I thank Fine Gael for the opportunity to contribute to this very important debate and, in particular, Deputy Nuala Fennell for taking the initiative to draw attention to an appalling and glaring absence in the whole area of law reform, a situation that was highlighted by the unfortunate case of the woman who had been taken almost summarily into the custody of one of our mental hospitals but who was, at least, able to make contact with the outside world, convince people of her sanity and, through Deputy Fennell and others, highlight the utter inadequacies of the Mental Treatment Act, 1945, as a vehicle of protecting and ensuring the rights of people who are alleged by others to be somewhat mentally deficient.
The Mental Treatment Act, 1945, is the most outdated item of legislation relating to the general area of civil liberties and medicine in Ireland today. It is particularly significant, despite the many developments that have taken place in both the legal and medical areas, that our legislation in this area has fallen so far and so notably behind. The draconian nature of the 1945 Act is based on the idea that those with mental deficiency or handicap are considered less than human by the great majority of us. The deference paid on the other hand to the unquestioning judgment of members of the medical profession adds to the unsatisfactory nature of the provisions in the 1945 Act that have existed for far too long. These ideas were graphically brought home to me as a practising solicitor in the early seventies. One of my first cases involved — I hope the House will bear with me while I explain it — a man from the west who was lodged in the central mental hospital in Dundrum. He wrote to me and I went to see him. He explained that because of a marital disagreement between himself and his wife she had literally got to the local priest and doctor quicker than he had — not that he ever suggested he would take that avenue — and by one device or another he ended up in a district mental hospital.
There, protesting to the resident medical superintendent his innocence and sanity, he was simply ignored and spurned. As the resident medical superintendent turned on his heel to walk away, this patient picked up a stone, threw it in his direction and missed. Nonetheless he was charged with the offence of common assault, was certified by the district justice within the terms of the Act, and on a certificate of the Minister for Justice of the day, ended up in Dundrum Central Mental Hospital. That was in 1953. In 1975, 22 years later, I met that man, sane as the day he went in but, unfortunately, at that stage very institutionalised. The doctors' concern was not with regard to the man's sanity but rather with his inability to cope with the outside world should someone take the courage and the decision to discharge him. Shortly afterwards, as a result of a lawyer now showing some consideration, the case was reviewed and, within a short time, he was returned to the district mental hospital and, eventually, released into the commmunity. In the early days of his committal he challenged the whole process in the High Court, but the law of the day in reviewing it through a process of judicial review certiorari was that the strict letter of the law had been complied with. For upwards of 22 years a sane, inoffensive man was detained unnecessarily at Dundrum Central Mental Hospital, and only because of the provisions of the 1945 Act.
Shortly after, as a knock-on effect, another unfortunate man wrote to me from Dundrum Central Mental Hospital. This man, spurred by the success of his co-patient, had written to the High Court to complain that after 15 years something should be done about the fact that as a sane person he was still incarcerated in Dundrum Central Mental Hospital. This man, again, was sane and inoffensive. He was eccentric, certainly, and a person of very determined and emphatic view. The case was lost in the High Court but, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the then Chief Justice recognised that while the letter of the law had been complied with, the assertions of the man, so carefully set out in documentary evidence and almost screaming his sanity, opened up the possibility that a person, though technically and legally correctly lodged, could nonetheless challenge the medical view and use the courts as a device to do that. Again, the Supreme Court asked if I would act on his behalf. I did so temporarily but, as part of his eccentricity, he decided he would do better in the Supreme Court arguing his case without my services. Subsequently, on my election to the Dáil in 1987, I was extremely pleased to be called to the gate of Leinster House to meet this man. Though he had failed in his legal arguments in the Supreme Court, he was subsequently transferred back to the district mental hospital and released back into the community because of the initiatives he had taken. He also was as sane and inoffensive though perhaps as eccentric as the day he went in.
These two cases brought home to me that people who have been plucked from our community and lodged in a mental hospital on the certification of one or two doctors are in the worst possible position to launch a case on their behalf. It is remarkable that so little has been done over the years to review the operation of the Mental Treatment Act, 1945. There are many provisions in that Act which are totally inconsistent with our constitutional thinking and with medical opinion and practice today. It is because the people concerned are in our mental institutions and are so little regarded that so little has been done.
