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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 21 Mar 1984

Vol. 349 No. 1

Meeting with Heads of State or Government: Statement by Taoiseach.

I propose, a Cheann Comhairle, to make a statement to the House on my recent meetings with Heads of State or Government.

I visited the United States of America from 9 to 16 March at the invitation of President Reagan. I also attended the European Council in Brussels on 19 and 20 March, where I was accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Peter Barry. The Minister for Agriculture, Deputy Austin Deasy, also attended in Brussels on the Irish delegation.

At the outset, I wish to place on record my appreciation of the outstanding warmth and generosity of the welcome accorded to us in the United States. From the Administration, I met President Reagan, Vice-President Bush, Mr. Schultz, Secretary of State, Mr. Brock, United States Trade Representative, Mr. Clark, Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. Block, Secretary for Agriculture.

At the initiative of the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, The Hon. Thomas P. O'Neill, I addressed a joint meeting of the US Congress following which I was received by the Friends of Ireland in Congress and was guest of honour at a lunch hosted by the Speaker.

On a point of order, would the Taoiseach be good enough to arrange that copies be provided?

Yes, certainly.

It is normal practice when the Taoiseach or a Minister reads a statement that copies of that statement are furnished to Members.

I have my copy.

The Press Gallery is full of documents and I think we are entitled to the same courtesy.

I entirely agree and I have instructed that copies be provided.

A Cheann Comhairle, would you please arrange for the same courtesy to be extended to Members as is extended to members of the Press Gallery?

This is outrageous.

I do not understand the purpose of this. Advance copies were circulated.

Would the Taoiseach not ask his civil servants to arrange for copies of the document to be supplied?

I have asked.

He has asked, has he?

So long as the Press have them it is all right.

(Interruptions.)

Advance copies were circulated to the Leaders of the parties. I understand that was done. As a further courtesy to the House I will postpone speaking until copies have been furnished to the Deputies.

Everywhere the unique character of the relationship between Ireland and the United States was clearly reflected: and everywhere the greatest understanding was shown of the problems and prospects of our country. In particular the reception accorded by Congress to the address I delivered on 15 March was for me, and for the other members of the Irish delegation, an overwhelming experience. I have had copies of this address presented to the House, for information. I hope that in the welcome we accord to President Reagan when he visits Ireland at my invitation next June, we can reciprocate something of the warmth and generosity shown to us in the United States.

My first objective in making the visit was to affirm the relationship based on history, common interest and beliefs and the closest ties of affection and kinship, linking Ireland and the United States.

Secondly, I wished to present to the political leaders and the people of the US our analysis of the situation in Northern Ireland; as we see it developing. I asked that no support or encouragement, direct or indirect, should be given to the use of violence for political ends. I also described, in terms agreed with the other Forum leaders, the work of the Forum and the hopes we have for it.

On previous occasions when Irish leaders visited the States there have been dissonant voices. These were lacking or muted on this occasion. I formed the impression that the positive efforts we are making through the Forum, and the hope that it is providing for the future, were favourably received. Indeed, I believe that my visit helped to effect a certain shift in opinion among some of those who have, perhaps, hitherto had a residual sympathy for the men of violence and their methods. What I said has certainly achieved a better level of understanding of the objects of Government policy in relation to Northern Ireland as the single most serious political problem facing our country today.

Next, I outlined at many meetings with leaders of commerce and industry the opportunities for further American investment in Ireland — both as a location in its own right and as a member of the European Community. I told them that there are already more than 350 American firms located here, representing an investment approaching five billion dollars and employing about one-seventh of the Irish manufacturing workforce. This flow of investment is now being reciprocated in a significant way through a number of Irish enterprises operating in the United States, to the benefit of both our countries.

In my discussions with the President, Vice-President and other members of the Administration, we touched on the many problems facing Ireland and the European Community. As Deputies are aware, Ireland will be assuming the Presidency of the Community on 1 July next. What was particularly notable in the discussions was the strength of the opposition expressed to the growing tendency to protectionism in world trade. The defects of this form of economic nihilism are too obvious to need restatement here. Its most immediate effect now could be to stunt the recovery from recession which is quite marked in many countries, particularly the United States, where the growth rate for the first quarter of the year is put by some commentators at an annual rate of about 6 per cent. Given the weight of the United States in world trade, this growth must be reflected in the Community and other countries — if the benefits are not eroded or eliminated by restrictive tariffs or other protectionist devices resorted to for short-term or sectional reasons.

We also discussed a wide range of issues of common concern including other aspects of US-EC relations, East-West relations, Central America, the Middle East and disarmament.

I now come to the European Council which concluded yesterday in Brussels.

