I will now ask the Minister for Tourism, Transport and Communications, Deputy Brennan, to move that the Bill be now read a Second Time.
B & I Line Bill, 1991: Second Stage.
On a point of order, Sir, I have in my possession a document dated 5 December, which is an advisory note to the Minister and which casts the most grave reflection on the manner in which the Minister has handled this legislation and the proposed sale——
Please allow the debate to proceed. The Deputy will have an opportunity to state his grievance in the matter later, I will not hear it now.
I appreciate——
I call on the Minister to move that the Bill be now read a Second Time.
This is an important point of order.
Deputies will have ample time later.
The Deputy has asked to speak on a point of order.
Deputy McCartan, do not intrude in that manner. It is not a point of order. I have asked the Minister to move that the Bill be now read a Second Time.
With respect, Sir——
Resume your seat, Deputy McCartan.
I am entitled to raise a point of order.
Deputy McCartan, do not ignore the Chair.
The Deputy is entitled to raise a point of order.
I have heard it. It was not a point of order and the Deputy knows it was not.
I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
There was a request to make a point of order. We are entitled to make a point of order.
This is obviously a concerted effort by certain Members over there to disrupt the discussion of this Bill.
I have a document which contains advice from the Government's senior counsel, Mr. John Cooke, which implies that the Minister went along with this sale without referring to the normal competitive procedures——
Deputy Rabbitte, allow the debate to proceed. It is not a point of order.
——and I am entitled to raise this matter without you, Sir, casting reflections on my motives.
Let the debate proceed.
I am putting it to the Minister that he went against the advice he got——
The Deputy must resume his seat. Resume your seat, Deputy, or leave the House. This debate will proceed in an orderly fashion.
A Cheann Comhairle——
Deputy Byrne, I will hear no more of this matter.
A point of order is being raised.
No, not now.
Why not? Why not now?
I have called on the Minister to move this Bill.
Deputy Rabbitte wishes to raise a point of order. The Chair said, "not now." Why?
Resume your seat, Deputy.
I should like to raise a point of order.
No, not now. Resume your seat.
Why not now?
This is clear obstruction.
It is not.
I call on the Minister.
In March last year, when the House had before it the B & I Line Act, 1990——
Am I not permitted to say anything?
No, Deputy resume your seat.
A Cheann Comhairle, this is unbelieveable.
I am telling the Deputy to resume his seat, for the second time.
——I announced my intention——
Is the Chair not prepared to listen to my point of order?
Resume your seat.
This is outrageous.
It is outrageous.
In March last year, when the House had before it the B & I Line Act, 1990, I announced my intention——
May I put it into the record of the House that in 1953——
This is gross disorder.
It is a different point of order.
This is gross disorder.
It is a different point of order.
This is gross disorder. I will hear no points of order now.
The Taoiseach on 3 December——
Deputy Rabbitte, please. I must ask Deputy Rabbitte to leave the House.
A Deputy
He will love that.
This is outrageous.
It is outrageous Deputy, I grant you that.
It is outrageous that the Minister negotiated the sale of the B & I without coming to the House to tell us.
In March last year when the House had before it the B & I Line Bill, 1990, I announced my intention of carrying out an examination of the future options for B & I. My main objective was to determine how soon the company's dependence on Exchequer financial support could be ended, while having regard for the importance of our access transport services, employment and expansion in the medium term.
That was a joke, the Minister had already agreed to sell off the company.
I can assure the House that a very substantial amount of work has been——
The deal had been done.
Deputy McCartan may not interrupt from a sitting position. He is being continuously disorderly. I have to take note of that.
I do not mean any disrespect to the Chair, a Cheann Comhairle, but Deputy Rabbitte did seek to raise a point of order——
This is quite intolerable, Deputy. If you rise again I shall ask you to leave, and I shall insist upon it.
I hope to God the Chair will not take that sort of action.
The bad deal being done to the taxpayer is a good deal more important. The management and staff of B & I are outraged by what the Minister has done.
Deputy Rabbitte, please.
I can assure the House——
The company had been sold before this Bill came to the House.
(Interruptions.)
Even in Eastern Europe one gets freedom of speech.
Deputy Byrne, please. This is completely disorderly.
The Minister is making a fool of the House and of the workers in B & I.
This is a democratic assembly. The right of free speech prevails here and I will not tolerate any Member being obstructed in the manner that is being done to the Minister now. The interruptions will cease forthwith.
The House is being misled.
Deputy McCartan, I think you should leave. If you cannot listen to the Minister in quietude, please leave the House.
I can assure the House that a very substantial amount of work has been carried out in the intervening period. The result of this work is reflected in the Bill before us. The essential purpose of the Bill is to provide for matters connected with the sale of B & I to the Irish Continental Group plc.
The basic terms of the sale are that ICG will, when all conditions relating to the sale of B & I have been completed, pay £8.5 million to the Minister for Finance in return for the entire issued share capital of B & I. Prior to the sale, the Government will remove accumulated bank and other debt from B & I's balance sheet amounting to £35 million. The Government may decide to do this either by injecting the requisite amount of additional share capital in the company to enable the debt to be paid off as provided for in section 2 or by assuming direct responsibility for the debt as provided for in section 3.
Section 3 also provides that the aggregate amount arising under sections 2 and 3 will not exceed £36 million. This maximum amount includes a contingency figure of £1 million over and above the £35 million Exchequer investment envisaged to provide for any subsequent adjustment which may be required in exceptional circumstances.
Before dealing with the events of the past few months, I believe it is appropriate I should devote some time to the history of the State's involvement with the B & I. The British and Irish Steampacket Company Ltd., now the B & I plc, was acquired by the State from the private sector in 1965. The Minister for Finance is the beneficial owner of all of the shares in the company. The main objective of the acquisition of the B & I was to ensure an adequate level of capacity and to maintain competition in sea transport between Ireland and the UK. That objective is as valid today as it was then but State ownership is no longer the only way to achieve it. It is noteworthy that B & I 's main competitor, Sealink, was sold some years back by British Rail and has more recently been acquired by the Swedish-based Stena group.
The B & I were mandated in 1965 to operate on strictly commercial lines. The company's core objective was to provide and develop a modern, efficient, profitable, national and comprehensive transport system to and from Ireland. However, the shareholder — that is, the Minister for Finance — had to inject equity into the company in 1971 and 1972, and has injected further equity each year from 1976 onwards for working capital purposes. Since their acquisition in 1965, total Exchequer equity injections in the B & I have amounted to £106 million, of which £53 million has been paid in since 1985.
