I move:
That Dáil Éireann approves the despatch, pursuant to section 2 of the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960, as applied by the Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993, of a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force for service outside the State to participate in the United Nations Operation in Somalia, known as UNOSOM II, as part of the International United Nations Force established by the United Nations Security Council.
This motion is required under section 2 of the Defence Act, 1960, as applied by the Defence Act, 1993, which became law last week. One of the purposes of the motion, in approving the despatch of a contingent from the Permanent Defence Force, is to allow the House to review the situation in the country or region to which the Irish troops will be sent. I propose, therefore, to outline the background to the establishment of UNOSOM II before considering the issue of Ireland's participation in that mission.
The modern history of Somalia is tragic, although the omens were good. While there are regional differences, Somalia is probably unique in Africa. A country of one people, one language, one culture and one religion. Somalis are divided into five major clan families which claim a common ancestry. The Somali Republic came about as the union on 1 July 1960 of the former British Somaliland Protectorate and the former Italian-administered United Nations Trust Territory of Somalia, which was approved by a national referendum in June 1961. A form of democratic government existed until 1969, when President Ali Shermake was assassinated on 15 October. Six days later there was a military coup led by General Mohammed Siad Barre.
Somalia's strategic position was ably used by Siad Barre during the Cold War period to play off the Soviet Union and the United States. The result was that Somalia became one of the most heavily armed countries in Africa and this is one of the most difficult problems that the UN operation has to face today.
During 1990 fighting between Siad Barre's Government and rebel forces escalated. One of the rebel groups, the United Somali Congress (USC), entered the capital, Mogadishu, in late December and claimed, by 1 January 1991, to control large parts of the city. Shortly afterwards it announced that it had taken control of the Government and invited all former opposition groups to participate in a national conference to discuss the democratisation of Somalia. Siad Barre fled the capital, thereby ending his 23 year dictatorship. Sadly, all attempts by the different groups to reach agreement on the future of the country failed. By mid-March 1991 southern Somalia had begun to disintegrate into anarchy.
During 1991 there were several further attempts to reconcile the different Somali movements, particularly by Djibouti, which hosted two conferences. Ceasefires were agreed but failed to hold. In November 1991 the United Somali Congress split. Its leadership and principal support come from the Hawiye clan, which is numerically Somalia's largest, and dominates the commercial and intellectual life of Mogadishu and its hinterland. Fighting broke out between two factions — the supporters of interim President Mahdi and the partisans of USC chairman, General Aideed.
Alarmed at the rapid deterioration in the situation and the heavy loss of life, the Security Council in January 1992 imposed an arms embargo on Somalia — a very necessary measure that has to be seen in the context of the vast quantity of arms already in the country. Under the same Resolution, Resolution 733, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative for Somalia, who was charged with ensuring (a) the cessation of hostilities, (b) the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance, and (c) movement towards national reconciliation.
The imposition of the arms embargo and the appointment of a UN Special Representative was followed in April 1992 by the establishment of the UN operation in Somalia known as UNOSOM I. This provided for 50 military observers to be sent to Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire agreement and the deployment of 500 security personnel to protect the transport, storage and distribution of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The deployment of security personnel was blocked by General Aideed, whose agreement was only secured in mid-August.
President Robinson, accompanied by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Somalia in October and reported on the situation to the UN Secretary-General, briefing him on what they had seen, on the inadequacy of the supplies getting through to those in need and on the unacceptable security situation.
The Government decided in November, in response to a request from the United Nations, that Ireland would make available a transport unit to UNOSOM, subject to Dáil approval. Unfortunately, it was becoming clear that in spite of the efforts of the UN special representative, UNOSOM would be unable to fulfil its mandate. Its efforts were blocked by the warlords and bandits at every stage. In December 1992 the Security Council authorised the establishment of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under United States command.
