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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 28 Mar 1985

Vol. 357 No. 5

Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, 1985; Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Before Question Time I was dealing with the serious situation which has developed over the last number of years. There have been many debacles in the financial area and I was quoting a reply given to my parliamentary question by the Minister of State at the Department of Tourism. On 29 January at column 745 of the Official Report I asked the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism if he was aware of the high rate of insurance premiums which industrialists in this country have to pay under employers' liability compared with their competitors in other EC countries, and the action he proposed to take on the matter. In his reply the Minister said:

The level of awards is ascribed by many commentators to the existence of the jury system. However, the Prices Advisory Committee on Motor Insurance, which reported in 1982, did not consider that the jury system should be abolished. An alternative measure, to the effect that the trial judge should be permitted to guide the jury on the going rate of general damages, is being considered by the Committee on Court Practice and Procedures at present.

He proceeded to justify why the jury system should not be abolished. I was glad to see today that the Minister has decided to introduce other measures. Many industrial concerns are finding it very difficult to compete in the marketplace because of high employers' liability insurance. Recently I discussed this with a firm in my constituency who export 99 per cent of their production. They claim that their insurance increased from £18,000 last year to a minimum of £40,000 this year, despite the fact that they have a good accident record. They say that the uncertainty in dealing with outstanding claims and the length of time taken — from three to five years — to settle cases are the main reasons for the cost increase. They also claimed that it was anticipated that there would be a 50 per cent increase projected for next year. If that is so, it would mean that their insurance bill would be equal to the PRSI bill. They say that a company like theirs competing on the European market find that their employers' liability insurance bill is four to six times greater than that of their United Kingdom competitors. They said if the situation was not changed they would be in very serious difficulties.

In today's Irish Independent the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism mentioned the figure of £120 million and said that the Government clearly intend to levy either the Allied Irish Banks or all banks and insurance companies to cover all or most of the liabilities incurred by ICI. There are many “ors” and “buts” in this, but it is a pity he could not be more specific. We know that if the insurance companies and the banks are levied, this will filter back to the people who are already paying very high insurance premiums. This is a very serious matter.

Over the last few months we have heard a great deal about the inadequacies of management in Irish industry, particularly in small family firms. Members of the boards of ICI and AIB are leading lights in the Irish business world. When one looks at the names of the directors and management personnel, one wonders how a small business could compete. The answer is that small businesses are more careful and do not buy a pig in a poke, which has happened in this case.

When it was discovered that ICI were in financial difficulties Fianna Fáil avoided any action which would worsen the position, but because we did not take any action, it could be taken that we agreed with the Government's handling of the matter. Nothing could be further from the truth. We must condemn the Government for their handling of this situation. We were told that the sum involved would be between £60 million and £120 million, less than two years' profits for Allied Irish Banks. Last week a major industry in my constituency collapsed. I raised this matter on the Adjournment and asked the Minister to take whatever action was necessary to ensure a continuation of employment for 65 people. At no time did I ask him for money. There would have been a more valid argument to look for money in that case than to expect the taxpayers to bail out a bank which got into difficulties because of mismanagement at many levels.

I hope the least possible damage is done to our financial institutions but we must restore public confidence in the economy. We cannot have a succession of bungling efforts; there was the £500 million, the black hole in the economy, we were unable to get our milk figures right and so on. Measures have to be introduced, even if they are severe, to bring back an element of responsibility and confidence in the economy as quickly as possible.

In the time at my disposal I cannot deal with all the points raised in the debate so far which merit comment or reply. I should, however, like to try to place the issue in its proper perspective and convey to the House developments which have taken place during the past 24 hours which will, I hope, set at rest the unease felt by some Deputies about the possibility of losses arising from problems at the Insurance Corporation of Ireland falling on the general taxpayer.

When these problems first came to the Government's notice it was clearly seen that they centred on an insurance company; as such, it was an insurance problem, albeit a large one. Unfortunately, however, the company was owned by our largest bank and, while that did not make it a banking problem, it did immediately carry the danger that it might impinge on the operations of the bank. The various components of the financial sector do not operate in water-tight compartments. The internationally-widespread growth in recent years of mergers, links, takeovers and associations between firms in differing financial subsectors bears eloquent testimony to the degree to which different parts of the financial sector are seen to be interdependent and mutually supportive. It was with these considerations in mind, and especially because the insurance company concerned was owned by our largest bank, that the Central Bank was deeply involved in the discussions of the problem from the outset and assumed a clear and prominent place in the arrangements announced by the Government on 15 March last to cope with the problem.

The second feature of the financial sector of which I would like to remind the House is that, of its nature, it operates on trust. It would not be possible to carry on the financial business of the country if the component parts of the financial sector did not at all times have the implicit trust of those who deal with them, whether they be other firms or the general public. At the heart of this problem, therefore, was the urgent need to put in place arrangements which would maintain public confidence and enable the unhesitating conduct of business — in both the banking and insurance worlds — without which the economy itself could not function healthily. It is quite wrong, therefore, to view the speed with which the Government acted or the fact that they did not wait until all the details were known as in any sense a panic reaction, as some Deputies have implied. Speed in this case was not panic; it was necessary prudence and an essential ingredient in coping with the problem.

This brings me to what is for many Deputies one of the more frustrating and even infuriating aspects of the problem — the uncertainty of its dimensions. The problem has, in effect, three dimensions: past, present and future. The past dimension of the problem is quantifiable and more or less quantified — AIB knows how much its investment has cost and we know, within reasonable margins of tolerance, the amount of losses, at least up to the end of 1983. The present is also quantifiable but cannot yet be fully quantified. We have, as the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism said yesterday, a first assessment of losses, amounting to over £65 million and some estimates of the losses likely to arise from the activities of the company to date. It is not possible as yet to quantify the likely additional losses, though clearly we shall be in a better position to do so when the audit, which is at present proceeding, is completed and as the year progresses.

While Deputies may be frustrated by this, as the Government are, they must not allow this to cloud the issue; it is in the very nature of the insurance business. These are insurance contracts on which no losses have as yet been notified but on which it may be expected that claims will eventually come through. This is why, above all, time is needed to allow the full details of the story to unfold and to allow us to assess properly the true dimensions of the problem. This is why the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism indicated clearly yesterday that the position will be reviewed "in the light of the audit and of the claims experienced as they emerge over time" and that the Government will assess the situation again not later than 31 December 1985. In a very real sense, therefore, the action taken by the Government and announced on 15 March was an arrangement to buy sufficient time to allow the problem to be properly assessed.

Has the Minister copies of his speech?

They are being prepared. I apologise to the House. I understood that they would be available before I came into the House.

The essential uncertainty of the problem which I have outlined and its essentially unquantifiable nature, both in amount and duration, were at the heart of the Government's reasons for taking the action they did and in this view the Government were strongly supported by the Central Bank. If the losses could have been accurately quantified, or their duration clearly limited in time, Allied Irish Banks could, by themselves, have coped with the problem — no doubt at considerable cost to their shareholders and with some disruption. They could not, however, prudently be expected to cope with a situation where both the size of the losses and the duration for which they might run could not be charted with any assurance.

The Central Bank which, as I have said, was involved in these discussions from the outset, was strongly of the view, and so advised the Government, that for these reasons alone the prudent — indeed, the essential course — was to separate the affairs of the Insurance Corporation of Ireland completely from those of Allied Irish Banks and to cope with the insurance problem as a separate issue. Because of the ownership of ICI by our largest bank, because of the possible implications for the banking system as a whole and because of its banking responsibilities, the Central Bank was closely involved throughout in putting together the package of measures agreed on by the Government and Allied Irish Banks.

Yesterday, the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism referred again to what the Government statement of 15 March provided in relation to funding, which was that it would be on a broad basis through a number of special arrangements involving AIB, the banking and insurance sectors generally and, if necessary and only as a last resort, the Exchequer.

That brings me to the most recent development in this affair. Hitherto, the Central Bank's involvement in the problem has been at management level. Yesterday afternoon the board of the Central Bank considered the matter at its meeting. It decided, having regard to its statutory responsibility in relation to banking and financial systems generally, to indicate its willingness to provide sufficient funding, in conjunction with the banking system, within the dimensions of the problem indicated by the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism and subject to the end-year reassessment referred to by him, to deal with the problem as it arises so as to obviate the need for recourse to the Exchequer. The Central Bank will be discussing with Allied Irish Banks and the other licensed banks the appropriate form and apportionment of this funding.

Yesterday's decision by the board of the Central Bank means that the Exchequer will not now be involved in funding the administration of ICI. I am sure that those Deputies who have expressed their opposition to this Bill — itself merely a vehicle for setting up a company to ensure that ICI is separated from AIB — because, mistakenly, they construed its introduction as meaning that the burden of the losses involved would fall on the taxpayer, will wish to reconsider their position in the light of the information I have just given.

As to the arrangements we have made with AIB, they are as follows: First, AIB will make a loan of £50 million for a period of three years at a rate 4 percentage points below the three-year gilt rate, to the Central Bank. AIB have further agreed that, should the emerging position and the reassessment at the end of this year warrant it, they are prepared to extend the term of this facility for a further period not exceeding two years.

Second, AIB have agreed to place a non-interest bearing deposit of £20 million with the Central Bank to cover the contingent liability assumed by the State in respect of the AIB's guarantee to the Institute of London Underwriters. Third, AIB have agreed to share with the Government, in proportions to be determined when the ultimate losses are known, the proceeds of the bank's action against the former auditors of ICI Ernst & Whinney.

The total of £70 million provided in this way by AIB to the Central Bank will be onlent by the bank to the Insurance Corporation Fund to finance the operations of the administrator. These funds will, of course, be quite separate from the moneys already in the fund which are helping to finance the administration of the PMPA. Finally, I would remind Deputies of something I said at the beginning of my remarks. Financial institutions depend on trust and can properly operate only in an atmosphere of trust and calm. Those who indulge in uninformed speculation about the affairs of financial institutions, wherever they do so, should be acutely conscious of the possible damage that they may cause by their very indulgence in this speculation.

The Insurance Corporation of Ireland, now under administration, has itself a substantial cash flow which enables it to carry on its day-to-day business. The £70 million of funding which AIB have put in place provides amply for any immediately foreseeable funding requirements of the administrator. Yesterday's decision by the board of the Central Bank renders doubly assured the provision of any funding requirements that will arise and allays fears that losses arising from the company's operations were about to fall on the taxpayer. These arrangements ensure that we can now concentrate on assessing the full dimensions of the problems so that we may all come to a sensible, informed view of how they are to be met within the framework of the arrangements which I have set out.

The first thing that has to be said in response to the intervention by the Minister for Finance is that we on this side of the House welcome the belated if dramatic change of mind on the part of the Government. This is precisely what our leader suggested and precisely what the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism rejected.

The Minister should just listen.

In his final sentence the Minister for Finance said:

These arrangements ensure that we can now concentrate on assessing the full dimensions of the problems so that we may all come to a sensible, informed view of how they are to be met.

It is hard to reconcile that statement with the statement made by the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism who put the dimensions of the problem yesterday within figures of from £50 million to £120 million. It is very clear from this belated but welcome conversion to reality expressed by the Minister for Finance that, even now, the Government do not know precisely where they are going or what the extent of the problem we all have to face may be. In passing I want to note that yesterday morning this House was asked to accept what was in the words of the Minister introducing the Bill a relatively simple and straightforward purpose of statutorily underpinning the role of the State in respect of ICI. The only issue presented to us was an issue affecting the administration of ICI and the need to provide indemnity funding.

Since this issue became public it is recognised that we have adopted a very responsible and measured approach. Nothing that will be said from our side will change that consistent approach. It must now be acknowledged that within the past day the Government have had a very traumatic change of mind, perhaps on the basis of information which they did not have when the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism introduced the legislation. On the basis of their awareness of the significance and seriousness of the matter they asked us to pass a relatively simple and straightforward Bill. The Minister for Finance has now asserted that there is an inter-linkage between the various financial institutions and that we are not just dealing, and never were, with the ICI alone but with much bigger and broader issues.

It has to be said that more than any thing else what has undermined the essential confidence the nation requires was the indecisive and contradictory approaches of the Government within the past few days. We would all expect that the Government facing a serious issue of this nature would come before us and explain in a consistent way the scale of the problem and request the House to respond in a responsible way to the Government's proposals. We are getting quite the opposite. Our financial institutions must be underpinned in terms of their role in our economy and confidence internationally which this party have always supported in Government and in Opposition. That has been undermined to a considerable extent by the approach of the Government.

We must ask the Minister what is the relevance of the Bill he introduced yesterday. What was the need for it? Of all the options which were open to us, the Minister indicated that the ultimate decision taken by the Government was the decision he proposed to the House yesterday to set up the compensation fund. Now it is being presented as a simple response to a decision made by the Central Bank. Yesterday the Minister presented us with an unpaged script. Anyone who has had even the most limited experience in this House of ministerial scripts will see that what was presented to us yesterday was the product of a last minute decision on the part of the Minister concerned. It had been changed and rechanged. Paragraphs were deleted and pages were incompleted. Up to the time he came into this House yesterday with two extra pages of some significance to be added he did not quite know what he was about to propose. He said yesterday:

The Central Bank, whose job it is to assure the soundness of our banking system, was involved in the discussions leading to the decision to rescue ICI. Their strong view, as a regulator of the banking industry, was that the contribution by the bank that I have already outlined was the limit of what AIB could prudently be expected to make at this time.

What has changed in the course of the day?

The only reference to the Central Bank in the contribution from the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism yesterday was that one underlining that what he was proposing yesterday was in line with the strong view of the Central Bank. Here we have the Minister for Finance coming in today and conveying to us that, in view of the decision of the Central Bank yesterday, the Government are now taking a position which will guarantee that the taxpayer will not be called upon to meet even the contingent liabilities as lender of last resort, if you like, arising from the ICI-AIB debacle.

It is quite clear from the Minister's speech yesterday that that obligation was going to be placed, in the final analysis, on the taxpayers and the Exchequer. He made it eminently clear that while his hope and expectation was that it might not be necessary, nonetheless he was underlining very specifically that in the final analysis, in the last resort, it would be the Exchequer that would, if necessary, underpin the liabilities that arose from the collapse of the ICI. That was the position announced by one Minister yesterday and today the Minister for Finance comes in giving us an entirely different position.

Oh, for goodness sake.

(Interruptions.)

That actually aggravates the position.

The Minister should do himself a favour and not talk about the Central Bank.

He is undermining confidence in the country.

From my very first statement on this matter, I indicated that the Central Bank would be one of the people contributing to the solution of these problems.

I shall quote what the Minister said yesterday and then he can sort out the differences between himself and the Minister for Finance. I would suggest that he would not air those differences so much in public, because he has done enough damage already.

The Deputy should not try to create an advantage for himself out of this national incident.

In the nation's interest, would the Minister be quiet. He has done enough already.

Deputy O'Kennedy, without further interruption.

I shall quote what the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism said yesterday. I am quoting from what I take to be page 13 — a half page note, before the Minister decided to move on to something which occurred in new type on the next page. The quotation was:

For the purpose of the administration of ICI, the compensation fund will be financed on a broad basis by a number of special arrangements involving Allied Irish Banks, the banking and insurance sectors generally, and if necessary, and only as a last resort, the Exchequer.

That is what the Minister said. Where is there any reference to the major announcement the Minister has made today in respect of the Central Bank?

Part of the banking system.

If the Minister for Finance is capable of saying that, then all we can say——

The Deputy should check the copy. He should check the first statement made by the Government on this issue. The Central Bank were mentioned on Friday night.

A Deputy

Did the Minister forget it yesterday?

(Interruptions.)

It is very clear that the Government, frankly, have been in a state of total confusion at a time when what the country required more than anything else, in the face of what was and is a serious problem, was a deliberate, consistent and direct strategy that the House would support, as was indicated from this side at all stages, which would underline the confidence in our whole financial structure and our financial institutions. That, I submit, is the first responsibility of Government but, unfortunately, in the way this Government handle business, they have done more than any one Government has done for a long time to undermine that confidence.

We were told yesterday that the Bill was relatively simple and straightforward. Now it is going to be, and at least we have a belated recognition, much more than simple and straightforward. The Bill and its implications are complex and far-reaching. Yesterday, we were being asked to cast the taxpayer in the role of the statutory re-insurer, without any clear indication of the amounts he or she might be called upon to guarantee. In fact, up to the announcement of the Minister for Finance now, the State was being asked to follow the imprudent, if not reckless, precedent of the ICI and the Allied Irish Banks in indemnifying against losses, the nature and extent of which were generally unknown. This is why it was that this party, from the moment that the need for this was first published — and our leader spoke very clearly on our behalf — indicated that we could not, should not and would not, in conscience, accept such a liability which could be unlimited in terms of amount and, indeed, in extent of time. Last week the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism was quoted in the Sunday Independent as follows:

The only people in a position to work out the liabilities of the Insurance Corporation of Ireland are the team now working in the company and that will take up to six months.

How then could the Minister justify, if that were the case, bringing in legislation yesterday that we now know was not necessary in any event, in which the Exchequer taxpayer would be bound to guarantee to finance the compensation fund to an extent that could not be fully known until, at the earliest, the first week in May if we required six weeks for the information to emerge? If it could not be fully known until then, what was the urgency in bringing legislation of the kind we had yesterday, which is generating confusion? It has done more to undermine confidence. Certainly, the Government have undermined confidence in themselves long ago.

I do not think the Deputy understands what this is all about.

