JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (Sub-Committee on Ireland's Future in the European Union) debate

Role of Houses of the Oireachtas in EU Affairs: Discussion.

Chairman

I welcome the delegates and thank them for giving of their time at short notice. The sub-committee was set up to deliver an important report by the end of November. We have structured our terms of reference into four work modules, the first of which we are working through. We have invited the delegates in order to avail of their expertise in many areas. The area of particular interest to us is the institutional structure and governance of the European Union, specifically the role of national parliaments with reference to the democratic legitimacy of the Union. The meeting is structured to allow each delegate 15 minutes to make his or her contribution. We will then have a question and answer session during which lead speakers will have ten minutes to discuss various points with Professor Deirdre Curtin and following which all members will have an opportunity to ask questions.

On behalf of the sub-committee, I thank Professor Curtin for attending and draw her attention to the fact that while members of the sub-committee have absolute privilege, the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the sub-committee. I remind members of the parliamentary practice that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

I am happy to be here and hope I can be of some assistance. As I was not sure what was expected of me, I propose to make some introductory remarks and position in a sense from where I come and how I view the European Union without getting into the nitty gritty of the role of the national parliament, assuming that the detail of this will come out in discussions. I am more than happy to answer questions and engage in dialogue with members of the sub-committee.

As long ago as 1974 Lord Denning, a well known and not uncontentious English Vice Chancellor during the second half of the last century, used a fairly dramatic metaphor to describe the effect of European law on national legal orders. He described European law as "an incoming tide" which flows into estuaries and up rivers and cannot be held back. An incoming tide is a highly suggestive metaphor, as the waves of an incoming tide are relentless and cannot be stopped. He was referring to the constant ebb and flow of European law and rules at the tidal margins of a legal system. When this metaphor was used some 30 years ago, one could still analyse the nature of the European Economic Community, as it was then known, as a specific kind of international organisation.

In 1992 a leap was made from the original economic union to what amounted to a nascent political union. In 2008 what is striking is the constant ebb and flow at the tidal margins not only of the national legal systems but of national political and administrative systems. The European Union has in practice evolved in ways that recall strongly national political and administrative systems, at least in part. This is not the same as saying it is evolving into a state or a would-be state in its own right, rather that it views its more recent evolution as a political system in its own right. The more neutral and abstract qualification of a political system also applies to non-state systems. As a self-standing political system, we can address to the European Union the questions that can be addressed to any political system. We can expect of it the standards of legitimacy and accountability expected of other political systems, yet when we compare the Union to other political systems in the post-industrial world, the most striking point is its non-responsiveness in terms of elections, parties and the conventional procedures of popular democracy.

A political scientist, Professor Vivien Schmidt, recently described the European Union as producing policy without politics. In this regard, what she refers to is democratic politics. At the same time, the Union is institutionally part of the national political systems of the member states. We only find the conditions for electoral and party democracy at national level. In this case, as stated by Professor Schmidt, we are left with the reverse, politics without policy. Moreover, in many countries European issues are depoliticised, even at national level.

Members will be aware that I am a citizen of the Netherlands and that my experience in this regard may be of some relevance to the sub-committee. A detailed study of the reasons the Dutch voted "No" to the constitutional treaty, the predecessor of the Lisbon treaty, concluded it was due in large part to the neglect of the national level. For Dutch and, I suspect, Irish citizens, the results of European policy have remained largely invisible. Dutch citizens felt inadequately represented and had major doubts about the manner in which the European Union rendered an account for its policy choices.

One of the major recommendations of a report published some years ago was the need to engage in public debate on the European Union as a political system. A political system evolves not only by virtue of what is formally laid down in international treaty texts concerning the powers and tasks of various institutions. What Jacques Delors referred to in 1992 as an unidentified political object has during the past 15 years taken further shape as a living object. Various actors and institutions have acquired and exercised legislative and executive powers in a broad range of policy areas.

The topic of executive power in the European Union is often overlooked. We hear much about the legislative and judicial power of the Union, but somehow its executive power seems to be left in the middle or the focus is only on the Commission. The Union was never meant to have its own executive power. It was to have the European Commission, but designed more as a public administration rather than as a political executive comparable to a national government. In the original design politics was deliberately organised out. For the rest, the executive power of the Union was, literally, the executive power of the member states.

