Annual Report of the Free Legal Aid Committee they deplored such an approach, an approach based on the limiting of the scheme to specific cases. They see that as creating yet further inequalities and they consider it discriminatory in nature and likely only to aggravate rather than alleviate the present injustice that exists. It would be better to have a limited scheme. Eligibility for aid would be restricted not only by the applicant's needs but also by the category into which the problem of the applicant fell. Indeed, perhaps only part of the applicant's problem or the child's problem would fall within the prescribed category at all. The result would be confusion, frustration and dissatisfaction.

I submit that a lawyer acting on behalf of a legally aided client would be severely impeded in his duty to give the sound professional advice he would be in duty bound to give by the dictates of this scheme. This, in my view, would defeat the whole purpose of the scheme. I suggest that nine years' experience in providing voluntarily a scheme of legal aid and advice for those without the means to pay and nine years' experience in highlighting the need for a comprehensive State scheme puts FLAC in the best possible position to advise us at this juncture. They have handled 23,000 cases of need in which successive Governments have failed to meet their responsibilities. The experience gained by the students and the solicitors involved in FLAC is of service at this point. We should heed that experience and that point of view. I want to pay a very sincere tribute to them for fulfilling such needs in our society and for the devotion and the obvious zeal they have brought to their work under very difficult circumstances.

They tell us that 43 per cent of the cases they have dealt with were family law cases. They advance reasons for this, as the greater awareness brought about by recent family legislation and the growth of the women's rights movement. That is one reason why family law cases are more numerous than others. There is also a very interesting point made by them. They maintain that it has been found that family problems are more readily identifiable and more easily received as legal problems than some of the other problems that people have in the circumstances in which they seek free legal aid and advice. I submit also the urgency of the physical need involved in some places and an urgent need for help would prompt people to seek aid and advice from whatever source is available in this area of family law.

I also submit that family problems may well be a manifestation of other problems for which there will also be a legal remedy and which may be causing friction in the homes and from which the family problems may be arising. FLAC handled 477 cases of contracts, 138 cases of hire purchase, 697 cases relating to landlord and tenant law, 452 cases of tort and 296 cases of probate over their nine years in existence. They recommend all those cases as meriting inclusion in a comprehensive scheme of legal aid and advice. They see this comprehensive scheme of legal aid as the only solution to the problems in all the areas they have covered during their nine years in existence.

Their view is very strongly reinforced by the Incorporated Law Society, who have made a very strong submission in this area for the implementation not of an interim scheme, but of a full comprehensive scheme of legal aid and advice. They make a very desirable suggestion also that the scheme, as well as being available to eligible people in the District Court, the Circuit Court, the High Court and appeals from those courts to the Supreme Court, should also be extended to quasi-judicial cases, appeals boards and so on. That is a worth-while suggestion.

The Pringle Committee in their report suggest the establishment of a legal aid board and recommend that that board have responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the scheme of free legal aid and advice, that it be comprised of a chairman and 14 members, six of whom would represent the legal profession. They suggest as part of their responsibilities that the board should engage in the dissemination of information about the law to the public in general and that they should evaluate the results of this work. They go on to say that if this evaluation were to indicate a need for any reforms in the law it would be a matter for the free legal aid board to bring this fact to the attention of the appropriate body. I regard this as a vital role for the free legal aid board.

There can be no estimate at this stage of the depth of unmet legal needs in our society. Constant research and review will have to be an essential function of a board established to administer the scheme. I would be very concerned that the board would not become bogged down in day-to-day work which could perhaps be done effectively by properly constituted legal aid centres. We have had experience of other boards, some recently established, such as the Planning Appeals Board, which already has long delays, a pile-up of work and which is coping with arrears of work. It would be fatal in the area of free legal aid if delays occured. They would constitute an injustice to the people concerned.

The report suggests that a panel system be established, that legal aid, advice and assistance be provided two ways, by a panel of lawyers in private practice who would opt for inclusion in the scheme and that that advice would be available at legal advice centres. I believe that the way to operate this scheme and to get it off the ground at an early stage would be to become involved in a panel system. It is very important that the panel system get off to a good start.

We have had the experience of the scheme for criminal law which is now in a shambles. I ask the Minister and all those concerned to ensure that the same problem will not arise with regard to civil legal aid. The panel system should be so constituted that the law centres could refer the main body of the individual cases to the solicitors operating in the area, that they would have free facilities to do this and that they could concentrate on test cases and on a more general aspect of a community service in the particular community in which they would be operated. I fear that a system like this could get bogged down in individual case work and could fail to focus attention on the need for social reform.

