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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 15 Jun 1993

Vol. 432 No. 3

Ceisteanna—Questions. Oral Answers. - ERM Reform.

Pat Rabbitte

Question:

10 Mr. Rabbitte asked the Minister for Finance his views on the meeting of Finance Ministers on 23 May 1993 which considered the report of the EC Monetary Committee on possible reforms of the ERM; if he accepts the findings of the report that the ERM is fundamentally sound and requires little radical surgery, especially in view of the Irish experience during the period of currency instability at the end of 1992; if he still intends to seek the introduction of a new system which would place an onus on the stronger currencies to come in and support the weaker ones; and if he will make a statement on the matter.

Michael McDowell

Question:

32 Mr. M. McDowell asked the Minister for Finance the suggestions, if any, which have been made by the Committee of Central Bank Governors with regard to reform of the ERM following the currency crisis; and if he will make a statement on the matter.

Ivan Yates

Question:

70 Mr. Yates asked the Minister for Finance his views in relation to recent meetings of the Council of Finance Ministers concerning reports on the ERM by the EC Monetary Committee and the EC Central Bank Governors; and the response, if any, he has made to these reports.

John Bruton

Question:

71 Mr. J. Bruton asked the Minister for Finance if the ECOFIN has yet considered the report of the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks on the operation of the EMS; and if so, the changes that are to be made in the operation of the EMS as a result of this.

I propose to take Questions Nos. 10, 32, 70 and 71 together.

The European Council in Birmingham on 16 October 1992 invited the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers to review the lessons to be drawn from the currency crisis. In turn, the EC Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks were asked to examine the matter and report back to the ECOFIN. The reports of these two committees were discussed at the informal ECOFIN in May.

The reports emphasise the need for countries in the Exchange Rate Mechanism to ensure that their economic policies are such as to sustain their exchange rates. It was partly the cumulative divergence of some economies from the policies necessary to support their exchange rates that brought about the crisis. The reports recommend the establishment of a monitoring system for exchange rate parities to sound an early warning on potential problems in this area. The reports, as has been widely reported, do not recommend any changes to the intervention mechanisms.

I have broadly welcomed the reports and I can agree with most of the views expressed in them. It is true that I would have preferred a change to the intervention mechanisms to require other countries to support a currency under pressure, even before it reached the bottom of the ERM band, where the new monitoring system showed that the relevant exchange rate was correct. This was based on the view that, while intra-marginal intervention is not the only solution to a currency crisis, it nevertheless can play an important role. Other countries did not agree to this and, at the end of the day, the system is built on consensus. Both reports give emphasis to the use of voluntary co-operative intervention within the ERM bands. I welcome recent examples of this type of co-operation as indicating a greater awareness of the need to resist speculative pressure where it is not warranted.

I have arranged for copies of both reports to be placed in the Dáil Library.

Does the Minister recall his own scathing attacks and those of his ministerial colleagues on the operation of the ERM at the height of the currency crisis?

They would not know anything about that.

Does the Minister acknowledge that those criticisms are not echoed in the report of the monetary committee and that what our partners are telling us is that we have persisted in a fundamental error in defending the pound for too long when our main reliance is on the British market?

That is not correct. What my colleagues and both reports are saying is that because the system is a voluntary system, nobody wishes to give an absolute guarantee to accept the cost of the marginal intervention. This is particularly the German position. In fairness to them they carried much of the load on behalf of the system during the winter months. A useful aspect of the report is that it identifies that intra-marginal intervention will be applied on a voluntary basis, provided the monetary committee and the Governors of the Central Banks, who in future will have ongoing monitoring of exchange rate parities, believe that the exchange rate parities are defensible. Equally if they do not feel parities are defensible, they will not act. On foot of the conclusions received on a quarterly basis, the monetary committee who meet monthly on this matter will continue to monitor exchange rates and report on a confidential basis to the Governors and the relevant Minister of the member state which is out of line. Perhaps that is not as much as I would have liked to see but on the basis that it is not Ireland that has to pay the substantial tab on intervention and then has to wait several weeks or months to be reimbursed, it is not an unreasonable compromise. This has been in operation in the recent past in Spain, Portugal and Denmark.

Does the Minister not recall in the post-devaluation period all the whingeing and crying and scapegoating that the Minister, the Taoiseach and the Government participated in, blaming the Bundesbank and the European Central banking system for not coming to the support of the punt as it did to the Danish Krone? Now that this whole matter is investigated, the Minister and the Government are saying that everything is fine although there is no fundamental reform. Does the Minister not consider these reports to be a major rebuff to him and to the Irish position in view of the earlier position taken up? Does it not have serious implications for our credibility in so far as we did not take due cognisance of the relevance of sterling to the punt?

