I welcome Dr. Ann McGarry, Dr. Tony Colgan, Mr. David Pollard and Dr. Tom Ryan of the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland who will deal with the 2002 annual report and accounts of the RPII as well as its report on the visit to the BNFL Sellafield site. Before the presentation commences, I draw attention to the fact that while members of the joint committee have absolute privilege, the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House, or an official, by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland: Presentation.
Dr. Ann McGarry
I thank the Chairman and the joint committee for the invitation to the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland to attend this meeting. We are pleased to have the opportunity to brief the committee on recent developments in the work of the institute.
The aim of the RPII is to protect people from the harmful effects of exposure to ionising radiation, through regulation, monitoring and advice. As the joint committee will be aware, ionising radiation is emitted by man-made sources used both in industry and medicine and by natural radiation sources present in our environment such as radon gas and cosmic radiation. In terms of exposure of the population, about 90% of average exposure is due to natural radiation, while the remaining 10% is due to artificial sources. However, the situation is more complex in that there can be very significant variations in individual exposure to both natural and artificial radiation. The RPII's radon map of Ireland shows very significant variations in radon levels in different parts of the country. In terms of exposure to artificial radiation sources, exposure for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes in medicine is the principal means by which people are exposed.
As with any artificial radiation source, there is always the potential for an accident which could lead to unplanned exposures. Through its system of licensing and inspection, the RPII ensures radioactive sources are used in a safe manner and that the potential for accidental exposures is reduced or, where possible, eliminated. Regarding nuclear power plants in operation in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, the RPII ensures up-to-date information on accident scenarios likely to impact on Ireland is available to inform Ireland's emergency preparedness arrangements.
The joint committee has received copies of both the report on the RPII visit to BNFL Sellafield and the RPII annual report for 2003. By way of introduction, with the committee's permission, I propose to summarise briefly the background to the visit to BNFL Sellafield and the issues of most concern to Ireland. The other areas of the institute's work, in particular, our work on radon, the regulation of the uses of ionising radiation and our monitoring programmes, are set out in detail in the annual report. In the interests of time I will limit my presentation to recent developments which may be of interest to the committee.
In 2002 the Irish Government initiated international legal proceedings against the United Kingdom regarding the Sellafield MOX plant under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The tribunal in the case issued a provisional measures award in June 2003 which recommended, inter alia, that Ireland and the United Kingdom enter into dialogue to improve co-operation and consultation between the two Governments. As part of this process, the Government expressed an interest in further visits to BNFL Sellafield by scientists from the RPII and this was facilitated in September last year by the nuclear installations inspectorate, NII, of the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency.
It is worth clarifying that, as a result of the visit, the RPII now has a clearer picture of the long-term plans for managing the Sellafield site and the factors that may affect the timetable for ending reprocessing. We also now have regular access to more detailed information than heretofore. This allows us to monitor progress in achieving the milestones stipulated by the regulators and advise the Government accordingly. A number of significant changes at the Sellafield site in recent years have impacted on the threat to Ireland. A very significant change was the closure of the Calder Hall reactors at the site in March 2003. The institute had expressed concern on a number of occasions about the continued operation of the older magnox reactors and their closure eliminates their potential to pose a significant risk to Ireland.
Through its regular monitoring of the marine environment, the RPII has concluded that the routine operations at the Sellafield site give rise to radiation doses that are not significant from the point of view of health. Because most of these doses arise as a result of exposure to radioactivity discharged in previous years, specifically in the 1970s and 1980s, unless very significant increases in discharges occur, these doses are not expected to increase by a large amount in the future.
With the signing of the OSPAR strategy in 1998, however, the focus has moved from the health risk and radiation doses to pollution of the marine environment and radioactivity levels in the Irish Sea. The strategy requires progressive and substantial reductions in discharges of radioactive substances, with specific targets for both naturally occurring and artificial radionuclides, which must be met by 2020. While the discharge of some radionuclides has decreased or will decrease, in particular Tc-99, the likelihood is that discharges of others will increase. It is not yet clear how the United Kigdom will manage these changes while still meeting the OSPAR objective. However, the RPII does and will continue to monitor these developments closely.
The storage of liquid radioactive wastes in the highly active storage tanks, HASTs, continues to be the dominant focus of the RPII's concern. The content of the tanks represents over 90% of the inventory of radioactivity in the form of waste on the BNFL Sellafield site. The NII has imposed a requirement that the volume of liquid stored in the HASTs is to be progressively reduced, reaching a buffer volume of 200 m3 by July 2015. Based on information provided during the visit, the worst credible accident which is reasonably foreseeable involving the HASTs could result in levels of contamination in the food chain in Ireland that would require intervention by the Irish authorities.
In addition to considering the possibility of an accident at the site, we must also consider the possibility of terrorist attacks. While there is a well established and internationally accepted framework for assessing the safety of nuclear installations in respect of accidental failures, the situation with regard to terrorist attacks is very different. There is no widely accepted and transparent methodology for assessing risks or consequences. In the case of the BNFL Sellafield site, while we understand the UK authorities have re-evaluated their assessment of the terrorist threat, this information has not been made available to the institute on the basis that it might compromise security and safety at the site.
Members of the joint committee will be well aware of the health effects associated with long-term exposure to radon. The risks associated with exposure to radon were recently reconfirmed in a new study using data on radon and lung cancer from nine European countries. The RPII's radon programme covers radon in homes, schools and the workplace. To date 26,250 houses in Ireland have been measured for radon. Of these, 3,269 have been found to have radon levels above the reference level of 200 Bq/m3. From the RPII's database, less than 3% of these are known to have been remediated. The number identified as being above the reference level represents approximately 4% of the 91,000 houses predicted to be above the reference level based on the national survey.
We have a number of initiatives in hand which aim to improve both the number of measurements undertaken and the number of houses with high levels remediated. A recent publicity campaign resulted in more than 5,000 calls to the RPII and requests for measurement from more than 2,000 householders. On remediation, we have prepared a guidance document for householders with high levels to assist them in determining how to proceed. We have also made a submission to the Law Reform Commission proposing that radon measurement be considered in the conveyancing process. In the middle of the year we plan to undertake a review of these and initiatives in other countries to encourage radon measurement and remediation and to bring forward a proposal to the Department.
With regard to radon in schools, the situation is much more positive. At the request of the Department of Education and Science, approximately 97% of all primary and post-primary schools have been measured for radon. Where high levels have been identified, remedial works have been undertaken or are in hand. The effectiveness of the remediation works is established by post-remediation measurement of the radon concentrations.
Legislation is in place requiring employers to measure radon in the workplace following receipt of a direction from the institute. The RPII has directed employers in specific high radon areas with some success. In a number of cases where employers have failed to act following receipt of a direction the process leading to prosecution has been put in train. A nationwide information campaign reminding employers of their obligations regarding radon was launched in Ballina at the end of February. Since then further events have taken place in Sligo and others are planned for Kilkenny, Waterford and Tralee before the end of the year.
Regarding regulation of the uses of ionising radiation, the joint committee will be aware from presentations by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government of the requirements of the high activity sealed sources directive which is due to be implemented into national legislation by the end of this year. Many of the existing requirements of the directive will be met by the RPII's existing licensing system which regulates the use of radiation substances and irradiation apparatus. The RPII is providing advice for the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government on meeting the other requirements of the directive.
That completes my presentation to the joint committee. My colleagues and I will be very happy to take questions on the visit to BNFL Sellafield or any other aspect of the RPII's work.
