It would be irresponsible of this House to let this Bill through without a critical analysis of the history of B & I, and of its present state. It is fortuitous that, as former Minister for Tourism and Transport and for Communications, I have been asked to shadow this Bill through the House today. I suppose no one other than the Minister is in a better position to comment on the history of B & I than I. The Minister in his speech referred to the present problem of B & I and the latest explanation or rationale that exists within B & I for that state.
However, there are three main reasons for supporting the Bill. The first is that to close the company would cost the Exchequer a great deal more in the short term than to keep them going. Secondly, there is, in my opinion, a strategic national need for an Irish presence on the cross-Channel ferries. Thirdly, the B & I group of unions have contributed very positively to the salvage package recently negotiated for the company.
Notwithstanding these factors, the B & I Bill represents a mysterious black hole into which tens of millions of taxpayers' pounds have sunk without trace. For over 20 years now with an uncanny consistency B & I have never reached either the annual targets set for them or the projection for end of year outturns which the company make at the beginning of each year and, of course, each year a new explanation is given for the missed targets which in turn decorates the annual accounts as "exceptional expenditure'. The latest rationale for missed targets, as the Minister said, is the air fares competition. Management and unions alike are seeking refuge under the wings of lower air fares as an explanation for the fact that B & I's returns for 1987 are almost £20 million worse, in my calculations, than targeted, although this is obscured in the Minister's presentation. My calculations are that the targets which were for £500,000 profit in 1987 are now, when you add up all the different aspects of what the Minister said, something like a £19 million loss. They are trying to rationalise and blame air fares competition and ipso facto account for a £20 million deviation in their outturn for 1987 from that targeted.
I am culpable for the latest plight of B & I in the minds of both management and unions in B & I, but seeking outside scapegoats to blame has always been a hallmark of B & I, whereas in almost all cases the problems have been internal. In relation to the effects of lower air and sea fares on B & I's revenues, the Department's Estimate while I was Minister was effectively less than £6 million per annum. I made it clear at the time that the Government were prepared to adjust their annual targets accordingly on the basis that the overall economic benefits of lower access fares clearly outweighed their drawbacks for B & I. I am glad that that point has already been made by the Minister.
B & I cannot credibly ascribe a £20 million deviation from the 1987 target to air fare reductions. This is heavily emphasised by the fact that the other ferry companies serving Irish ports are all private and profit-making even after the air and sea fares revolution. Would Sealink still be on the Irish Sea route if it were not profitable to do so? They have nobody to blame or give them free equity. Would Belfast Ferries still serve the long Belfast-Liverpool route if it were not profitable to do so? They have nobody to give them free equity. Would Irish Ferries or Brittany Ferries still be serving the Ireland-France routes if it were not profitable to do so? Of course they would not. They are still making profits even after the air fare revolution and they have no scapegoat like me to blame. They have had to react competitively, to perform, to make profits, not just since air fares were reduced but for all those years when B & I were consistently losing money. I have described it already as a mysterious black hole.
Why then do B & I not make profits on their routes when all other ferry companies serving Irish ports make profits? With the exception of the Cork-Swansea company just set up, no other company get any subsidy or free equity. B & I are the last subsidised shipping company in these islands and they still manage to make enormous losses. Why do they not make profits? How then can they seek refuge in the air fares revolution when all other companies have managed to survive, make profits and continue in being even though they have no uncle in the Department of Finance to come out with another chit for £4 million?
To put it in a more comparative context, B & I were one of eight State companies for whom I was responsible when I became Minister for Communications in December 1982. At that time only one of those companies, Aer Rianta, were in profit and a tiny one at that. Major structural and accountancy improvements, major new approaches in the State sector turned the State sector round. That was one of the great achievements of the previous Government. Every one of those companies today are in profit, some of them substantially so. Aer Lingus, Aer Rianta, CIE, BTE, Great Southern Hotels, An Post and RTE have all been turned round and are doing well. Only one, B & I, have not reacted to the same restructuring and, even more, the same efforts of the Minister and the Department. Indeed, we went further with B & I than with any of the other companies. We want to exceptional lengths to bring in a top rate manager from outside at above Devlin rates. As the Minister has said, £38 million was committed to investment. The ships were overhauled, restructured and made completely modern and attractive. New companies were brought in to run the dutyfree shops but despite all these exceptional movements, this exceptional investment, restructuring of the board of management and new controls, B & I's performance was never worse.
The three year agreement with the unions is a ray of hope but poor industrial relations, at least in the sense of strikes, have never been a contributing factor to the company's perpetual problems. I know what the Minister has said about the ridiculous strikes that have taken place in the past year or so, particularly by the officers. The history of the B & I has been one of continuous losses way above targets set by the company itself, but bad industrial relations resulting in strikes was never a problem.
I have studied the question long and hard and I still do not understand where or what is the black hole of the B & I. It is a mystery to me that this company can suck in so many millions of pounds when all the other companies in the State sector and all the other ferry companies are making profits.
I believe the passage of this Bill today is advisable and necessary but for the reasons I have stated, I think it only right that Dáil Éireann should seek a final, independent and professional analysis of every nook and cranny of this tormented company. If we do not, the chances are that we will have yet another B & I equity Bill before this year is out, and certainly as an annual feature of the legislative programme.
I hope the Minister takes on board my proposal. I know the Oireachtas Committee on Semi-State Bodies have been examining the B & I in the way that they examine other companies, but I have some prescience as to the sort of information that is being fed to the committee by management and unions blaming all the latest failures on air fares which is totally absurd, especially in the light of the reaction and performance of the private companies who have to deal with the competition just as they have and have remained profitable.
