On the last occasion when we discussed this Bill I had made a number of observations to which I hope the Minister will give some consideration. Perhaps he has had an opportunity to do so by now. I was just about to come to one of the important points raised in the discussion on this Bill. It relates to the question of what up to some years ago was a particular provocation and which more recently has been somewhat ameliorated but is still causing concern to many women's organisations and to many fair thinking men and women, the question of the composition of juries in these cases.
The proposition has been made that there should be a minimum number of women on juries and the Minister has discounted that possibility. I would agree with him that as baldly presented it is not the best way of tackling this problem. Nevertheless, there is an area of concern here and I do not think we can just pretend that everything is satisfactory. It is assumed now that jury selection is at random. Logically, it would follow that on average there should be a reasonable proportion of women, probably 50 per cent, roughly representing the population pattern. That does not happen.
Since our last discussion I saw a case in County Sligo recently in which the jury was totally male. Unless some filtering process is taking place, the likelihood of this is extremely improbable and should not be occurring. The problem stems from the fact that objections are lodged to would-be jurors on the basis of their sex, though that is not stated, in the context of what are known as peremptory objections to jurors. I am asking the Minister to consider some way of circumventing this problem because it is obviously both unjust and unfair that a jury in any case but particularly in a case concerning the most serious and essentially repugnant violation of the rights of a woman, should be composed of people of one sex only.
The question is one of trying to overcome the problem. The Minister might consider some way of ensuring that any process whereby a would-be juror is in the position of being objected to on the grounds of sex, is excluded by law or else, that the reasons for the objection are spelled out. But even that would not guarantee a total degree of satisfaction in this respect because it would not exclude the possibility of someone saying, for instance, "I do not think that person would be a good juror in this case because she is from the same county as one of the people involved", when what the objector is saying is that a woman is not wanted on the jury. This sort of thinking is most unjust and unfair to women. It implies that in some way they would be more hostile, more prejudicial and, therefore, less just to the defendant than a male juror would be in the sort of case we are discussing.
On 17 April last I asked a question of the Minister regarding the composition of juries. I was prompted to ask the question because one hears now and again the suggestion that there is a whiff of jury vetting about the process of selecting juries. Loath as we are to believe that there is any such process, the figures and the statistics seem to indicate that everything is not satisfactory in this respect. As reported at column 1566 of the Official Report for the day in question, the Minister replied:
The selection of juries is provided for in the Juries Act, 1976 (No. 4 of 1976) and is carried out by the county registrars. The Act provides that each county shall be a jury district but that the Minister may by order divide a county into two or more jury districts or limit a jury district to a part or parts of a county. The Jury Districts Order, 1976 (S.I. No. 57 of 1976), as amended by the Jury Districts Order, 1977 (S.I. No. 59 of 1977), makes provision for districts on this basis in some counties.
The next paragraph was the kernel of the Minister's reply. I quote:
The procedure for the selection of juries is set out in a manual dated February 1976 which, as I indicated in my reply to parliamentary question No. 444 of 18 October 1979, is available in the Oireachtas library. The only records are those kept by the county registrars.
I had asked if there were in operation any socio-economic exclusion clause. I asked this because it appeared that people from some areas of some cities had never been members of a jury though very often they were the people in the defendant's box. The Minister's reply continued:
Since the system is designed expressly to ensure the random selection of jurors, an assessment of the kind mentioned could not be expected to reveal any local variations in the composition of juries other than those that must inevitably arise from such factors as the proportion of rural to town dwellers which can vary from jury district to jury district.
Unfortunately, the Minister is equivocal about this. When he says that an assessment of the kind mentioned could not be expected to reveal any local variation or, I presume, any other variation, he is saying that there has not taken place any such analysis of the composition of juries which would ensure that justice is being done and that not any category of people, for instance, local authority tenants or women, are being excluded from jury service.
There is a problem here, particularly in the context of trials pertaining to rape cases. I would suggest, though my suggestion may evoke some protestations from the legal profession, that the situation whereby the current practice of someone being able to lodge an objection to a would-be juror on the basis solely of that would-be juror being a woman, should be outlawed. I do not know how this could be done but it is not my responsibility to concern myself with that part of the problem. Obviously, one way of making greater progress in that area would be to insist that wherever a would-be juror is objected to, the reason should be given either publicly or, in the event of the possibility of embarrassing or offending the person concerned, to the judge in private.
In passing I should like to draw attention to the great debt of gratitude we owe to the many people who are called day after day for jury service and who render this service at great inconvenience to themselves. They are prepared to suffer this inconvenience in the interest of the State. Therefore, it is very infortunate when people are objected to and are ruled out merely because, as in the case we are talking of, they are women. On the other hand, it would be extremely wrong to reverse the process of discrimination and to include people on the jury merely because they were men or because they were women as the case may be. Not only would that be unjust and difficult to operate but it would lead to a series of requests from various interested groups to be involved as jurors in various cases.
