Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 24 Jun 1980

Vol. 322 No. 9

Exports to Iran: Motion.

Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Lenihan):

I move:

That Dáil Éireann takes note of the measures taken by the Government controlling and regulating exports to Iran.

Statutory Instruments 145 and 146 of 1980 which have been laid before this House enable exports to Iran to be controlled and regulated. The issue of these Orders followed on a decision of the nine member states of the European Community to impose limited trade and diplomatic sanctions on Iran.

The chain of events which led up to that decision of the Nine may be said to have begun on 4 November last when demonstrators led by militant students occupied the US embassy compound in Tehran and took captive over fifty members of the embassy staff. The seizure of the embassy was one incident in a long period of instability which included frequent mass demonstrations in Tehran and other cities, fighting between the armed forces and factions opposed to the Shah, the departure of the Shah and the return from exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, one of the spiritual leaders of the Shia Moslem community which is the predominant religious faith in Iran. More recently, there has been the execution of many highly placed officials and military officers of the Shah's regime and the growth of tension between Iran and neighbouring countries, particularly in the Gulf area. It is clear that in the last two years Iran has passed through a traumatic period. An elected assembly is now meeting, for the first time in many years, and we can predict that its decisions will be of fundamental importance for the future development of Iran.

Ireland and the other member states of the European Community have followed these developments with great interest. While the Nine have expressed concern over the frequent executions, it is neither our intention nor indeed our right to challenge the free choice of the Iranian people in regard to the form of Government and institutions under which they choose to live. These are matters which they must determine for themselves, and we accept that fully. The European Council in their statement of 30 November 1979 made it clear that the Nine Community member states fully respect the independence of Iran and the right of the Iranian people to determine their own future, and are aware of the importance which the Iranian people attach to the changes which have taken place in their country.

The students who took captive the staff of the US embassy claimed that they intend to hold them as hostages for the return of the Shah and of assets which he and members of his family had removed from Iran illegally, or acquired abroad with funds taken out of the country illegally.

It is not my intention to go into the matters at issue between the US and the Iranian authorities in regard to events during the Shah's regime, or the matters alleged by the students. The specific point at issue in the discussion about sanctions has been the holding as hostages of diplomatic personnel, properly accredited, whom it is the duty of the host country under international law to protect. The European Council characterised the holding of the, hostages as a flagrant breach of international law.

That the Iranian authorities have failed to act in accordance with their clear obligations under international law is evident from the fact that no effort has been made to remove the hostages from the control of those who hold them and to set them at liberty. The Revolutionary Council, which was the de facto authority in the country prior to the election of an assembly, in fact refused to accept responsibility for the hostages. The newly elected Assembly has not to date deliberated on the hostages issue and there is no evidence that it intends to take it up with any urgency.

The United States administration for its part has made it clear that it considers the holding of the hostages and the whereabouts of the Shah to be separate and unrelated questions. The United States has tried to avail of such means of recourse as are open to it at the international level. It has taken the matter up both in the International Court of Justice and in the United Nations Security Council. It has also tried to use various channels of mediation.

On 29 November 1979 the United States instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice against Iran, seeking an order to the Government of Iran to release the hostages and return US property. The Iranian authorities declined to appear, arguing that the holding of the hostages should not be dissociated from its proper context, namely, the whole relationship between Iran and the US over the last 25 years, and that matters arising out of the Islamic revolution of Iran fell within the national sovereignty of Iran. In its judgment given on 24 May the court rejected this argument and pointed out that if Iran believed it had legitimate grievances against the US it was free to bring these before the court, by way of counter-claim or otherwise; however, Iran, by refusing to appear, had deprived itself of the opportunity to make its case before the court and seek redress. The court pointed out that there is an obligation, long established in international law, on receiving States to protect diplomatic personnel and premises. Islam had itself contributed to the development of international law on this subject. These obligations remain in the event of the breaking off of diplomatic relations or even of war between states. The court also pointed out that states are not obliged to maintain diplomatic relations, but those which do are obliged to respect the norms of international law governing them.

