Vol. 677 No. 3
43 Deputy Jimmy Deenihan asked the Minister for Defence the net amount that will be received by the State as an insurance payment in respect of the sinking of the Asgard II; the reason it was decided not to salvage the vessel; his plans for replacing the vessel, including the estimated cost of a replacement; his plans for a temporary replacement pending a permanent solution; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [9877/09]
The amount due in respect of the insurance payment for Asgard II is €3.8 million. As the Deputy will be aware, I have accepted the unanimous recommendation of the board of Coiste an Asgard not to proceed with a salvage operation. The main reason for that decision was that I considered that the risks were too great to commit to spending a sum in the region of €2 million at this time on a salvage effort where the outcome is uncertain. I also had to consider the cost of restoration, which cannot be accurately assessed until after the vessel is raised.
I have also stated that I propose to replace Asgard II with a new steel-hulled vessel. The cost of building such a vessel is not known at this stage. However, arrangements are under way to provide a limited cruise programme on the Creidne during the summer months this year. This vessel was used by Coiste an Asgard for sail training prior to Asgard II. It is now under the control of the Naval Service. A programme of extensive refurbishment of the Creidne is nearing completion and the vessel is expected to be available by May.
Coiste an Asgard has also entered into an arrangement whereby it will arrange for a number of Irish trainees to undergo sail training on board the Norwegian sail training vessel Christian Radich during the tall ships race.
Is the Minister aware of comments made by the former captain of the Asgard, Captain Newport? He said he believed that the Asgard could be salvaged, repaired and hopefully restored as a sail training vessel. Is the Minister also aware of similar observations by the Asgard’s crew? In addition, a person who was there at the time of the last survey felt the ship was in sufficient shape to be salvaged. Does the Minister reject the claims by Captain Newport who questioned the competency of the board of Coiste an Asgard to make such a decision? Does the Minister agree with Captain Newport that there is an obligation on the Government to remove the vessel from French waters?
I have not spoken personally to Captain Newport but I am aware of his comments. I want to take this opportunity to compliment him again on the wonderful job he did at the time the boat unfortunately sank in the Bay of Biscay. I am also aware of the crew's comments. My advice, however, is that despite those comments it was uncertain what condition the Asgard would be in if we salvaged it. There is no hard evidence available to me that the vessel would be repairable or that it would not be irrevocably damaged during the course of a salvage operation. That is the scientific and engineering advice I have received. The people who undertook the ROV survey were in no position to give a clear yes or no on that question. All they could tell us was the position of the Asgard. They confirmed that the vessel was in an upright position, but they were not able to confirm that it would have survived a salvage operation and that it would be repairable for a reasonable cost if salvaged. In the current economic circumstances in particular, I could not afford to take the risk of blowing €2 million of taxpayers’ money on what could be a futile operation.
As regards the competency of the board of Coiste an Asgard, there are many excellent people on the board. Many of them have extensive experience in these matters and they also have advice available to them if and when they need it. Therefore I must take seriously what they say. The board's recommendation was unanimous — that it would be too risky to proceed with the salvage.
Does the Minister think there is an obligation on the Government to remove the vessel from French waters? Who owns the Asgard now? Has it been abandoned or is it still in our ownership? Is there anything to prevent some other country or group from salvaging the ship? Are they free to do so now? If the Minister has decided to abandon the Asgard for the reasons he outlined, does he not think he should give another group or country access in order to salvage the vessel and restore it as a sail training ship?
The answer to Deputy Deenihan's last question is that the vessel is still owned by the Department of Defence. As regards giving a salvage opportunity to others, I already said in my initial announcement that a number of people have been in touch with my Department and have written to newspapers to say they would be willing to make a contribution towards salvaging the Asgard. I intend to put a system in place through the board of Coiste an Asgard to facilitate them should they so wish.
It has not been communicated to me that we have any obligation to remove the vessel. However, I am putting a system in place whereby people can make a voluntary contribution if they wish. If the contributions are sufficiently high we could possibly top them up. I am keeping that option open.