I welcome Dr. McGarry and the other members of the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland's delegation. The RPII has given excellent advice to political parties and the general public during the years. Its staff have demonstrated their professional and helpful attitude by showing a high level of commitment to making the unvarnished truth available to the public. Its former chief executive, Dr. Tom O'Flaherty, was extremely helpful and knowledgeable. That the debate on the Sellafield site has been marked by credibility and factual information is to be welcomed.
I would like to raise two or three aspects of the RPII's report. Chapter 5.4 which relates to the terrorist threat states radioactive waste is contained at the Sellafield site in highly active storage tanks. According to the report, the UK nuclear installations inspectorate has assured the RPII that the tanks "have a very high level of protection both in terms of engineered safety systems and physical security". However, I understand another RPII report states the roof of the building in which the tanks are stored would not withstand an attack from a fully laden aircraft. I refer to an attack of the type that occurred in New York on 11 September 2001. It seems it was decided before that date not to construct the facility to a standard that would withstand such an attack. I would like the RPII to explain the assurances contained in the report under discussion, given that the building cannot withstand such an attack. I do not think the joint committee can accept such assurances when one considers that the possibility was expressly ruled out as a million to one chance when the building was being constructed at Sellafield.
I would also like to ask about the suggestion in the RPII report that the means of dealing with "emergencies resulting from malicious or terrorist incidents is significantly different" from the means of dealing with other emergencies. The RPII rightly points out in the report that "there is no widely accepted and transparent methodology for assessing risks". That is a serious concern for it, as it is for all of us. Does it believe the International Atomic Energy Agency should have a policing role in this area? The RPII is represented on the agency's international board.
I accept that most security information should not be made available other than in rare and special circumstances. Having said that, the Government should insist, through the RPII, that the International Atomic Energy Agency act as the guarantor of nuclear safety and security in the event of a terrorist incident. The agency which has held a number of international conferences on the issue of nuclear terrorism is compiling a large mass of information in this regard. Does the RPII think Ireland should more aggressively defend itself by ensuring security and safety knowledge relating to the Sellafield site is made available to the international agency? I accept such information cannot be made available to the Government because it is not an international policeman. Gaps in information and control are developing in this way.
I welcome the delegation from the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland and, in particular, the report the RPII has compiled on its visits to the Sellafield site. Although I have been invited on several occasions, I have never visited the facility. I thought I might be accused of cosying up to the nuclear authorities if I were to have tea with them. I am happy for representatives of the RPII to make such visits on my behalf. The RPII's frightening report which makes the Sellafield site seem like a nuclear scrapyard indicates clearly that its officials do more than drink tea on such occasions. It refers in the report to "legacy waste" which is found in several locations on the Sellafield site and has been made available for certain purposes.
Deputy O'Dowd referred to the storage of solid waste in a building with a dangerous roof that has the potential to collapse. The RPII report states:
The NII has expressed its "concern about the prolonged use of ... [the tanks] ... to store MAC because of the age of the tanks (built in the late 1940s) and the deteriorating condition of the building structure". Specifically the NII cited that the roof of the building could collapse.
It is extraordinary that such a set of circumstances is being allowed to continue. I am glad the RPII has highlighted and brought it to the attention of the joint committee.
Does the RPII think the Sellafield plant will be closed when the present magnox and THORP reprocessing procedures have been completed? We know that the current magnox procedures will finish in 2013 and that the current THORP contracts will come to an end in 2010. Does the RPII think new contracts will be signed? What can we do to encourage the British Government not to sign new contracts? We would all like to arrive at that final position.
Shortly after I started to study the RPII report on the Sellafield site in advance of this meeting the media reported that there had been a leak at the plant recently. It has been suggested that 20 tonnes of nitric acid, containing uranium and plutonium, had to be sealed off. Many dangers could result from this. I accept the RPII's response that the leak does not present an immediate danger but people wonder about what else might happen if it has been possible for an accident of this nature to have taken place. The issue of human error needs to be considered in this context.
The RPII has confirmed my belief that the main danger to Ireland is that posed by the highly active liquid waste tanks. The ongoing activity at the Sellafield site is leading to drip-drip contamination of the air and the marine environment. While such activity is highly undesirable, I accept it is unlikely there is an immediate danger to the human food chain as a consequence.
The storage of highly active liquid waste in 21 tanks is a real worry. One of the tanks which was built in 1955 has been found to have a microscopic crack in its wall. This has resulted in an increase in readings of contamination. What would be the consequences for Ireland if one of the tanks were to explode because it could no longer be cooled, or if it were attacked and the cooling system was destroyed? Would there be a chain reaction between the tanks?
Various scientists who have written about the Sellafield site have outlined a doomsday scenario — if the wind is blowing in the direction of Ireland when an accident occurs, our agriculture industry will be wiped out, in effect, while our tourism industry will face real difficulties. Such an incident would cause immediate deaths in this country, as well as further fatalities over a long period. I ask the RPII delegation to comment on the likely sequence of events if a tank explodes, or if there is a chain reaction from one tank to another following the explosion of a tank. I presume a terrorist attack would be the most likely cause of such an event. Unfortunately, such an attack is a possibility.
I am reluctant to interrupt the Deputy but a vote has been called in the Dáil. I propose that the joint committee adjourn until the vote has concluded.
As a Whip, I agree with the Chairman.
I apologise to the delegation.
Sitting suspended at 4.30 p.m. and resumed at 4.45 p.m.
The RPII and others have identified highly active liquid waste storage as the main problem. The RPII has also identified a microscopic crack in a wall of a holding tank built, I believe, in 1955 — I understand it is tank No. 13 — which is also a matter of concern. The consequences of further faults in old buildings on the site create further pressure to reduce the use of highly active liquid waste storage by using vitrification, a significantly safer system. When compared with liquid waste storage, how safe is storage using vitrification?
The report identifies a number of other problems. It describes "legacy waste" as a major challenge which could take 150 years to address if the plant was closed down now. The roof on the solid waste storage facility which the RPII and my colleague identified and difficulties with sludge in the tanks are also matters of concern. My primary concern, however, is the danger of an explosion in the highly active liquid waste tanks because the other issues can be tackled over time. Even if the process of speeding up vitrification and dealing with the other wastes causes a temporary increase in waste emissions into the sea or air, this would be acceptable if it also removed the major risks. Will the delegation comment on this?
The British authorities do not appear to have identified any scientific means of dealing with the waste which does not involve increased emissions of waste into the atmosphere. Given the possibility that reprocessing will cease by 2013, what action should the joint committee recommend to the Government to prevent the plant operating beyond that point or acquiring renewed contracts?
I am conscious that we must place a degree of trust in perfidious Albion which during the years has lied to our Government. Moreover, the British nuclear authorities have been caught out engaging in cover-ups and telling fibs, lies and untruths, not only to the international authorities but also to the British Government. They have been fined and some managers have been sacked for this reason.
Will the delegation also comment on the necessity to ensure the British nuclear industry derives no support from Ireland? In that context, the RPII may wish to comment on the agreement between the two Governments to build an electricity interconnector, given that it will result in Irish businesses buying the product of the Sellafield site in the form of electricity. Given our anti-nuclear policy, is it possible to have a regulation to the effect that Irish users of electricity would not be allowed to pay nuclear producers for electricity? During my short period in that particular office we examined the matter in some detail and we were fairly confident that it was legally possible to exclude producers of nuclear electricity from that process, given Irish Government policy.