Because the situation in relation to juries is not dealt with adequately in the Bill, I urge the Minister to consider if further. The position I have outlined represents a glaring omission in view of the sort of situation which occurs now and then whereby, despite the law and despite our understanding that random selection is the process that prevails, all-male juries still operate. That can only happen as a result of the law being either circumvented or abused. The Minister should investigate the situation urgently with a view to bringing in any necessary amendment on Committee Stage to ensure that in future juries in the type of case we are talking of will not be either chosen or rejected on part on the basis of their sex.
There is the question also of medical examinations in rape cases. For a variety of reasons the unfortunate alleged victim in an alleged rape case needs immediate medical attention in order to ensure that the level of trauma may subside as rapidly as possible. It has been represented to me in this regard that the facilities for such medical attention are not readily available. The proposal has been put forward that the appropriate medical attention should be available at Garda stations. I have qualms about that, having had the opportunity of commiserating with some gardaí on the conditions in which they work. I cannot imagine any place less suitable for the storing of the necessary treatment equipment for rape cases than some of the Garda stations that I have visited. At the same time there is the problem that a doctor called to examine a patient may not have the necessary equipment for treatment. Perhaps some sort of compromise might be reached whereby the necessary facilities would be made available at least within specific regions and within a radius of so many miles so that there would not be delays of days or even of weeks in providing the necessary treatment and so that the victim would not have to travel some distance to receive treatment.
There have been comments also about the necessity for improvements in police regulations and training in respect of rape cases. These comments are not fundamentally germane to the Bill, but whether they should be is another question.
There is a suggestion that, despite the best efforts of the gardaí and the banghardaí involved in handling such cases, there may be deficiencies in this respect. That is something that should be considered and, if there is any evidence to suggest so, the necessary remedial practices should be introduced. For example, the police investigation should be carried out by a ban-gharda — unless the woman involved wishes otherwise — especially with regard to taking a statement. Clearly that is a traumatic event, one that I think neither the Minister nor myself could ever understand fully. It must be a very depressing and distressing event and it is likely that the taking of such a statement by a ban-gharda or an appropriate woman officer would help. Some consideration should be given to that point of view. There is a suggestion also that not all women in such situations are informed of their right to be examined for forensic evidence by a doctor of their own choice. I understand that may not happen in all cases, and I can understand that in the immediate aftermath of such a crime. However, people should be made aware of their rights in this respect.
It has also been represented to me that preparation for the procedures in court could be more comprehensive and more sympathetic to the victim in particular. For example, the barrister representing the State from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions or the solicitor from the Chief State Solicitor's Office could hold consultations with the witness well in advance of the hearing. The excuse in such cases is that this provision does not apply in other criminal cases and that the preparation of witnesses in this way could not be accepted in the special and unique circumstances applying in rape cases. There is a fair amount of strength in that, but we are dealing with an extraordinary crime, one that unforttunately is on the increase. We are also dealing with a crime that because it does not relate to physical property at a remove from the defendant tends, because of the subjective nature of the evidence involved, to give it priority for this kind of treatment. There is no reason why the woman, the victim in this case, should not be consulted earlier on and be prepared to give her story. The suggestion is that quite often the woman in the case feels little more than an exhibit. We know of unfortunate cases where people have broken down in the witness box and we know of the subsequent results.
The suggestion in the Bill that anonymity will prevail is welcome because presumably it will increase the chances of more women coming forward and also will reduce the sense of trauma involved. I look forward to the time when we will conduct proceedings openly in court, when we will be sufficiently mature as a nation, when, whatever the crime, people will not feel they will be ostracised because their names were mentioned. Every time we obscure from public gaze any element of the court system, whether it be the proper examination of the defence or the past history or the name of the defendant in a case like this, we do some degree of injury to the concept of justice. Some of that injury may have to be accepted in the short-or medium-term because of the fact that women in many cases are quite terror-stricken about what will happen in the trial, almost as much as they are about the crime itself. I look forward to an improvement in that area.
The request that the woman involved in such a case be consulted about the proceedings is unique in this context because she will be put in the position of being cross-examined in a very intimate way about her behaviour in an area of activity that is extremely difficult for any of us to deal with publicly. Some degree of sensitive handling prior to the trial is the least we should give in the context of a humanitarian treatment of a person who is, after all, the victim. In many cases it is the victim who tends to break down and who tends to feel alienated from the community.
The Minister struck an important note in his final remarks on Second Stage when he said:
Changing the law will not in itself lead to eradication of the crime of rape. What we can do by legislation, and what we are endeavouring to do in this Bill, is to remove certain features which may at present inhibit rape victims from bringing their complaint to the Garda and thus create a situation where there would be a greater likelihood of rapists being brought to justice.
