Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 8 May 1980

Vol. 320 No. 7

Dublin Meeting on UNIFIL: Motion.

Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Lenihan)

I move:

That Dáil Éireann takes note of the outcome of the meeting in Dublin on 2 May of representatives of Governments which contribute troops to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Deputies will recall that at its special meeting on 20 April, following the murder of two of our soldiers serving with UNIFIL, the Government decided to take a number of steps at the diplomatic level. In my statement in reply to questions on 29 April I outlined the action which had been taken in this regard. In particular the Government proposed that there should be a meeting of representatives of Governments which contribute troops to UNIFIL to consider the situation facing the Force in its endeavours to implement the mandate laid down by the UN Security Council.

The Government's intention had been that the meeting should take place at UN Headquarters in New York, but, in order to facilitate high-level participation by a number of countries which indicated a clear preference for Dublin, the Government agreed to host the meeting in Dublin.

The important aspect in our consideration was to have the meeting as quickly as possible and, even though our preference was to have it in New York in order to emphasise the independence of the approach in regard to all the countries participating and going along with the approach, the fact of the matter is that the meeting in Dublin was arranged and could have been arranged quicker and, accordingly, it took place in Dublin.

In proposing the meeting the Government had in mind to foster among the troop-contributing states a sense of solidarity in their joint endeavour on behalf of the United Nations. This solidarity was the important objective in bringing the countries together and success has been achieved in that respect. Our view was that this solidarity could be utilised in an effort to bring about conditions in which UNIFIL could operate more effectively and in conditions of adequate security for its personnel. We were conscious of the particular problems which our contingent had encountered, but we were aware that the contingents of almost all the countries participating in the Force had encountered difficulties over the past two years and in most cases suffered loss of life. We felt it would be particularly valuable to pool the experiences of the different contingents and to see to what extent we were in agreement and could make a common evaluation of the difficulties with which UNIFIL is confronted.

In our approach to the meeting we were conscious of the need to ensure that, meeting as troop-contributing states, certain basic considerations should be respected: firstly, that the troop-contributing states would in no way wish to derogate from the role and functions of the Security Council which set up the Force and has responsibility for it. Indeed, we saw the efforts of the troop-contributing states as being supportive of the objectives laid down by the Security Council. Secondly, the troop-contributing states would not wish to interfere in any way with the direction of UNIFIL by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the conduct of its operations in the field by the Force Commander, in both of whom all have full confidence. Thirdly, that, while being fully aware that UNIFIL's problems and those of the Southern Lebanon are part of the overall problem of the Middle East and that the states participating might have differing views on the political issues involved, the meeting should confine itself as far as possible to questions directly arising from UNIFIL and its problems in which all states represented had a common interest.

Representatives of 11 countries participated in the meeting—Fiji, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal and Sweden. All these except Sweden currently contribute to UNIFIL; Sweden will supply medical personnel to the Force from next summer and has been accepted by the Security Council as a contributor. The Secretary-General was represented at the meeting by Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, who is responsible for the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and whose experience in this area of UN policy is virtually unrivalled. Mr. Urquhart gave the meeting a detailed briefing on the present situation of UNIFIL and the efforts made by the United Nations, both in general and in specific instances, to improve the position.

I think I may say that the meeting was very successful and that the decisions and the outcome were most fruitful. I have placed a copy of the agreed Communiqué issued following the meeting in the Dáil Library and copies have been made available to Deputies. I would not therefore propose to go through it in detail but rather will try to highlight a number of aspects which emerged in the course of the discussions.

The most impressive feature of the meeting was the deep and genuine sense of solidarity expressed by all participants. When representatives of 11 countries, situated in different parts of the world and belonging to different regional groups, who had agreed to contribute contingents to UNIFIL at the request of the Secretary General, came together, one might have anticipated that considerable differences of view would emerge. This was not so. The views expressed were, for all practical purposes, unanimous and I can therefore, without qualification, speak of an agreed view of the meeting on what was discussed.

The meeting was fully agreed on the vital role being played by UNIFIL despite the difficulties it has faced, given the situation in the Lebanon and in the Middle East as a whole at the present time. As expressed in the Communiqué all agreed that the Force "continues to make a significant contribution to peace in the Middle East and to the prevention of an outbreak of more general hostilities". At the present time of heightened international tensions withdrawal of the Force could have the most serious consequences and might easily lead to wider war.

I wish to emphasise this fact because the whole situation in the Middle East and to the east of the Middle East, to Iran and Afghanistan, is one of extreme difficulty and one which has very grave implications for the world at large. The UNIFIL presence in the Lebanon is one of the bricks in that situation of a very shaky edifice. The withdrawal of UNIFIL from that area could lead to serious consequences not only in the Lebanon but throughout the whole area which is already in a state of serious tension. I say this to emphasise the importance of UNIFIL presence in that difficult area and to put the Lebanon problem in the wider context of the whole Middle East and of that whole region from the Lebanon to Afghanistan.

At the same time, all were agreed that any United Nations peace-keeping operation depends fundamentally on acceptance of the peace-keeping force and of its role in the area where it is to serve. This requires co-operation and support from those who wish a peacekeeping force to be interposed between parties in conflict. In the case of UNIFIL it has been all too clear that the required co-operation from the parties has not been forthcoming. Such co-operation is necessary if UNIFIL is to operate in the conditions necessary for the effective implementation of its mandate.

The meeting was therefore in agreement that the co-operation of all parties was necessary for UNIFIL to function effectively, and it was agreed to call on all parties to co-operate fully with UNIFIL. All participants however, also agreed that the basic problems of the Force could not be overcome while it was prevented from full deployment in the area of operation assigned to it. The basic requirement of the Force at present is, therefore, as the Security Council stated as recently as 18 April that it "take immediate and total control of its entire area of operations up to the internationally recognised boundaries".

They are the internationally recognised boundaries of the State of Lebanon. That was the basic term in the mandate and it was reaffirmed by the Security Council on 18 April.

It seemed clear to the meeting that the existence of a strip of territory controlled by the so-called de facto forces is the principal source of the difficulties at present. Moreover, Israel's extensive support for these forces has been the key factor in enabling them to maintain control of this strip of territory and to deny UNIFIL the freedom of movement that is necessary to carry out its mandate. The meeting, therefore, called on Israel to cease this support and on all parties in the area to co-operate fully with UNIFIL.

All participants in the meeting were of course aware that "armed elements" of Palestinian and Lebanese affiliations also try to operate in the area and have caused difficulties and deaths among UNIFIL personnel.

Mr. Cluskey

Are they the PLO?

Mr. Lenihan

However, all were agreed that UNIFIL's inability to deploy fully is the major factor which at present inhibits its ability to discharge its responsibilities effectively. If UNIFIL were fully deployed and not subjected to harassment by the de facto forces, it would be in a better position to control and ensure the peaceful character of its area of operations.

I want to emphasise this fact because the harassment that is taking place at the hands of the de facto forces is in fact and in practice inhibiting and prohibiting the UNIFIL forces from dealing with other armed elements in the area as a whole. Therefore, far from securing their protection from these other elements, the operations of the de facto forces are preventing UNIFIL from dealing effectively with other elements in the situation.

All participants in the meeting were agreed that UNIFIL's role is one of peace-keeping. There was absolute unanimity on adherence to the principle of the mandate being a peace-keeping mandate. There was no question of a peace-enforcement mandate or anything of that nature. To the extent that the meeting clarified that aspect of the matter, the decision was very important. The peace-keeping role was laid down in the mandate of the Force and it is in accordance with the experience of the United Nations in this field over the years that its effective role must be a peace-keeping role. Any departure from that role could be counter-productive and nugatory in the extreme. Any question of peace enforcement would be leading one straight away into the war area in which the UN cannot have any part. Such a situation would be counter to the whole principles of UN involvement in an area of operation of this kind.

I indicated to the House at Question Time on 29 April that this was the Government's view and it emerged at the meeting that our view of what the mandate was, is and should be, was fully shared by all participants. A force, the object of which is to keep the peace and to save lives, cannot adopt an aggressive attitude without undermining its fundamental objective. As I have already indicated, the basic requirement for peace-keeping is the co-operation of the parties involved and this must be achieved through political and diplomatic means and by negotiation. This does not of course preclude a suitably firm attitude by UNIFIL on the ground.

All countries participating in the meeting made clear their wish to continue to participate in UNIFIL in view of the important work they are doing. It was clear to all, however, that if progress were not made towards the achievement of minimum conditions in which UNIFIL could operate effectively and with reasonable security for their personnel, then the continued viability of the force and the willingness on the part of all troop-contributors to continue to participate, might be brought into question.

I wish to emphasise that any step or any decision in that direction will be taken by all the troop-contributing countries. We will operate as a group when any decisions are to be taken. We will not—and an assurance was given by other countries that they will not—operate on a unilateral basis. We will continue to review the matter in a spirit of solidarity and to make decisions, however serious they might be, as a group of troop-contributors who are making the major contribution towards peace in this area. We will make our decision as a UNIFIL group.

Another point on which there was unanimous agreement was the need for continued contact in order to maintain the solidarity of the group. Representatives of the troop-contributing countries already have, from time to time, met in New York with the Secretary General. These contacts will now be intensified and take place regularly in the light of the Dublin meeting. As noted in the communiqué they will continue to discuss with the Secretary-General practical steps which can be taken towards the achievement of the basic conditions which are necessary if the Force is to operate fully and effectively. It was also the general view that there should be a further meeting at ministerial level to review how far progress has been made towards the creation of conditions which will permit UNIFIL to exercise their mandate more effectively. Norway offered to host a meeting in Oslo in due course on a date to be arranged with this purpose in mind.

Arising out of the meeting, it was agreed that diplomatic approaches would be made in a number of capitals. The views of the troop-contributing countries as a group would be presented, using the text of the communiqué as a basis for these démarches. It was agreed that, in order to emphasise the collective nature of these approaches, they should be carried out by a different group of three countries in each case; each group comprising, in so far as possible, a European, an Asian and an African country.

Accordingly it was decided at the United Nations in New York, that Ireland, together with Fiji and Senegal, should present the text of the communiqué to both the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General, and request that it be circulated as an official document of the Security Council. The approaches in three capitals were to be conducted as follows: in Beirut by Italy and two others: in Israel by the Netherlands and two others; and in Washington DC by Nigeria and two others. The reaction to these démarches will of course have to be considered by all troop-contributing countries in New York. After these various approaches have been made to consider and review the position further, the meeting can take place in New York at ambassador level.

I would like now to make some remarks of a more general character. I think the particular value of the meeting last week has been to demonstrate that the troop-contributing countries share a united and common approach in their joint endeavour as part of UNIFIL. This has shown clearly what it has been the object of the Government to emphasise all along; that the difficulties encountered by the Irish contingent were encountered in the course of the discharge of their duties as an integral part of UNIFIL within a specified area in accordance with the mandate of the Security Council. There is no question of a bilateral dispute between Ireland and Israel; it is rather a question of securing the necessary co-operation of those concerned in enabling a UN peacekeeping force to carry out the mandate given to it by the Security Council and recently confirmed by that body. I would hope that all participants in this debate will place their comments in that context.

It is very much in Israel's interest that peace be established in this area and that her territorial integrity can best be guaranteed in a peaceful settlement of the whole middle east area, and not just the Lebanon alone. It is very much in Israel's interest as a State that the Lebanon resumes as a peaceful State and that under the protection and guarantees of the United Nations normal living conditions can be restored in the Lebanon and similarly that there will be a peaceful settlement of the whole Middle Eastern area, including the Lebanon and the Palestinian problem, that will guarantee the territorial integrity of Israel and maintain the security and integrity of that State. It is in the interests of everyone concerned, Lebanese, Israelis and other Middle Eastern countries, that we move towards a settlement situation where peaceful conditions and the integrity of the states concerned can be guaranteed on an international basis.