The agenda for the Council as presented to us by President Mitterand included (1) Budgetary Discipline; (2) Budgetary Imbalances (including the British problem); (3) Common Agricultural Policy; (4) Own Resources; (5) Structural Funds; (6) Enlargement; and (7) New Policies.

In the event, since there was no unanimity on the issues, the Council was unable to reach agreement. The Presidency did not, therefore, issue the usual statement of conclusions. I propose to touch here on the main issues we discussed and in particular on the issues of concern to Ireland.

I turn first to the question which is clearly of greatest interest to Ireland — the proposed milk super-levy. No one should underestimate — I think that in reality no one does underestimate — the extreme difficulty of this problem. Deputies will recall that I had bilaterial meetings with the heads of State or Government of all member states — the Deputy Prime Minister in Belgium, in the absence at that time through illness of the Prime Minister — before the last European Council in December to ensure that the strength of our arguments was fully understood and appreciated. I continued this programme of discussions at a meeting with President Mitterand in Dublin in February and through other contacts before and at the Council with Mr. Thorn, President of the Commission and with other leaders.

The scale of the milk surplus within the Community is clearly unsustainable — with output running at an estimated 106 million tonnes or almost 20 million tonnes above requirements this year, costing the Community budget a sum of about £4 billion. Because of our uniquely high dependence on the dairy industry it is, in fact, in the interest particularly of Irish farmers that this surplus be tackled, but in a way that will not impede the continued expansion of output in Ireland from the abnormally low level at which it was held prior to our entry to the Community, by historical forces — by the operation of British cheap food policies, the effect of which was compounded in the post-war period through the introduction of deficiency payments for farmers in the United Kingdom. In other words, we were simply seeking the application to us of those fundamental Community principles of market unity and comparative advantage from which other countries themselves had so long benefited without artificial constraint and on which their agriculture has for so long based its ability to invest and thus to achieve its present levels of efficiency and output.

However, irrespective of the basic strength and logic of our case, the negotiating problem posed for Ireland has been a formidable one: to secure the agreement of our partners to the continued expansion of Irish dairy production at a time when an average cut of 5 per cent to 6 per cent was being imposed in the Community as a whole, with production of other members countries being sharply reduced below last year's level, or, in two cases, held at last year's level, without a possibility of further increases.

In view of the fact that, following the failure of this European Council meeting, we are still in a negotiating situation with the crucial decision affecting our dairy sector still to be taken, I am, in the nature of things, limited in what I can say to the House today and Deputies will, I hope, have regard to this fact.

I can, however, say that the situation which faced us in the European Council yesterday morning was one of peculiar difficulty. In the course of discussion of the milk situation a powerful consensus began to emerge amongst the member states, with the exception of the Presidency and Greece, that Irish milk production should be held indefinitely at the 1983 level. A quota, even at the 1983 level, would have involved an increase of 720,000 tonnes on the base figures being used for the purpose of the Council's deliberations — viz. production at the level reached in 1981 plus 1 per cent.

It was essential to achieve at that stage two objectives: first, to establish beyond doubt that there were no circumstances in which we could accept such an outcome and that the opportunity to continue to increase production, without the application of a super-levy, at the kind of rate achieved since we joined the EEC — viz. 5 per cent — was for us a sine qua non; and second, that in pressing this point not to adopt an unreasonable attitude that could be presented in other countries as involving our seeking an arrangement that would objectively be politically impossible for other member states to “sell” in their own countries in the face of pressures deriving from in most cases a requirement to reduce production significantly by comparison with last year — and even more significantly by comparison with the level of production likely to be attained under normal circumstances in the current year.

We faced two real dangers: on the one hand that our position would go by default if we failed to make a sufficiently strong line and to demonstrate our determination; and, on the other hand, the danger of posing this demand in a form that would unavoidably create such a negative reaction among member states as to undermine our whole position.

It would, of course, have been easy, and in the short term at least politically very attractive, to have ignored this latter element and to have allowed the interests of our dairy industry to be sacrificed to a fine show of intransigence. I was not prepared to take this course of irresponsibility however. My concern had to be to create conditions in which either at this meeting or later we would secure the agreement of our partners to the opening for Ireland of a growth path which they themselves were being required to abandon.

Accordingly, after a considerable amount of discussion and negotiation I agreed that a Presidency proposal be put before the Council. This proposal involved a 260,000 tonne increase in Irish production this year — a figure designed to establish the principle of a 5 per cent annual increase in production — combined with a review of the Irish milk quota in each of the subsequent years on the basis of the milk situation in the Community and the possibility of the development of new markets.

I made it absolutely clear to the Council that there were no circumstances in which we would agree to move from this position and that failure to accept this proposal would lead to the maintenance of an Irish reserve on any conclusions that might be reached on other matters before the Council.