The matter of the hostages was also considered in the United Nations Security Council. On 25 November 1979 the Secretary-General wrote to the Security Council describing the holding of the hostages as a grave situation posing a serious threat to international peace and security. The Security Council on 4 December 1979 expressed deep concern at the dangerous level of tension between Iran and the US, which could have grave consequences for international peace and security. It reaffirmed the solemn obligation on all states that were parties to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and premises. It called on the Government of Iran to release the personnel of the US Embassy, afford them protection and allow them to leave Iran. It asked the Secretary-General to use his good offices for the immediate implementation of the resolution.

The Security Council considered the hostage question again on 31 December 1979 and decided, in the event of non-compliance with its resolution, to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter. These articles provide, among other things, for the imposition of sanctions.

The Security Council met again on 12 January 1980 to consider the issue of the hostages. At this meeting the US presented a request for sanctions against Iran in certain specified areas, the most notable exclusions being foodstuffs and medicines. Despite the absence of any improvement in the situation and the commitment to action in the Security Council's Resolution of 31 December 1979, the Soviet Union voted against the imposition of sanctions, thus frustrating the earlier unanimous decision.

The US has also had recourse to mediation. In the early days of the hostages' captivity President Carter sent personal envoys to Iran, but they did not complete the journey when it was made clear that they would not be allowed to meet Iranian government officials or the hostages themselves.

The Secretary-General in the exercise of the "good offices" function entrusted to him by the Security Council, remained in contact with the parties to the dispute and on 19 February 1980 nominated a Commission of Inquiry comprising five members, eminent lawyers or diplomats from Algeria, France, Sri Lanka, Syria and Venezuela. The mandate of the commission was "to undertake a fact-finding mission to Tehran to hear Iran's grievances and allow an early solution to the crisis between Iran and the United States". Initially it appeared that the commission would be able to play an important part in resolving the problem. They travelled to Tehran and heard evidence, from the students holding the hostages and others, of injustices under the Shah's regime and of alleged US involvement. After the commission had completed their investigation into Iran's grievances the students holding the hostages offered to turn them over to the Revolutionary Council. The council refused to accept responsibility for them. The commission was unable to gain access to the hostages. The members of the commission left Tehran on 10 March and later informed the Secretary-General that they had been unable to carry out their mandate fully and were not in a position to submit a report.

At this point it may have appeared to the US that all the normal avenues of recourse had been tried and had failed. There had often seemed to be grounds for hope that a solution would soon be found, but each time the hopes had been disappointed and the efforts bedevilled by the absence of an effective central authority in Iran, and in the last analysis by an absence of political will on the part of the Iranian authorities.

However, the US decided to proceed with the imposition of sanctions against Iran on the basis of the draft Security Council Resolution which had been vetoed. On 1 April President Bani Sadr of Iran held out the prospect that the hostages would be transferred to government custody and the US deferred the application of sanctions. President Bani Sadr's statement came to nothing. On 7 April Ayatollah Khomeini stated that the situation of the hostages was unchanged and that the students would continue to hold them. The US then broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and imposed economic sanctions. The US also appealed to a number of West European and other countries including the member states of the Community to join in the imposition of sanctions on the basis of the vetoed Security Council Resolution.

The Nine had followed the hostages situation with the utmost concern from its earliest days. I have referred already to the position taken by the European Council on 30 November 1979. In the months following 4 November, the heads of mission of the Nine in Tehran, first under the Irish presidency and later under that of Italy, were in regular contact with the Iranian authorities with a view to bringing about improvements in the conditions in which the hostages were held, and their eventual release.

These messages did not unfortunately produce any change in the situation. The Foreign Ministers of the Nine met in Lisbon on 10 April and decided to instruct their representatives in Tehran to approach President Bani Sadr immediately and request the release of the hostages and details of the timing and manner of the release. The heads of mission were instructed to report back to capitals on the reaction to their request. The Foreign Ministers stated that they would study their positions in the light of the reports they received. The approach was made and the heads of mission, including the Irish Chargé d'Affaires, reported in person to their respective capitals.

