While under our criminal law the general rule is that a person is not required to answer any questions in connection with an offence of which they are suspected, it is not correct to say there is an unqualified right to silence. The general rule — which is in line with a general constitutional protection against self-incrimination — is subject to a number of statutory exceptions.
The most recent of these were included in the Criminal Justice Act, 1984. Sections 18 and 19 of that Act allow a court or jury to draw inferences from an accused's failure or refusal in the course of Garda questioning to account for certain matters: marks on his or her person or clothing or presence in the vicinity of a crime. These inferences cannot be drawn unless the accused was told in ordinary language what the effect of failing or refusing to provide the relevant information might be. While inferences can be treated as amounting to corroboration of other evidence the Act specifically provides that they cannot alone form the basis of a conviction.
The House will appreciate that in this area of our law conflicting and competing rights are at issue. On the one hand, it is argued that the right to silence is an old and very important protection of a suspect's rights and that its removal could place in jeopardy those innocent of any crime. On the other hand, the concerns which have been increasingly expressed in recent times to the effect that the present situation helps those involved in very serious crimes to avoid conviction require that at the very least the law in this area is constantly kept under review in the light of changes that have taken place in the nature of crime and the nature of society.
It is only right to sound a note of caution in relation to any possible change in the law in this area: there are clear limits to what any such changes could achieve. In particular, it is difficult to imagine any change in the law in this area which would not continue to provide that inferences from silence alone are not a sufficient basis for a conviction. In other words other evidence linking the suspect to the crime would also have to be available. I mentioned this not to indicate any unwillingness on my part to consider further changes in the law in this area but to emphasise that we should be realistic about what such changes might achieve.