I have not changed my views one iota on that. I noticed, even in this morning's Financial Times, that the influential group, the Bank of International Settlements, who are considered experts in this matter, in their report speak about the system and blame last year's crisis within the European exchange rate mechanism on the lack of willingness of Governments to consider preventive parity adjustments in exchange rates prior to the emergence of severe market strains. That report also concludes — in clear reference to ourselves — that ultimately adjustments have to be made in crisis conditions precipitately, and that speculative attacks were triggered, even in the case of currencies where the fundamentals were sound. Effectively that is what happened to us; indeed, in some ways it is still happening, perhaps to a lesser degree now, in the case of our colleagues in Spain and Portugal. I have not changed my opinion one iota and still believe that, during the crisis, the co-operation and co-ordination should have been better. That is not to say that the overall system which has served us well since 1979 is fundamentally wrong. But I believe — I have placed this on the record many times — that it is better that the system speak clearly on whomsoever they believe to be out of line; if there are exchange rate parities out of line the finger should be pointed, and one does not then continue to defend those parities. In the case of the Irish punt the point was made clearly throughout the crisis that we were not out of line. Indeed, even when our Central Bank, not that many days before devaluation, asked the question again, it was told it was not out of line. Nonetheless we did not receive the type of support we would have liked to have received.

But the contents of this report will change that.

It will change it, perhaps not as much as we should like, in two respects. First, the EC Monetary Committee henceforth will continuously monitor all exchange rates; it has not been given that very important role and power which will play a very important part overall. It will then be at any country's peril to ignore what it is told. While I cannot speak for every other member state, it would be my view that any country would err fundamentally to ignore such advice if and when given by the EC Monetary Committee and the Governors of the Central Banks. Second, on a voluntary basis, if they believe that the parity is right, on an intermarginal basis, they will intervene in support of a currency. The House should remember that that is what they would not do in the crisis. Inter marginal intervention may not save a currency or prevent speculative attacks, but it gives the right signal and did work in the case of Denmark. I know it did not work recently in the case of Spain, because they decided to go ahead and devalue. While it does not constitute all that was sought, it is an improvement.

I thank the Minister for having placed the reports mentioned in the Dáil Library. I have had an opportunity of reading one, the Annual Report of the Committee of Central Bank Governors in which they express the very clear view that they should be, and should have been, more flexibility in the operation of the exchange rate mechanism. Will the Minister clarify something politically not clarified in any other forum? Did these technical people in the banks advise this course of action in advance of crises and did the politicians ignore such advice, or was it a case of them expressing wisdom with the beneift of hindsight? In view of the Minister's comments about voluntary interventions on an inter-marginal basis, will the Minister accept that it could be inferred that, at the end of the day, the Central Banks took the view that Ireland was a loser last January, and that the failure to get what was described as a sweetheart deal was nothing more than a validation of the view that they thought we could not ride both horses, that is sterling and the then value of our currency?

No, that was not the position. It should be remembered that when we were at the bottom of the band, the countries at the top supported us, but that was merely one for one. The inter-marginal support tends to be forthcoming but not when one is are the bottom of the band. I know Deputy Cox fully understands that one should not wait until one is at the bottom of the band, a point made not only by us but by four or five other countries. After we had devalued, on the following Monday morning, but more particularly on the Tuesday morning, the speculation moved on fully to the Danes, who took a rather quick decision that they were not going to sit there. I cannot say whether their decision was to leave the system altogether, as alleged, or whether to devalue by a large amount, but it was one or other. At that stage the political fear — in respect of which we would like to have received support — hit other countries, mainly one, when they acted to give inter-marginal intervention and a reduction in interest rates. It was that which stabilised currencies at least for the present though I would still hold the view that perhaps more should be done.

I made my point clear on the reports in Denmark that, while it is all right to maintain everything is now fine, such problems may recur. I agree with Deputy Cox that greater flexibility within the system on more general realignments would not be a bad thing, if undertaken within the EC monetary committee. The House should remember that had a meeting been held of the monetary committee in September last, or late August, they might have said: "Let us call it as it is"; certainly two or three other countries, not ours, would have changed their exchange rates. That has been fairly well acknowledged, both politically and in the reports since.

On the political aspect, the Central Bank was very much part of all the decisions taken up to the last minute. Indeed, we acted at all times on the basis of its advice which I very much appreciated during the currency crisis.

