I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time.
The question of the allowances to be paid to Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas and the salaries for Ministers and other parliamentary office holders is always a sensitive issue. It can be, and indeed in the past has been, a matter which has attracted critical comment which has not always been well founded. When the matter has to be debated in the Houses of the Oireachtas members may feel a sense of embarrassment in having to discuss publicly their own pay increases.
I hardly have any need to remind Deputies that their remuneration and, of course, that of Senators and Ministers and other parliamentary office holders, has not been adjusted since 1 June 1981 — nearly two-and-a-half years ago.
When the Review Body on Higher Remuneration submitted their report on 30 October 1979, as well as recommending levels of remuneration for those covered by this Bill, they dealt with the question of future reviews. At paragraph 14.5 the report states that "future reviews of remuneration for those covered by our terms of reference should take place at least every four years provided that the groups concerned receive all standard national agreements or other general round increases".
The Government at the time accepted the review body's recommendations on the appropriate level of remuneration and the adjustments were made, in respect of Members of the Oireachtas and the Judiciary, as from 26 June 1979 and 26 June 1980. Subsequently, the provisions of the 1980 national agreement on pay policy, as recommended, applied also. Successive Governments have not, however, applied the 1981 Public Service Pay Agreement, as amended, which provided for phased increases of 2 per cent, 6 per cent, and 5 per cent payable on 1 December 1981, 1 March 1982 and 1 January 1983. The effect of this has been to leave the remuneration of TDs. Senators and members of the Judiciary set at the level of the last phase of the 1980 Agreement on Pay Policy, that is at 1 June 1981 rates.
Parliamentarians, and judges, are the only review body groups whose remuneration is still at 1 June 1981 levels. Given that the review body were firmly of the opinion that the remuneration levels which they put forward in 1979 should have national pay round increases added, it is clearly undesirable that none of the three phases of the 1981 pay agreement have been implemented. In addition, since 1 September last, the first phase of the 1983 Public Service Pay Agreement has been payable to public service personnel, representing a further increase of 4.75 per cent.
The Bill, therefore, provides that the increases under the 1981 Public Service Pay Agreement (2 per cent, 6 per cent and 5 per cent) and the first phase of the 1983 Public Service Pay Agreement (4.75 per cent) will be applied with effect from 1 September 1983, to parliamentarians — and to the annual sums payable to leaders of certain parties in Dáil Éireann — and the Judiciary. The Bill also provides that in the future general pay rounds applied to the civil service will also automatically apply to Oireachtas members and to the Judiciary with effect from the appropriate dates. In this way the recommendation of the review body will, in the future, be met.
As regards the Judiciary, I do not think that there are any good grounds for treating them less favourably than the rest of the public service, and accordingly the Bill provides that the increases under the 1981 Public Service Pay Agreement and the first phase of the 1983 Public Service Pay Agreement will be applied in their case with retrospection to the due dates, that is, 2 per cent from December 1981, 6 per cent from 1 March 1982, 5 per cent from 1 October 1982, and 4.75 per cent from 1 September 1983.
In the case of the parliamentarians, however, the Government have decided that the 1981 Agreement increases will apply from 1 September 1983 without retrospection. As a result of this, TDs who served since the 1981 agreement came into effect will be at a permanent loss of £2,320 approximately, which is the amount by which their remuneration fell short during the period up to 31 August, 1983. In the light of the prevailing economic climate, Deputies will appreciate, I hope, the reasons which compelled the Government to decide against payment of retrospection for parliamentarians.
The failure to apply the 1981 agreement to parliamentarians is perhaps best illustrated by a comparison of the remuneration levels. Thus a TD who received — and still remains at — £13,802 per annum in 1981, would have moved progressively, on 1 December, 1981 to £14,078, to £14,923 at 1 March 1982, and to £15,669 from 1 January 1983 — this last phase to have actually been paid in January of this year, rather than October 1982, in accordance with the amendments to the 1981 agreement. Similarly a Senator, currently in receipt of £7,619, would have received increases bringing this remuneration to £7,828, £8,298, and £8,713 per annum on the respective dates. As from 1 September last, the appropriate levels for TDs and Senators, applying the first phase of the current public service pay agreement, would increase, by 4.75 per cent, to £16,413, and £9,127, respectively.
