Mary Harney
Question:10 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach the reason the Anglo-Irish Summit planned for Chequers on Wednesday, 6 September 1995 was called off by him on the preceding evening; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [13104/95]
Ceisteanna—Questions. Oral Answers. - Northern Ireland Peace Process.
Mary Harney
Question:11 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach if he had sought to have the cancellation of the planned Chequers Anglo-Irish Summit of 6 September 1995 jointly announced by the British and Irish Governments. [13105/95]
Mary Harney
Question:12 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach when he became aware of the fact that Sinn Féin was not prepared to go along with the proposed International Commission on illegal arms decommissioning which was envisaged in the draft communiqué for the aborted Chequers Summit of 6 September 1995. [13106/95]
Mary Harney
Question:13 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach when he became aware, in the run-up to the aborted Chequers Summit of 6 September 1995 that the British Government was not prepared to abandon the Third Washington Test relating to arms decommissioning. [13107/95]
Mary Harney
Question:14 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach if it is Government policy that the agreement of Sinn Féin is not a prerequisite to an agreement with the British Government on the way in which the issue of decommissioning illegal arms might be handled; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [13108/95]
Mary Harney
Question:15 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach if it is the Government's policy that all political parties participating in inclusive talks to devise a political settlement for Northern Ireland must establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods in accordance with paragraph 10 of the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993. [13111/95]
Mary Harney
Question:16 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach the proposals, if any, the Government has in relation to the establishment of an International Commission for the decommissioning of arms in Northern Ireland; and the steps, if any, the Government has taken and proposes to take to secure agreement to its establishment. [13366/95]
Mary Harney
Question:17 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach when he decided on the cancellation of the Anglo-Irish Summit scheduled to be held on 6 September 1995; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [13367/95]
Mary Harney
Question:18 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach if Sinn Féin has communicated to him the reason it opposed the proposed International Commission on illegal arms decommissioning which was envisaged in the draft communiqué for the aborted Chequers Summit of 6 September 1995. [13368/95]
Mary Harney
Question:19 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach the contact, if any, he has had with the British Government in relation to the setting of a new date for the Anglo-Irish Summit which was scheduled for 6 September 1995 and was cancelled. [13370/95]
Mary Harney
Question:20 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach if he will report on his meeting of 14 July 1995 with the Tánaiste, the leader of the SDLP and the leader of Sinn Féin; his views on Dr. John Alderdice's subsequent criticism of the meeting; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [13378/95]
Bertie Ahern
Question:21 Mr. B. Ahern asked the Taoiseach the reason his meeting with the British Prime Minister arranged for early September 1995 was postponed. [13407/95]
Bertie Ahern
Question:22 Mr. B. Ahern asked the Taoiseach if the Government is committed to the proposal to establish an International Commission on the issue of weapons decommissioning; the way in which he envisages it operating; and whether he regards the co-operation of Sinn Féin and the two loyalist parties as essential to its success. [13410/95]
Mary Harney
Question:23 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach if he will report on any contact he has had during the summer with the United States' Administration in relation to the peace process. [13424/95]
Mary Harney
Question:24 Miss Harney asked the Taoiseach if he will make a statement on his meeting with the British Prime Minister on the margins of the informal meeting of EU Heads of Government. [13525/95]
Bertie Ahern
Question:25 Mr. B. Ahern asked the Taoiseach whether he raised with the British Prime Minister the widespread anger and concern that exists in the Irish Republic concerning the operations of nuclear power stations on the west coast of Britain. [13550/95]
Bertie Ahern
Question:26 Mr. B. Ahern asked the Taoiseach whether there is now in place an agreed agenda for the peace process that will result in perceptible progress by the time the President of the United States of America arrives in November. [13551/95]
Bertie Ahern
Question:27 Mr. B. Ahern asked the Taoiseach the steps, if any, he has taken to avoid a recurrence of the calamity of the cancellation of the recent Summit; and whether he will confirm that there has only been one meeting of senior officials to examine the causes of the cancellation. [13552/95]
Ivor Callely
Question:98 Mr. Callely asked the Taoiseach the reason it was necessary to postpone the Anglo-Irish Summit arranged for 6 September 1995; the effect, if any, the postponement will have on the peace process; the progress made since the postponement; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [13513/95]
I propose to take Questions Nos. 10 to 27, inclusive, and Question No. 98 together. The key objective for everybody at this stage in the peace process must be to create the conditions in which round table talks can take place, leading to a negotiated settlement based on consent.