That is a worthy aim but, with a little amendment, I think we could go beyond that. We could have a Bill that will not just accept that rape is inevitable, that it will increase, that there is nothing we can do about it, that the best we can do is hope that more people will come forward and report it and that the convictions obtained will be more secure. We can do better than that. We can ensure that people involved in the crime of rape will be dealt with properly, that women will feel they are being safeguarded and that people who are the defendants in such cases will be taken out of public circulation and will be dealt with in the appropriate manner. I do not accept the defeatist attitude that is implicit in the Bill and I hope on Committee Stage to show that we can do better.
In so far as this Bill has given us an opportunity to discuss the matter it is welcome. There are good provisions in the Bill but there are some deficiencies. I suggest to the Minister that rape is too narrowly defined. At this stage it is the traditional definition of sexual intercourse. The forms of injury caused to women in this context are much wider. I believe some are by utilisation of objects of various kinds and these should be open to the charge of rape.
I would, therefore, ask that the definition be broadened to include these cases. Secondly, the area relating to the anonymity of the defendant is to some extent regrettable but I think it is necessary. There are other possible areas to which anonymity should be extended, where people involved are often visited afterwards by great loss and damage to their character and their integrity in the community. Even though it goes against the grain, to some extent, that any part of a court proceedings should be obscured or hidden away it is necessary in this case and I support it.
The Bill puts a greater onus on judges than heretofore in these cases. We must have a certain sense of understanding and, indeed, almost compassion for some of the exigencies which we are expecting of them. This is a difficult Bill and a man — or indeed a woman, and I hope there will be more of them in the future — sitting on the bench would be in a very demanding and emotional position. We should ensure in so far as we can that what I might respectfully call the education of the judges in that respect would be the best possible and that they would be helped by the readily available help of the appropriate witnesses and other means to be as expert in this as is possible.
Another point which I mentioned earlier but do not think I made quite clear is the question relating to so-called marital rape. I want to make clear our thinking about this. Rape is a crime. It has a clear definition. We know what it means. In a sentence, it is the unwanted sexual violation of one human being by another. Marital status has nothing to do with it and whatever obstruction, hindrance or inhibition rests at present on a married woman taking such an action where she thinks it is justified, should be removed. It to me is as illogical and irrational as to disallow the possibility of that kind of charge being brought as it would be for example, in any other criminal case. Take the case of a mugging. For example, if one were to suggest that a teenager who mugs old ladies in fact is not open to being charged if the old lady he mugged is his mother, it would be nonsensical. I do not understand the rationale or justification for the suggestion that it is impossible for a woman to be raped by her husband. This is a delicate case because it comes into the area of family relationships. I know that it would be very difficult for a woman to prove that.
I hope and pray that there would not be too many charges of that nature brought forward and we would all hope that, but there have been, and are, and will be such cases. In common justice such a woman has the same right to protection as any other person and should not have her rights circumscribed by virtue of the fact that for better or for worse, for richer or for poorer, she got married to some man some years ago. Indeed, I believe that under the Constitution such a woman would have a case because the rights of all citizens should be equal under the law and such rights are not circumscribed by virtue of marital status, for example, in a case like this. I do not want to over-emphasise this or speak too long about it. The crime of rape is, and should be, repugnant to us. We should be able to eradicate it from our society and all women should have the right to take an action if they believe that they have been so dealt with.
There is also concern in the area of delays in trials. Some suggestion has been made that a statutory limit would be put, some said of three months, and that the case would have to be taken within that period. I sympathise with the views of such people but I can see the utter impossibility of it. It could very well go quite against the victim in such a case, because a defendant could quite rightly claim that the task of his lawyers and people defending him is made more difficult—and bear in mind that a conviction of someone in a case like this is an extremely serious matter. We do not want to be unfair, either to the defendant or the victim, in a case like this. All we do is urge that the appropriate court facilities, appropriate number of judges and witnesses are made available, so that these trials can take place as immediately as possible. It is not unfair to say that at present some trials take too long to come to execution, as it were. From that arise demands for some changes in the law, but that is another day's work. The answer is not to say that at three months there must be a trial. Clearly that cannot be entertained and would not serve the purpose of the administration of justice if it could be shown that more weeks were needed to prepare a case, either for the prosecution or for the defence.
These are the basic points and we shall be tabling amendments. Having been able to deal with the Minister across the floor previously, I know that he will be receptive, will listen and take the courtesy of reading and considering what we have said. I feel sure that we can make some progress and that there may be a meeting ground somewhere in the middle so that some of the honest interest taken by all sides of the House in this Bill could be dealt with.
This Bill is non-party political. It is timely. I hope that we can bring about even further improvements in this very important area without undue delay and show the women of this country that this Parliament is very concerned about respecting and protecting them.
