Deputy Keating has been given permission to raise on the adjournment the question of the sinking of the Cristos Bitas and of the Government's involvement in it.
Adjournment Debate. - Sinking of Cristos Bitas.
I have a number of questions to ask in relation to this issue. In the time that has elapsed since the difficulty first arose, particularly since the tanker was scuttled, it has become clear that there are a number of questions which have not been satisfactorily answered. A number of organisations and many individuals have expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the matter was handled and with the shroud of silence surrounding it. I am happy to provide the Minister with an opportunity of putting on the record the details of the case in question. At the close of my remarks I will have a few questions which I hope the Minister will deal with in his reply.
The dumping of a tanker of this size, and the philosophy behind it and the attitude of mind it reveals, to many people are most unsatisfactory. It borders on an act of vandalism and in the normal course of events it is not any more justifiable than wanton dumping of any other material or any vehicle in any part of the country or off the coastline. It does inevitable damage to our ecology and our environment. It affects the civic standards we all want to encourage in our children and in our adults.
Therefore, when a Government are willingly party to an act of this nature they set a very low standard of civics and civic example, unless, of course, such an act has become inevitable, and I am not at all sure that this action was. I do not think I need go into any great detail on the effects an incident of this kind has on the environment. Basically, the impact of oil on marine and equatic life is major. I am personally concerned about the effects it may have on the recreational and amenity outlets of many people in urban centres around the coastline. Other members of my party are concerned about other elements of this major issue. Therefore, I ask the Government to come clean on the whole issue by making a full comprehensive statement at this stage. Such an incident has not happened before.
The issue was raised by way of Private Notice Question by me on 26 October and in his reply the Minister indicated that he was satisfied that all necessary steps were being taken at that time. That was before the unfortunate scuttling of the ship roughly half way between the point at which it had been agreed originally to sink it and where it eventually was sunk. The Minister was quite clear it would be 500 miles from our coast and he based his complacency, if such it was, his happiness, that there would not be any environmental damage, largely on the basis that it was 500 miles from our coast. I quote him from column 1407 of the Official Report:
I cannot accept that 500 miles of our coast is on the Irish coast. I studied this matter carefully and got all the expert advice that it is possible to get.
Further on he said:
As I have explained, it will be 500 miles from the Irish coast. Even if some oil was to escape it would not affect our coast because of the distance between the dumping site and the coast.
It is a reasonably logical consequence of that that if the distance of the dumping site from our coast were diminished to any degree the Minister could accept there would be damage. I want to know if he now agrees that a reduction of almost 50 per cent in that distance definitely increases the danger of damage to our environment and ecology in that area. The effects of oil pollution can be summed up by quoting from a report on the environmental effects of oil pollution by Thomas A. Murphy:
Oil is, gallon for gallon, if thrown out, the most destructive to aquatic life of all the foreign substances now entering our coastal waters.
We must remember that this part of our coast has been the scene of a substantial amount of dumping in the past number of years. It is reasonable to conclude that if the present trend continues this part of the sea will become the dumping ground of Europe. Nuclear waste has been dumped near this place. I understand that various chemical substances have been dumped there by some of our EEC partners.
I should like to think that one of the few remaining natural assets which this country has, the environment, the quality of our waters and our general ecology, would be treasured and cherished by our Government as first guarantors of standards from this point of view. I do not agree that it would be in the public interest or that the Government have a mandate to allow any deterioration of standards in this area or that they should in any way be less than 100 per cent vigilant and assertive about protecting the environment and the ecology. I am confident when I say that I am speaking on behalf of the vast majority of our people. Since this issue first arose I have not heard one individual expressing satisfaction at the manner in which it was handled by the Government.
I will return to the Minister's answers in the Dáil on 26 October last when he expressed a degree of certainty and satisfaction, if not complacency, at the position. It immediately became clear that all was not right despite the Minister's assertion that at no point would the ship come within 80 miles of our coast and that it would be towed 500 miles away from the spot where the original discussions took place. The ship went down very soon afterwards far away from the point at which it had been agreed to sink it.
Another matter subsequently emerged as part of an alleged contingency plan. Attempts were made to represent the site in which the ship ultimately was sunk as being a better one than the first site. I was most disappointed that the Minister was not forthcoming in his original reply, that he did not see fit to refer to any such plan in regard to the second site, knowing as he must have that this was a matter of extreme national importance, being of interest, among others, to the Irish Fishermen's Organisation and other such bodies. At that time there was not a word about a contingency plan.