As the House will be aware, the decommissioning issue represents the main obstacle in the way of achieving all-party talks in round table format. In the lead up to the summit planned for 6 September and following intensive discussions with many of the relevant parties, the Government believed it had identified a way forward out of this impasse. However, in discussions with the British Government and Sinn Féin in the days immediately preceding the Summit, it emerged that this was unlikely to work. In these circumstances, the only responsible course of action was to seek a postponement of the Summit. It would be counterproductive to elaborate on the background, having regard to the need for confidentiality in the ongoing efforts to resolve the problem. I cannot reasonably be expected to interpret for this House the positions of the other parties involved.
There was no intention of calling round table talks, as has been suggested, in the absence of adequate progress on the decommissioning issue. Certainly, the Government wishes to see round table talks taking place as soon as possible, as it made clear following the meeting of July in Dublin Castle with the SDLP and Sinn Féin. At the same time, however, it fully recognises that, as a matter of both principle and practical reality, the requirements of paragraph 10 of the Downing Street Declaration must be met to the satisfaction of all concerned. It all boils down to a question of trust. The Irish Government has trusted Sinn Féin that the cessation of IRA violence is irreversible and it continues to be encouraged in this by the absence of violence for over a year now. However, the British Government and, more importantly, the Unionists do not yet fully share in this trust.
Following the postponement of the Summit, the Government is continuing with its intensive efforts to identify the way forward with the British Government and with the other relevant parties, including by way of an international commission. As I stated in the Dáil last week, there have been contacts on an almost daily basis between officials of the two Governments and as Deputies will be aware, I reviewed the position with the Prime Minister Mr. Major on a number of occasions during the recent EU informal Summit in Majorca. Since then, I have been and will continue to be in ongoing communication with the Prime Minister. As Deputies will be aware, the Tánaiste is now in the United States and the US Administration continues to engage in the peace process in a very balanced and constructive way.
While the two Governments are not yet in a position to reschedule the Summit, the contacts at official and political level to which I have referred have allowed us to take stock of each other's position. In addition, during my discussions with the British Prime Minister in Majorca, we took the opportunity to explore some possibilities for moving matters forward. I can assure the House that the Prime Minister and I are totally committed to working our way to a solution and that we will continue to work together intensively over the short term to this end. We are determined to use the opportunity presented by the cease-fires to ensure that the people of Northern Ireland are given the political stability and certainty which have eluded them for so long. I am convinced that we can succeed.
In the course of my meetings with the Prime Minister Mr. Major in Majorca, I emphasised the continuing importance of constructive movement on prisoners issues, which are of concern to both loyalists and republicans. In that regard, I am pleased that Ireland has now ratified the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons and discussions have already taken place between officials of the Department of Justice and of the Home Office about the practicalities of giving effect to the Convention in our two jurisdictions. These discussions have been useful, but there are significant issues to be resolved. The Irish Government has now asked that the discussions be progressed urgently with the British authorities and it will pursue the matter accordingly.
The British Prime Minister and I also discussed ways of developing the east-west strand of the three relationships on these islands and we have put in hands work at official level on this matter.
