I will call on the Deputies who tabled questions to the Minister for Transport in the order in which they submitted their questions to my office.
Private Notice Questions.
Air Services.
I ask the Minister for Transport to request urgently a comprehensive report from the Irish Aviation Authority regarding the re-occurrence of malfunctions with the radar system at Dublin Airport, the SSR system, and to give a full report to Dáil Éireann on the operation of all safety systems in Dublin Airport; and to make an urgent statement.
I ask the Minister for Transport the action he proposes to take to resolve the chaos in Dublin Airport.
I ask the Minister for Transport to carry out an immediate investigation into the chaos at Dublin Airport arising from the failure of the radar system with resultant safety implications, causing the cancellation of numerous flights and major inconvenience to customers; if he will ascertain the reason for the failure of the technology; if he will give an assurance that the issues involved can be resolved immediately; and if he will make a statement on the matter.
On behalf of Deputy James Reilly, I ask the Minister for Transport about Dublin Airport and the current chaos that has arisen as a result of the failure for the radar there and the plight of the thousands of passengers stranded there.
I thank the Ceann Comhairle for the opportunity to outline and give information on the background to the current situation at Dublin Airport. I want to bring Members up to date on the air traffic control problems at the airport. I am satisfied that, since these problems started, the IAA has done everything in its power to resolve the issues that arose. My Department has been in ongoing contact with the authority since the problem arose. The IAA has expressed its sincere regrets over the delays to passengers because of the difficulties with the air traffic control software. It is giving priority to resolve the difficulties. Once these have been resolved I have asked that it make a full report to me on what happened.
The overriding concern of the IAA, which is shared by Members, is to ensure the safety of passengers. The IAA has assured me that this is the reason it is taking these precautions. It is not prepared to compromise the safety of passengers until everything is in 100% working order.
The IAA was established following the passing of the Irish Aviation Authority Act 1993. It is responsible for the safe operation of Irish air space and is tasked with the provision, operation and management of air navigation services in Irish air space. The authority has an exemplary record in the conduct of its functions in this regard. It enjoys an excellent record among peer groups as a safe and efficient service provider. It is responsible for air navigation at the three State airports and the regulatory oversight of such services at non-State airports, as well as for all air traffic flying in Irish air space. Some 90% of air traffic on the north Atlantic travels through Irish air space. As such, the IAA is a major provider of air navigation services to the US and European traffic, as well as to traffic originating in, or destined for, Ireland.
Over the past number of weeks there have been intermittent problems with the radar system at Dublin Airport. It was possible to resolve those problems and maintain the operation of the system at the same time as they arose. However, further problems arose in Dublin air traffic control centre late yesterday morning. The nature of the problems led the IAA to reduce traffic to the bare minimum for three hours while it conducted an initial investigation of the problem. That investigation was undertaken by the IAA engineers and a team from Thales SA, the French company that supplies radars and air traffic equipment.
By 4 p.m. yesterday it was possible to increase traffic to 12 arriving aircraft and nine departing aircraft per hour. Several airlines, including Aer Lingus and Ryanair, cancelled flights because of the delays. With a view to minimising the impact on the travelling public overnight, the IAA put on additional staff to facilitate airlines in repositioning aircraft at Dublin for the early outbound flights this morning. Currently, the overarching priority for the provision of air traffic control services is safety. While the IAA is acutely aware of the inconvenience caused to passengers, and while every effort is being made to minimise disruption, no compromise can be made on maintaining the highest standard of safety.
The Department of Transport has been in contact with the IAA since yesterday afternoon and has received assurances that the IAA is doing everything in its power to resolve the problems and restore full operational capacity as soon as possible. The latest position is that the IAA engineering team and the system suppliers, Thales SA, have identified the software problems and have rectified them.
I do not want to interrupt the Minister unfairly but he may not realise that he is reading the same page a second time. I may be wrong and I do not mean to be disruptive.
That is the problem with technology.
I am repeating a portion of it to give continuity. The Deputy can let me know if I am repeating it but I do not think so.
Technology can be queer.
That paragraph is similar to one of the earlier ones.