It is a remarkable achievement by Deputy Fennell and those who have been drawn into a broad group, to have produced legislation, however limited in the way it is expected to act, designed to challenge the 1945 Act, how it has worked since it was introduced, and highlight the need for action. To the extent that that is the purpose of the Bill, I am happy, on behalf of the Democratic Left, to support it. I committed that support in writing to Deputy Fennell on receipt of the Bill. As a mechanism to force us to address legislation that is long out of date and in need of reform, this initiative by Deputy Fennell and Fine Gael deserves the support of the House. One has to accept that this Bill may be defeated if the Government take an absolute position against it on the vote, but if the Minister for Health will give a commitment, if he has not done so, to take direct action on the issues raised it will be a good thing.
There was reference to a Green Paper or, perhaps, a White Paper on the issues. I am concerned about that because I have argued the need to bring forward a verdicts Bill to deal with insanity as an issue in the criminal justice area. If that is to be deferred to await this paper, we will have to wait longer than we expected for the legislation promised by various Ministers. Whatever about the desirability of having a major paper on this area of work, there are too many cases in which the Mental Treatments Act, 1945 is being abused in a way that we never intended. If we are not to take on board this legislation and await longer process of report and debate then the Minister must give a commitment to take decisive interim action employing whatever provisions in the 1945 legislation as are available to him. In particular the Minister should agree that the inspector of mental hospitals be given adequate resources and a directive to carry out an overview of all patients now in the Central Mental Hospital and in district mental hospitals that are a cause for concern.
The legislation is particularly welcome and must be fully considered. It presents an opportunity that must not be missed. The constituency of the mentally handicapped or deficient, of the people who are in our mental hospitals, is so marginalised that it is rarely a Deputy, particularly from the Opposition, has the opportunity to bring forward reforming legislation on their behalf. It is almost akin to the position of aliens in Ireland who are so poorly treated by Government and administrative officers. Again, the prospect of ever developing any movement within this House to bring forward legislation to establish a proper administration procedure for dealing with aliens coming to these shores is so unlikely because they are such a marginalised constituency. The same applies to the mentally handicapped and for that reason I would be slow to allow this legislation to slip lightly away from this Chamber on the basis that the issue will be looked at in due course by Government. It needs a more specific and stronger commitment than that.
The legislation is brought forward to deal specifically with two phenomena. The first is the use of the Act as a device to take people into custody in extraordinary circumstances and in circumstances never contemplated by the Act. Those are the type of short term actions taken in classic family rows or marital disputes where the certificate of a doctor — or doctors — is required for the purpose of committing someone to a psychiatric hospital.
The first point I want to make refers to a more general matter, the very curious provisions of the 1945 Act, which say that if the patient is being taken to a private hospital there is a need for two doctors to sign the commital form but that if the patient is being taken to a public hospital, only one doctor need sign. The very clear discriminatory provision in that Act is based on the fact that a private hospital will be receiving well off "private" patients and that public hospitals are for the poor. It is a remarkable class discrimination written into the 1945 legislation which has survived for so long, despite our Constitution and its provisions.
It is an invidious discrimination which, in any amending legislation, should be addressed; Deputy Fennell proposes to do that in her legislation as, from now on, two doctors will be needed to sign the form. However, I do not believe that in her legislation there is a requirement that at least one of the doctors should be someone employed or appointed by the Minister of the day with specific expertise to assess these types of cases, as provided for in the 1983 legislation in England. It is something which should be addressed so that one doctor is not supporting another colleague at the same level or in the same discipline or practice. It is very important to have one perhaps from the community in general practice and the other a doctor with psychiatric or specific training and expertise who can professionally assess the correctness of the procedure.
In regard to the proposals in the Bill dealing with the abuse of the situation which exists — which is all too common and continues to this day — of using the 1945 Act as a device to resolve interfamily disputes or marital problems, the first phenomenon I mentioned, the legislation proposed by Deputy Fennell, argues for the setting up of a review board. There is a fundamental difference between the process of reviewing and the process of appealing against a decision. In a review you are simply asking a higher authority to survey what has gone before and to decide whether it was correctly dealt with on the facts available to the original people who made the decision. However, in an appeal process, you are moving to a higher authority and you are entitled to look for an entirely new decision based on additional or new evidence and on an entirely new process or hearing.
In any legislation dealing with this issue I would much prefer to see a process of appeal in place as opposed to a process of review. In fact, some of the later provisions in the Bill circulated by Deputy Fennell seem to suggest that, while she is legislating for a process of appeal, she calls it a process of review. That is particularly suggested by the provisions in section 6 which entitle the review board to make separate types of orders from those originally given, to release a person where they are not happy with his or her commital and to allow for the hearing — orally or otherwise — of the review process. The importance of an appeal is that a person is entitled to be present, to be represented, to call additional evidence and witnesses and to be heard on his or her own behalf. That is not the established law in a process of review but it could be dealt with on Committee Stage of the Bill and rectified. It is really only a matter of terminology in the Bill, as opposed to anything in principle, which would divide Deputy Fennell and myself.