The report recommends the establishment of six community law centres as a start. I suggest this as a very minimum. There is undoubtedly need for a total nationwide network of law centres. I suggest that a legal aid board should give priority to the completion of this nationwide network of community law centres giving the greatest possible autonomy to each individual centre consistent with the whole principle of accountability.

FLAC point out to us that the limitation of a panel system are that it would be designed to provide in the main the financial incentive for lawyers to take the cases of poorer clients and that it would not in fact be designed to take legal services into the communities of the people who need them. They point out that solicitors traditionally have established their offices in business areas in the towns and the cities and have made their services available at business hours to facilitate their paying clientele. In the present system they are unavoidably removed geographically in terms of opening hours from the people for whom the FLAC scheme of civil legal aid and advice has been designed. In many cases they have little familiarity with many of the problems of the lower income groups. As things stand the people who man such a system, as they do, exist for the middle and upper income groups.

For the future lawyers must be encouraged to acquire the skills required to deal effectively with the cases of people of no property. These are skills in family law, housing, social welfare, employment and so on. They must also be kept in direct touch with the social services and with the personnel and the agencies who operate in the field of social services. I have heard very concerned solicitors complain of this vacuum in the social services scheme. They do not know to where they should refer their clients who may need advice from a marriage group, a welfare officer or a social worker. There should be a direct link between and accessibility to the solicitors themselves, the law and advice centres and other social services. It seems desirable that, in so far as is possible, the law centres, the social service centres and the community advice centres should be housed under one roof.

The law faculties have in the main been the preserve of the middle and upper classes up to now. This is unavoidable because of the high cost of legal education which limits it to those sections of the community who are comfortably well off. The cost of third level education, and even second level education, is often prohibitive for those for whom we are hoping to provide the scheme of civil legal aid and advice, but that possibly is a matter for another debate. Suffice it to say now that higher education grants are insufficient. Maintenance grants at second level may be necessary in certain cases, and definitely the position obtaining now under which higher education grants are not tenable at professional law schools makes law a very exclusive profession indeed. That situation must cease for the future. Law, like the other faculties such as medicine, exists for all the people and in so far as we can do it, it must be made accessible to all the people and more particularly to the section who need this protection most and who are the very cases who have been deprived up to now. Access to it must be simplified and the veil of mystery must be removed. Very many people never dream of asserting their rights in law because of fear of the law and that must cease. Steps must be taken to make the law relevant for all the people.

Coolock Law Centre in Dublin, established in 1974, is the only Irish model we have. It was established for three basic reasons: (1) to provide a full-time legal service for poorer individuals in the community, (2) to examine and organise with the local people in the area on issues arising from the case laws in the law centres where individual solutions to the problems would be either legally impossible or satisfactory only in the short term, and to adapt the services and resources of the centre accordingly, and (3) to promote the knowledge and awareness of legal rights within the community. The first community law officer was appointed in 1977, and to my knowledge the work that he has been doing since then has been of an excellent quality. He has interpreted his role as a community law officer in organising citizens' advice sessions on matters such as social welfare, something which is very relevant to the community in the area; he has brought claimants together and enabled them to challenge their own cases and to help others with their cases. He has done very important work in obtaining group support at meetings for deserted and battered wives. He has run citizens' advice courses on labour, family law and social welfare law, and he has published leaflets on all these topics.

These are the areas most relevant to the poor and deprived. Social welfare may not readily be seen as an area in which the law would be relevant, but in that regard at present appeals officers make decisions arbitrarily which are final and from which the applicant has no redress. They are based on material to which the applicant has no access and there is no question of revealing the basis on which the decision is reached. This aspect of social welfare is in the category of wrongs which could be put right by group pressure and which may be challenged legally also.

I do not apologise for quoting FLAC because they are one group of persons with experience in this area. I quote from FLAC Report 78, page 30:

The basic aims of a neighbourhood or Community Law Centre can be summarised as follows:

(1) To bring lawyers out into the communities and the neighbourhoods to be available to act on behalf of the people of that community or neighbourhood.

(2) It would be open day and evening.

(3) It would provide programmes of community education and would assist with the relevant legal skills—community development projects of self-help.

(4) By specialising in areas of law of interest to their clients, the lawyers in the Law Centre would give their clients a very good service.