It has done more to undermine confidence in the institutions that are very essential and are a permanent aspect of our economic health. Can we now have some indication from the Government as to whether they now stand over the statement made by the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism yesterday that, despite the fact that we would not know the information for another six weeks he could actually say that it could be £50 million and perhaps up to £120 million but under no circumstances could it exceed the latter figure? Can the Government tell us now that that, in fact, is a position to which they are adhering and on which they can stake their reputation, such as it is?

Anyone with any knowledge of insurance contracts will appreciate that one of the main issues that distinguish these from other contracts is, as our leader and others mentioned in the course of this debate, that they are contracts uberrima fides, where you must disclose all material and relevant facts. There is, at least, a suggestion that the re-insurers and underwriters of the ICI commitments are questioning their legal obligations under those contracts, on the basis that there was not a full disclosure of documentation or information which would bind them legally, either in terms of liability or in terms of a specific quantity. If that is the case, that kind of issue could take, not six weeks but perhaps two years to resolve. Nonetheless, the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism yesterday could convey to us blandly that they were of an order of between £50 million and £120 million, without taking account of how the impact of these dramatic events could continue beyond six weeks, six months or 12 months.

It is time we had from the Government, certainly before this debate concludes, a straight and clear indication of what they regard as being the extent of the total commitments. The Minister for Finance today has said that it is not possible to quantify them and it would have been well if, before the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism made his statement yesterday or the Minister for Finance made his today, there had been a little consultation, in order to give the House some indication as to where precisely——

The Deputy has had the indication. He got that indication yesterday.

Yesterday?

A lot has changed since yesterday and before this debate concludes our apprehension on this side of the House is that something else might now emerge from Government which would change events dramatically again. The most important thing that should emerge from this debate at this stage — and all of us should acknowledge this — that despite the damaging effect of the confusing and contradictory approaches of Government — is the underpinning of the confidence in this economy and the institutions which serve it. The potential of our economy is enormous, the potential of the development of our resources and of investment in this economy is enormous. Just imagine the effect it will now have on those who will view us from the outside, particularly those viewing a Government who could not even discharge their basic responsibilities in relation to the monitoring of our insurance liabilities.

I might illustrate, by way of the remarks of the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism yesterday, the extent of the problem, in his lack of capacity to research, much less identify the extent of the problems of the ICI. The Government's role in the affair does nothing at all to inspire confidence that they have the requisite degree of judgment and skill to restore confidence in our financial institutions by protecting the taxpayer against unacceptable and unquantifiable burdens. There is now a good case for unloading some of those responsibilities of the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism. He and his Minister of State assured us in this House in the last six weeks that there was no cause for concern in respect of the ICI. That is what was put on the record of this House by the Minister of State. Surely that is a clear illustration that neither Minister is aware of the extent of the problems and certainly not in a position to discharge their responsibilities.

The Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism acknowledged in his speech yesterday that even two years ago his Department were concerned about the adequacy of the claim reserves of the ICI. Despite that the Minister and his Department wasted one and a half years in fruitless, ongoing discussions with the ICI. Despite the fact that early in 1983 he had acknowledged that they had cause for concern, all that continued between his Department — who have the duty and obligation to monitor and control — were discussions. What happened in the course of discussions? By September 1984 the Minister seemed to have come to the belated conclusion that his Department were not capable of sizing up the full facts. Only in October 1984 did he engage a firm of consulting actuaries to undertake an examination of the Irish technical claims reserves. Apparently about that time he accepted, just on trust, a statement from the ICI that there was no cause for concern in respect of their reserves on the London market. Within two months of the independent firm of auditors going in to examine the situation — on the statement of the Minister yesterday — it became very clear that there were serious deficiencies in the information systems and the data base covering the London branch of the operations of the ICI.

The Deputy is mixing up two separate investigations there. He is quite confused.

I am indicating to the Minister that, when the world at large was at least aware of the reason to be apprehensive and to inquire behind the London activities and re-insurance commitments of the ICI, he whose job it is to monitor, regulate and control the insurance sector, blandly accepted assurances that all was well, when he must acknowledge now that all was far from well.

I am saying very deliberately that the crisis in which we now find ourselves arose as a direct consequence of the failure of the Minister and of his Department to take the necessary actions, seek the necessary information, if necessary, to demand all accounts in respect of the London operation and to go through them with a fine comb as of one and a half years ago. But it was not until the last few months, in the course of an independent audit — particularly when the AIB themselves approached the Minister's Department last month — that the full facts began to emerge.

We were given bland assurances from the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism yesterday that, because of these assurances from the ICI, there was no reason to have any degree of concern. He mentioned that the ICI were trading in a market in which they had long experience. Does that not fly in the face of the facts? They were trading in a market in which they had no experience — the market of re-insurance, in the re-insurance world in which they were very small boys indeed covering everything from re-insurance to Australian bush fires, to the blood stock industry and, we are told, in some cases, the success or otherwise of an English third division football team. Are we being asked to accept that this was a market of which the ICI had long experience and, on the basis of that long experience, they did not require the same degree of diligent inquiry and searching examination on the part of the Minister and the Government that clearly in retrospect was absolutely essential?

The Minister said yesterday also:

It would be unreasonable to expect that the State should provide resources to double-check on the work done by auditors.

Since when do the Government of this State, or a Minister within that Government, discharge their responsibility by simply accepting the work done by auditors of any company? Far from it being unreasonable to expect the State to provide the resources to double-check it is absolutely essential that the State should have the resources, expertise and skill to double-check to protect us against the kind of battle we now face. In a world in which the major insurance corporations have people of the highest degree of technical competence, of post graduate qualification, dealing with their affairs it is fairly clear that the Minister and his Department have not got either the resources or the qualifications to compete much less to regulate the activities of companies with that kind of resources available to them internationally. Even if the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism is now, as he said yesterday, reassessing the capacity of his Department to deal with these issues and to discharge their obligation, then it must be said that it is a bit late. It is somewhat late of the Minister, after two years, to come to the conclusion that he should reassess the capacity of his Department to discharge their statutory responsibilities in this area.

In the course of his remarks the Minister said the Government had a tertiary responsibility. It should be said that, on this and any related issue, the Government have a primary responsibility, if not in terms of indemnifying through the Exchequer the consequences of a loss of the kind with which we are now dealing, a primary responsibility in ensuring that the financial structures of this nation are geared and controlled in every respect in accordance with tried and trusted procedures.

For over 18 months now we have been calling on the Government to review the Central Bank legislation, particularly the controlling and monitoring of our financial institutions. Each time we are told the matter is being considered by the Government and that very shortly it will come before the House. For more than 18 months we have been asking for legislation to deal with limited liability: in fact, the then Minister, Deputy Cluskey, informed us a year and a half ago that it was ready but we are still waiting for that legislation. Having regard to that it is very clear that the primary role of Government is not being discharged as a regulator, controller and monitor.

I have often accused the Government of intervening too much in areas where they should leave matters to others. I have particularly accused them of intervening by way of the introduction of penal tax levels and tax structures, thus suffocating the economic well-being of the nation. However, in this area the Government stand accused of standing back and of not having any idea of how to discharge their responsibilities under existing law.

We welcome the belated acceptance by the Minister for Finance of the principle we have been proposing from the start but more than anything else this debate has demonstrated that there is no basis whatever for having any confidence in this Government to regulate and control the affairs of this economy.

I welcome the action the Government took in the past few days in relation to the crisis that obviously loomed at the time. There has been a great deal of speculation and uninformed criticism from many quarters — and I suppose that in the circumstances that is understandable — as to what could or should have been done in the circumstances. I believe the Government took the only action available when the crisis arose and they took a decision in a forthright manner and in a way that would maintain public confidence in the financial institutions of the State. That was their responsibility and they discharged it admirably.

I welcome the recent announcement by the Minister for Finance which has alleviated the fears expressed by many people in the past few days. I listened to the Opposition spokesman on Finance who was critical of the way the Government had handled the situation but as matters have developed things have worked out exactly as the Opposition were suggesting and as many people outside and inside the House were suggesting they should. In the final analysis the taxpayers, the bank depositors or the people with insurance premiums will not be left to bear too great a burden.

In such a situation I suppose a question that should be asked is whether it should have arisen at all. One must question the sequence of events that led to this debacle. Everyone with a bank account is well aware that little happens from day to day that is not quickly recorded on a central computer and, where necessary, the alarm bells are set off automatically. I would be very worried if a financial corporation of the magnitude of ICI were able in the future to accumulate losses to such an alarming extent and with such rapidity without the alarm bells sounding. It would be very worrying for those of us in public life, for the taxpayers and for business interests if there was a repetition of the difficulties that arose in this case, the speed with which it happened and the extent of the problem.

I am sure every Member here is aware of the supervisory role of the Government Department responsible and also of the responsibility of the major financial group involved. When one considers that AIB cater for 40 per cent of banking interests, one can realise the dramatic impact that difficulties in this area would have had on business, on confidence and on the entire Irish economy.

When the news first became known Members of this House were made aware of the concern of the business world. Many of those people had probably been repeatedly lectured by their financial institutions as to how they should run their business. I am sure many of the business people here and outside the House have had to listen to these financial institutions tell them how to run their business affairs and I am sure they were told on many occasions where they went wrong. All of us have had that experience. It must be a sobering thought for some of those financial institutions to find themselves in that position. One hopes that will bring home to them the reality of business, the effects of competition and the speed with which business enterprises can go wrong and off the rails. In a peculiar way it could have a beneficial effect on the whole system, or at least I hope it does.

Had the Government not acted in the way they did, there would have been a serious knock-on effect and many aspects of Irish society would have been affected. I should like to quote from a document recently circulated by the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs relating to the number of people employed in the insurance business whose livelihoods would be affected, as well as the livelihood of many others in various enterprises that are insured with ICI. The document stated that ICI employ approximately 800 staff in many locations in Ireland and elsewhere. They gave a rough breakdown as follows: Head Office, 550; Republic of Ireland, 13 branches, 90; Northern Ireland, two branches, 20; Britain, four branches, 75. The document indicated the various aspects of business and enterprise covered by ICI insurance and it highlighted the absolute necessity for positive and decisive action to ensure that there was no failure to recognise the importance of keeping the show on the road.

That has clearly been done. The action of the Government last week and today will ensure that future Governments will be more aware of the difficulties likely to occur and the various commercial institutions will have more confidence in the ability of Governments to take control of that kind of situation. The same document indicates that 8,000 people are employed in the insurance industry. That indicates the magnitude of the situation.

This is the second insurance problem arising in the last couple of years. We continue to hear of the kinds of losses to which insurance companies can be subjected. We learnt in recent days of the high risks in the ICI business. It is amazing that a company closely associated with Allied Irish Banks should have allowed itself to pick up the loss makers in the insurance area, the high risk insurances which other insurance companies were extremely reluctant to handle. The general public will want to know why this happened. They will want to know why this trend was allowed to continue for some time and how it will be possible to ensure that other companies cannot embark on the same course.

The case of PMPA about which we had legislation not so long ago is a sore point for a number of people who were investors with the PMPS. Those investors see their position in the light of recent events. They invested with a company closely linked to a motor insurance corporation which was taken over by the State but the State did not take responsibility for the money invested in the PMPS, which amounted to £18 million. The primary concern there was to ensure that the motor insurance sector would continue in operation and they see their savings, in many cases their life savings, being utilised to shore up the PMPA. It is one of the sad things that we are incapable of assuaging the feelings of these people. I have great sympathy for the investors with the PMPS and I hope the Minister will consider that matter again.

The fact that modern technology is available to the financial corporations to assist them in monitoring on an hour to hour basis the fluctuations in the market makes it hard to understand how a slide of this magnitude can take place undetected. That is something which should be carefully examined so as to ensure that we do not have a repetition of this in the future.

One of the most repeated queries that most of us have had to deal with in the past few days is whether or not the taxpayer will have to foot the bill. From recent developments I am glad to know that that will not be the case. If we could have had the answer to that query a couple of days ago there would have been less speculation but it was something that took time and effort to put together. It is to the eternal credit of the Government, and the Ministers responsible, in association with the Central Bank, that they moved swiftly and decisively to protect the insurance industry, the vast number of people employed in it and the people covered by employers' liability and other insurances. By their swift action the Government showed that they were aware of the effect a delay would have had and that they were committed to dealing with the situation.

I am still concerned at the way in which this situation arose without sounding the alarm bells. I am sure every Member of the House at some time or other was told by some financial institution that he was going in a wrong direction and was told how to run the show in a more efficient way. I cannot understand why that was not done in the case of AIB some time ago and I cannot understand why decisive action was not taken earlier. As a result of this experience I hope other companies similarly engaged, having regard to the massive impact of a failure or a mistake on not only themselves but on the economy, will ensure that they operate in a fashion that will make it impossible for a repetition of this crisis to occur.

This side of the House came into this debate with certain priorities in mind. One was to ensure that the stability of our financial institutions was preserved and that strength, integrity and confidence in them were preserved. Secondly, we did not want the taxpayers to be asked to foot a bill they were not responsible for creating. We also set out to examine as far as we could — unfortunately, it cannot finish in this debate — the dimension of the problem and how it can finally be resolved. The debate took a different turning with the intervention of the Minister for Finance today. The House will recall that from the outset of the debate on this issue Fianna Fáil adopted a responsible attitude. We were conscious of the grave consequences that would result if we went for cheap political kudos. There would be short term gain in that but serious consequences in the long term. Unfortunately, while the Government asked everybody to adopt a responsible attitude in regard to this, many of their backbenchers chose to take the other road and not back the apparent stand being taken by the Government in holding the line.

I do not think any other single issue in recent years has gripped the general public so much. It has become increasingly obvious to everybody that the general public are not prepared to shoulder the bill for a mistake they did not contribute to in the first place. The principle of liability should always be established. Our leader, Deputy Haughey, a week ago suggested that the problem should have been approached from a different angle on the first day. That was not done. In fact, Minister Bruton ridiculed him and said he was totally out of line, was misguided and was not suggesting the correct way to approach the problem. What has happened in two weeks to change the Government's attitude to the matter?

When one is dealing with affairs involving financial institutions the first thing one must be is decisive in one's action. If one is indecisive and there is a lack of action an air of uncertainty is created in the financial world. A lack of confidence results. This feeds upon itself and develops a momentum of its own which, if one is not careful, one will not be able to stop. We recognise that this is a serious matter. We wanted decisive action but we did not get it. For two weeks the Government lumbered along from indecision to indecision and, finally, produced a Bill which does not do any more than underpin a semi-State body. The actions needed to run the collapsed ICI company were already in place. An administrator had been appointed and Allied Irish Banks shares had been transferred to a shelf company, those shares being held by two civil servants in the Minister's Department. There are other companies in the State sector — for example the Irish National Petroleum Corporation — which as yet have not been underpinned statutorily.

We have our views as to why it took two weeks to produce the legislation before us, the first 13 sections of which are clear cut and could have been copied out of any other Bill. Another section amounted to a paper exercise transferring the liability from AIB to the Government for a guarantee of £20 million which had been given by AIB to the Institute of London Underwriters. That guarantee did not require legislation. I do not have any doubt that the Institute of London Underwriters would accept a guarantee for the £20 million from the Central Bank because that amount had been lodged in the Central Bank. It was available for any shortfall that might arise under the guarantee given by AIB.

The court appointed an administrator who had, under the 1983 legislation, access to the insurance compensation fund. We are all aware that the accountant appointed by the High Court to take charge of the fund can go into the market place and borrow on the strength of the income from the portfolios he has and that the fund can be supplemented at any time by the Minister for Finance under section 4 of the 1964 legislation. It is well to remember that a limit has not been set on that fund. There was a limit of £1 million, but that was removed when we passed legislation in 1983 to deal with the PMPA problem. Funds can be supplied at any time by the Minister for Finance but the only way those funds can be repaid is through the taxpayer. We saw that unfolding. We were conscious that taxpayers had to be protected and that is why we highlighted that matter. Minister Bruton never ruled out the possibility of a mini-budget. There was talk about such a move in the first week of this crisis. It is obvious that in the early days the Government had in mind asking the taxpayer to carry the burden. They changed when they got the feedback from their own backbenchers.

That is not so.

The Minister's statements are available and they are clear.

The Deputy is misinterpreting them, as I would expect.

How could I misinterpret the Minister, who was interviewed on radio? The Minister said he would not rule out the possibility of a mini-budget.

There is a difference in not ruling something out and not intending something.

I will not concentrate on the contradictions in the Minister's statement yesterday and the contradictions involved in today's statements. I do not have the time to do so. Now that the Minister has intervened in the debate it is no harm to remind him that 70 per cent of ICI business was carried on in the London office and the remainder at home. Throughout the Minister's script he made it obvious that his regulatory service was concerned only with the Irish scene where only 30 per cent of the business of the company was being carried on, although the corporate headquarters of the company was under the Minister's jurisdiction. He was not concerned about the 70 per cent of the business despite all the warning signs that went out. The Minister said that in 1983 he became aware of problems in ICI, but even at that stage he did not make any inquiries of the British Department of Trade and Industry.

I would like to think that the position is different, but I am basing my statement on what the Minister said yesterday. How any responsible Minister, with the alarm bells ringing all over the place and his Department looking into the Irish business carried on by ICI, would not think of making an inquiry of the British Department of Trade and Industry is beyond me. I am not taking the responsibility from the British Department of Trade and Industry, because obviously they were not too concerned, despite the fact that in the market place in London everybody was referring to the serious position in ICI. The day the Minister was introducing emergency legislation here to recover money from a bank business people all over the country were ringing to try to find out if the legislation concerned ICI. I lunched in a city centre hotel and I was asked a number of times if ICI were involved. The Board of Trade obviously fell down on their obligations because it was well known on the market what was happening to ICI over there and it is incredible to suggest that the Board of Trade did not know. An article in Business and Finance last November sounded the alarm bells but nobody bothered about them.