The RPII's work on radon gas has been a great service to the Irish people. It has identified a major health risk that is causing a significant number of deaths every year. Nobody has yet said a particular death was caused by Sellafield but we can say that deaths are caused by radon gas, a nuclear hazard that we produce ourselves because of our geology. We also know that there is a remedy for that hazard, which is the exclusion of radon gas from places where people live, work or are educated. Places of enjoyment may also be included but the time people spend there would be short-term in comparison. We know technically how to do that. The RPII has proved the effectiveness of radon exclusion measures. Its annual report shows the difference in levels of radon for houses that were fitted with radon exclusion procedures and ones which were not, the respective figures being an average of 127 Bq/m3 and 219 Bq/m3, a considerable reduction.
In the past I advocated and attempted to introduce a grant scheme to assist people to retrofit radon exclusion in their houses and the legislation was subsequently passed to formalise the grant scheme. In the RPII's previous annual report in 2002, specific reference was made to that grant scheme and the desirability of it to encourage people to exclude radon from their houses and prevent themselves dying from lung cancer. I understand the cost of treatment to the health service of a person who is diagnosed in the early stages of lung cancer is in the region of €1 million. A significant number of beds are unnecessarily taken up by people with lung cancer who could otherwise be prevented from getting this disease. Given the RPII survey and the international opinion on the incidence of lung cancer rising due to radon gas, we could be dealing with between 200 and 300 deaths per year. People who smoke tobacco have a greatly increased chance of getting lung cancer if they are exposed to radon.
I hope the RPII is not getting soft on the idea of grants. It is not referred to at all this year. Perhaps some new people in the institute are pro-Government and do not wish to say anything, although I am sure that would never happen in a scientific institution. Due to financial constraints in 2002, when we had a surplus of €1.5 billion, the Government did not implement the grant scheme. Due to budgetary constraints, Exchequer funding was not available to support the grant scheme for the exclusion of radon gas.
The committee, with the support of the RPII, should stress to the Government that if it values the people who are dying from lung cancer due to radon gas as I am sure it does, even if it is a question of money, it is much cheaper to retrofit houses to exclude radon than to treat up to 200 people per year for lung cancer. These people take up valuable hospital beds and cost about €1 million per person to treat. If one argument does not succeed, the other might. The two arguments together would be most effective. A total of 100,000 homes have been identified as being in need of remediation. Since 1998 all new houses have been fitted with exclusion measures. However, it is worrying that 3% of schools have not been tested. Perhaps these are in the low radon areas but it is still worrying. I would have thought all schools would be tested.
I thank the deputation from the RPII for appearing before the committee. I commend it on the work it has done. Fantastic work has been done in addressing the issue of radon gas. Time and again it has put into the public domain the problem that naturally occurring radon is causing and that it is responsible for the deaths of between 100 and 200 people per year. Is there an estimate of what it would cost to supply free testing kits to homes in high risk areas? Whatever about the grant scheme which I would love to see being introduced, a step towards that would be to supply free testing kits for people in those areas. Would the RPII consider such a step? It would help to put people's minds at ease and may not be too costly.
It was great to see such a detailed report from the visit of the RPII to the Sellafield complex. We should remind ourselves that the visit only took place because of the interim ruling from the tribunal of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. There may have been some gritted teeth at the visit of the delegation although I am sure the authorities there treated the group very well.
Was the RPII restricted in what it could see at the Sellafield plant? Was it asked not to speak about particular aspects of it? Perhaps the delegation members were asked to sign security agreements. Were the members bound to secrecy or were there areas to which they did not have access? I note that the visit was extensive. It is reiterated in the report that there are concerns about the older buildings on the site. It would be amusing if it were not so frightening to re-read the comments about the THORP plant as being one of the most advanced and modern on the site in the context of what we have heard in recent days.
Did the group get any information about flight paths? Are flight paths kept well away from Sellafield? A few years ago I was looking out of an Aer Lingus aeroplane at Anglesea and I saw the Wylfa plant below me. It was probably only four or five miles away which is not much in flying time.
I note the RPII's comments on security post-11 September 2001. Reference was made in the report to highly active storage tanks. I have heard different names for them. In a Royal Irish Academy seminar a couple of years ago where Dr. Ryan gave an excellent paper I think they had a slightly different designation. I assume they are tanks that contain dissolved spent fuel. They were referred to in one of the papers by Richard Garwin. If we are to take what the RPII defines as the highly active storage tanks, can the RPII comment on whether precautions have been put in place for potential terrorist impacts, such as concrete fortifications?
I assume the RPII has staff who deal with risk assessment but are there people with knowledge of risk assessment in the area of terrorism? Sadly, this is a seminal issue in regard to the issue of nuclear installations in recent years. Does the RPII have resources on which it can draw in that area?
When was the RPII informed of a leak on 18 April in the THORP plant? On foot of the interim ruling that there should be co-operation and consultation, was there a time lag before information on the leak became available? When did the RPII and the Irish Government become aware of the severity of the leak? I only became aware of it on reading The Guardian last Monday, a full three weeks after the event.
The incident seems to be accorded a "0" or "1" on the scale of nuclear accidents, depending on which side of the water one lives. I found it difficult to obtain information on the incident from either BNFL or the new national decommissioning agency. I saw no particular information on the RPII website. This probably mirrors the difficulty that one would encounter if trying to find accurate information on a more serious accident. I was glad to see that the RPII made comments to the media. I hope there will be more direct information on such incidents on its website. Information on the incident in question may be on the website but perhaps I was looking in the wrong place.
I have a brief question for Tom Ryan. He presented a paper at the Royal Irish Academy seminar some years ago. Richard Garwin from New York also presented a paper at the seminar on risks at Sellafield. Was Mr. Ryan happy with his assessment of the potential dangers posed by a catastrophic event at the Sellafield complex? Mr. Ryan should feel free to comment on this. If he does not wish to do so, he does not have to.
I welcome the representatives of the RPII and commend them on their particularly frank report. I note some discharges or emissions from Sellafield are to be reduced. Among these are technetium-99. Has the RPII a role in the new TPP process, which has been commented upon? I understand the RPII will not comment on everything in the report. The process is new and I welcomed it initially but I hope the cure will not be worse than the original problem and result in additional discharges. Has the RPII a monitoring role in the TPP process? The issue is scary given that technetium-99 has a half life of 214,000 years. Anything that would reduce emissions is welcome as long as it is not more dangerous than the original problem.
Will the RPII elaborate on what discharges are likely to increase? We know some are bound to increase owing to the clean-up activity, the beginning of decommissioning and dealing with the legacy of waste.
What are the consequences of the leak at THORP for the decommissioning of Sellafield given that those concerned were depending on funding from THORP to pay for the clean-up and remediation of the whole site? Will this process be postponed for a significant period? If so, and presuming the representatives of RPII can elaborate on this, how long will be the delay?
Further to Deputy Cuffe's question on the incident on 18 April, I instinctively question anything said by management of BNFL. We have learned over the years that it misleads us, tells us part of the truth or, more often than not, considerable lies. Do the RPII representatives believe the leak at the THORP was discovered on 18 April? Was it adequate that they were informed three days after the event? We are very fortunate that the leak occurred in a stainless steel tank encased in concrete, thus greatly reducing the risk for a host of reasons. However, the reporting sequence leaves much to be desired. It is ironic that the RPII was notified three days after the event whereas the Department was notified four days later. I would have thought that everyone would have been informed electronically at the same time. I consider the three-day delay extraordinary. If there was a serious accident, would the RPII expect to be notified any sooner than three days after the event?