Ireland has always been accommodating in the past when Community concerns or the vital national interests of other States are involved. It did not seem at all unreasonable to me, in view of the crucial issues at stake for us on this occasion, to ask for similar understanding for our position. That is why early in the proceedings I had stated formally our intention of withholding consent to the adoption of any measures that the Council might seek to agree upon in respect of other items on the agenda, many of which would have serious cost implications for us, unless an understanding was reached on our situation.

When this Presidency proposal was rejected by two member states, I made a brief intervention in response to the comments made on behalf of one of the member states that had objected to our proposal and then withdrew from the meeting, leaving the Minister for Foreign Affairs with instructions to withhold agreement in respect of anything else that might emerge in the course of subsequent discussions.

By this approach we have made it perfectly clear to our partners that we will not be moved from our position in relation to the continued expansion of milk production in this country.

In subsequent discussion, the Council failed to agree upon another important agenda item — the so-called "budgetary imbalances", involving a proposed payment to Britian of part of the contributions required from them to finance the Community under the terms of the original Treaties and the subsequent agreement on Own Resources which was in force at the time that Britain and ourselves, with Denmark, joined. Even if agreement had been reached on the British problem there would have been no positive result from the Council because unanimity is required for a decision and because of the position we had adopted in relation to the withholding of agreement — unless, of course, the member countries which had objected to the Presidency proposal in respect of Irish milk production had decided subsequently to withdraw their objections.

At the end of the meeting, following the failure to agree on the British problem, the President of the Council, President Mitterand of France, indicated that when he returns from the United States he will undertake diplomatic initiatives with the various member states to see whether there would be a possibility of agreement on the outstanding issues of Irish milk production and the British financial problem if a meeting of the European Council were reconvened in three to four weeks time. The resolution of these two issues is now equally necessary if there is to be a successful outcome to the prolonged negotiations that have followed the Stuttgart European Council meeting.

There were one or two other matters dealt with at the Council upon which I should perhaps make some comment. One is the general question of budgetary restraint. We are firmly opposed to the imposition of any legal limitation on the expansion of Community expenditure other than that implicit in the limit on the Community's own resources but we recognise realistically that a political consensus on restraint in the growth of spending is necessary and have been prepared to agree to a proposed formulation along these lines.

On the question of Own Resources, a consensus emerged at the Council in favour of recommending to national parliaments an increase in maximum VAT rate from 1 per cent to 1.4 per cent, contingent on agreement on the other matters outstanding. This was complemented by a political understanding that this increase, to take effect at the beginning of 1986, could be supplemented by a further increase to 1.6 per cent in 1988 on the basis of unanimity being secured for such an increase within the Council. Member states accepted that if such an agreement were secured at Council level, they would present a proposal to their Parliaments for such a further increase.

The fact that this aspect of the proposed package requires parliamentary approval in ten member states is a complicating element not normally present in European Council discussions. Finally, agreement appeared to be emerging on proposals to deal with the gradual phasing out of monetary compensation amounts, which, as they operate at present, offer a price advantage to farmers in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK which tends to induce additional production in these countries.

There should be no illusion but that the failure to reach agreement at this European Council will have negative implications in the short-term for the farming community here as elsewhere, but repercussions are unavoidable if we are to stand our ground on this issue of crucial long-term importance to the Irish farm sector and the Irish economy as a whole.

Having reached the 1 per cent VAT limit, and with an increase in this limit now blocked, together with interim measures that might have provided additional resources pending the coming into effect of a higher VAT limit, the Community's finances are now under grave pressure. Indeed, with the Community expenditure at the limit of its resources, the Commission will be forced to take action to cut spending under various headings, including agriculture. What form these economies will take and just where they will have impact is something we cannot yet know, but I believe that Irish farmers are prepared to take the short-term financial consequences of this situation rather than concede the principle of foregoing the potential of the Irish soil and climate for the increased production of milk in reasonable market conditions over the years ahead.

There are, of course, some balancing advantages in the short run. Neither the proposed effective cut of 1 per cent to 1.25 per cent in the price of milk and beef nor the proposed 1 per cent additional co-responsibility levy may now take effect on 1 April. On the other hand, the benefits of the 3.4 per cent price effect arising from the proposed MCA adjustment will also be postponed.

Obviously much now depends on whether the President of the Community, President Mitterand of France, can succeed in finding a basis for agreeement on the two major outstanding issues. Pending these efforts we can only await events. At this point I must express my warm personal appreciation for the efforts made by President Mitterand, not merely in his unremitting attempts prior to the Council to establish a basis for agreement on these two major issues and others, and for his assiduous, skilful and extraordinarily patient handling of the meeting, but also for the support that he has given throughout to the Irish Government's position. These efforts were, as we should expect, reflected in the efforts which the entire French delegation put into the meeting. Our thanks are due to them all.