From the foregoing it will be seen that Deputies, in annual terms, are now in receipt of £2,611 less than is appropriate to maintain their remuneration level in line with movements throughout the public service. The proposed increases effective from 1 September 1983 do no more than rectify this situation.
It would be unfortunate were the provisions of this measure to be represented as a "Rise in TDs pay". Rather should they be seen for what they are — the extremely belated application of a number of public service pay agreement phases.
They should be viewed in the context of public servants generally having received and enjoyed the benefits of these phases progressively over the past two year period, as well as adjustments of this order having been granted in the private sector.
In addition, it may be remembered that twice last year, in February and November, general elections took place. This meant that Deputies, who had previously stood in the general election of June 1981, were invited to participate in two further electoral contests within eighteen months. Apart from the usual election expense, the fact that Members cease to receive their Oireachtas allowance from the date of dissolution until, and unless, they are re-elected, is often lost sight of.
Thus, a pre-December 1981 TD, who still survives, was at the loss of the equivalent of £864 approximately in allowance during the February 1982 election and £827 approximately in respect of the period of the contest in November of last year. These two figures, combined with that of £2,320 approximately, to which I referred earlier, means that a TD is now £4,011 approximately worse off than someone in the public service who had an income equal to his in November 1981 and who received the benefit of the general increases. Members who stood in the June 1981 election also, incidentally, lost a further £730 approximately through cessation of remuneration at that time.
It appears a rather pointless exercise if one establishes a review body, accepts their findings and recommendations and then, subsequently, fails to implement what is, after all, an integral part of such recommendations. Additionally, there does not appear to be a case for having the provisions of national or public service type agreements applied to all whom they were intended to cover and at the same time specifically to exclude the legislature for no good reason.
Apart from anything else, such inaction merely compounds the problem, from a presentational point of view, when steps have to be taken, as now, to correct the situation. Doubtless there will be many who will be in disagreement with what they perceive as a unilateral "increase in Oireachtas pay" although they themselves have benefited from precisely the same percentage increases — and had them paid upon the agreed dates, rather than, as will be the case in respect of one phase for the Deputies, two years later. It is for this reason that the Government have decided to amend the manner in which such pay agreements are applied to the members of the Oireachtas and the Judiciary.
Heretofore a cumbersome procedure has resulted in a situation where, literally, a period of months could — and did — elapse between the decision to implement a pay round and its actual payment. Firstly, there is required a Government decision, followed by the making of a statutory order which, in turn, must be laid before the House for 21 sitting days before taking effect. Should a recess intervene, or if the decision to initiate the procedure takes place during a recess, the process is even longer. It will be obvious, therefore, that without delay on the part of Government, a period of months may elapse before an ordinary phase, payable to all others, is actually paid to the Members of the House.
Indeed, on occasions in the past the delay has been such that the one single increase, whilst passing through this legislative conduit, has been reported or commented upon on a number of occasions to such an extent that the impression may have been created that there had, in fact, been a series of increases actually paid during the period.
In the future, therefore, and commencing with the enacting of this legislation and the current public service pay agreement, increases applying generally to the civil service will be applied automatically to members of the Oireachtas, to the annual sums payable to certain party leaders, and to the Judiciary with effect from the due date in each case.
In relation to any other changes in parliamentary remuneration, arising, for example, as a result of a review body inquiry, provision is being made so that, in future, an order having immediate effect could be made either increasing or decreasing such remuneration and such an order would be capable of being annulled by resolution of the Dáil within 21 sitting days but without prejudice on anything already done thereunder. In the case of the Judiciary the order will simply be presented to both Houses but would not, for constitutional reasons, be capable of annulment.
