I should preface my remarks by saying the Institute of European Affairs is in the happy position of not having to take policy decisions or even recommend policy decisions on such a difficult question as Turkish membership of the European Union. With our limited resources we are putting together information, facts, opinions and attitudes on the subject which we think will be of help in encouraging an informed debate and of interest to our members, researchers and opinion formers. We will continue this work in the next month or so with seminars and round table discussions with a view to completing our information on the subject. We do not pretend we know everything there is to know about it. I sent a preliminary note which I hope committee members have received and on which I will base what I have to say, elaborating as I go along.
A somewhat heated debate is taking place in several member states of the European Union in the run-up to the meeting of the European Council on 17 December when, as Deputy Haughey said, a decision is expected on an opening date for negotiations. It is expected a decision will be taken one way or the other. The debate is heated, notably in France and Germany. While governments are generally in favour of a positive decision being made on 17 December, or at least not a negative one, it seems clear public opinion is more negative in several member states.
The debate is taking place against the background of the recent enlargement from 15 to 25 member states which reawakened many questions about the future of the European Union, where it is going and what it is about. Some of the questions are: if the European Union of 25 member states will settle down and work effectively with or without a European constitution. Now that the Union is about to expand to the shores of the Black Sea and into the Balkans, what are its proper limits? Can it keep on expanding indefinitely? How is it to handle relations with its new neighbours in the east and to the south which are sometimes unstable? What about the security of the Union; its political role in the world; its relations, for example, with the United States, China and other countries? Most importantly, questions arise about whether the rich member states will continue to put in money to pay for the economic and social integration of the poorer regions. In an extended European Union of 27 to 29 member states, there is also the question of whether there would be new core groupings. Would there be new alliances within the Union and would the euro group be strong enough to maintain a role as the essential core? These general and important questions arise in the debate as well as issues specific to Turkey, to which we will come.
Some member states strongly support the opening of negotiations, notably the United Kingdom. This immediately gives rise to questions in other member states about its motives. Importantly, Greece is in favour, at least for the moment. Cyprus which faces real problems is hesitant but apparently not expected to oppose at this stage. We await further developments. France and Germany are seriously split to a considerable extent at party level for internal political reasons, but their leaders are in favour. President Chirac has backed calls for a referendum if and when there is a draft accession treaty. This is not widely seen as a good idea but one perhaps which is gathering strength.
I have included in the preliminary sheet a few important statistics and facts about Turkey. Population is an important consideration. Turkey's population is growing while the populations of most developed European countries are set for decline. Turkey's population will equal that of Germany, about 82 million, in 2015 and is expected to reach 98 million in 2050 by which date the population of Germany will have declined to about 80 million. It is calculated that at that time Turkey will account for about 18% of the population of the European Union. In 2015 it will account for about 14.5%.
Turkey is very big; at 800,000 km2, it is more than ten times the size of Ireland. As it is only one and a half times the size of France, perhaps we should not exaggerate. Most of the country is underdeveloped. Some 3% of its land area is in Europe while 97% lies east of the Bosphorus in Asia. The official guidebook to Turkey describes it as a Eurasian country. At €6,256, GDP is low, about 28% of the EU average of €22,300. It is about the same as that for several of the recent accession countries, including Latvia.
Turkey's constitution is based on Ataturk's. It states the Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the supremacy of law, respecting human rights and committed to the nationalism of Ataturk. When the European Council decided in December 1999 to recognise Turkey as a candidate for accession, it was able to say it was considered to have the basic features of a democratic system but with serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and the protection of minorities. The constitution in its present form dates from 1982, although it has been amended substantially on several occasions to introduce important reforms. Civil rights organisations accept that this is the case but some maintain that proper reform of Turkish legislation should ideally have started with a complete overhaul of the constitution or even with a completely new constitution. They maintain that the current constitution still shows signs of its imposition under threat of a military regime and lacks legitimacy for this reason. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that considerable progress has been made in regard, for example, to fundamental constitutional rights and freedoms, the abolition of the death penalty, the independence of the judiciary, more civilian control over the military, a clampdown on police torture and so on.
