As soon as the Central Bank became aware of what had happened, contact was made with the US Federal Reserve, the primary regulator of Allfirst's activities. As the consolidated regulator for the AIB Group, the Central Bank has supervisory oversight of Allfirst. However, primary regulatory responsibility lies with the Federal Reserve. Two officers of the Central Bank travelled to the headquarters of Allfirst and they have been working with officers of the Federal Reserve to confirm the scale of losses and to identify as far as they can how these losses were accumulated and why procedures failed to identify a serious problem in good time. These inquires are ongoing.
When their current investigation has been completed, the Central Bank will prepare a report for me on whether any changes to legislative provisions governing banking supervision may be required in the light of recent events. I should explain that the Central Bank is statutorily independent in the exercise of its regulatory functions. National legislation dealing with the prudential regulation of credit institutions, which is largely derived from EU directives, obliges the Central Bank to treat as confidential the information it holds on supervised entities.
The legislation is framed so as to preserve the confidentiality of a bank's commercial interests and customer relations. It provides a protection for privacy, balancing the very wide range of inquiry which the Central Bank must have to carry out its supervisory role. There are provisions which enable the Central Bank to share confidential information with other bodies with similar functions subject to stringent conditions of professional secrecy.
It follows from what I have just outlined that there is no specific legal right of a Minister for Finance to information held by the Central Bank on individual supervised entities. I may, however, under the Central Bank Act, 1998 consult with the bank, in general terms, on regulatory issues. In this case, I have asked the Central Bank to report to me on the legislative arrangements in place and on the lessons to be learnt in that regard. The bank has confirmed to me that it will produce such a report.
International banking supervision is very complex, and many subsidiary entities are regulated at different levels and in different countries from their parent companies. A very wide network of co-operative working arrangements exists between regulators. In this case, the Central Bank was not the principal regulator of the supervised entity, but did regulate the overall prudential position of the group concerned. Events have shown that the prudential and solvency position of the group is more than sufficient to weather the strain. I know the Central Bank is anxious to learn from these events.