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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 13 Dec 1978

Vol. 310 No. 8

European Monetary System: Motion.

I move:

That Dáil Éireann takes note of the White Paper The European Monetary System and supports the Government's continuing efforts to participate in the formulation of a durable and effective system in the best interests of Ireland and of the Community.

I should like to start by referring to the allegations that were made last week by the Leaders of the Opposition parties following the conclusion of the meeting of the European Council on Tuesday, 5 December. I want to assert that there was and could be no confusion about my decision on the resolution of the European Council on the setting up of the European Monetary System. At the end of the meeting, and I repeat, I told the Council I could not as of then indicate that I could recommend to the Government and the Dáil Ireland's entry to the system on the basis of the resource transfers offered but that I would give the matter further consideration in consultation with my Government with a view especially to see whether there could be a further basis on which I could make a positive response.

At a press conference shortly after the end of the Council meeting I reported to Irish and other political correspondents what I had told the Council about my decision not to recommend our entry. I told them word for word what I had indicated about half an hour previously.

On a point of order, is it in order to have the Taoiseach's speech circulated to the Press Gallery prior to circulation to Members?

There is no rule of the House on the matter. The Chair is not aware of any ruling.

It is a gross insult to Members.

Is it intended to circulate it?

I shall be saying more than is actually in my script but I shall ask my Secretary to let the script be circulated.

It has already been circulated to the press.

I sat over in those benches for years and I saw circulations to the Press Gallery and I was not given the courtesy of a copy then.

(Interruptions.)

On no occasion since I have sat here have I failed to extend the courtesy of circulating my speech to Members and this is now being done.

That is not surprising.

(Interruptions.)

Order. Would Deputies on both sides please allow the Taoiseach to continue?

Petty little minds. Deputy Kelly must get in the last word.

(Interruptions.)

There was a reference yesterday to a circus and Deputy Kelly certainly participates fully in whatever circus operates. As I was saying, before I was interrupted——

The Taoiseach was the first to complain if a speech was not circulated.

Deputy Kelly is like an old woman. He must have the last word. What is all the fuss about? Deputies have got a copy now.

Would the Taoiseach get on with his speech?

In the vain hope that the Taoiseach will give us some useful information, could I ask you——

(Interruptions.)

——Would the Chair maintain order in the House?

Would the Deputy resume his seat? He is part of the disorder. The Chair has had enough. The Taoiseach to continue, please.

I will continue and I hope there will be no more interruptions. As I was saying, I made my position clear to the Council at the end of the Council meeting and subsequently at the meeting I had with Irish and other political correspondents shortly afterwards. I told them what my attitude was and what I had said and so I suggest there was no confusion whatever as far as the net outcome of the Council discussions was concerned about Ireland's position.

Any confusion as to our attitude has not been caused by this side of the House but rather by the type of obfuscation of which the motion put down by the leader of the Labour Party here today is an example. It refers to the preparation for the Brussels meeting. I doubt if any Council were ever as adequately prepared. Between the 6 and 20 November the Tánaiste had bilateral discussions with all his colleagues from all the other member states to discuss the technical details of the EMS and, in particular, the Irish case for resource transfers. During the discussions there was general acceptance of the principle of Community action to help Ireland to participate in the system. However, there was no commitment, nor was it ever suggested there was, of the type of volume of aid which might be made available and neither was there at the Economic Finance Council, generally called the ECOFIN Council, on 20 November when I personally arranged a series of meetings with the Heads of Government most concerned with the foundation of the new system.

On 22 November I met President Giscard d'Estaing in Paris. We discussed the technical and resource transfer aspects of the system in detail for more than two hours. The French President indicated his understanding for the Irish case but gave no firm commitment on the volume or on the form of assistance which he would regard as suitable. My conclusion on the meeting, as summarised by the press at that time, is that there was certainly support, certainly understanding but no commitment.

Next I met the British Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, on 27 November and discussed the European Monetary System and other Community questions, as well as issues relating to Northern Ireland. At the conclusion of that meeting I said that it had led to a clearer understanding of our respective positions. Mr. Callaghan showed the utmost goodwill and expressed the wish that whatever happened, the result would be in our interests. Here again the conclusion of that meeting was accurately described in the press.

On 28 November I met Chancellor Schmidt of the German Federal Republic. The orally agreed statement of conclusions following that meeting was to the effect that the Chancellor had expressed his understanding of the Irish attitude and his willingness to support transfers of resources in the event of Ireland's entry to the EMS. Methods of effecting these transfers were discussed but there was no final agreement. The decisions on that issue were specifically stated to remain for the Brussels Council to be taken by the nine members of the Community. The Chancellor indicated that the German Presidency would make the fullest possible use of the time between then and the Brussels Council to formulate proposals for transfers: and they honoured that commitment to the full.

I stand over what I said after each of these meetings, both publicly and to this House. I believe what each of the leaders said to me about their understanding and positive approach to Ireland's request for resources. I believe that what they said to me they said in good faith. I want to say I was not conned, as a newspaper heading seemed to suggest, and I am certain that there was no intention whatever on the part of these leaders to con me.

After my meetings with the French President and the German Chancellor in particular, I felt that the transfers which we sought would not be in the form of grants only and at no stage did I give the impression that we could get the full amount of the transfers we asked for. I still, however, expressed my confidence and I feel it was important that I should have done so. Even from the strategic point of view if I had left one of these meetings and said that we were not likely to get support, or support even near what we were expecting, it would have been a bad mistake for me. It would have been a mistake to adopt that stance and attitude.

It is now well known that a draft resolution, prepared by the Presidency, was put before the meeting of the Council; that was on last Monday. This draft provided for transfers by way of grants as well as loans to the less prosperous countries who would join the EMS. The paragraph of that draft dealing with grants or cash transfers was in brackets indicating that there was no agreement on it. This draft emanated from a meeting which was held by high officials of the member countries in Frankfurt on Friday, 1 December, which was called by the German Presidency. That was part of the fulfilment of the undertaking given to me by the German Chancellor that he would use the time between my meeting and the meeting in Brussels last Monday to the full to explore what could be done. This draft, prepared in Frankfurt, was before the European Council on Monday last. I might add that the draft was circulated to the Heads of Government who would be meeting in Brussels on Monday, circulated during Sunday a couple of hours before I left for Brussels.

It contained, as I indicated last week, two Parts. The first Part dealt with the mechanism of the European Monetary System itself and the second part dealt with the form and amount of transfers to be made available to the less prosperous countries. Part A only was discussed on the first day and for some time—an hour or less—on the morning of the second meeting. There was no reference whatever to money on the first day, so any report of the likelihood of our being in or out, or of the size of the resources likely to be transferred at the end of the first day, any report of that nature, was purely speculative.

I want to deal briefly again with what was decided in Brussels last week. The Opposition have claimed that the Government abused the restraint they claimed they showed in recognition of the fact that the Government were in a negotiating position. The reality, of course, is that the Opposition abused the position they occupy arising from the decision of the Irish people to relieve them of the responsibility of taking any serious decisions affecting the country's welfare and future. They have constantly sought to misrepresent and to misquote the Government's statements and positions, to discover conflicts where none existed, and to accuse us of failure to provide information.

Let us take this last charge first. Immediately after the European Council in Bremen I supplied the conclusions to the Leaders of both Opposition Parties. Almost as soon as the Dáil resumed after the summer recess, we provided an opportunity for a very full debate on the Bremen conclusions. That debate spread over five days. At the opening, the Minister for Finance and I outlined the reasons for expressing our positive approach to the question of joining the European Monetary System, the expansion of trade that it would involve, the beneficial effect on the rate of inflation, on the rate of employment and investment, inter-Community investment and indeed outside investment into the Community that would be likely to follow. We pointed out also the difficulty that might arise. We pointed out the need for moderation in expectation of income increases if we were to remain in and reap full advantage of our membership of the system. We provided further opportunities for comment on the statements I made on my discussions with other Heads of State or Government and on the outcome of the European Council itself last week. Last Wednesday, as soon as the text was confirmed from Brussels, I had the resolution of the European Council on the European Monetary System and related matters placed before both Houses of the Oireachtas. I drew attention to this in my statement last Thursday. Yet, apparently, the Leader of the Fine Gael Party had to send to Brussels himself for answers to these questions, the information on which had already been included in documents laid before the Houses.

Since then we have published a White Paper which has been circulated to Deputies. The simple fact is that this House has been kept at least as well informed, and indeed I would suggest better informed, than other member countries and other Parliaments in the Community on this subject.

In his reply to my statement last Thursday, the Leader of the Fine Gael Party, in seeking to discover conflicts in what, to any reasonable person, would be fully consistent indications of the outcome of the Brussels meeting, wrapped himself up in such knots that the Leader of the Labour Party was compelled to comment adversely on his performance. He was apparently disappointed that I failed to indulge in that weakness for juggling with figures. What I did was simply to give the detailed and intricate conclusions of the Brussels meeting in reasonably simple and straight-forward terms. What people wanted to know was the general form and amount of the transfer of resources which we were offered—not detailed figuring to four decimal places.

Since then, by sending to Brussels for information that was already made available to the House in the normal way and by putting down Parliamentary Questions yesterday, to which he was given written answers yesterday, Deputy FitzGerald has, I hope, by now satisfied his curiosity. I do not intend here to follow every hare he raised last week. But I would like to add a little to the information and comment in my previous statements and in the documents that have been available.

First, I want to repeat that the resource transfer we were offered was equivalent to approximately £45 million a year, each year over five years or £225 million in total. This represents the grant equivalent of interest rate subsidies on loans. At no stage have I, or any other member of the Government, despite what Deputy FitzGerald suggested here on 30 November and what Deputy Cluskey sought to represent last Wednesday, stated or implied that the loans themselves were a transfer of resources.

I summarised the relevant sections of the European Council resolution here last Wednesday. In doing so I indicated that the details of the scheme were not included in the resolution. Since then the Leader of the Fine Gael Party has been complaining that he cannot confirm these details from his contacts in Brussels—I am sure they are many. For instance, he has apparently been told that there is no record of any discussion on a moratorium. I am afraid the Deputy will have to secure election to the job I now hold before he gets the full kind of information he has sought to get in Brussels of what transpires at meetings of the European Council.

That is a most unworthy sneer.

Let me say to the Deputy who has the propensity for interrupting at every second time, chasing every hare that might be raised, that last week not once did I interrupt his Leader while he opened up an attack on me. I did not intervene once, nor did any Member of the House except on a technical detail.

A second rate speech.

Little boys should be seen and not heard.

Do not interrupt a spokesman.

Deputy FitzGerald should control his troops.

(Interruptions.)

I was hoping Deputy Kelly would remain quiet. It will only take another few minutes, if the Deputy can contain himself.

Deputies should remember that they may want to speak themselves and if we are going to have continuous interruptions we will not have an orderly debate.

I should like to return to the meeting. As I stated earlier, I intend to give some further bit of information. I felt precluded from speaking in any detail of what transpired at the meeting of the Council last week. Those meetings are presumed to be held in private and only Heads of State or Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs are present. I believe they are expected to be held in an atmosphere of reasonable confidentiality. Since then much information has leaked out, or been made available deliberately, so I feel free now to give a further indication to the House of what transpired as far as I was concerned at that meeting.

The position is that in response to a number of detailed proposals I put forward, some of which were also raised by the Italian Prime Minister, Signor Andreotti, there were Commission suggestions put forward at the meeting that the term of the loan would be 15 years; that the loan subsidy would apply over the full period of 15 years and that the full capitalised value would be repayable to the borrower; that there would be a moratorium from three to five years on repayments of capital and that loans from the Ortoli Facility, which stand side by side with the European Investment Bank as a means of securing loans within the Community, would also attract subsidies. A number of these proposals were also accepted by the German Presidency when I visited Bonn and are reflected in the conclusions of the Council. The Leader of the Fine Gael Party may have noted the correspondence between these conclusions and the written reply to his parliamentary question yesterday, in that the cost of the interest subsidies referred to in the draft resolution represents one-fifth of the value of the loans, as it does on the basis used in deriving the figure of £45 million. These details were not specifically agreed at the European Council but it was clear from the reactions of the participants such as President Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt, as it is from the final conclusions, that there was general acceptance of them.

Deputy FitzGerald made much of what he saw as a major inconsistency between reference to the period of the moratorium as three years, three to five years or five years. As I have just explained, these details were not fully settled although the Presidency seemed to accept five years. However, the Deputy has probably been gratified to note from yesterday's written reply that, in terms of the present value of the interest rate subsidies over 15 years, the difference between moratoria of three and five years, on a loan of £100 million between three and five years, is the comparatively small sum of £0.7 million. For most of us this would not be a major issue but I can understand its significance for a Deputy who as Minister for Foreign Affairs went to the Paris Summit in 1974 with the Taoiseach and returned after settling for an additional six million units of accounts a year for three years at an average rate of £2½ million on the Regional Development Fund. The Deputy went over there with high hopes and returned gravely disappointed and he greatly disappointed the country also.

I readily concede to the Deputy that there is scope for discovering further major sums of these magnitudes in quibbles about the calculation of the £45 million. One could perhaps reduce it by reference to the availability of moratoria on commercial loans. On the other side, one could find arguments for using a lower rate of discount to bring sums of money over time to their value today. When all is said and done I think that objective observers will agree that when all the permutations are examined, the assessment I gave was a fair statement of the position.

As reported in last Saturday's Irish Press, the Deputy has noted a number of other respects in which my statement to the Dáil was allegedly incomplete or incorrect. For example, he said that I did not explain that the loans were not general loans but rather loans for general infrastructure programmes and projects to be submitted. There is, of course, as the House is aware, a difference between projects and programmes. Normally speaking the loans I have referred to, EIB loans or Ortoli Facility loans, are directed in the main to projects and programmes which are of a much wider connotation. This and other conditions are clearly spelt out in the documents I laid before the House. I might say in passing that Deputy FitzGerald was speaking then at a civil service dinner on Saturday night and while he complained that the information I gave was incomplete he did not go so far as to justify the heading contained in a newspaper the following day that I had got it wrong again. I am saying that in passing in fairness to Deputy FitzGerald; he was not responsible for that heading.

At no stage did I suggest that these were general loans. I have indicated that loans from EIB or Ortoli Facility loans are made for certain purposes and that, therefore, they could not be regarded as general loans to do whatever we liked with, as the Leader of the Labour Party apparently thought to be necessary and realistic. Indeed, it was clear to anyone who followed our case what the loans were for and, of course, this could have been established simply by perusal of the document laid before the House.

Again, Deputy FitzGerald is reported as drawing attention to the fact that the Council resolution refers to an understanding that, in relation to the funds to be provided any direct or indirect distortion of the competitive position of specific industries within member states will have to be avoided. He had earlier referred here on 30 November to the position of industries that might be vulnerable in certain circumstances. Does he suggest, having regard to the purposes for which the Community was established that it would have been sensible to seek to have the reference in question deleted from the draft conclusions? In any event the basic assumption on which he is apparently acting has no foundation. There are far too many variables involved for anyone to be able to conclude that any sector would of necessity be affected adversely by our entry into the new system. Much would, for example, depend on the way both management and workers in the industries themselves act.

I hope it is clear from what I have been saying that in Brussels we sought and obtained quite a number of modifications to the proposal for loans and that it remained open to us to take further steps to ensure that aid was provided under conditions that made it as effective as possible. We are still pursuing these questions.

