JOINT COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT debate -
Wednesday, 7 Jan 2004

Scrutiny of EU Proposals.

Acting Chairman

The next item on the agenda is the scrutiny of two EU documents, namely COM 2003/18 and COM 2003/32 which list the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and the principles on safety of nuclear installations and radioactive waste, respectively.

I welcome back to the joint committee Ms Renee Dempsey and her colleagues in the nuclear safety division of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, as well as Dr. Ann McGarry from the RPII. We will hear first from Ms Dempsey before taking questions from members. I have to draw attention to the fact that members of the committee have absolute privilege but this same privilege does not apply to witnesses before the committee. Members are also reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that members should not comment on, criticise, or make charges against a person outside the House, or an official by name in such as way as to make him or her identifiable. The Chairman sends his apologies and I act on his behalf this morning.

Ms Renee Dempsey

Thank you, Chairman. I wish everyone a happy new year. I am pleased to be back in front of the committee.

The High Activity Sealed Sources Directive has been adopted with effect from 22 December 2003. I am happy to remind the joint committee of the contents of that and then to set out where the next steps lie.

This directive is aimed at strengthening the control by the competent national authority of those sealed radioactive sources posing the greatest risk. It also sets out the responsibilities of holders of such sources.

A sealed radioactive source is a source the structure of which is such as to prevent under normal conditions of use any dispersion of the radioactive substances into the environment. Sealed radioactive sources are used throughout the world for a wide variety of applications, notably in medicine, industry and research. The risks posed by such sources vary widely, depending on their activity, the contained radionuclides, the purpose for which used, construction and so on.

Sealed sources can be categorised as those which are currently in use; those which are no longer in use and in storage; and those which are called orphan sources. Sealed sources which are either in use in Ireland or disused are regulated by the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland having regard to the requirements of EU Council Directive 96/29 Euratom of 13 May 1996 which lays down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against dangers arising from ionising radiation. These requirements are enshrined in Irish law under the Radiological Protection Act 1991 (Ionising Radiation) Order 2000 (S.I. 125 of 2000).

Orphan sources are sources which were never subject to regulatory control, or sources which were subject to regulatory control but have been abandoned, lost, misplaced or stolen and as such are no longer subject to control.

The risks associated with inadequate control of sealed sources are many. For example, disused sources stored in the user's premises may become lost, stolen or misplaced and thus fall into the orphan source category. Sealed sources may leak and thus increase the radiological content. Orphan sources can cause serious injury, including death to workers and members of the public who may not be aware of their existence or of the radiation hazard.

There have been a number of accidents worldwide, some of which have been fatal, arising from inadequately controlled radiation sources. While there have been no fatal accidents in EU States, the European Commission acknowledges the possibility of accidents occurring because of the mismanagement of sealed sources.

An area of particular concern to the Commission is the increasing incidence of the findings of radioactivity in scrap metal in the EU. Such an incident occurred in Ireland in 1994 when what now could be described as an orphan source was melted down by Irish Steel at their premises in Cork.

These concerns, and the imminent expansion of the EU through the accession of new states, many of which have large numbers of disused and orphan sources, have prompted the Commission to bring forward these proposals, which have been endorsed and approved.

The summary of the proposals is that prior authorisation is required from the member state's authority for any practice involving a high activity sealed source. Before issuing such an authorisation, the member state's authority must ensure that arrangements, plus financial provision, have been made for the safe management of the sources when they become disused under Article 3 of the directive.

The authorisation granted must, among other things, set out the holder's responsibilities, staff competencies and training, work procedures to be followed, the requirements for emergency procedures and adequate management of the disused sources, including agreements on the transfer of the disused sources to a supplier or to a recognised installation under Article 3.

The holder is required to keep records of the sources in his possession, their location and transfer which must be available for inspection by the national competent authority. The holder must also regularly check the integrity of the source, check that it is in situ at the place of use or storage and notify the competent authority immediately of the loss, theft and damage of the source under Article 5 of the directive. Manufacturers are required to identify each source by a unique number under Article 7 of the directive.

Member states must encourage a situation whereby management and workers of installations where orphan sources are most likely to be found, such as metal scrapyards, or customs points, are advised, on the visual detection of sources and their containers and are informed of action to be taken if a source is detected. This is under Article 8 of the directive.

Member states must also ensure the establishment of a system of guarantee for damage to human health caused by high activity sources, as well as for the costs of intervention under Article 11 of the directive. This would also address a situation where the holder of a source cannot be identified or is found to be insolvent.

Following our meeting last September, the directive was considered further by the atomic questions working group, an EU Council working group with responsibility for these matters, and was agreed. The European Parliament issued its opinion on 22 December 2003 and the proposal was formally adopted at Council on 22 December 2003.

The critical issues resulting from the adoption are its implications for Ireland. Under existing Irish law, the custody, use, storage, transfer or disposal of all radiation sources, other than very small exempted sources, such as in individual smoke detectors, is prohibited save under a licence from the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland. These licences have particular conditions attached related to the safe use of sealed sources and their proper management when they become disused.

In Ireland, there are some 600 disused sealed sources which are stored on the premises of the licence holder in accordance with conditions laid down in the licence granted by the RPII. Licences are now granted by the RPII only if the applicant can provide a written guarantee from the supplier of the source that will accept back the source when it is no longer required. In cases where the supplier is no longer trading, the holder of the source must continue to hold a licence for the custody of the source.

The directive, however, incorporates some additional requirements which are not currently included in the RPII's licensing requirements. These are the requirement requiring the need to provide financially for the management of disused source; the requirement on holders of disused sources which cannot be returned to the supplier to send them to a recognised installation for long-term storage or disposal. In practice, as the committee will be aware from our previous discussion on this topic, this would require Ireland to establish a dedicated storage facility for such sources.

There is also the requirement to establish controls, including radiation detection systems, at establishments where orphan sources are most likely to appear, such as metal scrapyards or air and sea ports and the requirement to establish a system of guarantee for damage to human health as well as for the cost of intervention.

On the matter of disposal of disused sealed sources, an option increasingly being suggested by expert bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, is that the sources be placed in boreholes in the ground, which are then backfilled with concrete. The boreholes would be typically 15 centimetres in diameter and 100-300 metres deep. The attraction of this option is that there is no requirement for ongoing security surveillance. Also, unlike spent nuclear fuels, which remain radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years, most sealed sources will decay to background levels in a few hundred years, that is, over a timescale in which source containment integrity and geological stability can be assured with a high degree of confidence.