Despite a major financial restructuring programme implemented by the B & I during 1986, involving substantial Exchequer funding and staff reductions, the company's position continued to deteriorate.
Not true.
In December 1986 the board of the B & I submitted further major rationalisation proposals to the then Minister for Communications. This was followed in February 1987 by a request from the board for additional equity from the Exchequer to allow the company to continue to meet their trading commitments.
In May, 1987 the Minister directed the board to submit to him as soon as possible an alternative plan of action aimed at achieving a substantial reduction in the company's losses.
Which they did and the Minister ignored.
Following intensive negotiations with all of the unions concerned the board of the B & I presented a plan of action to the Government on 11 December 1987, which plan had "across the board" support from the company's workforce.
On the basis of the plan of action and of the company's financial performance, additional equity injections of £6.2 million, £4.8 million and £6 million respectively were made by the Exchequer in the years 1988, 1989 and 1990.
Pending a final decision on B & I's future, the Government did not approve the injection of further equity into the company in 1991. In the absence of equity, the Government decided on 11 December 1990 that it was necessary, however, to guarantee the minimum borrowing required to enable the company to continue trading and thus avoid liquidation. The amount of B & I loans subject to Government guarantees at 31 December 1990 stood at £14.7 million. Since then, a further short term facility of up to £8 million has been guaranteed by the Government in 1991. This cash was needed by the company to meet their commitments, including interest and other charges, despite realising a before interest charges trading profit of more than £2 million. The total amount of B & I borrowing guaranteed by the State at 31 December 1991 will be approximately £21.4 million. All guarantees will cease following the sale of the company.
There has been much comment on the improved operating performance by the B & I and increased carryings under the plan.
Not by the Minister.
I have consistently acknowledged that there was an improvement.
Tell us when.
Deputies, interruptions should cease. Restrain yourselves.
Indeed, at a meeting with the board of B & I this morning I repeated this and undertook to place it on the record of the House today. Let me now do so.
They had to drag it out of the Minister.
I want to acknowledge and publicly thank the board, the management and all of the staff of the company for their efforts in making the plan of action work.
What thanks?
Nobody appreciates more than I do the very difficult circumstances in which they have had to work over the past five years.
Then the Minister sacked 250 of them.
They did so in a very professional manner. However, the fact remains that despite reported operating profits of £1.8 million, £2.8 million and £2.3 million in the past three years the company needed £6.2 million, £4.8 million and £6 million cash from the Exchequer to stay in business.
The Minister is comparing apples with oranges.
The company are simply not generating enough cash to finance their operations without substantial continuing equity injections from the Exchequer. It is also clear that B & I have been unable to generate the resources they need for the renewal of their fleet, which will be necessary if they are to remain competitive and maintain market share. The chairman, on behalf of his board, made these points to me on a few occasions.
It was against this background that I launched the study of the options for the future of B & I to which I have already referred.
In May 1990. I received a submission from the board of B & I setting out options for the future of the company under various scenarios. The submission made it clear that the status quo could not be maintained. Further rationalisation and substantial job reductions were necessary to eliminate the unprofitable areas of activity and achieve the improvements in efficiency necessary to enable the company survive. The board advised that it was necessary to gear the operations of the company for the increasingly competitive conditions in the marketplace for both tourism and freight and highlighted the need for a balance sheet restructuring as part of any long term solution. The benefits that would be achieved from economies of scale by a merger of the activities of the company with another shipping company were also highlighted together with the potential that such would provide for financing future development needs.
I indicated to the board that I would seek independent advice to ensure that every possibility was fully explored.
But the Minister did not explore them.
In August 1990, I commissioned Stockes Kennedy Crowley Corporate Finance Limited to advise on the best and most economic means of terminating Exchequer support for B & I at the earliest possible time having regard to the need for adequate capacity and competition in the provision of passenger and freight shipping services to and from Ireland.
Provided they sold ICG.
The report from SKC came to broadly similar conclusions as the report from the board of the B & I on the realistic options which were available to meet the objectives as outlined.
The consultants examined the feasibility of four key options for the future of the company. These were: continuation of the status quo; redevelopment of the company with major capital investment; liquidation of the company or sale of the company.
Having assessed the feasibility and financial implications of each of these options, the consultants came out strongly in favour of disposal of the B & I as the best option. They were of the opinion that the sale of B & I would have a positive effect on access transport services in a situation where the purchaser would bring financial and operational strength resulting in greater competition on Irish Sea routes. They also believed a sale would secure the future employment of the majority of the company's employees.
Following consideration of the consultants' report in September 1990 the Government decided that the consultants should be requested to explore the level of interest which existed in the international shipping market for the acquisition of B & I.
SKC had extensive discussions with a number of interested parties.
ICG and ICG.
A prerequisite in all cases was that the State would assume responsibility for most or all of the company's substantial long term debt because it quickly became clear there was no prospect of effecting a sale unless the Government agreed to take over the company's debate. A significant reduction in the workforce was also an integral part of each of these proposals.
Before finalising their recommendations, and at my request, SKC also had discussions with the management of the B & I who had submitted a proposal for a staff/management buy-out of the company.
The Minister met them very late in the day.
Having considered all of the offers made by the interested parties, the consultants strongly recommended that the Government should pursue the offer of Irish Continental Group plc, which trades as "Irish Ferries". In their view, this would offer a firm prospect of ensuring a strong strategic shipping line, under the Irish flag, of sufficient scale to compete internationally.
The Government decided on 16 January 1991 to proceed with negotiations for the sale of the B & I to Irish Continental Group plc. A Memorandum of Agreement for the sale by the Minister for Finance of the entire share capital of B & I to ICG was signed on 28 February, 1991. A clause in the agreement provided that it would lapse if, for whatever reason, the sale was not completed by 16 August 1991.
Following the signing of the agreement, ICG had a comprehensive due diligence exercise carried out on B & I. This led to further complex and protracted negotiations with my advisers on a range of additional items in respect of which ICG had sought compensation.
ICG also entered into extensive negotiations with the B & I unions with a view to reaching a comprehensive agreement on rationalisation and work practices prior to completion of the sale.
That is not true, there was consultation but no negotiations.
It is pure fiction.