The main decision-making institution, the Council of Ministers, is composed of national political executives. Underneath the ministerial level are scores of committees which have an important role to play. These unseen hands of European integration were populated not by so-called Eurocrats — European level civil servants — but by national civil servants. This national bureaucratic component of EU executive power is often overlooked. Much of the executive power of the Union is, in fact, composed by members of national executives, both political and bureaucratic. They exercise power and take decisions in a context other than that to which they were elected or appointed. They may take decisions at one level, with no forum able to hold them to account for their actions, either politically, as in a parliament or election procedure, or legally, as in a court. The national executive power has long operated outside of its own national political and constitutional level. It is actively engaged in decision-making at European level and at international or global level. It has, as a matter of practice, surmounted thinking in terms of hierarchical levels and may even be considered as being engaged in a more fluid and composite governance process.

The core problem is that outside the confines of the territorial nation states executives are, only to a very limited extent, held to account for their action or inaction. National parliaments, in particular, have not kept up with what their national executives are doing or not doing. They have stayed put within their own neatly nationally fenced-off compartments. The executive, however, has leaped over the fence and developed into a strongly interwoven complex administrative network, beyond the horizons of many, perhaps all, national parliaments. The Treaty of Lisbon makes the element of executive power more visible in the political system of the Union but does not create it. Failure to ratify the treaty will also not eliminate it. On the contrary, failure to ratify may well aggravate it and force it more underground unless it is subjected to checks and balances.

Looking to the future, parliaments must stop feeling trapped within enclosed national systems, must try to keep up with where power and rule-making has migrated and must play a role in holding it to account. How can we start thinking outside the box of our purely national constitutional and political systems and begin the process of reflecting on and adapting those systems to hold our own executive actors to account for their action and inaction at the international and European level of governance? This is a key and under-discussed question.

Thinking outside the box in the context of the next phase of European integration will involve national parliaments more proactively considering themselves part of a wider constitutional whole, rather than as a microcosm of the national constitutional system. From this more composite point of view, the role of national parliaments is potentially much greater. There is no reason for them to limit themselves to what governments send them for examination. If parliament is part of a greater constitutional whole, then it can also approach other institutions within that greater whole. There is no reason a national parliament should restrict itself to holding its own national representative to account. Why should only the Assemblée Nationale in France enjoy the privilege of a real and lively debate with the President of the European Commission? Why could there not be an annual debate on the state of the Union in the respective national parliaments in order to hold the European institutions to account?

None of these suggestions needs constitutional amendments or treaty revisions but could in most cases be effected as a matter of bottom-up proactive practice by national parliaments. In my view, this next stage of European integration needs to be brought about by actors in the national political systems. This is the biggest challenge the citizens of Europe face. In the wider perspective, the failure to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon is a window of opportunity rather than the definitive slamming of the door.

These introductory comments are intended to set out my position on the issue. While they do not address the nitty gritty of the protocol of the national parliaments and subsidiarity, I assume these issues will arise during the course of our discussion.

Deputy Joe Costello

I thank Professor Curtin for her fascinating presentation. It appears from her analysis of the matter that people and parliaments have been left behind even as national and European institutions have forged ahead. The sub-committee is today investigating ways of enhancing the role of national parliaments. Our present functions are scrutinising and transposing into domestic legislation whatever comes from Europe. We are working post factum for the most part, in that we are required to legislate without being given the opportunity to make an initial input.

Can Professor Curtin envisage a mechanism which would allow national parliaments a greater input into decision making at draft stage? Rather than considering the role of subsidiarity after proposals are brought to us, how could we have an input equivalent to our Ministers at the Council of Ministers in terms of prior discussions? Once the work is done in Europe, 95% of the proposal has been agreed and we are simply asked to rubber stamp it or, at most, make minimal amendments.

The Council of Europe includes a Parliamentary Assembly and a court but, while it can make policy, it has difficulties in terms of implementing its decisions. Parliaments have little say in the European Union as a body, whereas the Parliamentary Assembly forms the heart of the Council of Europe. Does a mechanism exist which would allow us to take advantage of both bodies in developing a more effective function for national parliaments?