Now that it has been adopted, the directive will be transposed into national law in accordance with the timescales indicated therein. The timescale varies depending on which article is referenced, which is why I do not have specific details. Ireland will aim to transpose in full as soon as possible. Such transposition will include the additional requirements not currently included in the RPII's licensing requirements. In that context, if amending legislation is required for the RPII in this regard then it will be proposed and enacted.

That completes my presentation to the joint committee. I am available to take any questions that the committee may wish to ask.

Acting Chairman

Thank you for your update.

Deputy Sargent

May I ask on a point of information whether we are dealing with Commission Directives Nos. 18 and 32 together?

Acting Chairman

Just No. 18.

Deputy Allen

I thank Ms Dempsey for a very clear presentation to us. Are the only changes concerning the RPII the changes outlined which provide financially for the management of disused sources, the matter of storage and the establishment of radiation detection systems? On the matter of providing financially for the disused sources, which number about 600 nationwide, have the resources been made available in 2004 to assist the new role of the RPII in financially supporting the management of the disused sources?

Would the disused sources be classified as low level, medium or high level sources? Can we obtain a breakdown of the categories? With regard to the setting up of the storage facility, while we have the type of storage facility that has been recommended, has any consideration been given to the location? When and how fast would such a facility be set up? On the assessment of the RPII's additional role, how much new legislation will have to be enacted to allow the RPII to carry out its own responsibilities?

Ms Dempsey

If the joint committee will permit, I will answer questions numbers one, three and four. I will pass question number two to Dr. McGarry, who may also have other points make.

Is funding there to allow the RPII to exercise this additional remit? The proposal in the directive is that the holder of the source should be required to provide the financial wherewithal to manage the implications of this. That is a proper imposition as far as we are concerned. Not only do they have to provide but they have to show that they can provide for the management and ultimate disposal of such disused sources.

I will pass to Dr. McGarry the question of the level of disused sources. We had a fairly lively exchange on the storage facility at the last meeting. I explained to the committee that we aware of our obligations in this matter and that we are examining the various possibilities, including an analysis of the difficulties inside the timeframes to site our own waste, which in the main, as far as I am aware, is of low level and low volume, generated by hospital and research use and some industrial use, rather than by any other major activity. Dr. McGarry can mention that.

We are aware that we are obligated to research and propose appropriate methods for disposal. We will pursue that and a paper will be put to the Minister in the spring of this year.

On the additional role for the RPII, Dr. McGarry can confirm that the RPII is well geared and well embedded in a monitoring and licensing role. As to whether additional legislation is required for this extension, we have not done the full analysis yet. These are additional elements of the licensing regulations. It may be that they do not require any further primary legislation, in which case the execution can be transferred very quickly, but I have put down a marker that lawyers may find anomalies of which we might not be immediately aware. Obviously if there are such legal anomalies or other things that need to be done in law, we will put the proposals forward.

Deputy Allen

The directive also puts a responsibility on the State to ensure that scrapyards, distribution points and recycling installations will have monitoring equipment. How will the RPII be in a position to monitor all these types of activities throughout the State? Has it the personnel and resources to monitor every type of scrapyard, local distribution point and recycling installation and has it the appropriate equipment to monitor radioactive discharge?

Ms Dempsey

Dr. McGarry will be more expert, but my understanding is that the holder of the installation will be required to invest in monitoring equipment and the RPII will ensure the monitoring of those outcomes is reported upon in an orderly manner. Dr. McGarry has a better handle on how the organisation will do it.

Dr. Ann McGarry

I will answer the question on the high, medium and low activity. The directive before us deals with high activity sealedsources and the table gives the levels of activity considered to be high activity sealed sources. In the Irish context, Ms Dempsey has mentioned already that there are approximately 600 disused sealed sources in storage on premises in Ireland and of those - - - - -

Deputy Allen

May I interrupt? Would Dr. McGarry give an example of high activity sealed sources? For example, would X-ray units from hospitals, scanners and so on be considered in the high, medium or low category?

Dr. McGarry

In fact X-ray equipment is not considered a sealed source because X-ray equipment emits radiation only when it is plugged in and switched on. A sealed source would be a radioactive element that is emitting radiation all the time; in other words it does not need to be plugged in. This directive does not cover X-ray or irradiating apparatus. The high activity sealed sources are the types of sources used in radiotherapy. For cancer treatment, for example, there would be cobalt or caesium sources. A number of those would be considered high activity sources. Lower activity sources would be used in industry or research applications in laboratories.

Of the 600 disused sealed sources in the country, only a small number would be consider high activity sealed sources in the context of the directive. I do not have the exact figures, but of the order of less than 50 would be high activity sealed sources. There is a large number of sealed sources, some of which have lower activity.

On the monitoring of storage, we have not investigated fully how we would go about monitoring scrapyards and other storage premises. It is a job that is lined up in our business plan for early this year. Irish Steel had monitoring equipment which was very successful in detecting orphansources or inadvertently included radioactive material in scraps that might have come for recycling. A number of other scrapyards already have monitoring equipment, not the sophisticated monitoring equipment in place in Irish ISPAT but hand-held monitors for checking the consignments that come in.

What is important is that we learn more about the routes by which scrap comes into the country. Obviously we have had some very preliminary discussions with our UK counterparts because a great deal of our scrap comes here by that route. We need to be clear what they are doing and how we might fit in with that. It may not end up that there is an absolute requirement for every scrapyard to have sophisticated monitoring equipment. It is more important that we know where the scrap is likely to come from and what checks there may have been on it coming through. An information campaign for scrapyards will be very important, so that they will be able to recognise inadvertent sources within the scrap metal and question as to whether it will pose a problem.

The RPII in its assessment of its new role in implementing this directive has some preliminary ideas about the various aspects that will work. It appears that the legislation that allows the institute to license all radioactive sources is quite comprehensive. We believe that the new requirements of the directive will certainly mean changes to licence conditions but I am not convinced as yet that they will require new legislation. That remains to be seen. We hope to have that answer by mid year.

Deputy Gilmore

I thank the representatives of the Department for coming before the committee again to talk about this. On the requirement to provide a dedicated storage facility in Ireland, what is the date by which it must be done? I note that a paper will be given to the Minister in the spring on the options to be considered on the matter. I understood from the previous discussion that three or four possible locations were being actively considered. Has progress been made? Have conclusions been reached as to where the dedicated storage facility might be located or the criteria to be used in deciding where it might be located?