At their next meeting, on 22 April 1980 in Luxembourg, the Foreign Ministers again discussed the hostages question. They noted that, while the International Committee of the Red Cross had been permitted to visit the hostages and President Bani Sadr had given assurances about their living conditions, no commitment had been forthcoming in regard to their release. They were concerned that the continuance of this situation was intolerable from a humanitarian and legal point of view, and would endanger international peace and security. They accordingly decided to take certain measures at once against Iran. These included reduction of Embassy staffs in Tehran, introduction of a visa requirement for Iranian nationals and withholding of arms or defence-related equipment. They agreed that if by 17 May, the date of their next meeting, there had been no decisive progress leading to the release of the hostages they would proceed to the application of sanctions on the basis of the vetoed Security Council resolution. The heads of mission in Tehran were instructed to inform the Iranian authorities of this decision.

The European Council, meeting on 27-28 April, described the continued holding of the hostages as an inadmissible violation of international law. They reaffirmed their solidarity with the government and people of the US in this difficult situation. They endorsed the decision of the Foreign Ministers and expressed support for the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to bring about a resolution of the problem.

The Foreign Ministers met again on 17-18 May in Naples. They acknowledged that since the date of their last meeting there had been no progress towards the release of the hostages. They decided to impose sanctions against Iran on the basis already agreed. They stressed that the only purpose of these measures was to hasten the release of the hostages and that they wished to respect the independence of Iran and the right of the Iranian people to determine their own future.

To sum up, our view is that the position created by the taking of the hostages is of concern to all states, since the violation of international law which it involves touches on the rights and interests of all. Whatever Iran's grievances, it is clear that channels of recourse are open to it, and they do not justify the taking of diplomatic personnel as hostages. This is not only a very serious breach of international law, but a continuing one which the Iranian authorities have to date shown no disposition to remedy. Iran is flouting the laws by which relations between states are governed. To that extent it can be said to have put itself outside the normal operation of these relations. The Nine have tried to point out to the Iranians the seriousness of their action. We have given them time in which to consider our appeals. The International Court of Justice and the Security Council have also given their judgments. All this has been to no avail. We have accordingly taken a step which we hope will bring home to Iran the unacceptability of the course in which it is engaged and contribute to efforts by peaceful means to bring it to reconsider its actions.

Given the danger to the lives and wellbeing of the hostages and the dilatory approach of the Iranian authorities, the intensity of feeling which led the US to decide that a mission should be undertaken to rescue the hostages is understandable. However, we and our partners in the Nine have expressed the hope that the US will continue to use peaceful means for the release of the hostages so as not to incur the danger of international conflict. It was in the hope of contributing to pressure on Iran through peaceful means that we agreed on the imposition of sanctions, to which the Security Council was in principle committed, and it is in that hope that we are implementing them.

At a time when we are striving to increase our exports it is not lightly that we take measures to restrict Irish exports to a specific country. We consider, however, that in this case the extreme gravity of the situation justifies our action. I hope that the need for these extraordinary measures and for the orders which have been laid before this House will rapidly disappear.

Mr. O'Keeffe:

It is very important that we should have this debate. The taking of trade sanctions against any nation is a very serious step which warrants discussion in the Dáil. I am glad that the Government, following on our putting down a Private Members' motion in regard to this, raised the matter by way of a Government motion so that we could have a discussion here.

I have considerable reservations about the imposition of trade sanctions against Iran in the context of a complete condemnation of the taking of diplomatic hostages by students in Iran. It is absolutely clear that their action is totally in breach of international law and conventions and nobody can have the slightest reservation about issuing a total condemnation of it. From time immemorial there has been a convention that diplomats have immunity in their guest country. Far back in history there was a period when this was not so, and I recall the activities of one Peter the Impaler who treated the diplomats in his day in a most appalling manner. Over the last hundreds of years, however, it has been accepted that the placing of diplomats has helped in the reduction of tensions between countries, not just in peace but in war times, and they have always been accorded a traditional immunity.

