Skip to main content
Normal View

Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 16 May 2023

Vol. 1038 No. 3

Ceisteanna ar Sonraíodh Uain Dóibh - Priority Questions

The Tánaiste is welcome.

Defence Forces

Matt Carthy

Question:

1. Deputy Matt Carthy asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence the current capacity of the Defence Forces to ensure the territorial integrity of Irish airspace; his proposals to increase this capacity, and the details of any arrangements with other states to monitor or enter Irish airspace for military or defence purposes. [23112/23]

Will the Tánaiste outline the current capacity of our Defence Forces to ensure the territorial integrity of Irish airspace? Will he outline the details of any arrangements we have with other states to enter Irish airspace for military or defence purposes?

I thank the Deputy for the question. I think this is the first time he is asking questions in his capacity as spokesperson on defence. I congratulate him on his appointment and look forward to ongoing engagement.

My priority as Minister for Defence is to ensure the operational capability of the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service is maintained to the greatest extent possible so as to enable the Defence Forces to carry out their roles as assigned by the Government, both at home and overseas. AirNav Ireland, which was formerly part of the Irish Aviation Authority, IAA, exercises air traffic control responsibilities for both sovereign airspace and also airspace over the high seas, largely off the western seaboard. All air traffic, civil and military, is monitored and controlled by AirNav Ireland in respect of this airspace and in line with International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, rules it is normal practice for AirNav to be informed by the relevant state of any military flights operating in Irish-controlled airspace.

The development of a primary radar capability was one of the recommendations made in the report of the Commission on the Defence Forces last year. In response to that a project team comprising senior civil and military personnel has commenced work on planning for military radar capabilities. This includes ground-based, maritime and primary radar systems. Delivery of primary radar is extremely complex and will take some time. However, delivery has been prioritised by the Government and this year’s increased capital allocation for defence includes funding to progress the development of a primary radar capability. The Government is totally committed to resourcing radar capability.

As I have previously stated, it is the Government’s consistent approach that we do not comment on national security but policies are conducted with full respect for Irish sovereign decision-making authority and for Ireland’s policy of military neutrality. They are also fully in accordance with Irish and international law. It should be noted that the issues involved are the subject of a current High Court case.

Gabhaim buíochas leis an Tánaiste. It is on that last point I would like to have a supplementary answer because it would be deeply disappointing if, through a court action, the High Court was to hear before this House what particular arrangements are in place with other states. The Tánaiste stated the Government does not comment on these types of arrangements, which he termed national security arrangements, but his predecessor, the Minister, Deputy Coveney, did. He told the Oireachtas Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence that "We do not have overflight arrangements with the RAF, to be clear." Is that a remark the Tánaiste would make and stand over or is it one that needs to be corrected in the House? The Tánaiste has referenced that everything done in terms of arrangements with other states is done in line with the constitutional and legal provisions-----

We need to be very-----

Can the Tánaiste outline when and how the Government last secured legal advice that every arrangement was indeed in line with the constitutional provisions?

No, no. We cannot start venturing into an area that is currently before the courts. It is just not acceptable. I am sure the Tánaiste-----

A Cheann Comhairle, I have to dispute that, what I am asking is in relation to-----

I do not care whether you dispute it or not.

It is a long-established tradition that we do not debate matters that are before the courts. I am sure the Tánaiste has a reply that I imagine-----

I certainly have.

-----avoids going into the responsibility of the courts, but we are not intruding on their territory.

I am not suggesting that we would at all.

We are not intruding on the territory of the courts.

I appreciate the Ceann Comhairle's intervention and the Deputy's query. Regarding the Deputy's reference to the then Minister, Deputy Coveney's statement, I do not see anything in it that requires a correction of the Dáil record.

The two important points we have consistently made in terms of national security is that everything we do as a country is in line with our military neutrality and Irish sovereign decision-making. There is a challenge in going further than that in protecting our national security and the security of others. I am giving this matter ongoing reflection, but we should not take too lightly the issues around national security more generally. I would be somewhat cautious of overinterpreting various reports that have been published recently about overflights and so on.

Let us leave media reports aside. The British armed forces minister, Mr. James Heappey, told Westminster:

RAF jets have deployed into Irish airspace on occasion. It is for the Irish Government to set out their policy on why, when and how.