I have some reservations about the period of time provided for by way of review. If the legislation is specifically seeking to provide a vehicle for tackling the kind of situation which led to Deputy Fennell outlining the case of the unfortunate woman, which was so well documented in the media and in this House on the Adjournment and in other debates, a period of one month is extremely long to enable action to be taken by the review board. I would have thought that a person complaining that he or she had been summarily taken from home, workplace or other area and committed to a mental hospital and who was protesting his or her sanity should be entitled to be heard within a matter of days — if not hours — rather than the period of one month provided for in the Bill.
Certainly different considerations arise with the second phenomenon, that of the longer stay patient who has been in a district mental hospital for over one year or thereabouts where the Bill argues for a systematic review of all these cases. In that case a period of one month would seem to be reasonable but I suggest to Deputy Fennell that she should shorten the period provided for in her Bill. I do not think there could be any objections if the principle and idea is that we should not tolerate the abuse of this type of legislation to take people unwarrantedly and summarily into custody on medical grounds. They should be entitled to an immediate review or appeal.
Because of the quasi-judicial nature of the process suggested, there is also a need to reaffirm in this or any legislation that it is not a substitute for the provisions of habeas corpus which exist in the broader law. There is also — and should always be — the right of a litigant to go directly to the courts if he or she decides to do so. There may be occasions when it is much more appropriate to get the sanction and protection of the court rather than simply relying on an internal review procedure. That is something which should be provided for. I say that not just simply as a throwaway consideration; there is a body of law developing on the administrative, natural justice side within our courts which says that if there is an avenue of redress administratively within the authority, a hospital, school, university or union, the courts tend to deny the review procedures of the courts in favour of exhausting the internal remedies first. However, habeas corpus is a very important right and should always be available to a patient or a person in custody in addition to or over and above any administrative internal arrangements.
Because of the vulnerability of the people in hospital, we should also provide in any legislation for the establishment of duty solicitor schemes in relation to each of the hospitals. This can be very easily provided for and established in consultation with district Bar associations and district associations of the solicitors' profession. In every county or region in which there is a district mental hospital there is a readiness by solicitors to work on a duty rota system, in consultation with the Department of Health, to provide an immediate panel of lawyers who can be contacted on behalf of a patient to say that he or she requires legal advice and assistance and to ask for a lawyer. Mental hospitals have very high walls and are terribly remote places. Unfortunately, communications from them tend to be ignored or put aside on the basis that they are from people who are less than human things. That is why a duty solicitor scheme is very important, it should be established if not legislated for.
One of the provisions in the Bill argues that non-family persons who seek a review can only do so at the discretion of the review board. I suggest that a rider be attached to the effect that the discretion only be exercised for good cause. Perhaps the discretion should be taken away entirely. A person can be wrongly committed following internal family rows. The person committed might not have within the immediate family someone who would come to his or her aid. It is important that there should be an outside person, a friend perhaps, who should not have to show good cause and who would have the same rights to come in as a family member.
Section 6 provides that the board would not be entitled to release a person unless satisfied that the person would not be a danger to his self-interest or a danger to the community. This is very close to the provision in the British legislation. If a person is wrongly lodged in the first place, he or she should be entitled to be released provided that the review board consider him or her mentally fit. The fact that the person concerned might on release assault the person responsible for having him sent in is not a matter that should be borne in mind. A person could have a huge grudge against a spouse or other family member perceived as having been responsible for having him or her put into hospital in the first place and it would be a matter for the criminal code to deal with any such assault. If a person is of sound mind, that should be the only criterion with regard to release.
I welcome the provisions dealing with people who are detained unnecessarily for inordinately long periods. It is important that there be a systematic review by an independent body. Under the 1945 Act that work is supposed to be ongoing by the Minister for Health through the inspector of hospitals. From my experience of visiting mental hospitals, patients are not aware of that. They are totally at sea, not knowing that there is an authority looking after them and taking an interest in them.
The legislation is a valiant effort to highlight an area of major oversight by our legislators. That oversight is rooted directly in the problem of peripherality and isolation which is the constituency of mental hospital inhabitants. A very good opportunity is presented by this Bill. The 1945 Act is grossly outdated in many of its concepts and ideas. It is incumbent on us as a matter of urgency to legislate in this area. For those reasons my party will support this Bill on Second Stage and we commend Deputy Fennell on her initiative.