However, I regret to say that negotiations with the unions took much longer than was anticipated. By 16 August 1991, a share purchase agreement had not been concluded and the necessary enabling legislation had not been enacted. Accordingly, the Memorandum of Agreement with ICG expired on 16 August 1991. Further detailed discussions took place with ICG after 16 August. While progress was made, the expired Memorandum of Agreement was not replaced by any new legal agreement.
While discussions were continuing with ICG during September, I received representations from the Chairman of B & I, acting on behalf of independent board directors, to the effect that in their view the terms of the proposed sale to ICG did not represent good value. They recommended that in view of the Government's intention to proceed with the sale of the company the way should be opened once more to competitive bids. The Chairman of the B & I Board advised me that, given a decision to sell now at the best price available, their advice was that fair value is whatever is the best price that can be obtained in the market.
That misrepresents the position.
At the same time, my advisers became aware that a consortium of B & I management and staff, together with their Danish backers, were anxious to make a revised offer for the company. On 2 October my advisers had informal discussions with the Danish backers who indicated the type of offer they would support. They indicated they would need two weeks to make a final decision.
After they had been here a month and the Minister would not let them see the company.
Approximately, one week later Mr. Blaesbjerg and some colleagues, together with B & I management, met with SKC Corporate Finance Ltd. They asked, inter alia, for permission to carry out a due diligence exercise on the B & I. As I had not made a decision at that stage whether to re-open the tendering process I refused Mr. Blaesbjerg's team access to commercially sensitive information on B & I. On 14 October I asked the Secretary of my Department to obtain from the B & I management consortium within seven days an indication of the type of bid they would make for the company. I obtained this on 21 October.
I would emphasise that up to this date there had been no trade union involvement in the MSBO consortium. However, when the B & I group of unions requested that they be given an opportunity, in conjunction with the MSBO consortium, to prepare a proposal for the acquisition of the company, I agreed to allow them two weeks to do so.
It took ICG nine months.
I can tell the House I did so reluctantly as we had already been through an exhaustive trawl of the international shipping market and a competitive tendering process for the sale of the company.
Blarney, and the Minister knows it.
The fact that I agreed to re-open the process was in deference to the views of the chairman and the independent directors.
The Minister's mind was made up.
More importantly, it was a major concession on my part to the management and the trade unions.
These are the concessions.
These are the facts. So, let me now reject the view that I used the MSBO to get ICG to increase their bid.
That is precisely what the Minister did.
Both Irish Continental Group and a consortium of B & I management and staff together with their Danish backers were invited on 25 October to submit fully comprehensive offers within a two week deadline ending on 8 November 1991.
Following requests for an extension from the management-staff buy-out — or MSBO — consortium, the deadline was extended first until 15 November and then for a further week until 22 November 1991. As a result of the collision involving the m.v. Kilkenny, I agreed to give the MSBO consortium a further extension until 28 November. Offers were finally received on that date from both the consortium and Irish Continental Group. A further period was subsequently allowed for clarification of the offers. In all, over five weeks were allowed. Both bidders were allowed this five weeks.
In a manner calculated to undermine management and staff.
I appointed an assessment committee comprising representatives of my Department, the Department of Finance and Stokes Kennedy Crowley Corporate Finance Limited to examine the two offers. Following detailed consideration of the offers, the assessment committee made a unanimous recommendation to me, which I accepted, that the sale should be concluded with Irish Continental Group subject to final agreement on all issues.
The matter was considered by the Government at their meeting on 4 December 1991. This allowed seven days for the assessment committee to make its recommendations to me. During the Government meeting, I became aware of information from the advisers to the MSBO consortium indicating, inter alia, that management and staff had withdrawn from the consortium bid involving Danish interests and wished to have an amended bid submitted on their behalf on terms substantially similar to the consortium bid.
While the terms of this revised offer were presented as being substantially similar to the MSBO consortium bid, the fact is that only £2 million of the proposed £5 million purchase price offered could be paid immediately. The balance would be paid on a deferred basis. In addition, the revised offer proposed that discussions with suitable partners, including Irish Ferries, would take place after 12 months. The revised offer was in truth worse than the previous MSBO offer which the assessment committee had advised against. Logically, therefore, the fresh proposals had also to be rejected.
Having considered the overall position in the light of the report of the assessment committee, the Government decided that the sale of B & I to Irish Continental Group should take place subject to final agreement on all sides.
In arriving at their decision, the Government noted the view of the assessment committee that the buy-out proposal had represented a welcome initiative in Irish industry, involving an equal partnership between management and staff. The Government agreed——
The Minister gave them a clap on the back for their efforts.
The Government agreed with the committee's conclusion, however, that in line with standard practice, the B & I should be sold to the best offer, Irish Continental Group, unless there were other compelling circumstances for not doing so. On the basis of the two offers received, the Government were satisfied that there were not.
The ICG bid of £8.5 million is substantially better than the MSBO offer of £5 million with £3 million of that on a deferred basis.
They had a new institutional investor and the Minister knows it.
Both ICG and MSBO consortium sought an Exchequer investment of £35 million to remove the company's debt prior to the sale. Clearly, the sale to Irish Continental Group will result in a substantially lower cost to the Exchequer.
I am satisfied that the sale to the Irish Continental Group represents the best prospect for the future development of the B & I. It will create a strong shipping entity with substantial synergetic benefits, a proven track record and the ability to make the necessary investment in the future of the combined entity. In this regard ICG are committed to investing £30 million in the B & I over the next five years.
I would see the following as some of the main additional benefits which can be expected to accrue from the acquisition of the B & I by ICG: the maintenance of vital Irish shipping/maritime skills; the maintenance and development of critical shipping routes vital for tourism and national transport needs; the creation of a platform for an increase in capacity and improvements in the quality of services; competitive market led fare policies; the overall enhancement of B & I's services and, in particular, the development of its central corridor and southern corridor services; removal of the requirement for ongoing Exchequer funding, and the maintenance of B & I's ships on the Irish register. These benefits should make a substantial contribution to employment creation, both directely and indirectly.
In essence, the sale will lead to the creation of a strong Irish shipping company with the potential to alleviate the twin evils of under-capacity and high access costs. It will also preserve competition which is a vital ingredient in achieving these objectives. The provision of a modern, efficient and competitive access transport network, integrated as far as possible with the rest of the European Community's network, is of vital concern to the Irish economy.
ICG are committed to the creation and development of a dynamic shipping entity, under the Irish flag, which will be capable of competing internationally — a company which has committed itself to provide high quality service and secure employment. The employees of B & I will now have an opportunity of directly participating in this strong new Irish group.