Underground storage is being planned at the plant for much of the radioactive waste. Is the RPII satisfied that the burying radioactive waste several miles underground, albeit in so-called controlled conditions, is a good idea? I thought we had abandoned the notion of burying seriously radioactive substances below ground. The idea is a little dated.
A number of members of the committee referred to Magnox spent fuel stored under water in open ponds. The report refers to highly radioactive spent fuel in the form of sludge at the bottom of the storage ponds. The report also states the total inventory of contaminated material and its radioactive content is not accurately known. We have known this for some years but I commend the RPII for revisiting the issue and dealing with it substantially in the report. The subject warrants such treatment.
Is BNFL doing anything at all to quantify the amount of waste? If an employee or member of the management team gained access to the plant and decided, for whatever reason, to remove some of the radioactive material, could he or she do so easily? Apart from security designed to prevent an attack, what other forms of security are in place at the ponds? The removal of radioactive material represents a threat. Have the delegates a view on this?
Will the RPII have a role in establishing the timeframe for decommissioning and remediation, at Sellafield in particular? I know one of the functions of the RPII is to monitor the process. Will the institute be able to influence the timeframe in terms of reporting back to the Government, which in turn may be able to take additional steps, be they associated with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or relevant fora? Has the RPII a role in advising the Government proactively on the issues in question?
I commend the RPII on its maps showing concentrations of radon gas. They are available on the website and in several brochures and documents, and they are exceptionally useful. Would it be useful if radon testing were required as part of the normal process of applying for planning permission for housing through a local authority? Would this begin to address the problems in high-risk areas?
Dr. McGarry
I thank the members of the committee for their detailed questions and kind remarks on the institute and its role in informing the committee on developments at Sellafield and issues associated with ionising radiation. We are pleased the committee has taken the time to read the report in detail and question us closely on many of the issues raised. The members have covered significant ground in their questions so I hope they will forgive me if I miss out on some points. I will attempt to cover most of the issues raised and will invite my colleagues to take some of the questions too.
Deputy O'Dowd asked about a fully laden aircraft which we considered in our earlier highly active storage tanks report in 2000. We said the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate had reassured us there is a high level of protection in the form of engineered safety systems and physical security. The point in our earlier report was that while the design of the system was not such as to prevent an aircraft attack, that did not mean it could not prevent such an attack. The Nuclear Installation Inspectorate assures us it has revisited the issue.
I thought the report said this protection was expressly excluded from the design of the roof of the building before it was constructed.
Dr. McGarry
I do not have a copy of the report with me.
It is a key issue.
Dr. McGarry
I had the impression that it had not been positively considered during the construction of——
According to the RPII report it was considered and excluded as an option from the construction because the odds were greater than 1 million to one.
Dr. McGarry
We have been assured, albeit with no back-up information, that the physical security of the construction is sufficient to withstand an attack. There are other aspects to this.
It cannot do that. I am not trying to confuse Dr. McGarry.
Dr. McGarry
I appreciate that but what we have been told is that, in so far as possible, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate has looked at various flight paths which could impact on the tanks. With the combination of how the aircraft could reach the tanks and the strength of the tanks at that point, it would not be a serious risk.
I accept the aircraft would have to be at a very steep angle and technically it would be very difficult but it is technically possible. I am aware the RPII did not build the tanks and that Dr. McGarry is being helpful here. The key question, however, is how can we accept what the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate says when it cannot withstand such an attack if it were to happen. I am aware it is for the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, not the RPII to answer.
Will the Deputy please move on from this question otherwise we will not complete our business?
Yes, but I want to get to the bottom of this issue. I accept there are other questions to be answered but the key issue is that this facility cannot withstand an attack similar to the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001. That is why we need the International Atomic Energy Agency in a policing role.
Dr. McGarry
We can provide only the information we have on that point. The second point concerned the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in regard to safety and security. The agency has a key role in this and in regard to safeguards and non-proliferation, and advising the international community on the standards that should exist.
We agree with the Deputy and from an international perspective would like to see some mechanism for peer review of the terrorist threat to give comfort to a country such as Ireland which is not directly involved in the area. This would provide a framework within which we could evaluate the risk of terrorist attacks. That does not necessarily mean we would like to see the agency play an inspector's role in the site.
This is a new area globally but particularly for the nuclear energy industry and its regulators. We hope that in time, more information will be made available. At present, however, there is no information on individual situations.
Deputy Stagg asked whether the plant will be closed when reprocessing is completed and whether new contracts will be issued. Our information is that the contract for Magnox expires in 2010 and for THORP in 2012. There will be no new contracts for Magnox because the Magnox fuel will be reprocessed. It is difficult to say what will happen to THORP and the oxide fuels it reprocesses. We can judge only on the basis of what we know.
We have been assured that the British Government will make the decision to offer new contracts. This will be subject to consultation, giving Ireland some opportunity to voice concerns about further reprocessing. The international market for reprocessing of these fuels has advantages and disadvantages. It is difficult to know whether there will be new contracts.
I hoped Dr. McGarry would advise the committee to advise the Government to put as much pressure as possible on the British Government not to renew the contracts and to use whatever means are available to it in this regard, diplomatic or otherwise.
Dr. McGarry
My understanding of Government policy is that it will bring pressure to bear to that effect. There will be a consultation process at which it can make this point. There have been many consultation processes in the past two years on all aspects of the UK nuclear industry and regarding the establishment of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, the body established to resolve the waste issue in the long term under the aegis of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. We will advise the Government to enable it to contribute to any consultation on new contracts.
Dr. Colgan will deal with the recent reports of the leak from THORP. However I will take the question on when we were notified, and our view of that issue. We were notified on 21 April. We understand that on 18 April the operator, BNFL, noticed that there was some incompatibility in the process which alerted it to the fact that something might be wrong but it did not know what was wrong. On 20 April it brought in cameras to document the situation and discovered there was a leak. The UK Environment Agency advised us of that leak and its severity on 21 April. We received the full information available to the Environment Agency.
Did a pipe burst or a wall break?
Dr. McGarry
There was a leak in a pipe which had burst. The liquid from the pipe flowed into the containment vessel which was designed to accept that liquid if there was such a leak. On one level we were pleased to see that a containment vessel had been designed into the building but as we identified in our report, this is one of the new pieces of equipment on the THORP site and it is disturbing to think there would be a leak in a relatively new piece of plant.
In regard to the institute's interaction with the UK regulators and the Irish Government, we generally deal exclusively with the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the UK Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency. We do not deal directly with BNFL. Most of our information comes through the regulators.
Since the provisional measures award in 2003, co-operation between us and the UK regulators has improved. We had a good relationship with the UK regulators before that point but the impetus of the legal actions has not only solidified that relationship but also required the UK regulators provide us with more information than they were allowed to do heretofore.
Did Dr. McGarry say the result of the legal action has "required" the UK regulators to provide more information?
Dr. McGarry
I believe it has required the regulators to provide more information. While it appears that there was a long delay in this case, there have been several instances in recent years when we have received information promptly. For example, late one Friday evening, I was notified by telephone of an incident and when I called to the chief inspector of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate to confirm this he had not heard about it. We also received reports that go to the local liaison committee on an embargo basis before the information is given to people in the locality. The information flow, I believe, has worked well and we are now receiving better and timely information than was the case in the past.
Dr. Tony Colgan will fill in the details of the THORP incident. The institute posed several questions and received answers which has become standard practice. As for putting this information on our website, I am afraid we have been lax in realising the level of interest there would be in these bits of information, even if the initial consequences for Ireland were not so great. We did issue a statement on the matter which is on our website. However, I accept that we need to sharpen up and get our information out quicker.