Yesterday in the House, the Minister tried to convey that the solutions were arrived at after two weeks of Government consideration. They could not possibly have spent two weeks discussing the Bill which was introduced. It is important to examine the statement of the Minister for Finance and, in that regard, I will examine the role of the Central Bank, quoting from his statement. He said:

It was with these considerations in mind, and especially because the insurance company concerned was owned by our largest bank, that the Central Bank was deeply involved in the discussions of the problem from the outset and assumed a clear and prominent place in the arrangements announced by the Government on 15 March last to cope with the problem.

We should bear in mind that the Minister said that the Central Bank was "deeply involved" because later on the said:

The Central Bank which, as I said, was involved in these discussions from the outset, was strongly of the view, and so advised the Government, that for these reasons alone the prudent, — indeed, the essential course — was to separate the affairs of the Insurance Corporation of Ireland completely from those of Allied Irish Banks and to cope with the insurance problem as a separate issue.

Obviously, that was the view of the Central Bank, if we are to believe the Minister's statement, as late as yesterday. What happened to change the mind of the Central Bank? Further on in his statement — this is a gem — the Minister said:

That brings me to the most recent development in this affair. Hitherto, the Central Bank's involvement in the problem has been at management level. Yesterday afternoon, the board of the Central Bank considered the matter at its meeting. It decided, having regard to their statutory responsibility in relation to banking and financial systems generally, to indicate their willingness to provide sufficient funding, in conjunction with the banking system, within the dimensions of the problem indicated by the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism and subject to the end-year reassessment referred to by him, to deal with the problem as it arises so as to obviate the need for recourse to the Exchequer.

We see from the Minister's statement that the Central Bank was deeply involved and so advised the Government; yet the Minister said that the involvement of the Central Bank up to then was at managerial level. When the Minister talks about the Central Bank, is he referring to the management? Are we to understand from his statement that the board of directors of the Central Bank did not look at the problem over the last two weeks? The statement implies that it was left to the management, who advised the Government. Who advised the Government? It is very important to know why the directors of the Central Bank were not brought in on the first day of the crisis. The Minister for Finance also said:

Yesterday's decision by the board of the Central Bank means that the Exchequer will not now be involved in funding the administration of ICI.

When did the Central Bank decide otherwise?

Yesterday afternoon.

There has been an incredible lack of communication between the Government and the Central Bank.

The Central Bank is an independent body set up by statute.

The Government were getting the advice of the Central Bank all along. Was it advice from the management or from the board of directors? What is different now from two weeks ago? When this crisis broke, decisive action was needed. If the Central Bank had come in then we would have avoided all the rumours and counter-rumours regarding problems in the banking and insurance systems. The Government will have to do a lot of explaining to convince the public that they could not have acted any sooner, because the first duty of a Government is to protect the financial stability of their own institutions, and we gave them full backing in that regard.

I do not doubt the Minister's figure of £65 million or £70 million, because they have had the best advice available from internal auditors and the actuarial profession. The figures have been available to everyone, but it is illogical to suggest that the AIB would have suffered such damage and humiliation if they could have avoided it. Confidence in the bank has been undermined, regrettably, because that institution is deeply rooted in our society and is a great flagship of achievement. Our leader said, time and time again, that the Central Bank and financial institutions, even on a moral basis, should have stood behind them, if their sources did not allow them to carry the situation through, which I find hard to believe, although I know there was an erosion of their equity base. However 50 per cent of their losses are written off against tax, so that their losses are halved. If the equity base had to be protected then it was good business for the Central Bank, the Government and the financial institutions to do it because it has repercussions not alone for them but for everybody else in the financial scene. Why delay two weeks? The lack of confidence that has been created in this economy is a hallmark of the indecisiveness that seems to have engulfed this Government for a long time back. The first priority in an economy and in the financial institutions is confidence. Without it we can go nowhere. The Government can talk about all the policies they like, but if they cannot establish and retain confidence then all their efforts will be in vain. Therefore, the first priority of any Government and this Government especially should have been to put in confidence where it was needed, but they lacked the decisiveness to do that. Maybe this brings out one of the inbuilt weaknesses of Coalition Government. Maybe it takes them too long to be decisive about issues that should be decided on the spot. Maybe that is one of Coalition's weaknesses. I do not know because I have never worked in a Coalition nor would I like to do so because I like to be able to implement what I believe in, and I am sure the Minister feels the same about it. Half a decision is no decision. Either you take a full decision or you take no decision. Half a decision must be the compromise of Coalition Governments and in a situation such as this it is infinitely difficult to take the decision which is so necessary in the interest of the country, the economy and the financial institutions. If this is a spin-off of Coalition Governments I do not want to be around to see another one and, I am sure, neither do the people.

You were wrongfooted. You wrongfooted Fianna Fáil because you took an assessment——

If the Deputy wants to put out that sort of stupid statement more luck to him, but let him try to convince anybody outside of that. I was amazed to se Deputy Barry Desmond sitting sniggering and laughing, because we are in a very serious situation and to treat it lightly or flippantly is unbecoming a Member of this House. Let the Deputy ply his own business outside and if the people want to buy it that is fine. I am speaking with conviction of what I believe are the dangers of this situation and the essential requirement in taking immediate action. That is the action we were talking about. Why all the damage for two weeks? Was it worth it? I do not think so. Talk to AIB, the Bank of Ireland, international financiers, anybody and ask them if they think this indecision for two weeks was a price worth paying. It was not.

The Deputy did not say much for a week or two.

Obviously the Deputy has not been around in the political arena or he would have been listening and reading. I said it as long as a week ago but obviously he did not read it, but then he would not be interested in what I say. I am interested enough to recognise a dangerous situation when I see it and I do not treat it lightly. I could do the popular political thing but I do not believe in doing that. The consequences for this country if things go wrong in a financial situation are too horrendous to contemplate. Maybe the Deputy does not realise the seriousness of what is happening. The Central Bank are the regulator of the banking system. The Department of Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism are the regulator of the insurance business. The speeches of both Ministers indicate that the lines of distinction were drawn clearly by the Central Bank for the last two weeks and that the insurance sector should be kept separate from the banking sector. What changed their mind? When I get an answer to that I might make a different assessment of the position.

The Deputy has five minutes.

The Minister for Finance expressed political arrogance when he said:

...those Deputies who have expressed their opposition to this Bill — itself merely a vehicle for setting up a company to ensure that ICI is separated from AIB — because, mistakenly, they construed its introduction as meaning that the burden of the losses involved was going to fall on the taxpayer,

Anybody who reads the Act of 1964 will know where the compensation fund comes from. Is anyone trying to convince me that funds given out by the Minister for Finance into a compensation fund will not be paid by the taxpayer? Who else is to pay them?

I want to get back to the package and the figures and parameters set out. The Central Bank have accepted the outside parameter of £120 million. That is to be made up of a £50 million loan from AIB, £20 million that is already there as a back to back arrangement for the guarantee of £20 million to the London Institute of Underwriters originally given by AIB now taken up by the Government and £50 million obviously to be provided by the Central Bank. I want the Minister to clarify that the Central Bank will be repaying the loan. How will they repay the loan? Is it straight from the money generated by the Central Bank coming from profits of financial transactions in banking and financial areas?

The Minister for Finance said that the losses for 1983 have been defined. I understand the £65 million to £70 million figure to come from the losses for 1984 with an outside parameter of £120 million. After all the assessment and advice available to the Minister, that is the outside parameter he comes to. I understand from Deputy Flynn that the contractual arrangements have been set aside by the administrator since he went in, no new business would be written. I understand also that very little business has been written since 1 January, and that would indicate that the risk would be in relation to the amount of business, and I am sure they were much more careful in writing the business from 1 January than they were before that.

What about repudiations of re-insurance contracts? Is the Minister satisfied and will he satisfy this House that there can and will be no repudiations? I understand that legal advice has been taken on this but the grave risk is that re-insurance companies when they see State involvement will seek any possible loophole in an effort to break re-insurance contracts. We all know that re-insurance is done on bona fides, on the basis that the best practices of re-insurance and insurance have been applied. I do not know whether that is so, but rumours which have been going around for quite some time about ICI suggest that they were in re-insuring situations that even Lloyds would not take, for example insurance against a strike of baseball in America when everybody could sit back and let the Irish insurance company pay up when the strike took place. There was also re-insurance against bushfires in Australia, satellites that did not go up or satellites that went up and came down when they should not have come down, re-insurance against the municipal authorities on the west coast of America and re-insurance against wrongful arrest. These were all the highest possible risks and everyone knew that. Is there not a danger of trying to break out of re-insurance contracts, and if that happens will the Minister agree that we will be in a bottomless well in that regard? Nobody can quantify now or in three months the results if that should happen.

What happens beyond £120 million? The Central Bank are in there now for £120 million within the parameters set. What will happen in six months? What do the Government propose to do if the amount exceeds that? Where is it to finish? For the life of me I cannot understand why this legislation was introduced now when we are told the figures will not be available for six months.

Most people have pointed an accusatory finger at Allied Irish Banks and said they bought a pig in a poke. The Minister bought a pig in a poke. He removed limited liability and replaced it by unlimited liability. The shareholders of Allied Irish Banks can make up their minds about the people who run their business but the people of this country look on the Government as their board of directors and they will see how the Government perform their duties on their behalf. This Government took on an unlimited liability on behalf of the people but they did not know how to handle it. After all the uncertainty and lack of confidence that was generated, the Government finally came round to the view Deputy Haughey proposed a week ago and which they dismissed as ill-informed and unworkable. The Minister produced a solution here yesterday and 24 hours later it had to be changed. The Minister stands indicated of creating the worst fortnight of uncertainty in the history of this country.

Is there something wrong? As I know from experience in business and finance a person's word is his bond. The day a man breaks his word his credibility is gone and people lose confidence in him. The day a bank breaks its word, it faces the same problem as an ordinary businessman. AIB should have got the moral support of the Central Bank, the other financial institutions and a Government who knew what they were about. Unfortunately this Government's lack of decision in the last fortnight indicates a technocrat's approach. We have too many technocrats in the wrong places. They do not know what the commercial world is all about because if they did, they would have realised the correct decision should have been taken on day one, and this would have saved the trouble that has been caused over the last two weeks.

It is only right that I as Minister of State with responsibility for the supervision of insurance should deal factually and clearly with the system of supervision of insurance undertakings under the relevant Acts and regulations, and the statutory powers which the Minister has under those instruments. It is particularly appropriate and desirable that I should do so in view of some sweeping comments made over the past ten days and a certain amount of unease which has been expressed. I am also very conscious of the statement by Deputy Mac Giolla — a statement which I accept was made by him in good faith — to this House yesterday that the British Department of Trade and Industry had no responsibility in relation to supervising the UK branch business of ICI. Deputy Mac Giolla's statement is nevertheless factually incorrect. I would like that to be noted very clearly.

The first thing that must be stressed is that insurance companies operating here are, like any other companies, subject to the Companies Acts and the attendant requirements involving the presentation of statutory returns and the responsibilities of directors and managers. They are also, however, subject to much more specific financial and other requirements laid down by EC Directives which harmonise basic insurance supervision throughout the Community.

To be more precise the supervision of non-life insurance undertakings authorised to operate in Ireland is grounded on an EC Directive of 24 July 1973, introduced into Irish law by the European Communities (Non-Life Insurance) Regulations, 1976.

The first non-life directive, as it is known, recognised the different considerations which arise in dealing with the head office and branch office activities of insurance undertakings and it established the respective competences of the supervisory authorities of the member states in dealing with insurance undertakings. In the case of head office companies, the supervisory authority of the member state in which the head office is located is responsible for the global activities and overall solvency of the company concerned, while the operations of EC branches are supervised by the authority of the member state in which the branch is located.

In addition to defining the respective competences of supervisory authorities, the first non-life directive also specified the mechanisms by which supervision was to be carried out. It addressed the question of reserving for the underwriting liabilities incurred in different territories by providing in Article 15 that each member state in whose territory business is carried on must require an undertaking to establish sufficient technical reserves. Such reserves are required to be covered by equivalent and matching assets localised in each country where business is carried on.

In summary, therefore, each member state supervises the branch operations of an insurance undertaking, and the returns and accounts furnished by the branch office to its supervisory authority feed into the head office accounts. The supervisory authority of the member state in whose territory the head office of that undertaking is situated then verifies the state of solvency of the undertaking with respect to its entire business. The solvency margin of an insurer is essentially a cushion of free reserves to guard against either the over-estimation of assets or the under-estimation of its liabilities.

The general approach adopted by each supervisory authority in examining accounts submitted to it is to assess the nature and acceptability of assets to cover liabilities, and to test the reasonableness of the reserves set up by each insurer in respect of the business written in the member state concerned. Supervisory authorities are not entitled to impinge on one another's supervisory competences, nor is the head office supervisory authority responsible for resolving any operational uncertainties at branch level in another member state.

It can be seen therefore that the supervisory authority of a branch has only to look after the proper running of that part of an undertaking's business in their own territory. The supervisory authority of the head office, which is responsible for the global activities and overall solvency of a company, may require collaborative evidence from supervisory authorities of branches in order to verify the value of an undertaking's actual solvency margin. The supervisory authorities of branches are required to take the initiative towards the supervisory authority of a head office in pointing out differences which they note between branch accounts and the particulars supplied to the supervisory authority of the head office, and pointing out shortcomings in the management of the branches of which they are aware.

With regard to the latter type of information, it is made clear that supervisory authorities of branches may judge freely what information is sent to the supervisory authority of the head office, and when to send it. Under the formal EC Protocol of Collaboration between insurance supervisory authorities, each supervisory authority may make requests to and receive from other supervisory authorities information which it needs in order to carry out the responsibility for supervision which is laid upon it, provided that the requests made do not detract from the division of competences between supervisory authorities as provided for by the directive. As I have already made clear, the Department of Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom were required to ensure that the London branch of ICI established sufficient technical reserves covering the business carried on by the London branch office. In other words, this was not within the competence of my Department as the supervisor of the head office operations of ICI.

Furthermore, I would point out that my Department, in relation to its supervisory functions covering branches of EC undertakings established in Ireland, have had occasion from time to time to insist that remedial measures be taken at branch level in Ireland to ensure that the Irish technical reserves are fully covered by branch assets, in the interests of protecting the Irish policy holders concerned. This has arisen in those instances where, arising out of its analysis of the branch accounts submitted to it, my Department have concluded that the assets put forward in the branch accounts to cover the branch technical reserves are insufficient to meet the eventual liabilities of the branch operation in Ireland. I emphasise this point particularly for the benefit of Deputy Mac Giolla.

The basic requirement imposed on insurers by the first non-life directive relates to the maintenance of solvency. The Minister has specific powers to take action in cases where the technical reserves provisions or, in the case of head offices, the solvency margin are not being met. These powers envisage a direct intervention in the activities of the insurer through the issue of directions to suspend business, the furnishing of deposits to the Minister, or such other measures as are deemed necessary, including the disposal of assets. In the case of failure to meet the solvency margin requirements, the Minister may as an initial step require a scheme to be submitted to him for restoration of the financial position. If the solvency margin falls below the guarantee fund amount, which is one-third of the full solvency margin, the submission of a short term finance scheme would be required. The ultimate sanction under the 1976 regulations, if an insurer fails to filfil its obligations, is the withdrawal of authorisation.

That, then, is an outline of the system of supervision as set down in EC directives. I will now deal with the practicalities of checking on the financial state of authorised insurers.

The compiling and presentation of insurance accounts requires the exercise by the company — its underwriters, its claims estimators, statisticians and in some cases actuaries — of a high degree of professional judgment which is the product of very considerable specialised expertise. Approval by the board of directors and certification by the statutory auditors add the final seal of approval.

The examination of accounts by my Department, while essentially a test of the reasonableness of what the insurer produces, is quite detailed and searching. Starting with the company's revenue account, it is possible to identify the underwriting result per category of business, and we examine the individual factors contributing to these results. Close attention is paid to the loss ratio arising in each category of business, to the cost of claims incurred, average claims cost and, very importantly, by reference to the claims settlement analysis it is possible to trace the accuracy of initial provisions for outstanding claims as reflected in the final settlement costs. This analysis provides basic indicators from which decisions can be taken on the need to pursue reserving procedures with the company concerned.

It is not at all unusual to request more detailed reports on particular aspects of an insurer's business activities or to require the early submission of financial data. This does not mean that the insurer is insolvent and unable to meets its liabilities; not does the fact that insurers are called in to the Department to discuss their accounts have any significant connotations. The investigation of such matters is a normal part of the supervisory function. After all, the requirement to meet the solvency and reserving criteria is ongoing and the task of supervision is not simply the checking-off of forms received once a year, although the analysis of the information provided in this way is essential to the process.

In addition, the Department for a number of years have engaged expert consultants to carry out in-depth examinations of a particular company or of certain aspects of a particular company's business. Such examinations can be directed at clarifying particular features of a company's activity or it may be part of our ongoing system of random checks which is applied as a back-up to normal supervisory procedures. In doing this we seek to pursue a balanced approach by dividing our attention between the newly-established companies and those which are longer established in the market. The information gained from these examinations can also provide useful indicators in areas to be watched more closely in the future.

