I propose to take Questions Nos. 3 and 11 together.
In July, unimaginable brutality took place during and after the capture of Srebrenica. The events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica represent the darkest chapter of the brutal war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. There is overwhelming evidence that thousands of those who fled Srebrenica were murdered by Bosnian Serb forces. The actions of these forces were utterly condemned by the Government. The European Union Council of Ministers strongly condemned the Bosnian Serb attacks on Srebrenica and demanded an immediate halt to this offensive and an end to the bombardment of Zepa.
In light of the tragic events at Srebrenica and Zepa, I well understand the feelings of despair which led Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki to resign his post as the UNCHR's Special Rapporteur on human rights in former Yugoslavia. The international community owes him an enormous debt for his untiring efforts. His successor in office, Ms Elizabeth Rehn of Finland, has my full support in exposing human rights violations in the region. I believe the hopes expressed by Mr. Mazowiecki in his letter of resignation that the appalling events in July would constitute a defining moment have been realised.
As it transpired, the horrific events at Srebrenica in July did, in fact, represent a defining moment for the United Nations in Bosnia-Hercegovina. At the London Conference which was held after the fall of Srebrenica, the United Nations, major troop contributors and NATO decided that, rather than deploy UNPROFOR personnel to the isolated safe areas, the increased use of air power would be the most effective deterrent.
The crimes committed after the fall of Srebrenica must be fully investigated. The fate of the thousands of missing persons must be established. I hope that the provision in the Dayton Agreement which commits the parties to cooperating fully with the ICRC in determining the whereabouts and fate of those unaccounted for will be honoured in full.
Following the London meeting, detailed arrangements for the protection of the civilian population of the other safe areas were elaborated. The subsequent action taken by NATO on behalf of the United Nations reflected the outrage and the strong desire of the international community to ensure the protection of the civilian population of the safe areas.
There can be no doubt as to where the responsibility rests for the events in Srebrenica and Zepa. It is with the leadership, both political and military, of the Bosnian Serbs. I welcome the fact that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has recently issued a number of indictments against Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic in connection with their involvement in the crimes which took place in the eastern enclaves.
The United Nations peace-keeping operation in former Yugoslavia was mandated by the Security Council. It has been the largest UN peacekeeping mission ever deployed. The Security Council was kept fully informed by the Secretary General on its work and the overwhelming difficulties which it was encountering in discharging its mandate.
With regard to UNPROFOR's specific role, that force was, in addition to its basic peace-keeping duties, mandated to deter aggression against the safe areas, but not to defend them. The Secretary General had recommended some 35,000 additional troops to protect the safe areas. Only 6,500 were forthcoming. UNPROFOR's largely symbolic presence in Srebrenica and Zepa was therefore unable to prevent the fall of these areas. Its inability in this regard can also be attributed in considerable measure to the manifest absence of the cooperation of the belligerents on which the safe areas concept was predicated.
Following a review of developments in September, the Secretary General reaffirmed his opinion that it was impossible to entrust a United Nations Peace-keeping Force with a mandate which would require it to take enforcement action against parties whose co-operation it required to enable the force to carry out its basic peace-keeping functions. The Secretary General therefore recommended that the Security Council should authorise an ad hoc coalition of member states which would implement a peace agreement in Bosnia, with an expeditious transfer to that force by UNPROFOR.
The Secretary General also underlined the limited capacity of the United Nations to manage large-scale operations, especially those established under Chapter VII of the Charter with a potential enforcement role; the severe difficulties which the United Nations has in obtaining sufficient military, police and civilian personnel for the conduct of large-scale operations; the difficulties of co-ordinating operations of military personnel with different chains of command; and the serious difficulties which arise when a peace-keeping force is also tasked with actions of an enforcement nature.
The Secretary General's conclusions also coincide with the assessment of many other parties who were deeply engaged in the search for peace in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The ongoing efforts to establish an implementation force reflect these conclusions.
Many lessons need to be drawn from the United Nations peace-keeping presence in former Yugoslavia, including by the Security Council which elaborates peace-keeping mandates. In particular, great care needs to be taken to ensure that peace-keeping forces have clear mandates and sufficient means to discharge them.
I believe, however, that sight should not be lost of the fact that the United Nations peace-keeping forces have saved many thousands of lives in Bosnia-Hercegovina, prevented a second Serbo-Croat war in Croatia and prevented the conflict from spilling over into a more deadly war in the southern Balkans.