All I am asking is for the Tánaiste to set out the Irish Government's position, which unfortunately is as clear as mud because we are hiding behind the veneer of national security. The Irish people are entitled to know if our capabilities in terms of radar – I welcome the progress made in this respect – and our Air Corps mean we are not in a position to meet what is a basic requirement of our Defence Forces, which in the first instance is to monitor activity that is taking place in our skies and our seas, and are instead relying on others to do this pivotal work. We will then be able to work together on planning to ensure that we have the capacity to deal with these issues.

I am sure the Deputy has read the report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. It is there for the public to read. We have limited capabilities to monitor or intercept foreign aircraft in Irish skies. We are a military neutral country. Given our size and so on, we have limited capabilities. That is not a secret. It was well documented by the Commission on the Defence Forces.

The eight-strong Pilatus PC-9 fleet operated by the Air Corps offers limited air-to-air and air-to-ground intercept capability. There has been significant investment in air base capability in recent years, with the programme for the supply of two C295 maritime patrol aircraft well under way and the delivery of the aircraft expected very shortly. A contract was recently awarded at a cost of €68 million for the provision of a new C295W fixed-wing military transport aircraft for the Defence Forces. This is alongside the four PC-12 aircraft equipped for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance that were acquired in 2020.

This is the essence of our capabilities in a nutshell. We are progressing the radar issue, which is needed. It is complex, but we are determined to make a comprehensive provision.

Defence Forces

Matt Carthy

Question:

2. Deputy Matt Carthy asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence if he will accede to the wishes of the Women of Honour that any internal appointee to the oversight board be "vetted" for "appropriateness" by an Oireachtas committee, such desire reflecting the group's particular experience within the organisation and its culture; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [23113/23]

Will the Tánaiste accede to the wishes of the Women of Honour that any internal appointee to the oversight board be vetted for appropriateness by an Oireachtas committee, such desire reflecting their particular experience within the Defence Forces organisation and its culture? Will the Tánaiste also make a statement on this matter?

As the Deputy will be aware, the Government has agreed to progress as a priority the 13 recommendations of the independent review group, IRG, including the setting up an external oversight body - on a non-statutory basis initially - to increase transparency and accountability and to drive necessary culture change throughout the Defence Forces. I moved quickly on the establishment of the external oversight body, given its central role in driving change and to create momentum around the implementation of the IRG's recommendations. I am determined that we implement the recommendations and that we move on and change the culture within our Defence Forces.

I do not believe that some of the commentary in respect of the oversight body has been fair or appropriate. Its establishment and its membership were approved by the Government and are fully in line with the recommendation in the IRG report relating to "external oversight of the Defence Forces". The review group was explicit in the report on the membership of the oversight body, and it is on the basis of the group's guidance that the Government made the appointments to the external oversight body on 5 April, including the Secretary General of the Department of Defence.

I wish to emphasise strongly that the calibre and combined skills and experience of the members of the body, chaired by Professor Brian MacCraith, are exceptional. I am satisfied of their ability to carry out their important role effectively. The need for the Secretary General to be on the body was recommended by the IRG for good reason and reflects the important link between the external oversight body and the administration of Government to effect the change that is needed within the Defence Forces.

I am pleased to announce that, with the agreement of the Government this morning, I have today appointed Ms Sam des Forges to the body. Ms des Forges is the director of conduct, equity and justice in the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom and has relevant experience in the areas of diversity and inclusion, transformation of defence forces' complaints system, implementation of reforms relating to culture, and unacceptable behaviours within defence forces. Ms des Forges's unique personal experience, expertise and insight will be of considerable value to the body.

I will also be introducing legislation to place the body on a statutory footing.

My end goal has to be a safe workplace where self-worth and dignity are actively promoted and mutual respect becomes a dominant feature in an organisation that is open to change. The external oversight body will be a key player in that endeavour.

It is time that the Women of Honour were honoured in word and in deed by the House. The seriousness of the damage that was done to these women - and, indeed, men – has been fully articulated in the national media. It is not that they were raped or sexually assaulted out on the street and then did not get a kind ear when they went into work. This was done by their superior officers. This was done within the Defence Forces by people who should have known better and were there to defend the honour of these women.