I raised with the Prime Minister the strong concern in Ireland at the presence of nuclear power stations on the west coast of Britain. I stated that the 1993 incident at Wylfa power station in Wales was a matter of particularly grave concern to the Irish Government. The Prime Minister undertook to come back to me on the points which I raised. In light of the importance of the employment situation in Cork, and in Cobh in particular, I sought the Prime Minister's support for the proposed sale and 100 per cent disposal of the Irish Steel plant in Haulbowline in the forthcoming discussions on the issue at the EU Industry Council in November.
Were the Taoiseach's adviser and the head of the Anglo-Irish division of the Department of Foreign Affairs told by representatives of Sinn Féin that if the Government went ahead with the Summit and established an international commission there would be "bodies on the street"?
As the Deputy will recollect, I stated in my reply that I did not think it would be particularly useful for me to become involved in interpreting the positions adopted by others. I remind the Deputy that shortly after the postponement of the Summit I offered a confidential briefing to her party which was graciously accepted and that was an occasion at which most of the questions that the Deputy's party has on this matter were answered in a way that would not be prejudicial to the overall interests of the peace process.
I am not asking the Taoiseach to interpret anything, but we need to know and the public at large needs to know the reason the Summit was cancelled; if the Government caved in to the threat of violence by Sinn Féin everyone should know that.
The Irish Government did not cave in to any threat, nor would it ever cave in to a threat from a paramilitary organisation. The Irish Government in the interest of peace wishes to bring all the relevant parties, including paramilitary organisations with it on an agreed basis towards a solution. That requires — I am sure the Deputy would not urge otherwise — that we take into account the views of parties associated with paramilitary organisations because we need to get their agreement to put their guns out of commission. We have to work at that and we have to listen to them in order to reach that objective. That does not mean and will never mean that at the end of the day they will have the final say. It is the Government, elected by the people who will make the decisions. The Deputy will recollect that I made that very clear at a dinner in Dublin Castle, at which her party was also represented. The Deputy will be well aware of what I said, but should she want a copy of what I said I will furnish it to her. However, in her absence I gave a very full briefing to Deputy Desmond O'Malley on all the matters raised here. If the Deputy wishes to ask me all those questions in public, she may certainly do so but the purpose of the briefing was to enable me to give a fully comprehensive reply. If the Deputy checks with Deputy O'Malley she will find that my answers to his questions were full and there was no question that I did not answer.
This party was most grateful for the briefing it received but there was one issue on which we did not agree. Will the Taoiseach in hindsight now agree that it was foolish to attempt to hold a Summit in the week of a Unionist leadership contest and it would have been better, as had been stated by the Tánaiste a week earlier, to postpone it because of lack of preparation? Does the Taoiseach accept that the abrupt cancellation of the summit, the day before it was scheduled to take place, damaged trust between both Governments and both communities in the North? Admittedly the Taoiseach has been working in recent weeks to resolve the matter but does he agree that this was the effect of his handling of the situation?
At the beginning of June when I was in Moscow I had a summit meeting with the British Prime Minister and we agreed to meet again in September. Early in August we agreed the date of 6 September. The decision to meet on that date was made long before there was a vacancy in the leadership of the Unionist Party and without having the facility for prophecy it would not have been possible for us to have taken that issue into account.
The position with regard to the Summit was that the two Governments had agreed on a certain approach which I believe was reasonable. Despite it having been modified to take account of Sinn Féin's concerns, Sinn Féin indicated to us a very short time before the meeting that it would not co-operate. Subsequently, in discussions with the British Government it became clear that the answers to supplementary questions that might be put to them — not on the communiqué but on contingent matters arising from the communiqué — might not be sufficiently clear in regard to Washington 3 being subjected to, and not being something that was retained in defiance of the report of the commission.