Deep disappointment and a measure of disillusionment about the Community are inevitable in the light of the failure of this Council and the intransigent attitude taken up by certain countries in relation to the outstanding problems. The Community has, however, great resilience and has overcome major crises before. Current difficulties will also, no doubt, be resolved in due course. I believe that member states are now quite clear that these cannot be resolved without agreement that milk production in Ireland is permitted to continue to expand, and they know that no agreement that does not make provision for such expansion will be acceptable to the Government of Ireland.

The European Council of the last two days was a total disaster for Irish farmers and for the country at large. The Taoiseach has been personally humiliated and rejected by his colleagues in Europe. After all the talk about total opposition to the super-levy, the Taoiseach's resistance collapsed ignominiously in Brussels, a fact he has attempted to disguise by his silly pretence of a walk out. He has accepted a derisory concession, an exemption of 5 per cent which does not even cover one year's increase in our milk production; but he could not even get this pittance agreed by those who, he tried to tell us, held him in high regard. When it came to the point, he was brushed aside.

There is no joy for anyone in this pathetic performance. Over the last months we have seen a vital national interest, one universally accepted as such by the politicians of all parties, farmers and trade unionists, disastrously bungled. Here let me say that the Government cannot on this occasion resort to that shabby tactic to which they are so addicted, namely, of blaming Fianna Fáil, because on this occasion we made it clear from the beginning that anything the Government would wish to do would have our wholehearted support.

Is there any need at this stage to reiterate here today that milk production has a unique importance in the Irish economy? It has been stated that it represents 9 per cent of GNP. It is the basis of the whole agricultural sector. Other European countries have nearly maximised their milk production. We need time to catch up, a minimum of five to ten years. The milk super-levy will allow developed European countries to retain their comparative lead and keep the Irish dairy industry in a state of underdevelopment. The expansion of this, the most profitable agricultural enterprise in Ireland, and the whole manufacturing and processing superstructure based on it, will be completely blocked as a result of the Taoiseach's failure.

We do not know at this stage what the final result will be, but we do know that the pass has been sold. Will the Taoiseach, having given his position away in Brussels, now be forced to settle for even less? The President of the EEC Commission has already strongly hinted today that the Commission's proposals will not be based on the French Presidency's 5 per cent offer. It is clear that the concession for Ireland of 5 per cent growth this year is partly used up already. The end of year review which was proposed in Brussels will be worthless. Once the major issues are settled now Ireland will have no leverage left to ensure that any concessions are made to us in future years. What are we to make of a man who, when offered 10 per cent in Athens, refused it and now is prepared to accept 5 per cent? He should be kept at home.

I want to recall the different stages in this fiasco. It all started with a complete misreading of the situation by the Taoiseach in last year's Stuttgart European Council. Let me quote what the Taoiseach said, when he came back, full of forced bonhomie and false promises from the Stuttgart meeting, where it all began. He said, "the Minister and I, with gratifying support from colleagues, were successful in preventing damage to Irish interests in the Common Agricultural Policy. In fact, a comparison between the proposals circulating recently on that subject and the conclusions of the Stuttgart Council will show a really remarkable degree of understanding and support for the basic principles of Community policy".

It will be recalled that, without the benefit of having been at the meeting to gauge the mood at first hand, I pointed out in reply that I did not think the Taoiseach had done a great day's work for Irish farmers, and that it was only necessary to read the list of questions to be examined under the Common Agricultural Policy "to realise that they constitute a major onslaught on the Common Agricultural Policy".

How right I unfortunately was. The Commission soon came up with its proposals, which the Taoiseach declared "would be severely damaging to this country and would also operate in a manner that would be inconsistent with the basic principles of Community policy".

From the start the Government's position was totally contradictory. The Minister for Agriculture was quoted in The Irish Times of 30 July 1983 as saying in the same breath: “I hope we will get major changes. These proposals are not acceptable in any form”. Unfortunately, there was no clear statement of unequivocal opposition to the super-levy. The Taoiseach, playing his usual good European part, deprecated references to the use of the veto and made it clear how reluctant he would be to use it. That surely did not go unnoticed in other European capitals.

The performance of the Minister for Agriculture throughout this episode has been dismal and defeatist. We all recall him going out to one crucial meeting when he told television news reporters that he was "deeply anxious and nervous".

The Taoiseach went to Athens and to London and around Europe. A memorandum was sent to EEC capitals, and the Taoiseach commented: "This has had a significant impact in a number of capitals, judging from the reaction to it"—The Irish Press, 2 November 1983. After a meeting with the Greek Prime Minister in Athens we were told a “working alliance” between the two poorest member states had been formed.

