Vol. 504 No. 7
133 Mr. Sargent asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs his views on whether all diplomatic measures in relation to solving the conflict within Yugoslavia had been exhausted before the beginning of the NATO bombing; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [12045/99]
From the time that open conflict broke out in Kosovo in March 1998, extensive diplomatic efforts were made by the international community to bring about a peaceful solution. However, use by the Belgrade authorities of excessive and indiscriminate force against the civilian ethnic Albanian population led to the displacement of several hundred thousand persons, living in the most precarious conditions and without shelter, as last winter approached. To stave off a humanitarian crisis, diplomatic efforts were intensified, leading to the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1199, 23 September 1999, and 1203, 24 October 1998. The latter resolution provided the basis and outline of steps to be taken towards an overall solution. It also provided for the establishment by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe of their Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), and allowed a certain amount of urgent humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance to be delivered.
Intensive efforts by US and EU special envoys, through shuttle diplomacy, to start political dialogue were unfortunately unsuccessful. Consequently the full mandate and programme of work of the KVM could not evolve. Instead that mission had to concentrate on crisis management.
The degree of non-compliance by the Belgrade authorities with the requirements of the Security Council Resolutions was considerable, and was highlighted by the Racak massacre in mid-January as well as by their subsequent refusal to co-operate with the international criminal tribunal in investigating it.
With the expectation that the end of winter would lead to a full-scale resumption of violence between the parties, the Rambouillet talks were convened by the contact group, US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. As a non-member Ireland did not participate directly in these talks although we were briefed on the main developments by the German EU Presidency. On the basis of this information, I have no reason to believe that a reasonable solution was not in prospect.
During the break between the conclusion of these talks on 23 February and their resumption in Paris on 15 March, the ethnic Albanian side were persuaded to accept what was on offer including the disarming and disbandment of the KLA and their renunciation of independence for Kosovo – while the Serb position hardened considerably. The interval was also used by Belgrade to build up further their forces in Kosovo.
In the days leading up to 24 March, there was a further round of intense diplomatic activity, including efforts by the EU Presidency to persuade Belgrade to change course and to avoid a final breakdown of diplomatic efforts.