The directive will put a requirement for an authorisation or licence to be obtained from the RPII. Could we have some idea of the number of applications the RPII might be required to deal with in a year? Could we have some practical examples of the types of applications anticipated? Who are the likely applicants and for what are they likely to be applying for a licence?

I appreciate Deputy Allen touched on my next question, but I wish to pursue it further. The licensing arrangement is clear-cut enough. If somebody knows he needs to apply for a licence, he applies to the RPII. After an assessment the licence is issued and there is a track of what is going on. What arrangements are or will be in place to deal with cases where people do not apply for a licence? It strikes me as an area of economic activity where people may try to take shortcuts. Scrap dealing tends to be all over the place and difficult to monitor. People trading in scrap material are not always very regulatable. Who will be looking out to see if orphan sources have been licensed? How will the licensing be policed? If somebody does not apply for a licence, what is the penalty and who will be responsible for bringing him to heel?

Ms Dempsey

I will address the first question and if Dr. McGarry has additions to make, she will do so. The bulk of the second question is Dr. McGarry's area of expertise rather than mine, but if the Deputy will permit, I will sweep in and out. The third question is very long. Dr. McGarry has experience of how the RPII monitors existing licence holders. Where existing licence holders for one reason or another find themselves in breach, the RPII has never hesitated to take all the action at its disposal.

I recognise that scrap metal and scrap usage is a more fluid situation and a dealer may not be aware but inadvertently find he has such scrap. As Dr. McGarry has said, there is an educational programme as well as an implementation programme that has to be allied in implementing that phase. I will leave that to Dr. McGarry to address.

The installation obligations will arise two years after the entry into force of the directive, which will probably take of the order of 18 months to two years' work.

Mr. Joe Mooney

It first has to be published.

Ms Dempsey

It has to be published in the Official Journal. I do not have a precise timescale but if one takes it from the publication in the Official Journal, which I think will be expected in the first half if not the first quarter of this year, then it will be two years after that; in effect it will be three years, give or take. The publication, as the Deputy will be aware, in the Official Journal is among other things an exercise in the proper legal translation of the directive into all the Community languages. To be honest, I do not know what the implications of the new accession countries will be in terms of the timetabling. The directive has been adopted, so the jurisprudence element is in train but a number of months will elapse before it is published in the Official Journal. After that it enters into force and two years after entry into force we would be obliged to have our plans. Is that correct, Mr. Mooney?

Mr. Mooney

Yes

Deputy Gilmore

Will it be around 2007?

Ms Dempsey

In and around 2007 to 2008. We had been scoping out possible locations that might be suitable for a radioactive waste disposal site, though it remains tentative - the type of surveying that needs to be done is expensive - until we have a clearer view of the standards we want to apply. This is on foot of some work that is being done by both the RPII and others on our behalf to look at the specification for a high quality, safe, secure and properly managed and administered radiological waste facility. Those requirements in themselves tend to point to some sites rather than others. Our embryonic view would be, and it remains this, that a solution is a safe secure site that can be monitored in the most effective and at the highest possible levels and is also remote from urban or population centres. Of necessity they do not immediately look as if they match. People might legitimately ask if an isolated location is capable of being properly monitored and managed and so on.

There are conundrums and the process is very under-ripe in terms of how we see the best passage in terms of advising the Minister. Ultimately when the Minister is advised of the decision, it will be further reflected upon, expert advice will be sought and, of course, any site or sites identified will be subject to the appropriate planning approvals and associated public consultation and so on. It will be a difficult nut to crack but it is an obligation.

On the issue of waste in general as well as radioactive waste, Ireland has a policy of trying to seek to manage its own waste in the best possible way. There will be many views on how best to do that which will be part of the natural exchange and ultimately we hope the best solution will be found. The timescale is tight enough for that type of programme and it is the reason we will be putting the first set of scoped out ideas to the Minister as to how to progress the matter in an effective and efficient manner.

We are still open on the criteria to be used in deciding on issues, but we will be looking to best practice, in accordance to where best practice might be identified in other member states or internationally. It will be the Minister's ambition to have a state of the art facility, with the highest possible security.

I will now pass to Dr. McGarry, but if other points arise, I will come back in.

Deputy Gilmore

Will Ms Dempsey state the three or four locations that the RPII is looking at?

Ms Dempsey

I think that would be improper at this point, because they are still very much in what we would call the reflective phase.

Deputy Gilmore

We will have to reflect on them. It is not in Dun Laoghaire.

Ms Dempsey

I will not be drawn.

Dr. McGarry

The Deputy asked about our licensing system. The RPII licenses all but the smallest of sources with very small amounts of radioactivity, which would be exempt - in other countries considered even non-radioactive. The institute has approximately 1,400 licensees and that would include approximately 700 dentists. Dentists are licensed because they use X-ray equipment and they would be the largest number. The remaining would include hospitals, for example X-ray equipment in smaller hospitals up to nuclear medicine departments that use unsealed radioactive materials to treat patients or for diagnosis. There are a number of hospitals that use radiotherapy facilities and would have high activity sealed sources on their premises. That would be the bulk in the medical sector.

In terms of industrial users, radioactive sources can be used in industrial processes to measure the level of liquids or any material in a container that is not easily accessible and would be used in production runs in beverage companies and so on. Radioactive sources are used for industrial radiography purposes where they are used to determine if there are flaws in pipework which cannot be easily seen by the naked eye. For those types of sources there are a number of companies that provide that service in Ireland. Some of the sources would be used on fixed locations but then would be moved from place to place to undertake industrial radiography. Radioactive sources are also used to measure the thickness of tarmac on roads. With the road building programmes quite a number of sources are used by various county councils for that purpose.

Veterinary surgeons use X-ray equipment to X-ray animals and there is nuclear medicine in veterinary medicine. Radioactive sources are used for educational purposes in universities. They are also used in small quantities for medical research, such as laboratory tests and are used in vivo for a diagnosis of patients in a research context. That is a broad idea of the type of people who use radioactive sources in this country.

The annual number of licence applications varies from year to year but is typically in the order of ten to 20. Not many licences lapse, especially now because we do not have a storage facility. Some companies no longer use the source on a production line. Irish ISPAT, the company in Cork, is a good example of this. They were using sources to measure levels on the production line for the recycling of steel. The company has gone into liquidation but the liquidator still holds the licence for the sources because they must be held in storage even though they are not in use. Not many people actually hand back their sources and then no longer use them. Typically, the number of licensees is around 1,400. It increases by a small number every year.

