I propose to take Questions Nos. 1, 50 and 118 together.
These questions arise from the judgment of the Central Criminal Court of 5 December last in the case of the DPP v. JR In that case Mr. Justice Carney, although inclined to impose a life sentence, considered that he was precluded from doing so by superior court judgments which obliged him to reduce the sentence to take account of a guilty plea. This was a particularly horrific case involving rape and other heinous sexual crimes against young people ranging in age from four to 14 years.
The accused pleaded guilty to ten counts of rape, five counts of unlawful carnal knowledge, seven counts of indecent assault and five counts of sexual assault. The accused was sentenced to 15 years for the rape offences, 15 years' penal servitude for the unlawful carnal knowledge offences and six years and four years' imprisonment, respectively, for the indecent and sexual assault offences, all sentences to run concurrently.
Mr. Justice Carney said he would have wished to have been free to consider the imposition of a life sentence in this case. While the maximum statutory penalty in respect of many of the counts in the indictment was either imprisonment or penal servitude for life, it was clear from the decisions of courts binding on him that this sentence was not open to him in this case, particularly in the light of the accused's plea of guilty.
Mr. Justice Carney said he would have wished to consider a life sentence for a number of specified reasons, including the capacity of the Minister's expert advisers to evaluate when and if a release would be safe from the standpoint of the community in general and its children in particular.
The judge quoted at some length from a number of court decisions. In the first such decision, the DPP v. James Jackson 1993, Hederman J. said that preventive detention was not known to our judicial system and in an apparent reference to the evaluation by the authorities of the fitness of the persons for release having regard to the safety of the community, he said that sentencing policy was exclusively a matter for the Judiciary and not for the Executive. In the second judgment G v. DPP 1993 Finlay C.J. concluded that a life sentence should be reduced to determinate sentence to mark and give effect to the mitigating factor arising from the admission and plea of guilty by the accused at an early stage.
The House will appreciate that it would be inappropriate for me to comment on a judicial decision in any particular case and I cannot comment on the sentencing decision in this case.
It is of course my function to ensure that the law offers the maximum protection to society against the criminal. Accordingly if, having given this judgment the detailed examination it requires, I am satisfied there are deficiencies in the law and that it needs to be changed for the good of society, and in the interests of the victim and, in particular, children, I will not be slow to bring forward appropriate legislative proposals.
The issues which this judgment raises are serious and complex and require detailed examination and analysis. That examination must take account of the need for maximum protection of our community and our children. It must also take account of the victims of rape and other sexual offences who are spared the trauma of giving painful evidence in court when an accused pleads guilty in the expectation of a reduced sentence.
I am conscious of the fact that sentencing guidelines have not been laid down by the Oireachtas or to any significant extent by the courts. The solution to the issues raised by Mr. Justice Carney's judgment may more appropriately lie in sentencing guidelines to assist the courts in imposing appropriate and consistent sentences.
The question of sentencing guidelines is being examined by the Law Reform Commission in its review of sentencing policy. The commission has already published a comprehensive discussion document on that topic which runs to more than 400 pages and deals with a wide range of issues including such matters as aggravating and mitigating factors and maximum, minimum and mandatory sentencing. I understand that the commission's final report will be published early next year and I will examine it immediately it is available.
I reiterate my assurance that, following a detailed examination of Mr. Justice Carney's judgment which clearly raises the question of a guilty plea and whether it should at all times lead to benefit to the convicted person, I will not be slow to bring forward any legislative proposals which I consider are necessary to offer the maximum protection to society against sexual and other serious criminal offences.