Other countries have put in place a mandate system to hold their executives to account. Professor Curtin raised the issue of making EU institutions accountable but it would appear to me that the only way to achieve this would be some sort of mandate system which gives parliaments more than an advisory role at national level. How could that be put into effect without changing the relationship between our Parliament and Executive? Ireland has a strong Executive but the Oireachtas is relatively weak. Can we achieve a better balance in that regard and what is the professor's view on a system which would give a mandate to Ministers before they go to Europe? How could a similar system be developed to hold EU institutions to task from a parliamentary point of view?

Is there a simple reason that parliaments have fallen behind? Is it the workload? Is it simply that it is extremely difficult for hard-working parliamentarians, particularly in the multi-seat constituencies that obtain here, to carry out the necessary workload to ensure that all this takes place? Is Professor Curtin satisfied with the mechanism by which the Oireachtas transposes legislation? Does the professor have views or knowledge on the quantity of legislation and directives emanating from Europe in proportion to domestically-produced legislation? Does she have a view on whether Ireland has a transparent mechanism for transposing such legislation as at present, the great majority is simply done by statutory instrument?

Professor Deirdre Curtin

I thank the Deputy for these questions. I will begin with the last question because it is the one about which I feel least competent. I am not in a position to answer it properly because I am not an expert on the Irish Constitution. I read and was quite impressed by the recent scrutiny provision from 2007. I thought it was quite wide, compared with some other national parliaments. However, I cannot answer the question on methods of transposing legislation. It is better to put that question to someone who is an expert in the Irish situation.

However, the other three questions are highly pertinent and relevant and I will do my best to provide some answers on them. Perhaps we can discuss them further as they go to the core of the issue. As for the Deputy's second question on a mandate system or otherwise for Ireland, it is fairly universal at this stage to have strong executive power and parliaments that are often weak. This can be seen almost across the globe and not simply within the European Union. Even in the United States, in constitutional terms the executive power is referred to as the most dangerous branch of government nowadays, because it is not held to account sufficiently or within a system of checks and balances by the other powers. However, that is beside the point.

Basically, there have been huge improvements. This is an old discussion and is not specific to the Treaty of Lisbon. In the context of the European Union, there have been discussions for many years on how to improve the role of national parliaments. Gradually, certainly over the past decade, there has been a realisation that this is part of the way forward and cannot be ignored. For a long time it was assumed that the national parliaments were not needed and that democratic politics could be transposed to the European level. More powers were given to the European Parliament on the assumption that it would replace the role of the national parliaments at national level.

In recent years, the more refined way of thinking is that the European Parliament and the national parliaments are not substitutes for one another but that their roles are complementary. Moreover, the fact that the European Parliament is getting more power and greater involvement in the legislative process, which is what is happening, does not rule out a stronger role for national parliaments. That is the broader context. For example, there have been endless discussions in the convention that led up to the constitutional treaty. The Lisbon treaty, to a large extent, is the constitutional treaty that was voted down, albeit made more complicated. In part this was to deal with the Dutch position as they could not have the old constitutional treaty but were obliged to have it put in a different form. That is why the Lisbon treaty is much more complex than the original constitutional treaty.

One of the hobby horses of Mr. Giscard d'Estaing who was president of the convention was that there would have to be a special forum for national parliaments at European level — an assize or something similar — where there would be direct input. However, there was much opposition to this, as there was a feeling it would make the whole procedure at European level much heavier and that for many reasons it would not work. It is an old idea and my feeling is that it is now, more or less, off the agenda. The Lisbon treaty has gone for a different track.

Article 10 of paragraph 2 of the Lisbon treaty deals with democratic principles. This is the core of the role of national parliaments. It states:

Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.

This is a new provision. It is followed by Article 12 which summarises various roles national parliaments have. This indicates that the role of national parliaments, as I was trying to say in my opening comments, relates to Ministers and national civil servants. They are the lines of democratic accountability, as the role of national parliaments is to hold their own Ministers and civil servants to account. It is not so much to input directly at European level by constituting an additional layer but to hold their Ministers to account. This can be done in a variety of ways, with one option being the mandate system which was referred to and which operates in a number of countries such as Denmark, Austria, Germany and Finland to some extent, where it has a distinctive position. The general feeling is that it only works in the context of certain national constitutional and political systems. It also very much depends on the relationship between government and parliament in the national system. For example, something often overlooked is that in the Danish system they only seem to have minority governments; therefore, they need to negotiate with the Opposition in order to secure agreement. That explains why they have the specific mandate system. The mandate system has been introduced more recently in Austria and Germany. Studies have indicated they may be formally good provisions but that in practice it does not amount to much.