Do they own the boat?
The Government still owns the boat.
44 Deputy Brian O’Shea asked the Minister for Defence if there will be a change in the role of Irish troops serving in Chad as a result of the decision to transfer command of the operation from the EU to the UN; if he is satisfied with the preparations for the handover of the command of Irish troops in Chad from EUFOR to the UN on 15 March 2009; the latest information regarding the security situation in Chad and the potential threat to Irish troops, particularly in view of reports that large numbers of heavily armed personnel could cross the border from Sudan; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [10087/09]
47 Deputy Jimmy Deenihan asked the Minister for Defence the contingency measures that have been put in place for the protection of members of the Irish Defence Forces on duty with EUFOR in Chad and due to remain as part of the UN mission in view of the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, on charges of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity, and the resulting demonstrations in favour of Bashir amid criticism of western countries for their support of the warrant; his views on whether the risks to the safety of members of the Defence Forces on duty in neighbouring Chad have increased; if he has been in contact with other states with EUFOR soldiers in the Chad region over rising tensions there; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [10023/09]
I propose to take Questions Nos. 44 and 47 together.
The mandate of the European Union military mission to Chad and the Central African Republic, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, established under the authority of United Nations Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), is due to expire on 15 March 2009.
Ireland is the second largest contributor to the mission with 439 Defence Forces personnel. The aim of the mission is to protect civilians in danger, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons or IDPs, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and protect UN personnel and equipment.
As the humanitarian and security situation in eastern Chad will clearly continue to warrant an international presence beyond March 2009, the Security Council unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 1861 (2009) on 14 January 2009. This resolution authorised the deployment of a military component of the United Nations mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, MINURCAT, to follow on from the EUFOR mission at the end of its mandate.
Following consideration of a request from the United Nations on 5 March 2009, Dáil Éireann approved the transfer of command of the Irish contingent currently serving in Chad with EUFOR TCHAD/RCA to the United Nations mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, MINURCAT.
The Defence Forces contribution will be similar in size and nature to Ireland's existing contribution to EUFOR. The nature of the Irish battalion's duties with MINURCAT will be similar to its duties with EUFOR, which include, inter alia, short and long-range patrolling, situational awareness and providing an overall security and deterrent presence within its area of operations.
As the House will be aware, the International Criminal Court, ICC, issued a warrant on 4 March 2009 for the arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, president of Sudan, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is the first warrant of arrest ever issued for a sitting Head of State by the International Criminal Court. Since its issue, there are fears the Sudanese reaction against the international community could include giving fresh support to Chadian rebel groups. Any such actions could have serious consequences for the large refugee population in eastern Chad, many of whom have fled from the conflict in Darfur.
The security situation in Chad and neighbouring Sudan is kept under constant review by the Defence Forces. Prior to the indictment of the Sudanese President, al-Bashir, by the International Criminal Court, a specific threat assessment review was conducted on the possible effects for the 99th Infantry Battalion serving in Chad. It is assessed that the overall threat has not changed and remains at medium. The Defence Forces are in constant contact with their EUFOR partners in the theatre of operations and with operational headquarters in Paris which all concur with the current Defence Forces' assessment. Indication for any change to the security situation is being monitored by both the Defence Forces and EUFOR's operational headquarters.
The detailed threat assessment and reconnaissance undertaken informs decisions regarding the configuration of the contingent and its armaments and protection. In the case of the current EUFOR mission, the Defence Forces have deployed a full range of force protection assets, including 18 MOWAG armoured personnel carriers, four close reconnaissance vehicles and indirect fire capabilities, such as mortars. Together, these provide the necessary armoured protection, mobility, firepower and communications. This will also be the case when Irish personnel transfer to MINURCAT. The MOWAG armoured personnel carriers deployed were also deployed with the Defence Forces when they served with UNMIL in Liberia and UNIFIL in Lebanon, where they performed effectively. The Defence Forces have also deployed a suite of robust tactical communications systems.