I have set out briefly in my preliminary paper the history of Turkey's relations with the European Communities and the European Union. I should add a reminder of the basic qualifications for membership. First, membership is open only to European countries which respect the values of the Union. In addition, the so-called Copenhagen criteria apply, the first of which, the political criteria, requires that an acceding country has stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities. The second, the economic criteria, requires the acceding country to have a functioning market economy, the capacity to deal with competition within the Single Market and the ability to implement the European Union's rules and regulations, namely, the acquis. A further important consideration which is often overlooked is the ability to absorb a new member state, while maintaining the Union’s achievements and the ability to maintain the momentum of European integration.
With regard to arguments for and against opening negotiations with Turkey, there appears to be a counter-argument for every argument in favour. We will examine the issues of geography and religion together since they are at the heart of the debate about the effect Turkish membership would have on the future of the European Union, although I will not go into too much detail.
Many take the view that the argument that Turkey is ineligible for membership because it is not really a European country has long been conceded. The European Economic Community, as the European Union was known, accepted in its association agreement in the 1960s that Turkey had a vocation for membership. It has repeated this statement on many subsequent occasions. It is argued, therefore, that we should keep our word. To use the Latin phrase, pacta servanda sunt.
Not everybody accepts this view. Across a wide political spectrum in several member states the case is made that the European Union cannot expand indefinitely, particularly to non-European countries. For example, if Turkey is eligible, we cannot say no to Ukraine. Where do we stop? If it continues to grow, the Union will lose its identity as a political project and an original social model and become a mere common market or free trade area. According to the proponents of these arguments, the Union should tell Turkey that much has changed since the 1960s, that we cannot maintain the idea of membership which was never a legal commitment and that we should offer a less privileged relationship, to be defined, offering advantages to both sides.
There are also reservations at grassroots level, although reliable opinion poll findings are scarce. These relate to what reports describe as "cultural differences", an expression which clearly includes the religious dimension. The idea of European identity which is difficult to define also features in the background. While there is no great enthusiasm in political circles in Europe to work on identifying this identity, a good deal of it is to be assumed from the content of the constitutional treaty.
It is probably significant that scepticism about Turkish membership is strongest in countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Denmark which have large Turkish minorities and that it is increased by fears related to the country's size, poverty rate and population. However, many of the organisations which report and discuss these reservations regarding this aspect of the argument favour an accession date being given. The positive arguments they cite are: good faith, that is, as I said, the fact that we have given our word; the prospects for economic and social improvements in Turkey over a long period of negotiations and preparation for membership; the experience of previous enlargements which has been positive; opposition to the idea of Europe as a Christian club; the moderate nature of Turkish religious observance about which we must all learn more and study; the secular nature of the Turkish state; Turkish acceptance of European values and its efforts over a long period to move towards Europe.
As regards arguments about Turkey's large and growing population, economists point to the contribution young immigrants can make to the ageing problem in more advanced European countries. Germany already spends more than 10% of its gross domestic product on pensions, with the figure expected to rise to 15.5% by 2040. When the number of workers per retired person drops from 2.6 to 1.4, we may be glad to have young immigrants. On the other hand, the man on the street, as we have noted, may be more worried about what he regards as floods of immigrants and the cultural and other problems this may bring. Questions are also raised about a poor country such as Turkey having the same weight in European institutions as Germany, an issue which also requires study and discussion.
Economically, while Turkish GDP per capita is less than one third of the EU average, it is growing rapidly. The OECD recently cited three problems in this regard, namely, the question of political and economic stability, corruption and the size of the black economy. The Turkish Prime Minister has responded by stating the government is extremely stable and cites in support of this contention that the country has received investment valued at €20 billion in the past six months; that inflation has fallen from 34% to under 10% in two years; that GDP is expected to grow by 10% this year — I saw a figure of 13% quoted recently in the The Economist; and that new laws have been adopted to deal with corruption and the black market. Much progress is related to the prospect of movement towards membership of the European Union.
The role of the military has been one of the major factors contributing to the view that Turkey has not been fully democratic. The military's role has traditionally been viewed as one of acting as the guardian of the ideology of Ataturk, for example, the principle of the unitary state - vis-à-vis the Kurds, for instance — and the state’s secular nature. The military has been widely respected by the people at large as a stabilising and incorrupt element. In the recent past it has intervened to assume control. Its powers have been reduced by recent reforms, for example, with respect to control of the national security council and parliamentary control of the military budget. Nevertheless, human rights organisations point out that it still intervenes in public affairs in ways which would not be tolerated in a western democracy, for instance, on education, the place of religion in society and more obvious issues such as separatism, that is, the position of the Kurdish minority.
