I move amendment
No. 1:
To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and substitute the following:
"concerned at the continuing and increased threat to the health and safety of Irish citizens posed by the Sellafield nuclear plant in Britain and conscious, in particular of the increased danger of a terrorist attack on the plant or on shipments of nuclear materials passing through the Irish Sea:
–notes the long and unsatisfactory history of accidents and incidents at the Sellafield plant;
–endorses the Government's condemnation of the recent decision to sanction the commissioning of the Sellafield mixed oxide fuel fabrication plant;
–supports the action being taken by the Government, including legal action initiated by the Government against the UK Government under the OSPAR Convention to prevent the commissioning of the MOX plant;
–notes that the Government is finalising consideration of further legal action against the UK Government in regard to the MOX plant under the EU and EURATOM Treaties and under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
–notes the strong representations made by the Government to the UK Government and at the OSPAR Commission against the proposed commissioning of the MOX plant;
–notes that radioactive waste from Sellafield is one of the areas identified for consideration in the work of the British-Irish Council Environment Sectoral Group;
–endorses the work being carried out by the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Safety which comprises ministerial representation from the key Government Departments, the Attorney General's office and representation from the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland (RPII) and which gives added impetus to the Government campaign against Sellafield;
–notes that the RPII continues to maintain contact with the UK nuclear installations inspectorate with regard to safety standards at the Sellafield plant;
–notes the effective role being carried out the RPII in monitoring radioactivity contamination of the marine, air and terrestrial environment;
–notes that the potential consequences for Ireland of a terrorist attack on the Sellafield plant would be of the same nature as that of a major accident at the plant and that the Irish Government has in place a national emergency plan for nuclear accidents to ensure a rapid, co-ordinated and effective response to such an accident or disaster at Sellafield or elsewhere; and
–notes that the Government will shortly be publishing an updated version of the national emergency plan for nuclear accidents, reflecting improvements made to the plan in recent years, and that a sum mary of the plan will be circulated also to every household."
The Government submits its own counter motion because the Labour motion fails to recognise the vigorous campaign which the Government has pursued against the Sellafield operations, including the Sellafield mixed oxide, MOX, fuel fabrication plant.
For years, the Sellafield facility has been a source of grave concern to successive Irish Governments and the Irish public. This facility, with its multiplicity of operations, represents a potentially serious threat to Ireland's public health and environment as well as to our vital commercial interests, such as fishing, agriculture and tourism. It is time this threat was removed once and for all. The Government remains firmly committed to its opposition to the continued operation and expansion of Sellafield – our priority is to bring about the cessation of all activities at the plant.
The Government's concerns about Sellafield relate particularly to the safety standards and safety management at the site; the storage on site in liquid form of high level radioactive waste; the continued reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at the site; the transportation of nuclear fuels to and from the plant; the continued operation of the old Magnox reactors; the discharge of radioactive materials into the Irish Sea and, most importantly, the risk of a catastrophic accident.
The Government, since taking office, has spared no effort in making known to the UK authorities its concerns about and objection to the Sellafield operations. Since assuming the Government's portfolio for nuclear safety and radiological protection, I have had numerous meetings with UK Ministers and have repeatedly called for the cessation of operations at Sellafield. The Government's concerns have also been highlighted at every available opportunity in the international arena, such as at EU level, at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the OECD and meetings held under the umbrella of the OSPAR convention relating to marine pollution.
All these concerns are also conveyed directly to the UK authorities at meetings of the UK-Ireland contact group on radioactivity. This group comprises officials from my Department, the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland and officials from the relevant UK Government Departments and agencies. The group meets twice a year and provides the opportunity to pursue Ireland's concerns about Sellafield and other related matters. It is reasonable to say that the UK Government is under no illusion whatsoever as to the depth of opposition in Ireland to the Sellafield plant.
A dominant theme of the Government's campaign against Sellafield has been the genuine fear of the consequences of a major accident at the site. The Sellafield plant is no stranger to accidents. An investigation in 1999 by the UK's nuclear installations inspectorate into safety procedures and standards at the plant was prompted by a series of incidents that year. The subsequent report published by the UK inspectorate in February 2000, one of three reports published at the time by the inspectorate, was severely critical of safety management and safety culture at the plant and made no less than 28 recommendations for improving safety. Today, 18 months later, few of these 28 recommendations have been implemented by BNFL and this must raise serious question marks about current safety standards at the plant.
At a time of heightened international tension arising from the terrible events of 11 September and the increased threat of terrorist attacks, the vulnerability of nuclear installations is a matter of real concern. The events of 11 September have highlighted new security risks which were previously unimagined. These events show that there is a huge onus on those countries with nuclear installations to protect their installations from such attacks. These countries have an absolute duty to do everything possible to protect their dangerous installations from attack, irrespective of the cost.