The air traffic control system is now operating at 70% capacity. This is giving rise to delays during the peak morning period. The process of verifying, diagnosing and testing the repaired system is now under way. The IAA is satisfied it has found the problem, identified the software problem and now, though it is at 70% capacity, it will continue to test until it is 100% sure that everything is in operation. The IAA will not return to full operation until it is sure of that. Protection and safety is always the highest priority for air traffic control. The system performance and validation that is under way now takes time. If no further problems are encountered, it should be possible to restore full capability over the next 24 to 48 hours.
The present air traffic control system has been operated by the IAA at Dublin Airport for five years. This was the first instance of a failure of this kind. While the IAA has arrangements in place for contingencies, it is not practical to maintain a full back-up system to maintain 100% capability. As evidenced by the fact that this is the first instance of a systems failure in five years, the IAA says there is no safety case for it and the cost to users would be significant.
Members are aware that the aviation safety system comprises four key components, namely, airports, airlines, aircraft maintenance and the air traffic management systems. The IAA is satisfied that all components of the system are safe in accordance with international standards and practices, notwithstanding the present problems. There has never been any compromise of safety of aircraft or persons.
I thank the Minister for his reply. However, it is not true that this was the first serious malfunction. A malfunction with the secondary surveillance radar, SSR, system also occurred on 5 and 6 June. Today the Irish Independent and The Irish Times report we have had five spectacular failures in as many weeks.
The secondary surveillance radar system was supposed to be space-age technology with a related computer management system. It is extraordinary that we have this rate of failure. How many times has it failed during the past year? At the time of the previous major failure in early June, did the Minister order any investigation? If so, what investigation did he order? Did he ask the IAA to report in full on this matter, the SSR system, the computer system and all aspects of safety at Dublin Airport? Was he aware of this, anticipating this and ensuring the safety of travellers?
Do we need fundamental changes in the system? I understand controllers feel they are effectively blind part of the time because the transmission which gives the blip on the screen is late or does not appear exactly as the aircraft is approaching and transmitting the information.
Yesterday, holiday-makers and business travellers were bewildered and upset. Does the Minister agree little information was given to people? People were left standing in queues. I received a phone call from a would-be passenger standing in a queue for two or three hours. He did not receive any information on when he would be able to get a flight to Liverpool.
I do not always agree with Michael O'Leary of Ryanair but I do agree with him that what happened yesterday was an unacceptable shambles at the major airport gateway to this country. Under the European directive, will the Minister ensure all holiday-makers and business passengers will be fully compensated? Will the Minister ensure the IAA fully compensates all passengers who were so badly treated yesterday?
Is it time to order a full safety review of all systems at Dublin Airport? Will the Minister publish the Irish Aviation Authority's engineering and other reports into the radar system? Will he give us guidance on whether similar systems at Cork and Shannon airports have had similar problems?
As I stated, the Department is aware of this and has been in contact with the IAA during recent weeks with regard to the intermittent problems with the radar system at Dublin Airport. It was possible to resolve these and maintain operation of the system generally. None of these problems was as serious as that which occurred yesterday. We sought reports from the IAA on what happened and received them at the time.
I do not understand how one can have software for five years and suddenly something goes wrong with it. I am not sufficently technical to know this. This appears to be what happened and the problem is with the software rather than the hardware. I must wait until I receive the report to see what happened.
This incident was handled well by the IAA.
Not for the passengers.
The IAA has a responsibility for the safety of passengers in the air. Other bodies and organisations have responsibilities for looking after passengers on the ground. I do not know what level of communication there was between the IAA, the DAA and the airlines concerned. It is not the sole responsibility of the IAA to inform passengers of various airlines of what is happening other than that there may be delays. Where this body is trying to look after the safety of passengers it is not fair that it should be responsible for providing information directly to passengers on the ground. I do not accept this.
If the IAA provided information that these delays would occur, this information should have been passed on to passengers. I agree with the Deputy on this. Information should have been more forthcoming to passengers, who should have known the possible length of the delay. When this started, I am sure nobody knew how long it would last and there may have been initial confusion as the Deputy outlined. I would not contest this.