There has been some discussion as to whether there are specific reasons as to why the Irish contingent have been harassed by and came under attack from the de facto forces. I think that on this point I should say, firstly that a number of other contingents, such as the Norwegians, have previously been the focus of Major Haddad's attentions for some time; it appears to be part of his tactics to probe different contingents from time to time. More important, however, is the fact that the Irish contingent controls an area of notable strategic significance in military terms, in particular a ridge that has a commanding position over much of the surrounding country. I do not believe that one needs to look any further for an explanation of the attack on At-tiri and the pressure on the Irish contingent area generally.

These attacks have been continuing off and on over the past two years. The most serious attack, and one that thankfully did not cost any loss of life so far as Irish personnel were concerned, was the shelling of Naquora, the UNIFIL headquarters, in April 1979. These off and on attacks relate to the tactical and strategical situation on the ground as the de facto forces see gaining particular ground as being a factor in regard to controlling the situation.

There has also been some disquiet, naturally, about an apparent press campaign directed against Irish troops and the Irish contingent. I should say that the United Nations have been and are concerned to make the facts available as effectively as possible, and we of course give them any help we can. At the same time I think that all must realise that to engage in a propaganda war would not necessarily serve the interests of peacekeeping and the need for impartiality of those involved. I think that the recent meeting has in any case been most useful in emphasising the common approach of all troop-contributors and the pointlessness of a campaign directed against any one participant in particular. There is also a certain responsibility on newspapermen and journalists to evaluate carefully reports that emanate from the region before giving them further currency.

I should emphasise that the countries which participated in last Friday's meeting are under no illusions that the objectives which they have outlined can be easily achieved. The prime responsibility still rests of course with the Security Council and the Council will have to address itself to these issues again not later than 19 June next when the mandate of UNIFIL again comes up for renewal. The troop-contributing countries have been concerned to make it clear that certain conditions must be met if the Force is to operate effectively and with adequate security for its personnel. In so far as they believe that UNIFIL should have full freedom of movement in the area assigned to it so as to exercise the control that is basic to its functions the troop contributors are asking only for what the Security Council itself has stated to be essential.

Although Ireland was prompted by events affecting our troops to propose the meeting it is now clear from the ready response of other troop-contributors to the suggestion made by Ireland that all were concerned about the present and potential situation of the Force to which all have contributed. It is our hope that by channelling this concern into political and diplomatic action we can help the United Nations bring about the necessary changes.

The Minister for Defence will, I understand, later in the debate comment in detail on the work of the Irish contingent. However, I would not wish to conclude without placing on record once again on behalf of the Government and I believe the whole Irish people our admiration for the impartial, dedicated and competent way in which successive Irish contingents have carried out their very difficult task.

I should like finally to put clearly on the record again in summary form the principles which have guided the Government in their attitude to this meeting and to Ireland's continued participation in UNIFIL.

We believe that over the two years of its existence, and despite many difficulties, UNIFIL has made a significant contribution towards the prevention of an outbreak of general hostilities in the Middle East. Ireland is proud that over these two years the officers and men of our Defence Forces who have volunteered for service with UNIFIL have played their full part in accordance with our best tradition of involvement in UN peacekeeping.

We believe that a withdrawal of the force now could have the most serious consequences and might easily lead to a wider war. We do not want to see such a withdrawal.

We recognise the concerns of the countries and peoples of the region for their security and their rights.

In particular we understand that Israel is deeply concerned about its security. We deplore and condemn attacks from across its border which have brought death or injury to its people, just as we deplore and condemn all acts of violence that bring death or injury to people in the region.

We agreed to take part in UNIFIL because we felt that as a country with a tradition of involvement in UN peacekeeping we could play a helpful part in the effort by the international community to bring some measure of peace and stability and prevent a wider war.

We would deeply regret it if this effort to play our part should be seen as adversely affecting relations between Ireland and Israel.

At the same time we are entitled to insist that if a peacekeeping force is to continue to operate it must be given the necessary conditions to do so effectively: the most basic of these conditions is that the force should operate with consent—a peacekeeping force should not have enemies.

The time has now come to create the necessary conditions for the effective functioning of UNIFIL. The force must be allowed to carry out its mandate in every respect and it must have freedom of movement through the area assigned to it and in conditions of adequate security for its personnel.

The main purpose of our meeting on 2 May was to develop and maintain solidarity between all 11 troop-contributing countries in demanding these conditions. In acting coherently as a group and in bringing our views to the attention of those most directly concerned, I believe we have achieved that purpose.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Today we are afforded the first opportunity of debating the position in the Lebanon and our Middle East policy generally since the May 1978 debate on the sending of Irish troops as part of UNIFIL to the Lebanon. Accordingly we must look at the picture in a broad context and not within the very narrow confines of the UNIFIL operation itself. This leads one to look at how one should conduct one's foreign policy in that area. It seems to me that the Middle East is a very difficult and complex area and that our foreign policy, particularly in that area, must be conducted in a very delicate and sensitive manner. We were fortunate in the past, during Coalition days, when Deputy Garrett FitzGerald was Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he conducted our foreign policy in that and indeed other areas in such a manner as to inspire confidence at home and abroad in our ability to play a role in international affairs. I have to put on record that since the assumption of office by our present Minister, Deputy Lenihan, confidence in the handling of foreign policy issues at home and abroad has been shattered. We have had a situation in which our present Minister—it gives me no great pleasure to say this but I feel it to be my duty—within months of assuming the Fisheries portfolio effectively jettisoned our claim to an exclusive 50-mile limit and within months of his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs, he created a serious imbalance in our Middle East relationships, particularly as a result of the Bahrain communiqué. In both of those portfolios his actions have seriously damaged this country and lead me now to suggest that his talents should be employed in an area other than that dealing with foreign affairs.

I do not think we can consider the position of our troops and UNIFIL in isolation. The Lebanon and that area of the Middle East is a tangled web through which we must tread with sensitivity and diplomacy. There are quite a number of areas to be considered here. Firstly we must consider the position of our troops in Southern Lebanon. As far as we are concerned that is a priority issue. Secondly, we must consider the UNIFIL operation generally. Thirdly, we must consider the position of the Lebanese Government; fourthly, the Palestinian problem; fifthly, our relationships with Israel; sixthly, the activities of Major Haddad and the Christian militia in the area immediately north of the Israeli border; seventhly, the efforts of Egypt and to some extent the United States and the present talks going on in the context of the Camp David agreement; and finally, the involvement of the EEC and the UN and our contribution to that involvement.

Dealing with the position of our troops in the Lebanon and the UNIFIL operation generally I take this opportunity to place on record, on my own behalf and on behalf of my party, our appreciation of their efforts in their peace-keeping role in a very difficult situation in Southern Lebanon. Our Army has a proud tradition in peace-keeping, dating back to the days of the Congo and they are continuing today to add to that proud tradition. It is only proper that we should say in this House, in the Parliament of their land, how proud we are of their efforts.

It is proper also to recall that in the May 1978 debate the original resolution referred to the dispatch of a contingent for service outside the State as part of UNIFIL for the performance of peace-keeping duties of a police character. It is important that we keep in mind that the function of the UNIFIL is not that of a warlike body. We must recall that these UNIFIL troops are sent there for the performance of duties of a police character in an effort to separate the various warring elements in the area.

In the light of the present situation there we must discuss the ability of UNIFIL, because of their peace-keeping role, because of the police character of that role, to fulfil the United Nations mandate, which had three components. There was, firstly, the job of confirming the withdrawal of the Israeli forces who had invaded north to the Litani River and who were to withdraw south to their own borders. There was, secondly, the job of restoring international peace and security; and, thirdly, the assisting of the Government of the Lebanon in ensuring the return of their effective authority in that area. We are faced with the situation that because the first part of the mandate was not fully and effectively established the present difficulties are being undergone by those forces. We can recall that the withdawal of the Israeli troops was to be in three stages. The first and second stages went without difficulty. The Israeli troops withdrew in two separate stages there and the UNIFIL troops took over the area from which the Israelis had withdrawn.

Unfortunately, and this goes back to the very beginning, the third stage—that is the withdrawal of the Israeli troops in the approximately ten mile wide zone north of their own border—was not completed in the same way because when the Israelis withdrew they left behind the forces of Major Haddad and the Christian militia. The result was that on the Israelis withdrawal the UNIFIL troops were unable to take control of that area. This has to be borne in mind and it has to be borne in mind that from the very beginning this militia force supported and financed by Israel was in such a position that the UNIFIL troops were unable to establish their effective mandate over that vital area of ground immediately north of the Israeli border. We therefore have to face some serious questions here as to whether in fact while Major Haddad's forces are there and continue to be financed and armed as they have been, the UNIFIL Force can establish its mandate over that zone. I am not suggesting at all that this should be done by military means. We now stand, as we did two years ago, in the position that the UNIFIL Force continues to be kept out of that area.

I would have hoped that the Minister today in his statement would have dealt with this aspect in more detail because it is one of the most vital aspects of the operations there. After the meeting last Friday a communique indicated that all the UNIFIL states might withdraw if Major Haddad stayed. I have seen that the efforts to convince Israel to withdraw their support from Major Haddad do not appear to have been successful. I see in The Irish Times of today, on page 1, a statement of a senior UN official that “The UNIFIL peace-keeping mandate in southern Lebanon is now in jeopardy because of the stated intention of the Israelis to continue supporting the irregular forces of Major Sa'ad Haddad in defiance of the UN Security Council”. I would have hoped that the Minister would have given more of an indication as to the outlook of the Irish Government in that situation. There appears to be a suggestion of further meetings. One in Norway was mentioned and, of course, there was the question of the renewal of the mandate in June. Perhaps some “Government” speaker will deal with this later in detail, as the question has been raised.

In regard to the meeting last Friday, I thought it was a good idea. I believe that discussions between the various bodies including UNIFIL would be helpful. Unfortunately however whether such a meeting could be categorised as successful, as indicated in the Minister's speech, is a moot point. It certainly did not do any harm. It certainly engendered and will continue to engender a degree of solidarity and open lines of communication among those countries contributing to UNIFIL. However the vital issue does not appear to have been discussed. This is: what will be the position of those countries in the event of Major Haddad continuing to occupy the area which he does occupy in the event of arms and finance continuing to be supplied to him and thus ensuring the support of his militia in that area? It is clear that the co-operation of Israel is needed and if it is not forthcoming we shall have to bear in mind the very considerable influence of the United States on Israel. The question must be raised of obtaining the total support and commitment of the United States to the UN resolution. The connection is very clear. The United States supply Israel with arms; Israel supplies the Haddad forces with arms. The same arises in the financial circumstances.

One point I would like to return to is the standardisation of the equipment among our troops there. This suggestion was made seriously by me last week and after discussion and consultation with officers of our Army, many of whom I met when I visited them in the Lebanon. While we accept that our role there is a peace-keeping one and that our weaponry should be in a defensive category I suggest seriously that, if only from the psychological point of view, it is important that our troops be armed with armaments of at least an equivalent range and accuracy as those of the Haddad militia. In that context I throw out the suggestion of the possibility of our troops in the UNIFIL Force being supplied with TOW anti-tank missiles and .5 heavy machine guns. From my discussions there it was mentioned to me that certain of our armaments, light machine guns and mortars, do not have the range and accuracy to counter the armaments of the Haddad militia. I am not raising any scare about the inadequacy of our armaments but I put it forward as a serious suggestion that was made to me by serving officers.