Concerning the security situation, there has been a noticeable decline in incidents of banditry in the Irish-led multinational battalion south's area of operations during January 2009, compared to December 2008. A significant redeployment of Chadian forces in the general area has added to the security and has assisted the reduction of banditry against the local population.
The UN follow-on force, which will take over from EUFOR on 15 March 2009, is expected to have a wider deployment in eastern Chad so as to further deter armed and criminal elements. MINURCAT will act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which means the force will be authorised to take all necessary measures in its capabilities and its area of operations in eastern Chad to fulfil its mandate.
Additional information not given on the floor of the House.
The UN follow-on force is the first example of a transfer of authority between the EU and the UN. Arrangements in this regard are progressing well. There is excellent co-operation between the UN and EUFOR and it is expected that there will be no security gap in the transition from EUFOR to MINURCAT. Negotiations with the Government of Chad on the hand-over of EUFOR assets to the UN were very prolonged and detailed, but these had now been finalised.
I wish success to the Irish personnel transferring over to the new UN mission. I know the Defence Forces will continue to acquit themselves well, and will make a vital and important contribution to the success of MINURCAT, as they have done on so many occasions in the past.
I am relieved to hear the overall threat assessment is medium. That is an encouraging development but, as the situation needs to be kept under constant review, there may be changes to this status.
With up to 13 NGOs having been expelled, a disastrous situation has emerged in Darfur with, for example, Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF, being forced to leave while dealing with two meningitis outbreaks. Will many more refugees begin to cross the border from Darfur and Sudan to eastern Chad? Is there any evidence that the Chadian rebels may be receiving new assistance from Sudan? What impact will the approaching rainy season have on the situation, which I understand is three months away?
As I indicated in my reply, it was felt that the issue of the arrest warrant against the Sudanese President, al-Bashir, would result in a renewed effort on the part of the Sudanese Government to further support the rebels attacking Chad and trying to undermine the Chadian regime. There is no evidence that this has happened to date. If it were to happen, it would have profound consequences, as the Deputy rightly anticipates, for the refugees. It will mean more refugees in already overcrowded camps, which I saw myself on a recent visit to the area.
To a certain extent, we have been the victims of our own success because the security brought about by the EUFOR force has encouraged more refugees and internally displaced persons to come to its camps which are run in a fairly disciplinarian manner. The threat remains live.
The initial action taken as a result of the issue of the arrest warrant was the expulsion of a large number of NGOs from Sudan. Several Irish NGOs on the ground in Sudan, with which we have been in touch, have not been affected to date. Their working environment, however, is becoming progressively more difficult and tense.
Paradoxically, the rainy season, which is not due for three months, tends to minimise rebel activities. Rebel movements across the border, operating to destabilise the Chadian regime, are severely restricted during the rainy season. There tends to be a lull during the season with groups rearming and reorganising.
I have not seen any evidence of further support from the Sudanese Government to the rebel groups. Last November, however, several rebel groups came together in an unified organisation which has created tension between Sudan and Chad with the Chadian President blaming Sudan for facilitating this development.
While it is a case of "so far, so good" and the threat has been assessed as medium, the situation is quite tense and we are keeping it under constant review.
According to today's The New York Times, the American embassy in the Sudan is allowing a large number of its staff leave the country. Embassies beginning to move staff out of countries is a serious development. Of the 85 NGOs operating in the Sudan, up to 16 have been expelled by the Sudanese President with threats to the others. If the peacekeepers were moved from Darfur, it could lead to the internal displacement and the movement of millions into Chad. Is the Minister confident that EUFOR will have the capacity to handle such a doomsday situation if this were to happen? If it does not have the resources, what will the Minister do to ensure it has adequate resources? Has he contacted the other countries involved in the mission? Initially, Lieutenant General Pat Nash was concerned about the Defence Forces’ equipment for the mission? Does the Minister believe they are sufficiently equipped to face this highly possible doomsday scenario?