People who are required to have licences must have them. The institute has a number of means by which it can ensure that people using sources have licences. It is in close contact with the Department of Health and Children and with the various medical organisations. There is quite a good awareness that a licence must be held. The industrial companies generally have quite a good awareness of this requirement. There is no one particular area that we would have identified as one where people would not have licences. If we find that somebody does not have a licence, perhaps because they never applied for one or because the person was, for example, a dentist or vet and did not realise that they were supposed to have it, or else someone had a licence, allowed it to lapse and did not renew it, we would bring a prosecution. We have a number of such prosecutions every year.

Most people who require a licence have one. Few who require a licence do not. It tends to come to our attention. In general, it does not happen that somebody does not have a licence through an oversight. Usually, they have not bothered even though they know that they should have it. I hope that answers the question.

Another point which I ought to have mentioned is that there are no manufacturing plants in Ireland that manufacture radioactive sources, so all sources must be imported into Ireland. There are EU regulations which require the exporting country to send information to the institute notifying us that various sources have been imported by various entities within the State. We have information about that.

On the subject of the scrapyards, it would not be a requirement that a scrapyard should have a licence unless it had a radioactive source. There are one or two scrapyards that currently have radioactive sources in storage because they came across them in incoming scrap and there is nowhere else for them to be sent. They would have a licence, would be required to monitor the source at reasonable frequency and to verify that it is still in the appropriate storage.

The way in which we will have to tackle this is to learn more about how scrap comes into and moves around the country and thus try to ensure that the scrapyards which might come across sources are aware of and familiar with the issue. A number of the bigger scrapyards are aware of this because they would have come across the issue and would have heard about it from their counterparts in other countries.

Deputy Sargent

I congratulate the Acting Chairman on his elevation.

Acting Chairman

It is only temporary.

Deputy Sargent

I welcome Ms Dempsey and her colleagues from the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and the RPII.

I wish to focus on two aspects of the directive before us. The first concerns the scrapyards and the issue of monitoring. The notes which we were given mention large scrapyard recycling installations and distribution points. Can that be elaborated on? Are landfills to be included?

I speak with some experience as I live in Dublin North where Ballealy has become a huge landfill. Material received at that landfill is often disguised, as a large volume of stuff comes in. Landfills should be mentioned explicitly. From the Department's perspective, is there a reason for including or excluding landfills?

To my knowledge, geigercounters are not hugely expensive. Ms Dempsey mentioned the holder of these facilities being responsible for the costs. In the context of a local authority, that is a public cost. If the cost of those facilities is to increase because overheads have increased, even allowing for a rip-off culture, will any additional resources be given to the enforcement? It sounds as though much of the illegal dumping taking place, such as medical or other waste, is brought about because of cost. The cost of disposal or the cost of dealing with it is one of the main incentives for illegal dumping. Presumably, local authorities will have to be cognisant of that and have geigercounters at the ready for their own enforcement staff. Has this been taken into account in the implementation of the directive?

The other area of debate is storage facilities. Dr. McGarry mentioned that there is not an official storage facility. I accept that nowhere is there a notice saying that this is Ireland's, Dublin's or Leinster's storage facility. Surely it is appropriate that there should be temporary storage facilities, whether they are in universities or hospitals. Is the need for security of existing storage facilities being considered? I make that point partly because the material in itself is dangerous if in the wrong hands, or if wrongly stored. "Dirty" bombs are an example of using nuclear material that goes astray for malevolent purposes.

Equally, there is the research that is being carried out in some of our universities. I mention this because a report was commissioned by the European Parliament into the implications for proliferation of nuclear arms from research being carried out throughout the European Union. Thermo-nuclear physics of the type being carried out in Ireland is similar to the type of technology that would be needed for a hydrogen bomb. Obviously, it will not be used to make a hydrogen bomb. The security surrounding the technology, as well as the material, suggests to me that the storage facility might well be close to a facility that is already carrying out nuclear research, if they have the expertise. What is the thinking in the Department on this matter?

Will such a storage facility be located in a part of the country which is not very strong in electoral terms, which often happens with waste facilities, or are we discussing a facility which——

Deputy Cregan

Whatever makes the Deputy happy. It is the Deputy's own party.

Deputy Sargent

I am not thinking of Deputy Cregan's area. I am worried about the Deputy's future. What is the thinking on this? Sometimes, where incinerators and waste facilities are concerned, the feeling is that a place with few votes can be seen as a sacrificial lamb for the greater good. Will the storage facility in this case take note of existing storage facilities and build on the security that is needed there? This would depend on volume.

Is it to be a totally new stand alone area? I wonder about "stand alone" because Ms Dempsey mentioned boreholes and concrete and it seemed to be as much related to cost as effectiveness. She talked about security not being needed around the clock for such a facility. International thought on this matter is now coming around to favouring above ground storage, rather than underground storage. Drigg, close to Sellafield, is an underground facility which has been in the news for the wrong reasons. It is important that we know of these types of decisions. If we are to debate this, or if it is to be developed in any way, it is important to know whether the Department is thinking in terms of above or below ground and whether it is near to a facility which is already a quasi-storage facility or is completely apart and a stand alone new operation.

We hold the EU Presidency and these aspects of EU structures will be developed. We should put down a marker that the control of nuclear installations, which is partly in the hands of EURATOM, as is that of funding, needs to be looked at again because of the secret nature of EURATOM.

I am disappointed that there is not a "sunset" clause in the negotiations for a new constitution to date with EURATOM and that the safety and health implications of nuclear power are not brought into the wider body of environmental and health law in the European Union. EURATOM should be seen as a feature of history rather than a continuing and very active part of the European Union. It is important that it be investigated as to where the funding goes, how it is used, how accountable it is. When we discuss the next directive we will come to this because we will deal with a fund for installations.

There are questions about the money which comes from EURATOM for research, vis-à-vis money coming from Science Foundation Ireland and Enterprise Ireland. One researcher informed me that from the paperwork he had seen relating to his position, 100% of his funding came from EURATOM, 100% was coming from Science Foundation Ireland and 40% from Enterprise Ireland. It does not need a highly qualified mathematician to reckon that there is something strange about that. There needs to be more investigation into the funding that goes into that type of research and who and what it is for. I appreciate medical contexts for that type of research, but thermo-nuclear physics sounds a bit wider than that particular interest. Perhaps Dr. McGarry, with her expertise, might be able to indicate the purpose that type of research would be used for.