I referred earlier to the situation whereby members of the Dáil cease to qualify for allowance as from the date of dissolution of the Dáil to which they were elected. Qualification for resumption of payment does not occur until, and unless, they are re-elected to the subsequent Dáil.
This in effect means that a TD is without remuneration for a period of approximately three weeks whenever a general election takes place. During a period of instability such as took place during 1981 and last year this can represent quite a burden for members — and especially those who are full-time TDs.
It is interesting to note that the three general elections of 1981 and 1982 meant a loss of income, for those Deputies of the 20th Dáil who have survived to the 24th, of £2,420 — or over two months' remuneration during the 18 months from June 1981 to November 1982. This represents a sizeable set-back by any standard.
Curiously the same situation does not exist in relation to the Seanad. There, a member remains so, despite the calling and holding of a Seanad general election, until the day before polling day. If re-elected he continues, therefore, without break in service. This matter was considered by the Review Body in 1979, who reported at paragraph 12.18 as follows:
The members of a Dáil cease to be TDs on its dissolution and an outgoing TD who is seeking re-election has exactly the same constitutional and statutory rights as any other candidate. However, in view of the fact that the Dáil may be, and normally is, dissolved without notice and the financial hardship which the abrupt cessation of a TD's allowance can cause, and having regard to the arrangements applying to Senators, we consider that the question of continuing payment of TD's allowances up to the date before polling day for the new Dáil might be reviewed in the context of the consideration which might be given to severance payments. Such a course could also avoid the situation where a TD would fail to qualify for pension because this period is not taken into account in determining eligibility.
Accordingly, the Government have decided to provide that a sum equivalent to one-eighteenth of annual allowance shall be payable to a Deputy on dissolution of a Dáil and arrangements will also be made to include the period of dissolution as reckonable for pension purposes.
The Review Body states at paragraph 12.13 that
"the minimum qualifying period of eight years does seem harsh in the case of a TD who fails to qualify for a pension because the period between dissolution of the Dáil and polling day, for which he is not paid, is not taken into account".
The case was made, by Deputies and Senators, to the Review Body, that some form of severance payment might be made to a member who retired, or was defeated, at a general election. According to the Report of the Review Body the submission stated that:
TDs were working on short-term contracts, terminable without notice and renewable only with the assent of the electorate, and that a TD had no security of tenure. The submission pointed out that since membership of Dáil Éireann was not considered an insurable employment, defeated or retiring TDs were not normally eligible for unemployment benefit or assistance and did not receive redundancy payments. Because of the abrupt termination of the parliamentary allowance on the dissolution of the Dáil and the demands in terms of time and expenses of contesting a general election, the submission said that the outgoing member of the Dáil and, in particular, the full-time member, had little opportunity to make arrangements for alternative employment. The submission argued that the introduction of severance arrangements would help alleviate the financial hardship caused by the abrupt termination of parliamentary income following the dissolution of the Dáil and the defeat or retirement of a member. It would help the outgoing member in the period between his defeat/retirement and his obtaining alternative employment, which might be a considerable period in some cases. A severance grant might, it was suggested, be considered an occupational redundancy scheme or a scheme for payment in lieu of notice.
The Review Body pointed out at paragraph 12.15 that this question did not come within their terms of reference but continued:
We would say, however, that we have some sympathy with the views expressed and consider that the possibility of introducing some form of severance grants for defeated deputies might be examined. Deputies who retire voluntarily would seem to be in a different position.
The Government have examined this matter but have concluded that, as the prime purpose of this legislation is to restore members to their June 1981 position relatively speaking, rather than materially improving their conditions vis-á-vis other groups, and because of the complex nature of determining qualification, and so on, no provision should be made for payment of a severance grant.