If I issue a statement about Sellafield or any accident at the plant, I will get more telephone calls from the local media than on any other issue.
On 21 April, the institute knew there was a leak. At what stage did it know that a significant amount of radioactive liquid had been contained within a tank?
Dr. Tony Colgan
We have an excellent relationship with the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and the Environment Agency. We were not just informed about this incident but also received a full copy of the file statement from the on-site inspector that went to the Environment Agency. The next day we received a report and telephone call from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. On this basis, we raised nine issues. We asked what are the implications of the leak, how much radioactivity is involved, who made the choice to shut down the plant and how long will it be out of action? We received a response to all the questions to which we could expect a response at this stage.
There are still some outstanding questions for obvious reasons. No one knows how long THORP will be closed down although we expect it to be for several months. The first information we received was that the volumes was 75 cu. m. but it has now been revised to 83 cu. m. The depth was ten inches which means the surface area is approximately 600 ft. by 600 ft. The walls are several feet thick which explains why the radioactivity did not leak out. However, it is a serious incident for a new plant. An incident that shuts a plant down for several months must be serious and is regarded as such by the RPII.
The RPII was originally advised that it was 75 cu. m. When was it advised that it had been revised to 83 cu. m.?
Dr. Colgan
The first estimate was 75 cu. m., given in response to one of our questions. We asked this on 22 April and received the response that evening or in the morning of 23 April. The figure of 83 cu. m. was a revision and contained in an article in The Guardian last week. When I asked about it I was informed that it was the most up-to-date estimate. Nobody can enter the site so it is only an estimate and it may change. As it is within a sealed unit the radioactivity levels are extremely high. Nobody can enter the site. From one aspect this is good but the question remains how will it be cleaned up?
The pipe must be repaired. The information we received from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate is that BNFL intends in some way to seal the pipe and pump the liquid back into the system. If it does not do this, it must come out of the cell and staff could receive radiation doses. BNFL does not own the material, it is owned by its international customer. There are many safeguard issues if it cannot handle it. From our viewpoint, this is the way it ought to go with this. Nothing will be done until BNFL makes a safety case to the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. Nothing will happen until it is happy with the case. The plant will not start up again until it is authorised by the inspectorate.
How long will this be?
Dr. Colgan
The inspectorate has said months. Nothing will happen until BNFL makes its case. The inspectorate has the right to accept the case or not. There are many steps involved such as remote access, cleaning and checking. My estimate is that it will be months at the minimum.
A report in New Scientist claimed that the first time the problem was noticed was when volumes were 8% down.
Dr. Colgan
Yes.
Should BNFL have notified the RPII then? It did not tell the institute until it had done the camera work. The information flow should have been accelerated from the moment it discovered a problem.
Dr. Colgan
That might be the Deputy's view but BNFL chose not to do so. I do not know what it or we could have said.
What if there was a larger flow? BNFL did not know what was wrong.
Dr. Colgan
Exactly.
Should BNFL immediately tell the institute regardless?
Dr. McGarry
My impression was that BNFL did not necessarily tell even the UK nuclear industry regulators that it noticed something amiss until it knew what was the problem.
Up to 8% of the waste volume was gone. That is a significant amount.
Dr. McGarry
Yes, but we can only go by what the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate does.
I appreciate this and there is no criticism of the institute.
Dr. Colgan
I am happy the UK Environment Agency informed us as soon as it felt it had something to inform us about.
I accept that but the BNFL did not tell everyone concerned when it had a problem. That is why we cannot trust it.
The delegation does not have to reply to that.
Dr. McGarry
I will refer to Mr. David Pollard the question on the consequences for Ireland if there was an accident in the HAST tanks.
Deputy Stagg is concerned we may be running soft on the grants issue for radon gas. For several years we have called for financial assistance to be provided to householders to encourage them to have remediation carried out. In a recent European study, the health risks from radon gas were reinforced. We have continued to inform the public and the Government of these serious risks. We have raised the grant issue with our Department on several occasions.
We have tried several different ways to inform members of the public about radon gas and to encourage them to have measurements done. We organised a recent TNS-MRBI poll and it certainly seems that people are now aware of the radon issue but not making the link between being aware of it and actually having the measurement done. We are preparing a proposal for free radon measurements for householders, most likely those in high radon areas. It will then be a matter of the costs involved and for Government to decide how it wishes to proceed on the issue. We fully agree that radon-related deaths are taking place daily and we believe there are 150 to 200 such deaths annually. Because they can be avoided, every effort should be made to address the issue.
We are pleased with the new building regulations which mean that householders must incorporate radon-preventive measures at the time of building. These regulations appear to have been effective. We will produce a further report in a couple of months on the effectiveness of the regulations which are important in tackling the radon issue.
Is the RPII satisfied that the exclusion system for radon is working adequately where new houses are being built? I would have thought it would exclude radon gas completely.
Dr. McGarry
There is a two-tier approach in the building regulations. In high radon areas there is a radon barrier and a sump which can be activated if it is found that the barrier is not fully effective. It all depends on what the radon level in the house is likely to be. If it is particularly high, the sump may need to be activated. We have repeatedly encouraged people to have radon measurements taken as soon as they move into new houses so that they can then make sure the radon level in the house is below the reference level or, if not, have the sump activated. That is the only way to ensure this issue is addressed.
Talking to the Department is a useless exercise. Has the RPII talked to the Minister and, if so, what was his response?
Dr. McGarry
We have spoken to him. To us he is a relatively new Minister. He has visited us on two occasions and appears to be very interested in the radon issue and how to address it. I expect he is awaiting our proposal.
I made the point that planners would rely on the return of information from the testing at planning stage that might guide them in terms of directing or conditioning what additional measures might be needed for protection.
Dr. McGarry
With regard to new build, our experience has been that it is very difficult to predict before the house is fully occupied, because of the disturbance, what the radon level will be. It has always been our view that the radon measurement needs to be done when people have been living in a house for three to six months. It is not possible to work it out in advance.
I understand. It is more accurate then.
Dr. McGarry
Yes. Regarding our visit to Sellafield, we have been asked if we were restricted in any way or told not to talk about matters. If members recall the introduction to the visit, we identified a number of plants which we wanted to visit and they were the subject of the visit. Clearly, we did not ask to see the entire plant because if we did we would probably still be there.
Regarding the areas in which we were interested, we had no impression that we were restricted in any way and we felt we were given full information. We have indicated to the NII that we are keen to visit Sellafield again, with some of the other nuclear plants in the UK. The NII has indicated that it would be happy to facilitate such visits and we will be discussing these proposed visits with it.
We were restricted only in the area of security. The NII indicated to us straightaway that because of dangers of terrorist attacks, security measures would not be covered in the visit. As can be seen from the report, we noticed certain things and others were pointed out to us, such as additional physical security. Those of us who had previously visited the plant saw immediately that in terms of our own security clearance, we were asked for more information than on previous visits. This was not discussed in any formal way so we do not have a picture of the full range of new security measures in place.
The committee may be aware that the Garda Síochána visited Sellafield some time before our visit to discuss security measures at the site. We have not been briefed on that issue because it is clearly a Garda matter. Regarding risk assessment in terrorism, our brief deals with the radiological protection aspect so that risk assessment in terrorism is entirely outside our level of competence.