I need hardly remind the House of the Government's dismay and anger at the announcement by the UK Government that it has given the go-ahead to the Sellafield MOX plant. At a time when one would have expected countries with nuclear installations to consider the very real threat to safety and security and to consolidate safety and security standards, the UK Government's decision to effectively expand operations at Sellafield defies belief.
The proposals by British Nuclear Fuels Limited to establish the MOX fuel production plant at Sellafield date back to the early 1990s when it first applied for planning permission to construct the facility. Ireland objected strongly to the project at that time but planning permission for the plant was granted in 1994. Construction of the MOX plant was actually completed in 1998 at a cost of over £300 million and I understand that capital expenditure of £450 million has been injected into the project.
In 1996, BNFL applied to the UK environment agency for approval to operate the plant. It is amazing that this approval was sought so late in the life of the project. Since then, the BNFL application has been the subject of no less than five public consultations held by the UK authorities and UK Ministers, the most recent of which was completed in August 2001.
The Government has strongly and consistently opposed the commissioning of the MOX plant and its concerns about this plant have been conveyed to the UK authorities in every possible manner and in our responses to each of the five separate rounds of public consultation over the period 1997 to 2001.
The MOX fuel to be produced at Sellafield would be made from uranium and plutonium material separated from spent fuel which is reprocessed mainly in BNFL's thermal oxide reprocessing plant, or THORP, as it is better known. Therefore, the production of MOX fuel is effectively part of the spent nuclear fuel reprocessing industry at Sellafield.
Ireland is strongly opposed to nuclear reprocessing activities that generate gaseous and liquid radioactive discharges which contaminate the terrestrial and marine environment. Furthermore, the resulting production of plutonium creates an unnecessary risk that plutonium could be diverted for nuclear weapons production or terrorist activity.
Even countries with nuclear programmes are questioning the merits of reprocessing on economic and safety grounds. The nuclear spent fuel reprocessing industry is now separating more plutonium than the nuclear industry is able to absorb. Sellafield now has a stockpile of plutonium which represents a potential risk to existing and future generations. The existence of such a large stockpile demonstrates how ill-advised it is to persist with reprocessing.
The commissioning of the MOX plant will add even further to the multiplicity of operations already at Sellafield, thereby increasing the risk of an accident. It will increase the volume of worldwide transport of MOX fuel with obvious additional volume of traffic in the Irish Sea, thus posing an unacceptable safety and security risk as well as the potential for a major accident or terrorist attack. It will also perpetuate nuclear reprocessing activities at Sellafield and add to radioactive discharges into the Irish Sea. While I am advised that the increase in discharges associated with the MOX plant is likely to be small, any contamination whatsoever of our marine environment is objectionable and unacceptable. The Government sees no justification whatsoever for the MOX plant and will do everything possible to bring about a reversal of the UK Government's decision.
The Government has already initiated legal action against the UK under the OSPAR convention in regard to the MOX plant. The Government's legal action began in June this year and relates to the fact that the UK, on grounds of commercial confidentiality, withheld pertinent information essential to assessing the economic justification of the MOX plant. This action is proceeding on schedule and an arbitration tribunal is in the process of being established under the OSPAR convention to consider the case.
I specifically requested the UK not to take any decision on the MOX plant while the OSPAR arbitration process was in train. However, the UK did not accede to my request and instead has taken the decision to give the go-ahead to the plant, a decision which is totally unacceptable to Ireland and difficult to fathom, particularly in the current climate of heightened terrorist threats.
In my responses to the public consultations held by the UK, I had made it clear that the information being made available to the public in the consultation papers was inadequate and insufficient to assess or support the economic justification of the MOX plant. I had repeatedly demanded, without success, full release of the information withheld by the UK which purports to support the economic justification of the plant.
The Government does not accept the UK Government's decision that the MOX plant is justified. Indeed, in announcing its decision to give the go-ahead to the plant, the UK Government said that 2,000 of the 9,000 respondents to the consultation process were against the proposed commissioning of the plant.
Apart altogether from the depth of economic data and information deleted from the UK's public consultation documents relating to the plant, the Irish Government cannot accept an economic analysis which writes off capital costs of £450 million already injected into the project. Furthermore, there must be serious question marks about the projected markets for MOX fuel notably in respect of the Japanese and German markets which are identified by BNFL as the primary markets for MOX. Germany has already announced that it is phasing out nuclear power. Japan has its own plans to produce MOX fuel which would further reduce the demand for MOX fuel from Sellafield.
Immediately following the UK Government's MOX decision, the Taoiseach personally conveyed to Prime Minister Blair the Government's implacable opposition to the UK's decision. In addition, I wrote to both the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Secretary of State for Health reiterating our opposition to the MOX plant and calling upon the UK Government to suspend with immediate effect the authorisation of the MOX plant and to take the necessary steps to halt, also with immediate effect, all transportation of radioactive materials in and around the Irish Sea to and from the plant. I also informed them that we will be deciding on future legal actions under EU and-or UN law in the near future. It is fair to say that, at this stage, the Government has exhausted all efforts at a bilateral level with the UK in trying to stop this plant being commissioned.