When the Taoiseach went to London, we were told that he left the British Prime Minister "fully aware of the problem".

—(The Irish Press, 8 November 1983).

Some very clear and some very public commitments were made at the last Fine Gael Ard Fheis. The Minister for Agriculture stated, and I quote: "We are not going to accept the proposals from the Commission on milk. We are going to get a derogation".

Let me also recall this particularly nauseating piece in the Taoiseach's own Ard Fheis address: "For my own part I have already started to take advantage of the friendly and influential contacts I have made during and since my period as Minister for Foreign Affairs to ensure that the Heads of Government of other member states of the Community understand just how serious would be the problem for us if an agricultural policy were adopted which put a stop to the growth of our dairy industry".

In the week or two preceding the Athens Summit there was a flurry of diplomatic activity and we were given the impression in our media that all was going well. At the Athens Summit itself, which was as usual overshadowed by the British budgetary problem, an actual offer of 10 per cent above the 1983 milk production level was offered to the Taoiseach by the Greek Presidency and was turned down. I quote from the Taoiseach's report to the Dáil on that Athens Summit: "In so far as the super-levy was concerned, various proposals were made at different stages that would have provided for exemption in Ireland's case up to levels of production which eventually attained a figure of 10 per cent above the current year's output. We made clear our opposition to the limitations contained in each of these proposals".

It has been calculated that a 40 per cent rebate would have been required over a five year period to give us the equivalent of an exemption. At that time the Taoiseach was reported to be looking for at least 20 per cent to 25 per cent. However, in view of his opposition on Ireland's behalf, the Greek proposal in Athens was not further pursued.

After the Athens Summit there seems to have been a complete collapse of the Irish diplomatic effort. There were no more bilateral meetings. The Government did a complete U-turn and switched from opposition in principle to the super-levy to total support for the super-levy, provided Ireland received an exemption. Then last week we had the spectacle of the Minister for Agriculture throwing in the towel and allowing a package which included full agreement in principle to the super-levy to go up to the European Council. This broke the most elementary rule of EEC negotiating. It was actually claimed at the time by some of the media here at home that Ireland had won a great victory at that Agricultural Council meeting, even though it actually cleared the way for the Brussels debacle.

Here let me recall an occasion, I think in 1981, when Deputy Ray MacSharry as our Minister for Agriculture was in the same situation as was Deputy Deasy at the last Agricultural Council. I distinctly remember receiving a telephone call from Deputy MacSharry at three o'clock in the morning in which he said: "I am isolated, I am alone. What shall I do? Shall I stick it out?". I told him "Yes". He stuck it out and he won and no super-levy was imposed.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

The Taoiseach came to the Brussels Summit——

(Interruptions.)

These are facts.

——in an impossible position.

(Interruptions.)

When the rabble have subsided, I shall continue.

The Taoiseach came to the Brussels Summit in the weakest possible position, that of a supplicant, supporting the imposition of the super-levy on other countries and with nothing left to him but to beg for special treatment for Ireland. He would have been in a stronger position if the Government had continued to oppose the super-levy in principle at all times. But, of course, the Minister for Agriculture had given agreement in principle instead of letting the fight continue at every level.

At the Brussels Summit we have seen the Taoiseach's reputation and the current favour-currying type of Iveagh House diplomacy exposed for what it is. At the crunch, when Ireland's vital interests were at stake, they were hardly taken seriously.

The Taoiseach has persuaded himself, and has sought to persuade the country, that his influential friends and contacts would help Ireland in time of need, as indeed he hinted at the Fine Gael Ard Fheis. Where were they on Monday and Tuesday? I hope after this episode, with all illusions shattered, a less fuzzy and more hard-headed approach to foreign policy will now be adopted.

I believe the Taoiseach's futile walkout from the Summit will have done his cause, and regrettably Ireland's cause, great harm. Perhaps he realised early yesterday afternoon that his tactics of leaving the matter to the end would put him in an even weaker and more exposed position. But he should have stayed in there and argued, instead of abandoning the fight.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

Discussions continued, even though they did not reach agreement. As it is, he can now be blamed for wrecking a summit that was not going to succeed anyway. It remains to be seen whether an agreement is patched up on the British budgetary issue in the next few days.

I direct the attention of the House and the general public to the portion of the Taoiseach's statement which contains the nub of the whole thing. I quote:

Accordingly, after a considerable amount of discussion and negotiation, I agreed that the Presidency proposal be put before the Council.

The Taoiseach here agreed to the 5 per cent proposal before the Council meeting. He then goes on to say:

I made it absolutely clear to the Council that there were no circumstances in which we would agree to move from this position.