I now want to refer again to Bremen and to deal with the suggestion that the Government's tactics were misconceived from the outset and throughout thereafter. This allegation was made by the Leader of the Labour Party here on 17 October, again on 30 November, and was repeated last Thursday. For example, on 30 November he said that at Bremen I gave an enthusiastic response to the whole idea of the EMS and that that was a serious mistake. On 17 October Deputy Barry of Fine Gael suggested here that the negotiating stance adopted by the Government was not very wise. He went on to try to put words in my mouth that I had never uttered and, when challenged as to the reference, could not back up his misquotation. This was also the case when Deputy Cluskey, on the same day, recklessly and irresponsibly claimed that the impression had been created within all member states of the Community that we were favouring entry into the system irrespective of what Britain did and, apparently, irrespective of what other conditions might be laid down regarding membership and irrespective of the size of the concessions that would be necessary for this country's future welfare. Last Wednesday, the Deputy admonished me because I had not aligned myself with that approach. But I want to ask the Leader of the Labour Party if he has any conception of the reaction that this kind of approach would have created amoung our other seven partners? We will make our decision not on alignments with this country or that country, as the Deputy fancies, but on arguments applicable to this country and based on what is good for this country and for the Community.

I want to say that everything that has happened has vindicated the positive but balanced approach adopted by the Government and confirmed that this was in the best interests not only of European integration—which means our long-term interest—but also in our interest in the medium—term. The fact is that our support in principle for the concept of the EMS and our indication that we would be joining if the circumstances were right, evoked—and I want to emphasise this—a correspondingly positive and sympathetic response among our partners. That is still in evidence: and that is still the basis on which we are continuing to consider the whole issue.

It was on my proposal that the European Council in Bremen agreed to commission concurrent studies of the action necessary to strengthen the economies of the less prosperous member countries in the context of EMS. All members agreed, it will be recalled, that such measures would be necessary for the success of the system. Work on the concurrent studies was entrusted to the Community's Economic Policy Committee. Our representatives there put forward our arguments in relation to transfers of resources. A Commission spokesman explicitly recognised that we had put forward a cogent case. However, it became clear at a relatively early stage that, on the crucial issues, their report would set out differing majority and minority views. It would have been too much to expect a completely objective report in such a highly political domain.

Deputy FitzGerald suggested here on 30 November that in the absence of studies such as he had helped to undertake in the run-up to EEC entry, in the first place, the Government had not been able to convey any convincing reason to our EEC partners for the proposed transfers but had been content to go with a begging bowl looking for transfers without being able to explain why we needed the money or what we proposed to do with it. My comment on this is that we apparently put forward so strong a case as to lead the German Presidency to envisage the provision of 2,000 million EUA a year in subsidised loans for five years and a significant grant transfers through what was called a new window in the regional fund or a new budget line over a similar period. On the figures that were in mind, the transfer in grant and grant equivalent to this country could have been as high as £600 million over five years. It would appear that the reasons we gave were more convincing than those used when we got the £7,500,000 that Deputy FitzGerald brought home from the regional fund some years ago.

These proposals were reflected, with technical changes and with the figures left blank, in the draft conclusions circulated by the Presidency before the Brussels meeting. That draft referred specifically to a third section of the regional fund, of which Ireland's share would have been 30 per cent. There was allocated also 50 per cent to Italy and 20 per cent to the UK. There was the alternative of opening up a special line in the budget. This would be a special grant fund in which Ireland would be able to participate.

This, then, was the response to the Government's positive attitude to the initiative taken by Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing and to the case we put forward for transfers. I have reported already specifically on my meetings with these two leaders and with Mr. Callaghan. As I indicated last Thursday, our case was, in the main, accepted, with some reservations as to the size and form of the resource transfer involved and this acceptance was reiterated many times during the Brussels meeting. Indeed, in reporting to the Bundestag on the European Council on the day after the Council Meeting, Chancellor Schmidt went out of his way, as he has done publicly on at least two further occasions since then, to express his particular understanding of our difficulties and of the reserved position I adopted at the conclusion of the Brussels meeting.

In the same vein, I received a letter on Monday last, from Prime Minister Anker Joergensen of Denmark, in which he indicated that he personally attached the very greatest importance to the participation of both Italy and Ireland in the system from the outset. He went further and expressed his firm conviction that the possible extension of the number of countries participating in the EMS must not have the effect of reducing the aid given to Italy and Ireland. On the gap between the amount of aid discussed at the European Council and our wishes, Prime Minister Joergensen expressed the opinion that the very idea of the EMS implies a common responsibility to ensure that difficulties encountered by one member country should be solved in a way which does not weaken the main purpose of monetary co-operation, the creation of stability. This, in his view, implies that participation in the EMS carries with it the right of a member country which, contrary to expectation, faces the need for further assistance, to have the problem examined afresh. I should like to avail of this opportunity publicly to express my appreciation of this message from my Danish colleague. I may say that I have also received a similar communication from Prime Minister Van Agt of the Netherlands, in which support and goodwill are given a concrete expression which I should also like gratefully to acknowledge.

With so much goodwill, one might be forgiven for asking what went wrong. The answer is fundamentally an old one: the inability to reconcile conflicting interests and approaches, heavily influenced by limitations on the domestic political capacity to agree to compromises. It proved impossible to reach an agreement that would have been satisfactory for Ireland, not because of any defects in the presentation of our case but simply because, in the clash of wider interests and varying outlooks, the scope to accommodate our needs was not then available. As I have previously indicated, we had anticipated the difficulties that could arise. We had put forward a number of proposals for ways to overcome them. I came back on this several times during discussion on resource transfers when it appeared that there was no agreement for some time on conditions envisaged in the paragraph referred to earlier. During the course of the discussion I proposed that the Council consider the possibility of using the Regional Development Fund on the special budget line to which reference was also made, to supplement the transfer that could be made available to Ireland but for the reasons I have just outlined it was not possible to get agreement on my proposals. On another occasion and perhaps in another atmosphere, some of these proposals might have provided a basis for a solution that would have met our case but, in Brussels last week, this did not prove to be possible.

Here, I want to pay a warm tribute to the goodwill and to the patience shown by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the prolonged effort on 5 December to reach agreement that would enable this country to participate in the system from the outset. As he himself has indicated publicly, he was prepared to go further than what was eventually incorporated in the resolutions of the Council. All other members of the Council also showed the greatest understanding of the Irish position, but because, as I have said, of the relationship between what might have been done for us and what would have been required by some members in consequence, a reasonable conclusion was not possible in the atmosphere of the Brussels meeting.

The resolution which I have presented to this House contains the conclusions of that meeting and many of the details of the new monetary system. We are still considering the options open to us and certainly will join in the system if we can get the conditions right. When the Council concluded in Brussels on 5 December last this certainly did not apply—and the House knows my reaction.

The purpose of this debate is to afford Members an opportunity to say what their views are on the question of adherence to the new system, which is emerging after months of negotiation among the nine members states, a system of a delicacy and complexity for which there are few parallels in modern times.

If anything is clear from what I have said it is that this debate is not an occasion for scoring points. This is a national issue, affecting our future, our position in the Community and our relations with other States individually. The final decision has not yet been made because consideration of the questions at issue is still going on: all the details are not yet known. But the essentials are before this House. The framework of the system is in the documents I have presented: the reasons for the system and for the Government's view that it could be extremely beneficial, given the right-conditions, have been explained on many occasions in this House and elsewhere; and the attitude of other countries is known. The House now has a unique opportunity of expressing views and opinions on an issue of vital importance to the future of this country and of the European Community. I hope that that opportunity will not be wasted.

I move:

To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and substitute the following:—

"deplores the inadequacy of the Government's preparation for the European Council's deliberations on the European Monetary System in Brussels on the 4th and 5th of December 1978, condemns the resulting failure at that Council meeting due to this inadequacy in the preparations to secure adequate transfers of resources as a condition of Ireland's entry, and censures the Government for the various public misrepresentations subsequent to that meeting of what Ireland had been offered by the European Council as conditions of entry into the European Monetary System."

The main approach in that amendment is to illustrate and confirm that our failure in those negotiations did not happen in Brussels; it happened long before Brussels. Before the Taoiseach put his foot into the meeting on 4 December Ireland's case had been lost because we had not adequately prepared ourselves for the type of negotiations in which we were engaged. We have listened for the last three-quarters of an hour to the Taoiseach giving this House an unprecedented, from any Head of Government——

(Cavan-Monaghan): The three wise men in the Dáil.

——speech which displayed petulance, whining and a very defensive attitude but which was totally uninformative as far as any input into this debate is concerned. We have for quite a long period, extending over weeks and months, sought from the Taoiseach and the Government certain information which would have led to a more informed debate and which, had the Government treated this House with the confidence and respect with which a Government should treat democratically elected representatives, would have been extremely helpful to the Government and might have saved them from the incompetent mishandling of this case which will have such dire consequences for the future development of this country.

When I say that the negotiations failed at the preparatory stage I would like to take up a few of the points mentioned by the Taoiseach in the course of his three-quarters-of-an-hour speech here this morning. It is quite clear from the reaction of the Taoiseach to some of the statements made that they hurt him, and they hurt him because they were true. They hurt him because they were exposing in clear terms just where the lack of preparation lay and where the Taoiseach and his negotiating team had been negligent to the point of nearly criminal negligence as far as the future of this country is concerned.

The Deputy does not, for the record, mean the term "criminal negligence" I hope?

I doubt if anybody would take it too seriously.

I would be worried because if they were to take it as seriously as people are beginning to take the oath it would be a serious reflection——

The Deputy should keep it up. He is doing very well.

I will ask the Minister a few questions during the course of this and we might even get an answer at this stage. The first serious mistake in the preparation which resulted in the failure of the Government in these negotiations happened in Bremen and it happened for two reasons. First of all, there was a very enthusiastic response by the Taoiseach and the Government to the whole concept of the EMS and there was a refusal by the Taoiseach even to give serious consideration to other possible approaches to the forming of a European Monetary System which could result in the same admittedly desirable object: an end to speculation in European currency and a stabilising of European currency. There were other ways in which that could have been achieved and some of those other ways would and could have taken into consideration the position of the weaker economies within the European Community. The Taoiseach brushed that aside and would not even consider it.

The other really serious mistake——

Would the Deputy tell us what way we should have done it?

I was always tolerant of apprentices.

I take it the Deputy is not going to tell us——

(Interruptions.)

When the Minister has nothing left he always attacks the Opposition.

Please allow the Deputy to continue without interruption.

The other serious and fatal mistake was one which the Taoiseach made and to which I referred here last week. The Taoiseach in the course of his address this morning said he visited the Heads of Government. He said that of the countries most concerned with entry into the EMS——

That is not what the Taoiseach said. Has the Deputy got a script in front of him?

The series of interruptions by the Tánaiste will not serve the purpose which he hopes, namely, to try to diminish, so far as the people are concerned, his part and his incompetence in these negotiations and the failure of these negotiations. Of the three men sitting over there possibly the one who is least to blame is the Taoiseach but the Tánaiste bears a heavy responsibility and the unfortunate man sitting beside the Tánaiste, the Minister for Economic Planning and Development, bears a heavy responsibility in this matter. If the Tánaiste persists in interrupting, and possibly, even if he does not, I will go into a little more detail about his part.

All I asked the Deputy is to quote the Taoiseach correctly.

The Taoiseach said that he visited the Heads of Government of the countries most concerned with entry into the EMS. One of the Heads of Government that the Taoiseach neglected to visit was the Italian head of Government and Italy played a vital part in the negotiations and indeed in the failure of the negotiations so far as this Government were concerned. I have had some experience of dealing at European level and at Council of Europe meetings over the four-and-a-half-years of the previous administration. Some of them are extremely complex and extremely difficult but one of the things that this country has is an excellent mission placed in Brussels who are totally prepared and equipped and able to supply Ministers who are entering into negotiations with very detailed information regarding the position which other countries are adopting, the position which they may as a second position, adopt during the course of negotiations and also very detailed information regarding what may or may not motivate a Government's position in the course of those negotiations. I do not know where the Minister for Foreign Affairs was or what he was doing in the course of this long series of meetings that the Taoiseach described to us this morning regarding preparatory work for entry into the EMS. There is one thing he certainly was not doing: he was not availing of the very expert advice that was available to him and should have been available to the Taoiseach with regard to the possible position of Italy in these negotiations.

We have heard, and it was repeated over and over again, of all the massive goodwill that there is throughout Europe for Ireland's position. We had it again this morning, that this goodwill and understanding of Ireland's position was expressed to the Taoiseach so forcibly and so sincerely by the Heads of Government of France, Germany and Denmark. All sorts of people are expressing goodwill towards us. I believe that those expressions of goodwill were genuine and sincere but they thought they were talking to a man who knew his business; they thought they were talking to a man who knew how the EEC worked; they thought they were talking to a man who would realise that those expressions of goodwill could only be translated into monetary help or assistance if the mechanism could be found within the EEC's structures to do so. That is obvious. I do not know how the Taoiseach did not seem to realise that. There was no way that they, under the rules of the EEC, could make a special case of Ireland and give a transfer of resources to Ireland and exclude other countries, who are in a similar economic state of development, from availing proportionately of that transfer of resources. That was an extremely serious mistake. It was an extremely serious lack of knowledge going into these very high-powered negotiations and it led to this country being placed in the position in which it is today. I will go into that in more detail later on. It was because of this lack of knowledge of the EEC, which was available to our mission in Brussels but which was not listened to by the Taoiseach or was not conveyed to him by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that mainly led to the dismal failure of the Government's case at the meeting on 4 and 5 December last.

Another aspect which the Taoiseach did not refer to this morning but which has been referred to repeatedly up to 4 and 5 December was the figure in regard to the transfer of resources by way of grant of £650 million over a five-year period. It is reasonable, and I have maintained this day after day over the last number of weeks, for any responsible Opposition to ask how that figure was arrived at. Surely if we are going to present a case for Ireland and put forward the difficulties that we would experience in the transitional stage of our entry into the EMS, we can only do so if we have an in-depth analysis as to what effect that entry would have on our employment, on our agricultural sector and on industries that may be weak and may go to the wall if they are not shored up during that transitional period. We were assured by the Government on page 7 of the White Paper that was published that all this would be taken into account. The White Paper refers to the member states who will participate fully in the system from its establishment and additional Community aid in the order of 200 million European units of account. The significant part is as follows:

They were also informed that this estimate—which was approximate —was arrived at after a detailed review of the programme of public investment aiding infrastructural and industrial development and the process of its implementation.

That statement is in the White Paper. This morning in the Taoiseach's address to the House he said:

There are far too many variables involved for anyone to be able to conclude that any sector would, of necessity, be adversely affected by our entry into the new system.

We have a detailed analysis of the situation, according to the White Paper, arriving at the £650 million, and this morning the Taoiseach comes into the House and informs us that there are too many variables and nobody can calculate what will be needed or what sectors will be affected, and to what ex-sector will be affected. The Taoiseach may be trying to blur the situation and trying to get out of his failure and that of his Government but there are legitimate questions which any Opposition are entitled to ask and which in those circumstances the Taoiseach has a responsibility to answer to the House and to the country. If we were to go into the EMS under the offer that has been made to us or a slight improvement on it, could the Taoiseach tell us, as a result of the detailed analysis we are told about in the White Paper, how many jobs would be put at risk in this country? In what industries would those jobs be put at risk and where would they be situated? Has there been any consultation with the trade union movement, the Confederation of Irish Industry, the FUE, the farmers' organisations? Have they been told that there will be transitional difficulties within their particular sectors and how the Government intend to overcome them?

There can only be two reasons why this information is not available to us. I am inclined to believe the first one when one reads those two contradictory statements from the Government. The first reason is that there has not been an in-depth analysis of what the repercussions of entry would be and that the Government do not know. This is further evidence of their lack of preparatory work in the negotiations resulting in their failure. The second reason is that the number of jobs and the number of industries which would be put at risk under the terms which are now offered are so great that the Government are afraid to tell the country what they would be. Those are the only two possible reasons why we are not being given this legitimate information.