I believe in the system of parliamentary scrutiny reserve which a surprising number of member states operate. I recently saw that 17 of the total number of member states had a national system with some form of scrutiny reserve. European law and treaties do not prevent this in any way and it is up to the national system to decide what works in the context of its political system. I will consider the Dutch example which I know best and have followed closely. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the Schengen system did not apply to Ireland but was in operation in other states. There was a feeling in the Netherlands that the executive had much power with the result that the national parliament had no say or control. When the treaty was being ratified, the Dutch Parliament insisted on the inclusion of clauses that obliged the government to present on time draft measures and to enter into discussion with the parliament and obtain its approval before proceeding further to agree to provisions. This is what was done in regard to the Maastricht treaty. More recently, in the sphere of justice and home affairs, there was a view that where the European Parliament did not have a legislative role, there was a need for it.

The Chairman has indicated that he wishes me to conclude.

Chairman

I wish to allow others time to speak. There will be ample opportunity at the end of the meeting for Professor Curtin to return to any points she has not fully addressed.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

That is fine. I have not fully addressed that particular point.

Deputy Michael McGrath

I welcome Professor Curtin and thank her for her insightful contribution, much of which related to the role of national parliaments in holding both national executives and European Union institutions to account. She seemed to suggest national parliaments should become more directly interwoven with the work of these institutions instead of, as in our case, being completely reliant on the national executive to represent member states' interests in their dealings with the European Union. In other words, national parliaments should have a more direct role in holding the institutions, including the European Commission, to account. Will she elaborate on how that might work? It is an interesting idea which we would like to see developed. We must explore how national parliaments can be placed at the centre of decision-making within the European Union. As it stands, there is a perception that they are detached from the process.

Professor Curtin has observed that the results of European policy remain invisible in the eyes of the public and that we must engage the public on European issues and debates. This is something we find exceedingly difficult to do, even in national politics. The apathy towards the European Union and its institutions was crystallised during the campaign on the Lisbon treaty. Does Professor Curtin have any suggestions or ideas as to how we can convince people of the relevance of the work of European Union institutions to their daily lives? The answer to this may lie in allowing national parliaments which are directly elected by the public a more direct role in European policy formulation rather than merely a reactionary role which involves scrutinising legislation that is almost a fait accompli.

Is there evidence that the current formation of the Commission, comprising 27 members, has become cumbersome and is impairing or inhibiting its work? The Lisbon treaty provided for a reduction in that number and reference was also made to the issue in the Nice treaty. Is Professor Curtin of the view that a reduction in numbers would improve the ability of the Commission to function efficiently?

Professor Deirdre Curtin

My main point is that national parliaments must reassert themselves vis-à-vis their executives. That is the key to fostering greater accountability from the European Union. For years we focused on holding the Commission to account. Although there is always room for further change, there have been enormous improvements in this regard in the last decade or more. The problem now lies with the Council of Ministers and the European Council which comprises the Heads of Government. The Lisbon treaty provides for a vastly strengthened role for the latter. It has a permanent president and its own administrative apparatus and will probably be closely linked with the Council of Ministers.

The intergovernmental aspect is enormously increased in the Treaty of Lisbon. This is, in a sense, the black hole in terms of accountability. The European Parliament will not play a serious role. The president will meet the Parliament and answer questions and so on but there is no relationship at that level. The only relationship in that sense is at national level, namely, with national parliaments vis-à-vis individual Ministers or the Prime Minister. This line of accountability needs to be strengthened which can be done independently of the Treaty of Lisbon. Every national parliament needs to reassess how it will deal with this issue. This is not an issue for the European partners. For years the Dutch have made specific provisions when ratifying treaties to strengthen the role of the national parliament. Holding the other institutions to account is an issue that can be only addressed jointly by national parliaments.