The matter of compensation for passengers is one for passengers themselves. I will not make commitments in this House that passengers can be compensated or that the IAA should compensate them. This is a matter for other bodies.
With regard to safety, the way the IAA responded to this incident makes it clear that safety is at the top of its agenda and is a priority for it. Part of the report I expect from the IAA on this matter will fully deal with safety and the safety of the system in the future.
The Minister made reference to intermittent problems. Will he confirm that, as Deputy Broughan stated, over the past five weeks five different radar malfunctions occurred? If this is the case, and as I understand it three of them occurred before yesterday, why did they not sound the alarm bells? What information was he given on the three radar malfunctions which took place prior to yesterday?
In the context of the problem being with software, will the Minister tell the House whether the software operating the radar system has been corrupted? Has a third party accessed the software through the world wide web? If the Minister does not understand how software which operated reasonably well for five years stopped operating, has he asked the question of the Irish Aviation Authority? Did it occur to the Minister to ask this question prior to yesterday's serious malfunctions?
Will the Minister confirm that this software system cost €90 million to install? Will he advise the House what costings he has been given for an appropriate software back-up system should this system fail? Does the Minister agree that in light of it failing to ensure passenger safety there is an urgent need to have a secondary system which can be utilised should similar circumstances arise again?
What is the position with regard to passenger safety and what was the position yesterday in circumstances in which the software failed when flights were in the air and coming into Dublin Airport? Did it pose a risk to passenger safety? How were the substantial number of flights which enter Irish airspace and carry on to other countries affected yesterday and how are they affected today by the events which occurred? Is the safety of those aircraft in any way compromised? Does the Minister agree that, as the Irish Aviation Authority administers the system, and it is dealing with this after three malfunctions in the past five weeks in conjunction with the firm that installed the software, that will not necessarily give us appropriate answers? Does he further agree an independent investigation into these events should be conducted, in particular to investigate what went wrong with the software, whether the software has been corrupted and what are the security systems that protect the software from intervention by outside third parties, and an independent report produced on what is required and the likely costings of an appropriate back-up system?
Does he concur it is not acceptable that more than 20,000 passengers found their flights cancelled yesterday and congestion is increasing in Dublin Airport today? On the basis that the system is currently operating at between 65% and 70% of full capacity, will he indicate precisely when the system will be restored to 100% capacity? When it is restored, how confident is the Minister that an incident such as this will not recur? What has been done to secure the system and to ensure nothing is corrupting it that will reinstate itself and recreate this problem?
Does the Minister agree the events of the past two days are doing profound damage to the image of this country in the context of its tourism industry and other businesses? Business people looking on at what has happened in the airport will see it as unreliable as a passenger arrival or departure location. What guarantee can the Minister give to the House that the matter was dealt with properly by the aviation authority prior to yesterday's events and that it is being dealt with properly today to ensure no repetition?
I answered a number of these questions earlier but the Department received assurances from the IAA when previous disruptions took place that the matter had been dealt with and resolved. I understand the authority is not in a position to say whether the problem detected yesterday was in any way related to the previous difficulties. That is why I have asked for a full report on this incident and on the system generally.
I cannot answer whether the software has been corrupted or whether there is a glitch in the system. I must await the report to answer those questions. It has been indicated that the difficulty does not relate to somebody hacking into the system but I did not ask that question. I asked for a report on exactly what were, and are, the difficulties.
The Deputy asked about the cost of the system. My understanding is the system is in place for five years and it cost €115 million. As he said, it is one of the most sophisticated and state-of-the-art systems. It is unusual to install a back-up system but I understand the cost would be at least the same as the current system updated to present day values. It would, therefore, cost a minimum of €115 million to install such a system, which, for example, would not have been used over the past five years. The legitimate question arises as to whether that needs to change and whether the IAA needs to consider this.