By and large, our experience is that the affairs of insurance undertakings are managed by responsible people who are fully aware of both their duties under the law and their professional responsibility to the insuring public. They co-operate fully with the Department in filing the returns legally required of them and in supplying any further information which may be requested in connection with these.

In relation to the London branch office of the ICI, where the bulk of the losses arose, supervision is reposed by the statutory measures of the EC in the UK Department of Trade and Industry, and the Irish supervisory authority had every reason to be satisfied with what had been cleared by that supervisory authority. In respect of the head office, as the Minister mentioned in his Second Stage speech, we proceeded to ask questions of the company some two years ago and, despite what might be termed as reasonable answers, in the absence of a marked improvement in performance it was decided that the 1983 year-end accounts would be given priority examination and a more thorough analysis of areas which we had identified as rather worrying.

Arising from its examination of ICI's 1983 accounts, which were forwarded to the Department at the end of June 1984, my Department arranged a meeting for 17 August 1984 with representatives of the company to discuss matters of concern, concentrating particularly on the adequacy or otherwise of the outstanding claims provisions struck in the 1983 accounts. Very detailed questions were put to the visitors at that meeting and the company was requested to respond as soon as possible.

The Department made it clear that, having examined the Irish claims reserves of the company in the 1983 accounts, it appeared that the provisioning of the company in this respect was inadequate. The company had been striking its claims reserves on an individual case estimate basis and the Department stressed that there appeared to be reserving problems resulting from this procedure. The company was advised strongly that the case estimating procedures should accordingly be supplemented by statistical and actuarial techniques to ensure that the reserves would be adequate at the end of the day when all claims were settled.

At the time of the meeting with ICI representatives on 17 August 1984, the Department had already decided to enlist the aid of an actuarial consultant to examine the Irish claims reserves of the company's affairs. It was while that exercise was in progress that the company's own internal examination, which the bank is understood to have initiated, revealed the £23 million under-reserving for outstanding claims announced on 14 November 1984. That led to a strengthening of reserves and an injection of £30 million paid-up share capital by the bank in early December. The Department's consultancy exercise confirmed that the reserves of the Irish business of ICI, as strengthened by the injection of £30 million were reasonable.

A further meeting took place between my Department and representatives of Allied Irish Banks and ICI on 14 November 1984. The purpose of that meeting was to discuss the ICI results contained in the half-year results of AIB for the period ended 30 September 1984, which were being released to the media at that time. My Department raised questions at that meeting in relation to the financial and trading position of the London branch business of ICI. We were advised that there was no under-reserving in the London branch and that a deliberate policy had been pursued to cut back on gross premium growth in London to bring matters fully under control. It is also relevant that the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK, who were responsible for supervising the branch activities of ICI in London, had not communicated any concerns to my Department. Accordingly, my Department had no reason to pursue matters further at that stage.

There were allegations by both Deputy Haughey and Deputy Flynn during the debate yesterday to the effect that I deliberately misled the House when answering questions at the end of January 1985. That is a serious allegation. I emphatically refute those allegations. At the time I was answering questions about whether any insurer had refused business or indicated that it was not open for business during 1984 and if I accepted that there was a crisis existing in the writing of non-life insurance business in this country. In reply I indicated that I was not aware of any insurer intending to pull out of the Irish market, and furthermore that I did not accept the latter proposition that there was a crisis in the industry.

Both Deputies seem to be inferring now that because of what has come to light in relation to ICI, that I was deliberately misleading the House when I made those statements. I was not. In the particular case of ICI, my Department had identified a problem in relation to its Irish business and AIB had injected £30 million into ICI during December 1984. The consultant actuary employed by my Department had confirmed that the corrective measures were adequate in relation to ICI's Irish business.

No problems had arisen at that stage in relation to the UK branch business of the company, which was under the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom. My reply at the end of January was, therefore, based on the information available to my Department at that time, which indicated that the Irish business of ICI was adequately provided for.

I resent the allegations made by Deputy Haughey and by Deputy Flynn. On a number of occasions, particularly at Question Time, I have heard wild supplementary questions from Deputy Flynn which, to my mind, are geared to cause unease to the public in relation to the insurance industry. Deputy Flynn should be more responsible in his questioning. As a former Minister in the Department he knows full well the conditions in the Irish insurance industry in general. His attitude at Question Time leaves something to be desired.

In his contribution to this debate yesterday Deputy Prendergast referred to the "no fault" scheme of compensation in respect of occupational injuries in operation in New Zealand and indicated that the scheme had been abandoned due to its uneconomic cost. Deputy Prendergast considered that the costly experience in New Zealand of "no fault" cover represented a good case for the retention of the jury trial system in Ireland.

While I appreciate that Deputy Prendergast put this view in good faith, I must beg to disagree with this statement regarding the alleged abolition of the New Zealand scheme. The system referred to operates under the Accident Compensation Act, 1972, and provides compensation for personal injuries to victims of accidents at work, or in the home, and of motor accidents.

Although the scheme has recently been tightened up to discourage claims of a questionable nature, the levels of compensation for injuries of a minor nature have been revised and certain administrative changes have been made. My Department have been advised by the New Zealand Embassy in London that the scheme is still in operation and, to the best of their knowledge, there is no question of the operation of the scheme being suspended or discontinued.

With regard to the insurance market in general, it is recognised that the increasing incidence of claims and the growth in size of claims, and the degree of competition from outside companies which have come in and established in the Irish market, together with the recession itself, have put considerable strain on what is by European or world standards a relatively small industry built up carefully since the thirties. That policy of building up an Irish insurance industry brought enormous benefit to the economy as a whole and in the welter of recent exchanges of a depressing nature, that should not be lost sight of. It is important to the nation generally that our insurance industry is maintained and developed to face competition.

Apart from the claims problems which I have just mentioned and which are largely associated with a period of high and continuing inflation, I think it only fair to mention some of the other difficulties under which we operate.

First, there is the inevitable time-lag involved in the filing and examination of statutory returns with the result that where remedial action is called for a certain amount of ground may need to be made up. I do not consider this matter is a serious one because generally we are dealing with companies on an on-going year in year out basis. While it seems to be a problem I would not consider it a major problem.

Secondly, there is the fine line which must be drawn between too much and too little enabling statutory powers — in other words, the continuing need to strike the correct balance between, on the one hand, the outright protection of the man in the street in his dealings with the institutions and, on the other, the normal commercial freedom and professional competence of these institutions in carrying on their business on a day to day basis. Put another way, too little supervision would mean that a supervisory authority did not exercise intelligent judgment and apply yardsticks devised from its experience and its knowledge of the industry as a whole and, in particular, that it failed to call on any company or branch of a company to explain trends which looked unusual or abnormal; while too much supervision borders on taking the management responsibilities out of the hands of the underwriters, claims estimators, etc., whereas they, together with the directors of the company, must always carry that responsibility.

Clearly, now, there is a necessity for careful stocktaking of the economic climate in which the industry is functioning and of the legal procedures which put pressures on claims. Such an exercise is as much the responsibility of the industry as of the Minister. Also, admittedly, we will have to look at how much further supervision can be strengthened and improved, but always consistent with the primary responsibility of management and the supporting experts within the insurance companies for — and I would stress this — it must always be remembered that supervision does not amount to doing those people's jobs.

In the area of motor insurance the Government have pressed forward with the implementation of the measures announced in October 1983 on foot of the recommendations made by the Prices Advisory Committee. In regard to the further implementation of the Government's measures on motor insurance, the Government set up in February of this year a working group of Ministers of State to monitor and ensure the earliest possible implementation of the measures announced in October 1983.

I have tried in the course of my speech to deal a bit more technically than I normally would in a contribution in this House with the technical workings of my Department in relation to the insurance industry. It was necessary for me to do so on this occasion. I wanted to paint the picture of how my Department exercise their responsibility for the insurance industry. I am satisfied that the officials of my Department are of a high calibre and that they carry out their duties in an excellent way. Where necessary, we bring in outside consultants. That is as it should be. We may need to strengthen some aspects of our work. That would be a normal on-going and positive thing to do in any organisation.

Finally, the crisis which came upon the ICI was most unfortunate. An explanation will, I am sure, be forthcoming in the weeks ahead. The Opposition should not express an opinion that there is confusion about the relative contributions of AIB and of the banking system generally. The Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism yesterday dealt clearly with the contributions coming from the AIB and with the view of the Central Bank. He said the contribution mentioned was the limit which the bank could prudently be expected to accept at that time.

What the Minister for Finance has now dealt with is the role of the Central Bank following the decision of the bank's board yesterday. That decision opens the way for the contribution from the banking sector in general to which the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism referred yesterday. This is, of course, quite separate from the AIB contribution. As both Ministers have indicated, the steps which have been taken are a measure of the Government's resolve that the taxpayer should not have to shoulder the burden of these very necessary steps to protect our financial sectors. I comment on the speed, firmness and preciseness of the Government's actions in this matter. It is clearly necessary, because we must have confidence in our financial, insurance and banking sectors. The Government's move firmly to take control of the situation was the correct one and will result in the continuation of full confidence, both at home and abroad, in our financial sector.

I would certainly agree with the last remarks of the Minister. Nobody in this House has any interest in doing anything to affect the financial institutions of the State. It is because of that wish that this Bill has been debated and we have had the various restrained discussions in the last week or so. Perhaps in some of the contributions, and outside the House, figures have been thrown around fairly loosely, or perhaps not so loosely, but it is hard to substantiate them.

This party have gone along with the figures stated by the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism. We are talking about a liability ranging between £75 million and £125 million. I do not wish to go back over many of the arguments already put, but in the final reply to this debate there is an obligation on the Minister to answer the questions which have been raised by so many Members. Is that the honest case believed by the various people who have examined these figures — the actuaries who went in during the days before the Government took over, the officials of the Departments, the administrator in his initial examination — and with the information that was obviously available through various contacts with the London and American insurance field? If so, a major question must be asked about the leadership in the AIB. Why did they, last Friday week, ask the Government to take over the liabilities of ICI if these did not amount to much more than one year's profit? I could give all the arguments on that, but various people on all sides of the House have dealt with these. In the last day or two since this debate started the Minister must have had the opportunity to consult with AIB leadership on this matter. If a good answer is not forthcoming, I retain the right to say more on that matter over the next few days. The public and this House and all the financial institutions outside of AIB and ICI, deserve an answer.

The Minister spoke at length, as was his job and duty, about the supervisory end within the Department. Perhaps he felt that he was being accused. I shall take him on his word that the information which he gave to the House around the time of the budget was the best information available. With the greatest respect, I am sure the Minister is as disappointed as anybody to see how widely out of order that information was. I know that he is not satisfied and that he must come in and read out parliamentary briefs. However, if that is the best information that section can give to the Minister on a matter pertaining to a company which is in the state the ICI are in at present, I would seriously take whatever action was necessary to sort out the section. Perhaps it is a matter of control. It may not be the fault of individuals, but the whole procedure that allows information like that to be given to the Minister is to be deplored. It is not just good enough, to put it quite straight and simply.

Speaking to my brief as spokesman on Labour, there is the matter of 800 people's jobs involved in all this. It is almost amusing to hear about everybody being worried about the investors, private institutions and funds, with nobody being interested in these 800 jobs, or the jobs of 8,000 in the insurance industry. The position must be made clear for the sake of the future of these people, their career structures and related matters. Where do the staff stand and who are their bosses? Does the appointment, in the High Court, of the administrator, made under the 1983 Act, make him now totally in control, or is this legislation setting up a semi-State body and legalising the shares in a holding company? Does that make that board the employer? The 1983 Act has wide powers, which obviously were not used.

Will there be terms of reference for the administrator and his staff, on how they will deal with the semi-State company? Will the liquidator be the chief executive officer of the semi-State body, or is that just a device to legalise the handing over of the shares, or is the 1983 Act to be enforced as in the case of the PMPA? It is important to draw the clear distinction, from the staff's point of view, as to whether it is the administrator, or the holding company set up under this Bill, with a board of five people? Who are the employers and what controls will they have? If an administrator becomes involved in the same type of area as in the PMPA, in reducing staff and disentangling the company, and doing goodness knows what, a clear brief should be set out.

While our initial job would be to put ICI on some type of sound basis, we should know the structure by which this company will be run from tomorrow on when, presumably, this Bill will be passed. It is only fair that that be set out quite clearly.

What is the future of the finance and insurance industries, particularly the latter, which comes within his brief. I am glad there has been a major change today from yesterday, when it seemed, perhaps, that levies on the insurance companies would have been passed on directly to the consumer, and the taxpayer, if not directly, would indirectly shoulder the ICI burden. The speech made today by the Minister for Finance changes that. It will now be the Central Bank, the financial banking institutions, which will bear the burden. It is now a banking matter, which we tried to ensure a week ago.

What will happen in the long term? What are the plans and proposals of the Minister? What ideas has he, in his supervisory function? What has he done since November 1983? With the collapse of the PMPA in 1983 there was imposed a levy on all of the insurance companies that were not involved, which last year amounted to £11 million, to allow the PMPA to continue as a sort of semi-State company even though there was no legislation to render them a semi-State company at that time. Those companies are now being asked to compete with the very company in respect of which they are paying a subsidisation levy. Put bluntly the PMPA can go into the market undercutting the companies paying the levy to maintain them viable.

If the same type of thing happens in regard to ICI, if somebody else is paying the levy — thank God it is not the taxpayer — where does that leave us? Every time a commercial company gets into difficulty must the State pick up the tab whether through Central Bank levies, direct deficits or otherwise to the extent that companies in the commercial sector will be justified in asking: how can one make money in this country? How can one run a commercial business when the State makes one pay a levy to maintain a company run by it and when that company can go out and undercut one? Sooner or later there must be an inquiry initiated — one that will not take five years to report — into what will happen the insurance industry so that people will know what is the commercial climate in which they must operate.

Perhaps the Minister would clarify the position for the staff in ICI and the other 8,000 involved in the insurance industry, the various staff association and trade unions involved. Second, he might say what will be done for commercial companies, letting the various boards of directors know where they stand. Even if it is 18 months too late I gather that the actuarial advice and assistance available to the Minister's Department will be forthcoming in order that some kind of credibility will be attached to the information they supply. I am sure that will be done without delay.

In his speech yesterday the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism said:

An important focus in this debate will be on the contribution by Allied Irish Banks to the rescue of ICI...

He continued to say:

In fact they are contributing as follows:

Then he listed the various things that AIB were doing, the second last mentioned being the sale of a 20 per cent shareholding in the profitable and healthy Insurance Corporation Life, also for £5. As I understand it 80 per cent of the shares of that company are held by ICI and, therefore, by Allied Irish Banks. I might ask the Minister is that an error or is it not an 80 per cent stake held by ICI and AIB?

The ICI have 100 percent now.

Is this a mistake?

The AIB had 20 per cent which they handed over.

I am sure the Minister of State has clarified some of the points made in the course of this debate to date. I might raise a few not yet clarified.

In relation to the London branch of the ICI I understand that the Minister has replied to the point raised yesterday by Deputy Mac Giolla about the role of the British Department of Trade and Industry and the various EC legislation. Perhaps the Minister would clarify for me exactly what is their role. Was he saying in his speech a few moments ago that the British Department have a responsibility under company law?

What I said is that, under EC non-life regulations, the Department of Trade and Industry in Britain is the regulatory authority for branches of insurance companies operating in England, just as an EC head office company with a branch in Ireland is the responsibility of the Department of Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism here. Our Department are then the regulatory authority and have legal responsibility for overseeing the branch. The UK Department have a legal responsibility of overseeing branch operations in England.

In other words, the Minister is saying that the British Department of Trade and Industry were negligent in not fulfilling their legal responsibility in this matter?

I am not saying that. I am clarifying who is responsible for the supervision of the branch. The United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry were the responsible supervisory authority.

It is now clear that they have a legal responsibility whether or not the Minister admits they fulfilled it. It appears they had a legal responsibility which was not fulfilled. I presume there was no information supplied to our Department of Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism, or its supervisory section. Therefore, there was a breakdown somewhere. They had the legal responsibility, we had the supervisory responsibility. Nobody became aware of what was going on and the information clearly was not available. Therefore, somebody somewhere fell down and the Minister has clearly said where he believes that responsibility lies.

When this Bill has been passed I should like a clear statement as to who will hold the management position, what brief that person will hold and in what way it will be carried out. If that can be clearly established it will avoid many difficulties in the future. I am as concerned as anybody else in ensuring that the ICI, a company that gave good employment for 50 years be restored to a healthy state and that the jobs there be sustained. I want reassurance that the administrator is not going in to effect a demolition job whereby staff would be integrated into the insurance industry without any protection. It is vital that it be clarified whereby this is being done under the 1983 Act which gives administrators carte blanche; whether it is to be a semi-State company with a board of five, or a semi-State company with five board members having no authority but rather with that authority being vested in the administrator. I would ask the Minister to clarify that position when replying.

If the Deputy wishes I will endeavour to clarify matters for him. We are establishing a holding company under this Bill, if you like, to hold the Government shares in ICI. ICI is the employer but the company is in administration, in a similar situation to that of the PMPA under the administrator, who is answerable to the court. I am comparing it with the PMPA from a technical and legal point of view.

Is his brief under the 1983 Act?

The terms of the Insurance (No. 2) Act, 1983, apply to ICI as a company under administration. My Department, as the regulatory authority, will deal with ICI on an arm's length basis under my supervisory responsibilities in relation to matters such as price application systems.