I am now aware that not alone was there a second site apparently acceptable to the Irish Government but that there were almost an infinite number of points considered along a line from the first point at which the Dáil was told the ship would be sunk to the point where the ship was sent down, in other words, along a line joining those two points. That was apparently acceptable to the Irish Government—any point along that line, so long as it was a certain minimum distance from the coast. Apparently an agreement was arrived at between the Irish and British Governments along those lines. Such matters are obviously technical and I have neither the time nor the detailed information to go into them. However, I have been made aware by the British Agriculture Ministry that the agreement apparently thrashed out between this Government and the British Government was a lot more flexible and afforded a lot more room for mistake and was a lot less protective of the Irish coast than the Minister told the House on 26 October. I believe that, whether by accident or design, the Minister misled the House on that day and that he owes it to us to tell us about the discussions that took place and the decisions arrived at.
With regard to the ship itself, we have been given a figure of 1,000 tons of oil-cum-sludge as being the balance of the cargo in the sunken vessel. I now ask the Minister where the figure comes from and whether this figure has been verified by his officials through their tests on board the ship before it was sunk. Is it the case that that figure was accepted by his officials from other parties who had taken tests, samples and so on? My question is whether the Minister personally can stand over the veracity of that figure. I ask this because a number of interests have put the point to me that there is considerably more oil and sludge in the boat than we have been told publicly. If the 1,000 tons figure is as genuine and accurate as the reply given concerning the site, then perhaps those interests who mentioned this to me are accurate and that the Minister is not.
At which stage did the second contingency plan emerge? Was it there, and were other sites agreed, before 26 October, or did they arise suddenly over the weekend when the ship was scuttled? If they had been there before 26 October, then the Minister gave us an incomplete answer. I should like to know also whether the sinking of the ship was brought about largely by accident, or was it deliberate? In other words, was it inevitable that the ship would have to be scuttled at that point? If it was a deliberate act, in other words, if it was part of the agreement to sink the ship at any point along the line between the sites named Alpha and Bravo, then we have very firm evidence that the Minister was misleading the House. If it was accidental, that also is extremely alarming because it means that the competency with which the whole affair was handled is seriously in question. It means that the assurance the Minister gave the House about the 18 miles within which the ship would not come might not have stood the test at all and that the towing procedures involved, which apparently left something to be desired, and certain other means by which this whole affair was conducted were handled incompetently. If that incompetence existed, I am sure it is no reflection on the Irish Naval Service and the officers and men involved on the Irish side in the actual exercise on the sea. I should be far more willing to believe—and I think the evidence is there—that any incompetence would be found much closer to home if I pointed at the far side of the House. The efforts of the men involved in the Irish interest on the sea have not been given sufficient credit and it may be timely to put that on record.
Has the Minister any idea whether the hull of the ship and the portion containing whatever oil resides there are in good condition? How long will it take to rust and what will the result be when the oil inevitably comes to the surface? Is there any monitoring of the wreck at present? What action will the Minister take if it becomes evident, as I believe it will, that oil will come to the surface? When it does, it will inevitably come to shore because the vessel has been sunk in the path of prevailing winds and ocean currents which will mean that inevitably the Irish coastline will suffer.
The essential point is that it is extremely difficult for the average Irish citizen to accept and comprehend why a Greek tanker, with a very dubious history, sailing with Ukranian oil, I understand, on business to and from the United Kingdom is now nestling off the coast of this country. It will inevitably be concluded, unless the Minister can in some way contradict it, that the Irish Government in their handling of the whole affair were extremely weak, were not able to stand up to our European neighbours and point out that we did not need the ship, that we did not accept that dumping in the sea is a good principle per se, that we had no particular interest in the ship and no reason to accept it any more than any other country. On the contrary, when we asked the Minister if he believed that other ports would accept the ship and what their attitude was, he gave the impression that he felt other ports would not accept it. If that is so, I wonder why it was felt the waters of this country were adequate and that our people were entitled to inferior standards of environment and ecology compared with our European neighbours. That is a valid and logical interpretation of the position because that is what would happen.
