Written Answers. - Nuclear Safety.
Emmet Stagg
Question:
141
Mr. Stagg
asked the
Minister for the Environment and Local Government
if he has received a response to the letter he wrote to a UK Minister expressing concern regarding the adequacy of security around Sellafield; if he has satisfied himself with the assurances received; and if he will make a statement on the matter.
[12976/03]
I refer the Deputy to the reply to Question No. 293 of 1 April.
I received a response from the UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ms Patricia Hewitt, MP, on 16 April. This restates the position of the UK Government on nuclear security. It outlined the contacts on this matter between Ireland and the UK and sets out the internationally agreed standards and principles concerning nuclear safety, referring in particular to the International Atomic Energy Agency guidance on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. I appreciated the detailed response. However, it does not contain new information but reiterates UK Government policy on the confidentiality of security sensitive information.
In the Secretary of State's response she invited me to publish the contents of her letter and it is as follows:
16 April 2003
Martin Cullen Esq TD
Minister for the Environment and Local Government
Custom House
Dublin
Eire
Dear Minister
Thank you for your letter of 28 March. I appreciate that concerns about the possibility of terrorist attacks against nuclear installations have been prominent in Ireland in recent months and am aware of the various approaches Ireland has made to the UK Government about this issue. You will also be aware of the recent correspondence between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister concerning the prospect of acts of terrorism at facilities at Sellafield. As the Prime Minister said, the United Kingdom is not complacent about the threat of terrorism against civil nuclear facilities and continues to take proper steps to ensure that effective and robust measures are in place to counter these risks.
You say that "the response of the UK Government to date has been that such arrangements are a matter of national security and are for the UK to manage." While the statement "such arrangements are a matter of national security and are for the UK to manage" is in itself quite correct, I do not feel this properly reflects the response the Government of Ireland has received from the UK Government to the matters that have been raised.
There has been substantive correspondence between our officials through which the UK has sought to address as fully as possible the issues raised by the Government of Ireland. We have explained the processes followed by the UK Government to assess the threat, evaluate vulnerabilities and develop effective counter measures and have explained the reasons why we do not disclose more detailed information. We have sought to be as open and co-operative as we can with Ireland about these matters subject to ensuring the necessary confidentiality of security sensitive information.
In London on 16 July 2002, officials of the Irish Government and the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland attended a specially arranged private briefing on these matters given by the Director for Civil Nuclear Security and the Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations. Information was provided about the way in which, following the events of September 2001, the Office of Civil Nuclear Security, the security regulator, has worked closely with the Health and Safety Executive, the safety regulator, to review the safety implications of events, including external hazards such as plane crashes, at nuclear installations. It was explained that a range of additional measures have been introduced or are in the process of being introduced to further improve security precautions and implement and improvements that might be achieved in managing the effects of any event. Some new measures introduced will be visible as they involve additional physical barriers or other engineered features or increased perimeter security arrangements at sites. Other measures will not be visible and details must remain confidential.
As we have explained, the UK does not disclose outside the UK Government details of the threat assessments we have made, details about the physical robustness of installations against terrorist attacks, about the measures in place to address such threats, about the potential damage that might be caused by an attack or about counter-measures in place to minimise any potential effects. Access to such information is limited strictly to those that need it for the performance of their duties. The reason for this is that such information could be of use to someone seeking to carry out a malicious attack. We understand that the Irish authorities have declined to give details of security arrangements, for example at Irish airports, for precisely the same reason.
We have pointed out that our approach to non-disclosure of such detailed information is consistent with internationally agreed standards and principles concerning nuclear security. These principals are set out in guidance published by the International Atomic Energy Agency – The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev4). The guidelines confirm at section 4.1.2 that "The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection system within a state rests entirely with that state" and section 4.1.4 goes on to say that "The state should continuously review the threat, and evaluate the implications of any changes in that threat for the levels and methods of physical protection." Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 relate specifically to the protection of confidential information. These read as follows:
4.3.1 The state should take steps to ensure appropriate protection of specific or detailed information the unauthorised disclosure of which could compromise the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. It should define requirements for the confidentiality of physical protection systems and associated documentation.
4.3.2. Management of physical protection systems should limit access to sensitive information to those who need to know for the performance of their duties. Information addressing possible vulnerabilities in physical protection systems should be highly protected as it could indicate means of successfully removing nuclear material or of carrying out sabotage.
The Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is also relevant. Article 6(2) of the Convention provides:
States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would jeopardise the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear material.
That nuclear facilities might be a target for acts of terrorism has long been understood. Sellafield is certainly one of these sites in the UK that needs to be properly protected against such acts, although it is certainly not a unique target for these.
I am aware that the media in Ireland recently devoted considerable attention to an event where an individual – accompanied by a journalist – set up a banner at the perimeter fence of the Sellafield site and took photographs. This event is presented in such a way as to suggest that site security had been breached and that the individual had been allowed to get within reach of sensitive facilities on the site. In fact, the protest did not involve any breach of the perimeter fence and events were monitored closely at all times by Sellafield's security personnel. The individuals involved left the area when officers of the UK Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary approached them. The officers subsequently caught up with the individuals and spoke to them but took no further action.
Those responsible for ensuring security at civil nuclear sites recognise the right of individuals to demonstrate outside nuclear sites or during transport operations. Should protesters seek to carry out actions of a more irresponsible nature that try to bypass security precautions or otherwise cause danger to themselves and others, security staff must respond accordingly. They must distinguish between protest actions and genuine threats to site security. Physical security at nuclear sites is based on a series of defensive rings. The first and most obvious is the perimeter fence of the site. This is carefully monitored and controlled so that any intruders would be detected and appropriate action could be taken. In the event that intruders were considered to represent a serious threat rather than protest action, the response measures would, of course, be of a nature appropriate to that situation.
I hope this helps to explain the actions taken by the UK and our position on disclosure of detailed information. We are satisfied that arrangements for ensuring security in the UK's civil nuclear security are robust and that additional measures we have put in place since September 2001 to reinforce security are appropriate. This should not be taken to suggest complacency on our part. Security arrangements are subject to continual review.
In view of public and Parliamentary concern in Ireland about these matters, I would be content for you to publish this correspondence or place it in the Oireachtas Library if you felt this would be of some assistance.
Yours sincerely,
Patricia Hewitt.
Eamon Ryan
Question:
142
Mr. Eamon Ryan
asked the
Minister for the Environment and Local Government
the action he is taking to ensure the closure of the Wylfa Nuclear Plant on Anglesey Island in north Wales.
[13035/03]
The Government's concerns about old Magnox reactors, such as those at the Wylfa nuclear power plant, have been made known to the UK authorities both at official and ministerial level on numerous occasions. We have consistently called for the early closure of these reactors which continue to operate well beyond their original design life. The Wylfa Nuclear Plant at Anglesey is due to be decommissioned in 2010.
Ireland has also responded critically to various UK public consultation processes concerning the regulation of the UK nuclear industry covering such matters as the management of radioactive waste in the UK, a review of UK energy policy and the UK strategy for discharges from nuclear installations.
The Government has repeatedly pointed out that the risks and unresolved problems associated with the nuclear energy industry, when added to high research and capital costs, including decommissioning costs, as well as continued additional safety and security costs, mean that nuclear energy is not sustainable.