I thank the Minister for that clarification. It has long been known that staff in some of these companies have been wrongly accused of saying things, of putting together various pieces of information about the places in which they earn their livelihoods. The Minister and most people would agree that the recent collapse of companies, whether in the private or public sector, has certainly not been the fault of the workforce. Rather has it been the fault of those holding senior positions. Will the Minister consider allowing some participation by the staff who have worked so constructively? Will the administrator allow one of the staff representatives to be part of the board of five or to be part of a committee with a supervisory role? The staff have not been at fault in the case of the trouble at ICI or in respect of Irish Shipping. In the latter case people gave life service to that company and in their later years they were thrown on the scrap heap. Dedicated people like these should be allowed a role in discussing the future of their company.

In the case of the ICI it was said that staff representatives were responsible for rumours that were unhelpful, but if they had been advising the Minister six weeks ago he might not have had to come to this House and make the statements that were given to him by his Department. The staff involved were aware of the difficulties. Now they should be allowed to work with the administrator to bring ICI back to its former state, if that is possible. The staff have suffered hardship and trauma and they should be allowed to participate in the future working of their company.

In the case of the PMPA one can see that, while Mr. Kevin O'Kelly and his staff are doing as good a job as they can, they are still losing money and this cannot continue indefinitely. They cannot expect the insurance industry to continue contributing as they are doing. Sooner rather than later there will have to be a total review of the insurance industry, either bringing it back to the commercial sector or the State sector, and I assume all of us wish to see it in the commercial sector. We cannot have it half and half. The danger is that some of the people involved in the insurance industry will not stay around forever. Perhaps at the end of this debate the Minister may announce an inquiry or an investigation into the entire insurance industry to see what can be done to put it back on a proper commercial footing.

I think the Minister of State for his partial replies to the points I raised. I hope the Minister, Deputy John Bruton, will clarify the other fundamentally important questions I raised. They are important if we are to improve on the PMPA position and ensure that ICI will become a profitable company. As the supervising authority, the Minister has power to allow the staff to become involved in decision making. That will be for the benefit of the State.

The Government did a good two weeks' work in the way they rescued the ICI and the AIB. We were threatened not only with the collapse of the ICI but obviously the AIB would have been seriously undermined also. The Government were quite correct in asking that the cost be borne by the financial sector because they, through their inter-dependence, are the major people dependent on continued confidence in the sector.

However, I think it has been somewhat beside the point the way Opposition spokesmen have tried to say that there should not be even a residual possibility of the taxpayers having to pay any money. The reality is that it would not be possible to do what has been done if one ruled out any possibility of the taxpayers contributing. What the Government have done is that they have put a long stop safety net under the financial institutions. It is seriously misunderstanding what had to be done in this crisis to suggest that the Exchequer could exonerate itself entirely from any possibility of taking up some of the cost. What the Government have done quite responsibly is to put the real onus entirely back on the financial institutions. They said that the taxpayers are only willing to provide a long stop safety net in order to secure the continued survival of the financial institutions in which all of us have a stake.

I am convinced that the balance of benefit in what the Government did is entirely on the positive side. It is unfortunate that commentators have concentrated on just two beneficiaries, namely, the AIB shareholders and the overseas holders of policies, some of whom have been the most extraordinary kind of people, stallion owners and the like. The real stake holders who have been helped by this rescue package are mainly the policy holders of the ICI, some of whom have paid premiums for employment liability and who would have found themselves without any cover. Equally, there are people who now stand with claims for damages they have suffered. There are harrowing cases of people who are waiting for compensation. They are the people who were threatened, as well as the employees of ICI and ultimately the whole financial structure.

There was not an alternative for the Government to allow the bank put ICI into liquidation. That was not on the cards because of the damage it would have done to people who had taken up policies in good faith and who were expecting funds to come back to them. I will go further and say there was a real risk that if the ICI had repudiated the reinsurance business it had taken on in London it would have jeopardised the possibility of any native Irish insurance industry being able to get the kind of reinsurance cover that is essential for the continued viability of a native insurance industry. That would have been a serious blow to the entire industry.

Beyond that, we realise that AIB itself could not have come unscathed from the liquidation of ICI for a simple reason. The AIB have used as a capital base for their overseas activities what are known as floating rate notes. Essentially these are loans they have raised and they are accepted by the Central Bank for the overseas activities of the AIB. One of the clauses in the notes is that if any subsidiary of a bank that has raised these notes defaults the notes can be called in. In other words, with the liquidation of ICI we could have faced not just the effect on the insurance industry but on immediate recall of essential support for the overseas activities of the AIB which would be immediately thrown into serious question. The spin-off on the operations of the AIB at home and abroad would have been too horrendous to contemplate. That is why the AIB came to the Government for the support they needed.

Let it be said that we in Dáil Éireann have an enormous stake in the continued viability of the AIB. We have only to think of events last week in the United States where there has been a rapid fall in the value of the dollar. That was because of uncertainty regarding a number of financial institutions that were small fry in relation to the size of the US financial sector whereas the AIB is the major fish in our financial waters. In a very short time several points have been knocked off the value of the dollar. If we faced a similar effect, even a 1 per cent fall in our terms of trade would cost us £60 million a year and we could face a much more serious drop in the value of our terms of trade as a result of such uncertainty about our financial structures. Let us be quite clear that when we are talking in terms of the possibility of liabilities having to be picked up and borne by other parts of the financial sector if things had gone seriously wrong, it means that the whole economy would have faced millions of pounds of losses in terms of the effect on trade. Leaving that aside, if the State were to continue to raise the sums for which we are now in debt to overseas creditors, we would be bound to face a risk premium on that money. It would not take much uncertainty to create a situation in which a half per cent risk premium would occur and that alone would cost £50 million a year. We are talking about huge real losses to the economy should things have gone awry and should the Government not have intervened. The Government therefore were right in their response.

The question then arose as to the correct take to be exacted from the AIB. The answer to that is subjective because the right take is one that would be seen to be right afterwards by the market. One cannot objectively determine it on the basis of ratios. It is based on mood and feeling in the market. The Government were right to leave a safety margin in what they exacted from AIB because the risks of not leaving a safety margin were horrendous. The Government were right to do this in the knowledge that they would ask for that extra safety margin to be exacted from the financial sector. We could have exacted more from the AIB, but let us be clear that we must leave a safety margin in this case so as to prevent the undermining of confidence in our financial institutions. Some of the overnight experts who complain that we could have gone closer are like the people who go to a stunt display and when someone stops three or four inches from the brink they say that he could have gone further. It was crucial not to go to the brink.

The AIB in their 18 months ownership of this company put in a reasonable amount of money. They had to write off £86 million, they put in £12,500 million in assets and a £5 million contribution over the next five years. That amounts to almost £125 million. We should compare that to the annual dividend of AIB. It is eight times their annual dividend. Even the £5 million a year is taking a third of their annual dividend for the next five years. That is not even including whatever bank levy they will have to pay. In many ways AIB have made a significant contribution to this crisis. We should not be swayed by the rather emotional reaction to AIB's decision to sustain their dividend. As politicians we might have preferred to see AIB being a bit more abject and going around in sackcloth, but the financial market might not view it the same way. They might feel that an AIB going around in sackcloth and not declaring a dividend would undermine confidence. That would be the case for shareholders who need a liquidity cash flow coming from their investments. Pension funds are an obvious case where they must make payment to pensioners. They could not sustain the holding of AIB shares if a dividend was not going to appear for several years, because they are committed to their pensioners and the pensioners would have suffered.

The AIB decided to sustain their dividend as a commercial decision despite a blow of £11 million to their profits for the next five years. They are the best people to decide whether that was the right decision to ensure the restoration of their capital base. It is unfortunate that people reacted emotionally to the declaration by the AIB that they would sustain their dividends. This was probably in the best interests of the financial sector. It is regrettable that many commentators put out a false figure of what the AIB were giving in dividends. The figure quoted in numerous cases was twice the reality. People should have been more careful in that area.

I do not exonerate AIB from blame for their deplorable, inept behaviour in this affair. For a bank confidence is a crucial thing, so they should not have entered into diversification into an open-ended liability industry. If they went into brewing, for instance, at least there would be a limit to their losses; but in going into insurance and re-insurance there is absolutely no limit to their losses. That points to a failure to realise the nature of the banking business. Any hint of a problem has a devastating effect on a bank. They should not have entered into such a diversification project. If they wanted some diversification it would have been better for the economy if they had acted on the suggestion made recently by NESC, that they should take up equity in Irish companies so that they could support Irish industry, the real productive sectors which are creating wealth, rather than moving into a project which would jeopardise their own business. The bank should have built up their knowledge of the sectors which they are supposed to help by taking equity in Irish companies many of whom are suffering from lack of equity and over-dependence on borrowed finance.

We have heard about the bad selection of directors in State companies and the poor performance of State directors. There were directors on the board of ICI who must not have known much about the insurance industry when the bank, on their own admission, paid £50 million for an industry which at that time was worth minus £50 million. We have to question the approach adopted by the AIB and the sort of people they put on to those boards, who could not alert them to the problems in the insurance industry.

In regard to the Department of Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism, while they have acquitted themselves reasonably well on the domestic front in that they acted in time to ensure the viability of ICI's domestic activities, their control over overseas activity is a serious worry. It is quite clear from this experience that the buck stops with the parent company even if the supervision is the responsibility of a government outside that country. There is a problem which we must face, particularly in the area of re-insurance, which seems to be an extraordinary business. It appears that the company which takes on re-insurance business does not know the liabilities; they do not get a regular flow of information on the risks of which they have taken a percentage. This is why there has been such difficulty in the auditors pinning down to what extent the ICI were involved in on these re-insurance contracts.

The Department must look seriously at this. One approach — I do not know if it is the right one — would be to limit the re-insurance activity of any Irish based company to within a certain percentage of its own underwriting business. In other words, that it would be only laying off its own bets and would not be getting into a speculative activity on the re-insurance market. Such an upper percentage put on to insurance companies would be for the best for the Irish insurance industry. Certainly, ICI would not have run into difficulty if that had been done. If that happened it would be good for the industry given that the Government cannot carry out proper supervision overseas that would allow them to be confident that the risk at the end of the day would not fall in Ireland for activities carried on overseas.

I should like to comment on the role of the Central Bank in all of this. To be honest, I believe that the Central Bank are just as guilty as AIB in allowing AIB to diversify into the one open-ended industry where liabilities cannot be pinned down. If the bank were irresponsible in going into that area, then the Central Bank, who are charged with ensuring that the financial sector is strong and reliable, were equally irresponsible. The Central Bank must examine their consciences also about what happened. They have detailed rules preventing banks taking up equity in individual companies when engaging in lending activities and despite those detailed rules they can blithely allow shareholders' funds, which are at the base of the bank, to be used for open-ended business like this.

The Central Bank must re-examine the criteria being applied. Allied to that the Central Bank must examine whether it is correct that Irish banks should be supporting their overseas activities through these floating rate notes, given that they depend not only on the viability of the bank but on the viability of all their subsidiaries. The Central Bank should question policy in that area. I am aware that the Bank of England would not dream of allowing banks operate overseas on such a capital base. The Central Bank should be asked serious questions about their role in policing this area.

If we are looking ahead to where the financial sector is going we must ask why are the banks, not only AIB, looking for diversification into other sections of the financial sector. One of the problems is that there is a false distortion to go into life assurance activities, to go into building societies and pension funds. Those false distortions are easier vehicles for savings for the individual than saving through banks. It is not surprising to see the banks trying to expand their own base into insurance, building societies and so on. We have to address that, a problem that has been ducked too often in the past. We must ask ourselves why life insurance offers people a vehicle that is purely for savings giving them a tax break that would not be enjoyed by many small savers who put their money into a bank. After all the bank is normally funding activities more valuable to the economy and producing wealth and jobs than would a life pension fund which would typically be supporting property development and Government gilts. That issue is not related to the Department of Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism but it does relate to the issue of tax reform and distortion of savings markets here.

I do not intend to take up the time of the House on this matter but I wish to raise a few points in regard to the Minister's statement which have caused me confusion. What has happened in recent weeks has dealt a serious blow to the country. The panic action of the Government has done more to undermine our credibility than anything else. Many questions need to be put to the Minister, Deputy Bruton, arising out of his speech in the House and, as Deputy Richard Bruton stated, the Central Bank must stand indicted in regard to this issue. In recent years a number of banks have gone to the wall. Banks on the fringe of the financial world here went to the wall because there was not proper supervision by the Central Bank. I recall one bank being taken over by a group of directors who did not have any money but used the bank's finance to take it over. The Central Bank did not investigate that activity. The collapse of these peripheral banks resulted in considerable losses to small depositors. There should be an investigation into the role of the Central Bank and how active they are in pursuing these matters.

The Central Bank seem to have ignored all that was going on despite the fact that the bank concerned was involved in commercial activities outside their own sphere. The Central Bank were aware of what was happening but did not carry out an examination as to how the bank could cope with the liabilities that might present themselves. A number of questions must be put to the Central Bank about this issue.

The Department must stand indicted also. The AIB were asked by the Department if they were satisfied that there was no under-reserving on the London business and the bank gave an assurance that there was not. However, the same AIB and ICI representatives gave assurances on the Irish business which the Department found inadequate. In the light of that, why is it that the Department accepted their word that everything was right on the British scene? That calls for an answer. Have the Department been in contact with their British counterparts to inquire why the British Ministry did not send a report about this? If the British Ministry, as is suggested by the Minister, were in dereliction of their duty in not examining the affairs of the company in London what degree of responsibility rests with them? What can we do about this? It is obvious that the British Ministry were in dereliction of their duty in not monitoring the affairs of the company in London. Has the Minister been in contact with his counterparts in London about the affair?

The Government have had a change of heart in regard to this because there was a public outcry at the suggestion that the overburdened taxpayer might once more have to pay a levy due to the action of the bank. The proposals outlined by the Minister for Finance leave a lot to be desired. They amount to a cosmetic exercise. The Minister told us that the AIB have agreed to share with the Government, in proportions to be determined when the ultimate losses are known, the proceeds of the banks action against the former auditors of ICI, Ernst & Whinney. That is a farcical situation. We do not know if there will be a successful action although the Minister says that they will share the proceeds of the bank action with the Government. This is an insult to our intelligence and they should not assume that the auditors are guilty when no action has been brought. The Minister should not have cast this reflection on a firm of auditors. He said:

AIB will make a loan of £50 million for a period of three years at a rate 4 percentage points below the three year gilt rate to the Central Bank. AIB have further agreed that, should the emerging position and the reassessment at the end of this year warrant it, they are prepared to extend the term of this facility for a further period not exceeding two years.

The AIB should have been asked to dispose of their interests in Bank Corp in America because that would not have undermined their position in Ireland. This was another speculative move on the part of AIB with Irish money and it would not be too much to ask them to dispose of their interest in that and to make the money available to cover the losses. To say that they are making a gracious gesture in writing off their total acquisition cost for ICI is an insult as it is not a serious contribution to their losses. If they write off a sum of £86 million it will not help the State.

The Minister said:

The Central Bank.... decided, having regard to its statutory responsibility in relation to banking and financial systems generally, to indicate its willingness to provide sufficient funding, in conjunction with the banking system, within the dimensions of the problem indicated by the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism and subject to the end year reassessment referred to by him, to deal with the problem as it arises so as to obviate the need for recourse to the Exchequer.

What happens if liabilities far exceed this amount? No indication is given as to who will pay that amount. They will only give this funding up to £120 million but if, as some experts have suggested, it reaches £400 million or £500 million, what will happen then? It is incumbent on the Minister to answer this. The Minister also said:

Yesterday's decision by the board of the Central Bank means that the Exchequer will not now be involved in funding the administration of ICI.

The Minister does not know the extent of the liabilities at present and perhaps when the full extent of the losses is known, it may be far in excess of present estimates. There is no indication as to who will pay the extra costs.

Later on in his speech, the Minister said:

AIB have agreed to place a non interest bearing deposit of £20 million with the Central Bank to cover the contingent liability assumed by the State in respect of the AIB's guarantee to the Institute of London Underwriters.

Will this have any effect on the deposit which the AIB must place with the Central Bank? Will it also affect its lending capacity and its policy in relation to lending in the private sector? The Minister should make a statement in that regard.

The Minister of State, Deputy Collins, went to a great deal of trouble to explain what happens in his Department but I should like to know if his Department sought discussions with their counterpart in London to ask why the losses were not picked up there. The Minister went on to say:

We were advised that there was no under-reserving in the London branch and that a deliberate policy had been pursued to cutback on gross premium growth in London to bring matters fully under control.

Having regard to the fact that they did not accept the assurances in respect of the Irish business, why did they not ask for further details? The Minister went on to say:

It is also relevant that the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK who were responsible for supervising the branch activities of ICI in London had not communicated any concern to my Department. Accordingly, my Department had no reason to pursue matters further at that stage.

Because the parent company were in this country and must accept final responsibility, does the Minister consider that he should have accepted the fact that there was no communication from the British Ministry? Did he think that that was an indication that everything was all right? Under an EC directive, the responsibility lies in this country. In that regard, what happens when information is not available in the country in which the branch operates because there has been a failure to monitor or take proper action to ensure that the company is functioning properly? Is there an onus on that country to make good the losses? The Minister should be able to give us that information.