It is vitally important, if the geographical and psychological barriers to equal justice are to be removed along with the financial barriers, that Law Centres are not regarded as an experiment; for example, one, two or three Law Centres run by FLAC will just not be enough. The Law Centre in Coolock run by FLAC can only cater for the people of Cooklock. There must be a sufficient number of Law Centres to serve each community, throughout the country.

They talk about community identity and they say:

A Law Centre which does not have community identity, community involvement and community management will not be perceived as a service for the individual and group every bit as independent and committed as any private lawyer, but with greater assets. Unless this is realised we cannot hope to eradicate the justified belief that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor.

That is the only experience I can refer to in this country. Regarding the experience in other countries, in so far as time permits. I will refer briefly to the experience in America. In their book Dilemmas of Social Reform, Poverty and Community Action in the United States, Peter Marris and Martin Rein speak of the legal services programme in that community, and I quote:

The Legal Services Programme is difficult to evaluate quantitatively; not all the cases are taken up to courts; not all the judgements are in money.... It does seem certain, however, that both on its own terms of making available to the poor good law and good lawyers, and on the broader terms of breaking the institutional barrier to people getting out of poverty, the programme should be a marked success. It was also the only programme to induce widespread institutional changes, both in the practice of welfare departments, and the legal profession itself.

The inauguration of hundreds of new neighbourhood legal services.... had a far-reaching effect on the practice of poor law. Many private legal defence organisations soon shifted some of their resources into the poor-law field.... The Law Students Civil Rights Research Council began to recruit hundreds of law-student volunteers to work with welfare rights groups and to perform legal research for attorneys representing recipients. Moreover, OEO created a new kind of legal personnel—non-professionals trained in special facets of the law who were able to extend the reach of the neighbourhood legal services programme. Hundreds of poor people were recruited and trained to perform various kinds of ‘lay advocacy' tasks.

University law schools, too, responded to these changes, founding research and advisory centres on legal aspects of social welfare and housing policy. ‘The ferment also affected law school curricula—new courses in poverty law were introduced in dozens of universities, and some two thousand law students registered for them in the 1965-7 academic years.'

We are ten or 12 years behind but some of these results could be achieved from the establishment of law centres here and we could then look forward to a much more egalitarian future for the State.

The Pringle Committee recommend that the scheme should cover hearings before tribunals as well as before the courts. There has been a fault in the English system in this regard so I would suggest that it is something the Minister should pay attention to in establishing the scheme here.

I should like to deal briefly with the question of eligibility for the scheme so far as finance is concerned. The report recommends that eligibility should be based on disposable income and the suggestion is that this income would range from £500 for full eligibility up to £2,000, beyond which there would not be eligibility. There is mention, too, of contributions commencing at £1 for advice and increasing to £10 for aid and that the amounts would be graduated by reference to the level of the disposal income of the client. It is very important that means tests in this area should be generous and related to real money values. It is important, too, that the funds available for the scheme should not be squandered on an elaborate means test system and that use be made of the existing criteria. Certainly, people who are medical card holders should qualify automatically under the sort of scheme I am advocating. The Incorporated Law Society recommend that such people would make no contribution at all. That submission is worthy of note.

In addition to a means test there is a question of a reasonableness test. I suppose this is to be expected in an area in which the expenditure of public funds is involved but in no way should this be a barrier to test cases, to cases taken for the purpose of challenging a practice or for establishing a precedent which would be of benefit not only to the individual concerned but to all those concerned similarly.

The committee's reference to consideration being given to cases of possible social importance is an indication that this is the way they wish the scheme to be operated. Consequently, I would ask the Minister to take note of that recommendation.

One-third of the expenditure on the British scheme has been spent on its administration. We must do our best to avoid a similar situation here. Therefore, we must set out to reform the procedures and remedies before the courts once the proposals of the committee are implemented, as I hope they will be very soon. We must endeavour to get the best value from the money spent and to ensure that the public have access to simple and fair legal remedies and that they are aware of their rights in this area.

The scheme should be comprehensive and there should be no effort to work it in conjunction with, for instance, the existing voluntary scheme. A partial State scheme working side by side with the existing voluntary scheme would produce an untenable situation in that some of the professionals working in the area would be paid for their services while others would be giving their service voluntarily, depending on the nature of the cases with which they were dealing. The voluntary organisation point out that despite providing full advice and assistance, many of their clients are faced frequently with other expenses, for instance, expenses involved in the subpoenaing of expert witnesses. In that area there is no substitute for an effective State scheme that would meet all the expenses involved in the pursuit of justice. The voluntary body have established effectively the need for a full State scheme and that call has been backed up by the Incorporated Law Society while the Pringle Report is strongly in favour of such a scheme.