I briefed the Deputy privately about the two problems that arose. Whether the first caused the second is a matter upon which speculation may take place in the history books. Whether the position of the British Government was less clear because of the position being adopted by Sinn Féin and whether it might have been different if Sinn Féin had not adopted that position is something about which one can only speculate. The material facts are that this difference or divergence only became absolutely clear in both its dimensions to me on Tuesday and I decided, with the advice and support of my Government colleagues, that it would not be responsible to proceed with the summit unless we were confident that the purposes for which the summit was being called were going to be achieved. That was the correct decision and events will prove that.
I also believe that the problems that are there, which are now clearer than they would otherwise have been if no date had been set, will be resolved more easily as a result of the work that is being done. It is important to recognise that the peace process is a process of building trust. No one meeting will solve all the problems but we must be satisifed that we will be moving forward all the time and not in any other direction. I believe we are moving forward at this juncture.
With regard to what would have been asked of the British Government at the press conference, it is clear that it was not going to give the right answer to what was written in the draft communiqué. However, that refers back to the central position of what is delaying the peace process moving forward. This side of the House accepts that it is a process. I hope the Taoiseach is correct. I listened to Mr. Mayhew speaking to the British-Irish Association at Cambridge, I listened to what Mr. Mates said and, in the last few days, I listened to Mr. Ancram. I do not see the subtle difference yet.
The Taoiseach is aware that in May 1994, in the process of clarification on this issue, Sinn Féin asked the British Government in question 18A what exactly renunciation of violence meant. That was a clear question. It received a vague and general reply. I cannot remember the exact words but at no stage did the British Government insist on arms decommissioning as a precondition. If that was its view — and that is what it is stating now — it would have answered thus in direct correspondence with Sinn Féin. It is still the same issue. Since the failed or delayed summit, has the Taoiseach, in the course of his direct talks and yesterday's telephone conversation with Mr. Major, resolved that issue? Does he or will he accept that decommissioning was not a precondition? That is what is creating the difficulty for the Taoiseach——
The Deputy's question is becoming long and unwieldy.
Where does that issue stand now? It is still the difficulty in moving forward.
That is exactly the problem we are trying to solve and we all know that.
I want to know his attitude.
We have made some progress on it. There is a determination in all quarters to find a solution now. The Deputy can quote from certain documents and I can quote from others. In paragraph 6 of the Downing Street Declaration, for example, it is clearly established that the occupant of my office has an obligation to work to create a new era of trust in which suspicion of the motives or actions of others is removed on the part of either community.
That imposes an obligation on me, as Taoiseach, to work to satisfy the nationalist community that loyalist arms can never again be used against it and, equally importantly, to satisfy the unionist community that IRA arms can never again be used or threatened against it. That is a clear obligation imposed, with the agreement of my predecessor, on me and on any successor I may have. That is the basis upon which I am working to resolve the decommissioning issue.
We must provide reassurance to both communities that the guns still held by organisations which insist on their right to hold them will be put out of commission as soon as possible and, certainly, that their use will never be threatened again. I am acting on the basis of the Downing Street Declaration which is a commitment of the Irish Government, entered into by my predecessor, and not on the basis of a British Government answer to a Sinn Féin questionnaire.
Paragraph 10 of the Downing Street Declaration states that the parties who support paramilitary organisations must establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods. That must be established to the satisfaction not of their friends but of their foes. It is easy to establish one's good faith to the satisfaction of one's friends; in a peace process one must establish one's good faith to the satisfaction of one's foes. That is the challenge for Sinn Féin, the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party in paragraph 10. The obligation on me is set out in paragraph 6.
Before Deputy Harney puts her question, I advise Members that the House must deal with Priority Questions at 3.30 p.m.
Fifteen of the 27 questions are in my name so I would appreciate time to ask supplementaries. The Taoiseach referred to private briefings. If private briefings are to prevent me and my party from asking legitimate questions of public interest, I will not avail of such private briefings because that would be most unsatisfactory.
As the Taoiseach knows, the media was briefed——
A question please, Deputy Harney.