I am not satisfied either with the assurance the Minister gave us about his capacity to supervise this matter. I shall quote from inter-departmental environment committee report on pollution control issued just over a year ago. In paragraph 7.7.2, where the capacity of the Government to contain and handle pollution threats at the present time is dealt with, the following appears:
The existing commitments alone, not to mention the prospective increase arising from the developments referred to, are likely to prove quite beyond the monitoring and servicing capacity at present committed to relevant programmes in this country. In this situation, and as vital national interests are at stake in the marine pollution issue, it is essential to develop a more formal and logical arrangement of Departmental responsibilities.
It goes on to deal with other inadequacies of the Government's ability at that time—over a year ago—to handle existing commitments in regard to pollution. The many recommendations in that report, to the best of my knowledge, have not been implemented and it is reasonable to conclude that, if they could not cope with existing commitments a year ago, there is reason to question their capacity to handle the kind of threat which this ship brought into focus recently.
To sum up, we have an issue here which is symbolic of an attitude to our environment and to civic standards which says that it is an acceptable thing to dump. A famous Norwegian explorer once said that we cannot push our pollution off the edge of the world. I subscribe to that. We should have been far more responsible, not just the Irish Government but the British Government and all other interests involved. We should insist that no dumping of any nature takes place in or adjacent to Irish waters if any feasible alternative exists. An alternative existed in this case. If it was acceptable that a ship could be towed hundreds of miles across the sea to an allegedly safe dumping site then the ship could have been towed back to port and dismantled responsibly. Which of us would accept that a man who has finished with his old second-hand car is entitled to dump it on the roadside? We condemn people who do that. It is wrong from all viewpoints and this dumping is no more right. It is very difficult to accept that the Irish Government should have accepted this wreck any more than any other Government. If the Minister had been perhaps more forthcoming on 26 October and explained that there was a delicate situation—if it was that delicate—that there were contingency plans and that there was a possibility that the ship could have gone down much closer to the shore than in fact he said at that time it was intended to go down, this mini debate might not have been needed and some of the concern which has been expressed and is genuinely based need not have been experienced by people who were concerned in past weeks.
If at this time we are unable to cope from the point of view of making representations to other Governments on an issue such as this, if we are so weak that we must accept the flotsam and jetsam of Europe I am worried about the integrity of our stand when it comes to arguably more important issues such as the European Monetary System and various other international issues of importance to us.
The Deputy should conclude now.
There are two final matters on which I should like the Minister to comment if possible. One is that this will undoubtedly set a precedent for other dumpings and it will be far more difficult for us to reject the next overture from some semi-crippled hulk clogged with oil as it limps towards the Irish coast when the word gets around.
The Deputy's time is up. The Minister to reply.
I think I have got the message across; at least I hope I have.
: The Cristos Bitas saga began almost exactly four weeks ago when the vessel was damaged by hitting rocks off the Welsh coast on the evening of 12 October. At that time the vessel was sailing from Rotterdam to Belfast with 35,020 tons of crude oil. The ship's master at first reported an oil leak. Later he reported that the leak had stopped, that the ship was safe and that he was proceeding to his destination at Belfast. At that time he was on the high seas and there was no authority in a position to interfere with the vessel. As it transpired, the vessel was much more seriously damaged than it had appeared and she was forced to stop about 40 miles north of the original incident on course for Belfast. She was by that time a serious pollution hazard and indeed in danger of sinking.
During the following 12 days every possible effort was directed towards the elimination of the pollution hazard. That these efforts were, by and large, most successful is a credit to those involved in the operation. I should not let this opportunity pass without paying the highest tribute to all concerned, the appropriate Irish and British authorities and agencies between whom there was at all times very close and harmonious liaison, the salvors and all those others involved, who worked round the clock, often in most difficult conditions, to avert what could have been a major calamity.
I should emphasise the very active involvement of various Irish services throughout the operation, the Department of Defence, the Naval Service which had vessels constantly on the spot assisting in the operation and keeping us informed of the position, various other Irish spraying vessels, the army Air Corps, the Department of the Environment and the local authorities concerned who activated the action plan to deal with any oil that might come ashore and, of course, officers of my own Department who were in constant touch with all the operations. The activities of all these agencies were co-ordinated and directed from a control centre located in the Department of Defence.
Following the successful pumping-out operation, there remained about 1,000 tons which could not be extracted from the vessel. There was the question of what should be done with the Cristos Bitas and what remained of her oil. The vessel was badly damaged; she was still a serious hazard to the environment; there was a risk of gas explosion with consequent danger to life and threat to navigation. There were no ports within a reasonable distance which had the technical capacity to carry out the gas freeing, the cleaning and repair work necessary to make the vessel seaworthy again, if that were possible, and that I underline would be a dangerous operation in itself.