There should be a change in the Central Bank regulations which ensure that banking business do not engage in activities outside their own sphere. One bank sought to operate a building society but, luckily, permission was not granted to do this. If that sort of thing were allowed, many banks might not be able to fulfil their purpose, which is to provide finance for business in the private sector. The more they engage in extraneous activities, the more money is dissipated and not available for the purposes for which the banks were set up. There should be stricter control and what has happened in the last few years in regard to fringe banks leaves a lot to be desired. The Central Bank should exercise control and, if it is not in a position to do this, this House should make certain that they do.

The Minister has not been forthcoming in the information he made available to the House. There has been a change in the decision by the Government as outlined by the Minister for Finance today and they have come to the conclusion that what was suggested by the leader of Fianna Fáil is the only option open to them so that the taxpayers will not have to bear the burden.

With regard to the final comment made by Deputy O'Connell, I should like to point out that it was not only the leader of his party who expressed very strong reservations regarding the possible exposure and liability of the taxpayer; that view was forcibly expressed by many Members of my party, by me and by many backbenchers of the Fine Gael Party. Deputy Haughey had no monopoly on that.

One red herring was thrown into this debate by Deputy Bruton in his speech. While it is not directly involved here, he put it in, and I thought it inappropriate that he should have done so. By implication he suggested that jury trials in this country somehow carried a responsibility for the present situation of the ICI. The question of whether juries should hear actions for damages is important, and no doubt should be discussed in this House; but it has no bearing on the situation of the ICI. The problems of the ICI arose in England where for decades past there has been no trial by jury of actions for damages. I do not know why that was thrown in, except perhaps as a distraction. Certainly it has no relevance whatsoever to the main thrust of the debate on this issue.

Many speakers in this debate commented on the question of the public sector and the private sector, and it has been rightly pointed out that this debacle illustrates that the failings of the private sector are every bit as great as if not greater than the lapses that undoubtedly have occurred in some parts of the public sector. Deputy Kelly described the events we are debating here today as according a free kick to those on the crazy Left, as he put it, who criticise the private sector. I would prefer to put it that this was an own goal scored by the private sector in the course of their speculative business activities.

Deputy Kelly is a noted protagonist of the private sector, and he indicated in a radio interview this morning that this was perhaps the first event which left the private sector open to criticism. That is very far from the truth. The private sector in this country has an appalling record in all sorts of ways. The PMPA was a private sector situation that caused financial chaos which is still going on. The private sector has had its liquidations and receiverships day in and day out now for some years past, causing increases in unemployment. Most of the unemployed who have lost their jobs were former employees of the private sector, not the public sector. Fóir Teoranta, the State rescue operation, is engaged week in and week out in propping up with taxpayer's money many of these private institutions. To put a balance on it, the best one could say is that there is good and bad on both sides of the economy. Neither the public sector nor the private sector has a prerogative as far as good and bad enterprises are concerned.

The Minister for Finance came into this House earlier today and announced this new rescue package being put up by the Central Bank. Lest anybody get carried away by that with any sense of euphoria, some notes of caution must be sounded on this issue. While certainly it is welcome and no doubt, in the short term anyway, no call will be made on the taxpayer, I fear the matter will not end there. I suspect that this question of the ICI and insurance holdings of the new company will be talked about and debated in this House for many a long year yet, and I think there will be calls, debates on finance and votes of money for, perhaps, a long time. By no means will it be finished up with the passing of this Bill. A great deal of money must pass through the channels before that situation is reached.

The implication is put forward and the error is around that the Central Bank is coming up with this provision of money to cover the situation and to exonerate the taxpayer. Somehow it is a little reminiscent of the Fianna Fáil election programme of 1977 where all this money was being put up from somewhere to do all sorts of things — to abolish taxes, to assist taxpayers and so on. The money must come from some source and I want to analyse where it is likely to come from. This notion that there is some gift proposal here calls to mind Cassandra's warning: "I fear the Greeks when they come bearing gifts." The Central Bank are nothing more or less than a State institution and any money it provides from its own resources or reserves is taxpayers' funds, the moneys of the State.

Anything that the Central Bank provide is taxpayers money, let there be no misunderstanding about that. The Central Bank put forward this package and tells us now that they decided at a meeting yesterday to provide this package — everything is going to be all right; the Central Bank have seen to it. I wish I could have confidence enough in the Central Bank to be able to accept their proposition, but I am afraid I cannot in the light of the history that they have handed down to us over the past couple of years. I am afraid that their record does not warrant a great deal of confidence, the very confidence that they are charged with inspiring into the whole banking system.

The Minister, Deputy Bruton, told us in his speech introducing the Bill that the Central Bank's job is to assure the soundness of our banking system. That is right; its job is supposed to be to assure the soundness of our banking system. But the very fact that we have been debating here talks about a run on the banks and the dangers of insurance and bank collapses is an indication that they have not done their job very well. When the Central Bank come forward and tell us what AIB could prudently be expected to contribute towards this debacle, one must look with a could eye at best on advice coming from the Central Bank. It was they who permitted AIB and other banks to set off and engage in speculative ventures. These ventures cannot be undertaken by AIB or any other bank without the consent, authorisation and permission of the Central Bank. The fact that they gave that consent to, let us face it, gambling activities has led to the situation we are debating today. Therefore, one must look with some caution at the Central Bank's proposals. They have got these things wrong far too many times to enable us to have unbiased 100 per cent confidence in them. The funds that will be used here from the Central Bank are taxpayers' funds.

A further neat, careful and cautious limitation is put into this package, as indicated in the speech today by the Minister for Finance. His words must have been chosen very carefully. He said that the Central Bank indicated their willingness to provide sufficient funds in conjunction with the banking system within the dimensions of the problem indicated by the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism.

This is not an open-ended commitment to exonerate or indemnify the taxpayer. There is a limit on it, and the limit is that set down by the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism, Deputy Bruton, namely, a limit of between £65 million and £120 million. I will not indulge in speculating on whether the ultimate liability might be £500 million or £650 million or whatever, but I do have some reserve — and I think it is reasonable to have some reserve — about the parameters set by the Minister in his speech yesterday. The fact that the parameters he set — £65 million to £120 million — are so wide indicates how imprecise any assessment of the exposure must be. As he said, it is not possible at this stage to speak in definitive terms about the precise financial position of ICI. It will take years before the full extent of that is known. I believe that the time will come when the exposure will exceed, and well exceed, the uppermost figure of £120 million enunicated. No provision so far has been made in regard to how that will be dealt with or who will provide the moneys to meet those increased amounts if and when they arise.

On the package the indication is — and I quote from the speech of the Minister for Finance — that the Central Bank will be discussing with Allied Irish Banks and the other licensed banks the appropriate form and apportionment of this funding. That has not been settled yet. Discussions have to take place on what the contribution will be and the extent of the contribution from the commercial banks. It may well be that at the end of the day their contribution may be minimal. Great care will have to be taken to ensure that when the commercial banks, the Allied Irish Banks, the Bank of Ireland and the others make their contribution, it will be drawn out of their profits and not passed on to their customers in the form of increased bank charges or interest charges. There will be nothing clever about that. There is no great shakes in the commercial banks making this contribution if all they do is pass it on to their customers. That contribution must come out of their own pockets if it is to have any meaning.

It is perfectly right and reasonable that the commercial banks, with AIB at their head, should cover this situation in its entirety. That is their responsibility because they operate in this country an oligopoly situation. Between them they have a closed shop. They have the same bank charges, the same arrangements and the same rates of interest. They do not compete with each other as banks do, and have done in the past, in the United Kingdom. They have a cosy little interbank set up and they work as a unit. Many complaints have been expressed about that situation from time to time, and rightly so, but the answer that is usually given is that the banks protect each other to the advantage of the customer. They say that is better than if they competed with each other. That may be, but this much must be said. If they operate a monopoly situation between them for charging purposes then the very least that the tax paying members of the public can expect from them is that they operate a mutual support system when a crisis arises. That is the other side of the coin. They cannot have it both ways.

There has been much talk about the role of AIB and what the extent of their contribution should be. As the Minister, Deputy John Bruton, said yesterday, this is a matter for debate. In my opinion what has been put forward here as their contribution to the package is woefully inadequate. This loan of £50 million is referred to somewhat euphemistically as a contribution. I do not regard that as a contribution. A loan has to be paid back with interest, whether it be a hard loan, a soft loan or an interest free loan. One way or another the main catch about loans is that they have to be paid back, as will this money. I wonder about that.

The Insurance Corporation of Ireland will be converted to a semi-State body carrying on the business heretofore carried out by ICI. They will take over their assets and liabilities. This £50 million being lent on interest by the AIB to the Central Bank is going to be onlent — that is the expression used and I like it — to the new semi-State body. I do not know if it will be onlent at interest or not. I do not think there will be much point in charging interest because I would not rate too highly the prospect of getting it. What is going to become of this £50 million? The answer is clear enough. It will shoot out of the country to the United Kingdom and the United States to pay the claimants on the irresponsible policies taken out by the Insurance Corporation of Ireland. It will not take long to exhaust that loan paying the claims to the bloodstock owners, the owners of the satellites and on all the other irresponsible policies written by the corporation and for which this country will have to carry the can one way or the other, be it the taxpayer or whoever.

The Minister spoke about protecting the policy holders. If there is one category we should not be worrying too much about protecting it is the policy holders. These policy holders in the United Kingdom and the United States are people who ran around looking for a policy for their outlandish, highly risky, speculative projects, but they found it impossible to get cover except from ICI, who willingly rowed in and obliged. Now the chickens have come home to roost and they have three enormous claims already pending — and you can be sure that more are still to come. From their point of view it was like taking candy from a child. The ICI were ready to oblige when all the others refused.

The idea that we should bend backwards to protect that category seems rather strange. The money will be onlent to the new semi-State body and will be spent on payment of claims. Sooner or later, whether it is three or five years, the AIB will approach the Central Bank and say that it is time for the loan to be repaid with interest. Admittedly they are not charging the Central Bank the full rate of interest but nevertheless AIB will want the £50 million repaid with interest. Where will the money come from to repay AIB? From whom will it come? Will it come out of the profits the new SAT will make? Is anyone suggesting that will turn into a profitable institution having regard to the backlog of claims that are hanging over its head? Will it make profits of £50 million plus interest to enable it to pay back its onloan to the Central Bank so that it, in turn, can repay AIB? I doubt it very much. What we are talking about are ongoing losses rather than incremental profits.

As far as the loan is concerned, the question arises whether it will do the taxpayer or the Central Bank any good in the long term. I have grave doubts about that. I do not regard it as an adequate contribution from the resources of AIB to meet the situation.

The directors of AIB as well as those of the Central Bank have a great deal to answer for. The whole system of directors and director appointments will have to be examined thoroughly because State institutions, be they the Central Bank or the taxpayer, ultimately carry the can for these people. Some system will have to be devised to ensure that not just anyone can become a director of a bank or an insurance company by virtue of the fact that such a person has an in arrangement with a club and has contacts. People occupying sensitive positions of that nature, which can affect us all, will have to be licensed before they are eligible to be a director of a bank or an insurance company. Existing bank directors should be compelled as soon as possible to apply for a licence under which their records could be examined. I would hazard a guess that it would be highly inappropriate for many of them to be granted licences to carry out functions in what appear to be private enterprise institutions but which at the end of the day have reprecussions in the public arena.

I am concerned that the AIB are escaping from this far too lightly. The contribution from the action against Ernst and Whinney is a remarkable proposition to be talking about. Any action of that nature at best can only be regarded as speculative and to talk in a realistic way as though funds may be forthcoming to the State or the Central Bank from that source strikes me as rather strange. The real owners of AIB, who elect the directors and who took on this venture, are their shareholders. There must be some contribution made to the kitty by the shareholders of AIB. Apparently that is the one thing that is being scrupulously avoided at the say so of the Central Bank. I do not believe that some reduction of dividend for AIB shareholders would be inappropriate. It would be highly appropriate that there should be some reduction for some years until we see exactly what comes out this mess when the claims position is qualified. It will take some years before that will happen. Some percentage of the profits of AIB should be put aside each year and frozen as a contingency fund until we see what the outcome of the losses will be and where the money will come from eventually to meet the claims that have to be met.

I wish to share the time allotted to me with my colleague, Deputy Foley. When I speak for 12 minutes perhaps the Chair would remind me of the time and then call Deputy Foley.

I understand that the timetable may be altered later. Would Deputy Harney and Deputy Foley be satisfied with 20 minutes between them?

Yes. We could talk about this subject for a considerable length of time and yet we would possibly be no nearer a solution at the end than we were at the beginning. AIB are not the first people to have made a major blunder and I have no doubt they will not be the last. What the public, whether or not they are taxpayers, are concerned about is that these national scandals and disasters will not continue. They are not interested in whether they have to pay out of their wage package by way of taxation or pay when they go into the bank by way of being a bank customer or insurance holder. They are not interested from which purse the money is taken. What they are interested in is that we the legislators, do a good job and take the necessary steps to ensure that disasters of this kind do not happen again.

Approximately 18 months ago, when we had the PMPA debacle, several pleas were made from all sides regarding the need for urgent reform of company law. Obviously those pleas fell on deaf ears. I have not heard very much about changes in company law in the past 18 months. During this debate we have been told that urgent change is required.

For the past number of weeks we have spent time talking about wandering animals and the breeding of bulls. No doubt they were important Bills in themselves but that kind of legislation cannot be put before the absolute necessity to reform company law, to change our insurance system and to introduce the kind of measures suggested by the various committees and commissions which have sat through the years. From 1970 to 1976 a committee of inquiry examined the whole insurance industry. Their report has been left to sit in the Library and no doubt in many Government Departments but nothing was done to implement any of the recommendations in that report.

The rescue of the PMPA will cost £10 million per annum to insurance holders and to the insurance industry and Irish Shipping will cost the taxpayer anything up to £200 million. Five or six friendly or provident societies have gone to the wall and small investors and elderly people who invested their life savings in these societies have had to pay the consequences of the disastrous management of these companies. No Government and no Member of this House sought to introduce any Bill to have these people bailed out. The Irish people want to see justice being done. Whether it is a bank carrying clout, or an elderly person with £5,000 invested and the company goes to the wall, the Irish people want to see them all treated in the same way.

For many years now people have been operating here collecting money from small investors. At the end of the day these companies have gone to the wall. One such company was clearly breaking the law. It was operating under an Act of 1896 which entitled it to take £200 only by way of deposit from the public. It took far more than £200 from the public. Clearly it broke the law, an indictable offence. I do not believe anyone was ever prosecuted.

Recently on "Today Tonight" we saw that five industrial and provident societies went to the wall at a cost of £24 million to the people who had their life savings in them. Recently we saw the case of Kings North at a cost of £15 million. The public have every right to have lost confidence not just in the banks but in our whole administration. Is it any wonder that many of our elderly people prefer to keep their money in biscuit tins or under their mattress than to put them in some of the institutions which have been allowed to operate for far too long?

Over the past number of years we had from the Central Statistics Office three major blunders. One of those blunders was in relation to milk returns. Our Irish officials have spent the past year in Brussels not negotiating future improvements for farmers, but wrangling over the errors of our own officials. It is time some kind of watchdog or supervisory or monitoring role was carried out by some Government Department and I do not care which Government Department. These officials should be made responsible for the errors which take place. Whatever about people losing faith in their politicians, they always felt that at senior levels in the Civil Service things would be looked after.

In the case of some of these companies who went to the wall the rumours were around for months that they were in danger. Why were they never called in by a Government Department? The supervisory and monitoring role which should be part and parcel of our Civil Service structure was not involved in those cases. If the law is not sufficient and if the supervisory or monitoring role is not sufficient, they should be changed. I fully support the idea of free and private enterprise. The more incentives you give to individuals to do things for themselves the better. We cannot have that system on the one hand and on the other hand when financial blunders are made allow people to offload the burden onto the State and the taxpayer. Whether it is the taxpayer by way of direct taxation, or when he goes to take out an insurance policy, or open a bank account, the taxpayer and the public have to pay.

Mistakes have been made in the past and the great speeches which are being made during this debacle will not fall on deaf ears. I hope the Government will take the necessary action to ensure that disasters on this scale cannot happen again. It was right for the Central Bank to decide in the past 24 hours to play a more serious and a bigger role in this affair. They are the supervisory authority for all the banks. They should have ensured that there was vigorous supervision of the activities their banks got involved in. I can perfectly understand why the banks thought it necessary to involve themselves in the insurance industry. For quite some time there has been an anomaly between interest payments, disclosures, and so on, as between the different financial institutions. Building societies and insurance companies have enjoyed the advantage. For a long time the banks have been worried about the fact that they have lost substantial funds to the other institutions.

In their first report in July 1982 the Commission on Taxation recommended that these anomalies should be cleared up so that money would not continue to be taken from banking interests and put into other institutions at an advantage. That recommendation was never implemented. In recent budgets Governments have gone further to penalise investment in banks. It is for that reason as much as anything else that banking institutions saw fit to involve themselves in these other fringe financial arrangements.

The time for reviewing legislation, for having committees, for sitting back and thinking about what might or might not happen has long since passed. Over the next few months in this House we have to ensure that we bring in the necessary changes in company law to ensure that, when company accounts are produced, they fairly and accurately reflect in no ambiguous way the financial position of the company.

I hope the banks have learned great deal from their experience and that they will not be as keen in the future to hound the small person, the small businessman or the widow who has to get a personal guarantee if she wants to get £1,000 to build an extension or to put in new windows. These demands all of the banks have made on the public to ensure that their money was secure were unreasonable in many instances. I hope the mistake they made will make them slow in the future to criticise Governments for getting involved in white elephants or whatever. I hope they will take their own responsibility seriously and realise that they owe it to the people of Ireland to run their own affairs in an orderly fashion and not be so quick in the future to pontificate and to lecture everybody else.