The responsibility for the safety of the hostages is with the Iranian authorities and the continued retention of these hostages is something for which Iran must be condemned. However, I have reservations in regard to our joining in a trade boycott of Iran. Such a course may be ineffective and may be counterproductive. I recognise that the action taken was taken in good faith and with the best intentions and I raise my questions quite genuinely and not in any political context. The effect of Ireland controlling exports to Iran must be a very doubtful one and in his reply I would ask the Minister to indicate in terms of goods and money what exactly is involved. It appears to me that such action on our part will not have any great effect on the Iranian authorities from the point of view of encouraging, cajoling or forcing them to implement their national obligation to free the hostages.

On the other hand, I accept that we have to look at what we are doing in the broader context of the EEC and we have to look at what may be the effect of the overall banning or limitation of exports to Iran from the entire EEC. Will this lead to the desired effect? Will it result in the release of the hostages? My worry is that such measures may only solidify the anti-western feeling that is in Iran and may fortify the seige mentality apparently developing there. In Iran we are not talking of a situation where central government are in control of affairs. The situation there is very unstable. There are divisions of authority among various persons and groups. There is a lawfully elected president, Bani Sadr, who apparently wishes to negotiate a speedy and full settlement of this problem. On the other hand it appears that policy is undermined regularly by the Ayatollah Khomeini whose statements tend to range from the rational to the bizarre. Then there is the newly-elected assembly and it now appears that the majority in that assembly will not be answerable to the wishes of President Bani Sadr. There is also the position of the students actually holding the hostages. There are also the various revolutionary groups and militias, control of which is, to say the least, doubtful. We are not dealing with a strong Government with control, either because of the democratic process or for other reasons. In that unstable situation I am worried lest the measures that have been announced, not just by this country but by the other members of the EEC, may be ineffective or in fact counterproductive.

A line of approach that occurred to me, seeing the agony of the hostages and their people in the US, was that we might be able to help by using our neutral status as a small country in an effort to exert pressure through mediation and discussion with Iran. I accept that there have been many efforts at mediation and at discussing the problem with them, some of them outlined by the Minister in his comprehensive speech. There were others such as that most recently by Chancellor Kreisky and efforts by other Europeans. In looking to the future, I think we must consider both the short-term and the long-term. The aim must be to ensure that Iran does not fall victim to Soviet aggression and that Iran will be encouraged to seek help and support from the West in the re-establishment of her economy when the present troubles there settle down.

In the short term there is the danger that steps being taken may be counterproductive. I do not speak ex cathedra in that matter; I merely voice reservations I have and genuine worries I have regarding the hostages. In relation to the long-term aim I believe there is genuine danger that Iran, which has such a rich potential may be a target for the Soviets. This is highlighted by the invasion of their neighbour, Afganistan, and the provision of ready jumping-off points, for what to the Soviets would be the rich prize of Iran's oil deposits. In considering the future one must look at the global picture and the situation of the Soviets after a period of about 15 years when their oil situation will be causing them major concern. In that context anybody looking at the position objectively will certainly be watching the attempts of the Soviets to expand their sphere of influence in that area and particularly in Iran.

From that point of view, is it wise on the part of the Western nations and more so on our own part as a small neutral nation to take steps against Iran which (a) appear to me not to have a hope of succeeding in the short-term objective of freeing the hostages and (b) which will arouse the animosity of the people of that country which may endure for many a year and may have the effect of turning their minds towards support and assistance from the Soviet bloc. No doubt the potential of Iran which could be one of the richest in the world has not been exploited and there is need for very great help from the point of view of technology and so on in building up that nation particularly as regards restructuring and restoring it after the revolutionary period. I hope Iran will ultimately be helped by the western nations and to some degree by ourselves in whatever way we can so that we will show them that we are friends and anxious to help.