When these women speak out, we have to take what they say seriously. They have said that they want there to be some oversight of the internal appointees to the oversight board. The Tánaiste should respect that and listen to these women.

The Government has to act. I became the Minister for Defence in the context of the Commission on the Defence Forces and have been repeatedly asked and criticised in the House over the lack of momentum and progress on its recommendations, even though we have implemented many of them. I am not going to have the same complaint made in respect of the IRG's recommendations. I wanted to show momentum from very early on. I respect fully, and have gone on public record as praising, the work of Women of Honour, Women and Men of Honour, other organisations and serving personnel who have come forward about issues and unacceptable behaviours within the Defence Forces.

The purpose of the external oversight body is to ensure that we have a strong body in place that can oversee the radical cultural change that is required. I do not personally believe that the best route to that is through vetting by an Oireachtas committee. I do not agree with that particular approach. If the Deputy looks at the individuals on the body, she would see for herself that they are of a high calibre and are genuine in their commitment to public service.

If the Tánaiste will not agree to that, I am sure there is some way of providing confidentiality to any appointee to the oversight body. The Tánaiste met Women of Honour the week before last, but the group was not satisfied afterwards. Is the Tánaiste going to meet Women of Honour again to discuss how to reach an agreement on this? We are talking about women who were in the Defence Forces.

These are not soft women. These are women who were ready to go out and defend their country and the reputation of Ireland. It is a tough job. They are not weak women. They are strong women who have stood up and, since they have spoken out, it has become possible for men who have suffered this kind of abuse in the Defence Forces to come out as well. Does the Tánaiste intend to meet the group again to see if he can come to an agreement with it that its members will be satisfied with?

I hope to meet with the Women of Honour group again and I will do so. At the last meeting, we circulated draft terms of reference for a statutory inquiry. It was quite an amicable meeting and I was a bit surprised by the subsequent press statement. The press comments have tended to be very adversarial with regard to the actions that the Defence Forces and I are taking. We are doing this in the best interests of getting accountability, having full transparency and holding a comprehensive statutory inquiry. We circulated draft terms of reference for people to work on so that various groups, including the Women of Honour, could come back to us with amendments and suggestions. We had a discussion on both the scope of such an inquiry and whether it would be a public inquiry in the tribunal of inquiry format or a commission of inquiry. We have to bear in mind all of those who may want to come forward and what is the best model for them. We did that very openly at the meeting with all of the groups. We are waiting for responses from the various groups, the other groups represented being Men and Women of Honour, RACO, PDFORRA and the Defence Women's Network within the Defence Forces.

Defence Forces

Holly Cairns

Question:

3. Deputy Holly Cairns asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence the steps he is taking to address staffing shortages in the Defence Forces. [19970/23]

This question is in the name of Deputy Cairns but will be taken by Deputy Gannon.

What steps is the Tánaiste taking to address the staffing shortages in the Defence Forces? I believe we are currently approximately 4,000 short of where we should be.

The military authorities advise that, as of 31 March 2023, the strength of the Permanent Defence Force stood at 7,807. The current establishment of the Defence Forces is 9,500. Sanction has recently been received for 100 extra positions to facilitate the implementation of the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. This is in addition to the pending appointments of a civilian head of strategic HR and a civilian head of transformation in the Defence Forces. 

I have previously acknowledged the current staffing difficulties in the Defence Forces and work is ongoing to counter these. The problem is most acute in the enlisted ranks as officer ranks remain above establishment. The military authorities advise that current recruitment initiatives include ongoing general service and direct entry recruitment, the re-entry schemes, the "Be More" recruitment campaign and a Naval Service-specific recruitment campaign.  A contract has recently been awarded to a marine specialist recruitment body to target individuals with the skills and expertise required by the Naval Service. The Defence Forces have established a joint induction training centre in Gormanston with a view to increasing the throughput of recruits.

A range of financial and non-financial retention measures have been introduced by the Government such as service commitment schemes, tax measures and a recent agreement to further extend the service of post-1994 privates and corporals, allowing for their continuance in service to the end of 2024. There has also been significant progress on pay. Current pay rates including military service allowances for recruits on completion of their training start at €37,147 in year 1, rising to €38,544 in year 2 and €39,832 in year 3 of service.

