When we adjourned on the previous day, I was discussing the meaning of the term "lawful authority" in section 8 (1) and (2). It appears that the "lawful authority" must constitute public duty in the narrowest possible sense. If seems, for example, that an employer cannot authorise his employees to carry offensive weapons simply by getting them to contract to do so. The other defence contained in section 8 (1) and (2) is the defence of reasonable excuse. The defence of reasonable excuse is one that is readily understandable and can be appreciated by most people. The criterion for a reasonable excuse is whether a reasonable man would think it excuseable to carry a weapon in the circumstances. That is the circumstances. That is the criterion for the test of reasonable excuse. Presumably — and we can only anticipate what will happen — the courts will construe this term as it was construed in the United Kingdom. It may not be enough that the intentions of the accused were lawful. The question that will arise in most cases is whether self defence is a reasonable excuse.
In the United Kingdom case of Evans v. Hughes in 1972 it was held that self defence will be a reasonable excuse where, in the words of the courts, there is an eminent particular threat affecting the circumstances in which the weapon was carried. The question then arises as to whether there is a distinction between a person being under constant threat and a person who is threatened intermittently. Questions will arise about such people as security guards who are armed with batons or say, taxi drivers who carry weapons for their own protection. Perhaps the Minister, when replying to the Second Stage debate, will advert to how this defence will apply to those people.
There are a few other points I want to raise briefly before I conclude. In section 8 (2) (b), in relation to a weapon which is "made or adapted" for causing injury, there are examples of cases in the neighbouring jurisdiction where a weapon which was not made for the purpose of causing offence to somebody is accidentally adapted in such a way that it would fall within that category. The example has been given of a bottle which is accidentally broken. Do the words "made or adapted" include a situation where a weapon is in somebody's possession which has been accidentally adapted for use to injure, incapacitate etc? Terminology which runs through various sections of the Bill is that a person has with him a weapon of offence. I presume that the term "with him" means he knowingly has it with him. There is United Kingdom case law which I will not go into—I will reserve my comments until we are on Committee Stage — which would suggest that there is some doubt about this. I presume that the word "knowingly" will be interpreted in the Bill.
The term "public place" is very widely defined in section 8 (1). It is specifically designed to include various events such as a discotheque, football match, bazaar, carnival etc. Deputy McCartan raised the point that there would be a difficulty of interpretation about what constitutes a carnival, a bazaar, etc. I do not share Deputy McCartan's pessimism on that score because the section goes on to say "or other similar place". If something does not fall exactly within the category of the place described it will fall within the terminology of "or other similar place".
It is correct to distinguish between public places, per se, and public places such as carnivals, football matches, etc. where people are congregated for the purpose of entertainment. The only point I would query is what types of weapon should a person be allowed to carry into a crowded situation. I am not happy that the knife or other pointed weapon which a person is prohibited from carrying under section 8 (1) is sufficient. That should be extended to any type of weapon because any type of weapon can cause injury. I have already dealt with that point in some detail and I do not want to go back over it again.
I also share Deputy McCartan's views on the question of the folding pocket knife. I am not happy that the folding pocket knife should be excluded from the category of weapons which are included in this legislation.
Section 8 (3) deals with the case of a person who is carrying a weapon which has an innocent origin and which does not have a destructive use. If a person is carrying such a weapon in a public place he must carry it with the intention to injure, incapacitate, intimidate etc. I take it from the wording of the section that the intention must be to incapacitate, injure, etc. at some time in the future. That can give rise to unexpected and anomalous results. Take, for example, a case of a person from Limerick who is convinced that he is owed money by somebody in Dublin. He leaves Limerick by train — a train is a public place for the purposes of the legislation — carrying a pocket knife or a butcher's knife with the intention of intimidating the person in Dublin so as to secure what he feels he is owed. On the way from Limerick to Dublin he is guilty of an offence under this section. If he meets the man in Dublin, gets the money, does not have to produce the knife and he is on the way home with the knife, at that stage, he is not guilty of an offence, unless the knife happens to be a flick knife, as defined in the Bill, in which case he is guilty both on the way to Dublin and on the way back. I accept we cannot write legislation to cover every eventuality. Some Deputies have made the suggestion that perhaps we should adopt a simpler approach to this whole matter and ban the carrying of all weapons of offence in all situations except where the person carrying the weapon can establish lawful authority or reasonable excuse. I would not go that far but I am giving that example to illustrate the interpretation which the courts put on this legislation and which can give rise to anomalous situations in certain circumstances.
Section 10 deals with a situation where a person, while committing or appearing to be about to commit an offence, or in the course of a dispute or fight, produces a weapon. Does the word "produce" cover the situation where that person picks a weapon off the floor or accepts a weapon handed to him by somebody else? Does he need to have the weapon on him and then produce it in the sense in which the word is normally used?