I accept that but the RPII is party to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which deals with all these issues. The RPII has a seat on the IAEA board and clearly it holds many seminars on the issue. I suggest that the RPII has a very important role. I am not being critical of the organisation but the RPII needs to pursue those issues at the IAEA since it has a seat at that table. If it does not do so, things will not change at Sellafield.
I appreciate that the RPII never could or should become the repository of this information, but we should be demanding that the International Atomic Energy Agency tells us how safe this is. The only way we can accept it is if the agency itself becomes the international guarantor of safety in terms of terrorism. It is moving in that direction and it organises conferences and produces papers, but the RPII should be a stronger force there, ensuring that certain things do not happen rather than urging it to do its best to ensure those things do not happen.
Dr. McGarry
The seat on the IAEA board is an Irish seat rather than an RPII seat.
I know that Dr. TomO'Flaherty attended board meetings because I met him one day coming from one. I am not personalising the matter. When the Government or its agencies attends these meetings it should insist on this area being totally compliant in terms of an international model acceptable internationally, and not leave things up to the British Government or to BNFL to run.
Dr. McGarry
I cannot agree or disagree with that, but it is important that where the RPII sits in the scheme of things is clear. It is our role to advise the Government on all these matters but it is then up to the Government to take matters forward in whatever way it sees fit. Clearly, Government policy is anti-nuclear and in terms of the pronouncement it would make at the IAEA, over the past two to three years the Government and our parent Department have been much more active than previously in pursuing this agenda. Clearly, the legal actions are one example of that.
The RPII comments on terrorism are an issue. I am trying to be constructive when I say we need assurances on these issues through the International Atomic Energy Agency, whether the RPII or the Government is the conduit. It is a key issue for me that we get such assurances. Different people go to different meetings but I know that the witness's predecessor went to at least one IAEA meeting. More international pressure is needed on this issue. I accept that the RPII has certain problems and may currently lack a clear role in this area. The RPII is advising us on the threat of terrorism in Sellafield. I am suggesting that the RPII goes to the IAEA and returns to us to tell us what more must be done.
We can pursue this issue with the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.
We cannot afford not to do so. I am not suggesting the RPII does not want to do it, but it must be done. It is a key issue for the future.
Dr. McGarry
Deputy Morgan asked if we felt that underground storage was a good idea. We saw the situation at Sellafield whereby the HAST waste, the waste from the highly active storage tanks, will ultimately be vitrified and stored in glass blocks, semi-underground and retrievable. Our impression was that surface storage of this highly dangerous material was extremely safe. It is certainly infinitely safer than storing it in tanks above ground. Our impression is that underground storage with retrieval, given all the right conditions, might be an appropriate way to store such waste. Clearly, however, we have not formed a definitive view on it so far since we have not been faced with doing so. We are actively observing what is happening in the UK regarding its discussions on radioactive waste management and how it proposes to move matters forward. From an Irish perspective, we would certainly like to see that moving forward much faster, but they have taken a particular course regarding their exploration of the options.
On that point, I was directly involved, with advice, support and back-up from the RPII, in fighting at the public hearing in Cumbria against an underground repository. We won the argument, and the British Government accepted the case we made, stating that in its decision. I presume there has been no change in the RPII's position since. I noted Dr. McGarry's point about retrieval. We were worried that what is retrievable now may not be retrievable in future and that there could be deterioration, an accident or human error that would make the entire repository irretrievable for ever. We saw in that the potential for a permanent bone of contention between two otherwise friendly countries and fought it very strongly on that basis, with assistance from the RPII and legal back-up where required. We won the case. That an underground repository is retrievable was what the British said at the time. However, they accepted our argument that they could not guarantee that it would be retrievable.
They are back on that territory — I have seen some of their outline plans — in which they are talking about storage two miles under the surface. It would not be for the material to which Dr. McGarry is referring but for some of the legacy waste and some other products that they do not yet feel able to dispose of in a proper manner. They are talking about that, something that concerns me greatly. I have raised that directly with BNFL at conferences in Britain. I hope that the RPII has access to their plans in that regard. If not, can it seek those plans so that it can satisfy itself as to what they are proposing?
Does the vitrified material require air circulation around it?
Dr. McGarry
Yes, it does.
Does that have to be mechanical?
Dr. McGarry
Yes.
Essentially, one is taking the gloop from the pools and turning it into glass so that it presents less of a danger. However, does it still require cooling and, for such cooling, is forced air needed?
Dr. McGarry
Yes, it requires natural circulation. On underground storage, it is perhaps a question of where we are coming to with the situation, with more information being supplied to us. I suppose, from the institute's perspective, we have a much clearer view of what we are facing. Both the institute and Ireland have choices to make regarding what needs to happen with that radioactive waste. When we went to visit the site, it was my second time there. It was a much more comprehensive tour than I had previously. I realised that the problem would not disappear. From our perspective, it needs an immediate solution. Therefore, while on the one hand we can say that we have reservations about underground storage, particularly regarding retrievability, what is the alternative?
The alternative is overground storage.
Dr. McGarry
Exactly. Whatever is ultimately proposed, we will be interested in ensuring that it is the safest option from our perspective. There are pros and cons to each, but we are reaching the point where it is decision time on the UK side, and the same is true regarding what we require. What option is best from our perspective? We will not know until we see the detail of exactly how that will be, but retrievability is certainly a useful option.
The RPII has not yet seen the detail.
Dr. McGarry
It has not proposed the full detail, it has proposed where it is in the current scheme of things. It has not plumped for any particular option but set out several different ones that it is considering and that are open for consultation.
Has it shown the RPII the range of options that it is considering?
Dr. McGarry
Yes, it has, of course.
When presenting the underground storage option, it demonstrated the retrieval techniques it could employ and the monitoring equipment and techniques. To be frank, I found that some of it left a great deal to be desired. Dr. McGarry is telling us that she has seen and had access to those plans.
Dr. McGarry
The plans are on the website. There are currently four different options. I cannot recall the initial number, but it has been whittled down to four, which are being actively pursued now.
Does the RPII have a view on those yet?
Dr. McGarry
We have not yet formed one.
I remember a time not long ago when one of the issues was the geological stability of the area and the theoretical potential, over the next 100, 200 or 1,000 years, that in the event of an earthquake, no matter how stable it might appear, it could result in seepage or leakage into the Irish Sea. That was another reason we never wanted it.
Dr. McGarry
Yes, absolutely.
The only view of which I was aware was that it would never be on that coast underground. Dr. McGarry says that it is decision time, but I thought that we had already made the decision that we would not opt for that.
The other issue is that in America, the Nevada desert is the place where this material is stored. There is no problem there with geology or distance. Is it a realistic proposal to put that the waste should be transported to America and stored in the Nevada desert, if it is to be more stable, for ever or for thousands of years?
Dr. McGarry
I am not very familiar with the situation, but I imagine that the Americans would not welcome the UK's waste.
Neither would we. Might that be examined as a line of argument? Waste is brought here from Japan and all over the world.
Dr. McGarry
Perhaps I am giving the wrong impression regarding the waste issue.
We think that Dr. McGarry is softening a little on the underground repository and that she is afraid of it.
Dr. McGarry
In the case of the underground repository, we were talking about a specific one. Now we are talking about the principle, after which we will get to the site. When that stage is reached, we will look at the matter and advise them. We are not softening our stance.
Dr. McGarry sounds like a county manager. I am sure that she has never met a county manager, but I have met a few, and once the principle was accepted, the manager was right. He would get over the detail.
Dr. McGarry
I will turn to my colleague, Dr. Colgan, for some of the issues relating to the detail of the recent leak at THORP and the question of legacy waste and B30.