National parliaments must network together to ensure a cumulation of accountability. They can only hold accountable one Minister, not the collectivity of the Council of Ministers. This is rendered essential by the subsidiarity protocol, if even fairly limited. It is almost a prerequisite: if one does not have networking by national parliaments, the procedural requirements of the subsidiarity protocol will not be fulfilled. People often say the introduction of qualified majority voting has reduced the role of national parliaments which can be outvoted. There needs to be much more emphasis on the role of national parliaments as public accountability forums, spaces for debating issues regarded as politically important. We must ensure Ministers explain their negotiating mandates and the margins in that regard.

I am not suggesting the Dutch system is absolutely perfect. In fact, there are many problems because the government does not give the parliament enough information.

Chairman

I am sorry to interrupt Professor Curtin but I must inform members who may not be aware of it that a vote has been called in the Dáil. Members who do not have in place a pairing arrangement may wish to go and vote.

Deputy Billy Timmins

We should seek to put in place a mechanism for dealing with the taking of votes in the Houses while the sub-committee is meeting. It is unfair on our guest speaker and members who may have to leave the meeting. We will return immediately after the vote.

Chairman

Senator de Búrca is our next speaker. I hope a vote is not called in the Seanad in the next few minutes.

Deputy Michael McGrath

Perhaps Professor Curtin could answer my question in regard to the Commission.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

The debate on the Commission is endless with issues such as whether we should have voting or non-voting Commissioners arising. The simple mathematics and logistics of taking decisions cause difficulties. It is difficult, for example, for 27 people to combine with each other and make a collegial decision. However, this is not a major point. If it is not possible to agree on a reduced number, so be it. The Commission will not dissolve and it will find ways to circumvent the problem. I do not see it as a major point. If Ireland or other countries are of the opinion that it is important, from a political point of view, that they should have a Commissioner — other member states, in a pragmatic way, see that too — I do not believe that will a breaking point by any means. This could be seen as a reason for having a protocol under which something different from the ideal scenario contained in the Treaty of Lisbon could be agreed. That is one level at which certain issues of concern in the Irish context could be addressed. However, the Parliament here has a proactive role to play in the context of stating there are many things which can be done within the Irish system, in respect of which the European leaders and the Treaty of Lisbon are not required. There are different levels and layers within which one can develop solutions.

Senator Déirdre de Búrca

I welcome Professor Curtin and thank her for her presentation. It was interesting that she addressed the issue of the use of executive power at EU level. That resonates a great deal with me, particularly in the aftermath of the referendum campaign on the Lisbon treaty. During that campaign members of the public referred to unelected, faceless bureaucrats running the European Union. That reflects Professor Curtin's statement about the European Union producing policy without politics. There is a sense that the human dimension of European politics is missing. If asked to identify the president of the European Parliament or a member of the Commission, most people would be hard pressed to do so. I accept, however, that they might know the identities of their own countries' Commissioners.

People are not familiar with the European Union, nor do they have the opportunity to follow or engage with the debate taking place. The lively political debate that occurs in national parliaments does not appear to take place at European Union level. This matter could be addressed, with the involvement of national parliaments, at European Union level. As Professor Curtin stated, perhaps Commissioners could address national parliaments on a much more regular basis and present to them some of the legislation the Commission proposes to advance. This would ignite the debate at national level. The media do not follow the debates that occur within the institutions of the European Union in the same way they cover those which take place at national level.

Will Professor Curtin comment in greater detail on the executive power exercised by the Commission and the Council of Ministers? Obviously, the position will improve as the latter is to legislate in public rather than in private. To date, the Council of Ministers has met behind closed doors and Ministers have gone to its meetings without any mandate from their national parliaments and with no necessity to report back on what has been agreed. This has led to a lack of accountability in the exercising of executive power. Professor Curtin also referred to the committees which support the work of the Council of Ministers. Will she comment further on the executive power exercised by these committees and how the monitoring or supervision of this could be improved?

What are Professor Curtin's views on the European Council? She stated the provisions of the Lisbon treaty might strengthen the power of the European Council and the Heads of State and provide them with their own administrative apparatus. Is it not the case that the European Council exercises some degree of executive power but that it remains largely invisible because it does not have formal status within the treaties? Will Professor Curtin comment on its role and how it might be held more accountable in the context of the power it exercises?

Is Professor Curtin of the view that the role of the national parliaments will always be one of supervising or monitoring what is happening in the European institutions rather than being directed more towards a shared approach to decision-making and policy-making?