Does the Taoiseach not realise that there is widespread fear and uncertainty throughout the business world, that people do not know where they are, that the Government are hopping from one foot to the other? The Government are telling one member of the press that the matter is under deep consideration, that we possibly will go in, that our options are open. One of this morning's papers says that it seems that the Government are favourably considering entry. We had the Minister for Economic Planning and Development last week telling us that the options were still open and they were still giving it very serious consideration. At the same time the Taoiseach was telling a meeting of business people that under the present circumstances we were not going in. This is a very complex, detailed and confusing issue to start with, but we have statement after statement, day after day, by members of the Government from the Taoiseach down, to add to the confusion, the uncertainty and the fear that is now prevalent regarding the gross incompetence of the Government in the EMS.

In what way is what I said different from what the Taoiseach said?

Yesterday, when it was announced unexpectedly that Italy would be joining the EMS, I asked the Taoiseach on the Order of Business if the Government had any view with regard to Italy's entry into the EMS, had it changed the situation as far as the Irish Government are concerned and had we been offered any additional inducement or transfer of resources if we joined the EMS at this stage? The Taoiseach refused to answer those questions yesterday. He refused to enter into any discussion on them or give a straight answer to them, but he assured us that all the necessary information would be made available here this morning. Where is the necessary information regarding Italy's entry and whether or not we have an additional offer, which the Taoiseach promised yesterday to the House and to the people? We have not had that information. The image of "Honest Jack" is getting a bit blurred too because of repeated breaches of faith which the Taoiseach has displayed here over the last few weeks in regard to this issue.

I deny and challenge that. I do not want to interrupt the Deputy but I cannot stand idly by and take personal insults from him.

I do not confuse personalities with politics. Your attitude here today during the course of your speech and your attitude now is one which you have brought nearly to a fine art: "Do not hit me now with the child in my arms". We are hitting you now with Ireland's future in your arms, the future of the Irish men and women whose jobs will be put at risk by your gross mishandling of this affair. We are asking legitimate questions and we are entitled to answers from you.

Deputy Cluskey is entitled to pose questions but through the Chair, please.

There are various statements in this morning's papers. We can glean some information about what the Government's attitude may be from reading the newspapers. The Press Gallery have been informed by Government spokesmen about certain attitudes the Government may or may not be adopting regarding entry into the EMS. As far as the Opposition, who were elected by the people, are concerned, we can only try to gather together whatever information we can get from the press because neither we nor the people who will be directly affected can get information from the Government in the House.

When will Ireland's decision finally be made regarding entry into the EMS? Will it be after 4 p.m. next Friday when the House rises for the Christmas Recess? Will the decision be made when the Dáil is not sitting and the Taoiseach will further be able to avoid an informed debate in the House when all the facts are known and when the Government's attitude is finally seen to be whatever it will be? If Ireland is to enter the EMS under the terms which are now offered, or under slightly improved terms, the House is entitled to be informed and is entitled to have a debate on that entry. The Taoiseach has an inescapable responsibility in the circumstances which surround this issue to ensure that, if we are going in before 1 January next, the announcement is made in the House and that the elected representatives of the people have an opportunity of discussing the matter before that decision is taken.

We are told that the Government are still in a negotiating position. What negotiating position are we in? "Negotiate" implies to me that one is in a bargaining position, that one is in a position to extract something from the other party or parties involved in discussions. Let us look at the result of the Government's mishandling of the negotiations and at the position we are in now. The first result is that we have now a two-tier Europe. We have now a situation where this country is officially in the second division as far as Europe is concerned and the first division will forge ahead. Some members of the Community have been trying to achieve that over several years and the Taoiseach helped them.

The second result of the gross mishandling of this issue by the Taoiseach and the Government is that, with the British in the position they are now in and with the desire of the other influential members of the Community to have Britain join the EMS, one of the conditions which I genuinely believe they will pursue vigorously for their entry is a complete review of the operation of the common agricultural policy. At the end of that review we will have suffered severe damage. Those are the two things which were achieved by the Government in Brussels.

There are now seven out of nine member states in the EMS. The United Kingdom and ourselves are not as yet members. Will the Taoiseach tell the House, if the Government are going in now, will this be on the terms offered in Brussels, which he said then and has repeated a few times since were unacceptable and that he could not recommend them to the Government and the House for entry into the EMS? As a political facesaver for the Government will there be some kind of cosmetic operation added to those conditions to enable the Taoiseach to grab them and join? If we stay out and after a general election in the UK they decide to join, what do we do in those circumstances? Will we stay out and go it alone? Will the Taoiseach inform us what the Government's position will be in any of those eventualities?

We have no negotiating position. The Government should acknowledge that and try to cope with the terrible situation in which they have placed us. While internal political matters influence member states, they also influence this member state and decisions and actions by this Government. I suggested before and say again now that there is a great danger this Government will enter the EMS without the adequate transfer of resources by way of grant necessary to protect industry and jobs. They will do it for the most base motives. They will do it because they have brought the country into such an economic and financial mess and because of what is happening now in the Cabinet room in trying to frame the budget. Their action will be dictated purely by party political motives and will not be in the best interests of the country.

People have voiced objections to Ireland going around Europe with a begging bowl. There may have been some justification for this during the course of the negotiations, explaining that we are a poor nation with a weak economy in the context of the EEC, but can any Irishman accept the fact that now and during the past four or five days our diplomatic corps and all our official State connections are being used in an effort to find some sort of political facesaver for the Fianna Fáil Party? We are now going around Europe with the begging bowl, not in the interests of the nation but to get a political facesaver for the dismal failure of the Government in these negotiations.

Let us look at what is on the table if the Government decide to enter now. We are being offered loans—they are nothing else. The Government may try to confuse us with talk about a £45 million subsidy. This £45 million is to subsidise interest payable on the loans. We are being offered substantial loans at 6 per cent over a 15-year period but it will be five years before we begin repayments. At the end of the five years the £45 million subsidy stops and we are then paying interest at 9 per cent. We will pay approximately £100 million per year in interest just to service the loan and that is approximately 6p in the £ for a PAYE taxpayer.

We have come a long way from the statements by the Taoiseach and the Government about the massive transfer of resources by way of grant which they sought in the initial stages. Then there were meetings with the Heads of State of France and Germany. There was some modification by the Taoiseach when he came to this House and said there would have to be a high proportion by way of grants. There are no grants on the table for our entry to the EMS but massive loans at 6 per cent. There is no transfer of resources to help us overcome the initial impact. We will have to pay handsomely for the privilege of joining. There is no doubt that the situation in which this country finds itself in relation to the EMS is the direct responsibility of the Government and is directly related to the haphazard, amateurish way in which they prepared themselves for and conducted these negotiations.

I do not believe this is the end of the EMS. There will be another announcement from the Government in the near future. If the Government decide to join and do not do so before the House rises and try to avail of the fact that the House is in recess during the Christmas period, it will be seen by the people as a further evasion of governmental responsibility by the Taoiseach and his Ministers. I do not know what the outcome of this sorry mess will be. As far as this party are concerned, we laid down the minimum conditions for our support for entry to the EMS. We did so because we are convinced that only by these conditions being met can we successfully get through the initial transition period of entry to that monetary system. Those conditions stand because people are entitled to have the few jobs they now have guaranteed to them and not thrown away by a mad grab for the money on the table as short-term relief for the financial difficulties of the Fianna Fáil Government. In the long term that action will have disastrous results on the economy and the hopes and aspirations of our people so far as employment is concerned.

A lot can be learned from the tone of a speech and the points of emphasis in it. In this speech it is quite evident that we have an exceptionally defensive speech, one full of what might be called negative point scoring, and defensive in a way which is not explicable by the understandable and legitimate embarrassment of the Government in facing this House in the debate at a time when it has not been possible to take a decision. We all understand that a debate occurring at this time, when the Government are understandably considering the position, is one which has certain limitations imposed on it, perhaps more limitations on the Government than on the Opposition although we too are inhibited in various ways.

In these circumstances there were various possible approaches open to the Taoiseach. The one he chose was such as to make me wonder if it was entirely his own. The smoke screen tactic, in the particular way used today, does not seem quiet in character. Possibly in this instance he was influenced by other advice as to how to confuse the issues here today. What he said failed to obscure the contradictions and incorrect statements made by himself and members of the Government. He tried to suggest that at no time was there any doubt about what decision they had taken in Brussels. I suppose that is substantially true.

But there seems to have been a different expression of that decision by himself and his Ministers, depending upon their degree of enthusiasm or lack of it. He made the position fairly clear that night in Brussels as regards where he stood. It was somewhat modified the following day by two of his Ministers, who sounded a more positive and optimistic note and led many journalists to believe that, contrary to what the Taoiseach had said, the Government might contemplate entering without any improvement in the terms. To be fair, the Taoiseach endeavoured to scotch that idea in briefing the press on Wednesday night and I think he has been clear and consistent in his position throughout that we will not join on the terms offered.

He had difficulties in the Government on this, if there have been divisions and other views were expressed privately—and, I am afraid, some publicly—perhaps that is inevitable on an issue of such importance and he has endeavoured to keep that under control.

Our complaints do not lie in that area so much, where divergent emphasis by different Ministers has contributed to the confusion. What he did not deny, because he could not, is that whatever clarity there may have been that night on the decision that was taken, there has been a total lack of clarity since, and there remains even in his speech today a contradiction, with regard to what we were offered. I would like to trace this through because each time we meet here I hope we have come to the end of the saga and that we will get an account of what happened consistent with what we were told previously and one that is credible.

In today's speech there is what seems to me a need for a clarification by the Taoiseach in due course of a flat contradiction between the White Paper and the Taoiseach's speech. This means we have not come to the end of this saga of confusion which started in Brussels when the Taoiseach failed to explain that the £225 million in loans was £225 million a year for five years, when he compounded that error by talking of £45 million in loans each year instead of saying “in grants”. As a result of the cumulative effect of his two errors he produced a new picture which was internally valid, because if he had been right that the total was £225 million, it would have been right that the loans per annum would be £45 million. The two figures he gave and the way he gave them were internally consistent and everybody believed them. There was no inconsistency that any journalist could check on. The double error had that effect and it is there the confusion started.

When he arrived back in Dublin he spoke about a figure of 200 million units of account as being available per annum in loans. In fact, the figure he was referring to was the figure for Ireland and Italy, which he did not mention, and was for grants not loans. This second double error further confused the position. We then had the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Economic Planning and Development telling us the next day that the Taoiseach got it wrong and the terms were very much better. The Minister for Economic Planning and Development explained about the loan terms, the interest subsidy and the effect it would have through our receiving £45 million a year in grants and he said also that there was a moratorium on which we had not yet put a value. When the Taoiseach came to the House to explain the position the following day he told us that the moratorium had a value which was included in the £45 million, contrary to what the Minister said on radio the previous day.

In the Dáil the Taoiseach managed to confuse the position further because he excluded all references to the Ortoli Facility. He misled the House—unintentionally, I accept—into thinking that the loans involved were from the European Investment Bank only. Those of us who have some familiarity with these loans know that such loans cannot extend to more than 40 per cent of the total amount of the project. I double checked that figure because I was not 100 per cent certain of it. If the Taoiseach had been correct and they were only EIB loans, then in order for us to collect £225 million in loans in a given year, we would need to borrow for infrastructural projects over £500 million. That would have been impossible in any sense, physically or economically. If you examine the capital programme you will find that, if you add all the headings which contain anything which has ever been defined by the EIB as infrastructural the total for 1978 is £285 million.

As was pointed out to me in Brussels, while some of these headings include things which could be financed by the EIB, they also contain many things which could not. We are not in a position from the breakdown to know precisely what the maximum amount of our present capital programme is which could conceivably, under the rules of EIB, be financed from it as infrastructural projects, but we know it is probably much less than £285 million.

Had the Taoiseach been correct in what he told the House and had I not checked the documents, what we were being told was that we had the right to borrow £225 million for projects but of course the Government could not conceive that they would ever get the money or the £45 million subsidy because the present infrastructural programme is not big enough and the Government could scarcely, conceivably even if there were no constraints on borrowing, in a period of a year double the total infrastructural programme. The physical constraints would make that impossible.

In fact the Taoiseach got it wrong again. His repeated statement to the House that the money was coming from the EIB was wrong; it was coming from the Ortoli Facility and the EIB. He has not yet told us what effect this has on the amount we can borrow. I can give him the information I have from Brussels on this, which is that in those circumstances you can borrow 80 per cent. I do not know why he has not told this to the House. The situation is that the information about this whole affair has to come from the Opposition benches making their own inquiries, which the Taoiseach seems to be unhappy about preferring to let us all stay in ignorance if he misleads us and preferring us not to tease out the facts and not be able to contradict him. I can see the Government pleading that, but the duty of an Opposition is to get the facts and if the Government do not produce them to extract them for themselves and publish them.

And go to Brussels and give the information in the House.

My understanding is that with the help of the Ortoli Facility we will be in a position to borrow up to 80 per cent. This means it is conceivable, on an outside chance, depending on how much under the infrastructural headings listed in our public capital programme is eligible for an EIB loan, that from a public capital programme of the same magnitude next year as this, if it were the same magnitude, we might just be able to borrow £225 million. That would only be so if every item in our list of infrastructural items qualifies—I am told that this is not the case—so that in fact we would have to have a bigger capital programme than the present one in order to have enough infrastructural investment to get, even at the 80 per cent rate about which we have not been told by the Government, the chance to borrow the sum required in order to get the £45 million subsidy, which is what the Government are after. The borrowing is irrelevant because we can borrow the money in various places at similar interest rates and whether we borrow it from Europe or elsewhere is irrelevant.

The position is that we have not borrowed very much from the EIB hitherto partly because the EIB terms are relatively unfavourable—I shall return to this because it is very relevant to the benefit of the interest subsidy. The most we have every borrowed up to last year was £52 million last year, which is barely one-fifth of the sum we are now proposing to borrow annually from this source. The reason is because the terms are fairly harsh and it has not been thought wise to borrow there. We borrowed elsewhere and without undue difficulty. Neither we nor the Government have been constrained in terms of borrowing money. The wisdom of the Government's borrowing on the scale they are borrowing is something we contest. The purpose for which they are using it— financing budget deficit—we contest also. But they have been able to borrow and can continue to borrow.

It is of no assistance to us to be told that we can borrow from the EIB. It means we are borrowing from an institution whose terms are more harsh than those we borrow most of our money from and which we have hitherto tended, therefore, to avoid. It is not of any advantage; if anything it is marginally a disadvantage. The only advantage lies in the £45 million interest subsidy, and our ability to touch that interest subsidy depends on our ability to find enough projects to submit in order to borrow £225 million from this not particularly attracjects source. To do that it is clear that it would be necessary for the Government next year, even if every infrastructural project which could qualify for the EIB were submitted and accepted, to increase our infrastructural expenditure investment very substantially. Otherwise, we will not get the £45 million which may, in fact, prove to be a chimera, something we will never actually reach.

I should like to point out that if we are going to increase our borrowing substantially next year for infrastructural projects and simultaneously adhere to what the Government have said about reducing total borrowing from 13 per cent to 10½ per cent then there will have to be very sharp cuts either in borrowing for other parts of the public capital programme or else in the very high current deficit. Otherwise, the Government would be going back on their own commitment to reduce borrowing. That commitment is one which the Government have referred to in the White Paper. Paragraph 12 of the White Paper states:

Ireland indicated that grants were the preferred form of Community aid for the reason that it was the Government's aim to reduce the borrowing requirement as a percentage of GNP, an aim supported by the EEC Commission and in accordance with Community guidelines for Ireland. Its importance would, if anything, be greater in the context of EMS membership.

The commitment to reduce borrowing from 13 to 10½ per cent which the Government have undertaken is one which will be of even greater importance to us if we join the EMS. We do not get the money unless we join, we are talking about what happens if we join and if we join we cannot get the £45 million subsidy unless we increase drastically our infrastructural investment. If we do that, the effect on the rest of our public spending would be drastic if we have to reduce total borrowing which, apparently, is more important to do in the EMS than outside it.