Dr. Colgan
At the risk of opening up matters again, perhaps I should say something on the issue of waste. I think that Yucca Mountain is in a situation where it cannot even handle its own waste. The Americans are considering trying to separate the radioactive waste that they have into short-lived, intermediate-lived and long-lived, and it is only the long-lived that will go into Yucca Mountain. They have particular NIMBY issues in Nevada. If they put in all the waste they have in storage, the site would be full by 2032, and they do not believe that they will ever be able to get another site. Local politics will not allow that to happen, and even now there is an ongoing case regarding Yucca Mountain.
I believe the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been asked to look again at the standards it has laid down. The whole thing is in limbo. Therefore the option of the UK exporting its waste there is not on at this stage. The other aspect is that we do not know whether there will be any suitable site in the UK. The option is being proposed that perhaps those member states of the EU which have suitable sites, as Finland and Sweden have, might be asked to open them. Of course they do not particularly want that. Russia is also being spoken about as a country that might happily accept anyone's waste, but I do not believe anybody wants that.
The whole issue has not been solved. As Dr. McGarry has said, the next step will be the recommendations from the committee on radioactive waste management, which are due in July 2006. Until we see what they contain, there is not much more that the RPII can say, unfortunately, about what will happen in the UK. However, it is a very serious issue, given the amount of waste involved and it has failed to live up to its responsibilities in this. It is something that should have been solved a long time ago.
Is it not the case that under current international law and, indeed, for very many years, each country is legally obliged to deal with its own waste? Part of the problem with the legacy of waste and all that is going on at Sellafield is that it is hoarding its waste. The original countries are legally obliged to take the waste back. If we could get them to live up to that element of a legal requirement that has existed for many years, part of their problems would be solved because the massive waste being retained at Sellafield would be gone. Will Dr. Colgan confirm that this is the case?
Dr. Colgan
Deputy Morgan is absolutely right. The agreements in place require the plutonium, uranium, vitrified material and intermediate level waste from overseas contractors to be returned to them. Those shipments have not started yet. We were informed that a new plant is being built and high level waste will start to be shipped from the Sellafield site to Japan in 2007. The Deputy is right, large amounts of the radioactive waste and plutonium which are stored on site at Sellafield now are not of UK origin. However, that material will, in due course, go back to where it came from, whether it be Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands or a number of other countries.
Plutonium makes up about 55% of the total in that category.
Dr. Colgan
As regards plutonium, I do not have the figures. They are in the report on this matter, which is on the website, and it may be looked up there. It is true that a significant amount of plutonium stocks belong to the overseas customers. We are talking about 40% or so.
I am moving on. Have all the questions been replied to? Has Dr. McGarry finished her presentation or has she something to add as regards the initial questions?
Dr. McGarry
We have not touched on the question of discharges.
The vital question is what the effects would be if one of the highly radioactive liquid waste tanks exploded. What would be the effects of this? Dr. McGarry has a quaint little piece in her statement to the effect that it "could result in levels of contamination that would require intervention by the Irish authorities". That is a gross understatement of potential, though maybe I am wrong.
Some emissions will increase in the coming years. The fact that some of the old, nastier ones are starting to decrease is wonderful news. However, can we have clarification in terms of the new emissions that will occur and precisely what, in the view of the RPII, they will be.
Does Deputy Cuffe have a supplementary question?
I had one question——
That was my original question, by the way.
: —with reference to page 13 where it is stated that current estimates are that decommissioning and final site remediation of BNFL Sellafield will not be completed until about 2150. I would like a source for that information.
Perhaps we could have the RPII without interruption from this point onwards.
That is not possible.
Dr. McGarry
Perhaps my colleague, Mr. Pollard, will deal with the consequences of an accident at the highly active storage tanks, HASTs, and Dr. Colgan will deal with the question of discharges. As regards the source of the date, 2150, we were given that by the NII during the visit.
Mr. David Pollard
As regards the HASTs, the Deputy is quite correct. In terms of the risk from an accident at Sellafield, undoubtedly the HASTs is the issue of primary concern to us. There are 21 HASTs. In size they are equivalent in circumference to the inner circle formed by the arrangement of the desks in this committee room and about the height of the room. That will give the committee an idea of the size of one of the HASTs. They currently contain more than 90% of all the long-life fission products that have been generated over the past 40 years or more of the nuclear power programme. There is no doubt that there is an enormous amount of activity in the tanks. The fact that such activity is in liquid form is obviously a matter of considerable concern. It is the position of the RPII and indeed the NII that this material should be converted into a passively safe form as soon as possible.
I do not want to exaggerate the risks, however. The HASTs are housed in a sophisticated plant. There are multiple levels of redundancy. Each of the tanks is cooled. There are numerous fall-back cooling systems in place and if one fails, another one can be used. Ultimately, water can be taken from the local river through fire hoses and pumped in. That is what I mean by multiple levels of redundancy. If there were an accident, undoubtedly the consequences would be potentially significant, but the risk is extremely small. If there were an accident the most likely impact would be an enormous local mess.
Would it blow up?
Mr. Pollard
It is not a reactor. It does not generate large amounts of heat. If there was a crack or if, for instance, it was hit by a missile of some description——
An aeroplane.
Would it stop cooling?
Mr. Pollard
The activity in the older tanks, which have been there since the 1950s, is now relatively cool. If the cooling failed in one of the older tanks, which are of greater concern in terms of their physical integrity, there would be very little impact because it takes a long time for the material in those to heat up. In the more active tanks, however, those which have been filled more recently, it would take several days for the temperature to come up. That allows a significant amount of time in which to implement remedial measures if the cooling were to fail.
I appreciate that. I want Mr. Pollard to tell the committee — he is not doing so but is telling us about all the possible ways to avoid this — what would happen if a bomb went off under one of the tanks and blew it up.
Mr. Pollard
If there was an accident which resulted in a significant release of the activity into the atmosphere, given the right wind conditions it certainly could have major effects on agriculture and probably on tourism. There could be a very significant economic impact on Ireland in the very unlikely event of a major accident involving the HASTs that involved a release of radioactivity into the atmosphere.
Could it cause thousands of deaths?
Mr. Pollard
It is unlikely it would have immediate health impacts. In the event of a reactor accident, one of the materials of particular concern is iodine-131. That was the nuclide that caused so much local damage after the Chernobyl accident. It is not present in the highly active storage tanks, HASTS, because they contain the material that has been there for years so all the short-lived fission products, which are the iodines, have long gone. However, there is a significant quantity of activity in the tanks. For this reason, they remain a matter of considerable concern.
Does caesium-137 present a significant risk?
Mr. Pollard
Yes, caesium-137 is the nuclide of primary concern to us in the event of an accident because it is the most volatile and the most likely to be dispersed. One of the reference accidents that is postulated for the HASTs is a situation where all other cooling fails and there is no way to re-establish cooling. In such a scenario, the material would start to boil off after a number of days leaving a residue at the bottom of the tank. The nuclide most likely to be released from that residue is caesium-137.
Does Mr. Pollard agree there is approximately 30 times as much of that nuclide present at Sellafield as there was in the reactor at Chernobyl?
Mr. Pollard
That sounds reasonable. I do not have the figure.
What is the possibility of chain reactions? Other scientists have told us there is potential for such an eventuality but the RPII says the risk is so small it can be discounted.
Mr. Pollard
An explosion could be caused by a bomb, for example, but the tanks of themselves cannot blow up. I cannot see any mechanism whereby one tank would impact on the next. The only scenario in which more than one tank could be impacted would be in the case of a catastrophic event which affected the cooling system of several tanks.