Another point that must be discussed is the position of the UN headquarters at Naquora. It is clear in the context of the present situation that it is causing a lot of difficulty to the operations there to have the UN headquarters in the middle of a zone over which the UNIFIL troops do not exercise their mandate. I appreciate the difficulties about removing the headquarters, the possible danger of lending a degree of legitimacy to the Haddad situation by a pull-out of the headquarters at Naquora, but consideration will have to be given to possibly relocating part of the operation in a more accessible location while at the same time allowing to continue in Naquora possibly the Norwegian hospital unit and other parts of the operation. In other words, I am not recommending a pull-out from Naquora but I think consideration will have to be given to the relocation of certain parts of the UN headquarters established there.

In considering the operation in the Lebanon one must look at the position of the Lebanese Government. We must recall the disastrous civil war in that country which left 50,000 people dead in 1975 and 1976 and the split that occurred in the army. We must not forget that this established the present unhappy situation in that country. When I visited Beirut I was told on good authority that in the Lebanon there are 25 different armed groups outside the UNIFIL contingent in the Lebanon, 25 groups, many of them with conflicting outlooks. It is clear on the ground there the difficulties of the Lebanese Government in establishing effective control when one has to go through as many as a dozen checkpoints manned by different groups when one travels even a short journey in the Lebanon. However, we must bear in mind that the original mandate envisaged possibly as the main part of its operation, that the job of the UNIFIL troops would be to assist the Government of the Lebanon in ensuring a return of their effective authority in the area. As I understand it the up-to-date situation is that fairly successful efforts have been made in the re-establishment of the Lebanese national army which has now about 25,000 men. Discussions will have to take place on how these people can be brought more and more into some type of joint operation with the UNIFIL troops. I understand certain contingents are operating with some of the battalions there, but in the long term we will have to try more and more to involve the new Lebanese army in that operation so that the UNIFIL troops can be withdrawn secure in the knowledge that effective control of the area is in the hands of the Lebanese Government.

The other major component in the problem—and many would say it is the key to the solution of many of the problems not only in the Lebanon but in the Middle East—is that relating to the Palestinians. This is something that has to be discussed in this context. It is clear to all who have taken an interest in this area that a solution to the Palestinian problem ultimately will have to be found and unless and until it is found there will not be peace in that area. That is not to say it is the only problem there and that securing a solution to that problem will establish peace, but one can put it in the negative fashion and say that without securing a solution there will not be peace.

Our position and that of the EEC was stated in September 1979 by the Minister for Finance, Deputy O'Kennedy, on behalf of this country and the Community when he spoke at the United Nations. This statement was very carefully worded. It recognised the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. It recognised their right to a homeland and, through their representatives, to play a full part in the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement. That statement by the Minister was very carefully worded and one he was delivering with the full support of the EEC. Then came the Bahrein communiqué and to a considerable degree it burst like a bombshell on the diplomatic scene and on the Middle East scene. This communiqué referred to an independent State in Palestine, to recognition of the role of the PLO and to withdrawal by Israel from Jerusalem. One has to say that this communiqué must be faulted. I can see that time will not permit me to discuss it in too much detail.

The communiqué can be faulted on at least six grounds. It made no mention of the right of Israel to exist secure and guaranteed within its pre-1967 borders. There was no official declaration from the PLO prior to the issue of that communiqué about its links with the IRA here. There were no concrete assurances with regard to the PLO activities in the UNIFIL area and infiltration across it to the Israeli border. We have to bear in mind that despite the current difficulties with Major Haddad and his militia difficulties have been experienced by UNIFIL with the Palestinians and the PLO. The Fijians lost five or six of their troops who were shot in a fracas with the Palestinians. This brings us to the question of the balance we are trying to find and maintain between the PLO and the Palestinians.

The fourth aspect on which I would question the Bahrain communiqué is that there was no indication in it of our nonacceptance of the PLO covenant calling for the destruction of the State of Israel. Fifthly, there was no indication of our recognition of the complex position of Jerusalem. That is something that has been the subject of such discussion going back for many long years, back to the Vatican proposals that Jerusalem should be a city with international status because of its holy places revered by many hundreds of millions of people of different religions. It is certainly a complex question which cannot be disposed of in the manner in which it was disposed of in the Bahrain communiqué. Lastly, that communiqué was seen in international terms as being opportunistic, lacking credibility and as being related solely to the oil situation in the world. Hardheaded people will know well that our supplies of oil and the price we pay for them are not related in any way in the views we take on the Palestinian question.

What is important in the context of this debate is that in view of our involvement through the UN in that area it has been and will continue to be necessary for us to be cautious, diplomatic and balanced in our approach. I accept that we are entitled to express sympathy and support for the position of the Palestinians but that has to be balanced by an outlook that would not disrupt relationships with Israel and the other countries. In that context, the Bahrain communiqué was a major blunder. Another aspect that must be recognised in dealing with the Palestinian question is that there are separate elements in the PLO, some moderate and some extremely radical and our diplomatic efforts and responsibilities in the Palestinian situation have to be related to the support that can be given to the Palestinian moderate elements as opposed to the extremely radical ones, those who believe in diplomatic initiatives and efforts rather than those who believe in outright terrorism. We also have to bear in mind the position of the Palestinians on the West Bank. I recall a remark made having discussed the situation with one of the mayors of the West Bank in relation to the PLO and the future possibility with regard to Palestinians generally. The remark, in reply to a question about the return of the Palestinians was that the Palestinians were welcome to return to the West Bank from the refugee camps outside the area provided they came with an olive branch and not with a gun. It is important to bear in mind that the outlook of the Palestinians in that area may be slightly different from that of those who live in the refugee camps.

In the context of this debate we must also consider the position of Israel and our relationship with Israel. I am glad that the Minister's statement made it clear that despite our difficulties with Israel, those difficulties do not arise in a bilateral capacity but simply because of our involvement in a UN operation. It is important to bear in mind that our difficulties with Israel arise from their backing for the Haddad militia and their virtual refusal to co-operate in the implementation of the UN resolution both in the letter and in the spirit. Our difficulty arises because that impedes us as part of the UNIFIL force in doing the job we have been asked to do by the UN. In considering our relationship with Israel we have to understand that every one of them, from their Foreign Minister, Mr. Shamir, to all the officials with whom I discussed the position, evidenced this seige mentality—the fact that they were alone with hordes of other countries around them seeking the destruction of their State. Any objective observer will also have to look at the fractured state of their Government at the moment which is leading to these attempts to establish settlements which are causing so much trouble in the area. Basically, we have to make it clear in our representations to them that our row is not with them as between Ireland and Israel but that our difficulties are related solely to our efforts to carry out a UN operation.

Israel has been requesting for many years to have an embassy established here. They have had diplomatic relations with us since the foundation of their State, but they never had the opportunity of having an embassy here although they have been pressing from time to time to have one established. If the Minister or Foreign Affairs officials wish to discuss anything with the Israelis they have to send to them in London for such discussions. The fact that they lack an embassy here means that the possibility of more effective communication with the Israelis is lost. In that regard serious consideration should now be given to exchanging the establishment of embassies as between Dublin and Tel Aviv. There is also the question of restoring the balance which has been put out of plumb by the Bahrain communiqué, the effect it would have in the United States where we have to concentrate a certain amount of our diplomatic effort as a nation and through the UN and through the UNIFIL countries, so that they can in turn assert their influence on Israel.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy has five minutes.

Mr. O'Keeffe

There is the question of the difficulties that arise from lack of information. There is clearly a lot of propaganda emanating from Israel and other quarters about the UNIFIL troops and about the Irish troops. If we had an embassy in Israel in exchange for one established in Dublin there would be the possibility, through an information officer, of ensuring that propaganda was countered effectively. There is always the long-term situation about trade and so forth.

They are some of the main points I was interested in making—time will not permit me to go into much more detail. How do we control the activities of Major Haddad? How can we assure the Israelis that the UNIFIL troops control that zone and that the Israelis must co-operate with those troops to establish control of that zone?

I should refer briefly to the Egyptians and to the Camp David talks while discussing the establishment of peace in that area. There is the question of what we can do in co-operation with our EEC partners to have a more effective voice in securing ultimate peace and an ultimate settlement in that area. It is very important that those involved at Government level should see the practical difficulties in this matter. We have had an opportunity to visit our troops and to meet various bodies with an interest in the Lebanon, including the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Israeli Foreign Minister.

From the point of view of the morale of our troops and the recognition of the job they are doing, I suggest to the Minister that he should visit our troops, accompanied by an all-party delegation, to indicate our support here for their efforts. Such a party would not be going on a picnic, but we have a duty to help to maintain the morale of our troops serving with the UN force. Such a delegation could avail of that opportunity to have discussions with the Israelis.

Time does not permit me to deal with this problem in greater detail but I hope we will have a further opportunity soon to discuss the position of our UNIFIL troops.

Mr. Cluskey

I sought this debate in the hope, forlorn as it now turns out, that the Government might explain or try to justify some of their actions in the political and diplomatic spheres on the Lebanon situation. I say that it has been a forlorn hope because if one reads the Minister's speech it becomes clear he was far more concerned with the Government's political plank than explaining the situation in the Lebanon or justifying his own and the Government's contribution towards the deteriorating situation there.

I should like to make one thing clear. As far as this party are concerned we have a particular pride in the operation of our troops serving with UNIFIL. Our only criticism might be that they were too restrained, too disciplined and not sufficiently aggressive to engage the forces who fired on them. Otherwise we can be proud of our troops there.

On the other hand, we are highly critical of the Government's political and diplomatic policy in this regard which I believe—and I do not say this lightly—particularly with regard to the Bahrain communiqué, was a major factor in contributing to the deteriorating situation which resulted in the deaths of three Irish soldiers. I believe that that statement in Bahrain contributed to that end result. There has been no justification given for that statement nor has there been an attempt by the Government to justify it or their policy towards the Middle East. They have never attempted to justify in this House that policy either in political or diplomatic terms. We have a right to demand such justification in this House. The time has long gone for it, but at least let the Minister take this opportunity to do that in this House for the benefit of the Irish people.

There have been very tragic consequences for our soldiers in the Labanon and the danger is still there. It is a very complex situation and naturally our anger and most of our worries have been directed against the Israeli Government, and rightly so, for their support of the de facto force of Major Haddad. He could not operate or last 48 hours in the Lebanon if he had not the full backing, the full military, financial and moral suport of the Israeli Government.

Our troops serving in the Lebanon are there as a peacekeeping force with other national contingents and with the agreement of the Israeli Government. The arrangements under which they undertook to go into the Lebanon were that the Israeli army which had invaded the Lebanon would be withdrawn right back across Israel and that the occupied land would be handed over to the UN forces. Of course, the Israelis drew back a certain part of the way towards their own border, but they left approximately a five-mile strip without handing it over to the UN forces as a buffer zone between them and people they believed with considerable justification were threatening their very existence, the PLO.

One of the most remarkable features of the Minister's speech this morning is that in that whole speech the PLO and their contribution to the situation in the Lebanon are not mentioned once. The Minister talked about the de facto forces under Major Haddad, which we all agree with, and other UN soldiers from different contingents being killed by other armed elements. As the Minister knows, the other armed elements are the PLO.

Mr. Lenihan

Yes.

Mr. Cluskey

It is "yes" now. It was not "yes" when the Minister was presenting his case to this House.

Mr. Lenihan

That is the official name.

Mr. Cluskey

You were determined to do as much as you could——

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Deputy Cluskey, through the Chair.