I do not wish to be alarmist but anything that affects the air traffic control system whether it is the software or the individuals operating it — we had problems with work to rules a number of months ago — may cause danger to passengers. That is why, despite the inconvenience correctly highlighted by the Deputy, the IAA believes it must make sure everything is right before it will allow the system to operate at full capacity. The Deputy is also correct that the system is operating at approximately 70% capacity. Staff are still testing the system. I asked the authority for a more precise timeline than 24 to 48 hours and it said it does not know what will happen. The system is being tested and everything is working at 70% capacity. Everything seems to have been ironed out and there have been no problems or difficulties. The authority will gradually increase capacity and if it can achieve 100% capacity, it will do so. However, if something happens at 85% or 90% capacity, the authority will be back to the drawing board. That is why the timescale is as outlined.
I do not have an answer to the Deputy's other technical question on overflights. My understanding is that, where possible, in a scenario such as this, overflights are diverted out of Irish airspace. Those that are absolutely necessary will be permitted into our airspace but there is no danger to aeroplanes or passengers. Nothing will be done that could cause danger to passengers on any airline. That is the primary concern of the IAA.
We all must acknowledge that health and safety is a primary factor and the authority must be congratulated that this prevailed. However, significant inconvenience is being caused. The Minister indicated in response to earlier questions that the system attempted to break down during a number of previous incidents. On receipt of the information that matters had been resolved, did the Minister request a double check? Did he receive assurances the system would be restored to full working order? What assurances can he give that, on resolution of the immediate problems, the system will withstand the pressures of time and the rigours of the workload?
Was a service contact involved in the installation of the system? This is a sophisticated system, which is almost foolproof. There are variations in the purchase contract, which relate to monitoring and ongoing service. Was that a factor in this incident? Was a service contract an option? If so, was it taken up? What action was taken following the first malfunction in the context of the service contract? Is it possible to provide a back-up system, given it would cost the same as the original system?
Notwithstanding the level of sophistication, technology can always malfunction. Has it been indicated to the Minister whether the system can protect itself? It is my understanding that the system is similar to that used in electronic voting in that such systems can be subject to intrusion. Is protection built into the system to ensure that its technology cannot be externally targeted?
I will be brief because many questions have been asked. I could not agree more with the Minister in acknowledging safety as our first consideration. The annual income of the Irish Aviation Authority, IAA, is €154 million. Last year, it made €15.4 million in profit. The system, which cost €115 million, is only five years old and has broken down five times in five weeks. An investigation into this situation is required. I have been given to understand that the answer may lie in the fact that the IAA upgraded its computer software a number of weeks ago, since when there have been intermittent computer malfunctions. Will the Minister inform the House whether this is true? If it is the truth, why has the old software not been put back in place given that normal practice is to keep old software until new software has been proven to function properly?
I empathise with the thousands of people who have been delayed, particularly the elderly and those travelling with children at a busy time of the year. Who will pay and why is there no back-up system? In radiotherapy, we insist that every facility has two linear accelerators lest one breaks down.
An external independent investigation is clearly required because nothing less will reassure the travelling public. The safety of hundreds of thousands of people is at stake. We must all ensure that taxpayers' money is spent appropriately. The Minister should ensure that the investigation is independent and that its report is made available to the House in a timely fashion.
All speakers have acknowledged that safety is a matter of significant concern for everyone and that this situation has led to inconveniences and difficulties for many people. It must also be acknowledged that this problem could not have occurred at a worse time of year, given the peak holiday season.
Regarding points that I may not have addressed, a back-up system is available to and being used by the IAA, but a valid question has been asked as to whether the IAA requires an exact duplicate of the system.
The system is clearly inadequate.
I would not say that, but something has gone wrong. The system is the most sophisticated available, but one malfunction in five years is one too many. The situation gives rise to the issues referred to by the Deputies and I will ask that they be addressed in the report. The IAA's report will be based on facts and the best people to get those facts are those who operate and know the system. That is the report that I seek and when we receive it, we can decide whether further reports are necessary. Since the other points raised by the Deputies are technical in nature, I must await the report before responding.
Will the Minister publish the independent reviews of the IAA that have been carried out every few years and make them available to the House?
That would afford Members some information.
Private Notice Questions have concluded. We have gone well over time.