None of that has been explained to us by the Government in any shape or form. I am teasing it out from statements made by the Government and pointing out the logical consequences if one puts the Government statements together, where they are contradictory or where they diverge or where they are based on different assumptions. There is, in fact, no logical or coherent picture.

I object to the fact that in the last debate the House was misled into thinking that the £45 million would come in some automatic way to us. We were not told that it was a question of project loans or that there were limitations on what the loans could be for. We were not told that there are strict limitations or that within those limitations we would have to increase borrowing for infrastructure very sharply in order to get the £45 million. We were not told that the effect of this would be that there would be sharp cuts in other sections of the public capital programme or current expenditure. We are entitled to be told those things but we still have not been told them today. They are implicit in the various bits and pieces of statements in the White Paper and in the Taoiseach's speech, but it is necessary for me to spell them out because the Government are not doing their job in this respect.

So much for the contradictions which have run right through. I should now like to come to the latest contradictions—I suppose it is impossible for the Government to make any statement on this subject without contradicting themselves. I should like to contrast the Taoiseach's statement and that in the White Paper statement as to what was offered by the German Government. The White Paper stated:

An increase in the lending capacity of the European Investment Bank and the new financial instrument (Ortoli Facility) amounting to 2,000 million EUA per annum for three years by way of loans for the less prosperous member states, was suggested by the Presidency of which 20 per cent would be available to Ireland.

What did the Taoiseach say about what the Germans offered us? It does not bear any resemblance to that statement in the White Paper. The Taoiseach stated:

My comment on this——

The accusation that he had not done enough home work.

——is that we apparently put forward so strong a case as to lead the German Presidency to envisage the provision of 2,000 million EUA a year in subsidised loans for five years and a significant grant transfer through what was called a new window in the Regional Fund or a new budget line over a similar period. On the figures that were in mind, the transfer in grant and grant equivalent to this country could have been as high as £600 million over five years.

I should like to ask the Taoiseach to tell the House which is correct, the White Paper or his speech?

There is no contradiction at all. Why is the Deputy wasting time?

The White Paper says that the increase in the lending capacity of the EIB and the new financial instrument amounting to 2,000 million EUA per annum for three years by way of loans for the less prosperous member states was suggested by the Presidency——

They were proposals put before the Presidency.

Exactly. But the Taoiseach said that we apparently put forward so strong a case as to lead the German Presidency to envisage the provision of 2,000 million EUA a year in subsidised loans for five years. Which did the German Presidency offer?

They are not the same thing. The Deputy is wasting the time of the House.

I am addressing my remarks to the Chair.

Deputy Colley's leader nearly had a fit when he was interrupted some time ago.

The Tánaiste will have an opportunity of contributing later. Deputy FitzGerald, without interruption from any side.

It is very difficult for me to proceed on the basis of a White Paper which says one thing and the Taoiseach in his speech saying the opposite. The House is entitled to be told which is correct.

That statement is incorrect.

Which is correct? Did the Presidency propose 2,000 million EUA a year for three years by way of loans to less prosperous countries or——

Deputy FitzGerald should make his statements through the Chair without asking questions across the floor of the House. The Deputy can pose questions but he cannot look for replies.

Surely rhetorical questions are in order?

Deputy kelly is not in the Chair.

The Taoiseach is so embarrassed at having misled the House again. This is the sixth occasion that a Minister has made a statement on the subject and on no occasion has any of the statements concurred. On this occasion we have a further contradiction.

According to Deputy FitzGerald.

Either one or other of those statements is correct, but the Taoiseach has gone so far as to add up the grant equivalent of the interest subsidy on 2,000 million EUA for five years and to add it to the grant offer made by the German Chancellor and provide the figure of £600 million. If in fact he is correct about the five years and the White Paper is wrong it is easy enough to calculate, on the basis of the £45 million a year being the interest subsidy with a marginal effect as he pointed out with regard to the length of the moratorium, on the £225 million a year loan over five years, but if the three-year period is correct then the total amount we would be getting in grant equivalent would be £120 million. Is the White Paper correct in indicating that the figure is £120 million? That means the Taoiseach is telling us that the German Chancellor offered him £480 million in grants over and above the grant equivalent of the offer. Alternatively, if the White Paper is wrong and if the Taoiseach is right, then the grant equivalent of the sum in question so far as I can calculate—I have to do the calculations on the spot here faced with the Taoiseach's extraordinary divergence from the White Paper—the effect would be of the order of £200 million in grants in lieu of subsidy for the five years and £400 million in grants from the German Chancellor.

The Deputy's case will be comprehensively dealt with.

The Deputy produced some confusion himself.

This is a serious debate and the fact that the House has been presented with a White Paper saying one thing and the Taoiseach saying something totally different the next day is quite extraordinary. That we should have to debate on that basis is absurd. The House has a right to be given the correct information.

The Deputy confused things——

Deputy FitzGerald should be allowed to make his statement. The Minister will have an opportunity of dealing with it afterwards.

I shall do my best but I am sure the Chair appreciates the difficulty of having a serious debate if we are given in speech after speech, in debate after debate, in statement after statement, figures that contradict one another——

In the Deputy's opinion.

It is not a question of my opinion. If there is any doubt about it, I shall read out the words again and let one of the two Ministers who are so willing to interrupt when the Taoiseach is so significantly silent tell me what is the difference.

I shall explain to the Deputy and get him out of pain.

The White Paper states:

An increase in the lending capacity of the European Investment Bank and the new financial instrument (Ortoli Facility) amounting to 2,000 million EUA per annum for three years by way of loans for the less prosperous member States, was suggested by the Presidency of which 20 per cent would be available....

The Taoiseach's speech stated:

...we apparently put forward so strong a case as to lead the German Presidency to envisage the provision of 2,000 million EUA a year in subsidised loans for five years and a significant grant transfer...

Those two statements are irreconcilable and the two Ministers opposite should not make fools of themselves by pretending to reconcile them. It is obvious from the faces opposite that they are in a muddle——

The question is whether we tell the Deputy now or later.

The Chair suggests later.

The Minister is putting a remarkably unconvincing face on this. The country was misled by a factor of five on the first night, was given another figure which worked out at almost half that when the Taoiseach arrived home, was given another figure the next day by the Minister for Economic Planning and Development which said the moratorium was calculated separately and then a statement by the Taoiseach that the moratorium was included in the calculation of £45 million but with no mention of the Ortoli Facility whatever. Then, when the Ortoli Facility was finally flushed out we have been given two different versions of what we were offered by the German Chancellor in terms of five years or three years. This is no way to treat this House. It is no way to run a Government and it is no way to negotiate. The Taoiseach knows that well.

It is no wonder we are in our present difficulty. I can imagine the reactions in other countries, and we have had one indication of it, to the kind of negotiation going on. Where a Government do not know what they have got and are incapable on six successive occasions of getting it right, their ability to convince anybody else that they should be taken seriously is very limited. It is a tragedy at this time that the country is governed in this way and that our possibilities in this affair have been so disastrously handled.

The entire negotiations were misconceived from the first, as the Leader of the Labour Party had identified correctly. I find it quite inexplicable. On the record of this House there is reference to a series of visits made for previous similar negotiations in which once again the two main countries seeking assistance were Italy and Ireland in relation to the regional fund to which the Taoiseach has referred so contemptuously. In Volume 270, column 1138, of the Official Report dated 20 February 1974, in reply to a question from Deputy O'Kennedy, there is reference to a series of visits I made in relation to the regional fund. They started immediately after a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Nine in Copenhagen on 9 and 10 September 1973. Where did I go first? I went to Rome on 12, 13 and 14 September for meetings on regional policy with the Foreign Minister and Minister for Special Investments for the Mezzogiorno. Next morning I went to Luxembourg for a meeting on regional policy with the Foreign Minister. That afternoon I went to Bonn for a meeting on regional policy with the Foreign Minister and that evening I was in Brussels for a meeting on regional policy with Commissioner Thompson. From 17 September to 21 September I was in London for a meeting on regional policy with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. I then went on to The Hague for a meeting on regional policy with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Paris for a meeting on regional policy with the Foreign Minister and then to Brussels for various Council meetings. That was the order in which we approached this problem. It was perfectly obvious, and one did not need to be a brilliant diplomat to work out that if we were to come out with anything reasonable from any such negotiations we should first agree with the Italians so that we and they would not trip over ourselves, each looking for more, and giving the others the excuse of saying that neither of us should get anything.

How much did the Deputy get?

The first thing I did was to visit Italy and reach agreement with the Italians on the ratio between us, and on the fact that we would be entitled, on top of the ratio agreed, to some additional aid when the negotiations was completed. We negotiated on that basis and at no point in those negotiations did they come to grief because of Italy or Ireland. They came to grief because the proposal of the Commission was so clearly biased in favour of Britain, without any possible justification, that the French insisted they must have a share in what was obviously going to be a share-out all round. The French and British insistence on taking almost half of the fund led the German Government, understandably, to ask why should they finance their two main competitors and to cut the proposed fund from 2,400 million units of account to 1,300 million units of account so that the total amount available at the end for countries other than France and Britain was not much more than one-quarter of the sum originally proposed for them.

In all of that there was no error of negotiation on our part and there was no failure in arrangements with Italy. There were no problems with regard to that. We worked closely with the Italians and, while the scheme itself was unsuccessful for the reasons I have mentioned and the total amount was reduced, we succeeded in that negotiation and in harmony with the Italians in not tripping over each other and in not having the Italians suddenly finding that we got apparently a bigger share vis-à-vis Italy than they were led to believe. We got agreement with them. We sorted out the matter to the point where the original 4 per cent share of the fund originally offered to us was increased to 6 per cent without objection from the Italians. We increased by 50 per cent our share of the fund in negotiations before we went to the European Council to which the Taoiseach has referred. It was done in harmony with the Italians, although it involved us getting a bigger share vis-à-vis Italy and a much bigger share than envisaged originally. This happened because we first negotiated with the Italians, we brought them into our confidence and in that way we succeeded in increasing our share by 50 per cent——

50 per cent of what?

In the share originally proposed.

How much was that?

It was a 50 per cent increase of the share proposed for the original 3,400 million units of account, which was 4 per cent. We went to the Summit Meeting in Paris at a stage in the negotiating position where the fund was much smaller than we had hoped because of the interaction of France and Britain and because of German reaction to it, but we went to it at least with the starting point of a 50 per cent higher share of that reduced fund and we had sufficient agreement with our Italian friends to go to that meeting and say, "We want more on top of that." We got a small sum more on top of that, at which the Taoiseach has been poking fun. Eventually we got the equivalent of 6½ per cent as against 4 per cent offered. We got a two-thirds bigger share than we were offered——

How much did you get?

——of a fund which through no fault of our negotiations and through no disagreement with the Italians had been reduced. I now want to turn from this merited criticism, merited because the basic error was not to go to the Italians first as I had done then, and I do not understand why what was obvious to me was not obvious to the Government, or why, when they had the example of the earlier negotiations, they decided not to follow it, with the result that when it came to the point the Italian obstacle arose, one which has now put our Government in the position where they do not know whether or not to go in, and they are in a state of considerable embarrassment.

The Italian Government made a decision yesterday to go in. It is being debated in Parliament now. It will probably be defeated because the Italian Government have not got the misfortune of having a 20 seat majority. If defeated the Italian Government will be in a very powerful negotiating position at that stage to seek more. Could we arrange a small defeat here today just to help the Government because, without that, it is hard to see how this Government, because of the way they have handled this, will get anything more even if the Italians renegotiate and get more for themselves?

May I make a constructive point?

That will be a change.

What the Taoiseach dismissed as a trival achievement of topping up what we had already secured at Foreign Minister level—the 50 per cent increase in our share—has a possible significance for the negotiation the Taoiseach is engaged in. It seems clear the Taoiseach has not told us much about the attitudes of individual Governments. Up to a point I understand why. I do not think it would be helpful to assauge our curiosity at this stage as to who was responsible for what at the meeting, while negotiations are still in progress. It would be unwise for the Taoiseach and it might alienate any of the parties concerned by being critical of them. I say this in fairness to the Taoiseach, whatever may have been said otherwise—I think some things were attributed to him incorrectly—so far as I am aware he has been careful to avoid any such criticism which might damage our negotiations.

In the agreement at the Paris Summit, of which I have here a photocopy taken at the time, with a version of my own handwriting notes on it, the percentages are set out, and ours is 6 per cent. It is stated that Ireland will in addition be given another six million units of account which will come from a reduction in the shares of the other member states with the exception of Italy. In other words, there is a procedure by which a sum is taken out and then the percentages which are set out are recalculated, although Italy does not have to pay any share of that.

Have the Government considered proposing in the renegotiation that the six million units of account, small though it is, and I make no pretence that it is a large sum, could become the basis on which to build a transfer of resources which would come through the regional fund, but which would not affect the expressed percentages for member states? We know the sensitivity of the French Government in particular in relation to their 15 per cent. They had to negotiate down from a higher figure to 15 per cent, with the UK moving to 28 per cent. It was not easy for the French Government to accept that their share should be barely half that of the United Kingdom when they claimed equal needs in the matter, or almost equal needs.

That figure of 15 per cent in the form in which it is in the regional fund decision is fairly sacrosanct in French terms. The French President is in a difficult position in that he has not got the kind of majority the Taoiseach has. Sometimes majorities are good. Sometimes they are not too good. As in the case of the Italian negotiations at present, the French President's lack of majority is unfortunate from our point of view. Has the Taoiseach considered proposing that the figure of six million units of account in the regional fund should be increased very substantially, and that it should come from a reduction in the shares of other member states with the exception of Italy, a reduction which would not at any point be expressed in figures and would leave the table of percentages expressed just as they are here?

The House will note the interesting thing about this table. It was not recalculated. It would have been possible arithmetically in two minutes to add on to us the six million units of account out of the fund of 1,300 million UA, and then to re-divide that pro rata among the other seven countries apart from Ireland and Italy. It could have been done, but it was not done for a very good reason. The French Government did not want the 15 per cent figure altered. It was on the proposal of President Giscard D'Estaing that this particular solution was arrived at. There was an alternative proposal from the British Prime Minister and the German Chancellor which would have secured us a few hundred thousand extra units of account but the French proposal was eventually accepted. It was proposed in that way so that the basic percentages remained unaltered in the document.

Has the Taoiseach considered what seems to me to be a way of approaching this problem, taking due account of French sensitivity, a proposal that the regional fund could be used to help us by increasing by a very substantial amount the six million units of account, while leaving unchanged the table of percentages, as the French President ensured they were left unchanged when this document was published and prepared in December 1974? I am asking the Taoiseach a rhetorical question. I am not seeking information about the negotiations which it would be inappropriate to give. But I suggest that this may be a fruitful line to follow up, for if the sensitivity we are faced with is that of the French President with regard to the regional fund, there is a mechanism which he himself chose in order to help us before, and which he himself could use in order to help us again, were he so minded to do.

I hope the Government have not overlooked this in the negotiations. I hope, though without much confidence, that in the past couple of days this matter has been under discussion. I would hope that it might provide a solution to the technical problem of achieving a transfer to us, through an existing Community mechanism, in a way which does not tread on the political toes of any of the member states. So much for that. I want to move from that suggestion, which I hope is constructive. I got nowhere in trying to find out whether the loan proposal was for three years or five years, and whether the German Chancellor offered us £400 million or £480 million in grants, which seem to be the figures which derive from the alternative interpretation. We have been told by two Ministers that it will all be made clear to us at the end, and that by some magic trick, these two opposite or different formulae will be reconciled, and we will then know how much the German Chancellor agreed to offer in grants. I am glad it will come out at some stage. I am sorry we cannot hear it now. Perhaps the next Fianna Fáil speaker will vouchsafe to us this revelation so that the rest of the debate can be carried on with more clarity than we have at present.