There are two things which arise from that. Firstly, why did he do what no farmer would do at a fair — agree to this proposal being put up before he had some indication that it was going to be agreed?

Deputies

Hear, hear.

We all know the practice at the fair. When a farmer is selling his beast, he always gets some decent outsider to come along——

(Interruptions.)

——and make sure that the proposal being put forward is going to be accepted before it is actually put forward.

It is not funny. That is what it is all about.

The Government may laugh away, but the farmers in Ireland are not laughing today.

Or the workers.

No competent negotiator would put himself in that stupid situation——

Deputies

Hear, hear.

——putting forward a proposal and having it agreed with the President before he had any indication from anybody that it was going to be accepted.

As we all know, it was not accepted.

The joker of the pack. He had his chance.

No one accepts the Taoiseach's spurious claims that the 5 per cent increase will secure the future of the Irish dairy industry. They are in total contradiction to everything he and everyone else have previously said. In fact, we all know that it will amount to a major irreparable setback for our farmers.

It is clear that the British Prime Minister succeeded in keeping the Summit concentrated exclusively on Britain's position and that the Taoiseach was totally outmanoeuvred. As far as the British budget rebate, which has dominated virtually every meeting of the European Council since late 1979, is concerned, I think it is time that the Community took a firm stand against British blackmail. The Irish case, and indeed the case of every other member state, is drowned out by the incessant pressing of British interests to the exclusion of the interests of everyone else and, indeed, of the Community as a whole. The Irish Government should now support the firm stand adopted by the French Presidency this morning. No pretence about mutually advantageous Anglo-Irish relations has ever deterred a British Government from opposing Ireland in the Community.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

The Taoiseach's problem, of course, after all the changes of stance was that no one at European level takes him seriously. His acceptance of the French offer has proved them right. The Taoiseach is not an effective negotiator, but, unfortunately for Ireland, it was on Ireland's behalf that he was negotiating on this occasion.

I do not intend to waste time on the Taoiseach's American visit. What was the Taoiseach doing in America all week before this vital Summit took place in Brussels?

Deputies

Hear, hear.

Would he not have been better employed — and, indeed, his host of advisers who trooped around after him — in preparing the ground with some of our European partners? We have been told of the gratifying support for various Irish objectives in meetings with all sorts of prominent people in the United States. I want to know what is the substance of these claims? These are the sort of claims made by the Taoiseach in the course of the super-levy negotiations. What do they ultimately amount to? I have only this one comment. The Taoiseach in all his speeches in America did not once seek support for Irish unity, as far as I can ascertain.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

He lost the opportunity of an historic occasion for once again pressing that claim on American public opinion and on the American administration when he addressed both Houses of Congress.

Let me now turn to Anglo-Irish relations. It is to be noted that the customary bilateral meeting between the Taoiseach and the British Minister did not take place. Despite some erroneous reports in one of our morning newspapers, I did not ever attend a European Summit at which I did not have a meeting with the British Prime Minister. It would appear that the Taoiseach offered support to the British Prime Minister on the budgetary problem but that this went wholly unreciprocated. Indeed, I note that the British Prime Minister openly condemned the Taoiseach's departure from the conference table. The Taoiseach gets no recognition for all the gestures of appeasement and compliance he has made since he came to office.

We have been constantly told for some time now how friendly and co-operative Anglo-Irish relations are under the Taoiseach and the Government by way of contrast to the unhappy state of affairs that prevailed under Fianna Fáil. Where was the evidence of that friendliness and co-operation in Brussels? In a matter that vitally affected our national economic interests, which will have a direct bearing on the standard of living of thousands and thousands of Irish families and that did not in any way directly affect Britain's interests, the British Prime Minister could not find enough generosity or goodwill to support our cause. After all the Taoiseach's protestations and compliance, the British Prime Minister, far from supporting him, led the pack against him. Will he never learn? Will he never understand that, no matter what soft words or protestations are used, the age old reality prevails — Britain relentlessly and remorselessly pursues her own self-interest no matter who it hurts or affects. I hope that lesson will be fully understood in another context also. The old people had a phrase which applies to the Taoiseach's situation — he who sups with the devil must use a long spoon.

(Interruptions.)

Can we now hope that all the sophistry, ambivalence and self-deception that has oozed out of Iveagh House for some time now will cease and that the cold harsh reality will be accepted: that Ireland's interests are best defended by Irishmen and women and that all the appeasement, the platitudes and honeyed words mean nothing when the chips are down?

It is to be noted also that the British Prime Minister in opposing any super-levy exemptions completely ignored the interests of Northern Ireland farmers. I would like to quote from Report No. 41 of the Northern Ireland Economic Council on Agriculture, page 44: "The adoption of a quota system implemented by a super-levy on production above the quota would be extremely damaging to the industry in Northern Ireland: we recommend that the government should vigorously oppose the proposed super-levy on milk".