Mr. Lenihan

The Deputy does not understand fully. That is the official term.

Mr. Cluskey

Your lack of understanding, I would go so far as to say your total ignorance——

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Deputy Cluskey through the Chair without interruption.

Mr. Cluskey

——of the whole situation in the Middle East——

Mr. Lenihan

The Deputy should grow up.

Mr. Cluskey

——when you made the statement in Bahrain was a major factor in the developments which have taken place in the Lebanon. Let us look at the Lebanon before the Israeli invasion. Before doing that, I want to place this on the record. I condemn the State of Israel for their continued support of Major Haddad and the de facto forces. I condemn them for their defiance of the communiqué issued after last Friday's meeting and the wishes of the UN, and for their breach of the agreement they entered into in the mandate by not handing over to the UN forces.

Let us look at how the situation developed in the Lebanon. The Lebanon was a French colony. It was occupied by the French for a number of years. When it got its independence—in many respects like our own country—it had two communities, two different religious groupings. It had an unwritten constitution which tried to allow for the fact that there were two religious groupings, two traditions, in the country. It worked very successfully for a number of years. I recall that in 1972, 1973 and 1974 people here were looking at the situation in the Lebanon because it had worked so well, and wondering could it be applied here in Northern Ireland.

It was recognised as the most successful country in the Middle East. It was economically very sound and very prosperous. It also had the virtue of being one of the few parliamentary democracies in the Middle East, apart from Israel. In Jordan the PLO were building up considerable strength. They were operating a state within a state. It developed to such a pitch that the King of Jordan and the Jordanian authorities came to the conclusion that it had to end. There was a pitched battle between the Jordanian army and the PLO. It took place in the capital city, Amman, and, as a result of their defeat in Jordan the PLO moved into the Lebanon. This country was very delicately balanced and the influx of the PLO and the forces and pressures which they brought to bear within that society led to the civil war there, led to the situation which developed in the Lebanon. It was the reason given, again with some justification, although I am not trying to justify an invasion, why the Israeli army moved into the Lebanon. It was being used by the PLO for direct assaults against Israel.

Under the covenant of the PLO, their aim is the total annihilation of Israel. When I asked the Minister, after his Bahrain statement, was he aware of this, or had he got any undertaking from the PLO that they were prepared to abandon that principle, the Minister's reply—it is on the record of the House—was "what covenant"? The Minister is the man who is in charge of our foreign affairs, the man who made the statement in Bahrain recognising the PLO. At that time the whole emphasis of the Minister's contribution in the House was on the question of the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland. The implication of that statement and bluster about the rights of the Palestinian people was that we were not in favour of that. That we were against the Palestinian people, that we did not believe that they had a right to a homeland, which is totally contrary to the truth.

We believe in the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland. We always have. The Minister recognised the PLO. The whole justification for their very existence is the elimination of the state of Israel. They have engaged over the years in international terrorism and have never publicly disowned or abandoned that fundamental aim, the elimination of the state of Israel.

The Minister recognises the PLO because they are in favour of a Palestinian homeland. Could I ask the Minister a hypothetical question? The Provisional IRA are in favour of a united Ireland. Is the Minister saying we should recognise the Provisional IRA as the legitimate spokesmen of the people of Northern Ireland, or even of the minority in Northern Ireland? That is the logic of the Minister's attempted justification of his recognition of the PLO.

Our country is very small. Over the years our Army have made a considerable contribution to peace-keeping efforts by the United Nations. A situation has developed in the Lebanon in which there are warring factors. The major warring factors in the situation in which we were called in, were the Israeli army, the de facto forces, and the PLO. We were sent in there to police the situation and our major task was to stop infiltration by the PLO into the state of Israel while they were engaging in terrorist acts.

While we have 700 of our troops there in that very delicate operation, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanying our President on a State visit to Bahrain makes a statement in which he recognises a terrorist organisation as the "legitimate voice of the Palestinian people." The full implications of that statement would appear not to have registered with the Irish people at the time, but as a result of the very tragic events concerning some of our troops since then our people have been paying a lot of attention to the stand taken by the Government on the question of the PLO. One can only judge the effect on the whole Middle East area by way of the views being expressed on that statement by the various sides concerned. When a view is expressed by one side it has an effect on the view to be taken by the other side. In this regard I should like to quote from The Palestinian Report for March, 1980. This publication emanated from the London office of the PLO. I am interested particularly in a reference to our President. Under the heading “Ireland leads EEC on Palestine Question”, there is the following observation:

In a joint Irish-Bahrein declaration issued on 10th February, at the end of a state visit to the Gulf State by Irish President Patrick Hillery, Eire's Foreign Minister Mr. Brian Lenihan praised PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and said he would have no objection to holding talks with him. The Irish pronouncement is seen by observers as de facto recognition of the PLO.

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation has welcomed the new Irish position, declaring that it hopes Ireland's recognition of the right of the Palestinians to an independent state in Palestine will be recognised by other European countries.

The PLO's official spokesman, Mahmoud Labadi, said, "We appreciate the new position of the Irish Republic expressed by the President and the Foreign Minister".

I am sure that is incorrect and that our President on a State visit——

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy is aware that we cannot involve the President in any debate here.

Mr. Cluskey

It is my anxiety to ensure that the President is not involved.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

I am asking the Deputy to get away from the point that involves the President. This is in accordance with a long standing rule of the House.

Mr. Cluskey

It is a rule with which I agree totally, but I am anxious to ensure that the position of the President in matters such as this will be maintained. The paragraph continues:

He added, "We hope that the European countries will recognise the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people, and the right of the Palestinians to establish their own independent state."

Not only have we 700 troops in the Lebanon and not only are we seen in that very delicately balanced position to extend recognition to the PLO but we are put forward in their official publication as leading the rest of Europe on this question. What effect could that have on the situation, on the tension and the dangers for our men serving in the Lebanon, without there being any justification for it? What was the political need or the desirability of such a statement being issued? What was the diplomatic justification for it? I should like answers to these questions although I have my own ideas as to why the statement was made. I believe it to have been made in the private commercial interests of Irish nationals who are closely associated with Fianna Fáil. My reason for saying this goes back to 1974 or 1975 when as Parliamentary Secretary in the Coalition Government I took part in an all-party delegation that had been invited by the Arab League to visit Libya. The invitations were issued to individual members of the three political parties and I sought and received the permission of the then Government to take part in the delegation. We went there just after the Claudia affair. One of the reasons for my going to Libya was to try to ensure in so far as possible that the real nature of the Provisional IRA was made known to the Libyan authorities and that we might exercise as much influence as possible on them to stop supplying the Provisional IRA or to desist from giving them support of any kind.

One of the members of that delegation is now a member of the Cabinet. I refer to the Minister for Agriculture. Our first meeting was with the President of the Arab League at the time. There was one person on the delegation who was not a parliamentarian. He was there to engage in discussions on trade between Ireland and Libya. There was a disagreement between the Fianna Fáil representatives and myself regarding the eligibility of that gentleman to attend meetings of a political nature. My objection was based on his not being representative of any political party, that he was representing his own interests. In the event I refused to attend any meeting of a political nature with that gentleman. This led to conflict on the spot, and because we were accompanied by Irish journalists the incident was given considerable publicity at home.

At the first meeting we had in Libya the message to the Irish delegation was that Libya was now a very wealthy but an underdeveloped country, that she was engaged in massive development and there were boundless opportunities of an economic nature for any country or, indeed, for any individual who would be disposed favourably towards Libyan foreign policy and to their attitudes to some problems in the world. They made it clear that they looked for a commitment from us as a parliamentary delegation regarding our attitude toward Israel and towards the PLO and also our attitude towards a solution of the Northern Ireland problem. There were between eight and 12 Members of this House present when this was said, and the reply that I gave and with which, in fairness, no one dissociated himself was that as far as Israel was concerned, our position was that of the UN as set out in Resolution 242 and to which our Government has subscribed. As far as Northern Ireland was concerned we would be very interested to enter into a full discussion with them during our stay, but only as parliamentarians and not allowing people who were non-representative to participate in that meeting.

It is known to me and others—and I do not say this lightly—that there are Irish nationals engaged in very considerable commercial transactions within the Arab world, particularly Libya. These same people are very closely associated with the present, I emphasise that, administration. Some of them were very prominent members of Fianna Fáil——

Mr. Lenihan

That is contemptible.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Chair intervenes here, not the Minister. The Deputy should not make allegations against people outside the House because it is not within the rules of the House.

Mr. Cluskey

So far I have not named anybody.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

We are sailing very close to the wind.

Mr. Cluskey

If I attempt to, it is then time enough for the Chair to intervene, because up to then he has no function in the matter.

An Leas Cheann Comhairle

We are sailing very close to the wind. The Chair must intervene at this stage.

Mr. Cluskey

When I sail closer to it you can intervene, but there will be no smokescreen here. This matter is too serious. I am making a statement here and the Minister will have an opportunity to reply. These people left Fianna Fáil because of the arms trial and because of what they regarded as a dove attitude towards the North in the seventies. I believe they were largely instrumental in the change of foreign policy announced in Bahrein by the Minister.

Mr. Lenihan

That is not true.

Mr. Cluskey

I am making that statement, but I am not making it lightly. The Minister can get up and have his say and give us some legitimate, political——

Mr. Lenihan

Tone down.

Mr. Cluskey

It is very easy to say "tone down" but in these circumstances it is not easy to do. I believe that was the major factor which influenced our recognition of the PLO. I can see no political or diplomatic justification in the circumstances in which our armed forces found themselves for taking such a step. The Minister had three or four opportunities either at Question Time or in making statements to the House to attempt to justify our very dramatic change towards the PLO and the situation in the Middle East, but he never attempted to do that.

I have made this statement to underline the seriousness of this situation and to give the Minister every opportunity today to justify in political and diplomatic terms the decision and the communiqué in Bahrain. If he can do that, let the Irish people decide what motivated the Government in issuing that communiqué in present circumstances. As I said, that decision and that communiqué contributed to very tragic events. As far as our people in the Lebanon are concerned, they are not out of the woods yet. I will leave it at that.

Minister for Defence (Mr. Faulkner)

I would like to express sympathy once again to the relatives of the three Irish soldiers recently killed in the service of the United Nations in Lebanon. I hope that those injured will soon be restored to full health. On this occasion I think it would be fitting to remember the casualties sustained by other nationalities who have contributed troops to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. All these tragic events underline the serious situation existing in that troubled area and the urgent need for strong support for the United Nations in their efforts to attain their objectives of maintaining peace and restoring the rule of law in south Lebanon. This country has consistently supported the policy of the United Nations in regard to peace-keeping missions which have worked well to defuse tension. Our strength in maintaining this support has lain in the fact that as a small nation Ireland has no ambition to involve herself directly in conflict elsewhere in the world.

We recognise the value of international involvement in peace-keeping and have contributed actively and continuously to it for the past 22 years, from the time in 1958 when the first group of officers left Ireland for Lebanon to participate in the United Nations Observer Group which was then being set up. Our firm commitment to peace-keeping has been based, among other things, on the belief that the co-operation of all the conflicting sides is essential to a satisfactory outcome of any mission undertaken. This co-operation has been available in other mission areas.

It is sad to have to say that it was the absence of such co-operation that led to the death of Private Griffin and to the murder of Privates Smallhorne and Barrett, all three of whom had volunteered for service in Lebanon. This country's commitment to peace-keeping could not have been so well demonstrated had not successive generations of our young soldiers been willing and eager to volunteer for United Nations service, a tradition which, I am happy to say, remains unshaken, despite the tragic events of the past few weeks.