The United Task Force was created as an interim arrangement to deal with the immediate problems of creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. It largely succeeded in this objective. But it was clear that a wider international effort would be required if peace and stability were to be restored to Somalia. On 3 March the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council in some detail on the situation in Somalia and the efforts being made by the UN and UNITAF to restore peace. He recommended the establishment of UNOSOM II with a wider and stronger mandate.
The Secretary-General's recommendations were endorsed by the Security Council on 26 March when, by Resolution 814, it established UNOSOM II. Resolution 814 is the key resolution governing the UN's current involvement in Somalia. I believe it is worthwhile to set out the overall objectives of the UN in Somalia as provided for in that resolution. These are:
to assist in the provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of Somalia, based on assessment of clear, prioritised needs;
to assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons in Somalia;
to assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somalia society, and re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country;
to assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate, at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation of and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law;
to assist the people of Somalia in the development of a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines throughout Somalia;
to develop appropriate public information activities in support of the United Nations' activities in Somalia;
to create conditions under which Somalia civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realisation of rehabilitation and reconstruction programme.
Resolution 814 endorsed the Secretary-General's proposal that the UNOSOM mandate be expanded to include what he called "military tasks". Again, I believe it is worthwhile to spell out in detail what these military tasks are. They are:
(a) to monitor that all factions respect the ceasefire; (b) to prevent the resumption of violence and to take appropriate action against factions which violate or threaten to violate the ceasefire; (c) to maintain control of heavy weapons; (d) to seize unauthorised small arms; (e) to secure ports, airports and lines of communication; (f) to protect UN, Red Cross and NGO personnel and facilities, and to take such forceful action as may be required against attacks on them; (g) to continue the demining programme; (h) to assist in the repatriation of refugees; and (i) to carry out such further functions as may be authorised by the Security Council.
The mandate and activities of UNOSOM II must be seen as part of an attempt to create a secure environment in which the UN's wider political and humanitarian objectives can be achieved. The Government, Irish NGOs and public and political opinion have pressed for action along these lines and for a stronger UN presence. The mandate of UNOSOM II — disarmament, control of weapons, greater protection for aid personnel — corresponds to the requests that the Government has made directly to the UN and the US in recent months.
Resolution 814 demanded that the Somali parties, movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they entered into on 27 March, when they signed an agreement of national reconciliation formally ending the civil war. The agreement also includes the establishment of a Transitional National Council (TNC) to be made up of representatives from each of Somalia's 18 regions. UNOSOM political officers are currently holding meetings throughout southern Somalia, seeking agreement on the election of representatives to the district councils, from which in turn the Transitional National Council representatives will be chosen. It is important that the international community maintain pressure on the Somali leaders to work together for reconciliation and for a democratic national government.
UNOSOM II, at full strength, will have 20,000 military personnel, 8,000 logistics personnel and a civilian staff of 2,800. More than 18,000 personnel are already deployed. In addition, the United States provides a quick reaction force under UN command. This is to be replaced by an international quick reaction force before the end of this year.
The estimated cost of UNOSOM II, is $1.55 billion for the initial twelve months period. Ireland's share is approximately $2.79 million. This amount would have to be paid whether or not we decide to participate in UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II will be financed through assessed contributions from UN member states. Additional financing is to be provided through the UN Trust Fund for Somalia, which was established under Security Council Resolution 794. Ireland contributed £115,000 to that fund in December 1992.
Before taking up the UN's request to Ireland to participate in UNOSOM II, I would like to outline to the House some of the wiser implications of the use of Chapter VII in the evolution of UN peacekeeping as traditionally understood. It is this feature in particular which distinguishes our proposed involvement in Somalia from any other UN operation in which Ireland has previously participated.
At the heart of the concept of collective security as contained in the UN Charter is the notion that, if peaceful means fail to prevent a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, coercive measures agreed by the international community, may be used. In acceding to the UN, and in subscribing to the Charter, Ireland accepted that coercive measures, including military action, might need to be taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII to maintain or restore international peace and security. That chapter empowers the Security Council to adopt preventive and enforcement actions ranging from economic sanctions and blockades to military action by air, sea and land forces.
