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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 22 Mar 1995

Vol. 450 No. 8

Ceisteanna — Questions. Oral Answers. - County Wexford Estate.

Hugh Byrne

Question:

1 Mr. H. Byrne asked the Taoiseach the date on which a matter (details supplied) in County Wexford was first referred to the Attorney General by the Circuit Court; the reason for the time lapse; the reason four letters seeking resolution of the matter to successive Attorneys General on behalf of the party affected have to date received no substantive reply; if the business mentioned will be swiftly completed; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [4993/95]

I am happy to inform the Deputy that this case has at last been dealt with in a positive manner and a number of associated cases are also being dealt with. This is a direct result of Deputy Byrne's representations and the Dáil question, and is testimony to the effectiveness of the parliamentary question system in tackling the problem of delays in public administration.

As the Deputy will be aware from the letter dated 6 March 1995 which he received from the Attorney General, it is not the practice of his office to furnish details of the progress of applications for waiver in escheated estate cases such as this, particularly when there is a solicitor on record for the applicants. It should be noted that the utmost care and consideration must always be taken in dealing with escheated estates to ensure that when waivers are granted, no subsequent case can be brought against the State. I assure the Deputy that steps have been taken in the Department of Finance to ensure that such a delay will not arise again.

The case which is the subject of the Deputy's question was brought to the attention of the Attorney General by letter dated 4 February 1993 from a firm of solicitors informing him of the existence of the proceedings, which comprised an application to the Circuit Court by the solicitors' clients under the Trustee Acts for the directions of the court as to the disposal of certain funds. The court had given those directions on 22 July 1992.

On the same day that the solicitors' letter was received namely, 9 February 1993 the Attorney General's office referred the matter to the Chief State Solicitor's office for investigation. The Chief State Solicitor's office then entered into correspondence with the solicitors for the purpose of obtaining necessary information about the trust, which involved interests in property dating back to the 1890s. The trustees have been unable to trace any persons who would be entitled to a part of the trust and, therefore, the court held that the State was legally entitled to that part as ultimate intestate successor by virtue of section 73 (2) of the Succession Act, 1965. The Attorney General's function in the matter when he was notified of the court's order of 22 July 1992 was confined to investigating the claims and making a recommendation to the Minister for Finance as to whether the Minister should waive, in whole or in part, the entitlement of the State in favour of the parties who were entitled to the remainder of the trust property.

The information which was needed before the Attorney General could make a recommendation to the Minister for Finance took time to obtain because of the complexity of the case and all the necessary information was not finally obtained from the solicitors until 21 January 1994. On 10 March 1994 the Chief State Solicitor's office submitted the papers to the Attorney General for his recommendations. These were given by him and were conveyed to the Department of Finance by the Chief State Solicitor on 20 May 1994. At the same time, the solicitors were informed of that fact. The Attorney General had no further function in the matter after that. The Chief State Solicitor's office on 19 March 1995 conveyed the final waiver to the solicitors for the applicants.

I am pleased with the response and I sincerely hope this business is concluded. Given the disturbing laxity in the way the Attorney General's office conducts its business, will the Taoiseach promise to end a practice whereby one is refused the name of the official dealing with a matter on the grounds that, as the Government's legal adviser, the Attorney General's advice is only for the Government? Will the Taoiseach accept that is the general excuse offered for stonewalling on routine matters such as this? It is ridiculous and underlines the unresolved conflict between the Attorney General's responsibility to the Government and his responsibility to the public?

The Deputy's question is based on a misapprehension. The delay in the case was not in the Attorney Generals office. As I outlined at some length, the delay was in the Department of Finance. The Attorney General's recommendations were conveyed quite promptly to the Department of Finance in May 1994, but the Department did not come to a decision to act on it until 10 March 1995. That was due to misfiling of the case. As a result of the Deputy's question, not only has this case been dealt with effectively but cetain policy questions that were holding up 17 other cases were also brought to light and are being dealt with. It is in that context I express my appreciation of the value of Deputy Byrne's question, but he is mistaken in directing criticism at the Attorney Generals office in this case because it is not warranted.

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