I wish to put on record firmly my total condemnation of the taking and holding of the hostages in Iran. My remarks tonight are in the context of reservations I hold that the measures proposed may be ineffective or counter-productive.

Mr. B. Desmond:

It has been part of the Conventional wisdom in commenting on this situation that western spokesmen particularly in western Europe and the US and Canada should place particular emphasis on the "breach of international law" on the part of Iran. It is also part of the conventional wisdom of the western democracies that we have failed time and again to put the situation in perspective as seen by the people of Iran and by very many Governments other than those in the west. We would be entirely hypocritical if we did not try to appreciate the absolute depths of feeling within the general population, not just of Iran but of the surrounding states, in relation to the history of domestic tyranny of the most brutal and prolonged kind, which they suffered at the hands of the Shah, who was, if one may quote the words of Edward Kennedy, one of the most tyrannical despots in the history of that part of the world.

I have a very jaundiced view about the adoption of the export sanctions referred to. Lest we appear to fall into the trap, which has been set for so many countries, we should clearly put on record our absolute abhorrence, repugnance and detestation of what went on in Iran under the hands of the Shah. He had the total support over 20 years, especially in the past decade, of the official authority of successive presidents of the USA, the CIA in America and a large number of security agencies of a parallel kind of western powers. They exerted massive influence in Iran and exploited the reserves of that country. They bolstered it up with military hardware of a massive kind with monthly injections, where necessary, particularly in terms of the sale of arms to the Shah and in respect of the non-publication of the murder and torture of thousands of people by that particular despot in that period.

The hands of America, in particular, in relation to that appalling situation in Iran, are not just unclean but are absolutely bloodstained. Let us have an Irish vision of what happened in that period. No matter how much I or any other citizen in any democracy in western Europe may detest the aberrations and interpretation of democracy unique to the Ayatollah following his return, we must not shut out from our minds the history of that country in relation to that period. It is only by taking that fully into account that we can try to understand why it appears to us as a nation, that its students and its revolutionary council, as it emerged from such a tyranny and its spiritual leaders, would act in what might appear to us such an unconventional, strange and at times undemocratic manner.

There was what can only be called mass post-revolutionary provocation by America in relation to this situation. There was the acceptance of the Shah into the USA in which Henry Kissinger played a large part. The arm of President Carter was massively twisted by the erstwhile supporters of the Shah. It was certainly no great surprise to me that the Ayatollah, the student revolutionary council and the revolutionary council — it should not have been a surprise to anybody in America or to the Irish Government — engaged in such a continued violent reaction of such intensity as we saw on our television screens and we read about in the international agency reports, following the acceptance of the Shah into America by the American Government.

I do not, nor do my party, while I am making that very strong preamble to my comments, go along with, even in our reasonable appreciation of the situation vis-à-vis the United States and Iran, and publicly condone the taking into hostage of diplomatic personnel even though it has been suggested that a substantial proportion of those who were taken into captivity of a prolonged and rather brutal kind at times, were in fact agents of the CIA. It is not unknown to those of us who have some knowledge of that part of the world, that a proportion of such personnel in those embassies tend to be in inverse ratio to the gravity of the situation in the area. I accept in the conventional diplomatic sense that they were accredited diplomatic personnel. Accredited diplomatic personnel in that part of the world have a very acute sense of the prospects of their personal safety when they operate in that part of the world. That is another caveat I have to enter here.

In case there be any misconstruing of the view of the Labour Party in this matter we still submit to the Iranian authorities that no long-term useful purpose is served by, and no great victory is likely to result from, holding on to such personnel. There is a further real danger that the Iranian authorities, by holding on to such personnel, are likely to provoke the USA into a major breach of international peace. After reading the American investigation reports one can only describe as harebrained the particular rescue attempt by the Americans, which could have resulted in a major conflagration in that part of the world. God only knows what would have happened if it had proceeded beyond the befuddled state where the thing collapsed. That scenario has only been referred to by the Minister in a very minor way towards the end of his speech.