Ms Dempsey

I thank the Chairman and Deputy Sargent. I will move through the points the Deputy has made and deal with the questions he has asked. I will deal with the last point first.

The question of the new European constitution, whether and to what extent the EURATOM treaty should have been and will be addressed inside it, is outside the remit of this discussion. Many of the points made by the Deputy have been made to the Department and we are sensitive to the issues and to their validity. In the context of what we are discussing here, that should be set aside.

Concerning boreholes, I am flattered that the Deputy feels I know enough to think that boreholes are the right way to proceed. In fact, it is the International Atomic Energy Agency and its experts which suggests recommendations tending towards boreholes as one of the solutions for the lower levels of radioactive waste where they can be inserted in the borehole. As a scientist, Dr. McGarry will put me right if I am wrong, but this is where the breakdown of the materials is over a period which is sufficient to be sure there are no long-term issues that can be conceived of, that the types of materials placed there break down over a period of time ranging from between 50 to a few hundred years. While this is an enormously long time, it is a timeframe within which geological and other competence can be assured with the current state of science and knowledge.

That being the case, we in Ireland would always listen very carefully to what an international agency with a specific remit in the area of nuclear materials would say to us. We do not have to be led by the nose in any of the conclusions they may draw. In these kinds of issues, there are local matters that need to influence decision making as much as international best practice. A marriage between the best points of all of those is what we seek.

This leads me back to the Deputy's point about landfill and related matters. We are not at a ripe enough stage to give even three or four pillars of the way in which the policy might be suggested to the Minister, which can be debated and fleshed out. In the ideal world, there would be high consensus across the democratic process as to the best way to manage this sensitive issue.

As to whether installations are above or below ground, if an installation were to be either above or below ground, for our radioactive waste, the size or capacity required would be smaller than the size of this room, given the size of the individual sources, all of which would be carefully vitrified, or secured in whatever way is possible. Our current thinking is that we are not disposed to looking at waste management for a sensitive issue like radioactivity in a way that would see it sealed, closed off, and never checked again, where whatever would happen would be unknown. We would like to have a secure facility which would also keep pace with scientific and technological developments, such that they could be retrieved and improved upon. The management of the wastes would constantly meet, or aim to meet, best international practice and standards at any given time. Whether that ideal is feasible is part of the reflections of the people who are considering the matter on our behalf. They and ourselves will put ideas, suggestions and recommendations for developing a fully fleshed out policy to the Minister early in this new year.

Dr. McGarry is probably better equipped to answer some of the other matters. If I have omitted something, please come back to me.

Dr. McGarry

The first question raised by the committee concerned monitoring and the type of monitoring that might be done at scrapyards, where there are nodal points, or landfills. Deputy Sargent is quite right. A geigercounter is not an expensive piece of equipment. The arrangement that existed in Irish Steel was a horseshoe shaped arrangement with a number of geigercounters that the trucks carrying the scrap metal would pass through. One of the alarms would go off if there was any radioactive material in the truckload. In that case, there were quite a number of false alarms because background radiation occurs everywhere and the detectors can vary in their sensitivity to the radiation within the consignment. Most of what was discovered in consignments going into the steel plant was a build-up of naturally occurring radioactive material, for example on the inside of gas or oil pipes. That can happen. If we take the situation of a very large scrapyard where there is a large amount of scrap, an individual with a single geigercounter in his hand will not be able to detect a source in that way.

I should stress that although we have not researched it fully, it would seem that is not the most effective way of finding orphan sources, if they exist, in scrap metal. A better way would be to try to determine the origin of the scrap metal, based on our experience in Irish Steel, since knowing where the scrap comes from gives you a lot of confidence in deciding whether it may contain a source. The main concern about a scrap metal consignment is that the source might be melted down and then result in a major contamination problem, as happened in Irish Steel.

In some ways we are fortunate in Ireland that we no longer have a recycling facility, so scrapyards only handle and store scrap but do not recycle it. The hazard now is for anyone who may inadvertently handle the source. It is possibly better and more effective to give people at the scrapyard information as to what to be on the lookout for than monitors which may not detect the radiation. Members may not be familiar with the different types of radiation. Some of the Alpha and Beta emitters cannot be detected even at relatively close distances by a monitor. Therefore a monitor would not be very effective in that case, but information as to where the scrap came from might be more effective in alerting one to a possible orphan source within a consignment.

We would not want to give the committee the impression that these orphan sources were all over the place all the time. It is rare that an orphan source is detected.

Deputy Sargent

It is mainly Gamma emitters

Dr. McGarry

Not necessarily; they could be Beta emitters. A number of years ago, a company had sources from a production line in storage for a number of years because they were no longer in use. When the personnel at the company changed, the sources were inadvertently thrown out with ordinary rubbish and ended up in a landfill. We investigated thoroughly that landfill in so far as we could but never found the sources. We were happy that because they were buried they would not pose a risk to people in the future. There would not be a point in monitoring for source at landfill. It would involve an enormous expense and probably not turn up anything. I am not sure that would be the most effective way.

Deputy Sargent

In the case of illegal dumping, for example the illegal dumping of hospital waste, is there a requirement on the enforcement staff, the litter wardens, to be cognisant of that?

Dr. McGarry

In a number of illegal dumping incidents, particularly in County Wicklow, the RPII was called in to advise as to whether the material found might be radioactive, but fortunately it was not. I think there was a consultant working on one of the projects where they checked for radioactivity. From our point of view, the better process is to tackle the problem at the point of generation of the waste and to ensure that people generating the waste are fully cognisant of what they are dealing and have proper segregation arrangements in place, which is what we do. Putting on the pressure at that point is more effective than trying to find the source in the landfill, as it would be like trying to find a needle in a haystack.

Deputy Sargent

Was a nuclear canister not found in Wicklow in the 1980s? I seem to remember a Martin Turner cartoon in The Irish Times about it.

Dr. McGarry

I do not recall it.

Acting Chairman

I remind Deputies of the time constraints.

Dr. McGarry

On the question of waste storage, the Deputy will recall from Ms Dempsey's presentation that sources in storage are stored at approximately 70 locations. Nearly everyone who uses radioactive material has a small amount that is disused and in storage. We are confident that under the licensing arrangements we have in place this material is stored securely and through inspections we verify that. We are talking of bringing all the disused sources to the one location, again ensuring they are stored securely. This is to avoid the type of situation where sources are inadvertently thrown out because they are no longer in use within an industrial establishment or hospital.