There can be no question of the Minister settling for an interim scheme or for a partial scheme, neither of which would bring about the situation we require. The cost involved is surprisingly modest. It has been estimated that the cost of a partial scheme would be £1 million while it would cost £2 million for a comprehensive scheme based on the recommendations of the Pringle Report. In terms of present-day values and compared with the amount we are spending in other areas and having regard to such losses in revenue as £8.5 million this year by way of the abolition of wealth tax, the cost of a free legal aid scheme is very small. Consequently, the expense involved cannot justifiably be put forward as a factor for not introducing such a scheme. It is only a comprehensive scheme of legal aid that will lead to a greater measure of equality for the citizens. The Minister, in implementing a full scheme, has the power to bridge the gap that exists between the law as it applies to the poor and the law as it applies to the rich. There must be no question of settling for a scheme that would mean only partial justice. We must have a comprehensive scheme of legal aid and advice.

I move the following amendment:

To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and substitute the following:—

"expresses its confidence in the Minister for Justice in relation to the exercise by him of his functions in regard to legal education, legal services, including legal aid in civil cases, and the accessibility of justice in the Courts."

I should like to comment first on what seems to me to be the most general issue arising from this motion, that is, that a broad review of the provision of legal services be undertaken without delay. Then, I shall deal with the more specific issues—legal aid, simplified court procedures and legal education. I was not sure what the Deputy had in mind in seeking a broad review of the provision of legal services, whether it was a suggestion that the establishment of a commission such as the English or Scottish Royal Commissions on Legal Services is desirable. It would be interesting to hear the point developed.

In the context of provision of legal services I am conscious of the need to take a broad view, to look at legal services as a unit. It is precisely for this reason that the examination of proposals for reform and development in a particular direction takes time. There is no doubt, for example, but there is an interrelationship between the three specific issues raised by the Deputy on this motion and a very strong interrelationship between the two—legal aid and simplified court procedures.

From time to time proposals are made in relation to particular types of developments of legal services. These may be very strongly supported on the basis that their implementation would meet what is perceived to be an immediate need. However, clearly this does not free those of us who have to make decisions on them from the task of considering the particular developments in the context of legal services generally and indeed in the context of the availability of public financial resources. It may not be very popular to take the time necessary—I mean the minimum time necessary—to sift through the implications of the broader approach, but it is nonetheless the responsible approach given that the ultimate consideration is the public interest. It is for this reason I welcome the approach adopted in this motion in that it perceives legal aid and improved court procedures as being elements in the wider issues of accessibility to justice for all our citizens.

With regard to the introduction of a comprehensive scheme of civil legal aid and advice, which is the first of these specific issues raised on this motion, the position is that I am examining the recently published Report of the Committee on Civil Legal Aid and Advice and I hope to submit proposals to the Government on the matter in the near future. Quite apart from the need to set civil legal aid in the broader context, to which I have referred already, it is quite clear to anybody who has read the very substantial Report of the Pringle Committee that the introduction of civil legal aid is quite a complex matter. I shall mention some matters giving rise to this complexity in a moment but, first, I should like to draw attention to two general aspects of the Pringle Report particularly relevant to the motion before us. The first is that the committee itself clearly had some difficulty in defining what was meant by a comprehensive scheme of civil legal aid and advice. Because of this they stressed—and I quote from page 26 of the report, part I, paragraph 1.3.10:

The fact that views differ as to the objectives of a comprehensive legal aid and advice scheme emphasises the need for flexibility and pragmatism in developing it. There is no such thing as a ready-made blueprint for the ideal service. Consequently, the basic structure and the legislation bringing it into being have to be such that they will allow for the speedy implementation of any changes which experience may show to be necessary.

Quite obviously we cannot lose sight of the committee's note of caution here. The committee, having carefully examined the problem, had great difficulty in deciding exactly what services might come under a comprehensive scheme and indeed in the end appeared to have considered that its exact scope would probably remain somewhat indefinite.

Neither can we lose sight of the fact—and this brings me to the second general point—that the committee's report outlines an interim scheme as well as a comprehensive one. As the House knows, this is a limited version of the comprehensive scheme, but it is important to bear in mind that it is limited in more ways than one. The committee have limited their interim scheme, for example, by way of category of case, by way of means test and, by reference to forum, tribunals would not be covered. Any examination of the whole question of introducing a scheme must have regard to these and other possible limitations.