I would now like to comment on certain issues raised in recent days. I have previously rejected the notion of a golden share. This issue has been discussed with the trade unions during the 20 or so meetings held with them. A golden share is simply not practicable because it would mean the Government going back on their decision to effectively dispose of the line.
The concept of a golden share entails some Government control for strategic reasons over the future ownership or direction of the company's activities. The Government's primary strategic concern for the future relates to capacity and ensuring that shipping services to and from Ireland remain competitive. If a change of ownership were likely to operate so as to restrict competition, the Government would not hesitate to invoke the substantial safeguards that exist in the area of European Community and national law.
The imposition of a golden share as part of the sale process would have had a number of additional disadvantages. If it did not put off potential bidders, it would most certainly have lowered the price offered. This is because potential investors would naturally be wary of potential restrictions on the disposal of shares, thus affecting their saleability. This would be particularly damaging to any company in need of investment finance to make a success of its ownership of the B & I Line.
There is nothing the Government can do to prevent them selling their shares.
In addition, let us be very clear on this issue. Irish Continental Group are an Irish publicly quoted company. Their future is inextricably linked to serving Irish routes. Irish Continental Group have indicated to me, to the B & I staff, to the public at large through the press and to the Stock Exchange that they" will continue to operate all existing B & I shipping routes" and that they will upgrade and improve services. They have also guaranteed to maintain the B & I vessels under the Irish flag.
Irish Continental Group have also indicated to me that their plans for B & I over the next five years include: the retention of all existing B & I shipping routes; the provision of extra capacity on the m.v. Leinster; the sourcing of an improved vessel to replace the m.v. Munster on the Rosslare/Pembroke route; an upgrade of facilities throughout B & I; the provision of long term sustainable employment in B & I; and share ownership for B & I employees.
The acquisition is in the best long term interests of B & I, their employees and customers. It will lead to the creation of an enlarged Irish owned shipping enterprise with the resources to develop and provide an enhanced level of services to Irish tourism and export trade.
Regarding the suggestion that the management-staff buy-out was not given sufficient time, the MBSO was considered over one year ago and rejected after a detailed consideration by consultants and Government as not being the best solution. In fact, that MBSO was not supported by the trade unions.
When representations were made to me by the management and by the group of unions, I allowed them, with their Danish backers, a full five weeks to lodge a bid. Initially, I allowed two weeks from 25 October with a deadline of 8 November. This deadline was further extended twice to 15 November and 22 November in order to give the consortium every opportunity. Following the unfortuate collision of the m.v. Kilkenny, I agreed a further extension to 27 November.
Regarding the suggestion that £8.5 million was not good value, I am sure most people would agree that the only way to establish the best value for any company is to seek competitive bids. Over one year ago, we initiated world wide bids for the B & I Line. We had interest from P & O, Maersk, Cenargo, ICG and MBSO. However, the only offers received were from Cenargo, the MBSO and ICG. The ICG bid of £6.5 million was by for the best financial offer. It included the least number of redundancies and it met my concern and the trade unions' concern of having a strong Irish strategic shipping company under the Irish flag.
It did not involve the least number of redundancies.
I refer the House to a statement I issued on 4 April 1991 in which I pointed out that the trade union representatives had confirmed to me that they were prepared positively to co-operate with the sale of B & I to Irish Ferries, provided they got adequate assurances on key conditions affecting their members. They were satisfied on that occasion.
They are not satisfied now.
The revised offer of ICG represents an increase of £2 million on their original offer and is, therefore, the best deal available.
Maybe we should give it back to them.
An assessment committee comprising officials of the Department, the Department of Finance and SKC Corporate Finance studied the bids in detail. They unanimously recommended acceptance of the ICG offer.
I am not satisfied from indications received by me that the MSBO has the full support of the workforce in B & I. In relation to industrial relations problems in both companies, I would point out that ICG have not lost a sailing day due to work action since 1973. I understand, although this has yet to be confirmed to me fully, that the Seamen's Union of Ireland, for example, were not wholeheartedly in favour of the MSBO and that they favour somewhat more the ICG bid. That has yet to be confirmed but it is my indication.
And the Minister would have no idea why that would be the case.
There have been extensive consultations between my Department and the B & I group of unions, as well as the ICTU. My Department have had over 20 meetings with the B & I group of unions. I have met trade union representatives on three occasions. In addition, on at least half a dozen occasions, I have met the chairman and other senior members of the board.
They had no involvement, good, bad or indifferent. Do not tell the House otherwise.
Allow the Minister to conclude his speech without interruption.
The ICG bid was for £8.5 million. ICG have had substantial resources with current net cash balance of £9.5 million and a strong balance sheet having gone from a net debt position of £19 million in 1983 to a net cash surplus of £9.5 million in 1991.
The MSBO bid was for £5 million cash. The MSBO consortium is dependent on the availability of £6 million from the pension fund for the purchase, severance payments and working capital.
I look forward to the amalgamation of these two Irish companies and wish them every future success. I also wish to thank the board, management and staff of B & I for their constructive and co-operative approach throughout the lengthy and complex negotiations. I would also like to thank the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, with whom I share the same vision and goal for the development of a sound shipping industry which will sustain and expand employment for Irish mariners.
I commend the Bill to the House.
Before I come to the substance of my speech I want to comment on the debating arrangements for this Bill on which there have been two divisions today. I understood that all the Whips had agreed to the commencement of the Bill today but that there was no agreement as to its conclusion. This is why Fine Gael did not take part in the vote today. We are totally opposed to the proposal to bring the Second Stage debate to a conclusion at 11 p.m. tomorrow. We are also totally opposed to the guillotine being put on Committee and Report Stages next week. We do not believe this is the way to give proper consideration to the Bill. I might add for the information of the public and the House that it was the Government's intention to put all Stages of the Bill through the House this week in the first instance but we totally opposed such a proposal.
Fine Gael will be opposing this Bill. We believe the deal to sell the B & I Line to Irish Ferries is unsatisfactory from the perspective of the future requirements of the Irish economy, the requirements of Irish exporters and the tourism sector. It represents very bad value whereby the taxpayer gets the worst of all worlds. It does not adequately protect any of the staff of the B & I Line and cannot provide the necessary guarantees of continuity of shipping services for an island nation which is more dependent on exports than Japan or virtually any other European country. We export 70 per cent of all we produce.