As far as the Irish and British Governments were concerned, it was essential that the Christos Bitas be disposed of as quickly as possible. It was clear that this could be done only by scutting the vessel in a selected safe location. My personal concern was that any site selected for scuttling should be so far from the Irish coast as to present minimal danger of polluting to our coastline or marine environment. Representatives of my Department together with representatives of the appropriate British authorities and the other interests concerned, and I personally, with my opposite number in the British Department of Trade, discussed a number of possible sites for the scuttling of the vessel. As a result of these discussions, a site 580 miles west of Fastnet in the north Atlantic was chosen. It was agreed that on her way to the scuttling site the vessel would at no time pass nearer than 80 miles of the Irish coast and that she would be accompanied by Irish and British naval vessels.
Although weather forecasts for the tow-out were favourable, these have limited reliability beyond about three days. It was recognised that at this time of year weather and sea conditions might give rise to an emergency situation. In the consultations which I had with the British Minister it was suggested to me that we should designate an alternative sinking site for consideration in an emergency. I was not prepared to confer responsibility in advance for any departure from our original plan and I insisted that if problems were to arise there should be a reference back to me, in which case I would base my decision on all the circumstances, including particularly the report and advice of the commander of the Irish naval vessel on the spot. Accordingly, it was agreed that if an emergency arose which made the choice of an alternative scuttling location imperative, the commanders of the naval vessels together with the salvage master would report back to the respective Governments for instructions. In order to be ready for any such contingency, an alternative scuttling site starting about 280 miles west of Fastnet was identified, and my advice was that it would be perfectly safe. I emphasise that there was no question of utilising this site except in the event of an emergency and under the conditions I had laid down. Both sites were selected taking account of the depth of water available and the prevailing winds and ocean currents, all of which together would virtually eliminate any risk of pollution of our maritime environment.
Following these discussions I issued a statement anouncing the decision to have the vessel sunk at the 580 mile site. This statement was correct in every respect and I stand over it emphatically.
But it was not complete.
Let me repeat——
It was misleading.
The Deputy was not interrupted.
——that all the expert advice available to me agreed as to the safety of either site.
The Minister is not quite sure.
The Minister has only a few minutes left.
The Deputy does not want to listen to the facts. The more distant one was chosen to make assurance doubly sure. I will go back on that in case it has not been heard. Let me repeat that all the expert advice available to me agreed as to the safety of either site and the more distant one was chosen to make assurance doubly sure. On 31 October I was informed that gale force winds 8-10 were imminent in the area which the vessel had then reached about 330 miles west of Fastnet. There was danger to the salvage crew on board the tanker and the vessel was losing buoyancy. There was also the danger of the tow-lines parting from the vessel, thus setting her adrift on the open seas, still a pollution and explosion hazard. The salvage master and the Irish and British naval commanders recommended scuttling in that position, which was within the alternative scuttling site which had been identified. I accepted their recommendation. It was essential that a controlled scuttling in a selected site be achieved. The vessel was scuttled in 16,000 feet of water.
Since the scuttling on 31 October aircraft of the Irish Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force have carried out aerial reconnaisance over a wide area round the scuttling site on six occasions. On the day following the scuttling two oil slicks were seen due north of the position in which the vessel had been sunk. I want to underline that. This sighting confirmed for me the soundness of the advice I had been given as to the direction in which any escaping oil would move.
It did not take long to escape.
The Deputy does not like the fact that it moved in exactly the line in which I had forecast——
The Minister said there would be no oil.
The Minister, please.
——on the basis of the advice that had been given to me.
The Minister said it would be clear.
Deputy Keating had 20 minutes to raise this matter and he should not interrupt the Minister. He was not interrupted.
Let me repeat that in the area where the vessel was sunk the oil proceeded due north of the position. This siting confirmed for me the soundness of the advice I had been given as to the direction in which any escaping oil would move. Since then, despite regular and intensive searches, no oil slicks have been seen and it is assumed that those identified originally have been broken up by the action of the very rough seas in the area exactly as I said in replies to supplementaries on the Private Notice Question. The advice I was given is that the chance of any oil from the wreck of the Christos Bitas reaching our shores is extremely remote. Everything that has happened has confirmed that advice and any suggestions to the contrary are highly irresponsible.
The Dáil adjourned at 5.30 p.m. until 2.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 14 November 1978.