Arising from the completion of an early action of the Commission on the Defence Forces report endorsing the commitment in the programme for Government, I have recently secured agreement on extending the provision of healthcare to all members of the Permanent Defence Force. All personnel can now avail of private secondary medical care, a facility only available to officers up to now. This is in addition to the comprehensive primary medical and dental care available to all personnel.  

My immediate focus is on stabilising the numbers of personnel in the Defence Forces and thereafter increasing strength to meet the agreed level of ambition arising from the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces.

I thank the Tánaiste for his answer. This really comes down to the housing crisis. I grew up with a lot of people who went on to serve in the armed forces. McKee Barracks is right beside where I grew up. There is great pride among people who want to serve. I know several people who served, who then came out of the Defence Forces and into the private sector and who are now trying to get back in.

Last week, through a parliamentary question I submitted, it was revealed that 70% of Defence Forces accommodation remains idle with nobody living within it. That is despite the fact that one of the big reasons that people are removing themselves from the Defence Forces is that they cannot afford rent and they do not have the capacity to earn enough to get a mortgage. If we are to improve morale and look at the basic necessities that all people, including members of our Defence Forces, need, we need to look at issues such as Defence Forces accommodation. The Tánaiste has done fantastic work in restoring access to medical care for Defence Forces personnel. That is really important. Can we now look at housing? Can we get Defence Forces accommodation back into circulation? Some of the housing we have at our disposal at the moment - I believe 120 houses are lying idle - would go some way towards improving morale.

There has been very significant investment in accommodation within the Defence Forces. I refer to single accommodation. This mainly relates to programmes of induction and training on recruitment. For example, one of the more significant investments was made in the naval centre at Haulbowline. Some very historic buildings there have been refurbished in a very well-designed and aesthetically pleasing way to facilitate good-quality accommodation. That has happened in Cathal Brugha Barracks and other barracks as well. I will provide details in respect of that in the reply to a later parliamentary question. I also recently halted the demolition of up to 12 houses at the Curragh with a view to having them refurbished for accommodation purposes. It has been traditional policy for more than 20 years not to house personnel. We have been weaning off that programme, although quite a number of Army personnel are still housed within quarters. That matter is open to question but we have to be realistic as to the meaningful impact that could have on people on housing lists and so on. However, in the first instance, there is now significant investment being made in accommodation at barracks. There is an open question as to what more we can do over and above that.

At the very minimum, we should look at the stock we already have at our disposal. I believe we can reanimate some of it and get Defence Forces staff back into it. This may even be an emergency situation. There was a report in The Irish Times two weeks ago regarding a young woman, a member of the Defence Forces who had a child, who ended up homeless and sleeping in a car when the Defence Forces, which previously might have offered temporary accommodation until she got back on her feet, were not in a position to do so. That motivated the question I asked about the stock we have. I do not want to use the word "brave" but we need to be more open-minded with regard to bringing some of that accommodation back on track. It cannot simply lie idle. St. Bricin's Hospital is another example.

In the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, there is a target of 11,600. We are approximately 4,000 short of that figure. We are making good strides incrementally but are we going to lose more people than we can bring into the system? That is a big fear I have. With regard to the steps he is taking, is the Tánaiste confident that we can put basic measures, such as those relating to pay, in place within that timeframe? I understand that staffing at officer level is at the establishment figure but we seem to be having problems at the lower ranks. Is the Tánaiste confident we can address those issues?

I am confident we can address the issues but we have some journey to go before we will see a net increase with more staff being recruited than retiring. That is particularly the case with the Naval Service. I am very concerned about the Naval Service. I have had discussions with the flag officer and the Chief of Staff in that regard. The numbers within the Naval Service are a serious concern. We are extending access to private secondary healthcare with a view to improving quality of life for people working in our Defence Forces. In some barracks, we have invested in state-of-the-art gym facilities, which allow Defence Forces personnel to save some small degree of income by not having to purchase membership in an external facility. I recently saw a first-class facility of that kind in Kilkenny. It is our aim for every barracks to have such a first-class facility. I want all barracks accommodation refurbished with a view to using it for accommodation purposes. I do not want it demolished or anything like that. It is then for us to determine how that use will be prioritised.