The Minister is not a man known to keep his tongue unduly tied in his cheek, but he was masterful when he went on to say that the Nine expressed the hope that the US would continue to use peaceful means for the release of the hostages and then he said that it was understandable that the US should have considered it right to undertake a rescue mission. While that might have been understandable, it was a harebrained effort which did not help in any way either in rescuing the hostages or in lessening tensions in that part of the world. Neither did it help in regard to giving the Western democracies some opportunity of getting the hostages out of their situation.

I have been exceptionally strong in my condemnation of the exploitation of the US in the situation in Iran for 25 years. I have been vehement in my denunciation of the role of the Shah and of the US in that part of the world. They exploited the situation utterly to their mutual ends. I have been jaundiced about the way in which the Western democracies were dragged by the US diplomatic post into supporting their efforts in that area. We had a very reluctant Nine trying to save face, trying on the one hand to hold out half a finger to America by saying that they go along in this direction and, on the other hand, saying to the Iranians: "We hope you appreciate our position but we intend imposing a ban on exports to your country." Such a ban is totally ineffective because even the Israelis could teach the Iranians how to cope with that situation and if they needed further advice they might only have a word with any of the South African diplomatic posts who would advise them on how to destroy completely this purely cosmetic exercise of a ban on exports. Such sanctions are treated with contempt. Even the most inexperienced or unconventional Iranian businessman in a diplomatic post in London could get around those sanctions within a very short time.

As a delegate to the Council of Europe — a body which may not be of any great consequence but which may nevertheless have some influence on the situation — I have said, both privately and publicly, that the Iranian authorities should release the hostages, that they should try to deal with the situation in a more rational manner and that no useful purpose is being served by keeping the hostages in captivity. At least half of the hostages should be deported formally as staff of the CIA and the other half should be set free as ordinary diplomatic personnel, but since they are all accredited they should all be freed. The students who are holding the hostages would have been well advised to have adopted that approach in the first instance.

I recall being critical here of America's involvement in Vietnam and I recall also asking questions of former Ministers about American involvement in Cambodia, but I was classified then as being one of those rather odd Irishmen who was suffering from anti-American aberrations. I assure the House that I do not have any such obsession or preoccupation. At the risk of not receiving any invitation from the US State Department to visit that country during the next ten years, the best thing we could do to the American Government is to tell them the truth occasionally. They would respect us for this and in the process we should tell the Iranian Government that, much as we sympathise with their history in this situation, the way they are dealing with it is not the right way. We should tell them that there is a way out for them and that their country can progress in peace and prosperity, in economic and social development with a new parliament, a new hope and a new beginning. That would be something that the Irish people would wish for, having regard to our revolutionary past and our efforts to get us out of the kind of situation in which the Iranians also found themselves.

Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Lenihan):

I am very grateful for the constructive approach that has been adopted by speakers representing Fine Gael and Labour in regard to this matter. I think we would all agree that this question of sanctions in regard to Iran is not designed in any way to harm the Iranian people as such. The main thrust of the sanctions is to emphasise a very important principle, a principle that has been held rightly by civilised nations from the dawn of civilisation and which has been held particularly by the Muslim nations that have taken part in the growth and development of that civilisation. I refer to the principle whereby the emissaries of one nation living in another nation are respected. That is something that has developed into a whole corpus of international law down through the years. It has been acknowledged in many conventions and developed in law for thousands of years. Civilised conduct between nations, regardless of creed, colour or culture, would be impossible without a clear and resounding acknowledgment of diplomatic immunity so far as are concerned personnel living in a nation other than their own but representing their own nation in that other nation.

That principle is the only legal basis behind the sanctions. It must be made known to countries, regardless of how revolutionary or how extreme their attitudes may be, that this fundamental principle must be adhered to. There is plenty of precedent for this so far as the various revolutionary countries have been concerned down through the years. For example, in the early days of the Russian state after the revolution or in the early days of the French state after their revolution as well as in many other post-revolutionary countries there was protection for their citizens who acted as diplomatic representatives.