With regard to particular issues giving rise to complexity in relation to the introduction of civil legal aid, I shall mention just four. Firstly, there is the question of assessment of individual legal aid applications: does the applicant, be he plaintiff or defendant, have reasonable grounds for taking or defending the proceedings at public expense? This involves a detailed examination of all the facts in order to determine whether the applicant has a case in law, the likelihood of success and so on. Of necessity the assessment must be carried out prior to court proceedings and, for obvious reasons, cannot be carried out by the court which is to hear the case. This, in turn, leads to the question of setting up an independent administrative structure to make these assessments. There arises immediately the degree of independence to be allowed to this body, given that there is public expenditure involved. This raises the whole question of what I might call the mechanics of decision-making on individual legal aid applications. For example, should the board recommended by the committee decide the merits of each application for legal aid? According to the committee, at paragraph 4.16.3 of their report, in many cases there could be the question of issuing a limited legal aid certificate, and decisions as to such limitations there could raise problems. Moreover, delays could arise in individual cases in deciding what limitations to impose. It is appropriate to consider what delays would be reasonably tolerable and what, if anything, could be done in advance from a structural point of view to reduce them to a minimum.

Secondly, there are some difficult issues arising in connection with the award of costs and damages. Quite clearly costs recovered should be used to offset the cost to public funds of providing the legal aid. However, since the costs recovered would rarely cover the total outlay on legal aid, consideration has to be given to the extent to which a person in receipt of legal aid who is successful in proceedings and who is awarded damages should be expected to contribute from such damages towards the costs incurred from public funds in bringing his case to court.

Thirdly—and this is a matter of major importance—there is the whole question of a means test and the contributions to be paid by legally-aided parties. For example, at what level of income should applicants for legal aid be expected to contribute towards the service provided, what income assessment machinery is necessary and how should contributions be related to income and to the cost of the proceedings?

Fourthly, there is the question of what balance should be struck between salaried and private practitioner elements in the delivery of the service. The committee devoted a large section of their report to law centres, legal advice centres and to various other methods of providing legal services through salaried lawyers. The committee saw a number of advantages in the establishment of law centres, which they referred to at paragraph 4.6.1 of the report. It is obvious that they were impressed by this system of delivery. It is a matter for those of us who are now considering the report to assess how the salaried and non-salaried elements should be balanced. One of the considerations would be the level of fees which private practitioners would expect for legal aid work. This matter was specifically referred to by the committee at paragraph 7.4.7 of the report and they are of the opinion that it is a matter for negotiation with the profession.

The Pringle Report deals with all these issues but that does not absolve the Government from the task of making their own decisions. Indeed, some of the matters mentioned and others which have not been mentioned are matters which in the view of the committee must be left to the Government. Those of us who have to make decisions on specific proposals are invariably faced with a wider set of considerations than are those who make the proposals. The committee recognised this when they were discussing the interim scheme. Paragraph 6.1.1 of page 134 reads:

Although we were primarily charged with designing a comprehensive scheme, we felt, from an early point in our discussions, that it might not be possible to introduce such a scheme immediately.

They recognised that considerations which were not pressing on them as a committee would be relevant when it came to deciding the introduction of a scheme.

The solution of the various issues to which I have referred will not be used as an excuse for putting decisions in regard to legal aid on the long finger. I mentioned them to indicate that there are complexities which will have to be carefully considered if we are to end up with a just and workable scheme. I believe that we must heed those in other jurisdictions who have had the experience of providing and operating civil legal aid services when they advise of a need to plan carefully from the beginning. In England the desirability of introducing civil legal aid was reported on over 30 years ago. The scheme has been in operation for 27 years but it is still in the course of development. For example, it was not until 1973 that the present legal advice system, what is known as the green form scheme, was introduced. All of this suggests that it is well worth taking the necessary time to consider the Pringle Report in the detail which it deserves. In this context we should record our appreciation of the very substantial and comprehensive task performed by the committee. The committee and their chairman, Judge Pringle, all of whom gave their time freely for this work, are to be congratulated.

The call in the motion for the simplification of court procedures so that access to justice will be improved is something on which I am sure there will be general agreement. It is as well to mention that what we want is not a once-off clean-up of existing procedures. I believe that that would not be enough. New laws are passed which require new procedures, usually following consideration by the courts' rule-making body. The whole scope of court procedures must be kept under review by the various interests concerned. This is also a process which does not operate by merely waving a wand. There is an obvious close relationship between the development of legal aid advice services and reform of the law. This matter is referred to in paragraph 1.5.1 of the Pringle Report which reads:

... reform of the law and development of legal aid and advice services are related in the sense that a common aim is to provide people with greater and more effective access to justice.