I have visited the building in which the tanks are stored at Sellafield and there did not seem to be any special security as there is in other parts of the plant. I make this point merely as an observation on what is a security issue.
What might happen in the event of a catastrophic attack which caused the roof of the building to be blown off? There are a number of these tanks on different levels. In the event of such a catastrophe, those on the highest level would be exposed to the atmosphere immediately rather than over a period of days. Will Mr. Pollard comment on this scenario?
Mr. Pollard
Each of the tanks is individually enclosed in a large amount of steel and concrete. If the roof were blown off, there would be no direct impact on the individual HASTs. The tops of the HASTs come up from the ground but the tanks themselves are partially underground.
The nightmare scenario would involve impact from a large aircraft travelling at high speed. Unfortunately, such an eventuality is more likely after the events of 11 September 2001. It is a possibility that must be considered
I refer to the point made by Deputy Cuffe in regard to caesium-137. If this nuclide were to become airborne in conditions where the wind was blowing towards the east coast of Ireland, the Chairman and I would find our own lives and those of our constituents at grave risk. Does the delegation agree this is the case?
Dr. Colgan
Our objective is to provide members with accurate details of the likely scenarios. I do not know if members have visited the Chernobyl reactor and the area around it where there is an exclusion zone for 30 km. It is certainly not the case that we would suffer devastation akin to that wrought within the 30 km exclusion zone. That is just not possible given the amount of activity taking place at Sellafield. In the worst case scenario, there is no doubt our environment would be contaminated and that there would be serious economic consequences. There is also no doubt that such consequences could be mitigated to some extent by the introduction of prudent and timely counter measures.
We would certainly suffer as a consequence of such an event in the long term. However, there would not be the immediate devastation and death that occurred in Chernobyl because of our distance from the Sellafield site. Given the inventory in the HASTs, it does not seem credible that the entire country could be wiped out. Our concern is that if people are focused on the doomsday scenario, there may be a view that there is no point in doing anything. There is much to be achieved by taking counteractive measures.
Nobody to whom I have spoken about this ever claimed the entire country would be wiped out. I do not know who said that to Dr. Colgan but no member of the committee did so today. We have been told by other scientists that a doomsday situation could arise whereby a cloud of contaminated material could cross Ireland following an accident or attack at Sellafield. We do not know how long this would take and how large it would be. Perhaps it might rise up and travel off to the North Pole. We simply do not know. Any areas of this country it crossed would be severely contaminated given weather conditions favourable to such an occurrence.
If such a cloud were to cross Ireland, it would affect the agriculture in the affected area immediately and would have a drastic effect on tourism. These are the two areas that will be most affected in such an event. It would also have long-term health effects for many in the contaminated area. The delegation states in its submission that such an eventuality "could result in levels of contamination of the food chain in Ireland that would require intervention by the Irish authorities". That is very soft.
The situation I describe would require far more than that. I appreciate the RPII's objective is to prevent this possibility, no matter how vague, from occurring. The delegation has the full support of members in this endeavour. However, we do not want the institute to minimise even this small chance. A recognition of such a scenario is the best weapon we have in convincing the British authorities and the Government to keep fighting to ensure the danger is eliminated.
Dr. Colgan
In regard to the scenarios we now face compared to those we faced even five years ago, there is a significant difference in that both the Calderhall and Chapelcross reactors have closed down. This has made a major difference in terms of the threat to Ireland. Iodine was present in both those reactors which would have resulted in thyroid cancers in Ireland in the event of a serious accident.
We have Deputy Jacob's iodine now.
The closure of those two reactors was an improvement but the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 represent a setback.
Dr. Colgan
They were something of a setback. A reactor accident is more severe from our perspective than an accident in the HASTs. There is no question of a softening on this issue. We are providing detailed and exact advice. I agree that if read in a particular context, the statement to which Deputy Stagg referred may seem to be soft. However, that is what would be required in the event of a nuclear accident at Sellafield. The Irish authorities would have to act with vigour and speed.
Our concern, which is reinforced by some of the feedback we have had from the public, is that we must be careful not to induce mass hysteria among the population. It is possible that any accident at Sellafield might be more damaging because of the hysteria it would generate rather than the health implications of the radioactivity. I appreciate it is a fine line but we endeavour to manage the debate and put the correct information into the public domain to ensure people are properly informed about what they will face in the event of an accident.
I request members to make their concluding remarks.
Will Dr. Colgan speak a little more on the critical issue of new emissions?
Dr. Colgan
Deputy Morgan is most likely a very avid reader of the RPII marine report and will be aware of much of what I will say. The discharges from Sellafield depend very much on the amount of spent fuel which passes through the plant, in particular through Magnox and THORP. This has increased considerably over the past six years and the actual discharges have also risen every year since 1998 and are linked to the spent fuel. The one exception is technetium-99, levels of which have fallen. This mainly comes from Magnox which accounts for approximately 80% while THORP accounts for approximately 20%. Magnox will close in 2012 and THORP, in theory, in 2010. Therefore many of their radioactive discharges will stop. However, there are issues regarding legacy wastes and decommissioning and the radionuclides links to those are not the same. Discharges of technetium-99 will all but stop in 2006. The other radionuclides will be linked to the——
What about caesium-134 and caesium-137?
Dr. Colgan
Caesium-134, caesium-137, strontium-90 and plutonium will remain at similar levels based on the throughput of the Magnox and THORP plants. Many aerial releases are being moved to liquid discharges because the radiation dose is lower. This is being done in particular with regard to iodine and carbon-14.
In the longer term, it is quite clear and openly acknowledged that discharges of carbon-14 will increase, as will tritium (H-3) and iodine-129. There will be a significant fall in other radionuclides from 2012. With regard to OSPAR, Ireland must achieve something by 2020. It is important that we get there, but equally important is how we do so. It is not absolutely clear how the UK will deal with the issue.
While tritium (H-3), carbon-14 and iodine-129 will increase, the radiation doses linked to the same amount of those is less than, for example, caesium-137. Increased discharges will not necessarily mean increased radiation doses, and that is an important issue.
We are expecting a report from the UK on the implications of legacy wastes for its OSPAR strategy. The UK does not yet know the implications of decommissioning and legacy waste management. However, it is clear at this stage that there are certain radionuclides linked to those operations which will increase. I hope that answers the Deputy's question.
It does, thank you.
Dr. McGarry
I thank the Deputies for their questions. We appreciate the opportunity to come before the committee to answer questions on the Sellafield visit and other aspects of our work. Our principal aim is the protection of the Irish population from all hazards associated with ionising radiation. We view our independence, credibility and integrity as extremely important. This has been even more highlighted as a result of legal actions. It is very important that the institute is in a position to provide detailed, accurate and credible advice to both the Government and the public.
We face a number of challenges on the home front over the next while. We have already touched on the issue of radon, but there is also a question of how we manage our own radioactive waste and that is currently under discussion. There are a number of challenges on this side of the water and we also devote attention to those matters.
We would be delighted to discuss any aspect of the report in greater detail with the Deputies should they wish to contact us. Once again, I thank the committee.
I thank delegates for coming in and presenting their report. The committee is reassured that the institute is actively and effectively monitoring the situation, in particular with regard to Sellafield and other issues here at home. We are very grateful to them and look forward to keeping in contact regarding these concerns.
The joint committee went into private session at 6.16 p.m. and adjourned at 6.20 p.m. until 2.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 25 May 2005.