In response to the Secretary-General's request to provide a contingent for UNIFIL, Ireland provided a contingent of approximately 750 all ranks in May 1978. Since then the Government have four times extended their approval for the supply of a contingent and the Irish troops now serving in Lebanon comprise the fifth Irish contingent. The numerical strength of the contingent has varied over the past two years having regard to United Nations requirements and to exigencies at home. The strength of the present contingent is about 670 all ranks, comprising one battalion of 595 all ranks in the Irish battalion area of operations, a camp command element of 48 all ranks at UNIFIL headquarters at Naquora, and about 27 UNIFIL headquarters staff.

To date about 3,500 Irish troops, including the present contingent, have served in Lebanon. These contingents together with those supplied by other nations have come together under the direction of the Secretary-General and the command of the Force Commander, Major-General Erskine, to form the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. The mission of the Force is to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in that area. In the discharge of that mission all these different nationalities have been fused together as an international United Nations Force under the control of the United Nations. It is a great pity that they have not had the co-operation so necessary to allow them to get on with their peace-keeping work.

The situation arising from the recent tragic deaths of Irish soldiers and also of military personnel of other contributing countries prompted this country to call together all the troop-contributing countries to discuss the serious difficulties experienced by UNIFIL in its efforts to carry out its mandate in south Lebanon. I can assure Deputies—as the Minister for Foreign Affairs has done already—that this move by Ireland, which one might term a landmark in peacekeeping, was praised as an excellent initiative. From the unanimous and warm response to the initiative it was quite clear that all of the countries involved, while recognising the need for supporting and contributing to UNIFIL, appreciated the urgent necessity for creating conditions in the mission area in which the Force and its personnel could operate safely and effectively. The feeling of the meeting was that the troop-contributing countries could strongly support the Secretary-General in his efforts to secure the proper conditions for the Force personnel while, at the same time, recognising that the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council, has the responsibility for the peace-keeping operation. If UNIFIL were to fail in its efforts in south Lebanon the implications would go far beyond the mission area and the whole concept of peacekeeping would be in the balance.

One significant result of this unique meeting was the stated intention of the Governments of the troop-contributing states to monitor developments through continuing regular meetings and their intention to meet again at Ministerial level to review progress. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs has said already, the Minister for Defence of Norway pointed out that not only was his country willing to host the next meeting but would be very anxious to do so.

The strongest impression emanating from the meeting was the unanimous commitment of the participating countries to the concept of peacekeeping and their will to support fully the Secretary General in his efforts to create conditions which would permit the Force to operate effectively. Some facts which had been clear for some time were reiterated at the meeting. The de facto forces have resisted UNIFIL attempts to extend its controls over the full area covered by the mandate. These forces have regularly harassed and attacked UNIFIL and the local population. Also groups of the so-called armed elements are still in UNIFIL's area of operation. These factors have inhibited UNIFIL's ability to discharge its responsibilities effectively and have denied UNIFIL full freedom of movement within its area of operation. In that regard I do not think it is too much to expect that all parties to the conflict in the Middle East should recognise and respect the peace-keeping role of the United Nations and afford the United Nations Force personnel the co-operation which is their due and which is essential for the successful completion of the Force's mandate. United Nations soldiers on a peace-keeping mission are not the enemies of any party involved in a conflict. Their stock-in-trade consists of negotiation and persuasion with impartiality, instruments which in past peace-keeping missions have proved remarkably effective.

I sincerely trust that all those who can influence the situation in south Lebanon will now appreciate, as a result of continuing diplomatic and political initiatives, including the meeting in Dublin last Friday, that the security of their personnel in the mission area is of paramount importance to the troop-contributing countries. All elements should also understand that their co-operation in establishing proper conditions for the discharge of the Force's mandate is regarded by the troop-contributing countries as essential if the Force is to be fully effective. In that regard it must be manifest to anyone who has studied the situation that, with all the limitations and harassment, the Force has had to contend with, UNIFIL has made a significant contribution over the past two years towards the prevention of an outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. I hope that all parties to the conflict will now see the serious consequences for peace and stability in the region which could flow from a policy of non-co-operation with the efforts of the United Nations Force to discharge its mandate and that failure of the United Nations efforts could well lead to much wider conflicts. The success of the diplomatic initiatives at present being taken is of vital importance if the United Nations Force is to be given a reasonable opportunity, including full freedom of movement within the whole of its area of operations, to pursue its mission to a satisfactory conclusion.

I can say that Irish contingents serving with UNIFIL are better equipped for their peace-keeping role than any other Irish contingents that have served with other United Nations missions. This may be due to some extent to the call for a self-sufficient contingent but it is due also in very large measure to the careful planning of the military staffs at home and in the mission area. The battalion is self-sufficient in communications; it has its own transport, maintenance and engineering services which include a capability for clearing mines. Included in the battalion is a reconnaissance group of armed vehicles consisting of armoured personnel carriers and armoured cars. There is also a platoon of heavy mortars, and an adequate number of anti-tank weapons are deployed throughout the battalion. In general their equipment compares favourably with that of other contingents and their overall defensive capability is certainly of a very high standard. In the operations on the ground the Irish contingent co-operate with other contingents and have in turn, the back-up resources of these elements of the Force where the UNIFIL authorities see a necessity for such a service, as indeed they did not very long ago at At-tiri. We should keep in mind the fact that UNIFIL is a peace-keeping force and is not in the business of escalation of hostilities in its mission area, a policy which would have disastrous results for the local population and for the effectiveness of UNIFIL. Its main armoury consists of negotiation and persuasion in which qualities such as patience, tact and impartiality are far more effective than armed force. If the Force is to retain its effectiveness as a peace-keeping agent it must continue with its policies of working towards the restoration of peace through the means utilised up to the present.

Other services provided with the contingent include a medical platoon consisting of two medical officers, one dental officer and supporting staff who, in addition to looking after the general health of the Irish personnel, are providing medical and dental support for the local population as part of the general procedure operated on such missions. The health of the personnel is maintained at a high level due to the dedicated medical staff.

I should say here, partly as a counter to the rather strident propaganda emanating from certain quarters in the area, that there is ample evidence to show that the Irish troops are popular with the local population and that their presence has been welcomed by villagers within their area.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Hear, hear.

Mr. Faulkner

The services provided in these areas by the Irish troops in health and in other ways are very much appreciated by the local people, many of whom have been able to return to their homes and to lead normal lives because of the presence of Irish troops and the protection from harassment which they give in the course of the discharge of their duties. Schools have been reopened and normal commercial activities have been resumed throughout the villages. Tobacco crops, the main cash crop in this area, have been planted, harvested and marketed. None of this would have been possible without the help and protection provided by the Irish contingent, and the local people have on many occasions expressed their thanks and appreciation and the desire for a continuing United Nations presence in the area.

That, of course, will not surprise Deputies. Irish personnel have established for themselves a very high standard of performance in all their theatres of operation. This has been fostered by the inclusion in each contingent of a number of experienced officers and NCOs who ensure continuity of the approach to peacekeeping necessary for such achievements.

As regards the operational situation involving the Irish troops, the phasing out of the United Nation's Emergency Force in the Sinai in 1979 resulted in the provision of a contingent from Ghana for UNIFIL. This battalion became fully operational last September. The provision of this contingent, increasing the number of infantry battalions from seven to eight, necessitated some redeployment of the force.

This redeployment in the southeastern part of the central sector entailed a significant reduction in the area of operations of the Irish battalion. The Secretary General, reporting to the Security Council last December, noted that this redeployment reduced the operational strain on the Irish battalion. As the Irish area had been of considerable size and complexity, this move was a very welcome relief. This was, as I pointed out, in 1979.

In the same report, the Secretary General noted that there were increasing attempts by the de facto forces to encroach upon the UNIFIL area of deployment while, at the same time, there were increasing attempts by the armed elements to infiltrate the UNIFIL area. As encroachments by the de facto forces and infiltrations by the armed elements are closely linked, one leading to the other, both problems must be tackled simultaneously. In the Irish area of operation, the main problem arises from the actions of the de facto forces, but the main problem for some of the other battalions stems from the actions of the armed elements. The de facto forces have established four positions inside the UNIFIL area, two in the Irish area of operations at Rshaf and Bayt Yahun, and have so far refused to withdraw from these positions. This has made it more difficult for UNIFIL to stop infiltration by armed elements and to reduce the number of those elements in its area. The efforts by UNIFIL to stop and contain the attempts at encroachment and infiltration led to a number of incidents, some of which were serious, involving UNIFIL personnel.

The incidents last month, which resulted in the deaths of three Irish soldiers, arose directly from such an attempt by the de facto forces to establish a permanent post at the village of At-tiri in the Irish area of operations. This village is in a very strategic position and the de facto forces have been attempting, since the Irish battalion was first deployed in the area in 1978, to take over this village. These attempts have been firmly resisted and the de facto forces eventually withdrew to the enclave.

I would point out again that the events of last month were nothing new to the village of At-tiri. This village wishes to remain under United Nations protection. The village leader has stressed this, time and time again. The continued presence of Irish troops in the village will ensure that the villagers are afforded the opportunity to live their normal lives without outside interference.

UNIFIL maintains a number of positions within the enclave controlled by the de facto forces. These positions have also been frequently harassed. In confrontations with de facto forces, the safety of personnel manning these positions must always be borne in mind. Up to recently, four of these positions were occupied by Irish personnel. Three of these positions are now manned by the Norwegian battalion and the fourth, which is the Observer Post Ras, by observers from the United Nation's observation organisation.

I have dealt with the equipment of the contingent and have shown that it is as good as the best in the peace-keeping context. While not wishing to intrude on the responsibilities of the Force Commander, I feel that I should now reassure Deputies that it is the opinion of our military authorities that the guide to the use of force by UNIFIL personnel issued by the Force Commander gives ample power to local commanders to deal with any situation with which they may be confronted. The circumstances in which unarmed or armed force may be used are well defined, and the decision to use force, whether it is unarmed or armed, always rests with the commander on the spot. In such an important aspect of peacekeeping, it is right to leave the final decision to the commander in the area concerned, who would rely on his training and judgment in reaching his decision.

As regards welfare, arrangements exist for the despatch each day of the daily newspapers to the contingent—Sunday papers are also included in this arrangement. A UNIFIL request programme lasting half-an-hour is compiled by RTE each week, with the assistance of the Army Press Office. This programme is broadcast by Radio Cyprus to the troops on Thursday nights. The Army Press Office keeps in regular contact with RTE, with a view to making special programmes about or for the troops serving with UNIFIL. From time to time, RTE and Bord Fáilte send special films from Ireland, while the army commands have their own internal arrangements for sending tapes with local news and requests to their own troops. In an emergency, a soldier overseas can be put in contact with his family at home by telephone. The co-operation of all concerned in relation to these arrangements is much appreciated.

Ancillary services for the contingent include refrigerated trucks for the storage of perishable foodstuffs and water trucks.

Accommodation, which was mostly tentage two years age, has been improved very considerably. Despite the difficulties caused by periodic firing and shelling in the UNIFIL area of operation, considerable progress was achieved by the Force authorities on the transfer of personnel from tents to prefabricated installations, both at Naqoura headquarters and in the field. In the contingent areas, work on the replacement of tented by prefabrication accommodation has continued, and the erection of cookhouses and dining-halls at unit headquarters is proceeding. This programme will continue, and consideration will be given by the Force to the transfer of personnel now in privately-owned buildings to prefabricated accommodation. Most of the prefabricated buildings in the battalion areas have been erected by the battalion engineers on a self-help basis. Tented accommodation, while ideal for summer weather, was not at all comfortable during the winter. Because of the programme outlined above, it is expected that permanent or prefabricated accommodation will be available from now on for all personnel.