The report goes on to comment on the desirability of reforming practice and procedure in the area of family law in particular and of the close relationship between such reform and the ultimate cost of a legal aid and advice service.

Law reform is a continuing process. The two main bodies operating in this area are the Law Reform Commission and the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure. The work of the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure is of particular relevance to the motion under discussion, as part of the committee's terms of reference is to inquire into the operation of the courts, to consider whether the cost of litigation could be reduced, and the convenience of the public and the efficient dispatch of civil and criminal business more effectively secured by amending the law in relation to the jurisdiction of the various courts by making changes by legislation or otherwise in practice and procedures.

Some time ago I made some new appointments to the committee to replace members who were no longer in a position to act in the role to which they were originally appointed. The committee are continuing with their valuable work and are currently examining, at my request, the jurisdiction of the Circuit and District Courts.

That is to be welcomed.

An increase in the jurisdiction limits and possibly an extension of jurisdiction in other respects would have the effect of enabling actions to be taken at a lower level in the court structure with a resultant saving in time and overall costs.

A matter on which the committee have reported and on which some work has already been done in the preparation of legislation is the introduction of a system of pre-trial procedures in the High Court which would be operated by the Master of the High Court. The principal object of pre-trial procedures is to have a thorough stocktaking beforehand relating to the issues in an action and the manner in which the evidence would be presented at a trial with a view to shortening the length of the trial, thereby facilitating a cheaper and more efficient disposal of litigation.

A matter on which the Law Reform Commission and the Courts' Committee will be advising is what is often referred to as family courts. The term "family courts" can mean different things to different people, but the general idea is clear enough. In our election manifesto we referred to the need for a new informal and less institutionalised procedure in relation to family law. This is the objective which we are pursuing and there are different ways of going about it. It is something to be achieved by a variety of interrelated measures rather than one single change. Changes of this kind are complex and take time. It is better that we should build securely than produce structures that would not stand the strain of practical day-to-day use.

With regard to court facilities, the Government accept the desirability of improving court and court office accommodation so as to meet future needs of litigants. It is expected that the new court accommodation in Ormond House will be ready for occupation in June and not, as had been hoped, in May. It will include a chamber for the hearing of High Court and family law cases. In addition, the Office of Public Works are planning a new office block on the site of the former Four Courts Hotel which will enable us to readapt accommodation for additional courtrooms. It is expected this work will yield sufficient additional courtrooms to satisfy the needs of the High and Circuit Courts in the foreseeable future. There will then be scope for improvement of the structural requirements of the judicial system, and the Government will continue to play their part in this respect.

Professional legal education is at present in a state of transition. Both professional bodies, the Society of Kings Inns and the law society, have announced courses of education designed to improve the standard of entry to the profession. I am pleased to see that both branches intend that a university law degree should become the normal mode of entry to the profession. This is in line with the thinking of all of my predecessors who strongly advocated the advisability of law teaching in the universities. It is well recognised that the universities are best equipped to provide this type of teaching.

However, the manner in which the proposed new changes are to be implemented has given rise to some public controversy. As Minister for Justice I am anxious to ensure that the public interest will be protected and it is in the public interest that there should be a well-trained legal profession. At the same time it is important to ensure that entry to the profession will not be unnecessarily restrictive.

I am aware that the plans of the law society to put a restriction on the number of students who will go to their new professional law school and the scale of fees to be charged have come in for very strong criticism. The proposed restriction on numbers in effect means that law graduates who wish to become solicitors will not be guaranteed places in the law society's law school and this uncertainty may in the future act as a disincentive to persons to take up law as a career. I understand the universities feel that these changes under-value their law degree and question the law society's methods as being capable of producing the required numbers of solicitors in the future.

My functions in relation to legal education are not precise, but I am concerned that any arrangement arrived at will have due regard for the public interest. Future changes will involve amendment of the Solicitors' Acts and it would fall to me to sponsor the necessary amending legislation. For that reason it will be necessary for me to consult with the Minister for Education and, later, other Government colleagues, to look at this whole field. The issues are extremely varied and complex and I will have to consider carefully how to proceed.