I should like to ask why the interest rate is 9 per cent. I understand other Governments are raising loans in Europe at interest rates of 6½ per cent to 7 per cent. Is there not an Austrian loan at present in that range? It is the case that we have not borrowed much from the European Investment Bank because the interest rates are too high. How much value has an interest subsidy if it is an interest subsidy on an interest rate which is much higher than the prevailing rate? Would we be much worse off if we borrowed at 6½ per cent or 7 per cent like the Austrian Government, with no interest subsidy, than if we borrowed at 9 per cent from the EIB with a 3 per cent interest subsidy? Is this £45 million completely phoney? Would we get the benefit of it had we never bothered with the European Investment Bank and simply borrowed this much money in the years ahead from other sources, without being tied down as we are by this, to use the money only for infrastructural purposes, and unable to use the money for any purpose connected with assistance to industry which is what the money is needed for above all.

In what currency would this Deputy suggest we should borrow at 7 per cent?

Once we are inside the EMS——

Ah yes, inside the EMS.

We are talking about what kind of a loan has been negotiated by us on the assumption that we join. I am talking about an alternative loan if we join. We are both talking about what we will do if we join. If we do not join there will not be any loan anyway so the "ah yes" from the Tánaiste is meaningless.

We will see.

It is better not to interrupt if that is the level of interruption.

If that is the best the Deputy can do, we will see.

With respect, that is another piece of confusion. We will deal with it later.

Everything will be dealt with later. We know that since last Tuesday night and, the later it gets, the more the confusion.

(Cavan-Monaghan): The Minister is an authority on confusion.

The best authority in the world is over there beside the Deputy.

If we could borrow on the open market, like the Austrian Government, at 6½ per cent to 7 per cent, if that is correct—I put that to the Government; perhaps I have got the figures too low but they are the figures given to me—where is the great advantage in this? We can only get this £45 million if we spend far more on infrastructure at a time when we are committed to reducing our borrowing. To get it, we have to do that extra spending and the interest rate is much higher than the prevailing interest rate we could get elsewhere if we joined the EMS. What is the purpose of the exercise? Is it all just dust thrown in our eyes to give the impression that we are getting some great benefit, and to persuade us to join? Is there so much dust in our eyes that it is misleading the Government into thinking they have got something and it would be worth while joining. We should be told the answer to that. We should be told the interest rates at which Governments inside the EMS are now borrowing. That is the comparison we should make rather than with the interest rates at which we are borrowing now outside, and how different are they from the 9 per cent rate which in the context, seems extraordinarily high and explains why we hitherto have not borrowed much from the European Investment Bank.

In his speech the Taoiseach had a curious reference. The Taoiseach was addressing me when he said:

Does he suggest, having regard to the purposes for which the Community was established, that it would have been sensible to seek to have the reference in question deleted from the draft Conclusions?

It would have been sensible. The Taoiseach then went on:

In any event the basic assumption on which he is apparently acting has no foundation. There are far too many variables involved for anyone to be able to conclude that any sector would of necessity be adversely affected by our entry into the new system.

That sentence would have been more sensible if the Taoiseach had said that there are far too many variables involved for anyone to be able to conclude that any sector would not be adversely affected by our entry into the new system. The argument that one cannot be sure that a particular sector will be affected and therefore we must not get any money to help industry because it is only a possibility that we might be affected, is one of the weakest arguments ever put to this House in regard to an external negotiation. We all know perfectly well that if we join the EMS and if at a later stage we find ourselves with a different parity to sterling, we will be in a weakened financial position and many of our industries will be affected. We know that if we join and remain at parity with sterling, within this 6 per cent float range, the value of our currency vis-à-vis currencies outside the EMS and sterling will tend to rise. We cannot be sure of how much and we cannot be sure that we will indefinitely be able to sustain that because of the state of our economy today. We know that our industries will face difficulties, and they know it, and it is a poor argument for the Taoiseach to suggest that there are so many variables that one cannot be sure that some industry might be adversely affected and therefore we should not dream of looking for money for industry in those circumstances. It is probable that some of our industries will be adversely affected, from the beginning, in terms of selling to the countries outside the EMS and sterling. It is also probable that if we are in the EMS and sterling does not maintain its value outside, or joins and subsequently does not maintain its value we would be faced with competition, because of the different value of our currencies. It is precisely because of those dangers that we are looking for aid. If in joining the EMS nothing will happen and the relationship of our currency to all other currencies remains unchanged, on what grounds is the Taoiseach looking for aid? The Taoiseach put forward in his speech the reasons why we are looking for aid, and they were that precisely because joining the system will affect the relationship of our currency with others there will be adverse effects on vulnerable industries. For the Taoiseach to suggest the contrary is not wise or honest in any negotiation. The Taoiseach in the White Paper tells us that he sought aid for industry. Why did the Taoiseach seek aid for industry if, as he says in his speech, it is not necessary? Having said that he sought aid for infra-structure and for industry it is pathetic of the Taoiseach to explain his failure to get aid for industry on the ground that there is no evidence that industry will need aid. That certainly weakens the Taoiseach's case in this respect. Page 7 of the White Paper says:

Because of the need to expand capacity and to improve the rate of growth of productivity, the Government specifically requested that Community aid should aim to support additional investment in infra-structure and industry.

The Taoiseach's speech suggests that I am some kind of lunatic for suggesting that we need this.

Would the Deputy read that again?

Yes.

Because of the need to expand capacity and to improve the rate of growth of productivity, the Government specifically requested that Community aid should aim to support additional investment in infra-structure and industry.

"Support additional investment."

"Industry."

It means that the Government can fix the roads outside the factories that close.

Deputy FitzGerald can make his own speech.

The Taoiseach told us in the White Paper that they are looking for aid for industry and then told us that I am some kind of a lunatic for suggesting that we would want aid for industry. The Taoiseach says referring to me:

Does he suggest, having regard to the purposes for which the Community was established, that it would have been sensible to seek to have the reference in question deleted from the draft Conclusions?

What was the Taoiseach doing? The Taoiseach knows perfectly well that we need aid for industry and that that aid would be struck down as distortion of trade. The problem is that our industries will face more acute competition. They have already faced acute competition in the Anglo-Irish free trade area, they faced it because of our EEC membership, and they faced it in a world recession. The cumulative effect of these three occurrences involved very considerable losses for industry, some foreseen by the Government and the Opposition and some not foreseen. It is the industries which have already suffered which need aid. They need aid to enable them to meet the sharper competition that would be involved if our currency has a higher value vis-à-vis the outside world or in the event of sterling joining and eventually moving out of line to a lower level than the ECU vis-à-vis Britain as well. The White Paper says specifically that we sought aid for infrastructure and industry. We got additional money for investment for infrastructure, with a specific clause that it should not be used to help industry to face competition because that would involve distortion of competition. The precise aid which is necessary for industry is excluded, and the Taoiseach asks me if I am so foolish to suggest that he should try to have it included.

I am so foolish as to suggest it and that it should not have been negotiated on the basis of EIB with its present terms of reference without first of all getting a clear agreement that the money could be used to make industry more competitive. We thought that was what the negotiation was about. When the Taoiseach says that there are far too many variables involved for anyone to be able to conclude that any sector would of necessity be adversely affected by our entry into the new system, how does the Taoiseach think that will be received by Irish industry? I am sure there are no great cheers from the CII at this. The Taoiseach looked for aid for industry, but now that he has not got it we are told that industry did not really need it at all. That sort of argument is not serious or sensible, and it is certainly foolish in the middle of on-going negotiations.

What was submitted to our Community partners as a reasonable argument for the aid we need? Paragraph 10 of the White Paper says that we informed our Community partners that

it was estimated that, on the assumption that all member States would participate fully in the system from its establishment, additional Community aid of the order of 200 million EUA—or £130 million—a year, over a five year period, would be required.

We were also informed that this estimate, which was approximate, was arrived at after a detailed review of the programme of the public investment aiding infrastructure and industrial development and the process of its implementation. We were not told that they were given the programme. We were told they were informed that the estimate was arrived at after a detailed review of the programme. Were they given the programme or just told that we had looked at our own programme? If I were a German official I should be singularly unconvinced if I had been told that the Irish Government want £130 million, that they have been looking at their own domestic programme, that while they have no intention of showing what is in it they need £130 million for the purpose of financing it. As a method of negotiating it is pretty puerile. If the programme was submitted it is curious that the White Paper does not say so.

What is this programme? It is a programme of public investment aiding infrastructure and industrial development for a five year period. Where is this programme? Is it contained in the other White Paper which we have not seen? We know what the public capital programme is year by year. We have had a Green Paper, various documents, even a manifesto, but I am not aware of the publication of a programme of public investment aiding infrastructure and industrial development over a five year period. If it exists, why is it secret? Why are the Government not telling us or any other Government what is in it? This alleged document has been used as a basis for arriving at a figure. There is no suggestion that the £130 million is based on anything. It was not said that the programme of investment for aiding infrastructure and industrial development, which over the period is of the order of magnitude of £X million, will require to be increased by so much, and for this we need aid. If that was said, we have not been told. It would appear that the programme was not submitted. Was it that the programme was non-existent or was it scratched together on the back of an envelope and was that not the kind of thing that would impress foreign governments? As a method of negotiation, what is described here explains why we got so little.

I should like to point out that the White Paper is singularly deficient in any attempt to suggest what the effect of membership might be on our economy. It has not much to say about this subject. Fortunately, the Minister for Economic Planning and Development is, as usual, helpful. As we read in Magill magazine, to which one has to go as a source of information about this Government, the Minister explains:

If both Britain and Ireland were to go into the EMS then without offsetting action it would be expected that the growth rate would be lower and therefore increases in employment would be lower. The borrowing rate would be higher but the inflation rate would be lower because the EMS would have a deflationary impact.

That is a very succinct explanation.

If Britain stays out and we go in, then all these factors would be exacerbated: the growth rate would be even lower, employment lower, the borrowing rate even higher and inflation lower at least within a few years of entry. Ireland could also encounter balance of payments problems, possibly leading to a run on the Irish punt—perhaps even forcing us out of the EMS.

I should add that it says, "O'Donoghue, however, refused to comment on any issues relating to possible devaluation." I should say that lest what I have read out would suggest the contrary.

That is the Minister's assessment of the effects of going in without offsetting action. It is a pretty grim picture except in so far as the ultimate effect will be favourable so far as inflation is concerned. What does "offsetting action" mean? It is not clear from the context as to what it means. My first reading of it is that it could mean the £45 million or whatever we get from the Community. Does the Minister seriously suggest that £45 million in transfers per annum for five years would have the desired effect?

It is offsetting action by outsiders.

I am probing this. It is either outsiders or insiders. Would the Minister like to explain it?

Deputy FitzGerald in possession.

It does not seem that the sum of £45 million would be likely to have sufficient effect to do all the things that are necessary to deal with an exacerbated fall in the growth rate, an exacerbated reduction in employment and an exacerbated increase in the borrowing rate. When one reads the article further the impression one gets is that he is talking of action that we might have to take. The article says that he avoids the question of devaluation. He seems to be talking about action on our part. Is it the action he is reported as referring to yesterday—statutory wage control? Is that the offsetting action needed if we join, having failed to get adequate terms in the negotiations? Is that what the Dáil is debating today?

I shall be dealing with the matter at Question Time today.

It is a most curious debate in which we are presented with speeches and documents that are self-contradictory on almost every point, and every issue that is raised which is relevant we are told will be dealt with after the debate.

It will not be dealt with because my question was ruled out of order as being anticipatory.

One Deputy at a time. Deputy FitzGerald is in possession.

Deputy Kelly has made an important point. If this question is ruled out of order as being anticipatory it will not be answered today.

We cannot anticipate questions at this stage.

(Interruptions.)

I can quite see the difficulty. One cannot anticipate a question which is ruled out of order as being anticipatory. It is a very uninformative way to run a Parliament if neither during a debate nor at Question Time can a question of that kind be answered. If we are debating a Government failure in negotiation of such a magnitude that offsetting action, in the words of the Minister, would be needed on a scale that requires statutory wage control, then we should have been told this at the beginning. The Taoiseach has been remiss is not dealing with this matter in his speech.

I did not say that.

I am not in a position to refer to the exact words used. I merely heard a report of the Minister's speech.

It creates the impression that I might have implied that.

Do not tell me that the Minister is suffering from being misquoted again.

As far as the Chair is concerned, we have not yet reached Question Time and we cannot have questions and answers across the House.

At the beginning of this debate we should have been given some information on the likely effect of membership. Some attempt should have been made to quantify what the offsetting effect would be of the aids that we have got and what other offsetting action may be needed. That clarification is all the more necessary in view of the Minister for Economic Planning and Development's tendency to be misquoted every day, which has raised what may be a hare of statutory wage control. If it is a hare, it is a hare which is better stopped before it starts running.

We were not contemplating it.

The impression I received as a listener was that the Minister had said that. I would be very happy if the Minister can clarify that he was, once again, totally misquoted, and do that more convincingly than he has done on previous occasions when the alleged misquotation whether of himself or the Taoiseach was subsequently documented by the people concerned, in the case of the Taoiseach——

I think the phrase I used was that the Government were not contemplating statutory wage controls but that of course they could not rule out the possibility at some future date.

(Interruptions.)

That should dispose of that matter, but I would ask Deputy FitzGerald to come back to the motion instead of asking questions across the floor of the House.

(Cavan-Monaghan): But we are entitled to ask questions.

The Deputy in possession is perfectly entitled to pose questions but he is not entitled to ask them across the floor of the House and expect answers to them.

I do not really expect answers.

The Deputy will not be disappointed.

I think it would be very unwise for the Minister at this juncture, just in these few days, to talk about the possible future need—though not present, he says—for statutory wage control. To introduce that hare into the debate as a possible future requirement at a time when we are debating EMS membership has not done the Government any service. It would be better if that matter had not been raised at this time, and I am speaking there in national terms, not party terms.

We should have been given some attempt to assess the adverse affects of membership and some attempt to assess the benefits of the aid that is being offered to us or, indeed, the benefit that would come from the aid we sought. We should be told in the White Paper also what action the Government propose to take in regard to the economy in the event of membership. All that we now have, and it is a rather unfortunate outcome of the whole thing, is that the psychological atmosphere has been created in this country in which there is a widespread belief that the Government are now thinking of entering, despite the very clear statement of the Taoiseach that he would not recommend these terms to the Government, without any further concession, because of pressure from some Ministers with regard to the balancing of the budget, the easing of budgetary constraints so that——

Is there any evidence for that statement, an assumption without foundation?

(Cavan-Monaghan): You are meeting day and night about it.

I hope it is not true, but it is unfortunate that this matter of membership of the EMS should have been discussed at a quite different level and because of the mishandling of it this belief is now persistent throughout the country——

This totally unfounded belief is being fostered by the Deputy deliberately.

I am not fostering it at all. It is most unfortunate that it exists, and I am suggesting that it is important that the Government should not be fostering this belief, should not allow it to be fostered, because apart from anything else, it is obscuring the issues in regard to the EMS.

We are not fostering it.

The effect of the way it has been handled, of the divergent approaches of Ministers and Taoiseach, of the six contradictory statements so far made inside and outside this House, the overall confusion in regard to it and the newspaper reports being fostered by the Government now, that perhaps we shall join after all despite the Taoiseach—"Never mind the Taoiseach"—those reports are having the effect of leading people to believe that something is going on behind the scenes. Why are there reports in the papers day by day? Where do they emanate from, these reports that we are going to join without any further aid, despite the Taoiseach saying firmly that we do not intend to?

They are not made by me or by anybody in my Government.