I was not aware of the news concerning the American embassy in Sudan. I must point out to the Deputy the peacekeeping force is in Chad. I agree there is the possibility that, if the Sudan disintegrates or intensifies its support for the rebel groups, more refugees will be created. We do not know how many and over what a timescale. The situation is, however, being constantly monitored.
The military component of the EUFOR mission consisted of 3,400 troops who, it is commonly agreed, did a tremendous job in providing a sense of security in the area, particularly in the refugee camps, and allowing some internally displaced people to return home. The military element of the MINURCAT mission will be expanded to 5,200 troops with a number of police and military liaison officers. We are anticipating a potentially worse situation.
We are in constant contact with both the UN and our fellow members in MINURCAT about the situation on the ground. It is reviewed on a daily basis as it evolves.
I take the point about restricted movement during the rainy season. In the intervening three months, does the Minister envisage the withdrawal of the Irish or UN contingent from Chad? As matters stand, such a withdrawal is not a direct possibility. However, has a military assessment been carried out with regard to what would happen if our troops were placed at risk as a result of a serious deterioration in circumstances? Did the Minister discuss this matter with the Chief of Staff?
Are the logistics in place to move our mission in the event of a doomsday situation? Is the Minister confident of our troops' safety in the event of a large movement of people from Darfur into Chad should what is being threatened by President al-Bashir come to pass?
There are a number of aspects to this matter. The increase in the price of oil last year enabled the Government of Chad to build up its defence assets. In that context, it has acquired a number of substantial air assets and also appears to have improved its military capabilities. The Government of Chad has placed troops in an area adjacent to the Sudanese border in order to prevent rebel movements across the frontier. This has nothing to do with us, as such, but it has certainly improved the security situation.
I do not envisage a United Nations withdrawal over the next three months. I discussed the position of our troops with the Chief of Staff, and we are open to all possibilities and are examining all contingencies. However, I spoke to representatives of local communities in Chad and the governor of Goz Beida — whom I met for a detailed briefing — in addition to our troops and commanders from other countries during my recent visit and I do not envisage a doomsday scenario arising. The possibility of Ireland or the United Nations' force as a whole withdrawing at any time in the near future is seen as extremely remote.
45 Deputy Jimmy Deenihan asked the Minister for Defence if work will commence in 2009 on renovating and converting C house, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin, to single officers quarters in order to alleviate the situation of officers forced to live in steel containers at that barracks; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [9878/09]
The position is unchanged since I previously addressed this issue in reply to Question No. 111 of 4 February 2009. Some 20 containerised accommodation units have been provided for temporary accommodation for third level students at Cathal Brugha Barracks. These units consist of en suite accommodation and are fully furnished and heated. The military authorities advise that the units are compliant with all relevant regulations and are similar to units used for accommodating troops on some missions overseas. The accommodation in question is currently occupied by officers of the Defence Forces who are attending college on a full-time basis in the Dublin area. It is only used during term-time, with the relevant officers returning to their home bases during holiday periods. These officers are not charged for this accommodation.
The officers were previously accommodated at the Curragh and Gormanstown Camps and transported by bus by the military to college in Dublin. They found that this arrangement did not allow them to participate fully in all college activities and asked to be accommodated closer to college. The most immediate way of providing this accommodation was through the provision of temporary containerised accommodation units.
The requirement for more permanent living-in accommodation at Cathal Brugha Barracks is being considered as part of overall Defence Force requirements. A study into single living-in accommodation across all of the Defence Forces, with a view to defining the major priority areas for provision and refurbishment, is ongoing. Given that the current requirement at Cathal Brugha Barracks arises as a result of university attendance, it may be the case that there will actually be no requirement for additional accommodation at the barracks in the long term. This must be factored into our consideration, particularly in light of the cost of constructing permanent accommodation blocks.