The timing of this deal is not to the advantage of the seller as the turnaround in the company's fortunes will only really be evident in 1992 when it is estimated there will be a trading profit in the B & I Line of £4 million before repayments on borrowings. Even a cursory examination of the advantages to the buyer will show that a very soft price has been obtained in the deal. For £8.5 million they get debts of £36 million written off, all the assets of the B & I Line clear of any liabilities — these are reckoned by independent analysts to be worth approximately £20 million — the net amount of surplus on the pension funds, the property owned by the B & I and the shipping assets. I understand they are able to carry over — the Minister made no reference to this — corporation tax losses over £100 million to ensure they will not have to pay any corporation tax profits for the foreseeable future. They will have access to a pension fund with a total investment of over £60 million with a surplus of anywhere between £6 million and £13 million which is acknowledged by all parties to be overfunded. They have the freedom, as a private sector company, to negotiate away up to 350 redundancies, free of any Government interference, to substantially reduce operating costs.
They have the prospect of generous EC shipping grants given that Ireland will be the only State in Europe without a land link after the Channel Tunnel is built in 1993. In addition, they also have the prospect of reducing the purchase price by way of the small print of the deal whereby if on the balance sheet of the B & I Line for 1991 they do not achieve certain trading and asset figures the price will be reduced downwards. It is only in these special and extremely favourable circumstances that a company the size of Irish Ferries with a turnover of £40 million, 250 employees, assets of £13.5 million and a fleet of two boats can acquire a much larger company, the B & I Line, which has a turnover of between £65 million and £70 million, a fleet of several ships and a staff of approximately 1,000. This is not a merger; this is a reverse take-over by a relatively small shipping company of one of the two large short haul ferry operators on the Irish Sea.
Fine Gael's strong view of the proposed privatisation of the B & I Line is that the price is too low and the circumstances simply too risky in relation to the continuity of essential shipping services. Fine Gael concede that while the B & I Line have met all their targets in the plan of action submitted to the Government in December 1987, there are limits to the Exchequer and taxpayers' financial commitments to the company. There is and was a case to involve private sector finance in the necessary investment required by the B & I Line for the upgrading of their vessels and services. We also accept that Irish Ferries are an Irish registered company, they operate on the Irish Stock Exchange and sail under the Irish flag. It is desirable and essential to keep the B & I Line under Irish control. We accept the bona fides of Irish Ferries and their successful operation since 1973 in terms of their growth and expansion of shipping services. We agree that they are a well managed company with positive principles of employee share ownership. We acknowledge all of these points but for the Government to simply abandon the B & I Line, flog it off and wash their hands in the way now proposed is totally unacceptable. The Minister's decision is shortsighted and seems to be born out of immediate financial considerations rather than long term planning to develop a cost effective and efficient Irish marine sector and have competitive shipping services on the Irish Sea.
As I understand it, Irish Ferries propose to invest some £32 million over the next five years. Seven million pounds of this will be spent on the upgrading of the MV Leinster which operates on the Dublin-Holyhead route. It is proposed to construct an extra car deck giving an increased capacity for 120 cars and to put in sponsons to improve buoyancy of the ship. It is proposed on the Rosslare-Pembroke route on the southern corridor to invest some £20 million to replace the MV Munster, a 20 year old ship. It is anticipated that there will be losses on this route for three years but that it will make money in the fourth year with a new upgraded ship. They will also spend £1 million per annum on general upgrading and facilities. I agree that such investment is urgently needed, particularly at the North Wall terminal where facilities are in a deplorable condition.
While all of these proposals are laudable and essential to the future of the B & I Line it is important to pose some questions which could arise over that five year period and that we try to foresee the answers to those questions in so far as possible before the State is powerless to act in years to come. What if Stena Sealink detect a certain vulnerability in terms of the ability of Irish Ferries to compete in a price war on fares and enter into a fares war on the central and southern corridor? I think it is acknowledged that the MV Stena Hibernia which operates on the Dún Laoghaire-Holyhead route and the MV Stena Felicity which operates on the Rosslare-Fishguard route are super luxury vessels which have been described as floating hotels. If the MV Stena Hibernia is able to achieve three sailings per day, operating from upgraded facilities out of Dún Laoghaire port, how will the B & I Line under Irish Ferries compete? They cannot offer a superior quality product and will find it very difficult to maintain their share of the market. What if Irish Ferries incur exceptional losses? How will they finance these annual deficits? In order to pay for the £32 million investment plan they will be up to the hilt in borrowings because they will have exhausted their cash reserves in the purchase price. I understand such cash reserves currently stand at about £7 million-£8 million. Within the five year period they will also have to consider replacing their own ships, the St. Killian and the St. Patrick which were commissioned in 1973. What if Irish Ferries decide that the southern corridor route is uneconomic? It has to be pointed out that the only previous experience Irish Ferries or the Irish Continental Group have of short haul ferry routes was on the Belfast-Liverpool line which was closed down due to losses. They do not operate any such short haul on the Irish Sea at present.
What if they decide in the future to close down European container services which provide vital cargo links from Dublin port to Antwerp, Rotterdam and Le Havre? What action can the Government take in these circumstances if all shipping companies are absolutely private concerns which do not have any regard to Government policy and the Conferderation of Irish Industry, the Irish Exporters' Association and the Irish Tourism Confederation are knocking on their door asking them to maintain access transport services to the country? The answer is simple. The Government will be powerless to act or will be faced with the choice of doing what the then Government did in 1965 in acquiring the B & I line at that time. I do not think there is any argument that, at the time, the B & I line was acquired, not because of any love of the sea by the then Government nor by any determination to make a profit out of shipping services, but rather to secure a strategic national interest as an island in having a State involvement in shipping services.