Yesterday's meeting represented the most disastrous two days that Ireland has experienced since joining the EEC. It represents disaster for Irish farmers. The Taoiseach said in an interview on 26 September 1983 that these were the most important EEC negotiations Ireland will every handle. It is now clear that he has completely mishandled them. It represents a complete failure of Irish diplomacy. The complacent assumptions of recent times have been completely shattered.

The Taoiseach said this morning that the 5 per cent deal was the best Ireland could get. He has made a complete fiasco of Ireland's negotiating position, revealing it to have been so much empty bombast. The proposal of 5 per cent is totally unacceptable. The Taoiseach and the Government have failed the people of Ireland. It is his duty to go back to the European leaders and say that the 5 per cent cannot be accepted. He must take some new initiative to put the negotiations back on the rails. The Taoiseach must accept full responsibility for what has happened. The much heralded European experience and standing of this Taoiseach has been shown up to be another public relations myth and with its disappearance in Brussels yesterday goes the confidence of the country in this Administration. The farming population in particular will now, I believe, deal with the Taoiseach and his party in their own way.

The Taoiseach's speech was not over-packed with enthusiasm, punch or verve or anything that would rally the people behind him in his fight within the EEC.

In his remarks about his visit to the United States I would be more perturbed about what the Taoiseach does not tell us than about what he told us. He seems to be inviting US participation in the effort to find a solution to the Northern problem but he does not give any indication of the kind of help he is talking about. Is it economic, political or military aid? If he is expecting help from the United States, what did he offer President Reagan or Mr. Bush as a quid pro quo? Naturally, one will not get anything for nothing from the United States no more than from Britain. The Taoiseach gave us no indication of what he offered in return or how he would persuade America to give us aid with regard to the North. I am glad, however, that he raised the issues of disarmament and Central America in his discussions with the President and Vice-President. Did he object to the current US policy in Central America and did he voice Irish feelings in regard to what is happening in El Salvador and Nicaragua? Did he object to Cruise and Pershing missiles being sited in Europe and did he emphasise the Irish policy of neutrality? Did he mention our policy at the United Nations in regard to disarmament? I hope he did.

With regard to the EEC Summit, it appears as if the Taoiseach was on a hiding to nothing from the start. I suppose nobody wants to listen to us looking for money and undoubtedly he had great difficulties there. I do not intend to criticise the Taoiseach's negotiating tactics; they may have been good or bad, I am not in a position to judge. However, it is a pity he did not give us more information on the other EEC issues, apart from the super-levy. The EEC is changing fundamentally in character and the Irish people are not being told of those changes.

I do not think that Irish farmers know what they have to face in the future. At present there are 50 per cent more people unemployed in the EEC than working in agriculture. Yet the EEC has a Community wide policy on agriculture but none in regard to unemployment or job creation for the 12 million people unemployed. The numbers employed in agriculture in the EEC have declined in the past 25 years from 20 million to 8.7 million. The figure of 20 million refers to six countries while the 8.7 million refers to ten countries. With the proposed enlargement of the Community, the farming population will again increase by 57 per cent and the changes in agriculture and the overmanning which exists in EEC farming is shown when you make comparisons with the USA, which is somewhat overdeveloped and perhaps not comparable. Nevertheless, for about 250 million people in the EEC there are 8.7 million in farming and in the USA there are only two million people engaged in farming, with a similar population.

The price support system operated by the CAP has resulted in a huge surplus of butter, milk and cereals. Recently somebody said it would take 500,000 railway wagons to shift the ten million tonnes of excess cereals. While the butter consumption dropped by 8 per cent last year, production increased by 10 per cent. The CAP has resulted in overproduction of certain products and in the underutilisation of land in some regions.

The price support system has helped to maintain inefficient and unproductive farmers in control of land but it has not been able to stop the inevitable decline in the numbers involved in farming. There are surpluses of products for which demand is declining but the high prices of commodities such as meat puts it outside the means of many families in Ireland. It is becoming a very scarce commodity on the tables of many working-class families.

There are huge sums of money going into Irish farming. From the EEC some £400 million has been given to the industry and the taxpayers paid £200 million in 1982. However, there has been no improvement in farming efficiency, agricultural output or job creation in the related industries. Irish agriculture remains the least developed and most undercapitalised in the EEC with the exception of Greece. Measured by the two most important criteria — wealth generation and job creation — Irish farming is a disaster area and this after ten years in the EEC. Independent surveys and reports have concluded it would be possible to double the present output of agriculture in Ireland. Such an increase, with the processing of high demand products, could earn more than £2,000 million in exports. The NESC have estimated that a 5 per cent to 6 per cent growth in agriculture would mean an extra 75,000 jobs in agricultural-related industries.