I do not know if we should express the desire that this will be the last B & I Bill of this kind before the House, because there is some major problem in the B & I that we have not identified yet. We have to seek some way of limiting the exposure to risk of the Exchequer in the future, laying more emphasis than the Minister did on the fact that the future of the B & I will be dictated not from Dáil Éireann or the Department of Tourism and Transport but from within the B & I itself.
The Minister said that the Government alone cannot guarantee the future of the B & I. I would go much further and say that the Government cannot guarantee the future of the B & I. The only people who can guarantee its future are the B & I people themselves. In order to restrict the exposure to risk of the Exchequer I proposed — unfortunately it was not accepted by the Department of Finance at the time — that we would create an operating subsidiary to the B & I which would own the assets and be responsible for that part of the debts which equalled the assets, so at last they would have a one to one geared balance sheet, and if they wanted more investment they would have to justify it in the gilt markets or in the equity markets just as Sealink, Irish Ferries and Belfast Ferries have to do; the Exchequer would then take on responsibility for the holding company's debts. The exposure of the Exchequer would be limited and it would be absolutley clear and enshrined in legislation that if further funds were needed by the B & I they would have to be found in the equity markets. Unfortunately, that was not accepted. To my astonishment £20 million was agreed as an initial investment in the B & I, and tranches in subsequent years of £6 million each, giving a total of £38 million. Even after that massive investment we have losses beyond the bounds of reasonable explanation. Here again we have the Minister proposing yet another tranche of Exchequer subsidy, because that is what it is. We call it equity but in fact it is subsidy, and we will continue to have B & I Bills of this nature. I predict that we will have another before the year is out because the B & I will have run out of money. We will have one every year unless we take some more decisive steps.
It has become the custom in the western world in recent years for people to support the concept of privatisation as an ideology. Likewise there is a group very strongly of the view that all privatisation is wrong and that State enterprise is right no matter what. I do not belong to either of those camps. I do believe there is a major continuing role for State enterprise. As I said many times when I was Minister, the biggest enemies of State enterprise are often those who are its strongest adherents, refusing to co-operate with obviously needed restructuring and new practices. In 1982 there was a major crisis throughout the State sector. It has been said that there have been very significant changes in trade union attitudes and none better illustrated than in the case of the B & I. But there is still an ideological belief that certain things just have to be owned by the State and that to do anything else is somehow wrong or regressive or somehow antisocial. It is that sort of thinking that has consigned many of the our State enterprises to sure failure. Any enterprise, private or public, needs to be able to acquire and dispose of assets depending on developments. It often makes sense to realise gains from previous decisions, to dispose of assets that have gained in value and to provide much needed money for the company. Much of this is still resisted by some on the ideological left but these are matched in every way by those on the ideological right who want to privatise no matter what.
In the case of the B & I there is a very strong case for saying that this should be the last tranche of free capital that this House is prepared to approve for this company. There has to be a decisive new beginning. I suggest that this be done by setting up an operating subsidiary that owns the assets and has the responsibility for a like amount of the debts, the Exchequer to take on responsibility for the rest of the debts to be remitted over a period of years. That is the only way we have any hope of bringing certain realities home to the B & I or of ensuring that they act competitively with the other companies on the Irish scene, namely, Sealink and Belfast Car Ferries, Brittany Ferries and Irish Ferries, all of whom are operating profitably notwithstanding the air fares and the sea fares revolution of which I am happy to have been the author. I believe that the overall economic benefits of cheap access routes far outweigh any small drawbacks in the B & I. Even if we do not look at it from the broad economic point of view but from the State sector point of view, Aer Rianta are a booming company whose profits have been greatly enhanced by the increase in air travel. Aer Lingus, in the transport sector, are a booming company even though they thought the liberalisation of air fares would be the end of the world. Even in the limited State sector, the overall policy is correct and beneficial but in the wider economic area it is even more beneficial.
When the Minister comes to reply I would like him to outline some of the things he did not outline in his opening speech. What are the present projections for B & I's performance this year? What profit or loss does he expect them to make after this tranche investment? What is the outlook for B & I in terms of car and passenger numbers for this year? What is the present position in relation to their freight performance for this year? Perhaps the Minister could give us some sketch of how he sees the company developing in 1989 and 1990 not only in relation to the profit and loss account of B & I but also their balance sheet. What are his future plans for the company? Does he rule out another B & I equity Bill this year? Will he come to the Dáil with a B & I restructuring Bill along the lines I have suggested? The House deserves to know what the medium term outlook is for this company. I hope the Minister will give us clear replies to the questions I have raised and the underlying assumptions which give rise to those projections.
One of the consistent facts about the B & I is that their projections are never realised. That has been the case since 1965 when they were acquired by the State. I think the officials in the Department of Communications, as a rule of thumbs multiply by two, add ten, and take their first thoughts away. That is the way it is with B & I. I remember when we announced the four year investment package of £38 million and the bringing in of Mr. Alex Spain as Chairman and Chief Executive, B & I sources leaked to the media how unfortunate this was as we were heading for a greatly improved loss of £3.9 million compared with £7.1 million last year. They were buying this until I pointed to the history of the preceding five years of B & I's projections and the actual outturn, and that year turned out no different. The losses were not £3.9 million; they were several times that figure.
In conclusion I would like to say that this Bill is a holding operation. Clearly it is not the last we will hear of the B & I this year and we may hear more about them in the next session. Obviously, the Minister will not disclose his plans prematurely but he has a responsibility, in asking for these funds, to let us have some outline of the direction of his thoughts on how he will tackle and attempt to stop the haemorrhage of funds to plug the black hole which the B & I represent and which I tried valiantly to plug but did not succeed.