I accept the Taoiseach's statement on the part of himself. I moreover accept that the Taoiseach went to some trouble to scotch these rumours when they emanated after statements made on radio by two of his Ministers last Wednesday. I believe he went to the Press to try to put the matter straight. I am glad he did, but it has not stayed straight and there has been a recurrence of these rumours that we are going to join without any additional aid. That is fostering the idea that the only thought behind this Government's heads is the thought of having an easy budget——

Where are these rumours coming from?

I should like to know. Who is feeding the papers?

So would we. The Deputy is the one who is repeating them.

Certainly not me.

(Interruptions.)

I challenged anybody to debate——

Deputy FitzGerald is in possession. I shall call the Ministers afterwards. Deputy FitzGerald without interruption.

It is very hard to accept that what is now appearing on all our papers has suddenly grown totally spontaneously. We know that occasionally a story may appear in one paper which is ill-founded and speculative perhaps as a result of a journalist chancing his arm but more often because something that has been said has been misunderstood. So, when we see reports appearing in all the papers in relation to a matter of Government policy, in my experience, in government and in opposition it is usual to find that report emanated from some Government source; otherwise, one does not get this spread across the papers. If I am wrong on this occasion I am glad. I am unhappy with the impression that is being created at this stage. Apart from anything else, it is greatly weakening the Government's bargaining position; it is no help to the Taoiseach in this situation when the possibility remains of securing better terms and when I have suggested a mechanism by which they might be secured, to have rumours being fostered that we are going to join anyway, in other words telling the French President and the German Chancellor not to waste money on the Irish, that they will join when the Italians do, without any further assistance. It is very unfortunate that these reports should occur in this form, and if they derive from divisions in the Government made manifest on radio last Wednesday, it is not to the credit of this country.

All we are talking about derives basically from our present economic situation. Towards the end of 1976, we were at the end of a period when the value of sterling had fallen by 35 per cent and when it showed no signs of stopping, and there was no indication of any intervention to halt it and when we had imported in 18 months in respect of half of our total consumption 35 per cent inflation—in other words, we would have had 17½ per cent inflation at home deriving solely from the decline in the value of sterling, discounting price increases of goods in the sterling area or elsewhere and wage increases at home. Just from the one single source, the fall in the value of sterling had increased inflation by 17½ per cent in 18 months at a time when we were desperately trying to bring down inflation—at that stage we as a Government had to consider seriously whether we could continue to maintain our relationship with sterling if this was going to go on. First, we took certain precautions in order to be technically able to make a change should it be necessary. We also considered what budgetary action would be necessary to put the country in a condition where it could face this. As it happened, an intervention by the German Government saved sterling before the end of 1976. Had we been an irresponsible Government we would then have decided that the danger had been removed, and hopefully would not recur in the near future and as we had an election coming up, that we should go out and spend the necessary money to purchase the votes of as many people as possible and return to power. Then we could tidy up everything afterwards and cope with the problems of breaking with sterling without any aid from anybody.

We decided not to do that. We took a decision that in the circumstances it was not certain that sterling would hold—it has held much better than we expected; our fears in this respect proved unfounded. But we took so seriously the future national interest that, because we feared that sterling might fall again and that we might have to sever that link in the next year, we decided that the kind of budget we would have would not be an election budget, that it had to be a budget which would hold the current deficit at the then existing level and would reduce significantly our borrowing. That was not an easy decision, and there was much argument and discussion about it.

Finally, what prevailed was the national interest: we could not face into 1977 in a position where we might be forced into severing this link but with an economy so reflated and inflated by the actions of a Government trying to win an election that we would be unable to make that break and would be forced to stay linked with sterling, forced to continue to import inflation at a disastrous rate. We put the nation first, and we were defeated by a Government which put first not the nation but their own vote-catching activities. As a result we now have a situation where on the Taoiseach's own statement it is not possible for us to enter this Community even with the offer of £1,125 million in soft loans and subsidised interest rates, giving us £225 million in grants over five years. The Taoiseach says it is insufficient.

I take his word for it; he knows the state of the economy; he is in Government. He has every interest in entering the EMS if he thought the terms were right. Certainly it has been no pleasure for him to come home from the meeting the other day and to announce that it had not been successful. Had he thought that he could responsibly enter the system, he would have done so on Tuesday night last. He did not because he knows that the economy of this country is now, after 18 months of his Government, not in the position we left it in deliberately so as to enable us, if we had to, to make the break with sterling without any aid, because there was no aid on offer then. We are in the position now that even though substantial aid is on offer it is not sufficient, in his view, to cope with the problems created for this country by the way the economy has been mismanaged in the last 18 months. He is right; he is right not solely because of what has happened, because of the way in which we have had this consumer boom, because of the fact that although when we left office exports were rising much faster in volume than imports, for the last six months the volume of imports—which can be calculated from the monthly series, and I am sure the Minister for Economic Planning and Development has done it as I have done—has risen by 20 per cent and exports by 8 per cent. We are moving towards a severe balance of payments difficulty. Why? For two reason: first of all, because on the import side, the Government's policies of inducing a consumer boom—9 per cent increase in consumption—in present circumstances led to an enormous increase in imports because in fact the kind of consumer boom they produced is one concentrated on imports. What is the biggest single source of additional imports? Motor cars—and the Government took specific action that encouraged the purchase of motor cars and an enormous increase——

We are getting on to tomorrow's debate now.

I shall not be long, but I want to make the point that the Government, by promoting a consumer boom and a massive increase in imports and by the policies they pursued, which were alienating for trade unions and workers and led to a wage round which turned out to be grossly excessive and has now led to a breakdown of any wage negotiation, has left the country in a situation in which the Taoiseach feels—and he must make his own judgment, I have to take his judgment as correct in this—that we cannot afford to enter this European Monetary System even with £1,125 million of loans and £225 million of grants. Even that is not enough to salvage the position after 18 months of Fianna Fáil. When we left office we had prepared—at the cost, all right, of losing office—the country to be able to join, with an economy tightly held and in a position, not to join the EMS, but to break the link with sterling, without any aid because at that stage no such aid was on the cards at all. It is that failure we indict in this debate today as well as the failure in the negotiation itself.

There have been so many misstatements and misrepresentations that it is not going to be possible to follow all of them. But while it is fresh in Deputies' memories, might I refer to the point just made by Deputy FitzGerald when he said the previous Government, in the national interest, had prepared the economy for breaking the link with sterling with no aid from anywhere. The Deputy indicted us, amongst other things, because of the extent of our borrowing. What are the facts? One memorandum came before the previous Government on this matter. It came in January 1976 before the budget came out. In that year the borrowing of that Government was higher, as a percentage of GNP, than it is this year about which Deputy FitzGerald is complaining. It is totally dishonest of Deputy FitzGerald to make those kinds of statements and to pretend that there is some truth in them. What he is saying to us is that, having considered the whole matter in 1976, the then Government considered the necessity of breaking the link with sterling and, in the light of that, they prepared the economy for this situation.

Yes, those were the arguments in Government; without a civil service memorandum we were capable of discussing these things on our own.

Following that memorandum they ran the country on a basis of a higher percentage borrowing of GNP than this year, which we say is too high, and have always said is too high. It is because of what we inherited from Deputy FitzGerald and his friends that we are in this position. However, the facts are that Deputy FitzGerald, in what he has just been saying, has been trying to mislead the House and the country. Indeed he might like to be reminded that that memorandum which he brought before the Government —since he was talking earlier about pay pauses—contemplated a pay and incomes pause. I mention this solely to demonstrate to the House, while it is fresh in people's memories since Deputy FitzGerald sat down—how much importance can be attached to the kinds of statements he has been making today and previous days. Today for the first time we have an opportunity to answer the allegations that are being made. On each of the previous occasions —because of the structure of the situation under the Rules of the House—we had a statement from the Taoiseach, a statement from Fine Gael, a statement from Labour and no opportunity to answer. Obviously, even in this early stage of today's debate, the opportunity to answer is one the Opposition do not welcome the Government having.

As far as the EMS is concerned our basic stance, from the beginning, has been clear and unambiguous. We made it quite clear there were two primary reasons we wanted to enter the EMS: political, because of its immense importance in its own right and its potentially greater importance in achieving much greater unity in Europe; economic, because we could see that, properly handled—and that is an important qualification because it puts an onus on the Government and on the people if we did go into the EMS—we could end up with a much lower inflation rate, lower interest rates and greater potential for growth. Therefore, for those reasons, we regarded the EMS as extremely important and we said so. We said we wanted to join. The only question was: could we afford to join and to survive the stresses that would be imposed on the economy in the early stages? We put a figure on the table in regard to transfer of resources to enable us withstand these strains. We confined our arguments and our assessment of transfer of resources to the context of the EMS. We did not—as some other countries did—try to bring in various other matters such as the common agricultural policy and the general situation in regard to budgetary transfers in the EEC—whatever problems exist there exist independently of the EMS, existed before and will exist in the future.

One thing that emerged was that our approach to the EMS was different from that of Britain. Unfortunately, we found we had inherited a situation from the previous Government in which, within the Community, we were regarded merely as an appendage of Britain. Our views on matters of this kind were not of any real account because it was assumed that whatever Britain did we would do. In many cases it was not even thought necessary to consult us. We inherited this situation and it took some time for the penny to drop amongst our other Community partners. This became quite clear to me at meetings of the Economic and Finance Ministers when, having made our position clear, I found we were still being treated as if we did not count, as though all that counted was the attitude that Britain would take. But suddenly the penny dropped and there was a total change in the attitude of our Community partners. I think I can say with confidence that however this matter ends up—whether we are in or out of the EMS—our stature in the Community in future will be completely changed from what it has been under the previous Government. We may rest assured that, in future, attention will be paid to Irish views on matters of finance and economics.

There have been a number of misconceptions, some of which are genuine and some of which have been, I think, deliberately fostered. I would like to deal with them briefly. First of all, the suggestion has been made regularly, and it was repeated again by Deputy FitzGerald this morning, that we were depending on transfers arising out of the EMS in order to have a satisfactory budget. The fact is, and I would have thought that Deputy FitzGerald should know this, Estimates are prepared a long time back. They are discussed by the Government. No Government could possibly be preparing Estimates in the present situation on the basis of what might come from the EMS. We could not know when we were preparing the Estimates whether we would be in or out and we could not know what we were getting. Estimates have been prepared, and are virtually finalised in discussions at the Cabinet without any reference to the EMS, and our budget stance is being prepared on the basis of our economic strategy as outlined repeatedly before, during and since the last general election.

When I said here, in response to a question by Deputy Barry about the date of the budget, that the date could be affected by the EMS I had two things in mind—one was the sheer physical pressure on a number of Ministers, not least on the Minister for Finance, arising out of the EMS and the negotiations, not all of which, of course, are taking place abroad. I do not think it requires any great stretch of the imagination to appreciate the amount of time of a Minister for Finance that could be taken up in a matter like this, and that could affect the date on which the budget could be brought in, the sheer physical pressure involved and the ability to get through the ordinary heavy schedule of work at this time when added to by EMS requirements. The other things I had in mind was that if we joined the EMS, and this was before the Summit, there could well be sums of money being received which would have to be dealt with in the public capital programme. These were the two things I had in mind and these were all I had in mind.

In addition, I should say that the delay, and there has been some delay, in the production of the White Paper on the economy is also primarily due to the sheer physical pressure on the time of some Ministers, and especially on the Government as a whole, as a result of the unusual pressure we are under at the moment. I am not complaining about that in the least. I am merely explaining that there is a limit to what any individual or Government can accomplish in a given time.

Great play has been made by Deputy FitzGerald and others pretending that there is some discrepancy between what the Taoiseach said after the Brussels Summit in regard to whether we were rejecting, accepting or reserving our position on what emerged at the Brussels Summit and what the Minister for Economic Planning and Development and I said. There is, of course, no contradiction. If you look at what the Taoiseach said he did not close the door on the possibility that, having examined the situation and explored every possibility, we might still go into the EMS. That is what the Minister for Economic Planning and Development said and that is what I said when I referred to an episode which was not yet finished. By now I hope it is clear to everybody that the episode has not yet finished. That is simply all we were saying, and there is no contradiction whatever between what the Taoiseach said and what we said. It is simply mischief-making to suggest there is any contradiction. It is even more mischief-making to suggest that I, or any other Minister, is trying to pressurise the Taoiseach into accepting terms he said he could not recommend.

The only thing that has happened—it is perfectly straightforward and now, I hope, obvious to everyone—is that further possibilities are being explored. And that is all we said would happen. That is what is happening and if, as a result of that exploration, there is a change in the position, then obviously the Government could well decide to enter into the EMS. There is no decision on that yet because the full process of exploration has not been completed. But there is no more to it than that, and I wish people would cease to misrepresent what is clearly a plain, straightforward situation by pretending that there are pressures within the Government and struggles within the Government on this issue. There is no foundation whatever for that statement.

It has also been suggested in some quarters that there has been some excessive enthusiasm for the EMS on my part and on the part of the Minister for Economic Planning and Development in contradistinction to the attitude of the Taioseach. That was before the Summit. Anybody who has said that has not tried to produce any evidence in support of that statement. The basic position we have adopted has been quite clear. We want to go in for the reasons I mentioned earlier but we have at all times, each one of us, speaking on this, made it clear that whether we went in or not depended on the terms we could get in regard to the transfer of resources and, if we could not get satisfactory terms, we would not go in and, if we could, we would. I defy anyone to point out any contradiction between anything said by the Taoiseach and any of his Ministers in this regard prior to the Summit.

We come now to the question of what went wrong at the Summit. This, of course, is extremely relevant to all the allegations we have been hearing about the manner in which we negotiated beforehand, the amateur manner, to quote Deputy Cluskey. Offhand, I cannot remember the words Deputy FitzGerald used but he was certainly denigrating the approach we made to the preparation.

Malfeasance.

I have outlined what our stance was and I have made it perfectly clear to all our Community partners. I met my opposite number in each of the other Community countries. I discussed with each outstanding technical aspects of the EMS, our case for resource transfers, and one other matter to which I shall come in a moment. Arising out of these bilateral discussions and bilateral contacts it is now a matter of public record, either from what we said or the representatives of the other countries said following these bilateral contacts, what the attitude of these countries was before the Summit, with one qualification which I will now explain. That qualification relates to the French position. It was not a matter of public record, but it was known to us and to every other member of the Community before the Summit that the French had objections and reservations about the use of the Regional Fund as a method of transferring resources, but having made clear their objections they made an alternative proposal, which was described as "a line in the budget".

Let us look at what happened at the Summit. Which country departed from the stance they were taking? All this is on public record. It was not the French, and I suggest that any reasonable assessment of what happened makes it clear where the problem was and why it occurred. We have been told that we were naïve, that we were misled or some such thing. The fact is that we assessed correctly the attitude of each of the countries concerned. But I have to go further and say that in all my bilateral contacts I discussed the matter I have already mentioned and then I discussed the possibility that the Summit might turn out precisely as it did.

From the beginning we were aware of this danger and we drew the attention of each of our Community partners to it. We raised it, they did not. We raised it with all of them, and nobody can say with any justification that we were not aware of precisely what was going on and of the dangers that existed. Understandably, many of our Community partners reacted on the basis that in advance of its happening they could not contemplate a failure of the effort to establish the EMS—they could not assume that some countries would not go in and might even go so far as to veto arrangements being prepared for those who were going in. I understand that attitude.

But do not let anybody try to tell us that we did not know what was going on, and that we did not tell our Community partners what was a distinct possibility. Deputy Cluskey came in here some time ago and laid down a set of conditions for entry. The first one was that there should be £650 million in grants, and not a penny less, and no strings attached.

During a five-year period.

Yes, but he had a whole lot of other conditions. In the last weekend his stance changed to "an adequate transfer of resources". I want to put a question which I hope some member of the Labour Party will answer: what is the stance of the Labour Party on the EMS? Do they think we should go in, and if they think we should go in what now are the terms they think we should go in on?

We asked the Government the same question. Would they like to answer it?