The provision of any accommodation required will be undertaken in the context of the overall Defence Force infrastructure development programme. This will be implemented as part of the ongoing capital programme in my Department. Projects in this programme are prioritised in respect of addressing the Defence Forces' operational requirements, taking into account the annual capital allocation for the ongoing building programme. In light of the current set of priorities, it is unlikely that this project will commence during the current year. Should the current allocation change, the building programme will be reviewed and projects in the programme will be prioritised on a needs basis.
I visited Cathal Brugha Barracks and saw the containers in question. I do not agree with the Minister's assertion that they are comfortable and suitable for officers trying to study for examinations. It is unfair to state that these are the type of containers used on foreign missions. There is a major difference between soldiers operating on foreign missions and those at home trying to study. What is happening is completely unacceptable.
On my trip to the barracks, I visited C house and was surprised to discover that extensive renovations and repairs have been carried out there. In that context, a new roof has been put in place and new windows have been fitted. I am convinced that the money used to pay for the containers would have been sufficient to complete the works being carried out in respect of C house and make it suitable as living quarters. What is the cost relating to the provision of these containers? Is the Minister in a position to provide a figure with regard to the cost of completing the renovation of C house?
As already stated, the officers who are pursuing their studies and who are accommodated in these containers were originally based further afield and were being transported to college by bus. These individuals wanted to be based closer to college and were given the choice to move to their current accommodation. I accept that it is not an ideal situation. Nevertheless, we must consider the overall position. It may be the case that this is only a temporary arrangement and there may be no need for further extensive capital works at Cathal Brugha Barracks. If there is a need for such works, they may not attract the same priority as that attaching to projects which are slated to proceed this year.
I do not have the precise cost relating to the provision of the containers to hand. However, I will communicate further with the Deputy on the matter. I understand that completing the refurbishment of C house would cost in the region of €1.6 million.
As the Minister is aware, those in the Army will do what the Minister asks of them. In that context, if young officers such as those to whom I refer are asked to live in containers, they will do so. The figures I possess do not indicate that €1.6 million would be required to complete the refurbishment of C house, or an adequate portion of it, to enable the officers in question to be accommodated there. It struck me that C house could be refurbished for a considerably smaller sum of money.
What was the exact cost of providing the containers? It is amazing that the Minister does not have the figures in that regard to hand. In the review of accommodation at barracks nationwide, I hope special priority will be given to removing the containers at Cathal Brugha Barracks as soon as possible. In my view, these containers are an embarrassment to the Defence Forces.
I reiterate that the official costing relating to the refurbishment of C house is €1.6 million. I have an idea with regard to the cost of the temporary accommodation, but I do not have a precise figure. I would not like to be misquoted in that regard.
The Minister should indicate his idea of the cost.
I will provide the Deputy with the precise figure so that there will be no confusion. The Army did not ask anyone to occupy containers. The officers in question decided it would be better for them to be accommodated nearer to the college at which they are studying. They were informed that accommodation such as that available at Gormanstown or the Curragh would not be available and that they would be obliged to avail of the temporary accommodation on offer in the form of these containers. Those in question opted to occupy the containers. I did not ask them to do so, nor did I insist that they should do so. The Army was prepared to continue to transport them to college by bus, if that was what they desired.
46 Deputy Jimmy Deenihan asked the Minister for Defence if a draft has been received by his Department from the consultants appointed to review the medical services of the Defence Forces; the date on which such a report was received; the reason such a report was not accepted as the final report; the instructions given to the consultants by his Department regarding the amendments or additions to be made to the draft report; when a final report is expected to be submitted by the consultants; the date by which the contract awarded to the consultants required them to submit a final report; if the contract included penalty clauses for late submission of the report; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [9879/09]
I am pleased to dispel any confusion that might exist with regard to the review of the Defence Forces medical services currently being completed by PA Consulting. The normal process for consultancy of this nature is being followed. The consultants are formulating proposals based on an analysis of data and from their interviews and meetings with the various stakeholders. In the normal course, the basis on which these proposals are based is validated. As part of the quality assurance of the report, for example, a workshop was undertaken with the representative associations, PDFORRA and RACO. This workshop identified a number of areas in the report requiring further assessment.