It has been the custom to pay overseas allowances to personnel serving with United Nation's peace-keeping forces. The personnel serving with UNIFIL are in receipt of the highest rates of allowances, largely because of the conditions under which they serve. The personnel are allowed to have these amounts credited to their pay accounts at home, and many of them avail of this facility. In addition, personnel receive from the United Nations a local service allowance.

Frequent inspections of the contingent and the conditions under which personnel are serving are made by senior officers. Visits to the troops by the Minister, the Secretary of the Department, the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General or the Quartermaster-General are arranged at appropriate times in consultation with the United Nations. Any improvements deemed necessary as a result of these inspections and visits are dealt with expeditiously. Any matters of particular urgency can get priority by reason of the radio link between the contingent and Army headquarters.

At the moment apart from isolated firing incidents the Irish area is quiet. The roads into the enclave are still closed to Irish personnel, and this restriction is the subject of continuing negotiation by the Force headquarters. The restriction has not affected the current rotation of the Irish contingent, and arrangements are in operation whereby the contingent is being supplied.

Deputy O'Keeffe mentioned a possible visit by the Minister to meet our troops on the ground. I want to make it clear that my immediate reaction on hearing of the wounding of Private Griffin and the circumstances surrounding it was to go at once to the Lebanon. I consulted with the General Staff and they were opposed to such a visit at that time. They pointed out to me that the presence of a Minister in Lebanon in the particular circumstances would create problems for the Irish battalion and for UNIFIL generally. I accepted the validity of their point of view. I will, of course, be quite prepared to go to Lebanon at such time as the military and the United Nations advise that such a visit is opportune.

Mr. O'Keeffe

When the tension has eased will the Minister review the situation?

Mr. Faulkner

Yes. The United Nations are holding an inquiry into the death of the Irish soldiers. This is the course pursued by the United Nations in the case of deaths of UNIFIL personnel. In addition, an Irish inquiry will be held into the deaths in accordance with the relevant Defence Forces Regulations. The inquiry will be conducted by five officers and the prime function will be to establish the facts concerning the deaths of the soldiers. An advance visit to Lebanon has been made by the Deputy Judge Advocate General to make preparations for the inquiry.

I am glad to be able to inform the House that, notwithstanding the tragic losses recently suffered, the morale of the Irish contingent is high and the personnel are continuing in their dealings with the people of south Lebanon to observe the strict impartiality that is so necessary for the success of their mission. There is no shortage of volunteers for United Nations service, which remains popular with members of the Defence Forces. At no stage during the past 20 years has it been necessary to invoke the legal provisions which require personnel to serve with United Nations forces. Indeed, any complaints that have been received recently relate to some personnel who were disappointed when the latest contingent took up duty because of a slight cut in strength requested by the United Nations. I hope these personnel can be facilitated in the future.

Deputies may be assured that I will continue to do all in my power to ensure that the Irish contingent will have all the support and assistance that the State can provide in their difficult task—not only through the supply of necessary material but also through close monitoring of their day-to-day needs without, of course, intruding on the authority of the Force Commander and his staff. Deputies may also be assured that the intensive efforts now being made to support the Secretary General in his efforts to secure proper conditions for the effective operation of the Force will be pursued vigorously in conjunction with other troop-contributing countries.

Mr. M. Cosgrave

Because of the delicate position in the Middle East I am conscious of my responsibility in contributing to this debate. I am also aware that nothing should be said that will heighten international tension in the area.

I welcome most of the matters discussed at the meeting in Dublin on 2 May by representatives of governments who have contributed troops to the UNIFIL force. I recognise that the State of Israel has rights and that those rights should be protected, as the Minister rightly pointed out. I also recognise that the State of Lebanon has rights. I was disappointed that in the statement of 2 May the Minister did not cover some other serious matters.

I asked the Minister in the House previously about the situation at Naqoura, the headquarters of the UNIFIL force, and he promised me that he would take up the matter at the meeting. The Minister is well aware that this is a serious matter. The headquarters of the UNIFIL force is situated in the Christian enclave and it comes under harassment from the Haddad forces from time to time. On my visit there the road leading to the headquarters was blocked by Christian militia. The high ground around the headquarters is manned by Christian militia and from time to time they fire rounds of ammunition into the headquarters. When I was there I was informed by the medical staff that a soldier of the Norwegian force had been hit from this high ground around the headquarters at Naqoura. This harassment is continuing not only in Naqoura but in the Christian militia enclave controlled by Major Haddad. I want to put on the record of the House, as Deputy O'Keeffe has done already, the fact that the Israeli backing of Haddad is the serious problem. Not alone is Israel backing Haddad with military equipment, they are also backing him with money. Haddad can move freely in the area and be a menace to peace and a serious threat to our troops.

I would point out to the Minister that after several days of debate at the United Nations in New York the Security Council on 14 June 1979 agreed by 12 votes to nil to extend the UNIFIL mandate. At the same time the Security Council called on Israel to cease forthwith its acts against the sovereignty and political independence of the Lebanon, in particular its incursions into Lebanon and the assistance it has continued to lend to irresponsible armed groups. Clearly they were talking about the assistance the Israelis are giving to the Haddad forces.

I suggest we should seek a change in the stand taken by Israel. We should use all our diplomatic channels to put pressure on the Israeli authorities to cease supporting Haddad and let UNIFIL continue their mandate right up to the Israeli border and take over the area which is under the control of Major Haddad. If this is not done it will be impossible for the UNIFIL forces to complete their mandate. I recognise that both Israel and the PLO have certain rights and that in any settlement between them the PLO will have to recognise the existence of the State of Israel and Israel will have to recognise that the Palestinians have the right to a homeland.

Mr. Lenihan

That is fundamental.

Mr. M. Cosgrave

In 1978 the Lebanese forces had 7,000 men and the aim of President Sarkis was to build the forces up to 15,500 and get his men into southern Lebanon where they would take over the duties of the UNIFIL forces and work side by side with them. That was happening to a certain extent when I was there. However, since the latest problem with Haddad this great effort by the Lebanese Government to build up their forces in southern Lebanon has been torn asunder. President Sarkis also informed me that the Lebanese forces which he had put into southern Lebanon were continually thwarted by Haddad.

The United States who supply arms and fighter planes to them should apply pressure to the Israelis. If the Haddad forces wish to carry out sorties into the UNIFIL area, the F 15 fighter planes are there to support them. They have been used to strike against civilians and for the destruction of property in southern Lebanon. On August 21 last Israeli and Christian militia men assaulted 26 villages killing 11 people and wounding 20 others. During that attack the United States expressed concern that Israel might be violating UN regulations by continuing to use US weapons for nondefensive purposes. We should press the United States to bring pressure to bear on the Israelis in order that Haddad could be brought under some control. On August 24 the State Department warned that if these alleged attacks on the villages were true they might end their military aid to Israel. We have a weapon here that we can use. We can ask the Americans to help in this situation and that would help our troops in the Lebanon to carry out their duties. It was reported that during these attacks phosphorous and fragmentation bombs were used. These bombs were banned by the Geneva Convention and this matter should be brought to the attention of the Americans in our efforts to get them to pressurise the Israelis.

I would impress on the Minister the importance of establishing an Israeli embassy in Dublin. This would be good for relations between our two countries and would be in the interests of keeping our troops safe in their mission in the Lebanon. I am happy with what the Minister for Defence said this morning about our troops and I, too, compliment them on carrying out a very difficult job. As I mentioned before, President Sarkis went out of his way to compliment me on the behaviour of the Irish troops. We in Ireland, as President Sarkis said, have a great tradition of peacekeeping throughout the world and our troops are well able to handle any problems of an international nature. If peace in the Middle East can ultimately be achieved by agreement on the establishment of a homeland for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza, it should be seriously considered.

Mr. Lenihan

I agree fully.

Mr. Horgan

I welcome and endorse everything that has been said by the Minister for Defence in relation to the strategy, disposition and overall effectiveness, within the limits that exist, of our troops in the Lebanon. Irish people as a whole have every reason to be proud of them and it is appropriate that the Government should have given time for a motion which enables the Minister to give a full and detailed account of what is happening on the ground in the Lebanon both for the information of the House and not least for the information of the families of the Irish troops who are serving out there who are, more immediately than most people, affected by any developments that may relate to their welfare. I also express on behalf of this party, our sincere sympathy to the families of the soldiers who have died in the service of the UN in the Irish contingent. I also sympathise about soldiers of all nations who have contributed to this operation. Our natural concern with our own casualties has never blinded us the the fact that other nations are involved and they have also suffered casualties.

I was particularly struck by the attitude of the media to the series of events which led up to the latest casualties among the Irish in the UN troops. As a former journalist I was interested in the terminology used. It will not have escaped the notice of Members of the House that there was virtual unanimity among the media in describing the two most recent Irish deaths of Irish troops in the Lebanon as murder. This it undoubtedly was. I hope it will not be taken amiss if I make the point that it is altogether appropriate for the media to use that terminology at this stage in history. This terminology is very important where it is appropriate. I argue that the word "murder" not only can but should be used on all occasions on which unarmed Irish people are killed by illegal paramilitary organisations, not least and perhaps especially when those murders take place within the confines of this island.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs made one comment during his remarks this morning which I could underscore. He asked for acceptance on all sides of the House that what was involved here was not a war or battle, whether of words or any other kind, between the State of Israel and the State of Ireland, but a conflict at various levels between forces which are effectively armed and controlled by Israel, and the UN itself. It is appropriate therefore to suggest to the Israeli Government that if they seek to rely, as they are legitimately entitled to do, on the provisions of the UN Resolution 242 in relation to their territorial integrity and their rights to exist as a nation, they cannot and should not turn around and flout other UN resolutions and provisions because temporarily it is diplomatically and even militarily appropriate for them to do so at the time.

It is not unusual, of course, that nations in general, not just Israel, will tend to approach UN resolutions selectively. It is part of the weakness of that organisation and it will inevitably be a continuing weakness of that organisation in the foreseeable future, but all of us who are interested in the future of that organisation and in seeing an increase in world respect for its decisions and deliberations should point out occasions on which countries are attempting to have it both ways. This is undeniably so on this occasion.

It is true that the degree of support by the Israeli Government to the de facto forces in the Lebanon could not exist without arms supplies from the US. If my memory serves me correctly, it is not long since the Taoiseach wrote directly to President Carter asking him to do what he could to bring influence to bear on Israel, influence which he undoubtedly has, to hinder Israel's support for the de facto forces. I am surprised the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not make a reference to this in his speech. I hope he will indicate to us in his reply the result, if any, of that initiative by the Taoiseach.

I was depressed by a particular strain running through the Minister's remarks—his frequent and continual use of the word "solidarity". I have no doubt, on the basis of the communiqué he furnished to us this morning, that there is now solidarity among all the troops of the contributing nations of UNIFIL in relation to the issues they all face, but I must ask the Minister how he can reconcile his claimed solidarity with the Bahrein declaration.

In the context of the Bahrain declaration, I should like to turn the situation around and see what it would be like if it happened to us instead of to somebody else. Can we imagine the reaction in this country if the Fijian Foreign Minister on a visit to Tel Aviv said that he recognised the de facto forces controlled by Major Haddad as the effective authority of southern Lebanon? There would be uproar here. Yet when we remember that the Fijian troops had twice as many of their men killed facing the PLO as we had facing the de facto force we must marvel at the restraint of the Fijian and other UN forces faced with a declaration by our Minister for Foreign Affairs which must be considered as inflammatory.