The Minister's statement can only be construed as a total rejection of the Pringle Report. While considering this motion I thought it inconceivable that the Minister would oppose it. Everything in it is recommendable and I now put it on record that I recommend it. The purpose of the Minister's amendment is to subvert the laudable purposes of the motion by a procedural ruse. The motion asks for the implementation of a comprehensive scheme of civil legal aid advice as recommended by the Pringle Committee, a simplification of procedure to make it more acceptable, and a review of the legal aid system. Is there anybody with an interest in the improvement of our society who could with reason fault a syllable of that motion? What do we find? We have the usual type of Fianna Fáil Government amendment expressing confidence in the Minister. The real effect of the amendment can only be to shelve the matters referred to in the motion.

The Coalition Government did not set up the Pringle Committee for the sake of having their report filed in Fianna Fáil cobwebs or to have their recommendations ignored. I ask the Minister what possible objection he can have to any of the proposals in the motion. Why is an amendment necessary? The only conclusion I can possibly come to is that the amendment has been put down to enable the Minister, as he and his colleagues have done in many other areas, to avoid taking positive action.

The House has been asked to express confidence in the Minister. I would say to the Minister that there is a simple way for him to earn that confidence— and I am prepared to join in a vote of confidence in him—and that is by taking the practical step of giving an unequivocal undertaking to the House that the terms of the motion will be implemented immediately.

What is the background to the situation from Fianna Fáil's point of view? This is nothing new as far as they are concerned. We were led to believe all these matters had been considered before a certain event last June, almost a year ago, when a manifesto was produced which included some high sounding statements. According to the manifesto, the Government party believed in the concept of justice and fairness, the dignity of the individual and equality before the law. It included some specific commitments.

There was a commitment for the improvement and extension of the system of free legal aid in criminal cases. Mark you, as is the case with most of the other items in the same document, we are still waiting. We got a positive commitment that legal aid would be extended to civil cases, where this is necessary, coupled with a particular reference to family law. As I say, this is not something sprung on the Minister and his colleagues overnight. This is something to which, we were led to believe, they gave careful consideration quite some time back.

What has happened in the interim? This commission of worthy men— judges, civil servants, lawyers, members of different interested organisations—gave of their time freely and unstintingly to producing an excellent comprehensive document. What has been the response by this Administration to this document?

The response has been the usual response we get to any request for change, change for the better: "There is no call for reform.""We are having the matter examined." Those are the responses to virtually every proposal. If the members of this Cabinet were facing examinations, as will many students one month hence, because of their experience in examinations, evidenced in all aspects of Government, every single Minister would get a maximum 10 per cent mark.

The need for civil legal aid has been referred to. The committee went to the trouble of canvassing opinions and views from all sections. Views are published in their report. We have the President of the High Court referring to the complexity of law and litigation resulting in inequality from the absence of representation to one party in an action where his opponent has legal advice. He goes on:

While, therefore, legal aid in civil cases has long probably been a desirable social objective it has now, in my opinion, become a necessity if the courts are to function justly and with the public appearance and putation for justice.

So says one of our most eminent judges today, the President of the High Court.

We have from the Incorporated Law Society a submission pointing out that it is essential, having regard to the number presently unable to avail of legal services, to establish such a system. From the Dean of the Faculty of Law in UCD we have:

This indicates that due to the lack of means, as well as to ignorance about the law, people are being deprived of the opportunity to enforce their legal rights.

He expressed himself as totally in favour of a system of free legal aid in civil cases.

I have here a quotation from the ITGWU strongly pressing for a civil legal aid scheme. Finally, we have from FLAC, an organisation which has done such good work on a voluntary basis in this area over a number of years:

We are acutely aware, however, of the inherent limitations and deficiencies of this voluntary service. In our opinion only a comprehensive and publicly financed programme can meet the need for free legal services in our community.

Can there be any doubt in anyone's mind as to the need for civil legal aid, as to the need for the immediate implementation of the report of the Pringle Committee called for in this motion? No doubt the Minister must accept all the arguments in favour of this suggested course of action. He will, I suppose, have to count the cost. Here, as Deputy Mrs. Desmond said, he can get a great deal of consolation because the committee went to the trouble of examining the systems in operation in many countries. They record the fact that a system of civil legal aid exists in virtually every western democracy. They examined the cost involved and at page 148 of the report they say:

The best estimate we can make is that the annual cost of a fully comprehensive scheme on the lines proposed in this report, excluding legal aid for tribunals, would be £2 million.