In conjunction with other, though unrelated, changes of a minor nature which I intend to make to the members' pension scheme, following the passing of this Bill, I shall amend the provision whereby members qualify for pension based on one-fortieth for each year of service. In future there will be an optional situation whereby a defeated or retiring member, who has served the requisite eight qualifying years, may decide to draw pension on that basis or, alternatively, to choose a lump sum, calculated actuarially, together with reduced pension payments based on three-one hundred and sixtieths for each year of service.
Whilst not involving the State in any additional cost, this will allow an ex-member, who is, for example, without any other occupation, the opportunity to utilise the lump sum whilst endeavouring to seek alternative employment. I also intend modifying the pension scheme to allow those of short service, and who are not qualified for pension, to have their own pension contributions refunded to them as is common in most other schemes.
This matter was also referred to by the Devlin Review Body which stated, at paragraph 12.13.
Another feature of the present arrangements which does not seem entirely fair is that members who fail to qualify for a pension forfeit their contributions.
As mentioned, the Review Body referred to superannuation matters and pointed out, in paragraph 12.20, that they were taking the 6 per cent contribution payable by members into account "in considering the appropriate level of allowance".
They continued in this paragraph to state:
If changes were to be made in relation to the refund of contributions where members fail to qualify for pensions, severance grants and the continuance of payment of TDs' allowances beyond the date of dissolution of a Dáil, these would have to be part of an overall package, and improvements in benefits on these lines would require corresponding modifications elsewhere in existing arrangements.
I shall deal with two of these three matters, as I have already stated, and it would be my intention that these modifications, and members' conditions generally, would be considered by the body when next a general review similar to that undertaken and reported on in 1979 takes place. It is interesting to reflect upon the observations of the Review Body, at paragraph 12.70, regarding the other occupations of TDs. It should be mentioned that the survey referred to was taken in 1978. Paragraph 12.70 states:
Our questionnaire also sought information on how many TDs had other occupations. Of the 82 TDs who replied to this question, 6 were continuing with their ordinary jobs on a full-time basis and 39 were continuing with their ordinary jobs on a part-time basis. A further 4 had engaged part-time on new jobs but 1 of these had subsequently relinquished his. Thus 34 (41%) of 82 TDs indicate that they were full-time TDs with no other occupation. While this remains a minority it is a substantial increase in the number of full-time TDs since 1972 when our survey showed that only 15 (18%) out of 84 TDs who replied were full-time TDs with no other occupation. It must also be noted that only a handful of TDs have continued their normal occupations on a full-time basis. We return in our assessment to these points and to the whole question of whether the job of TD should be regarded, for the purposes of remuneration, as a full-time one.
In the assessment, at paragraphs 12.83, and 12.84 the Review Body stated:
We concluded in 1972 that the hours of work which the typical TD devotes to his official duties are such as to warrant near comparison with other full-time occupations. The replies to our surveys on this occasion showed an increase in the time devoted by the average TD to his duties as a TD and a significant increase in the number of full-time TDs with no other occupation. It must also be borne in mind that many of those who have maintained other occupations, either on a full-time or part-time basis, have had to employ extra assistance in their normal business or profession in view of their position as TDs.
It seems to us to be of limited meaning today to speak of full-time or part-time when speaking of the job of TD. The job is unique in its role, responsibilities, work and conditions. In a democratic system such as ours the salary of a TD should be high enough to provide a reasonable livelihood for those who choose to devote themselves full-time to their work as TDs and who may not have alternative sources of income. On the other hand we acknowledge that the majority of TDs have some other occupation, mostly on a part-time basis. It is likely that no matter how high the parliamentary allowance is a large proportion of TDs will continue to have other sources of income. The insecurity of the job of TD makes this inevitable.
While I am not aware of any recent similar survey having been carried out I am nevertheless satisfied that the increasing complexity and demands have resulted in a situation where at least as high a level of TDs today (41 per cent) as that shown in 1978, operate on a full-time basis.
It is, I think, good that this should be so. We need committed, dedicated Members in the service of the Parliament and the nation and we have, consequently, an obligation to ensure that they are provided with, as the review body states, a "reasonable livelihood".