Military Neutrality

Mick Barry

Question:

4. Deputy Mick Barry asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence if he will report on plans for the consultative forum on international security policy this summer; if his Department or the Defence Forces will be making submissions on the question of military non-alignment; which experts have been invited to participate; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [20857/23]

Will the Tánaiste report on plans for the consultative forum on international security policy this summer? Will his Department or the Defence Forces be making submissions on the question of military non-alignment?

Which experts have been invited to participate in the event? Will he make a statement on the matter?

The international security environment has changed significantly over the last year. In order to build a deeper understanding of the threats faced by the State and the links to and between our foreign, security and defence policy, I have convened a consultative forum on international security policy to discuss the issues involved. The consultative forum will take place in three different locations: on 22 June at University College Cork, on 23 June at the University of Galway and on 26 and 27 June at Dublin Castle. It will be chaired by Louise Richardson, formerly vice-chancellor of the University of Oxford and principal and vice-chancellor of the University of St. Andrews. The forum will be a broad discussion, examining issues such as Ireland's work to protect the rules-based international order through our engagement in peacekeeping, conflict prevention and peacebuilding and arms control and disarmament. It will examine new and emerging threats including cyber, hybrid, disinformation and threats to critical infrastructure. The forum will also examine our current and future engagement in EU Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, as well as our existing relationship with NATO through the Partnership for Peace. Attendance at the forum will consist of invited guests from Ireland and internationally with expertise and practical experience in the areas to be discussed. The full programme detailing moderators and panellists will be made available when finalised. I anticipate that those attending will include non-governmental organisations, academics and others, in addition to members of the general public for whom spaces will be reserved.

Discussions will be livestreamed and there will be an option for online submissions. There are no restrictions on who can and cannot make online submissions. The objective of the forum is to initiate an open and evidence-based discussion on the State’s foreign and security policy. Anyone interested in engaging in the process will be able to do so. The Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs have already contacted academic and policy institutions to encourage engagement and discussion on the issues the forum will focus on and will continue these contacts in the weeks ahead. Full details of the programme over the four days, as well as the arrangements for registration, livestreaming and the making of submissions, will be published by the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs in the coming weeks. Importantly, there are no predetermined or preconceived outcomes from discussions at the forum and participants will be free to raise any relevant issues during deliberations. The chair’s report will outline what transpired over the four days but will not include recommendations. Once presented to me, I will consider its findings and decide whether to make recommendations to the Government.

No predetermined outcomes - I believe the Tánaiste when thousands would not. I will start with a quote:

An examination of these cases reveals that the United States had very good reasons to object to the governments of Chile, Cuba and Nicaragua. Their ideological orientation was inimical to its own, so it supported local groups that used whatever means were available to them to try to bring them down.

These are the words of Louise Richardson, dame commander of the most excellent order of the British empire. They are words that might be used by an attorney to justify the actions of US imperialism in Central and Latin America, which, let us recall, included support for the killing of tens of thousands of people, at the very least. Why has this person been chosen to chair the Government's consultation forum on international security policy in June and to write the official report at the end of the forum's proceedings?

The Deputy has a very negative approach to the idea of even establishing a consultative forum. I find it disturbing in its own way that he would be so resolutely against an open and transparent debate in public forums regarding Ireland's foreign and security policy, as evidenced by his cynical comment about no "preconceived outcomes". I always suspected that the next approach would be to attack the chairperson. It is standard practice for the Deputy's movement and the movement he represents to try to assassinate someone at the knees - verbally, metaphorically speaking - in respect of their bona fides for chairing the committee. The chairperson is a distinguished academic in her own right and has achieved significant respect and credibility internationally for her achievements. That is the context for asking and inviting her to chair this and to compile a report. It will be a matter for me and the Government, subsequently, and indeed for the Oireachtas, if that is required, to then make decisions if decisions will be made in its aftermath. We need public debate and discussion around how Irish foreign and security policy has evolved over the last 20 years and the threats we will face over the next two decades.