My understanding is that none of the facilities that are in place would be big enough - generally they are concrete bunkers or within a general storage area but they are securely locked. I understand there will be public concern about bringing together all the sources, but in terms of the radiation hazard that presents, it is our view that the present dispersed locations present a greater hazard.

In terms of the radioactivity it would generate, from the RPII point of view it would not be sufficient to be of particular concern. Obviously the licensing process for the facility would be gone through in detail.

Acting Chairman

: Will Ms Dempsey give an account of COM 2003/32?

Ms Dempsey

The joint committee will recall that when we met last September we gave an outline of the original Commission proposals in document COM 2003/32, which was in two parts, a Council directive setting out the basic obligations and general principals on the safety of nuclear installations and the second part a council directive on the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Collectively the two proposals became known as the Commissions proposals for a "nuclear safety package". Since we last met the proposals have been discussing continually in the Council working group and the atomic questions working group and modifications of the Commission proposals were developed on foot of those discussions.

While no consensus has emerged the proposals were nevertheless brought by the Italian Presidency to COREPER, the Committee of the Permanent Representatives, on 26 November 2003 for "political and management guidance". The COREPER recommendation was that the texts developed by the Italian Presidency should be the basis upon which the discussions should continue during the Irish Presidency. This will be the focus of much of the atomic questions working group's work for the first quarter of the year and it is fortuitous for me to be in front of the joint committee as I will be chairing the first of the atomic questions working group on Friday. Apart from the presentation of the Presidency work programme and the Commission's legal programme, this will be the issue on the agenda for Friday's meeting.

I do not know if the committee wishes to be reminded of the details of the text in the time available. Perhaps if I can give some sense of how the Presidency proposes to manage it. I have provided written commentary on the content of the draft directives and the committee might be more usefully engaged in having a question and answer session.

Acting Chairman

Later.

Ms Dempsey

I have outlined Ireland's position. Ireland is under EURATOM which is a basis for securing a future for the nuclear industry. It is also welcomed because we believe it leads to a levelling up in safety standards, especially in the light of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union. Ireland in both these instances welcomes the thrust of the proposals and sees it as the proper way for the Commission and the European Union to move. Our role as Presidency is distinctly different from our national role, although there is less breach between the two positions than sometimes can occur. The Commission's proposal has been put forward and the Italian Presidency has worked upon it. The Presidency is obliged to seek to move the Commission's proposals forward toward successful conclusion on the basis of a consensus or managed way. Ireland supports these proposals, so there is no risk of difficulties between our national delegate and the Presidency.

We will be seeking to complete the package to adoption phase. Over and above other detailed issues, the most difficult and key issues will be whether the proposals should be binding or non-binding and whether timescales can be agreed for implementation. On the former, there is no consensus and it could be said there is the makings of a blocking minority; on the latter there is no consensus but there is scope for a negotiated consensus. The objective of the Presidency is to bring the matter to conclusion.

It might be interesting for the committee to be aware that the Council at which this will be considered in the GAERC, not the Environmental Council. It is a slightly unusual management issue for an official from the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government to bring forward a dossier that will be carried forward by the Minister for Foreign Affairs or his deputy. It would be normal for matters from the atomic questions working group to go forward as A points. The cascade of discussion, debate and consensus finding rests very largely on the lower management scales in and around COREPER and the Presidency. Members may seek clarification on any point.

Deputy Gilmore

I appreciate the navigational difficulty of trying to bring to a conclusion a directive on nuclear safety during Ireland's Presidency. There is an assumption that we accept nuclear power as an acceptable energy option, which we do not formally. This proposed directive recognises that responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations rests with the member states with jurisdiction over the installations.

If we preside over the bringing into being of such a directive, does that not compromise the legal case the State is bringing against the UK on the management of the Sellafield facility? If we agree to a European directive that states it is the responsibility of individual member states, on what basis do we continue to pursue legal action against a neighbouring state? In a previous document it states that it would be also a requirement that each member state would have a facility for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Does this apply only to states with nuclear power stations? Will there be a requirement arising from this directive on each member state, including this State, to establish a radioactive waste facility?

Is there anything in the directive that prohibits the export of waste from one member state to another for reprocessing or storage? If not, and if each state has its own waste facility, should there be such a proposal? If there were such a proposal, would that not resolve the difficulties we have with Sellafield in the UK, which could not operate to such a scale if it did not have waste material sent to it from other states? From what Ms Dempsey said, am I correct in saying it is not anticipated that this issue will emerge at ministerial level during the lifetime of the Presidency, that it is still at the COREPER official level and therefore it is unlikely to come through to a ministerial meeting in the lifetime of the Presidency?

Deputy Sargent

I know the German government does not believe there is sufficient consideration in this directive to the prohibition of the import or export of radioactive waste, which is one of their concerns. They are objecting to it, and there is by no means a consensus. There is also an assumption that nuclear waste can be adequately and relatively safe, with which we would have difficulty. There also seems to be an assumption - maybe not, but it looks like an assumption - that every member state is to pay towards the decommissiong fund. That strikes me as not very just in the case of Ireland, which has not a facility requiring decommissioning. I would like to have that point clarified because there is an assumption, or at least the German government thinks there is such an assumption.

Another difficulty in the document COM 2003/32 is that an accident at a nuclear installation is seen as everybody's problem. The responsibility first and foremost needs to be on the operators of that installation. That was a concern raised in the German government's objections and it should be noted.

I am still interested in thermo-nuclear physics and what it might be used for, in terms of research in Ireland. The EURATOM structure is part of the problem, the assumptions of safety and everybody paying into a fund because it is everybody's problems. The fund is on the one hand for decommissioning and on the other to ensure the continuance of the nuclear industry and that would be a problem from Ireland's point of view. A number of loose ends need to be tied up before there can be hope of consensus.

The safety aspects of the proposal are being used as a smoke screen by those who wish to continue to perpetrate, promote and enlarge the nuclear sector and we need to be careful not to be sold that pup in the middle of the talk on safety. The issue is fudged and I want to know if we as a country are expected to pay for the decommissioning of nuclear installations in other countries that have nuclear power.

Senator Dooley

: In light of the fact that this directive follows from the issues surrounding Chernobyl and the management of nuclear facilities in eastern bloc countries, what is the state of readiness of accession countries which will be joining the European Union next May in adopting the harmonisation of standards?