All that the main provisions of this Bill set out to do is to restore Members to the level which the review body recommended they should be at, and maintained at, through application of wage agreements. Doubtless there will be those who will relish the opportunity to describe this measure as "another example of the politicians looking after themselves".
That, in fact, is not the case. Indeed the main reason necessitating this Bill is that Governments have not properly provided for the parliamentarians over the past two years and have allowed their situation to deteriorate to a marked degree.
Already the current public service pay agreement applied from 1 September last and, consequently, the Government were faced with, again belatedly, tabling an order requiring 21 sitting days before the increase could be paid to pay parliamentarians or, alternatively, dealing with the situation in a reasonable and yet realistic way. This I hope we have done by granting the terms of the 1981 agreement and the first phase of this public service pay agreement to take effect only from September last.
Thus Members' remuneration is restored to the level recommended by the Devlin Review but without retrospection, which leaves them at a permanent loss of £2,320 in retrospection vis-á-vis comparable public service income earners. This is apart from the further loss arising from the non-payment of the parliamentary allowance between the dates of dissolution and polling.
I have no doubt whatsoever that were there to be an agreed general pay standstill for a defined period, Members here would be quick to support its application in their own case. In a situation, however, where all around them have got increases progressively over the past two years, with inevitable consequences for living costs and prices, it must surely be both unfair and unrealistic to expect Oireachtas Members alone to stand still.
There is an obligation upon those of us entrusted with the operation of a democracy to ensure that the democratic system is able to work. In a curious way, should we see fit to shirk from providing for what we know is a fair and just and reasonable payment to any Member doing his or her job, and to single out parliamentarians alone as the group who should not be allowed increases applicable to the rest of society, and whose application to parliamentarians has already been recommended by an independent review body, then we are doing both Parliament and democracy itself a disservice.
If we allow a situation to develop where only those of independent and substantial means can afford to last as Members of our Parliament, where this Chamber becomes, as it might have tended to before, a rich man's debating club, then the will and application to tackle the demanding, and increasingly complex, pressures of society, will neither be reflected nor present in the forum.
I believe that any fair-minded and dispassionate observer will see this measure for what it is, the application to parliamentarians, without retrospection, and to the Judiciary of general public service pay increases, long ago granted to, enjoyed — and spent — by others in the public service, and the introduction of automatic payment to Members of such general increases in the future, and that they will agree with me in commending the Bill to the House.
The opportunity is also being taken to effect certain other changes, basically of a minor nature, and which I will be happy to explain more fully on Committee Stage.
These include provision to allow changes to the Members pension scheme by ministerial amending scheme, provision that the posts of Cathaoirleach and Leas-Chathaoirleach of the Seanad be made pensionable, provision for amending the conditions for regarding the post of Attorney General as pensionable, and provision for removal of an anomaly in the pension terms of certain former Parliamentary Secretaries which was unintentionally caused by the pension provisions for Ministers of State in the 1977 Act. The amendments of the Members' pension scheme referred to earlier in this speech will be introduced by way of an amending scheme under the new procedure, together with provision for transferability of service between the pension scheme and the scheme for Members of the European Parliament.
Whilst they do not form part of the specific provisions of this Bill, nevertheless I think I should tell the House that it is also the intention of the Government, in conjunction with the passing of the Bill, to update Members' travelling, overnight and day allowances. These rates have not been increased since January 1980 and have clearly fallen through the floor of any basket of comparables. For the future Members who qualify will be paid the same mileage rates as are, for the time being, allowed to civil servants. The present overnight allowance of £17.50 for those Members who are obliged to stay in Dublin whilst the Houses are in session is to be revised to £27.50 and the day allowance, payable to those Members who reside within 10 miles of the House, from £10 to £16. It should be pointed out that this was the level of increase which was deemed to be appropriate nearly a year ago. It is intended that, in the future, these figures will be adjusted by reference to civil service mileage and subsistence rates.
I commend the Bill to the House.