Some advice.

Good advice.

The technicalities of the ERM make for a very interesting discussion but what lessons has the Minister learned from the experience? While I appreciate that one cannot quote at Question Time, there are a myriad of quotes from the Minister, none of which are reflected in the report the subject matter of this question. Does the Minister accept that the drama could yet be replayed? What lessons has he learned from that experience? Is it not the position that the Irish pound was over-valued? Is not the fall-out now that we are viewed, whether or not the Minister likes it, as being in the sterling zone? Does the Minister agree with the comment of Mr. Jacques Delors that anybody who fell out of the ERM, or whose parity was altered, did not do so because of some malfunctioning of the ERM but rather because of problems relating to the fundamentals of that particular economy?

Deputy Rabbitte correctly interpreted the thrust of Mr. Jacques Delors' comments about those who fell out of the system. Indeed, on the Friday evening before devaluation, in so far as he could, he was supportive of this country — which we must appreciate throughout the crisis — and felt strongly that the fundamentals of the Irish economy did not warrant devaluation. No, I do not believe the Irish punt is over-valued. Indeed, that is precisely what we have witnessed in recent months and why our reserves are so high at present. That is why people were prepared to move money back in here from many countries, not merely from the sterling area.

Does the Minister accept that the entire town disagrees with him on that?

No, I feel that, while markets sentiments——

Even trade unionists have changed their minds.

——held by some people or some institutions might be of that view, when one examines the position, analyses the figures calculated by some of the best houses in town, they would indictate that it is up to us to explain to international markets the level of our connection with the United Kingdom. There is no need to go through a detailed analysis of our exports again. The fact is that if 30 per cent of our trade is with the United Kingdom, then 70 per cent is with other countries. As the House will be aware that 30 per cent is comprised of multinational exports denominated in dollars, not in sterling. Indeed, there are other accounts that go through the United Kingdom which are ECU-related and related to other currencies in the Far East. Therefore, the percentage is not near 30 per cent.

The percentage of labour is much higher.

The percentage of labour-intensive industries is quite high because such industries, operating within a narrow margin, which go into the export market will begin their trade with the United Kingdom. That is a matter of history and geography.

But is it not as the best research house would comment, trying to ride two horses.

No, because that comprises approximately 16 per cent of our trade.

But not of our employment.

Do we throw it all away because 16 per cent of our trade is linked to one country?

It is a significant question at a time when there are 300,000 people unemployed.

It is a significant question but the Deputy's suggestion is not the answer. It would be wrong to link ourselves to the sterling zone because, traditionally, that currency is weak. All the finance houses here would advise us along those lines. They advise us to move away from it.

Does it matter if we are viewed that way?

Deputy Yates rose.

I am anxious to move on to deal with questions tabled by other Deputies. I will allow a brief final supplementary from the Deputy.

We have listened to a long dissertation on Anglophobia and on the reasons the United Kingdom is not considered important but would the Minister agree that the most desirable objective for Ireland would be to move towards convergence, a single currency, with sterling included?

He also believes in the Fairy Godmother.

In relation to the reviews, John Major has said that there is a "fault line" problem in the ERM. Did the countries which have slipped out of the system have an input into these reports and do these reports fly in the face of the need to meet some of the objections raised by the Italians and the British? What efforts are being made at ECOFIN to have those currencies brought back in?

Does the Minister agree with Mr. Norman Lamont?

Like Norman Lamont, will he retire?

In regard to the ECOFIN Council and the other committees, the countries which are not included in the ERM ars still included in the EMS and are, therefore, party to all the discussions on this matter and to these reports. I made the point earlier that when there is no consensus or unanimity one does not get one's way. Naturally, the United Kingdom, the Italians, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Danes, the French, the Belgians perhaps and our-selves would like to have something different but on many of these matters somebody calls the tune, as the Deputies are aware. Deputies have to acknowledge that it is very easy if one does not have to pick up the tab which last year ran to billions of pounds for the Bundesbank. Therefore, it is entitled to its point of view.

The Italians would like to re-enter the system at an early date while the United Kingdom has made its position clear, it has no intention of thinking about it in the medium-term. However, it is still party to all the discussions that take place at the monetary committee and at meetings of the governors of the central banks. It would be useful — this is the view of Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand — if moves were made later in the year to speed up the convergence process under the Maastricht Treaty. I agree with Deputy Yates when he says that, ultimately, we cannot force sterling to enter but in moving towards a single currency we can resolve many and probably all these problems.

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