I was interested to learn that the provisions in the Lisbon treaty on the role of national parliaments would have resulted in a greater level of networking between parliaments. This would have been a helpful development because there is a need to strengthen the horizontal relationships between parliaments as well as the vertical relationships between individual parliaments and their representatives within European institutions. I ask Professor Curtin to outline how that system might work effectively.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

How much time do I have to respond?

Chairman

Given the number of votes that are taking place, there is probably a fair amount of time.

Senator Phil Prendergast

I only have one question, if I may put it now.

Chairman

Ms Curtin should first respond to Senator de Búrca.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

I will do my best to answer all her questions. The Senator began by describing the image of unelected, faceless bureaucrats. I am finalising a book on executive power in the European Union, which is probably why I dwell on this area in particular. It is an unexplored area which did not have a clear name until recently. We have to be careful because the politicians, or who I call the political executive, are elected and not faceless. These are for the most part national Ministers and they have their own power within the system. The commissioners also have a role but I am drawing attention to the relationship between the Council of Ministers and the national level.

The faceless bureaucrats could be divided into two different types, the so-called Eurocrats, that is, the European civil servants employed in the Commission or the Council's general secretariat, and the hordes of national civil servants, who are often overlooked. The latter participate directly in the European public decision-making process, partly through the so-called comitology decisions under the European Commission. They often act in an uncontrolled manner because they are not held properly to account at European level nor are they monitored properly at national level. One of my PhD students who is conducting research on this area has discovered that civil servants often lack a clear negotiating mandate when they enter these comitology decisions and are not called to account by their superiors. The lines of accountability at national level are not working properly and there is a gap at European level in terms of holding these committees to account.

Senator de Búrca's second question referred to the committees under the Council of Ministers and the working parties under COREPER, which are populated solely by national civil servants rather than Eurocrats. The former are also faceless bureaucrats who take decisions at national level. Part of the problem with greater involvement of national parliaments in holding Ministers and civil servants to account is that they have to start very early in the process. It is not enough, as Deputy Costello noted, to start when the draft has been hammered through as an A point at Council of Ministers level. It is necessary to start much earlier in the decision-making process, at the stage when proposals come before the committees. None of the existing mechanisms for doing this is perfect but the sub-committee could learn from other systems. Other parliaments are also in learning mode.

None of the other parliaments has got it perfectly and this is what I perceive to be happening. Interestingly, the First Chambers or Senates are more proactive and pushing governments more in respect of requiring information. While I do not know whether that is the case here, it certainly is in Holland. I have to hand a letter from this year which pertains to the returns directives in the field of justice and home affairs. The parliamentarians were not getting information, although they knew that negotiations were taking place at bureaucratic or administrative level. They asked the Dutch Government for information on the drafts and its negotiating positions. This is precisely what must happen. Moreover, they made the point that although the Government was not providing them with such information, the relevant drafts were available on the Internet, via Statewatch, a civil liberties organisation based in London. It has done a lot in respect of transparency and tries proactively to make information available at the earliest possible stage. It is interesting that although national parliaments are not getting information voluntarily from their governments, they are able to find the drafts they need on the Internet and are then able to go back to their governments. In this case, the Dutch Parliament was able to ask for sight of the instructions given to Dutch civil servants in respect of what was their negotiating mandate, how they had changed and so on. While the aforementioned letter is from March 2008, it demonstrates that this is a dynamic relationship and that parliaments must be proactive when pushing their governments to provide such information.

I wish to add another important point. There is no role for political opposition at European level. If one thinks about it, the European Parliament has a different system and comprises the national Ministers and civil servants, etc. The political opposition as such does not have a voice in Europe. The voice of the political opposition is located at national level in the national parliaments, which is the reason it is so important for them to exercise their role. I wish to make that point because it often is overlooked.

As for the point on communication, getting Commissioners to come before national parliaments to explain matters and engage in debate might be part of the solution. I note that Margot Wallström produced a letter recently on the importance of communication in respect of the manner in which the European Union is portrayed. This is an old theme on which they have been working for years. However, it is very important that one does not simply look at the European level. What will not work is the European institutions communicating with the citizens and stating what the Union is all about. In a sense, such communication also must be from the bottom up. The national political actors must communicate about the Union. This is the linkage between policy and politics to which I referred. The bottom-up national actors also must communicate with their electorate about the European Union.