Therefore, Fine Gael's central contention is that the Government should have retained a stake or golden share in the B & I Line as part of any deal with Irish Ferries. This would have had substantial benefits for the Irish Continental Group, would have increased greatly the credibility of the company in raising finance for fleet investment purposes in terms of taking on a multinational company like Stena Shipping Lines in a competitive arena. If we had retained that interest in B & I the taxpayer could benefit from any upturn in the fortunes of the company given that they have moved from a loss making position of £9.4 million in 1984, with an improvement each year, to a projected profit in 1992 of £4.2 million. In that regard it is helpful to read into the record of the House the improved trading performance of the B & I Line. In 1984, in operating terms, they lost £9.4 million, in 1985, £7.7 million, in 1986, £6.8 million and in 1987, £3.6 million — an improvement all the time. However, in 1988 they made a profit, for the first time, of £1.76 million. In 1989 they had a profit of £1.95 million, in 1990 a profit of £1.59 million and, I understand, the figure for this year is £2.4 million while the projected operating surplus for next year is £4.2 million. In other words, there has been a gradual but definite increase from a minus of £9.4 million to a plus of £4.2 million. That shows clearly that the taxpayer having invested all this money now faces some prospect that things will get better if the debts are written off, and I appreciate that that is to be the case. This would allow the Government to ensure that no future resale of the B & I line would take place without their consent thereby ensuring that it could be retained in Irish hands. The rumour on the Stock Exchange and around town is that already there are talks between P & O and Irish Ferries for a merger. The point of resale arises directly and now in so far as the control, if any, we have in relation to a resale.
On all previous State privatisation legislation, such as the Acts which enabled the Sugar Company and Irish Life to privatise, the State saw fit to have a gradual process of reducing State share ownership. Currently Greencore is 45 per cent owned by the Government. This allows for continuity and stability and allows also for a future opportunity to sell shareholdings if a Government at some stage should decide that that is in the national interest.
Other than the strategic issues involved, the other major issue is one of industrial relations — the future welfare of the current staff of B & I, their pension fund and their rights of continuity of pay and conditions in the new takeover. The first point that has to be made in this regard is that as a private company the Government are basically quite happy to throw the staff and management of B & I to the wolves in terms of their jobs, pay and conditions.
It is an open secret that during the period January to August when Irish Continental Group outlined to the unions, their detailed proposals for job losses and reorganisation there was very little progress reported and some of the talks simply broke down. I do not believe any group of unions should be given a blank cheque in terms of preserving all their jobs in what is a very competitive and not very profitable sector of the transport industry. However the extent to which the Government are prepared to abandon these workers is unacceptable. It should have been a condition of the purchase deal that job losses were voluntary. I understand that the total number of employees at B & I as at 21 February 1991 was 1,000, including 123 temporary employees who have between one and three years service. The ultimate objective of ICG is to reduce these staffing levels to around 650 under the take over. Added to this despair for many of the employees and their families is the difference of opinion in terms of pay and conditions for different elements of the staff: between shore based and sea going staff, between white collar managerial staff including ships officers and other staff. It is no secret that relations are very strained between SIPTU and the Seamen's Union of Ireland. I am not an expert in industrial relations nor do I claim to know how this matter can best be resolved but it is obvious that the Government and the officials of the Department of Tourism, Transport and communications have made little or no attempt to get to grips with these underlying problems and to facilitate straightforward negotiations to ensure industrial harmony and a consensus.
The events of last week have made a difficult situation into an explosive one. The way the Government, and particularly the Minister, treated the staff management buy-out smacked of contempt. I have to confess that I was surprised initially when the Government invited such as MSBO to develop, at the 11th hour of negotiations between the Government and Irish Ferries. It soon became obvious what the Government were at: they said there was only two weeks for such an offer to be put together, then this was extended to four weeks. This contrasts with the fact that Irish Continental Group have been allowed a year to prepare an offer in conjunction with Stokes Kennedy Crowley corporate consultants and a further six months in which to carry out a due diligence assessment and to negotiate a legal contract, and a further four months in which to finalise the purchase.
I do not believe the staff management offer was given adequate time to develop or that it was given adequate consideration by the Government. In fact, the Minister was very cynical in this whole exercise, first, in trying to force the hand of Irish Continental Group and, second, by being abroad, in the Far East, when the offer was submitted and then immediately seizing the opportunity to conclude a deal with ICG when the management buy out was at its most vulnerable with the exit of the Danish shipping group who might have reentered a day or two later. It is possible that the consortium, if given more time, could have made an offer equal to that of Irish Continental Group. However, the Minister deliberately chose his time for decision, when making any comparison on the two offers, between ICG and the MSBO but was most favourable to ICG. Nearly everyone would agree that as of last Wednesday evening, the ICG offer was the best on the table. That is not to say that subsequently a better or improved offer could not have been obtained.
The most important aspect for the B & I staff and their union representatives is to secure their future. The fact is the Government have not only concluded a deal but want to railroad all stages of this legislation through the Dáil and Seanad in less than a week. The Government have access to much industrial relations machinery in the form of the Labour Relations Commission and the Labour Court to oversee meaningful and worthwhile discussions on the future security of as many jobs as possible in the B & I Line.
It is clear that Irish Ferries propose to make dramatic changes in relation to shore based employment levels. I understand senior management is to be virtually eliminated, perhaps three middle ranking executives will be retained, and the senior management will be replaced by that of ICG; 42 per cent of clerical jobs are to be got rid of; maintenance employees are to be completely removed and replaced by contractors. The number of dockers and checkers at Dublin Port are to be greatly reduced.
The B & I Line proposals are well known. A relatively public document of 12 April 1991, sent to all employees of B & I outlined by category the shore based staff, the sea going staff and those in Dublin Port. Since then I understand the position has become even worse. The current number of employees, 877, is being reduced to 253; The maintenance staff in Dublin Port of 25 is being reduced to two — a reduction of 92 per cent — road freight staff are being reduced from ten to four and the clerical staff of 240 is to be reduced to 102. These matters were discussed and no basis was found for anything. The Minister is underwriting the railroading through of that approach in the most disruptive and argumentative way. There are valid points on both sides in any such future negotiations. However, the level of revision in the term of pay and conditions of employment together with work practices is so stark that there is a risk of the mother of all battles between the group of unions and the Irish Continental Group. If such a doomsday scenario arises and shipping services are disrupted, or if the B & I Line as we know it, sinks because of industrial relations problems, the blame will lie exclusively with the Minister, Deputy Brennan, who has entered into a dialogue of the deaf with the group of unions to date on these difficulties. In this instance a minority State interest would have ensured the type of stability and continuity necessary to achieve the rationalisation and reduced operating costs while, at the same time, allowing the staff to feel secure in the knowledge that there would be a full transfer of undertakings in relation to their overall employment.
The B & I pension fund currently stands at over £60 million. I understand that it is over-subscribed to the extent of approximately £10 million but that there are some provisions in relation to EC equal rights that will reduce this amount slightly. I also understand that the trustees of this pension fund are the Allied Irish Banks and that there is some pressure from the UK authorities to remove the tax exempt status from the fund. I would like the Minister to clarify whether Irish Ferries will have a free hand in paying severence deals to staff — for them to be laid off — out of the surplus of this fund. If so, Irish Ferries will have got the company for virtually nothing as the purchase price will be equal to resources available from the pensions fund.