That Bahrain declaration by the tion to what was actually said in Bahrain State visit by the President, whom the Minister accompanied. I cannot recall any occasion on which such a major shift of policy was announced by our Minister for Foreign Affairs (a), abroad and (b), in the context of a State visit by the President. Whatever about any justification which may or may not have been advanced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his statement in general terms, I find it difficult if not impossible to imagine that in any sense he can justify that statement at that time and in that place.

At the very best it was counter-productive. At worst it was tragic and in all events it was unnecessary. Everybody knows that the Palestine Liberation Organisation will be involved in any final settlement of the Middle East situation, but to take the attitude the Minister adopted, to make the statement he made at that time and place, cannot be regarded as contributing in any positive way towards the achievement of such a settlement.

The Leader of the Labour Party has spoken on what he believes to be the reasons, or among them, for such a shift in policy by the Government. I should like to make it clear that we have no particular quarrel with anybody outside this House, but we would like to retain some belief in the political morality of the Irish Government, and it is this belief more than anything else that has been eroded seriously by the events of the last few months and by the Bahrein declaration in particular, which has ill served not just our national interests but the interests of our men who are serving the cause of peace.

Mr. Quinn

In conclusion, on behalf of the Labour Party I should like to reiterate our support for the role that has been undertaken by the Irish troops in what must be emphasised as a peace-keeping mission in southern Lebanon as part of the UNIFIL forces. Nobody in this House is under any illusion about the difficulties of that task. The troops and people who are related to members of the Defence Forces should be reassured of the kind of support this House is now putting on record.

I support the comments made by my colleagues on all sides of the House. The question of peacekeeping is particularly important. The role of a country like Ireland within the context of the United Nations in maintaining and expanding the capacity of the UN, whose track record of peacekeeping is not as successful as all of us would like it to be, should be strengthened and enforced irrespective of the tragic cost it may be from time to time and irrespective of the deaths which from time to time inevitably will come about from such a role. We have a contribution to make in this area and in so far as the Minister has attempted to co-ordinate the troop-contributing countries in their efforts in this area I commend him.

I had the honour and pleasure of recently hearing Lord Philip Noel-Baker speaking, as a person of 90 years of age with unrivalled experience on the question of disarmament and peacekeeping generally, about the increasing capacity of small nations to perform the role of peacekeeping. We cannot talk of peacekeeping in a vacuum in south Lebanon without looking at the whole question of Israel. We cannot do that without realising how critically important the Middle East is for this country and for the world. It is the powder keg of the third world war, Afghanistan not withstanding. It is the powder keg for many reasons but perhaps the most critical is that of energy supplies to the western world. Prior to the oil crisis of 1974 western countries and conservative parties tended to support the Israeli state without too much criticism. Fianna Fáil had long been associated as an uncritical supporter of the Israeli state. The harsh reality of the Arab control of oil supplies has dramatically changed that.

It is hard to reconcile the statement contained in the Minister's speech which reads:

In particular we understand that Israel is deeply concerned about its security. We deplore and condemn attacks from across its border which have brought death or injury to its people—just as we deplore and condemn all acts of violence that bring death or injury to people in the region.

One would expect a Minister with the actual experience of office of the present incumbent to be particularly sensitive to the very delicate situation that exists in the Middle East. One would expect that a Minister with the experience in politics, both domestic and international, that the present incumbent has would be acutely aware of the history of the Israeli people who, since the foundation of the state under a United Nations resolution in 1948 to the present day, have been under attack or threat of attack. One would expect that, with a Minister who has the advice, experience and expertise of the Department of Foreign Affairs which, as far as this party is concerned has the expertise to keep most of its Ministers right in sensitive areas, the statements that emerged from Bahrein on a return trip home would have been avoided. The Minister may say what he likes in relation to what was actually said in Bahrain but the response of the State of Israel to their reading of that statement—this after all is the essence of diplomacy—was perceived, as Deputy Horgan said, as a major shift in the Republic of Ireland's attitude to the State of Israel and its security. The Minister said in his speech that the only reason why the de facto forces have put pressure on the Irish contingent was their unique security position, given the geography of that area of south Lebanon. It seemed to be part of a pattern where the Haddad forces would probe contingent by contingent. He made no reference to the fact that as far as the state of Israel is concerned there was a perceived shift in the Irish Government's attitude to that state's right of existence. The Minister now says, and has repeatedly stated, that that is not the case.

History has a savage and vicious lesson to teach all of us. We have been prepared to tolerate minorities when times were good but we made minorities the scapegoat of the failure of economic systems, such as capitalism, when times got bad. Now, because of the energy crisis and because somehow or other a minority in the world's population appear to be in the way of preventing western Europe from getting access to energy supplies, our memory is fading very rapidly. If the State of Israel is breaking United Nations resolutions, as we know it is, it is at least doing it with the memory of the abandonment of it by the people of Europe in the past. There has been a horrible re-echo of history in the way there has been a rush to embrace Arab delegations, Arab contracts and Arab prospects because of the present situation, not just by this conservative Government but by others as well, their common characteristic being their conservative nature, be they Gaullist, Fianna Fáil or right wing of one kind or another.

Mr. Lenihan

Or Schmidt.

Mr. Quinn

They have a particular record in this regard. The Minister is attempting to suggest to the House that the statement of Bahrain had nothing to do with what happened recently in south Lebanon. He cannot prove that or effectively make it stick. Leaving that aside, let us look at some of the other initiatives taken by this Government in relation to the present situation.

I welcome the fact that the countries contributing troops were brought together in this country. I read with interest the communiqué the Minister made available to the House. I hope the démarches in the various capital cities will produce some kind of response. Effectively we all realise that to enable UNIFIL to operate in southern Lebanon there must be consent and co-operation from Israel. Israel must be reassured in the context of the oil crisis concerning the entire world that it will not be abandoned. The biggest backer in terms of equipment of Israel is the United States. The Minister for everything in particular, or so it would appear, the Taoiseach outside the House indicated that he had specifically requested the US President to exercise pressure on the State of Israel and their Government to try and influence the de facto forces which it effectively controls to make the role of UNIFIL possible in south Lebanon. There was no mention of that in the Minister's speech.

There was no mention of any response whatever from the Unites States President. Are we to assume that the Taoiseach sent a message to the United States President? Was this part of the overall exercise in government by performance in the newspapers and the media, but when you try to put down a question here you get nothing from it? If we were to put down a question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs—there would be no point in putting it down to the Taoiseach because he would deny responsibility for it—what answer would the Minister for Foreign Affairs give us? In his reply will he tell us what exactly has been the response of the President of the United States? Obviously it has not been of great substance. If it was, it would be stitched into the Minister's opening speech.

Because of the size of this country, because of the impact of the deaths, the murders to use Deputy Horgan's words, particularly of two of the soldiers, we have focussed in on the happenings in south Lebanon without perhaps looking at the reasons why we have people there in the first place. Why is it essential that it is a peace-keeping rather than a peace-enforcement role? What is the long-term prospect? Is this a stalemate that will go on forever? What are the ingredients for getting a long-term solution for this problem? Since its accession to the United Nations in 1956 this country has consistently and strenuously supported the role of small nations in attempting to get some degree of co-operation and agreement throughout the world in international affairs.

Any action the Government may take in strengthening the role of small nations through the forum of the United Nations, and in strengthening the role of peace-keeping forces in any part of the world, particularly in an area as sensitive as this, certainly warrants our support and will certainly get the support of the Labour Party. We are not prepared to give support to that kind of diplomatic endeavour which, by its very nature, takes time and effort and persuasion, if it is to be thrown out the window in a speech by the Minister on the way home from Africa when for economic reasons or for other reasons he puts that whole role at risk.

The Minister will strenuously deny that that is the case but, as far as the media are concerned, as far as the response of the state in question is concerned, that is the case. It is quite possible that the Minister may not have meant it like that, but what he meant and what he did are two different things. What is now the reality is the situation in south Lebanon. We need to reinforce the capacity of the UNIFIL forces, working through the procedure of the United Nations and with their full support, to fulfil the task they have been requested to do. We will support the Minister in the areas where he can be supported, because I believe in as much co-operation as possible in international affairs in the House. The Labour Party support those efforts, but they must not and cannot be undermined by a contradictory foreign affairs policy on this area.

I would ask the Minister, in his reply, to give the House the benefit of his knowledge of how successful the Taoiseach's intervention has been with the United States President in relation to exercising the pressure the US appear to have with the State of Israel.

Mr. Creed

On behalf of my party I should like to join with other Members of the House who paid tribute to our Army, who have played such an important role as peacekeepers throughout the troubled spots of the world, and to sympathise with the families of the Army personnel who were killed or murdered in the Lebanon. We saw that endorsed in no uncertain way by the Irish people at the funerals of those men. I hope their widows and families will be looked after in the matter of housing and compensation and that their needs will be met adequately.

I am glad the Taoiseach gave us an opportunity to have this debate and that the Minister contributed to it. I am glad the Minister for Defence spoke about the equipment and support for our troops in the Lebanon, because there is a rumour that they are not as fully equipped as the other United Nations troops. I am glad the Minister for Defence made a statement allaying those fears and discounting those rumours.

Deputy O'Keeffe suggested that a Minister and a parliamentary delegation should visit the Lebanon for on-the-spot negotiations and discussions. It is difficult to understand the situation without being on the ground there. The Minister said that the presence of a Minister in the Lebanon would aggravate the situation, or endanger it, or words to that effect. That is hard to understand. This small nation has contributed very much to world peace, and I cannot understand why the presence of a Minister and a parliamentary delegation in the Lebanon would endanger or aggravate the situation. I should like the Minister to clarify that.

This is the second short debate we have had on the situation in the Lebanon. On the previous occasion I contributed on behalf of my party together with the Leader of the Labour Party and the Minister. I suggested certain ways and means of bringing pressure to bear on Israel, because I believe the Israelies are mostly the cause of the trouble and the harassment out there. I suggested that there should be a meeting of representatives of the governments supplying troops to UNIFIL. I thought that was a powerful weapon, and I still think it would be most effective.

Mention was also made of the influence of the President of the United States. I am glad the Taoiseach took the initiative and asked the President of the United States to use his influence. When the Minister for Foreign Affairs is replying perhaps he would give as some indication of what the response was, if there was a response. I am still very concerned about the harassment of our troops and the campaign of vilification against the Irish troops in particular. While we availed of the meeting at which the Minister presided, regrettably I have to say that the request to Israel from that meeting was not accepted. It seems that Israel turns down any plea to end support for Major Haddad.

Mr. Lenihan

It has not been presented yet. That is a wrong report.

Mr. Creed

I am quoting from The Irish Times.

Mr. Lenihan

It is not correct.

Mr. Creed

The meeting took place on 11 April and we do not yet know whether that request was accepted. This is why I think a delegation to the Lebanon is of paramount importance, particularly including a Government representative.

We threw away one of our greatest leverages in the Minister's Bahrain speech. The response by Premier Begin was that we were an unfriendly nation and that it was a hostile statement. I do not want to go into that in detail now because this is not a time at which we should be divided or apportion blame to anybody. We must have a united approach in this Parliament to Israel.

What concerns me is a statement which was published in The Cork Examiner on May 7:

A claim by Lebanese Christian Militia leader Major Saad Haddad that the Irish Army had paid over "blood money" to the family of a sixteen-year-old youth killed in clashes with Irish UN troops was strongly denied yesterday.

Haddad, who is now demanding more than £5,000 in blood money from the Irish Army before he declares an end to his feud against Irish UN in Lebanon, has gone on Israeli television to claim that the army has already handed over some of the money to the Bazri family.