That brings me to one of Senator de Búrca's other questions because one problem is that there is never a moment in the electoral process in which voters are asked to vote on European issues. It does not happen at the elections to the European Parliament, as its Members generally are elected on national issues. This appears to be a Europe-wide phenomenon. As for elections to national parliaments, European issues rarely are integrated into part of the national agenda on which the electorate is asked to vote. There is a need to bring both together. National politicians also should assume their responsibility in these terms.

As for the European Council, Senator de Búrca asked me about executive power. In this respect, I was relatively satisfied with the constitutional treaty, as well as with the Lisbon treaty, because I believed it institutionalised and made visible the power of the European Council. Reading the Treaty of Lisbon closely, including all its difficult provisions, one can see the power is actually quite substantial. It has been regularised and put into the system of checks and balances. The European Court of Justice will have a role in future.

The problem is that accountability is still weak because there is no counterpart in the European political system and it must again come from the national political system, with accountability vis-à-vis the Heads of State or Government. If there is accountability, it is again an interaction between national parliaments acting together.

Germany, in particular, is more likely than Denmark to have a majority government.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Yes, the Germans have found it incredibly difficult to give the system teeth in the context of majority government. I am sceptical about the mandate system; it is not my preferred solution. It goes very far but is difficult to operate in practice.

Chairman

For the information of members, we have invited a Finnish representative to attend a meeting of the sub-committee. This afternoon, Mr. Michael Connarty, MP, chairman of the House of Commons scrutiny committee will make a presentation. Representatives of the Danish scrutiny committee will attend next Tuesday's meeting.

Professor Curtin observed that there is a great opportunity for national parliaments to provide a forum for the discussion of practical European issues. Bearing in mind the points she has made about the mandate system, how can national parliaments change their way of doing business in order to achieve that objective?

Professor Deirdre Curtin

I emphasise that the model I have in mind is scrutiny reserve. The mandate system applies to only a limited number of member states and is difficult to apply in practice. The scrutiny reserve is a lighter system. The Dutch system, which is the one I know best, has worked to some extent. Although it has not been taken far enough, it has forced the Dutch Government to explain its actions. There have been major problems in obtaining the information on time and in a language that people understand. That is part of the problem. This was the case when justice and home affairs issues were outside the European system. That will change somewhat if the Lisbon treaty enters into force and will be more streamlined, with more of a role for the Commission.

The success of any scrutiny system is very dependent on how a parliament organises itself, how the scrutiny committee is established, how frequently it meets and whether there is a prioritisation committee which examines the hundreds of incoming documents and decides which are relevant. Such prioritisation is important in terms of ascertaining what is politically relevant in a national context, making a selection and acting on that. Expert staff and funding would have made a great difference in the Netherlands. The Senate, the First Chamber in the Netherlands, developed an Internet site on which it made available information to parliamentarians. As a result of this work, it now has for the first time ever close collaboration with the Second Chamber. It might be worthwhile discussing with someone from the Dutch First Chamber how this has worked in practise.

It is important this matter is taken seriously, that funds and staff are provided and that particular rules are changed in order that committees can meet more frequently and in public, which is crucial. The Danish and Finnish committees meet privately rather than in public. What is happening is a form of political negotiation which is detrimental to the image being created in terms of the task of ensuring public accountability.

Chairman

I will restate what Professor Curtin has said in order that I can do justice to the points she made and ensure I have understood them. On the objective of a parliament providing a forum for practical discussion of EU issues, if we are operating in a system where a majority government tends to be the norm, she is saying she believes a properly resourced, reserve scrutiny system which includes a prioritisation function is the best way for parliament to discuss issues of relevance to its citizens.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Yes. I favour a properly resourced scrutiny system. There is a need for the politicisation of issues. The Dutch Parliament has a tendency to depoliticise European issues, to say the European Union is technocratic, expert and complex; that nobody can understand it and that it is boring. The challenge is to politicise issues at national level. Issues that are intrinsically boring and technical can be left much of the time to the experts to take decisions, as they must fit within some type of general control framework. The challenge is to politicise issues, debate them in public, listen to the voice of the Opposition and ensure the media are involved. This can only happen in the space provided by a well resourced institutionally feasible national parliament. I do not believe the answer is that it must be done from the top down from the European Union. This may part of the answer but it is only one segment and it is not the one that will appeal to the electorate to which parliaments are appealing.