In the context of the huge sums now being bandied about in the Estimates, in the context of the enormous sums the Government find it necessary to borrow to run the country—we are not talking even in millions; we are talking in billions in the context of a figure of almost £850 million being borrowed this year—surely a sum of £2 million assumes its proper perspective. In the context of the sums I have mentioned the figure must be considered a trivial one. If we relate that trivial figure to the protection of basic human rights which a proper system of civil legal aid would provide, protection to a hitherto neglected segment of our society, can we hesitate? Surely we cannot.

Someone once said that the courts of law like the Ritz Hotel are open to everyone. It is abundantly clear that the weaker sections in our community are no more at home in the courts of law than they are in the Ritz Hotel.

I am not suggesting there is any obligation or duty on the Minister to provide access for everyone to the Ritz Hotel but I am suggesting that in this day and age it is a human basic right that every individual should have free access to the courts. If the Minister accepts that contention, if he sees that need, if he has any concept of social justice, how can he hesitate to implement this report?

The Minister hinted tonight at the possibility of an interim report. He quoted certain lengthy extracts from the Pringle Report. He overlooked completely what is to me the fundamental recommendation. I refer to recommendation No. 10 at page 150:

Under a comprehensive legal aid scheme legal aid should be available to eligible persons in respect of all types of civil proceedings. We do not consider that the phasing in of a legal aid scheme by reference to categories of cases is desirable, but it would be possible to do so.

Can anything be clearer than that? The clear and specific recommendation of these people who spent such time and energy compiling this report is that an interim scheme is not the answer. Apart from the many valid reasons and arguments quoted in that report against the interim scheme, I should put on record my fear that if such an interim scheme were introduced, it would become a comprehensive scheme. My feeling, as evidenced and supported by the lack of any ideas on reform on the part of the present Administration, is that if they got away with establishing a portion of a scheme that would be that, and anybody interested in seeing a comprehensive scheme would be waiting a long time for further developments. In fact, he would be waiting probably until the next election but no doubt people with a sense of social justice will not support the Administration which had rejected that report.

It appears to be the Minister's intention to ensure that this report will gather dust. All I can say is that if he fails to immediately implement the Pringle Report which clearly shows that legal aid is so necessary, he breaks another manifesto promise. This is something which perhaps in the light of his performance in other fields he thinks can be done lightly. I can only warn him that the growing sense of disillusionment about the performance of the Government in relation to the manifesto will receive a greater thrust.

The Minister has indicated in a long statement the many complexities involved. Might I remind him that not alone did this commission produce a detailed report but they actually drafted a Bill. This means that a draft Bill is already available to the Minister. For that reason I am not that impressed with the arguments of the complexities involved. They were there before the commission was set up and was the purpose for setting up the commission. The commission sorted out these complexities, resolved the difficulties and produced a clear and definite recommendation to the Minister which it appears he is not prepared to accept.

The effects of the Minister's amendment is a clear rejection of the Pringle Report. It is a political tactic to deprive the weaker sections of our community of the right to which the commission say they are entitled, as of right, immediately and without any dilution or limitation. There are no proposals I can think of that would earn such whole-hearted acceptance across the political divide as the introduction of a comprehensive Bill for legal aid. I would go so far as to say that in so doing the Minister would appear as a knight in shining armour illuminating the corridors of justice. On the other hand his rejection of this report as evidenced by this amendment or any attempt to water it down will indicate a total lack of concern on the part of the Minister and his colleagues for those sections of the community most in need.

There are other aspects of this motion to which reference has been made. It is clear that the implementation of the scheme as recommended in this report will be a first major step to ensure ready accessibility to the courts as mentioned in this motion— this would be accessibility for all. In passing I should mention that it would to some small extent overcome the imposition already placed by the Government on the individual in an attempt to gain access to the courts by their increase in the cost of issuing High Court proceedings by almost 100 per cent in the last month. That was the immediate response of the Government to the Pringle Report. This was done without consultation with anybody and without any consideration for impecunious litigants. The implementation of the report will help automatically in the question of accessibility to the courts as an immediate, urgent major step. There are some other matters the Minister should consider. I would hesitate to use the word "consider" in the context of the response to all the proposals which have been made, but I will use it on the basis that consideration should be immediate and followed by action.

Reference has been made to the increase in the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and the District Court. I would remind the Minister that I raised this point over six months ago. At that time it was as usual under examination. What is so difficult about increasing the jurisdiction of these two courts? It has been done before. I remember when the jurisdiction of the District Court was £50 and it was increased to £250 and correspondingly the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was increased to £2,000. Since it is accepted on all sides that this is a very necessary step, why is there the delay in taking this step?

Debate adjourned.
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