We are negotiating, you are not. I am asking politically, both parties, what do they say to the people of the country is their stance on the EMS or are they simply engaging in political opportunism? Deputy Desmond told us within the last few days that we should not be going around Europe with the begging bowl. What does that mean? Does it mean we should not be looking for any transfer of resources, or where do the Labour Party stand?

Not in the style you have been engaging in.

Now we come to Deputy Cluskey, backed up today by Deputy FitzGerald with a total misunderstanding of what has been going on. Let me refer to a statement by Deputy Cluskey as reported in the Official Report for 7 December at columns 1013 and 1014. He said:

In a series of visits which he made, the Taoiseach did not seek to meet Mr. Andreotti, the Italian representative at these talks.

He then went on to quote from an interview the Taoiseach gave, and he referred to this sentence by the Taoiseach:

But unfortunately there were other members who were regarded as the less prosperous countries and they did, of course, expect that they proportionately would get what we would get. So I think that was an inhibiting factor.

What has Deputy Cluskey to say about that? Where is the evidence out of the Taoiseach's mouth that he should have gone to see Mr. Andreotti in advance? It just shows how totally blind and brainwashed Deputies Cluskey and FitzGerald, who backed Deputy Cluskey up today, are. That sentence to them is being interpreted only as involving Italy. Let them have another look at the sentence and try to find the reality of the situation. I will tell you the position in regard to Italy. We had an understanding with the Italians and they did not depart from it.

They left you high and dry.

What did Signor Andreotti say?

If Deputy FitzGerald wants to hear something let him stay quiet. I have a limited time, he did not. For Fine Gael, Deputy P. Barry said that the £650 million over a five-year period was ten times too small. Deputy FitzGerald—I suppose it is some advance on that—said it was five times smaller than our demands should have been. Deputy FitzGerald said the EMS is a de facto EMU. Will he deny that? I will quote it to him if he wants it.

Please do not misquote me.

Does Deputy FitzGerald deny that he said it is a de facto EMU?

I said the position was that either it was a de facto EMU, in which case the amount which would then be necessary should be provided, or alternatively that we were contemplating devaluing——

Did the Deputy say it was a de facto EMU?

I said that alternative one was a hypothesis. The other was that we would go in and devalue. I asked which, and said I presumed that it was not the intention to do the latter. The Minister need not try to misquote me.

We have had this debate before. The main thing is that the EMS is not the EMU, but the Deputy consistently has put forward in the wrong context figures which he has attributed to me.

I said it is the equivalent of EMU if we could not devalue.

The fact of the matter is that Fine Gael, like Labour, said that we had asked for far too little. More recently Deputy FitzGerald has become a little more cautious. I am asking him now if he is prepared to say what the Fine Gael attitude is: should we go in, should we not? If we should go in, on what terms? If he is not prepared to say so, why on earth does he ask the Government, who are negotiating, to say so?

I have not asked—the Tánaiste asked me.

Deputy FitzGerald earlier alleged that there was some discrepancy between the White Paper and what the Taoiseach said, and he spent a great deal of time on that. When he gets the chance, would he go back and look at what he was quoting? He will find the explanation quite simple. The White Paper was quoting what the German Presidency was putting before the Summit; the Taoiseach's statement quoted what the German Presidency had indicated in the course of negotiations. As the Taoiseach told Deputy FitzGerald, until he is elected to the Taoiseach's position there will be things going on which he will not know about.

Is the Tánaiste saying the Taoiseach was told by the German Presidency that he would get five years?

Deputy FitzGerald continues to interrupt me. As I have told him, I have a limited time, unlike him. But he made a gross error in what he was saying. He is only adding to the confusion he has created. He talked about interest rates, but we made no reference to interest rates except for the purpose of discounting when we mentioned 9 per cent. Does Deputy FitzGerald know the interest rate on the Ortolli facility? I do not think so.

Perhaps the Minister will tell us, then.

Nobody knows, as Deputy FitzGerald should well know instead of his pretending that it is 9 per cent.

It was your 9 per cent.

That figure was used only for finding the value of the subsidy.

As I have pointed out already.

It has not been quoted as a figure on any loan.

Now we are told.

The theme that came through from what was said earlier, particularly on the Fine Gael side, was that we should follow the British, that we should be very cautious. Deputy Barry's speech had many references of this kind, but I do not think that is the right approach for us. Deputy Cluskey told us today that he has lots of experience in this area of negotiation while Deputy FitzGerald, about whom we have been reading for years in terms of his being an outstanding international negotiator, went all out to achieve his aim in regard to the Regional Fund but for a period of three years, 1975 to 1977 the total amount received by this country from that fund was £18.8 million. If we give the Deputy the benefit of the doubt and take the allocations for those years as distinct from the receipts the total was £35 million. These are the great negotiators who tell us that we do not know what is going on, that we do not know how to negotiate.

But the Taoiseach got nothing.

A sum of £225 million happens to be eight times more than the people opposite got.

We refused a better offer for one year than the people opposite got for three years despite their marvellous knowledge of international affairs. The EMS is an immensely important concept, but there has not been any evidence of vision on either side of the Opposition regarding what the system could do for us not only economically but psychologically. This Government were faced with that prospect earlier on and took the basic decision that EMS was very important for us and that we should go for it if we could get in and get the terms right. Our whole approach has been consistent. The results that have come from the Summit have been disappointing, but they were far better than anything that was achieved by the people opposite in any other circumstances. As I said earlier, the episode is not finished yet. We are following up various possibilities, but regardless of the outcome ultimately, the prospect of entry into the EMS has focused attention on important aspects of life, economic and otherwise, in this country. Our stature in the Community is improved enormously. If we join the EMS we shall have serious problems but we have never pretended otherwise. However, if as a people we are prepared to accept the challenge we can be certain that if the decision to enter is taken, it will be the most important decision ever taken by this country since the signing of the Treaty.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

The Minister for Finance indicated that our stature in the Community will be changed completely in the future. I agree that it will be changed but at this stage the Government would be well advised to put the country out of agony and indicate that it is not intended to join the EMS on the basis of the terms negotiated, and negotiated so incompetently. Unless they make such an announcement very soon—and I do not think they should wait for another 48 hours as obviously they will not be offered any great improvement on the terms negotiated—the whole matter will descend to the level of being no more than a situation of a group of political corner boys hanging around for another few bob. Our national interest is not served by an exercise of that kind.

The standstill in the negotiating position of our Government has been underlined by the Taoiseach's speech this morning. There is no movement. The Government are playing a public relations cat-and-mouse game of alleged explorations at diplomatic level. In other words, they are phoning the Italian President to know if he has heard of anything, when we know that the Italians have not been able to effect any changes in their negotiating position.

This morning we had an uncharacteristically petulant contribution from the Taoiseach in which he descended to the level of a mere attack on the Opposition. This is about the last refuge of anybody who has nothing important to contribute. The Taoiseach's statement gave no further information regarding the negotiations. Neither did it indicate any further prospect of a change in our negotiating position, and we are left without any hope of an improvement in the negotiations in which the Taoiseach and the Minister for Foreign Affairs participated in Brussels.

I suppose it would be too much to ask the Deputy to quote the basis of what he is saying.

At the end of the day after all the to-ing and fro-ing, after all the peddling of the alleged poverty of this country around the capitals of Europe by the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste, we are left with the prospect, and only the prospect of an interest subsidy which, in certain circumstances that are not in any way outlined because essentially they relate to infrastructural projects about which we still have not had any information, would be 67 million EUAs or £45 million cash per year for five years, making a total of £225 million over a period, and on the clear understanding that the funds provided would have to be concentrated on financing selective infrastructural projects and programmes. To this extent the Taoiseach has been dishonest intellectually in his approach while the Minister for Finance has been dishonest in the context of the public capital programme. If the Minister had come into the House and told us that we would get about £50 million in terms of capital for telephone expansion or that we would get £70 million in terms of road structural development or that we would seek £50 million or £60 million in the context of harbour development, we would know at least what he was talking about in the context of the public capital programme relative to the EMS. But all the Minister has done—and the same can be said of the Taoiseach—is to attack the Opposition, to adopt the attitude of "let us have a go at Deputies FitzGerald and Cluskey in the hope of confusing the issue".

I suppose that was a frightful thing to do although they have been attacking us non stop.

We know from long political experience that this is the only way to keep one's troops happy when one is cornered and having made a right mess, not so much of the negotiations but in relation to the Government's public relations in that regard. The public stance of the Government was incredibly bad prior to the negotiations because it was giving the game away all over the place through every visit. It was so uncharacteristic of the Taoiseach; he was so effusively anxious of accommodation, so understanding of the position of the British Prime Minister, the French Prime Minister and so on. Since these negotiations started I have met Social Democrats from Germany, France, Britain and so forth, as a member of the Council of Europe at a meeting recently, and they were not impressed by this kind of European effusiveness on the part of the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste in trying to con their way into a situation where the negotiating power that they had was extremely limited.

What does the Deputy suggest we should have done?

Their handling of the public relations side of it was incredibly bad. We should come down to the more serious aspects.

I notice Deputy Cluskey did not want to answer that question either. What does Deputy Desmond suggest we should have done instead of what we did?

They should have been entirely honest in the situation. They should have said, as they should now say, that the offer they got is totally inadequate in the context of——

The Deputy was talking about the negotiations. What does he say we should have done in our negotiations as distinct from the way we did go about it?

I do not know of the Tánaiste or the Taoiseach presenting to the Heads of State the kind of background documentation relative to dimension of industries here and to the public capital programme needs of this country. Was that handed to the French Prime Minister? Was it explained to him or was it merely one of those classic working lunches where the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste waffled their way around the public capital programme requirements and where the French Prime Minister inquired daily of them how they abolished domestic rates and so on?

If the Deputy does not know, why does he say our stance is completely wrong?

Acting Chairman

Deputy Desmond, please, without interruption.

Having given their game away by their anxiety to be involved and the degree of their enthusiasm, afterwards they were not taken too seriously in terms of their demands.

In other words the Deputy would like it to appear that we are still tied to the British as we were under his Government.

I will come to that. We have a situation of direct relationship with and integration into the sterling money market. I have found a of business people in this country are not very sympathetic to Labour party policies, but in so far as they are bemused and perplexed by what Fianna Fáil are up to on the EMS, many of them are prepared to talk. They are appalled that all that the Government seem to be preoccupied about is to have some moneys for the public capital programme of next year or perhaps the year after, and, if that situation is resolved, what the effect of entering into the EMS will be in relation to a wide range of sensitive industries which are now at direct risk on entry. As Deputy Cluskey pointed out, we all were bemused this morning when we heard in the Taoiseach's speech that there are far too many variables involved for anyone to be able to conclude that any sector would of necessity be adversely affected by our entry into the new system. Surely that is giving their game away. If that was the attitude of the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste when they were going off to the capitals of Europe pleading poverty——

Maybe the Deputy would tell us which sectors would be affected.

——I find it incredible.

The Deputy should tell us which sections would be affected by our entry into the EMS.

Acting Chairman

Deputy Desmond, would you direct your remarks to the Chair, please?

I will mention a couple of sectors mentioned by the Taoiseach in Brussels——

On entry into the EMS?

——which could be affected.

By divergence of the £, not by entry into the EMS. The Deputy should look again at what the Taoiseach said and he should not misrepresent him.

I do not have to misrepresent the Taoiseach. In Brussels the Taoiseach was talking about the textile industry, about the furniture industry and in particular about the footwear industry.

In the event of a divergence of the £, not entry into the EMS.

Acting Chairman

Deputy Desmond, without interruption please, and the Deputy should cease inviting interruptions.

I tell the Tánaiste that I am perfectly well aware of that and I do not have to be given that elementary lesson in monetary and economic affairs.

I will sum up this aspect of my contribution. I have a human sympathy for the Taoiseach in this situation. I would not like to enter into any negotiating position—something which as a trade union official I did for a number of years—with not many cards in my hand. It is never pleasant to have to do that with not much strength behind your application and with really not much more than a lot of prior public relations with the capitals of Europe. We were not entering into these negotiations from a position of great national strength; to some extent we were entering from a position of national weakness by virtue of the Government's budgetary policy. Any of the German, British and French whom I met kept saying to me: "If you are that poverty-stricken how could you abolish your domestic rates and car tax?" I kept saying that we really are very poor, we have no money in this Republic of Ireland where the Government were enabled to do all those things. In fact we were so well off we could even abolish our wealth tax because it did not really matter. Generally speaking, therefore, I have a human and personal sympathy for the situation in which the Taoiseach found himself, but it was quite uncharacteristic and unnecessary that he should have allowed himself to get such a kick in the groin as he got. I am very surprised that a person so politically astute should mishandle the matter so seriously.

Therefore, we have to address ourselves to the central question, should we on the basis of the known terms at this stage consider entry into the EMS? In the national interest the answer is unequivocally no. The terms as now known and any minor improvements which may emerge from them in the next 48 hours do not warrant entry at this stage and do not warrant the kind of alignment and the risks inherent in that situation. That is the issue in this debate. Whether the Taoiseach was tired when he got off the plane on his way home from Brussels is not an issue here. It is not an issue whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs has not much knowledge of economic affairs. It is not an issue that the Minister for Economic Planning and Development—to my amazement and amusement as a fellow constituency colleague—continues to make a colossal eejit of himself now and again, almost every third day when he comments on different issues. I am surprised at my colleague in the Dún Laoghaire constituency who, in his bemusement of alleged academic honesty, seems to walk himself headlong into it and then blames the media. I suppose before Christmas we will all be blaming Santa Claus when more confusion emerges in relation to the Government's approach.

Europe do not particularly feel that they owe us very much. Europe have not been impressed by this alleged Irish pace. The Premiers of Europe have not been impressed and neither have the Finance Ministers, and as a result we have been offered very little by way of relief on entry. Until such time as we would have a major response from the other countries of the nine we would be incredibly ill-advised to proceed to entry on that basis.

I was interested to hear the reference by the Tánaiste, who let another four-legged hare out of the bag when he spoke about the regional fund. He stated that to date Ireland's income from the regional fund in the past three years was £18.8 million. This should be noted by Deputies in the context of all the talk about regional fund income which we have had here. When one thinks about it, what effect has that on our national economy in terms of the budget? We have a budget which is currently running well over £2,000 million a year. The Tánaiste admits that for all practical purposes in terms of any major impact on infrastructure here the regional fund is non-existent. It is not a regional fund. It is not having any real impact on the Irish infrastructural situation. The Tánaiste said that Ireland's national quota income from the fund on the basis of national quotas has been £18.8 million over three years. It is not even one half of one per cent of our national budget. It is even less than that. How do we have the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste careering around Europe asking for "another window", to quote the German President, to be opened in the regional fund for Ireland to get another bit of money when in fact what we got over the past three years is miniscule; it is irrelevant; it is not worthy of being called a regional fund.

I apply the same criticism to the social fund in that regard. Last year we got £4 million from the social fund. It would not even add up to point one of 1 per cent of our total national budget. It is a miserable amount of money. There is no social fund inflow of any real consequence into this country. There is no regional fund inflow of any consequence into this country, and it would be the height of folly to expect that at the Summit, the Taoiseach would have transformed the regional fund income and that the Tánaiste would have so succeeded as well. My view is that until such time as there is a prospect of real income from the regional fund and until such time as that money is forthcoming—and it obviously has been totally opposed by the French—we should not enter into the EMS even in the context of money for infra-structural development here.

Unfortunately, early on in the Bremen situation the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste were caught up with this republican euphoria of breaking the link with sterling. That I would suppose is article No. 5. After Partition and after the national language I suppose breaking the link with sterling would be about the greatest thing that the Taoiseach would like to go down in history on; he could comfortably retire on that. But the reality is entirely different. We have an integrated monetary system with Britain. Breaking that link cannot be done in the context of the EMS and these negotiations. It would require a far bigger political operation, a far greater economic effort on our part, to break through the direct relationship of parity with sterling. In that sense there was a great national pretence going on and being built up by the Government of easy entry into the EMS, gently shiffling off the apron strings of sterling and all would be well on the night. As we now know and as we should have appreciated long before now that situation is not as easily overcome as might appear.