I want to thank my colleague, Deputy Harney, for sharing her time with me. I welcome this opportunity to contribute to the debate on this very important legislation proposed by the Government to resolve the very serious ICI problem. The public perception of the ICI problem is one of concern. Has the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism obtained all the information pertaining to the affairs of ICI which now shows that they are in a sorry state, or has he been hampered by lack of information? That remains to be seen. After the PMPA affair one must be criticial of the supervisory authority within the Department for not being more effective in monitoring the whole business of insurance generally.

One must now conclude that there is a continuing crisis in general insurance. As public representatives we must demand action to ensure that we will not have to deal with a similar disastrous situation again as happened on 15 March. One of the most serious consequences of the AIB-ICI crisis is the instability which now exists in our financial institutions. The public, and especially the small investor, had faith and confidence in the safety and security of our banking system. That has now been shattered, mainly due to the enormous and outrageous rumours now circulating. I appeal to the Minister to assure the people of the stability and safety of their deposits. Otherwise we will be back to the biscuit tins.

Risk-taking was always regarded as a non-banking activity. People felt secure that their investments and banking arrangements were free from uncertainty. The debate so far has been responsible and rightly so. National stability has been maintained. A balanced view must be expressed so as to maintain confidence in our financial institutions and so prevent a dismal situation becoming a national crisis.

The big question of the moment is, who will pay the debt? I welcome the fact that the Minister stated it would not fall on the taxpayer. I also welcome the statement by the Minister for Finance today that the Central Bank will now be involved. The onus is now on the Government to come up with a rescue plan which will be fair and must involve the commercial private sector which has made massive profits over the years. This rescue plan should be spread over a number of years and certainly must not fall on the taxpayers, but be based on the profits of these commercial and banking ventures.

The Minister must now be aware that the financial experts and advisers here have let our concern down. One must put a question mark over their professional competence from here on. I welcome the statement of the Minister for Justice in that he has decided on the right of access to jury actions for personal injuries. This is a very timely statement in view of the high cost of premiums generated by some of the large damages awarded in the High Court.

One other relevant point is that the Minister for Justice is considering that the judge should be enabled to indicate a settlement sum to the jury on an advisory basis. The second consideration is that an advisory tribunal sit with the judges in these cases. This does not mean awards will be decreased but it could go a long way towards relieving the situation. However, it must be stated that the jury system has always been seen as a basic feature of the independent administration of justice and possibly could be challenged in relation to determination of guilt. The aim should be to secure a level of award which is fair and just. In the future, consistency must be the keynote in all awards.

At this moment there is a crisis in the general insurance industry. Statistics for 1982 show that the vast majority of companies recorded substantial losses — 50 per cent having losses in each case of over £2 million. Figures available for 1983 indicate that the position was far worse than for 1982. It is now known that some companies have attempted to right this situation by redundancies, substantial cuts and a cutback in loss-making business, as well as the increasing of premiums and the introducing of additional cover restrictions. I trust we shall not see this line of thought extended, as many would not be in a position to continue providing themselves with adequate cover. This will affect many industries, as they will be unable to meet the premiums demanded. This will lead to many companies and individuals taking the risk without any general cover. It will also lead to a further increase in the number of uninsured motorists.

It is well known that the big losses in insurance are public liability, employment liability, motor insurance, household damage and fire damage, mainly due to the size and number of claims and the high damages awarded in the High Court. There is, in effect, no cost control operating in general insurance. These costs are now out of control. As well as putting insurance companies at risk, they are creating hardship for industry and consumers generally. If any worthwhile impact is to be made on the cost of insurance, the Government must tackle and eliminate the causes in such a way that the consumer can anticipate insurance at a reasonable rate.

I welcome the statement of the Minister of State, Deputy Collins, accepting that there is a clear necessity for careful stocktaking of the economic climate in which the industry functions and of the legal procedures which put pressures on claims. He also indicated that supervision can be strengthened and improved. To me and many people, in fact to the public at large, this is the keynote to the whole situation for the future.

I was glad to be the observer of the Minister's intervention today, which was welcome. It seems to have resulted from a search for a solution and will encourage constructive criticism, the type which has taken place over the last week, even among backbenchers, both Labour and Fine Gael, of the quick intervention by the Government in the first place, even if there is now a situation in which bankers seem to be bailing out bankers. Nevertheless, one would like to know a little more about the meaning of the intervention. We realise that the profit from the Central Bank goes to the Exchequer in the first place and if it comes from Central Bank reserves, while there might be a temporary depletion of reserves, nevertheless at some time in the future it would have to be paid back. I presume, therefore, that the Central Bank, in conjunction with the financial institutions and the banks, would work out a system whereby they would be able to repay the money proffered. That would mean that it would fall back on the customers of those institutions, and, to a large extent in many cases, on the taxpayer, but not indiscriminately as was feared earlier.

The Minister today referred to the Central Bank's indication of its willingness to provide sufficient funding in conjunction with the banking system within the dimension of the problem indicated by the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism. I presume that he was talking about £120 million maximum. It is estimated that it will fall between £80 million and £90 million. We were told by the Minister that it means that the Exchequer is not now involved in funding the administration of ICI. The money is coming from the banking institutions.

I thought one of the obvious solutions would have been that the Government would invest £120 million, or whatever, in Allied Irish Banks, take shares for that amount and then over a period sell them back. This may be disadvantageous in that AIB would then become a semi-State body and because of the industry one would be dealing with, which is affected by uncertainty and is an open-ended industry, it may not be desirable in the first place. It must be said, after three weeks of putting the Government through the hoop that the Central Bank must come under criticism for not coming up with this solution earlier. It has been argued successfully, and is not disputed, that it is the responsibility of the Central Bank. They should have absorbed this problem in a businesslike and professional manner three weeks ago when the crisis broke. Much anxiety has been caused by this slow intervention.

One of the most disappointing things about the Minister's speech was his reference to the fact that legislation would be brought in which will change the jury system. I regret that the Government have capitulated so quickly to a pressure group and are giving in to big business and the institutions, because these say that the present method of jury awards is adversely affecting insurance premiums. The Minister for Justice according to yesterday's Irish Independent when pressed on the very high legal costs associated with the present system, agreed that that was probably a factor in occupational injury claims. I hope this will be debated fully and that the Government will not rush in and change the jury system.

I do not think that people are aware of the reasons for these awards being made, which awards can sometimes be very high. We are really talking about the badly injured, those maimed for life, people who are very sick, disabled or permanently ill. We are talking about people whose life expectancy has been shortened as a result of accident. To change this system, because of lobbying by large insurance companies, without giving it careful consideration would be disastrous. I observed my father-in-law, having been paralysed from the neck down, being rendered a quadriplegic for five years, lying on his back, being awarded a very modest sum of money.

If I might interrupt the Deputy, the Minister of State, Deputy Barrett, wants to make a statement.

(Dún Laoghaire): By agreement and notwithstanding anything contained in Standing Orders, on the Order of the Dáil made today, the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism shall be called on not later than 7.45 p.m. and the Leader of the Fianna Fáil Party shall be called on not later than 8.15 p.m.

I was urging the Minister to be more consultative before changing the system of jury awards. Such change would mean that the 12 men, trusted and true, would no longer be entrusted with making awards to their peers. It would mean also that the role of the ordinary man would be rejected, it being handed over to the judges who, in our society, come from an elitist group, leaving it to them to decide how much discomfort a person should suffer, how much costs, they are to be awarded, the standard of life to which they are entitled etc. We know that one of the many causes of these huge awards is the amount of legal fees involved, the amount of time lost through delays in the courts system, with people waiting four and five years to have their cases heard, often suffering badly in the interim period. In some instances insurance companies do not endeavour to have such cases dealt with. I submit that one of the other reasons for these high jury awards is that the provisions of the Road Traffic Act are not applied. It is very dangerous to even drive now with so many people driving without insurance cover.

I do not wish to go into the details of the reason for the débacle that has occurred between the ICI and AIB. It has been adequately covered already. People might be inclined to suggest that the AIB adhere to what they know best, which is banking. Of course they are likely to be more successful at that. Often the banks have an unfair advantage in putting pressure on individuals and companies vis-à-vis lending. It really boils down to the institution versus the individual and small companies. We should allow the banks to learn a lesson from the way the Government have treated them. Surely the objective is not to destroy Allied Irish Banks, or make them crawl away from their mistake but rather to walk away with dignity, which is what any individual or company should be allowed do by the banks in similar circumstances. There is no point in kicking somebody when they are down. The impression has been given that some people would like to see AIB go to the wall, but such people obviously have not taken into consideration the tremendous success of that bank, or of the large number of its employees who in the main are extremely efficient and who worked very hard to make it the biggest bank in the country.

Rather is the invective directed mainly at the directors and board of the bank, where there may be a lesson to be learned also. The populace may rejoice at the perceived dent in the establishment occasioned by this débacle in the control of the banks, mainly by gurus who make up the board of directors, those who would be the non-risk takers, non-entrepreneurs from accountancy ivory towers using OPM — other people's money — some of whom probably are as bad as the economic theorists, some of whom lend a hand in running the country. It has been said by many Members that they are not slow to deliver speeches to Government, with comments prejudiced in favour of the private sector. It should be remembered that that same sector, in turn, is screwed by the banking sector these gurus represent. Invariably the message is that the Government should be good to big profit makers, neglecting to recognise the fact that they themselves are very hard on the private sector, particularly the individual. There is here a temptation to gloat and I suggest that we resist that temptation.

The stance taken by Fianna Fáil on this Bill is reminiscent of that taken on the Family Planning Bill in that soundings were made over a week or two when it was decided to take a stance against the Bill. The opinion held on all sides of the House is that the taxpayer should not suffer as a result of what has happened. One should be careful not to destroy the success story that is Allied Irish Banks. The measure of a successful company or of an individual is that it or he can get up after a hard knock or blow. It would be ironic that the bank would cause such problems for the Government of the day or that it could discredit this country.

Much soul-searching should be done by the banks and the private sector as a result of what happened, particularly by the banking sector, which is inclined to go for the cream all the time. As the Leader of the Opposition said, there are many people who have had unhappy experiences at the hands of the banks. It is not desirable that the punishment should be absolutely punitive.

In a Confederation of Irish Industry Newsletter of November 1984 there was an article written in relation to failures and I quote:

It is ironic that the prevailing attitude to those who fail in business and those who succeed is similar. Those who fail are regularly treated with contempt, those who succeed are seen as pampered recipients of State aid. We need to develop new attitudes to failure, risk-taking and success. Honest failures should be encouraged to try again. Those who succeed should be applauded and encouraged to further enterprise.

That is something of which the AIB should take note.

In his speech Deputy Haughey said that if ICI were commercially profitable the Irish taxpayer would not benefit. In the same way we could say that the Irish taxpayer did not profit from the success of the PMPA before its collapse. I think it is necessary to correct the altruistic statement of my colleague, Deputy Kelly, yesterday that there was a feeling that between them the ICI and AIB have let down the private sector and given a free kick to the crazy left and that this was at the root of much of the fury felt by the public. I do not think that is so. I do not think that kind of approach exists in business at any level. It is very much a "dog eat dog" situation, with the survival of the fittest.

AIB have had a very short purgatory. They were taken very quickly out of pain by the intervention of the Government. I do not think they should be crucified or made to survive with a ball and chain around them. We should not forget that AIB carry out very successful operations and the punishment meted out should not be such as to destroy them. I know that in similar circumstances the bank would take assets and require directors of a company to give guarantees jointly and severally. As I said on another occasion, the banks would bottle one's blood. AIB should remember what has happened here. As Deputy Harney pointed out, they should remember how they have been treated by the Government, when they are dealing with other individuals or businesses. The object is not to crush AIB but to put them back where they belong because they still retain the qualities that brought them to their present position.

I should not like to finish my speech without mentioning Irish Shipping. The employees of that company are looking for a relatively modest settlement in respect of their redundancy but they have not got it yet. I hope the Government and the Minister will reconsider that matter.

I think it is necessary to give a firm rap on the knuckles, or perhaps a kick lower down, to AIB. An invitation should be given to AIB and the banks to help to get the economy moving again. They should return the compliment by injecting capital into our economy by means of loans. The banks should give more opportunities to the men and women who are building up the country. I am talking now of people without connections, not the belted earls, not the small coterie of people for whom the State seems to have been founded and for whose benefit it has since existed. The banks and various institutions seem to support these people. There is a hierarchy in Irish society not only in the religious sphere but also in secular life and it is stifling the growth of the country. In my view it is inevitable that when bank personnel step outside their ivory towers and their fur-lined moúse traps they will sometimes be devoured by a lurking tomcat, rather like a tame rabbit being devoured by a hungry fox. Their decisions are insulated by the kind of pressure they can apply on a company or on an individual but what has happened in this case should be an example to all of them of what it is like to compete in the real world of business. It is not the Government who were taken for a ride. The boardroom occupants of AIB thought they were on to a good thing when they saw the golden casket of ICI but they failed to detect the contents of maggots inside. Let us learn from what has happened in this instance and let us move on.

I should like to thank Deputies for the high level of consensus in which this debate was conducted on all sides although there were occasional flashes of acrimony. However, it must be accepted that there was an endeavour by all sides to find a solution and this is true of the Opposition and the Leader of the Opposition who is present. All tried to find a solution and to contribute to the best of their knowledge, ability and experience. Although this debate was occasioned by a very regrettable and sad event it was useful in helping to formulate policy.

I know that after the intervention in the debate by the Minister for Finance to announce the arrangements being made by the Central Bank that will obviate the need for a contribution from the Exchequer if the losses are within the parameters which the Government expect, Deputy O'Kennedy saw this as a change of heart and position on the part of the Government. I think he misunderstands the situation. The fact is this is a decision made not by the Government but by the Central Bank and, as I pointed out before when the matter was brought to my attention, the Central Bank act autonomously and it was their judgment that it was appropriate to take this step at this time.

One must recognise that the independence of the Central Bank in their decision-making is very important in a case such as this. In our original assessment of what the AIB could bear, the Government took careful account of and was guided to a great extent by what the Central Bank said was possible. However, it is true that from the outset the Government envisaged the likelihood, indeed almost the certainty, that the Central Bank would be contributing to the solution of the problem in the way they have indicated today they will do. I should like to quote from the press statement I made on the evening this matter first came to light. The wording is quite important. I said:

This financing will be broadly based and will involve the Exchequer, the Central Bank, the banking and insurance sector generally and the former owner, the AIB.

The Central Bank was clearly mentioned by me as a possible source of funding at that time. Therefore, there is no reason for the expressions of surprise now in evidence in some quarters about what has been announced, not is there any reason for trying to say that this is something unexpected. It is normal that the Central Bank in the course of their work should come to this decision, as was envisaged as a possibility and a likelihood from the first time a statement was made on this matter by me on behalf of the Government. There are no grounds for believing that the losses will fall outside the range of £50 million to £120 million. This has been questioned by some. These figures are based on the information supplied to us by the auditors and actuaries acting within the company. They are the people in the best position to assess the true situation. Our assessment is based on their information. This assessment is based on the re-insurance contracts being sustained.

Deputy Flynn wished to know why the legislation needed to be introduced at all and why we could not work with the legislation that was passed in 1983. We had to recognise the need to give guarantees in respect of the Institute of London Underwriters' business. In regard to the setting up of the company in which I have shares, that mechanism was not provided for in previous legislation. It was necessary on this occasion in order to separate the ICI from the bank. If the shares in the company were not taken over by someone else there would not have been a separation of the ICI from the bank and this was deemed to be necessary. In a matter of this importance, where confidence is of great moment, we decided that it would not have been wise to have left this legislation hanging around for a number of weeks. The action to underwrite the Minister taking shares in the company had to be introduced quite quickly in case somebody challenged whether we had the statutory right to do what we have done. As the entire exercise was designed to promote confidence, to do something for which there was not a statutory base would be contrary to what both Deputy Flynn and I wished.

Other Deputies, and also Deputy Flynn, questioned this legislation from the opposite sense. They wished to know why it took ten days to produce the legislation. That ten days involved two week ends, so it did not involve ten working days. There were considerable difficulties in drafting not the first 14 sections of the Bill but in drafting the sections in regard to the Institute of London Underwriters. This was new territory in respect of which there had to be a lot of consultation. It might have been possible to get some of the other legislation introduced more quickly but these sections required a degree of consultation as to the precise wording.

Deputy Cluskey raised queries about the timescale within which we expected the information to be available. We made this statement on the basis of information supplied by the auditors. Deputy Cluskey referred to the experience of the PMPA where it took a lot longer to get to the bottom of the situation. In the case of PMPA the auditors seeking the information on our behalf did not get the co-operation they are now getting in the case of ICI. That co-operation is an important factor and should enable the auditor to meet the timescale he has set himself.

Deputy Flynn said that if the system had been operated properly it should be possible to get this information in about two or three days using advanced accounting and computerised systems. As Deputy Flynn knows, the central problem of this company was that proper information systems did not exist in it. It might have been possible to get that information as quickly as the Deputy would have liked if those systems were there, but they are not and that is why six weeks was mentioned.

A number of other Deputies wished to know why the Government did not insist on taking shareholdings in the AIB as the price for engaging in the rescue of this subsidiary of the AIB. It is our advice that for the bank to give shares away free or on preferential terms would have required an extraordinary general meeting of the bank. That would require notices to be sent out resulting in a considerable amount of publicity. If such a meeting were called before the reasons for it were announced and before the Government had put its rescue in place, it would lead to speculation which might jeopardise the entire rescue attempt. Therefore we decided not to pursue that as a condition precedent to a settlement.