Ms Dempsey

I thank the Chairman, Deputies and Senators. That is a rich bag of questions.

The responsibility for safety of installations rests with the member states which exercise jurisdiction over them. Nothing has changed in that regard. In fact, those who have issues with these draft directives may be concerned that there might be a dilution or sharing of responsibility if the Commission were ultimately to have the kind of role that they fear may be in the Commission's gaze. For the moment, those are questions that those people are concerned about, but fundamentally there is no change in the responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations under this current proposal, which is that the primary and major responsibility lies with the country concerned, the member state.

We come then to the issue of financing decommissioning and other matters. The proposal for the decommissioning fund has been adjusted, so to speak, and there is no surviving idea of a decommissioning fund being centrally held. In fact, it is clearly stated in the current draft, and is Ireland's position, that the costs of decommissioning are entirely to be borne by those who possessed the installations in the first instance. Where we are urging strength and commitment is in ensuring that decommissioning funds are provided and made fully available.

In a wider debate, there is a question of whether the true cost of nuclear power is properly accommodated in the absence of full decommissioning funds. Perhaps there are economic magic tricks being played in some instances when costs are being allocated without those costs being factored in. Having said that, there is no question that the responsibility for the payment of the costs associated with any decommissioning is a matter for the member state in possession of the installation, as is responsibility for its safety.

Where the additionality of these proposals emerges is that it is a baby step towards a more visible Commission role in ensuring that all the family of the European Union, and particularly those with nuclear installations, work within the same principles and with the same standards and continue to achieve the same and higher standards vis-à-vis each other and best practice. These current proposals are not as advanced as that. In our view, and speaking now as an Irish delegate to Irish parliamentarians, the value is that the role of the Commission, which has been invisible in this non-promotional area of security and safety standards, should be enhanced and implemented in a more visible way for the comfort, security and confidence building of the communities of the European Union and not separately from the Irish community.

Deputy Gilmore asked about the implications for the legal actions, which are complex and difficult processes in themselves. Given that the base on which they were initiated is not different from the basis of these proposals, in other words that the security issue is a matter for the national authority in the member state, the areas in which legal actions were brought were not to do with the jurisdictional issue of governments over their installations or whether or not the MOX plant, in particular, met certain criteria under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and matters regarding discharges into the marine environment and other associated environmental issues. Under the OSPAR case it was to do with whether or not the economics were handled properly.

The members of the committee may recall that on the question of the availability of data not previously available to Ireland, we did not win that point under the OSPAR tribunal but we did win the jurisdictional right, in other words the right to bring that case or any future cases that may arise, under OSPAR, to those tribunals. That issue remains live. The UNCLOS case is in adjournment now pending clarification on a matter regarding European law which is now live and in train. The tribunal under UNCLOS stands adjourned sine die. The core of the message I am conveying to the committee is that these proposals, endorsed or otherwise by Ireland, do not have damaging or other implications for the pursuit of the legal actions which remain in train.

On Deputy Sargent's point on the German government's opposition, it would be improper for me to remark on the negotiating position of any other member state. On the assumptions that the installations would be safe, I recognise the point that no other member states will be contributing to decommissioning funds; they will be a matter for the responsible authority.

On Senator Dooley's point on the accession countries, the Commission claims that among the influences to bringing forward these two proposals was its analysis of the current position on nuclear power in the various candidate countries. In that context, it is seeking to ensure that there is a minimum level, which these proposals establish. It is always open to member states, and specifically stated in the directive, to have higher standards, which most member states claim they do. Where the additionality or the value-added might be seen here is in harmonised growth and improved standards and future Commission engagement, as well as confidence-building and a sense of security. Things are being built and developed in a cohesive manner and not in an ad hoc way. That at least is the Irish position. Currently, there are power stations - Lithuania has one - that have failed to pass the litmus test and will be decommissioned in a proper manner. That is part of the community acquis for Lithuania’s entry into the European Community.

The Commission has been very active in the candidate countries in looking at standards. The areas in which the Commission would see the greatest threat, a concern the Irish people would share, is the type of design typical of Chernobyl where western standards - I do not mean to be offensive, but the kind of high standards that apply outside the former eastern bloc - have not been applied, which is the object, among other things, of these two proposals.

On the question of spent nuclear fuel raised by Deputy Gilmore, we are not obliged to have a depository in Ireland for spent nuclear fuel as we do not generate it. Our obligations for management are in the areas where we have already had some detailed discussions today. The obligation to manage spent nuclear fuel will reside with the member state that generates it, in other words, member states that have power stations and consequently spent nuclear fuel.

As to whether or not everybody will have their own depository and there will be no movement, we are entering an area where the preambular statement by the Commission in these drafts states refers to certain economies, within certain parameters that might be more prudent in many ways. This is not necessarily an argument that I am accepting, either for myself or on behalf of Ireland, but this is the argument they have put forward, that it might be prudent to allow for movement of materials from one spot to another to be reprocessed, stored or managed to the best standard that can be applied. I believe, but I may be corrected, that there are few or no mechanisms for preventing movement of goods, even hazardous goods, under the treaties. The Commission certainly recognises that in certain circumstances the obligation for the safe management and disposal of radioactive waste is the function and responsibility of the member state, and that ideally it would store and manage that itself in its own backyard, so to speak.

There may be cases where that would be wrong. If next door to a country there was a depository that would take materials, the alternative being that they would have to be stored in a less than satisfactory way while waiting for the development of a depository in a given country, then one might say that the balance of the environment, safety and human health might be better served by allowing a controlled transport rather than insisting on storage in a less than secure place for perhaps ten or 12 years. However, that is speculation on my part on the Commission's thinking. We do not have an obligation in Ireland to have a depository for spent nuclear fuel under these proposals. If that were the case we would be fighting tooth and claw against it.

I hope I have covered most of the points. I apologise if I have not.

Dr McGarry

I do not believe I have anything to add.

Deputy Allen

I apologise for my absence. If this question has been answered already, please tell me and I will obtain the information from one of my colleagues.

The proposal would allow for peer review of the safety measures in operation in the member states. How does that affect our rights in the case of Sellafield? Does that mean that the RPII would have automatic access to the Sellafield site in respect of the safety measures there? Is there any information on our current status on Sellafield and the refusal by the British authorities up to the middle of 2003 to allow access to the Sellafield site by the RPII? Does this directive change the matter and does it give us automatic rights of access to view and review safety measures on site there?