The next step as far as the Government is concerned is to pursue further legal options. We have some time before the MOX plant is fully commissioned but not a lot. In tandem with the legal action already proceeding under OSPAR, final consideration of the EU and UN legal options is complete and a decision on the next action to be taken will be made by the Government in a matter of days. We will not be deterred from issuing proceedings on a number of fronts if necessary.
I mentioned earlier that Ireland highlighted its concerns about Sellafield on the international stage. Ireland has been particularly active in the OSPAR Commission against the Sellafield spent nuclear fuel reprocessing activities and associated discharges into the marine environment. In July 1998, at the meeting of the OSPAR Ministers from the contracting states to the OSPAR Convention, the Ministers adopted a strategy on radioactive substances. This strategy commits the contracting parties, which include the UK, to the virtual elimination of radioactive discharges into the marine environment by the year 2020 through progressive and substantial reductions of such discharges. Ireland was to the fore in the drafting of the OSPAR strategy. Its adoption was a vindication of Ireland's efforts throughout the process and an endorsement of the genuine concerns of a number of the contracting states about such discharges.
Following this strategy's adoption, Ireland was active at the subsequent meetings of the OSPAR Commission in 1999, 2000 and this year giving added impetus to its implementation. For example, at the meeting of the OSPAR Commission in June 2000, we tabled a draft decision effectively calling for an end to nuclear reprocessing activities at Sellafield. In the run up to that meeting, I met with each of the environment Ministers of the Nordic countries. I travelled to Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland seeking their support for Ireland's draft decision while the Danish Minister of the Environment, Mr. Svend Auken, met me in Dublin. At the June 2000 meeting, the OSPAR Commission adopted, by majority vote, a decision whereby current authorisations for discharges of radioactive materials to the marine environment would be reviewed as a matter of priority by the respective national authorities in order to implement the non-reprocessing option. The UK and France, which are involved in reprocessing activities, did not support this decision but its adoption effectively sent a clear message to those countries about the concerns of the majority of contracting parties over continued reprocessing activities.
At this year's meeting of the OSPAR Commission, in June 2001, Ireland tabled a draft decision calling for the completion, as a matter of urgency, of the current review of discharge authorisation limits by the contracting parties to the convention and that, in the meantime, there should be a moratorium on activities which promote the reprocessing of spent fuel. Arising from Ireland's proposal, the OSPAR commission, at that meeting, adopted by majority vote, a decision which called for the urgent completion of the current review of discharge authorisations from nuclear reprocessing facilities. The commission also agreed at that meeting that the deadline be brought forward for submission by contracting parties of details of their national plans for the implementation of the OSPAR strategy.
In the run up to the June 2001 OSPAR Commission meeting, I personally wrote to the relevant Government Minister in each of the OSPAR contracting states and the EU Commissioner for the Environment informing them that Ireland would be tabling the draft decision. In my letter, I also expressed the concerns of the Government over the resumption of shipments of spent nuclear fuel from Germany and the Netherlands to the Sellafield reprocessing plant. I pointed out that the resumption of such shipments is not in keeping with the spirit of the OSPAR decision, adopted at the previous year's commission meeting, on the reduction of discharges of radioactive substances arising from nuclear reprocessing activities.
The UK Government's decision to give the go-ahead to the MOX plant raises serious questions about its commitment to the OSPAR strategy. The UK Government is currently undertaking a full scale review of radioactive discharge authorisation limits in respect of the Sellafield plant as part of its plan to address the strategy. This review is being conducted with full public consultation. Already the UK has conducted three public consultations and a fourth is currently under way. The Irish Government is participating fully in this consultation process and is determined that the UK will not shirk from addressing its commitments under the OSPAR strategy. The Irish Government is determined to bring about an end to reprocessing activities at Sellafield and radioactive discharges and will continue to work closely with its like minded partners within OSPAR, particularly the Nordic countries, in achieving this objective.
The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland plays an important role in the Government's campaign against Sellafield. The RPIl was particularly active within the OSPAR working groups in the drafting of the OSPAR strategy and continues to play an active role in these groups to ensure its effective implementation. The RPII is also in regular contact with the UK nuclear installations inspectorate in monitoring BNFL's implementation of the inspectorate's February 2000 safety improvement recommendations relating to Sellafield which I referred to earlier.