The Tánaiste spoke of a citizens' assembly. He has decided to go ahead with an assembly but I note, as I think many other people will do, that he has taken the citizens out of the equation. A meeting of the chiefs of the European navies will take place in Cork tomorrow and on Thursday. Who will be in attendance? Any European Union or European NATO country that has a navy can send representatives. US navy commanders have the right to attend as observers. I understand that NATO's military command will be represented, as will EU military staff. No doubt, the Tánaiste will highlight the question of underwater cables but is the event not also discussing drone technology, artificial intelligence systems and the further militarisation of the European Union? Why is there no advance publicity for this event? To the best of my knowledge, no location has been made public. Will the Tánaiste tell the House the location for this meeting? Does the Tánaiste or any other Government representative intend to attend?

I have been invited to a dinner tomorrow evening at said gathering. There is nothing wrong with military chiefs from European countries or indeed other countries coming to such a meeting. They do this annually. It just so happens it is happening in Ireland this year - unless I am mistaken, for the first time in 20-odd years. It rotates among states and people get together to discuss the latest developments technologically and so on. That is normal. We are part of the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP. If you look at our United Nations missions with our Polish and Hungarian counterparts - Pol Batt - you see that they have to have interoperability. The idea that you would not meet anybody is farcical in terms of interoperability on peacekeeping missions. I presume the Deputy wants Ireland to continue peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. There are and will be threats to undersea cables, potentially. There are cybersecurity threats, which we had during Covid with the attack on health data. Cybersecurity cannot be dealt with in isolation. We need to collaborate and co-operate with others and learn from others who may have greater expertise in some areas; we may have expertise in others. That is how we all learn in life in different disciplines.

Defence Forces

Bernard Durkan

Question:

5. Deputy Bernard J. Durkan asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence the extent to which emergency action can be taken to protect Ireland’s infrastructure, on and offshore, inside and outside territorial waters; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [22875/23]

Bernard Durkan

Question:

18. Deputy Bernard J. Durkan asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence the extent to which sufficient attention has been drawn to the exercise of Russian war ships off the Irish coast, with particular reference to ensuring the protection of vital infrastructure; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [22874/23]

These questions seek to ascertain the extent to which our security forces can intercept, in an emergency, if necessary, to intervene to protect vital national or international infrastructure, given the unusual interest shown by foreign powers in these areas in recent times.

I propose to take Questions Nos. 5 and 18 together.

As Minister for Defence, I chair the Government task force on emergency planning, which supported by the office of emergency planning, OEP, in my Department. A subgroup of the task force on emergency planning was assigned responsibility to develop guidance on critical infrastructure resilience in 2017. The subgroup produced the first guideline document on critical infrastructure resilience in February 2019. This document was subsequently revised and updated in July 2021. While the primary responsibility for safeguarding critical infrastructure rests with its owner or operator, the guideline document provides the methodology for operators of essential services to follow to enhance their resilience. It also outlines that it is the responsibility of each Government Department to foster links and work closely with the semi-State and private sector operators of critical infrastructure in their respective policy areas to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure from a wide variety of threats.

The OEP in my Department is working to transpose the new critical entities resilience directive. In advance of the enactment of this directive and because of the increased threat to critical infrastructure, the Department of Defence is working with the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications to stress test critical infrastructure in the energy sector in Ireland. These stress tests will be completed before the end of 2023.

Regarding the protection of Ireland’s offshore infrastructure, the Naval Service, as the State's principal seagoing agency, is tasked with a variety of defence and other roles. While the main daily tasking of the Naval Service is to provide a fishery protection service in accordance with our obligations as a member of the EU, it also carries out several other non-fisheries related tasks, including contraband interdiction duties, search and rescue, and maritime defence and security operations.  As such, any Naval Service patrol should be viewed as a multifaceted activity. These patrols are augmented by the Air Corps maritime patrol squadron in patrolling the Irish exclusive economic zone, EEZ, using the two CASA CN235 maritime patrol aircraft which are equipped with state-of-the-art surveillance and communication equipment.

Following an extraordinary EU Energy Council meeting in October 2022 to discuss the EU’s energy security in response to the attacks on Nord Stream 1 and 2, the Minister for the Environment, Climate and Communications sought support from my Department concerning additional measures that could be put in place by the Defence Forces to ensure the protection of critical off-shore infrastructure, including data cables.