It is difficult to understand why Israeli television is being used constantly by Haddad for the purpose of his campaign of vilification against the Irish troops. This is a very serious matter. As the Minister has said, there has not been any response from the Israelis to the representations made to Mr. Begin as a result of the meeting of the 11. I am pleased to note that there is to be a meeting of the 11 again and that the Minister will then have a progress report but the point must be made that an immediate response is absolutely necessary. Since we have been through the normal process of negotiations there should be direct contact now with the Israeli Government because of the seriousness of the situation.

Something else to come out of that meeting was the news that an indication was given at least that, if our operations in the Lebanon were not successful and that if we were not able to implement the mandate given to us, there was the suggestion that we would have to consider our usefulness in the area. We have a serious and a vital international role to play in the preservation of world peace and it is important that we would continue to have a presence in the Middle East or in any other such area.

This raises the question of the mandate. It is extraordinary that at the meeting concerned the Minister should have said that the question was not one of renewing the mandate but one of fulfilling it and of the UNIFIL forces' ability to fulfil that mandate. Is the time opportune to review the mandate? If it cannot be fulfilled is it not important that it be reviewed and that changes would be made to it if necessary? It is worth recalling in this context that during the debate in this regard in this House in May 1978 the leader of this party, speaking from his experience as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the previous administration, said that the mandate was vague and he forecast the situation exactly as it has arisen today. Therefore it is important that the mandate be reviewed and, if necessary, changed. It is necessary to reiterate the fact that our troops are not in the Middle East to be put in any position of confrontation with any of the forces there. Neither are they there to take sides. Perhaps what the Minister for Foreign Affairs had to say on the occasion concerned had some merit, but the timing was wrong and to that extent it was irresponsible. We must explore every avenue to ensure that the campaign being launched against our troops will not continue. If there should be any suggestion that we have not been playing a useful role in the area such suggestion would be regarded as a victory for the Haddad forces. Although Israel indicated her full support for the mandate she might not be all that much displeased if the UNIFIL function in the Lebanon should prove to be unsuccessful.

I was pleased that the Minister clarified the position in regard to arms and equipment. The Minister referred to a number of armoured cars and to vehicles of that kind. My information is that we have four Panhard-90 armoured cars and that these are not sufficient for dealing with the situation. They may be all right in a situation of peace and quiet but not in the event of serious confrontation. However, I am glad to hear that there is co-operation and that our people may call on other UNIFIL forces in the event of an emergency of that kind.

I am informed also that we acquired some Milan anti-tank missiles in 1979 and that their use should be considered in this operation because of their usefulness in respect of the duties which our troops must perform.

I look forward to hearing from the Minister in respect of the various questions I have raised and I should like to hear why the presence of the Minister for Defence should aggravate the situation in the Lebanon. We deserve an explanation as to why the political head of a Department should aggravate a situation by his presence. He should be able to visit the troops if he so wishes.

Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Lenihan)

I thank Deputies for their constructive contributions but I would point out that some of the remarks made by Deputy Cluskey were ill advised, to put it mildly, and I shall deal with them before going on to the main tenor of my reply.

In respect of Irish foreign policy in the Middle East or elsewhere, it is dictated entirely by Ireland's national interest, as the Government of Ireland see it. There is no question of any pressure from groups of businessmen or groups of any kind exercising any influence whatever in the determination of that decision taken by the elected Government in the interests of the Irish people. That is our consistent approach to foreign affairs decisions.

I also want to reject absolutely any suggestion that there is a correlation between the Irish foreign policy attitude and the unfortunate casualties in the Lebanon. These casualties, thankfully, have been very few so far and have been spread throughout all the troop-contributing countries. In an RTE interview the Israeli Ambassador to Ireland was asked if Irish recognition of the PLO having a role to play in the Middle East had any bearing on the situation in south Lebanon. I quote from what he said: "I think there is no correlation there and none should be suggested".

Mr. Cluskey

He would be a foolish man if he said otherwise.

Mr. Lenihan

I would like to emphasise also that the reality behind Irish foreign policy in the Middle East is directly in accordance with the stated decided policy of the United Nations. A number of resolutions taken last November finally culminated in a resolution of 29 November 1979, incorporated in the record of the 34th session of the United Nations. A specific resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people,

Having heard the statement of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the representative of the Palestinian people,

1. Expresses its grave concern that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Middle East conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security;

2. Reaffirms that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, inter alia, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

3. Calls once more for the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate, on the basis of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties;

That is the policy of the United Nations. It is also the policy of a number of troop-contributing countries who have specifically stated that Palestine should be recognised and that the role of the PLO should be acknowledged in such negotiations.

Ghana said:

Any settlement which ... does not accord full recognition to the PLO as the authentic representative of the Palestinian people is unrealistic and is bound to fail (UN General Debate 1979).

Nigeria said:

The Palestinians ... must achieve independence with full sovereignty. We recognise the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

Senegal said:

[Palestinian] right to independence and national sovereignty in Palestine under the guidance of its sole authentic representative, the PLO.

Italy said:

[These principles apply] equally to the PLO which for quite a long time Italy has recognised as an important political force of the Palestinian people.

I could also refer to a number of our European partners who expressed themselves equally forcibly.

Belgium said:

The Palestinians, with the parties concerned should decide on the political form their homeland will take.

The representatives of the Palestinian people, and in particular the PLO.

France said:

President Giscard said that the PLO should participate in peace negotiations in the context of a negotiated peace settlement.

The Federated Republic of Germany said:

The right to establish a state-authority, the right to self-determination.

Italy said:

[The Palestinians have the right to] the constitution of a state entity having its own country translating into reality its national identity.

The United Kingdom said:

We continue to believe that the PLO is an important factor and will have to be involved at some stage in the peace process.—Lord Carrington, House of Lords Debate, March 1980.

... The recognition of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination is an indisputable prerequisite to any peace settlement.—Minister of State, Hurd.

France made a more specific statement on the right of Palestinian self-determination in Kuwait. I made our position quite clear in Bahrain.

Mr. Quinn

I always recognise the Minister's affinity with the right-wing French.

Mr. Lenihan

I think I have said sufficient to emphasise that there is an overwhelming world view from countries on all continents and represented at the United Nations that the problem in the Middle East can only be settled on two bases—the only Deputy who mentioned this was Deputy Cosgrave. The first is the right of the Palestinian people to have their problem finally settled along the path of self-determination, so that they are no longer the refugees of the Middle East, and the second is that that be done within the context of a negotiated peace settlement of the Middle East in which the territorial integrity of the State of Israel will be guaranteed. That is the central issue in the whole Middle East problem.

Mr. Cluskey

We do not dissent from that, and we never have.

Mr. Lenihan

As far as that aspect is concerned——

Mr. Cluskey

That red herring will not work.

Mr. Lenihan

Ireland is in accord with all our fellow member states of the European Economic Community and with the overwhelming majority of states members of the United Nations. So far as Europe is concerned, peace in the Middle East is essential because the two parts of the world are complementary—technology and expertise on the one hand in western Europe and natural resources and naturally intelligent people on the other. These people are utilising legitimately the revenues they are getting from their own natural resources. Within that context, the State of Israel must be guaranteed its territorial integrity. That is a sine qua non in regard to any peace settlement or any attempt at a peace settlement. The sine qua non is that all parties sitting down around a table to negotiate a peace settlement must recognise the right of Israel to its territorial integrity and to its independence as a State.

Mr. Cluskey

Could the Minister comment on the covenant of the PLO?

Mr. Lenihan

I am not going to comment on Middle Eastern rhetoric; I am talking about the need for a negotiated peace settlement. I quote from paragraph 5 of the Bahrain Communiqué in this respect which says:

The two sides agreed that the Palestinian people had the right to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent State in Palestine within the framework of a negotiated peace settlement which would include the principles of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

These are the specific resolutions to do with organising a negotiated peace settlement that would, as a pre-requisite, recognise the independence and territorial integrity of the State of Israel. Therefore the recognition of Israel is built into that paragraph.

Paragraph 6 of the same communiqué states:

The two sides stressed that all parties, including the PLO should play a full role in the negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement. In this regard, Ireland recognises the role of the PLO in representing the Palestinian people.

It says nothing more and nothing less than that. That is precisely in accordance with the terms of the United Nations Resolution I have just read out, a United Nations Resolution passed by an overwhelming majority of all the civilised nations represented there.

Mr. Quinn

What uncivilised nations are there in the United Nations?

Mr. Lenihan

The exact figures were: 117 for, 14 abstentions and 16 against. That is where our policy stands. Indeed our whole policy has been dictated since our entry into the United Nations by a recognition of the fact that it is only through the medium of the United Nations that peace can be maintained in the troubled areas of the world. As a small country we have played an honourable role in that respect by contributing to various peace-keeping forces in various parts of the world over the years and, through our military personnel, have acquired a recognised expertise in handling these particularly ticklish problems on the ground in an excellent manner.

That brings me to the immediate question of the Lebanon, but I thought I would make those earlier remarks because those matters tended to dominate the debate. Indeed that is only proper, because the whole question of the Middle East is like a domino situation, each one affecting the other. It is important to recognise that within the Lebanon itself the presence of the UNIFIL force is an essential element in preserving a very shaky fabric, a very difficult fabric to sustain. But the presence of the UNIFIL force is essential in order to maintain that fabric. Its withdrawal would be very serious and disruptive. We feel very strongly that, provided we can get the mandate made effective, a continued UNIFIL presence there, of which we can be a partner, will be beneficial to the Lebanon and to the area as a whole. The purpose of our meeting last Friday was to take steps to ensure that that mandate will be made effective, and we have already initiated diplomatic moves in that direction. I have had no response yet—the meeting was held only on Friday last—but all I can report to the House is that it was very successful and that we shall move on from there in pursuance of our objective in a political and diplomatic manner.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Was there not an objection by Israel?

Mr. Lenihan

No, that was a mistaken newspaper report. At present we are expecting a letter from President Carter. As the United States have been mentioned I should say in particular that they have been very helpful on various aspects over the past few weeks in the Middle East; I shall not go into it any further than that. The release of the Irish soldiers some weeks ago was due in no small measure to United States intervention. I thought I would just mention that en passant.

Mr. Cluskey

I hope they were more helpful to us than was the Minister to President Sadat.

Mr. Lenihan

As far as the UNIFIL presence is concerned, the very fact that the 11 nations concerned came together last Friday showed that we are conscious of our responsibilities, not alone to ourselves as nations but to the world at large. We will pursue our responsibilities on the basis of solidarity. If we take any decision on a review of the matter in regard to our continued presence there, it will not be a decision taken on a unilateral basis but rather one taken as a group and after full consideration of all the facts.

There is one final matter to which I should refer, raised, I think, by Deputy Creed—the question of the possibility of a visit by the Minister for Defence to the Lebanon. On the occasion of the first incident the Minister for Defence very rightly took up the matter with the Army authorities. The Army authorities, in their wisdom, decided that, as a matter of military security, it would not be appropriate for the Minister to go there. But I have no doubt that the Minister will go there when the Army authorities deem it proper and opportune for him to do so.

I thank the House for the opportunity this has offered for a constructive debate. I do not think on this occasion I will exclude Deputy Cluskey from that. Many of his remarks were constructive, along with many of the other remarks made. If on some matters I took issue with him, it was because I feel very strongly about them, particularly the imputations and allegations in regard to pressures——

Mr. Cluskey

So do I.

Mr. Lenihan

——outside the legitimate pressures of Ireland's national interest, which are the only pressures that will ever dictate to me in my capacity as long as I occupy this post as Ireland's Foreign Minister.

Question put and agreed to.