However, the Common Agricultural Policy is not concerned with job creation and it is not concerned with regional development which is vital for industrial development. It is a price support system to protect farmers from the worst exigencies of the market forces. Even the July 1983 proposals of the Commission for reform of the CAP do not include job creation or regional and social development.

The IDA have identified the agricultural processing industry as our most important single industry, with great potential for employment and wealth generation. We see our greatest natural resource being developed to maximise employment in related industries and to provide good quality food at reasonable prices. Therefore, we support the broad thrust of the policies for agriculture and its related industries of the European Trade Union Confederation, representing the majority of organised workers in the EEC. The Workers' Party want reform of the CAP. Therefore, subject to the maintenance of our national interest in the EEC, we will support the theory of the reform of the EEC budget, a question that will dominate the Parliament in Strasbourg for a number of years to come.

The fact that we are calling for reform of the CAP and increased emphasis on social and regional policy and development does not mean that we agree with or support the super-levy as proposed now. It is an ad hoc solution, added to a basically wrong system. It is nothing more than a piecemeal reform and it is not in our overall economic interest. I stated before that we would back the Taoiseach in his opposition to the super-levy and maintain Irish political unity in opposition to the levy, although obviously for different reasons. However, the Irish farming community must be prepared for major changes in the EEC. The interests of industrial workers and consumers must be heard as well as those of the farmers. EEC funds must go into more efficient development of agricultural production rather than into the pockets of farmers in the form of price supports. In the current negotiations we were prepared to back the Government's efforts to gain maximum exemption from the super-levy but in our overall EEC policy we are totally at variance with the blind support of the current CAP policy pursued by the Government and by Fianna Fáil. We will fight for some benefits, both in jobs and in prices, for the working-class who so far have got nothing from the EEC but who have lost everything.

I am calling Deputy Manning on item No. 9.

On a point of order, I ask the Chair at his discretion to allow me to say a few words. I do not want any shouting match.

Nobody is shouting.

I just want to put a point to the Chair. I am a member of the European Parliament and a member of the Agricultural Committee. I was budget rapporteur commencing last April leading right up to what is going on now. I participated at every level in the discussions and I know a little more than has been said here today. The Chair has discretion under a rule in the book to allow me to speak. It will be very wrong if that is not done.

I have no discretion in the matter. I am operating under Standing Order No. 38. The Deputy is well aware that, with regard to a statement by a member of the Government, I have discretion to allow a spokesman nominated by a party in opposition to contribute following the Taoiseach's statement. Deputy Haughey, leader of Fianna Fáil, spoke, as did Deputy Mac Giolla, leader of the Workers' Party. I am working within Standing Order No. 38 and for that reason I cannot allow Deputy Blaney to speak now.

On the last occasion when similar circumstances arose, in protest I was removed from this House. I am not reflecting in any way on the way the Leas-Cheann Comhairle administers the business of this House but on the last occasion it was quite clear from the rules quoted by the Ceann Comhairle, even though he was not prepared to give me the benefit of his discretion, that he had such discretion.

I want to make it very clear to the Deputy that I have no discretion whatever under Standing Order to allow him to contribute following the statement of the Taoiseach. This is a repetition of what occurred some months ago. I am acting within Standing Order No. 38 and I hope the Deputy will allow the debate on item No. 9 to continue.

I ask the office of the Ceann Comhairle to go back to the last occasion when the same set of circumstances arose and to read the Official Report. They will see that what I have said is accurate, namely, that there is a discretion to allow me to speak. I was denied the opportunity then and I am being denied it now, even though it may be a misreading of the situation by the Leas-Cheann Comhairle.

There is no question of my misreading the Standing Order. I have been consistent in my ruling. Four months ago I ruled in the same way as I am ruling now. Under Standing Order No. 38 the Deputy is not entitled to speak and that is the end of the story.

I am not specifying a particular Standing Order. I say there is discretion under Standing Orders.

It is my duty to indicate the particular Standing Order. I have indicated that Standing Order No. 38 covers the situation. I regret very much that the Deputy cannot contribute to the debate.

I request that you relay to the Ceann Comhairle's Office my request, as a Member of this House, that what transpired after he came to the Chair in order to name me in the House that night be checked for its accuracy to see if what the Leas-Cheann Comhairle says is accurate now because the two do not tally.

I will reiterate that my consistency in regard to both instances is the same. I will discuss the matter with the Ceann Comhairle.

I am not querying the Leas-Cheann Comhairle's inconsistency. I am querying the inconsistency of what was said then and what is your consistency now.

I will consult with the Ceann Comhairle.

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