Many former employees of the B & I Line and others dependent on a pension for their future from B & I must have answers to the future of the surpluses of this fund. Moreover, the Minister must clarify what steps he has taken to ensure that the surplus of this fund, if, and when amalgamated with Irish Ferries' existing pension fund, will not give a direct cross-subsidy from B & I workers to Irish Ferry workers. The Minister must also clarify whether the current pension fund arrangement which operates on the basis of a 7 per cent employee contribution and a 7 per cent employer contribution will continue for future B & I employees. It is not adequate for Irish Ferries to state that, simply because pension funds if in deficit are the responsibility of the employer, where there is a surplus and there is a new acquisition in the firm, they would have free access to these funds.
If the Minister's assurances on these points are not satisfactory we will be tabling amendments on Committee Stage to ensure that some protection is given in this regard. It would be remarkable if the Government in their panic to be removed from exposure to B & I debts were to give a present of the B & I Line to Irish Ferries, remove all interest charges and debts, facilitate rationalisation, confer huge tax loss benefits, make available EC grant aid and then allow pension fund surpluses to be creamed off as icing on the cake of this deal.
When Irish Sugar were being privatised there was an industrial relations agreement negotiated by the group of unions and the Sugar Company under the auspices of the Labour Relations Commission. This agreement was endorsed by the Minister for Agriculture and Food by letter. This was added to by a letter from the Taoiseach, who was then acting as Minister for Finance, confirming the pension arrangements as set out in clause 7 of that agreement. Amendments were made on the Committee Stage of the Sugar Company Bill on 14 March 1990 based on negotiations between the unions and the Minister for Agriculture and Food.
It is clear that, at the outset, the unions were opposed to the privatisation of Irish Sugar. They recognised the decision of the Government to proceed and thus every effort was made to influence the shape of the company for the future. This resulted in a satisfactorily negotiated settlement. There was a clear adherence to the provisions of the European Community's Safeguarding of Employees' Rights on Transfer of Undertakings Regulations, 1980. All this must contrast with the present actions of the Minister for Tourism, Transport and Communications. Why should State employees be treated so differently? On Committee Stage, we will be seeking to insert some amendments that would give some level of fair treatment to the B & I Line employees.
I have copies of correspondence from the Congress of Trade Unions, through their industrial officer, Mr. Stephen McCarthy, to each member of the Sugar Company group outlining the text of the industrial relations agreement negotiated by the union group and the Labour Relations Commission. I have the agreement signed by Mr. Kieran Mulvey for the Labour Relations Commission, by Mr. Tony Heaphy of the Sugar Company and by Mr. McCarthy of the ICTU. The workers of the B & I Line deserve no less than the workers of Greencore. If it was possible to amend sections 2 and 6 of the Irish Sugar Company Bill in relation to the rights of employees and the regulations as outlined on 3 October 1980, by the Minister for Labour, Deputy Gene Fitzgerald, and Statutory Instrument No. 306 of 1980, all of those requests by the workforce to have them included in this legislation are legitimate, fair and reasonable. It is not fair that workers in one State company should be treated differently to those in another.
It is essential for the Minister to clarify certain aspects of the small print of this Bill. What are the details of section 3 of this Bill, specifically subsection (3)? The media has referred to Irish Ferries purchasing the B & I Line free of "liabilities and warranties". Perhaps the Minister would clarify the situation in relation to the m.v. Kilkenny in this regard? If it transpires that the m.v. Kilkenny and the B & I Line were responsible for the recent accident with the m.v. Hasselwerder, who will pick up the bill for the damages claim that will ensue? Will it be the insurer, the taxpayer or ICG? Similarly, in what circumstances will ICG pay the Government less than £8.5 million? What commitment has been given as to the size of the net assets of the B & I at the end of 1991? What trading targets have been set for the B & I to achieve in 1991 for which a public balance sheet and accounts are not available as yet?
It is not acceptable for the Minister to come into this House to give an attempted defence of his position without outlining all aspects of the deal. I want to know the conditions of the deal as they relate to assets and trading figures for 1991. The Dáil and the public are entitled to these answers. It is unacceptable that the Dáil should be asked to sanction a pig in a poke without knowledge of the small print.
It is only fair in terms of the climate of recent months that the Government should clarify the exact role of NCB in relation to this ideal and what level of political contact there has been between the Taoiseach, NCB and Mr. Dermot Desmond, if any, in setting up this deal? The Minister must give a clear assurance that political preference has not been shown and that all aspects of political contacts on these negotiations as opposed to commercial and administrative contacts have been above board, open and accountable. I do not have any grounds for making allegations of impropriety, but it is important that no suspicion of political favouritism attaches to this sale.
My party will oppose Second Stage of this Bill because the B & I have been sold at a knock down price, at the wrong time and in the wrong way. It is wrong for the State to exclude itself from a vital shipping interest, thus giving no protection in terms of continuity of a shipping service, a return to the taxpayer, or any protection to the workforce and to the development of our access tourism services.
It might have been possible to pursue the British experience of a management buy-out by Maggie Thatcher in the instance of the National Freight Corporation, but this was jettisoned by the Minister who made a panic decision. Irish Ferries could have been a suitable partner for the State to develop the B & I Line into the nineties. Such a joint venture, partnership or even the retention of the minority or golden share would have been infinitely better than the present proposal. The fact that the Minister was psyched by ICG into thinking there was no alternative, that this way was the only way to have the company, represents seriously flawed judgement. We believe the ramifications of this deal will be serious not only for the Programme for Economic and Social Progress and the relations between the social partners and the Government but also for the economy in terms of a competitive marine transport sector.
The Government's botched handling of the industrial relations aspect of this negotiations has been appalling and may make a difficult situation impossible. For these reasons we will be opposing the Second Stage of this Bill and seeking to radically amend it on Committee Stage to insert some continuing role for the State in shipping services; to provide similar protection to the workforce as is provided in previous privatisations of State companies; to allow leverage clauses by the Government in terms of the write-off of debt; to ensure that in any future resale of the B & I Line it will be retained under the Irish flag; and to give adequate protection to all those dependent on the B & I pension fund.