The Government has long been concerned about the risks associated with the storage of high level liquid waste in tanks in Sellafield. Despite assurances received from the UK authorities on the safety of the storage arrangements, the Government continues to press the UK to speed up the vitrification of this waste, whereby the liquid waste is solidified into what is deemed to be a much safer form of storage. In 1999, following sustained pressure from the Government, BNFL allowed the RPII to examine, on the BNFL site, the safety standards documentation relating to the storage arrangements of high level liquid waste. The allowed the RPII to come to its own conclusions as to the safety of the storage arrangements. The following year, the RPII published its report of its examination of the BNFL safety documentation which concluded that the risk of a severe accident associated with the storage arrangements was low. However, it made a number of recommendations for reducing the risk and has been maintaining contact with the UK authorities over the implementation of these recommendations.
The events of 11 September raise concerns about the ability of the storage tanks at Sellafield to withstand the impact of an aircraft colliding with them. The BNFL safety documentation examined by the RPII stated that only a heavy commercial or military aircraft could inflict sufficient damage to result in a loss of coolant and aerial release of radioactivity. The events of last month, however, must call into question the capacity of the tanks to withstand a similar terrorist strike and it is imperative that the UK authorities have the necessary measures in place at Sellafield to withstand such an attack.
I mentioned that our concerns about Sellafield are also conveyed to the UK authorities at meetings of the UK-Ireland Contact Group on Radioactivity. Sellafield is also included in the work of the British-Irish Council – BIC – environment sectoral group. The British-Irish Council, as the House knows, was established under the Good Friday Agreement to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands. The council comprises representatives of the British and Irish Governments, the devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales and representatives of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. The purpose of the BIC is to exchange information, discuss, consult and use best endeavours to reach agreement on co-operation on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations. At the inaugural meeting in October 2000 of the BIC environment sectoral group, hosted by the British Government in London, it was agreed that a paper would be prepared by the Irish Government and the Isle of Man on radioactive waste from Sellafield.
As the House will be aware, this Government established in 1998 a ministerial committee on nuclear safety which comprises ministerial representation from key Government Departments and representation from the RPII and the Attorney General's office. Its remit is wide ranging covering all matters relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection. The Sellafield operations constitute a major part of its work. The committee was established primarily to give added focus and impetus to the Government's campaign against Sellafield. Since its establishment it has met on 12 occasions. The MOX plant is among a number of Sellafield related issues which have been on the committee's programme for some time. The MOX plant and the Government's campaign against it are key items on the committee's agenda. The Government's approach and opposition to the plant have been discussed and supported at numerous meetings of the committee since its establishment in 1998. The committee plays a very important role in informing Government policy in regard to Sellafield.
I referred to the increased threat of a terrorist attack on nuclear installations. Concern about terrorist attacks on Sellafield or other nuclear plants has raised public concerns about our preparedness to deal with the consequences of a nuclear incident. The public is right to be concerned, but wrong to be unduly alarmed.
My Department, in conjunction with the RPII, has primary responsibility for emergency planning for nuclear accidents. A national emergency plan for nuclear accidents is in place to ensure a rapid and effective response to accidents involving the release or potential release of radioactive substances into the environment which could give rise to radiation exposure of the public.
The potential consequences for Ireland of an attack on the Sellafield plant, similar to the attack on the World Trade Centre, would essentially be of the same nature as those of a major accident at the plant. The actual consequences of a particular accident would depend primarily on the quantity of radioactivity released and prevailing weather conditions, especially wind direction. Under the nuclear emergency plan, an assessment team, comprising scientists from the RPII, assisted by Met Éireann personnel, would assemble promptly and, on the basis of available information, provide advice as to the likely extent of effects on Ireland, how soon those effects might be experienced, and what areas of the country would be likely to be affected. This information would, in turn, provide a basis for advice as to the appropriate countermeasures to be put in place.
The nuclear emergency plan is designed to cater for a major disaster at a nuclear installation in Britain or another country, which would result in radioactive contamination reaching Ireland. The plan is not designed to deal with a direct nuclear attack on Ireland, but obviously a number of the arrangements and measures contained in the plan would be relevant in such a scenario.
The plan provides a structure for the management of the effects of such a disaster or accident under the overall direction of a committee of Ministers. It outlines the measures in place to assess and mitigate the effects of nuclear accidents which might pose a radiological hazard in Ireland.
The plan describes the early warning systems operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union for alerting states of any radiological accident; shows how accidents management will operate; how technical information and radioactivity monitoring data will be collected; how public information will be provided and what measures may be taken for the protection of the public in the short and long-term.
Once the plan is triggered the emergency response co-ordination committee goes into immediate session in a central control room. This committee comprises representation from all key Departments and agencies. Armed with information from the RPII and other agencies, notably Met Éireann because prevailing weather conditions will play a vital role, this committee will decide on and co-ordinate the implementation of countermeasures and public safety advice.
Providing accurate information and advice for the public is of major importance. Information will be released throughout the course of the emergency by the RPII using national radio and television and the Internet.