PA Consulting sent further elements of the report to my Department as part of this quality assurance process. This was received on 15 December 2008 and may be the material to which the Deputy is referring in his question. There is nothing unusual in the review and quality assurance process undertaken on the material delivered. This is explicitly catered for in the tender document. Any interaction between my Department and PA Consulting has centred on ensuring the report is comprehensive, meets the requirements as detailed in the contract and can stand up to robust examination of its assessments and recommendations.
The delay in completion of this report may also have added to the confusion. The report was scheduled for completion before the end of 2008. I have been disappointed that the schedule I outlined in the House has not been met. My officials, the Defence Forces and PA Consulting are aware of my view that this report should be completed quickly. At the same time, a focus should be also kept on ensuring the report provides the blueprint for the sustainable provision of the medical input required by the Defence Forces. On receipt of the report and following consideration of the recommendations, I intend to publish the report and engage with all of the key stakeholders on the way ahead.
Who is at fault for the delay in finalising the report? Is it due to issues the Department had with the report or is it due to the consultants? As I asked in the question, and the Minister did not reply, was there a penalty clause for the report being late? It is most important that the Defence Forces are serviced by a proper medical corps. Both the PwC report in the 1990s and the first White Paper strongly recommended that there should be an establishment of 46 in the medical corps. At present, there are only 23. Missions such as the Chad mission are very demanding physically on our troops, both in terms of preparing them for the mission and when they are in the battle theatre. There is also the issue of the general health of our military personnel and the fact that there is a very high absentee rate in the Irish Defence Forces, compared with the rate in other countries. That is attributable to the fact that there is a deficiency in numbers in the medical corps. This is a matter of supreme urgency.
Deputy Deenihan is correct that the establishment is 46 but the number of doctors employed in the Army at present is 24. That is not to say the Army is only getting half the medical attention it requires. The lacuna is made up by employing private medical practitioners. Successive Ministers have made valiant efforts over the years to ensure the medical corps reaches its establishment level. Unfortunately, our efforts have not met with success, which is why we decided to bring in consultants to advise us on how to proceed. We have taken various measures such as, for example, renegotiating the salaries of Army doctors, recruitment campaigns and so forth but, to date, those efforts have not borne the requisite fruit.
In response to Deputy Deenihan's query about a penalty clause, the answer is "No"; there is no penalty clause. Rather than discuss questions of fault I prefer to get the matter right. The consultants were initially brought in last July. As part of the process they had to consult a number of key stakeholders. They found it difficult to do that during the holiday period of July and August so there was a delay. They presented an initial report to the Department on 15 December last. The material in that report was not directly released to the representative organisations but the basis on which the report was arrived at and some of its conclusions and recommendations were discussed with them. Everybody decided, including the Department and the representative organisations, that the consultants would have to work again on the matter on the basis that a number of items were not referred to and there was a problem with the clarity of some of the recommendations and with the clarity of the language. We are a little behind schedule but it is very important that we get this right.
I agree it is very important to get this right, but the Minister must get it right as soon as possible. Has the Minister the figure for the cost of employing outside services for the Army to compensate for the lack of professionals within the Army?
Deputy Deenihan asked that question previously and I communicated the figure to him, as far as I can recall. I do not have it with me as I did not anticipate him asking the question again. I will make it available to him.
That is the point — the cost to the Department of paying outside professionals could be the cost of employing sufficient qualified people in the Army.
No, we have already examined that, as did successive Ministers. This is a problem that has bedevilled the Army for years through successive Administrations. None of us has managed to sort it out. Consider the number of doctors retiring over the years and the number we can get to replace them. Of the 24 doctors we have at present, eight of them are foreign nationals. There is nothing wrong with that, of course, but it illustrates the difficulties we have. We are trying to get it right. It is important that we do that and get the most comprehensive consultants' report possible. I expect to have that within the next few weeks.
Question No. 47 answered with Question No. 44.