My officials and the Defence Forces continue to engage with the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications regarding the protection of Ireland’s offshore infrastructure. While the Defence Forces have limited subsea capabilities, enhanced maritime patrolling of the Irish Sea in the vicinity of priority offshore infrastructure is taking place by a mixture of air and naval platforms.

A number of Russian ships have been observed inside the Irish EEZ in recent weeks. These ships were monitored by Naval Service and Air Corps maritime patrol aircraft as they transited through the Irish EEZ. Their transit appears to have been routine. Regarding Ireland's EEZ, it is not unusual for naval ships or civilian vessels of other states to carry out training exercises within this area or to pass through it.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, allows for all vessels, including military vessels, to transit through the territorial waters of coastal states when conducting innocent passage, as defined by Article 19 of the UNCLOS. Any vessels transiting Irish waters must do so in compliance with international law and may be subject to sighting and observation by the Naval Service and Air Corps without their innocent passage being infringed.

I thank the Tánaiste for that detailed reply. My question also focuses on the ability of the military services here to take the necessary action to dissuade those who might want to loiter, for want of a better description, in territorial waters, or non-territorial waters for that matter, close to the Irish shoreline. I refer to the degree to which it might be possible to receive assistance or support from other EU countries in the event of large-scale intrusions whose purpose it may not be possible to verify. It must also be kept in mind that some countries, to wit Russia, do not seem to be all that hurried in terms of giving any explanation in this regard.

As I said in my original reply, and again I think it is important to have a calmer perspective here, maritime vessels and ships are allowed passage through our waters and EEZ. I am not sure if there is a specific definition in military terms for the word "loiter".

It is a new one that I invented myself.

Well, we loitered in schools. We were loitering on the football pitch and many places.

It depends on the intent.

There has been a great deal of noise and publicity about this issue. The mere sighting of certain ships in the context of the war in Ukraine has created the impression this is all something new. It is not. Ships are being monitored all the time by our Navy and Air Corps and by others. In the vast majority of cases, as I said earlier, these transit passages appear to be routine. Obviously, there is a heightened focus and interest because of the war in Ukraine and because of the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosion. Equally, on the cyber front, we know there have been significant attacks on state infrastructures across Europe. We all collaborate, therefore, on sharing information with each other.

When the cyberattack on the Irish health service happened, the Polish Government, the British Government and other governments immediately contacted us. An Garda Síochána and other authorities pursued this issue and we then shared information in respect of the knowledge we had as a result of such investigations with other countries as well. The basic message in this regard is that because we are members of the CSDP framework, we share information and expertise and we work together in this context in observing and understanding what is going on. This is the future. I refer to co-operation through the CSDP.

I thank the Tánaiste again for that response. In view of the heightened level of anxiety about the operations of certain vessels in our territorial waters, and given that we have a long shoreline and are off the west coast of Europe, albeit not directly because one country stands between us and it, can we be assured, and can the Tánaiste be assured from the information available to him, that we have sufficiently invested in the necessary resources to be able to identify a threat well in advance concerning sensitive communications, power lines, communications lines or whatever may be the case in this regard?

As I said in an earlier reply, there are many responsibilities in respect of protecting critical infrastructure. There are responsibilities on the owners and operators and on the Defence Forces in terms of surveillance, etc., but the Naval Service has no unilateral powers of enforcement regarding damage, criminal or otherwise, to undersea cables or other communication links in Ireland's EEZ. The Naval Service retains certain capabilities that allow for underwater search and surveying, including an underwater remotely operated vehicle and a magnetometer system.

We must, however, improve this and, again, the Commission on the Defence Forces was clear on this point. On the future development of subsea capabilities, the report of that commission considered that the step up to the level of ambition, LOA, 2 should seek to deliver enhancement of subsurface capabilities to monitor subsea cables. It also states that to achieve this would mean that the naval fleet should have enhanced air, surface and subsurface search capabilities, with the latter allowing the Naval Service to monitor activity in the vicinity of subsea cables. The Government is committed to doing this and we published a high-level action plan in this regard. We will, therefore, continue to improve this capability.

Is the Deputy okay with that response?

I thank the Tánaiste.

Top
Share