If we were to make it a condition subsequent to a settlement, if we were to say to the bank that we would only settle the problem if the bank recommended to an extraordinary general meeting that they give us a share, there would still be a remaining uncertainty because there would be uncertainty as to whether the recommendations of the directors would be passed at the meeting. This course of action would have generated a degree of uncertainty about the durability of a settlement and that would have jeopardised its entire purpose. Also, a dilution of the shareholding, although something that might be feasible in calm times when people would not attach any significance to it, would, when there was perhaps a degree of uncertainty about the bank, lead to an even larger fall in share values in the bank. While there is no direct cause and relationship between share values and confidence in the bank and its ability to lend, a rapid fall in the share values would have an effect on confidence on the part of depositors. That would not have been desirable. To some extent that also acts as a constraint on people who might suggest that one should seek to solve the problem by looking for dividends or large parts of the profits to be allocated. That also would have the effect of leading to a rapid fall in shares which, although not directly linked to confidence in the bank, could have that effect by the public uncertainty and unease that might generate.

Deputy Manning suggested that the bank might have been required to sell the First Maryland Bank and the proceeds of the sale made available for the rescue. That would have required an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders. It would not have led to a high level of confidence being generated and confidence is at the centre of our endeavours in this entire matter.

Deputies Flynn and Richard Bruton raised questions about banks generally getting involved in diversifications into other related financial activities in regard to which they did not have particular expertise. The Deputies suggested that the Central Bank should try to stop this type of development. It is fair to say that the point raised by the Deputies has been very much taken on board by the Minister for Finance and, I expect, also by the Central Bank. I expect that this advice will be taken very much to heart.

Deputy Flynn also was interested in ensuring that the Minister should have power to attach conditions to an authorisation to carry out an undertaking and also in regard to paid-up share capital. In fact, the statutory power to do this is being taken in the proposed insurance legislation. As a matter of practice it is already being done but it needs statutory underpinning which is going to occur in the insurance Bill.

Deputies Flynn and Richard Bruton raised questions about whether Irish insurance companies should be so largely involved in the re-insurance business. Deputy Richard Bruton asked whether the Central Bank should essentially have allowed a bank to take over a business in which re-insurance played such a large part. Deputy Flynn suggested that there should be controls on the re-insurance activity of insurance companies generally. There are a number of points to make on this. There is no other Irish insurance company engaged in re-insurance business on anything like the same scale as ICI was. Controls are not as relevant to other insurance companies as they would be in the case of the ICI. It had to be said that if one was to say that Irish companies should not engage in a substantial amount of re-insurance business Irish companies in the insurance business who want to re-insure would be forced to do their re-insurance overseas because there might not be Irish companies available with a sufficient authorisation to transact the business of a quantity necessary to accommodate the needs of the Irish market and, perhaps, to take in other business.

While I would not at all rule out the possibility suggested by the two Deputies of some form of monitoring or control on the extent that re-insurance represents in any insurance company's business — that should be done any way by the supervisory authority as part of its normal prudential activity — I would have doubts about placing rigid limits on this because it might mean that we were voluntarily denuding ourselves of the possibility in the Irish insurance industry of doing work that was valuable and forcing, perhaps, Irish insurers to send the business overseas. However, it is a suggestion that certainly deserves to be followed up and it will be.

Deputy Flynn also suggested that the Minister should have the power to veto chief executive officers and directors of companies being appointed. We do that already in respect of new companies. Frankly, it is very difficult for the Department, without it becoming the boss of all insurance companies and running them, to say in respect of some person that he or she is not suitable to be a director unless we set down certain specific disqualification criteria. It would be our intention in respect of general company law to introduce certain bases for disqualification for acting as a director. I am aware that the people concerned in the present companies are unlikely to be people who would have been disqualified under any of the criteria one might think of. I am not sure whether that provision would have made that much difference in this case.

Deputy Flynn suggested that new procedures might be provided for the submission of returns and accounts to the supervisory authority which would involve, in fact, the Minister nominating a second actuary operating independently of the company's own actuary to do a second actuarial examination of the accounts. That would be a completely new departure. It involves a separate actuarial examination of each accounts by another actuary, apart from whatever actuarial resources the Department might have which would assist in its general work. I must say that in the Department we need to increase personnel involved in actuarial matters. Of course the Department use outside consultancy for this purpose on a regular basis but it is not desirable for us not to have at least a significant amount of such competence in-house in the Department. It is my intention to take this matter further.

Criticisms have been made of the supervision by the Department of the insurance business generally. Deputy Flynn, for instance, said that following the PMPA crisis the prudent thing for the Minister to do would have been to have had a searching inquiry made of the state of health of all other non-life insurers. In fact, it is fair to say that it was good insurance supervision under the responsibility of successive Ministers that led to the PMPA crisis being brought to a head in the first place. Were it not for good supervision it would not have been brought to a conclusion as satisfactorily as it was. It is worth saying that seven studies were carried out altogether at the initiative of my Department into the PMPA. It was the seventh one that revealed the problem in its true light, the first six did not. One can see that it was not an easy task to get to the bottom of this matter but the Department was very persistent in seeking it out.

I should also say that in addition to examining the individual accounts submitted, all of which are independently audited, the Department carry out cross-checks with the help of consulting actuaries on the claims provisions of the head office companies in Ireland. If under provisions exist in respect of specific headings they are taken up with them.

I can say in reassurance to all concerned that of the cross-checks we have done — we have done a complete cross check on the accounts — in so far as the Irish operations are concerned none indicates any difficulties in the overall solvency of the company. There have been indicated under-provisions in respect of individual classes of business. They are, of course, being pursued with the companies concerned but we have no evidence as a result of these cross-checks of any threat to the overall solvency of any of the companies.

The Minister of State, Deputy Collins, dealt in some detail with the relationship between the Irish supervisory authority and the British Department of Trade and Industry in this case. The Minister of State said:

Under the formal EEC Protocol of Collaboration between insurance supervisory authorities, each supervisory authority may make requests to and receive from other supervisory authorities information which it needs in order to carry out the responsibility for supervision which is laid upon it, provided that the requests made do not detract from the division of competences between supervisory authorities as provided for by the Directive.

Clearly the competence in regard to the supervision of the branch business in London rests with the Department of Trade and Industry and that is in accordance with the EC directive. There is no doubt, legally or otherwise, as to the division of competence there and we can be seen to have acted fully and conscientiously in pursuing this matter in the questions we raised with the company in accordance with the division of responsibility laid down in the EC directive in question.

I stress that the action announced by the Central Bank today was an independent decision of the Central Bank and that it is not possible for the Government to direct them as to their decisions in the performance of their statutory functions. The Central Bank are a State body upon which a higher degree of independence has been conferred by this House than on any other State body because of the importance of ensuring that they act as they think fit in protecting the banking and currency systems. The original decision which was taken and announced last Friday week envisaged a contribution by the Central Bank, as is clear from the statement I made on that occasion but the timing and nature of the contribution by the Central Bank and the extent of the contribution is a matter for them. They made the decision announced yesterday on their own account and there was no question of the Government changing their position. From the beginning, the Government had envisaged that the Central Bank would make a contribution and it was a matter for the Central Bank to decide when they would announce the contribution and they did so independently. For that reason, I had to take issue with Deputy O'Kennedy in his absence——

The Minister for Finance announced it.

The Minister for Finance announced it but it was on the basis of a communication which he received from the Central Bank which conveyed a decision to the Government which the Central Bank took independently. I ask every Member of the House to accept that the Central Bank take all their decisions in matters of this kind independently, on their own initiative, without direction from the Government——

They also announce them.

The Central Bank, in consultations with the Government, in conveying this decision indicated that the announcement was one which could be made in this way. There is no question of that decision being other than an independent one by the bank taken in their own time, in their own way and to the extent that they, in their independent function, deemed necessary. I say sincerely to Deputy Haughey that it will do no good for Members of the Opposition to suggest other than that the Central Bank are independent in the exercise of their functions and I hope that Deputy Haughey will not make any such suggestion because it would not serve any good purpose. I know that Deputy Haughey has been anxious in all his utterances regarding this matter to serve the greater good of the country and he would be departing from what has been his practice in this affair up to now if he suggested, at this late stage, that the Central Bank were acting other than independently on this issue.

I have very little time so I hope you will pardon me if I speak rapidly. When I spoke earlier in this debate, I indicated that Fianna Fáil had three principal objectives in this affair, the principal one being the need to protect the interests of the taxpayers and to ensure that they would not be liable in any shape or form for major financial losses for which the taxpayer had no responsibility. We will be returning later to the other two objectives but, in respect of our principal objective, we have achieved our purpose. We were clear in our minds and trenchantly argued that, as this difficulty had arisen in the financial sector, it should be contained, dealt with and solved within that sector. We were totally opposed to there being any recourse to the Exchequer to make good the losses or to any imposition in the short or longer term, directly or indirectly, on the very hard pressed taxpayer.

Last Friday, I indicated specifically what was required, namely, the putting together under the direction of the Central Bank in exercise of its statutory responsibilities under section 6 in relation to banking and the public finances, a package which would involve, in whatever measures seemed appropriate, financial institutions which would meet the financial implications of the collapse of the Insurance Corporation of Ireland. That is now going to be done. The Government and the Central Bank have now decided to act precisely along the lines which we called for last Friday and I am not making any accusation about the independence of the Central Bank. What is extraordinary and what should not and cannot be sidestepped is the complete turn around by the Government that this represents. Only yesterday, the Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism outlined a different approach — an insurance approach — as one which should be and was being undertaken by the Government. Not alone that, he specifically rejected the adoption of the procedure which I had proposed and I wish to quote what he said in The Sunday Tribune on 24 March:

The suggestion by the Fianna Fáil leader, Mr. Haughey, of invoking the Central Bank Act to have convened a conference of the financial institutions rather than take the action we did would not have dealt with the problem. The section of the Act Mr. Haughey mentioned referred to the protection of the currency. There are three other points to be made about that suggestion. This was an insurance problem, not a banking one, and the Central Bank's powers relate to banking. Secondly, the Central Bank acts independently of the Government, it does not take instructions from them. Third, any such conference would have taken time to convene and it is extremely doubtful if the necessary confidentiality could have been preserved.

In those words, the Minister specifically ruled out the course of action which I proposed. The same report is given in the Sunday Independent of that day and there is no doubt that the Minister was crystal clear at that time that the suggestions I had made about the Central Bank intervention were not going to be adopted by the Government.

In his speech yesterday, the Minister, Deputy Bruton, clearly indicated that the insurance approach was the one to be adopted and that the taxpayer would be involved. Let us be absolutely clear in that regard. He specifically said that the taxpayer would be involved. He said that the compensation fund would be financed on a broad basis by a number of special arrangements involving Allied Irish Banks, the banking and insurance sectors and, if necessary, but only as a last resort, the Exchequer. The Exchequer was to be involved——

If necessary and only as a last resort.

This Government are the last resort.

(Interruptions.)

I have very little time and I would appreciate good manners when I am speaking on this very serious matter. Today, the Minister for Finance clearly said that there will be no recourse to the Exchequer. They are two separate and distinct statements by two different Ministers in the course of two days. There is another statement of the Minister to which I wish to refer the House as it has a bearing on this matter. In today's statement, the Minister said:

Yesterday's decision by the board of the Central Bank means that the Exchequer will not now be involved in funding the administration of ICI.

This clearly indicates that, before he made this speech and before the decision of the Central Bank was conveyed to us, the Exchequer was going to be involved but would not now be involved. Let us stop prevaricating about this. The Government started a process which would involve the taxpayer in the rescue operation and that has now been changed.

While we welcome the fact that the course of action we proposed to meet this situation has now been adopted and that the Government now accept that the taxpayer cannot and should not be made liable for the losses, we must ask why this course of action was not undertaken at the start or at least agreed to when I publicly put it forward last Friday. The change around by the Minister for Finance in the House this afternoon is in complete contradiction to his previous stance. There could be no clearer indication that the Government are incapable of handling a financial crisis of this order.

The nature and extent of the problem were known on Friday, 15 March and the possible repercussion and likely developments were also known. The Government in that situation with that knowledge decided to deal with it in a certain way and they persisted in that approach for practically two weeks. Now they have changed direction completely and undertaken a course of action which they previously stated was unsuitable and inappropriate. Such a change of course, such a radical turn around in midstream, indicates faulty judgment, which at this level is frightening.

I want to make a quick reference to another aspect of the Minister's speech, and this is a very serious matter. The Minister said today:

That brings me to the most recent development in this affair. Hitherto, the Central Bank's involvement in the problem has been at management level. Yesterday afternoon the Board of the Central Bank considered the matter at its meeting.

The clear implication in that statement is that the board of the Central Bank were not involved in the matter until yesterday and it was being dealt with at management level. I tell the Minister that I do not accept that, and if that is the version of events that he is trying to put across in this House it casts very serious doubts on the integrity of his approach to this whole matter.

Not at all.

I do not believe, and nobody in this House believes, that the Governor of the Central Bank would not have been involved and consulted in this matter from the very beginning. It is misleading of the Minister to try to suggest that it was dealt with at management level.

It was the first meeting of the board——

(Interruptions.)

The Minister has tried in those words to infer that the management were dealing with it and taking a certain attitude and the board changed that decision. I suggest that that is not acceptable. That is equivalent to misleading this House, because nobody in this House or anywhere else believes the Minister for Finance if he tries to say that the Governor of the Central Bank was not au fait with this matter and involved in it from the very start.

Do not get yourself excited.

I am getting excited because the Minister is misleading this House.

The Deputy is getting excited about something I never said.

As a responsible Opposition we sought to protect the interests of the people and the financial structures of this State and in doing so we resisted any temptation to be political. We must now make it clear however——

(Interruptions.)

——that our actions were not to be interpreted in any way as reflecting any indication of a belief by us of a capacity in this Government to handle this situation. I stated on behalf of my party at the outset of this debate that we would be voting against this legislation to indicate our opposition to the procedure that the Government had started because that procedure would have resulted in a burden being placed on the Irish taxpayer. As the statement from the Central Bank now indicates quite clearly, there will be no recourse to the Exchequer and, therefore to the taxpayer. Our demand has been met, our approach has been adopted and accordingly we see no point in opposing the legislation because we were doing so only to indicate that we were totally opposed to the taxpayer being involved in any way in picking up these losses. We have succeeded in our objective of protecting the taxpayer which this Government at the start did not intend to do. They have now been forced to do it by opposition in this House and by the overwhelming volume of public opinion on the matter.

I want to point out that the Central Bank has intervened in this situation. That has never happened before in the history of the Central Bank and we must all take account of that fact. We must also accept that the results of what has now taken place could be very far reaching. This Government have created an appalling situation, an appalling impression of muddling, confusion and change of course. Now apparently as a Government they have set their machine to work to create a certain impression, and we can gather from the interjections from the back benches that they are now going to try to put this latest development across in a certain political context. All right, let them proceed to do that if they wish; but they are dealing with national financial institutions and with a situation where trust and confidence are essential factors, and they are dealing with sensitive international financial markets where massive amounts of money can move with lightning rapidity.

That is precisely why we moved so quickly.

They should be careful about the way they attempt to put across and sell this latest development in this situation. What they have done so far has inspired no confidence in anybody in their capacity to handle a major financial crisis. They have changed horses in mid-stream——

(Interruptions.)

——and that is not the hallmark——

We moved immediately.

The more they shout the more I know I am getting home to them and proving my points.

Ladies and gentlemen, it sounds terrible on the intercom.

(Interruptions.)

Let me suggest, a Ceann Comhairle, that if it sounds terrible on the intercom you can solve that difficulty by attending in the House and listening personally.

I was appealing for order for the Deputy.

I have not much time, but I want to point out again that the approach which the Government adopted to this matter in the first instance was not the right approach, that what we suggested to them early on has now been adopted by them, but in the meantime they had given the impression of a Government who are not clear in their minds about how to handle a major situation, who are capable of a change of direction at a crucial, critical stage in a major crisis. That sort of Government do not inspire confidence. I appeal to the Government, now that this new development has taken place, to handle it carefully and sensitively because they are dealing with a situation which is potentially dangerous, nationally and internationally. I tell them not to try to get some short term political advantage out of this situation because they will not get it but they may do enormous damage to this country and its creditworthiness and credibility.

We are again demonstrating our seriousness and our responsible approach to this matter by not voting against this legislation. We want to show to the world outside and to the general public that we are going to give this Government as much public support as we can, but they have made a serious mistake in not accepting the suggestion that we put to them in the first instance and now accepting it at this late stage. We must all stand back now and see how the situation develops from here on.

Is it agreed that the Bill be now read a Second Time?

May I make a remark?

No, I am afraid not.

It does not make any difference as far as the Exchequer is concerned because the money which was paid by the Central Bank to the Exchequer last year will not now be paid to the Central Bank. We have heard talk about misleading the House, but everybody is misleading the public because the taxpayer will still have to pay.

I am putting the question: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time".

Will those who are demanding a division please rise in their places?

Deputies Tomás Mac Giolla, Proinsias De Rossa and Gregory-Independent rose.

As fewer than ten Deputies have risen, in accordance with Standing Orders I declare the question carried. The names of those demanding a division will be entered in the Journal of the proceedings of the Dáil.

When is it proposed to take Committee Stage?

Committee Stage ordered for Friday, 29 March 1985.
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