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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 4 Apr 1995

Vol. 451 No. 5

Ceisteanna — Questions. Oral Answers. - Bosnian Conflict.

Desmond J. O'Malley

Question:

18 Mr. O'Malley asked the asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, in view of the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, the steps, if any, the Government proposes to take under the auspices of the United Nations and of the European Union to prevent a further escalation of the violence there and in view of the widespread breaches of human rights; and if he will press for an intensification of sanctions against Serbia in view of the Serbian aggression and attempts at ethnic cleansing. [

Ivor Callely

Question:

75 Mr. Callely asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the current deteriorating conditions in Bosnia; and the support, if any, the Irish Government is offering. [6983/95]

I propose to take Questions Nos. 18 and 75 together.

The Government is seriously concerned at the deteriorating situation in Bosnia where, in recent weeks, there has been a dramatic increase in violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. This agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1995 for a four-month period, had been generally holding, other than in the Bihac area. If it collapses and significant progress cannot be made towards a solution, there is a strong possibility that Bosnia will be plunged into a renewed war with tragic results for the region as a whole.

This critical situation in Bosnia has been precipitated by military offensives undertaken recently by Bosnian Government forces in the Tuzla and Travnik areas. Bosnian Serbs have retaliated against Tuzla, Gorazde, Mostar, and around Sarajevo.

It would be a tragedy for the people of Bosnia should the limited progress towards a political solution be lost at this stage. In my answer to a question on 24 January, I outlined the elements of the Contact Group's plan for territorial delimitation in Bosnia and for its preservation as a single union within its internationally recognised borders. This has been accepted by three of the four key participants in the conflict — the Bosnian Government, Bosnia's Croats, and the authorities in Belgrade who represent the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e., Serbia and Montenegro.

Only the Serbs in Bosnia itself continue to reject the plan. Pressure is being applied to obtain their agreement. The Security Council, in September 1994, reinforced and extended the sanctions which had been imposed earlier on the Bosnian Serbs. Provision was made to prevent all economic activities in member states by persons or entities resident in areas under control of Bosnian Serb forces; the freezing of Bosnian Serb assets; and the exclusion of Bosnian Serb civilian and military authorities from the territories of member states of the UN. These sanctions, together with those already in place, are among the most stringent measures ever adopted by the Security Council. For their refusal to accept the Contract Group's plan, the Bosnian Serbs are now isolated politically, materially and physically.

Belgrade's decision, in August 1994, to end its support for the Bosnian Serb leadership and to close its border with Bosnia, has brought further pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. A mission of the International Conference on former Yugoslavia, to which Ireland is contributing four personnel, is monitoring this closure. To encourage Belgrade's belated co-operation in the peace process the Security Council has suspended a limited number of sanctions — for example on sports and cultural contacts — but not the core economic sanctions. While pressure is being maintained on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group's plan, the European Union is working to advance the peace process on a broader level. We are endeavouring to bring about the mutual recognition of the former Yugoslav states. This would be a clear signal that the aspirations of the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs for a "greater Serbia" are not attainable and would improve the prospects for political settlements in Bosnia and Croatia.

At this critical time we, with our European Union partners and the UN, have made it clear that the Bosnian parties must cease their military operations; they must abide by their commitments under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and permit its renewal; they must co-operate with the Security Council's decision last week, which we fully support, to renew UNPROFOR's mandate; and, vitally, they must now begin negotiations on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group's plan.

We are continuing to work with our European partners to achieve these objectives.

The Minister in his reply, for which I am grateful because it covers the matter fairly fully, referred only to sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. Does he think it appropriate, in view of the very close connection and support between Serbia proper and the Bosnian Serbs, that sanctions against Serbia should be reimposed or intensified? When he says that the recent outbreak of fighting was caused, in the first instance, by the Bosnian Government forces attacking others within Bosnia and seeking to regain some of the territory which has been taken from it by Serbia illegally, does he not feel that the Bosnian Government, in all the circumstances, is entitled to seek to defend and try to reoccupy its own territory, particularly as an arms embargo has operated against them and not against Serbia?

The Deputy is well aware of the position taken by the Irish Government and by our European Union partners on the arms embargo. There are many who take a different view but I do not feel that allowing arms into Bosnia would in any way contribute to a solution to this horrendous problem. We have to look at this in the context of what the Contact Group set forward over many months and, indeed, going back to the original London conference. We have to ensure a continuation of pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group's plan. We have to maintain an emphasis on the overall resolution of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia which would guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states within their internationally recognised borders. That involves an emphasis on the importance of mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav republics. In this regard support for the convening of a meeting between Presidents Tudjman, Millosevic and Izetbegovic could pave the way for an international conference to settle all matters relating to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Also, we must support the international conference's peace plan for Croatia and we are urging parties to begin negotiations. There are no easy solutions. That is one of the lessons we have all learned in relation to former Yugoslavia. The parties must be brought back to the negotiating table and the European Union, in conjunction with our United States allies and the Russians, must do everything possible to encourage them to do so.

Will the Minister agree that if pressure is not put on Serbia in the present context, on the lines I suggest in the question, that the Serbians are likely — and thought by many people very likely — to engage in further acts of aggression in Kosovo where they will seek to occupy that country and to expel people of Albanian ethnic origin? Does he not regard the attitude now being taken in regard to Serbia as an encouragement to them to expand their idea of what they call a greater Serbia which they want to establish, and that they are showing no respect for national borders within the former Republic of Yugoslavia by occupying parts of Croatia, of Bosnia-Hercegovina and, effectively, parts of Kosovo?

First, the Bosnian Serbs remain intransigent in their opposition to the Contact Group's plan but we have to look at a way of advancing the overall peace process in Bosnia. We are pressing for recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Croatia, within their internationally recognised borders. This would be a major contribution to peace in the Yugoslav region. It could also be a clear signal — a signal which the European Union has been trying to send for many months — to both the Bosnian Serbs and the Croatian Serbs that their aspirations for a greater Serbia cannot be realised. They have to accept that they cannot be realised and everything we do must ensure that that is the position.

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