A great deal of material is available on human rights in general, most recently in the conclusions of the European Commission's annual report. In previous reports, while Turkey was considered to have the basic features of a democratic society, it was found to display serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and the protection of minorities. More recently, in 2002 and this year, two major constitutional reforms were introduced and eight legislative packages adopted by parliament. Major steps have been taken to achieve better implementation of the reforms which, as noted, include greater cultural, language and educational autonomy for minorities — again, in this case, the Kurds — the abolition of the death penalty, judicial reforms, the release of political prisoners, measures against torture in police stations and greater freedom of expression. However, it is accepted by everybody, including the Turkish Government, that the reforms have not gone far enough and that implementation is inadequate.
As one human rights observer put it, the philosophy of further necessary legislative reforms must be to move away from laws, the primary objective of which is to control and restrict the exercise of fundamental freedoms, to a position in which human rights are seen as desirable, normal and necessary. This observer, like others, finds that practical implementation is the main problem. He notes that every day there are cases which demonstrate that the police, prosecutors, judges and other public servants either do not understand or are not willing to comply with the legislative reforms and human rights standards accepted by the government. In spite of such criticism, human rights activists are among the strongest supporters of movement towards Turkish accession. A particular human rights activist says the prospect of Turkish membership of the European Union presents the best opportunity Turkey has ever had of becoming a real democracy with full respect for human rights and the rule of law based on European values.
Another of the arguments tossed about by those both for and against Turkish membership concerns regional conflicts. Among the aims European integration is designed to achieve is the mending of fences between old enemies. We have seen the effect of the prospect of EU membership on relations between Turkey and Greece on the issue of Cyprus. The Ahtaari commission — I am sure the committee has received copies of the recent report — points to the great emphasis being placed on the southern borders of the European Union in the context of security and the need to ensure stability in the areas involved. According to the commission, Turkey would add a new dimension to the Union's foreign policy efforts in vital regions such as the Middle East, the Mediterranean, central Asia and the Caucasus and have important practical effects on energy supply. There is a counter argument — why we want to bother to get involved in these areas and perhaps create a great deal of trouble for ourselves. The commission refutes this argument on the grounds that it would be better to have Turkey within the European camp than outside.
The Commission's conclusions and recommendations are fully summarised in my preliminary note. While they are generally positive, there are important qualifications and conditions. While the Commission accepts that substantial progress has been made in constitutional and legislative reform, it contends further action is necessary. According to it, while Turkey has not completely met the political criteria, it has done so to a sufficient extent to allow the European Union to open negotiations. The condition was added that the opening of negotiations should require the bringing into force by Turkey of outstanding legislation listed in paragraph 1 of the Commission's report which also makes clear that the irreversibility of the reform process must be confirmed over time.
The Commission outlines a three pillar strategy in which co-operation is offered to support reform while indicating progress should be monitored and negotiations suspended where there is evidence of back sliding. The concerns of some member states are addressed through the reminder that unanimity will apply at all stages of the negotiations. Any member state can stop the process. There will also be close monitoring of movement towards the adoption of acquis communautaire and the implementation of legislation. It is made clear that the outcome of negotiations is uncertain and long transitional arrangements and permanent safeguards can be put in place, although these are unusual. The reference relates to the free movement of persons. The report recommends that the financial perspective for the period from 2014 should be defined before negotiations are concluded. This is a clear pointer to a negotiating period of ten to 15 years. I count four references in the report to the condition to which I referred that Turkey’s accession will depend on the capacity of the European Union to absorb a new member.
Between now and 17 December further action is expected on the part of Turkey on specific legislative reforms as listed in paragraph 1. It is also expected to make a move on the recognition of Cyprus. Failure in this regard might understandably lead to difficulties. Governments will make up their minds on the Commission's recommendations and in the event of a positive decision which most observers regard as probable though not certain will have to decide what is meant by the "opening of negotiations without delay" as outlined in their original decision.