This has now grown into a firm principle of international law, sanctioned by conventions in all countries and recognised throughout the world as being fundamental and basic from the point of view of reasonable behaviour between nations. Unless this basic right is acknowledged it will be impossible to communicate, and the only way to break down barriers between nations of different views, different colours, be they extremely authoritarian, extremely democratic or extremely on the left or the right, is by exchange of diplomatic personnel and the growing communicating of facts on each side which would lead to growing understanding of where common interests lie, and gradually over the years to improvement of relations and relaxation of tension.

To bring the matter down to perspective, first of all in regard to Irish exports to Iran, food and medical and pharmaceutical products are excluded from the sanctions. That is relevant from our point of view. I have the figures here for the first four months of this year. The exports which have been excluded from sanctions accounted for 90 per cent of our total exports to Iran. That has not just happened this year because in 1979 a very high percentage of our total exports was composed of food and medical and pharmaceutical products. The percentage was 81.4 per cent of our total exports. They are excluded from our trade sanctions——

Mr. B. Desmond:

But they will be included in the list of commodities which Iran will never again buy from this country. We cannot have it both ways.

Mr. Lenihan:

I will roughly paraphrase what the Deputy said earlier: "Trade has ways of doing trade".

Mr. O'Keeffe:

What is the total annual figure?

Mr. Lenihan:

Our 1979 exports to Iran amounted to £7.4 million and of that figure 81.4 per cent represented food, pharmaceutical and medical products.

Mr. B. Desmond:

The French middleman will get a good percentage of that when he sells to the Iranians.

Mr. Lenihan:

I am only trying to bring things into perspective. We acted in conjunction with our Community partners. One may agree wholeheartedly or disagree with particular actions, but within a Community context it is important to ensure that a formula will be worked out agreeable to all the countries within the Community. I played a part in working out a moderate formula in regard to exports to Iran, excluding certain products, and the net result is that we have demonstrated as a Community, in conjunction with the US, our view of the wrong nature of the action in Iran when they took diplomatic personnel as hostages. There is no question of the Irish Government or the Irish people adopting an antagonistic attitude towards the Iranian people. We have seen and appreciated their difficulties and their problems. We should like to see some order developing out of chaos in that country in an orderly democratic manner.

I appreciate the sort of situation that gave rise to the revolutionary process there. However, the revolutionary process of itself has not led to a restoration of order but indeed to a slowing down to a substantial degree of the entire economy, of production in regard to basic products such as oil. At the moment there are serious problems in regard to production caused by the dispersal of power and there does not appear to be any real decision-making process. There appears to be a pattern of division of power and inability and incapacity to come to grips with realities in regard to the running of that country. I hope the Iranian people will work out of this situation and I would not like to see Ireland or the EEC doing anything that would exacerbate the situation there to any degree.

What has been done by the Community is the bare minimum necessary to indicate the Community's rightful abhorrence of interference with the civilised principle of immunity of diplomatic personnel which goes to the heart of relations between states and the fundamental principle of international law. One of the Community's principle functions is to emphasise aspects of that kind. The area covered by the EEC is one of the remaining parts of the world where Governments are democratically elected. One may say there is not any great harmony in regard to decision-making, but decisions are made by nine democratic Governments. A great part of the world today, unfortunately, is ruled by arbitrary totalitarian Governments. Despite faults and failings, the EEC represent nations who abide by the rule of law, who seek to ensure that the rule of law is observed on an international basis between nations. The stand taken by the Community on this issue, in conjunction with the US, was based on that principle.

Ireland is not greatly involved in the trading and economic sense, but some of our European partners stand to lose substantially through these sanctions. But they went along with them because of the basic violation of international law to which I have referred. We as one of the nine partners could not stand apart. As I have said, the harm or damage done to us has been infinitesimal compared with the losses suffered by some of our partners, such as Italy, Germany, France and the UK. The Community decision was taken to underscore the importance of the fundamental principle of law in relation to behaviour between civilised nations.

Question put and agreed to.

The Dáil adjourned at 10.30 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 25 June 1980.