I must put the background of my question. The summit was virtually agreed and a draft communiqué was ready. At the eleventh hour it was cancelled on a Monday evening but by Thursday the Taoiseach was telling us that the British and Irish Governments would move ahead without Sinn Féin——
Clearly we are having a statement.
——and on Friday the Tánaiste said that would not be practical. In light of those events, I am entitled to ask the Taoiseach what is the Government's approach. Will the Government move ahead without Sinn Féin? Would the Taoiseach agree that we need to create the circumstances or the environment where it will be unreasonable for anybody to stay away from the table? We must create the circumstances in which it would be unreasonable for anybody — whether it is the unionists or Sinn Féin — to stay away from the table. In that context, I urge the Taoiseach to move ahead and not let anybody dictate the terms of an agreement he might make with another Government.
Not even the Unionists.
I entirely agree with the proposition that it is the obligation and responsibility of this Government to create the conditions in which all the relevant parties would come to the table. There is no point in starting talks to which one side comes because they are satisfied with the conditions, and the other side stays away because they are not satisfied.
As the Government of this country, it is our job to make a judgment at any given time as to whether an agreement is sufficient to achieve that objective. I made the judgment on the day before the summit that what was in prospect at that stage would not fulfil the objective. Therefore, there was no point in going ahead with it unless we were going to ruin it.
I am working, however, to achieve a situation, with the assistance of my Government colleagues, the Tánaiste, the Minister for Social Welfare and others, to get to a point where we have an agreement that will bring all the relevant parties with us, but, as I made abundantly clear in my speech in Dublin Castle, this sovereign Government will make decisions at the end of the day. We will seek to bring others with us but, if we have to move forward without their prior agreement, having done everything necessary to get their prior agreement and failed, we will go ahead. We are not going to do that recklessly or precipitously. If we take the time necessary and do not set artificial deadlines or speak the language of crisis or confrontation — we are careful in our choice of words — we will get it. The more talk there is about crisis, the more difficult it becomes to achieve the trust that is needed.
I know the Taoiseach was being careful in his choice of words. I put it to him that within days of the postponed summit, he gave a speech in which he said that the two Governments soon might have to move on, in relation to decommissioning, without the participation of a number of elements whereas, within 24 hours of that speech, the Tánaiste made what might be regarded as a diametrically opposed speech, where he said there was no point proceeding with the forum or commission for decommissioning without the participation of the main components that the Government would be addressing within that. I put it to the Taoiseach that those two speeches were checked by the respective officials who, apparently, did not see any difference between those two speeches which I cannot understand. Could the Taoiseach explain that?
Yes, no problem.
While I am on my feet — I probably will not have another opportunity — I thank the Taoiseach for raising the issue of nuclear stations with the British Prime Minister. The Taoiseach may recall that I raised this issue before he previously met the Prime Minister in Brussels and that he, the Taoiseach, did not talk to him about the issue. When was the Government first informed of the Wylfa incident?
The question is becoming rather long.
With talk about better relationships between these two islands, would the Taoiseach not accept that, in order to create better relations, the British Government might be a bit more forthcoming in relation to nuclear stations on the west coast of their island?
The Tánaiste and I worked together on those two speeches. He saw my speech and I saw his before either of them were issued. We were fully happy with what one another said.
That makes it worse.
The Government is moving in two different directions at the one time.
Clearly — this is something which I hope the party opposite, speaking of Fianna Fáil, agrees with — in the final analysis, the Governments have a right and an obligation to move forward if others cannot be brought along. I recollect Deputy Bertie Ahern saying here on a number of occasions that the Irish Government should not see itself simply as a broker. By that I understand him to mean that, in the finaly analysis, the Government must act as well as attempt to facilitate agreement. That is precisely what I was saying in my Dublin Castle speech.