Finally there is a prospect of severe national demoralisation arising from the to-ing and fro-ing and the debacle of these negotiations. I am opposed to the Taoiseach or any other Minister of State here chasing around Europe peddling our alleged poverty for a mere interest subsidy of about £40 million a year on a prospect, subject to very stringent conditions, of £225 million over five years. We have tremendous natural resources. We have a people who can and do engage in industry and exports to a very high degree with Europe and with Britain. We have tens of thousands of young people who are more than capable of making a tremendous contribution to national social and economic development.

We should recover some of our pride in this situation. We should kick the begging bowl out of our negotiations, and we should also be acutely aware of the fact that in the past seven or eight years since we joined the EEC the attitude of Europe is that they have given massive transfers of agricultural subsidy and resources into Ireland in the past. Europe, on that basis, does not particularly feel that she owes us anything.

I am inclined to agree with the Minister that if there were proper regional funds and proper social funds we could then have a transfer of resources through these funds. Europe feels that by and large we have benefited very substantially from the common agricultural policy. The fact that the money has come into Ireland and has not been properly redistributed is a matter for a debate on another day. But there is a danger that the Government, hanging their hat so much on the sacred cow of monetary integration and ignoring all the other aspects of economic policy particularly co-ordination of economic policies, are forgetting as they have seemingly forgotten in recent weeks, the need for a planned co-ordination of taxation policies and social policies to combat inflation and social deprivation here. These are far more important than the kind of Fianna Fáil devotees that we now see to the prospect of breaking the link with sterling or the devotees to the EMS.

I therefore think that our country should not continue unduly long with this pretence. I am very much in favour personally of the closest possible links with Europe. I supported Ireland's entry into the Community and unfortunately the Government now are availing of the issue of monetary parity with Europe as a kind of soft option to soften the blow in relation to their own lack of internal resources. In the national interest that kind of option should not be availed of in such a manner by the Fianna Fáil Party. We have a direct link with sterling, and despite all the nostalgic hostility which many Irish people have in relation to that link it is going to be by no means easy to break that link, as has been proved in these negotiations. Unfortunately there was a national impression created by the Government that all we had to do was simply take the decision for entry and overnight everything would work out with some transfer of resources to this country. That has not now worked out, and for these reasons I would sum up by saying that, on the basis of the known negotiated terms, we should not enter at this stage; we should remain aloof. We will in that context not be faced with the rigours of a transitional period when Britain goes in, as undoubtedly she will go in most likely at the end of next year and there is no reason in the wide world why we should not go in with Britain at that time.

In the interim period we should try to ensure that the regional fund and the social fund in the Community are massively strengthened. We can do that in the context of being members of the Community of the Nine. When we have the presidency in the second half of next year it should be a bit easier to get that matter on the agenda. Ireland can benefit within the Community to a very considerable degree without necessarily having to face the rigours of the EMS if there are strong regional and social funds. I regret that the Taoiseach this morning attacked the Opposition for their views because it now appears that the Government are bankrupt of any further initiatives in this regard. They are simply hanging around like a crowd of political corner boys waiting for something to turn up and to get a few easy bob for next year's capital programme.

I do not believe that our economic management and the many sensitive industries that would be faced with the traumatic impact of currency changes are politically ready for that sleight-of-hand. They would not be able to face the rigours of that situation. We should desist from that kind of headlong rush, sober up and accept the facts of life as they are. We should then get down to the real issues of economic policy, taxation policy, budget policy and next year's public capital programme and run the country in a calmer, more responsible and undoubtedly more effective manner.

At what stage may I speak?

Acting Chairman

I have been given a list of names.

I am not a member of a registered political party. I am exculpating the Acting Chairman. I know he is not completely responsible for this, but at what stage do I get a chance of speaking?

Acting Chairman

I will check for the Deputy.

I conceded that I did not have a right to speak when the matter was discussed last week. I understood from the Leas-Cheann Comhairle that I would be called on when I stood up to speak at this point of the debate.

Acting Chairman

I will check that matter and I will let the Deputy know.

At the risk of upsetting some of my colleagues on the other side and perhaps incurring their wrath it is important that a few points should be clarified and a few things put in their proper perspective as far as this debate is concerned. The House and the nation owe a vote of thanks to the Taoiseach for his speech this morning. It was educational and elucidatory and left nobody in any doubt as to what the Government decision is at this time. The public are so enamoured of the handling of the negotiations to date, the way the Taoiseach resisted pressures by other nations to take the package that was offered in the best interests of the Irish people and his personal standing has increased so much that the Irish people are now confident that their best interests will be looked after by the Taoiseach.

I have the greatest respect for the Opposition leaders in this House but their contributions this morning were a great disappointment to me and I am quite sure to the nation. The leader of the main Opposition had only sixteen members of his party present when he was voicing the opinion of his party in this matter. Was the lack of Deputies behind him a reflection of the majority view of his party and the effectiveness of his leadership or was it a reflection of his contribution? It seems that he was under some considerable pressure because of the lack of support by his backbench colleagues.

The Deputy does not seem to be drawing very big crowds.

The matter has been so adequately dealt with by the front bench members of the Fianna Fáil Party that it is only necessary for me to clear up some misunderstandings among the Opposition parties. I am glad to see at least from the comments made by members of the Opposition that they recognise at last that our economic Ministers are the recognised authorities on the EMS. I wish they would leave it at that and let them get on with the job. They should stop interrupting for the sake of getting some notice in the newspapers tomorrow morning. The scheme of the Opposition parties today was to create further confusion in the minds of the public at large. We had the leader of Fine Gael juggling without figures. I am quite sure he is an extremely competent economist and there is no doubt in the world that his pocket calculator does a lot for him but I do not think it did a lot to enhance his image here today. The Opposition suggest that they know the answers at all times. Why then are they continually looking for clarification of points they raise? Why do they ask questions if they know the answers in advance except that they are trying to twist the answers and confuse the people at large?

The only contradiction I can see is the inability of Fine Gael to persuade anybody that they are a responsible Opposition. We had references today to people travelling abroad. It is well known that the best traveller abroad in the last four years was the man who referred to it today, the leader of the Fine Gael Party. I have no objection to people travelling abroad to improve their knowledge by getting advice from other nations and other economic Ministers but it seems to be taking it a step too far to level that kind of charge at the Fianna Fáil Party.

The Opposition this morning did their best to incite the general public to opinions foreign to their best interests. They want to distort the situation and instead of showing some kind of national patriotism they could very easily be charged with national sabotage. That charge can be made against their performance over the last few years. Why do those people have to go continually to Brussels to get their information? Has the truth not always been, as far as the Fine Gael Party are concerned, that they get their instructions much nearer to home? I suggest they get their instructions somewhere across the Channel, perhaps at Westminster. Have not their instructions been coming from there for the past 50 years? There is no reason to suggest it will change now. Bíonn rang clamach ag an oide clamprach and it would seem to be borne out here today. Deputy FitzGerald certainly has a noisy bunch of backbenchers. What one gets from that is learned length and thundering sound signifying nothing, and that is precisely what we heard this morning.

I cannot understand how Deputy Desmond can suggest, that the Taoiseach was not well received. Our position was sympathetically considered and it would appear from communiques reaching the Taoiseach that every nation in Europe is aware of the difficulties we might have to suffer in the EMS and is sympathetic to the point of view expressed by the Taoiseach during his journeys abroad.

I have always had a great respect for Deputy Cluskey's ability and his leadership of the Labour Party. His contribution was a great disappointment to me and, I imagine, to the whole House. Who do the Labour Party think they are representing in the points of view they are expressing? It is obvious that there is not even a united voice among their leaders as to what stance they and their followers should adopt.

We know what stance the Taoiseach will take.

We hear of certain members of that party not doing particular things next year and being admonished by the leader that it is not the right thing to say at this time. Deputy Cluskey stated that he does not want Ireland to join the EMS. He does not want us to have any close links. Is not that the stand they took when we were negotiating entry to the Common Market? They want to be isolated in the Atlantic so that they can continue to practise what they have been practising during the past few years. I do not suggest that they have not the best interests of the people at heart. I would suggest to Deputy Cluskey that the question he raised this morning about the Italian affair should be put into proper perspective. It was suggested outside this House a few days ago that the Taoiseach should have consulted the Italians and that we were almost responsible for keeping the Italians out. A few days later the Italian Government decide they would like to enter the EMS. The Leader of Fine Gael is not blessed with mental telepathy either, because the suggestion I hear is that the Italian Government might very well win the day and Italy might become a member of the EMS.

To what alternative was Deputy Cluskey referring? He went on about this ad nauseam this morning. He was challenged by several Fianna Fáil speakers to say what he would have advised the Taoiseach to do in the circumstances. The answer has not been forthcoming. The Labour Party are merely involved in Government bashing today. They are simply frightening the workers by unsupported estimates of job losses which might result if we entered this system. This is not in the national interest and could not be regarded as national patriotism, and I might level the charge of national sabotage. Who takes them seriously when their record in Government is a standing indictment of their performance in the very area they are talking about, namely, job losses and the creation of employment? During the Coalition period they took unto themselves those same portfolios about which they waffle now. Did they produce enormous job opportunities during that period? No. Did they bring about a situation of industrial peace? No. Their record is so bad in this regard that the people completely lost faith in them and consequently they bit the dust in 1977. It seems it will be a long time before they have the opportunity to hold any of those portfolios again.

When we consider the Coalition performance in Europe we realise the hollowness of some of their statements this morning. Ministers were travelling to Europe almost daily and they achieved absolutely nothing as far as fisheries were concerned.

Is this relevant to the EMS?

It is very relevant. It was suggested this morning that Government Ministers were travelling to and from Europe and achieving nothing. When Deputy FitzGerald went to the Hague conference in 1975 he was talking about doubling the fishing fleet, but his Minister for Finance could not give the money to implement the ideas he brought back. The present Minister for Fisheries has received a 50 per cent grant for all new boats, £30 million for fishery protection and a host of other things.

Acting Chairman

The Deputy should speak on the subject before the House.

It is important to put matters into proper perspective. Our Minister for Agriculture has got increased grants for disease eradication and improved grants for drainage programmes which will be of great benefit in the west. When he came back with the money from the EEC we were able to match it £ for £. That was not the situation when the Coalition were in office.

There are several advantages to this monetary system, and I am committed to our entry. The time will come when our position will be clarified and a situation will be created which will enable us to join. Monetary union would mean more efficient control of industry and commerce, removal of exchange rate risks and inflation, and would give confidence to the Irish businessman. There is no doubt in the mind of any businessman on this matter, irrespective of his political affiliations. Seven different currencies are floating around Europe, as well as the dollar. The £ sterling has depreciated over 60 per cent since 1971 against the mark. If fixed rates are to endure, closer co-ordination of economic performance must be secured. This is the Government's aim, and if the EMS is the vehicle to achieve it and if the Government are on the right road they deserve the support of the House in their endeavour.

The EMS might give Europe the advantage of a major international currency. The United States, even with their weak balance of payments situation, derive many advantages from the fact that they are in this position. We would be free from excessive dependence on the dollar. I would suggest that the dollar is still the only effective medium of exchange, and an unsatisfactory one at this time. The people, apart from the emotional and historical reasons, have long wished for an opportunity to break the link with Britain. Let us be clear about that. Ask people who are suffering the effects of increased mortgage interest rates what they feel about the EMS. They will tell one about their frustration with the link with sterling.

Must we be dragged up and down by Britain's rate of inflation forever? The hope is that the Taoiseach can arrange our alignment with the strong currencies of Europe and get us our just share of its improving economic growth. For further information I have here a little diagram setting out in precise terms how the link with sterling has affected us in the past few years. In 1964 the Irish inflation rate was 6.9 per cent. It dropped substantially to 3 per cent in 1966, it rose when we were in office to about 7 per cent, and when the Opposition came to power it took off until it reached more than 20 per cent. It is only since we came to power that it has been brought under control again. In 1964 the British rate of inflation was approximately 3.2 per cent and in the following years it went up and down until it reached 24.2 per cent in 1975. Could it be drawn from that that perhaps our complete link with sterling might have caused some of our serious inflationary problems?

I believe the EMS would be a major stimulus for growth and employment. The lowering of barriers and the release of new monetary policies would help to restore employment and the confident growth of the 1960s could be renewed. What are the alternatives? Between now and 1985 some 9 million young people are expected to join the Community workforce and that number will be in excess of those likely to leave it. Does not this mean that all the member states will have to pump extra purchasing powers into their economies and take all the necessary steps to bring down unemployment to a more acceptable level? Fianna Fáil are committed to that policy. The only people opposed to it are the pseudo-socialists who spend their time theorising and polishing up their doctrinaire policies rather than supporting Fianna Fáil measures that come from Ministers who are conscious of the human and social costs of unemployment.

On a point of order, are Deputies entitled to read out their statements in this House? It has always been the policy——

Deputies may use notes.

I know Deputies may refer to notes but it has not been the practice to read out statements.

I am extremely sorry if the Deputy has a problem understanding the EMS. I have spent some time considering the matter and I am now in a position to comment on it.

It was obvious from the start that the EMS would involve a larger and more redistributive Community budget. Leading economists accept that as a fact of life. I do not believe this was being sought purely to secure equality of economic performance but simply as a share-out of the greatly increased wealth which the monetary system, and eventually monetary union, would make available to the Community. The strong nations are being asked to share the surplus that increased growth and stability has made available. Was that too much for the Taoiseach to ask? Was it too much to ask the partners to put all the rungs in the ladder and not to leave out every third one so that we would not slip up and down? There are only a few pegs missing, and when they are inserted I think that a proper resource transfer will be made available to improve our infrastructure, to help us to overcome difficulties in catching up with European living standards and to reduce unemployment.

Our living standards have improved since 1977 when our inflation rate began to fall. Since Fianna Fáil came to power the rate of inflation has been reduced. I have some statistics to bear that out. In 1976 we were told that personal disposal of income rose by 17 per cent, but the truth is that it fell by 1 per cent for the simple reason that in that year inflation was running at 18 per cent. The people of Ireland were conned at that time. Since 1977 there has been a decrease in the rate of inflation to around 8 per cent but at the same time we are maintaining the increase in personal incomes at 17 per cent. I do not need a pocket calculator, as they have on the far side, to determine that that leaves a 9 per cent increase in personal disposable income. The Irish worker is well aware of this, and he is prepared to put his money on the Taoiseach and the way he has handled the negotiations on our behalf.

What about Japanese cars?

Whatever type of car I have, I can tell the Deputy it was helped to be paid for by a good Fianna Fáil Government. The Deputy's car does not have any tax on it either because we removed that tax. The EMS is probably a step towards EMU, and the Community's goal is a single currency. I suppose we could have the equivalent of some varying parity but with a central monetary institution. We all know that this has political implications.

So does M. Chirac.

I do not speak very often in this House but I have to listen to a lot of claptrap and waffle over the monitor. Whenever I come to the House to make a contribution I note that the Labour Party begin to converge. They must feel guilty about something. When I started my speech I just had my friend over there and one member of the Labour Party but now I am getting the full treatment. I am happy to get that treatment at any time. I shall have the opportunity of speaking on this matter again after Question Time and I will be in a position to sum up what I hear at the lunch table——

We are waiting for Martin.

The Labour Party stand disgraced in this matter. They have not offered an alternative to the Irish people. Their leader was asked today for an alternative strategy that would help the Government to do this important work on behalf of the people. Are they opting out of their obligation to the Irish nation and to their own members?

Debate adjourned.
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