Ms Dempsey

Yes and no is the answer. Peer review is initiated by the Commission. The model for peer review that we would be familiar with is OECD reviews of our economy or educational system. The International Energy Agency regularly carries out a peer review of our energy and the security of supply and our ways of managing our various commitments, such as climate change, through our energy policy. That is the model as it is perceived, where the Commission decides, recommends or considers that of the 25 member states, however many have nuclear power, on a cyclical basis all of them would be visited. I do not have a full grasp of the logistics. My vision is that a peer review would be initiated and that two or three countries per year would be visited by a Commission-headed group, with experts drawn from other member states, to view the selected sites or perhaps one site, or in certain circumstances all of them, depending on the number of installations in any given country. Some have many, some only one. Regular reporting on peer reviews would be part of the process. The Commission would report back to the Council, while the proposals envisage, and properly, that the reports would also go back to the European Parliament for assimilation, discussion and debate.

Peer review normally includes an analysis of the situation and a consideration of whether it meets the criteria that apply in law or in practice, and advice and recommendations on where improvements, changes or adjustments should be made in any member country, which is the norm. There is plenty of scope for a similar model in peer review of nuclear countries. It would be a new initiative as it is not a matter that has been undertaken traditionally, except on very rare occasions by the Commission. This would put a better structure on a peer review mechanism. In that sense, many of Ireland's concerns on not only UK but other installations would be met through information provided by experts in a transparent way and in a legally based parliamentary process.

On the bilateral issue and the RPII visit to Sellafield, members are aware that the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government has stated in the House that he has asked on a number of occasions for a right by the RPII to make such a visit to Sellafield. Currently, we are working very hard with the UK authorities to determine the scope of this. Sellafield is a massive site, so designing exactly what the visit would address, including who would go, is very much part of the bilateral discussions with the UK authorities involving the RPII and the various regulatory bodies in the UK, as well as officially between my division and colleagues in the UK. These, among other matters, are part of the impositions of the UN tribunal on the law of the sea, which found that co-operation and co-ordination of matters and exchanges of information between the UK and Ireland on Sellafield were not ideal, that while it was happening, it was not as good as it could be. Both sides were instructed, with equal responsibility, to find ways of improving the co-operation and co-ordination between us and to report back to the tribunal. We made our first report to the tribunal at the end of September last year. Our second report was at the end of November last year, and six monthly hereafter, until the substantive case is heard at least, we will be reporting to the tribunal on areas where we have sought to improve our co-operation and co-ordination. The visit of the RPII to the Sellafield site is part of the package of discussions. "Negotiations" is too heavy a word as both sides are engaging in this process with great commitment and enthusiasm.

Deputy Allen

Is it true that there is a lock-out now by the British authorities of our experts? When did the last visit take place on safety issues? There may be ongoing negotiations or discussions, but there is an effective lock-out of our experts by the British authorities. Will this directive allow us entry to Sellafield to make a judgment for ourselves in conjunction with other member states on the safety aspects there?

Ms Dempsey

I will pass on to Dr. McGarry shortly, but I do not believe the word "lock-out" describes how we feel. There are difficulties, given that the responsibility for safety and security of an installation is a matter for a member state. The rights and obligations they have and exercise in their own jurisdiction and vis-à-vis other jurisdictions are difficult issues to unravel in a way that respects normal international relations.

Deputy Allen

This impasse has been there for many years which makes it effectively a lock-out.

Ms Dempsey

We would certainly not judge it as being a lock-out, but it is entirely the Deputy's right to make that judgment.

On the matter of whether the peer review mechanism will improve that, undoubtedly if there are routine or regular analyses of installations that are part of a pattern and continuum - and Sellafield and other UK installations would be part of visits by experts drawn from other member states - then the information flow, independently assessed, would be improved and would, among other things, be part of what we would consider to be a value-added issue on a bilateral basis as well as an overall European basis.

Dr. McGarry will recall the last visit to take place and will give the members a briefing.

Dr. McGarry

It is my understanding that the last time the RPII visited Sellafield was in 2000 when we went with a particular mission in mind. We were, at that stage, reviewing information on the storage of high activity liquid waste at the Sellafield site. We had an objective of looking at the safety documentation. Following on from that visit we issued a report and made a number of recommendations regarding the safety of the storage of this waste at the site, which recommendations were taken on board by BNFL. It transpired that at the same time the nuclear installations inspectorate in the UK, the regulator for the Sellafield site, also issued a report which contained more recommendations, most of which are being addressed or have been addressed. I do not agree that we have been "locked-out"per se. We are in discussions about future visits to the Sellafield site. As Ms Dempsey mentioned, it is a complex site and there are many things to see. If any members of the institute asked to visit Sellafield in the morning it is my feeling that there would not be any difficulty, but it is a question of what one wants to see when one gets there.

Following the events of 11 September there was a tightening of information available on what the UK considered to be sensitive security issues. Information that might have been available prior to that was suddenly cloaked in the argument that it was a security matter and therefore the information would not be made available. The sort of information that the institute would look for would be very detailed and obviously there are sensitivities surrounding it, which is what I believe is under discussion at the moment.

I could not, hand on heart, say that we have sought a visit with a particular view in mind and were told that it could not happen. It would not be true to say that. However, certain information that we have sought has resulted in our being told that it is security classified. We are trying to put forward to the UK the reasons we may want particular information. It seems, at least at this stage, that they are attempting to meet our demands and to understand why we are looking for the information we have requested. As I have said, I do not believe there would be any problem in making a general visit to Sellafield, but there are particular issues and concerns that arise occasionally on which we would be looking for detailed information. That is as much as I can say for the moment.

Deputy Allen

I apologise for prolonging the meeting. Political and official opinions may be different, but on a visit there by my own party we sought information on safety and security but were denied it on security grounds, whereupon we asked that in good faith there should be a bilateral prime ministerial briefing on the security aspects of Sellafield. It is amazing that the UK authorities have not even acceded to that. Surely our Prime Minister should be briefed on a confidential basis and assured that security and safety are adequate. We have a vested interest as a potential victim of any security or safety breach there.

The witnesses may classify it as not being a lock-out, and I respect that, but I believe the UK has given the two-fingered response to a reasonable request and even on a prime ministerial bilateral basis have not given information. I would welcome this directive relaxing the process.

Chairman

I thank the officials for being here for two hours and the members for participating in the question and answer session.

The joint committee went into private session at 1.15 p.m. and adjourned until 2.30 p.m. on Wednesday 4 February 2004.