Equally, the Tánaiste was saying in his speech the following day to the British-Irish Association, as I have said here and also said in the Dublin Castle speech, that in pragmatic terms we must do everything possible to bring all the other parties with us and, if that involves postponing the summit until we have conditions right, then we should postpone the summit until we have brought all parties with us. If that does not work, as I said in response to Deputy Harney, the position set out in my Dublin Castle speech stands: the Government, having made its effort, has the right and the obligation to go ahead to use leadership in this matter.
As far as the nuclear power issue is concerned, I raised that matter with the Prime Minister and, as I said in my reply, I am awaiting a response from him and, if needs be, we will discuss the matter again.
When was the Taoiseach first informed of the Wylfa incident?
I have called Deputy Harney and she will be heard.
Will the Taoiseach state if a draft communiqué was agreed between the Irish and British sides for the summit on 6 September?
As I said to the Deputy in response to her earlier question, it is not particularly helpful to get into details on that matter. We had reached an advanced stage in that communiqué, it is true, but some of the conditions surrounding the communiqué, as distinct from the communiqué itself, which were necessary for the success of the objectives set out in the communiqué, were absent. I have explained in some detail what those absent surrounding necessary conditions were.
We on this side of the House certainly agree that the Government has a right to move forward. That is precisely what happened with the Downing Street Declaration. We would be much happier if all elements of the Government were heading in the same direction, not in completely opposite directions on the issue.
There are number of questions down for answer by the Taoiseach which asked when he became aware of the fact that Sinn Féin was not prepared to go along with the proposed decommissioning. In the reply he gave, he responded that it was "in the days immediately before" the proposed meeting. In a reply to a supplementary he said that it was "a short time before". I am trying to get precision. What do "in the days immediately before" and "a short time before" mean? Do they mean on the Monday or Tuesday, as some Government spokesmen are claiming, or do they mean the Thursday or Friday of the previous week, as Sinn Féin is claiming? He should be precise about it.
Saturday evening. Will that do? As far as the other matter referred to in the Deputy's question is concerned, I know the Deputy has much experience in this area, but he will be wasting his time trying to find divisions in this Government as far as this matter is concerned. The Government has been working in a concerted and careful manner in regard to this and all parties in the Government are complementing one another in the work that they are doing to promote the peace process. Deputy Dempsey, in particular, would not be the man to be entering into this area, in view of his own experiences.
That is precisely the point I am making. The Ministers are all going in a different direction.
There is more of that on the Deputy's benches at the moment.
The Taoiseach has put much emphasis today on the word "trust" and the trust that the Irish Government has to build up between Nationalists and loyalists. The most revealing thing that the Taoiseach said when talking about the cessation of violence and the fact that the Irish Government, as we do on this side of the House, believes that we have reached a "definitive end of violence"— in the words of one of Sinn Féin's leaders — was that the UK does not share that trust. The way they are handling the prisoners issue is another example of that.
Unfortunately, it is a precondition — not of the making of the Taoiseach or anybody in this House — made after the event that is causing the difficulty. Does the Taoiseach see any movement from the British Government that might unlock this situation in the foreseeable future? Can I take it that the summit is unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future?
It is important that we should not see the problem of dealing with decommissioning solely as one created by the British Government and I hope the Deputy is not pretending that this is the case. It is clear that in the Downing Street Declaration there is a requirement on the Irish Government to work to achieve trust on the part of the unionist community that IRA arms will never be used against them. Independently of anything the British Government might do, we are obliged under paragraph 6 of the declaration to work to persuade Sinn Féin and the Unionists to provide one another with sufficient reassurance that IRA arms will never be used again against the Unionist community. The same applies in reverse to Nationalist fears about loyalist arms. The problem is not created by one Government. Both Governments agreed with the terms of paragraph 10 of the Downing Street Declaration which dealt with that matter. In this instance it was a predecessor of mine from a different party who agreed to that paragraph. There is an obligation on both Governments, on the relevant communities and, in particular, on parties associated with those who hold arms to help solve this problem.
That disposes of questions to the Taoiseach for today. We now proceed to deal with Priority Questions.