Because of the Cold War, the Security Council never made use of the most coercive of these provisions. With the end of the Cold War, and the new mood of co-operation in the Security Council, the UN has been looking again at the possibilities open to it of dealing with serious international and regional crises. The decision to establish UNOSOM II under Chapter VII with a defined range of military tasks, in support of humanitarian and political objectives, can be seen in the context of the new co-operation in the Security Council and the desire to use the potential of the UN to its fullest in the search for peace in Somalia.
Traditional UN peacekeeping operations are not specifically provided for in the UN Charter. They developed out of the need for practical instruments to strengthen and underpin the efforts of the UN to bring about the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter IV of the Charter. There is a general consensus in the UN that such operations can be considered as having a basis in the broad powers conferred by the Charter on the UN and especially on the Security Council. In this sense, they are seen as falling somewhere between the political and diplomatic means described in Chapter VI and the enforcement measures envisaged in Chapter VII. In the case of UNOSOM II, the Secretary-General believed that the force would not be able to implement its mandate unless it were endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII. In the circumstances of Somalia, the Government accept the Secretary-General's view that UNOSOM II should have such a capability.
On 5 April, the United Nations Secretary-General formally requested Ireland to make available an 80-strong transport contingent to the mission. A number of our EC partners have also been asked and some are already participating in UNOSOM II. These include Belgium, France, Germany, Greece and Italy.
I have set out on a number of occasions, including most recently to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs last week, my view that Ireland should participate in UNOSOM II for the following reasons: participation would be a clear demonstration that Ireland is prepared to give operational content to its policy on Somalia; it would reaffirm our longstanding commitment to international peace and security and to upholding the role of the UN, even in difficult and complex situations; it would strengthen our position in demanding greater protection for our aid workers.
I believe that, to withdraw our original offer made in November 1992, would be perceived as demonstrating a lack of political resolve and of acting in a manner that falls short of our publicly stated commitment to the people of Somalia. Furthermore, participation in UNOSOM II would underline our view that peace keeping, and peace enforcement under the Charter, are international responsibilities shared by the entire UN membership and are not the preserve of the larger powers.
In the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs last week, and during the debates on the Defence (Amendment) Bill, 1993, some concern was expressed about the involvement of Irish troops in a United Nations peace enforcement mission and the potential combat role of those troops. I wish to assure the House that, in proposing that Bill, the intention of the Government was that Ireland should adequately play its role in the international force established by the United Nations to respond to the horrific man made situation in Somalia and that we should play our part in the international effort, which we ourselves had demanded. It was not, and is not the Government's intention that Irish troops should be placed in a combat role in Somalia.
Ireland will provide non-combat troops to UNOSOM II. I believe that, by acting in such a manner, we will be fulfilling a necessary and important role within the United Nations, a role that is in line with our proud tradition of peace keeping, but reflects the changes which have taken place in our world in recent years. Such a role will permit us to voice, with authority, our views on the nature and mandate of this and future missions.
I want to put on the record of the House the Government's deep regret and concern at the recent loss of life in Mogadishu. The killing and wounding of Pakistani members of the UNOSOM force on 5 June, the deaths of more than 20 civilians on 13 June, and the attack on Italian soldiers last week highlight the unstable and volatile situation in the city. These events must be fully investigated and the necessary measures taken by the UN. I have already said that it would be deeply worrying if the UN force — whose objective is peace — becomes the focus of resentment or rejection by the Somali people. I understand that the UN Secretary-General is to report shortly to the Security Council and I will ensure that a copy of his report is made available to Members through the Dáil Library.
The debate on the Defence (Amendment) Bill has shown that there is wide political support for Ireland's participation in UNOSOM II. I believe that this reflects the views of the vast majority of Irish people who have, time and again, demonstrated their humanitarian concern for the plight of the Somali people.
The participation of Irish troops in Somalia is in the best tradition of Irish involvement in UN operations and it will, I hope, contribute to the restoration of peace in that troubled land. I commend the motion to the House.