As I said, under section 10 if a person has a weapon with him he is already guilty if he is intent in a public place on causing injury, incapacitating, etc. However, if it is impossible for the prosecution to establish that intent and he produces the weapon in the circumstances outlined in section 10, he can also commit an offence. Consequently, section 10 is welcome in that it is designed to close a possible gap in the law. However, I ask the Minister to comment when replying to Second Stage on why the section states that in order to be convicted, the accused will have to produce the weapon in a manner likely unlawfully to intimidate another person. It appears to me that if a person produces a weapon by committing, or appearing to be about to commit, an offence or in the course of a fight or dispute, he should be guilty. I am not happy that the wording "in a manner likely unlawfully to intimidate another person" will do anything except to provide loopholes, which I know is not the Minister's intention.
I also query the part of the section which says that he will be guilty of an offence if he produces the weapon in the course of a fight or a dispute. It should also cover the situation where he produces the weapon in anticipation of a fight or dispute. The Minister will probably make the point that this is covered in section 8 but I should like him to comment further.
Sections 13 and 15 of the Bill give powers to the Garda to arrest and search. Section 13 allows a garda to arrest without warrant anybody he reasonably suspects to be in the act of committing an offence under sections 8, 9 or 10. Section 8 concerns possession of weapons in various circumstances. Section 9 covers a person in possession of a weapon while trespassing. However, section 10 concerns a person producing a weapon and, consequently, the question must arise as to whether that terminology is suitable for cases covered by it. It is just a drafting point and perhaps the Minister will examine it between now and Committee Stage.
Section 15 allows a member of the Garda Síochána to search a person if he suspects that that person has a weapon covered by section 8 in his possession in certain circumstances. This will apply where a breach of the peace is occurring. Secondly, he has such power where he has reasonable grounds for believing that a breach of the peace may occur. Thirdly, he has that power where he has reasonable grounds for believing that a breach of the peace has occured. However, as I interpret the section, a garda will have that power only where a number of people are congregated at one of the places mentioned in section 8(1) (a) such as a discotheque, cinema, etc. and the breach of the peace has occurred, is occurring or may occur, in the place while the people were congregated there. At what stage does the garda cease to have this power? For example, if people have gone home from a football match and the terraces are empty, but if something happened earlier at the match and the garda suspects a certain individual whom he wants to search later in the evening, does the section cover that person? In the case of breach of the peace before the match takes place and before people begin to congregate, does a garda have the power to search anyone he suspects will engage in conduct likely to lead to a breach of the peace? Whatever about extending the power of search indefinitely, it should be wide enough to cover a situation where a garda anticipates a breach of the peace and is able to apprehend the person before the event to which the section relates takes place.
I should also like guidance on the question of "a number of people". Would it be as few as two people and would the term "congregated" be appropriate to just two people? These points should be discussed on Committee Stage and I do not want to labour them now.
I mentioned the question of the terminology in the different sections in relation to a person having a weapon with him. If a person goes to a disco or a football match and knows he can readily lay his hands on a weapon, is it covered by the Bill? Does he have to be carrying the weapon? Will the Minister reply to that point? Section 7 deals with a situation where a person discharges a firearm being reckless as to whether it leads to certain consequences. We had a long discussion on "recklessness" in the debate on the Larcency Bill. I made the point — and I do not want to repeat it at any length — that there is no such thing as "recklessness"per se. The courts have interpreted “recklessness” in various ways. Broadly, it falls into two categories, subjective and objective. It is subjective when the person has to advert to a situation and objective when the person does not necessarily have to advert to any danger. Nothing has to enter his mind but he will be guilty if a reasonable man would not have acted in that way in those circumstances. The English courts have divided quite dramatically on the question of whether “recklessness” in criminal legislation means subjective or objective recklessness. I do not want that sort of division in Irish law and I suggest that the Minister insert another subsection to section 7 containing a definition of “recklessness” which will make it quite clear whether he is talking about subjective or objective recklessness. If he is including such a definition, I ask him to make the definition subjective as I am opposed to the idea of importing civil law concepts to criminal law.
Deputies referred to section 14 at some length. The controversial part of the section is the provision that gives a peace commissioner the right to issue a warrant to the Garda to enter a person's property, by force if necessary. The section states that if a justice of the District Court or a peace commissioner is satisfied on the sworn information of a member of the Garda Síochána that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence ... etc. There may be constitutional difficulties in giving a peace commissioner that sort of power. The Minister will be aware that the courts have reserved judicial functions under the Constitution in interpreting various situations as to whether the power being exercised by any administrative authority is judicial. They have jealously guarded their own powers and exclusive rights in this regard. It might solve the problem and get away from all the constitutional argument if the section were to read "if a justice of the District Court, or if he is unavailable, a peace commissioner". The onus should be on the Garda to seek a mandate to enter a person's property from a justice of the District Court in the first instance. If the Justice of the District Court is unavailable and the matter is urgent, then — and only then — can he refer to a peace commissioner.
I spoke at length on this legislation the last day it was debated in the House and I do not want to go over the same ground as some of my colleagues want to speak. I have raised various points, some of them might have been more appropriate on Committee Stage, but I look forward to a comprehensive reply from the Minister at the end of Second Stage.