In these contexts this Bill is seriously defective and it has major gaps. The Government's handling of this matter has been shortsighted, prejudiced and weak. Only the future will tell how big a price will have to be paid for the Government's mismanagement.
I wish to turn now to some points made by the Minister in his Second Stage speech. In page 13 he deals with the arguments against the golden share and his best line here is "a golden share is simply not practicable because it would mean the Government going back on its decision to effectively dispose of the line". I disagree with that. It would not be wrong to go back on that line. It shows the hidden agenda of the Minister which is to get rid of the B & I Line at any cost, at any price, and as quickly as possible.
The Minister also rejects it on the grounds that the Government's primary strategic concern for the future relates to capacity and ensuring that shipping services to and from Ireland remain competitive. The Minister cannot give the House any assurances with regard to the competitiveness of Irish shipping or what will happen in the southern corridor. He does not know what Stena Sealink will do. He realises their size; he has launched some of their ships, the Hibernia in particular. The Minister knows they are a very large multinational. We all know they took a bath this year and lost £30 million. We all know they have debts of £300 million. However, because of the development of the Channel Tunnel whereby their Dover-Calais service will obviously not be the growth pattern of the future, they will not leave the Irish Sea. They will dig in and see this as their opportunity. In the past they have been in a cartel with the B & I Line to try to shore up the southern corridor, so they split revenue. The Minister will see that they will probably take a different attitude when it is not a State company and when they are not dealing with big brother and the taxpayer in terms of competition.
The Minister points to the disadvantages. I would point to the advantage of Greencore, a very successful company that will make record profits this year. For years Irish Life had a mix of State and private holdings. This is a well established practice of mixing the two sectors.
The Minister goes on to say that he will allow five weeks for the unions to lodge a bid. With respect to the Minister, five weeks is not a very long time. It is not a very long time starting from a cold, standing still position. In fairness, five months would be more reasonable.
In relation to initiating worldwide bids for the B & I line, that brings me to something that is of deep concern to me and that was brought to my attention no later than today. In case this is misrepresented, I want to assure the Minister that the people who are advising me are not all mad Workers' Party supporters, and I have spoken to the workers and the staff of the B & I Line and many others. There are many very sensible committed people who do not see this——
Workers' Party supporters are not mad. They are very sane, very logical people.
Let me clarify that. The people I am speaking to, who have major reservations about this deal, have no ideological hang-up in relation to State ownership of companies. They are sound, business people.
The Minister has the ideological hang-up.
The Deputy's ground is shifting all the time. I am always interested in any new shift that it might take. I want to make a serious point here and that is in relation to SKC. The Minister said that they initiated worldwide bids. I believe that there was a serious conflict of interest because SKC are the auditors for the B & I Line and SKC, the corporate company, were advisers to the Minister in this matter. I do not believe that is appropriate and the Minister should have taken that into account when appointing the advisers. It is not my intention to cast any aspersions on the personnel involved on either side, but I believe that was not proper.
I also have very serious reservations about breaches of the Companies Act that have taken place. I want to be quite specific about this, and I want the Minister to respond. Under the provisions of section 131(1) of the Companies Act, 1963, every company must hold an annual general meeting in each calendar year. Not more than 15 months should elapse between annual general meetings. Therefore an AGM of the B & I Line plc should have been held on or before 25 July 1991. In accordance with the provisions of section 148 of the Companies Act, 1963, the accounts of a company must be presented to an AGM within nine months of the year end. This implies that the accounts to 31 December 1990 should have been laid before the AGM before 30 September 1991. However, the provisions of section 131 have precedence over the provisions of section 148 and, therefore, the AGM of the B & I Line plc should have been held on or before 25 July this year. Why did that not take place? Under the provisions of section 128 of the Companies Act, 1963 B & I Line plc is required to file a set of accounts with its annual return at the Companies Registration Office. Under the provisions of section 127 the annual return must be made up to a date 14 days after the holding of the AGM and the annual return and accounts must be filed within 60 days of the AGM. As no accounts have heretofore been available the B & I Line plc is in breach of the provisions of sections 131, 127 and 128 of the Companies Act, 1963. Therefore, when accounts do become available an AGM should be held as soon as possible and the annual return and accounts filed at the Companies Registration Office.
These are very serious allegations that have come to me and I would like the Minister to respond. As far as I am concerned this is not a matter that is open to debate; these are matters of fact, and I have them from an impeccable source.
It has also been brought to my attention by share analysts and stockbrokers, after this deal is over and all going well, what the effect will be on Irish Continental Group which is quoted on the Stock Exchange in the smaller equities division. I understand the present share value of ICG is 12p. I am told that this will double their share value to 24p; that their capital value at the moment is £20 million and that this will increase to £41 million. I also understand that their net profit will rise from £2.9 million to £4.2 million for the next year.
That brings me to the central point being made in that regard which is that it really is a knockdown price whatever way one looks at it. Even if it goes as low as £8 million from the surplus of the pension fund, when one adds that to the property and the ships clear of all debt charges, if one puts together the variable assets, leaving aside the perks and the tax losses — and they are making losses somewhere between £2 million and £3 million a year now — that is a very substantial benefit. I know there is 10 per cent corporation tax applying to the shipping sector. That is a substantial benefit, and all the time the Minister and his colleague, the Tánaiste, are making detailed submissions to the EC Commission to extend, because we do not have a land bridge to Europe, a sea bridge, and there is the possibility for the first time of substantial grant aid. I would have to conclude that one of the principles of privatisation, an open competitive tendering system, has not been established here to our satisfaction, that a precedent has been established whereby through private negotiation a sweetheart deal has been arrived at at a knockdown price.
We are not opposed in principle to privatisation. There are other companies where we would positively favour privatisation, where extra investment is needed. Take, for example the fleet replacement of Aer Lingus. I would not oppose a measure to do a joint merger with another airline or to inject outside equity into that. As an overall policy, I have no difficulty with it but the terms of this deal cause grave difficulty, leaving aside the powder keg of industrial relations and the way that matter is being handled.
I also have grave reservations, and I say this with some regret, about the treatment of the board in this manner. The people involved are not the type of people to go to the media. They are not the type of people to brief me in relation to their upset at the way they have been treated. I understand that it is only today that the Minister has met with them in the context of this deal and the developments at the eleventh hour. I understand in the memorandum to Government they have had no input or consultation. At the vital stages of conclusion there was no critical involvement.
Debate adjourned.
Sitting suspended at 6.30 p.m. and resumed at 7 p.m.