Senator Rónán Mullen

I welcome Professor Curtin and apologise for not being present to hear her presentation. Perhaps she will characterise again her primary objection to the mandate system. It appears we are constantly faced as we reflect on these issues with the philosophical difficulty that there is, in a sense, a collapsing of the separation of powers in that the Executive acts as our Legislature at European level. As the Chairman rightly pointed out, there is a difficulty in dealing with this where there is a majority government and a weak parliamentary system such as we have because the Executive dictates the state of play around legislation. Where is Professor Curtin's primary objection located in the context of her stated preference for a system of reserve scrutiny? Perhaps she could provide a soundbite answer.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

I do not know if I am very good at providing sound bites. I have a roundabout way of——

Chairman

That is not always a bad thing.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Sound bites, even for academics, can sometimes be good. I thought Vivien Schmidt's soundbite, "Policy without politics and politics without policy", was great. It was memorable and people immediately thought "Yes".

I do not have a strong view on that. I see the logic if one is involved in a specific policy area of having the expertise to understand the issues. However, a committee with a more general overview of the European system is also needed. If necessary, it should be able to work in partnership with a specific policy sector committee to decide on political priorities.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

I have not done empirical work comparing the various scrutiny committees and how far they go. Inevitably in the mandate system, the purview of committees is limited to legislation.

The Senator has raised a very important point because this issue should be stressed. One tends only to look at co-decision matters and formal legislation. However, if one reads the Treaty of Lisbon properly, I am satisfied with it because it makes visible a huge amount of what are called non-legislative acts and decisions. In my view, these are executive measures because, to keep it simple, those that are not legislative are executive. The next stage of European integration pertains to the need to get on top of what is happening in the non-legislative sphere and to try to exercise some scrutiny in that regard.

I believe this would be fantastic and having read briefly about the new Joint Committee on European Scrutiny, I note that it seems to have the ambition to consider both legislation and wider issues. While it then depends on how widely that is interpreted, some of the matters being mentioned here are exactly what, for example, the House of Lords would do. More generally, it considers the role of the European Court of Justice and perhaps even the Commission's activities in a particular area such as external relations.

Chairman

I must interrupt the professor because a vote has been called in the Seanad. I apologise for this but we are discussing the accountability of national parliaments and we also must operate inside that sphere. Is Senator Mullen willing to suspend the meeting now? The chairman of the UK's scrutiny committee will appear before the sub-committee this afternoon and perhaps some of the points he raised can be aired there.

Senator Rónán Mullen

Yes.

Chairman

On behalf of the sub-committee, I thank Professor Curtin for her excellent contribution. It has been extremely helpful to our work and we are grateful for her attendance. The meeting will resume at 2 p.m.

Sitting suspended at 11.37 a.m. and resumed at 2 p.m.

Chairman

I welcome Mr. Michael Connarty, MP, and thank him for attending. His was one of the first names suggested to us and he is one of several busy and important persons who have made the effort to visit us at short notice. The sub-committee was set up to examine Ireland's future in the European Union in the light of recent events. Our terms of reference divide our work into four modules. We are working through the first of these, an examination of the role of national parliaments within the framework of the European Union.

I draw Mr. Connarty's attention to the fact that while members of the sub-committee have absolute privilege, the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the sub-committee. I remind members of the parliamentary practice that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Oireachtas or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

I invite Mr Connarty to make a submission of some 15 minutes' duration. One speaker from each political party will then be allowed ten minutes each to put questions and Mr. Connarty may respond as he sees fit. We will then have an open discussion among all members.

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

I realise I have missed my vocation when I hear myself described as important. I am here as a servant of the people. I have been a councillor and council leader and I am now a Member of Parliament. This simply means that I now serve more people, not that I am more important.

I am chairman of the House of Commons Scrutiny Committee. I became interested in European business after volunteering for membership of one of what are now called European committees — formerly known as standing committees — which dealt with health and safety, environment and agriculture matters and to which the committee I now chair refers issues. Everything that came before the committee was of relevance to the people I represented and the interests I had. I ceased to be a parliamentary secretary when the Minister under whom I served returned to the backbenches. Volunteering to participate in the central committee afforded the opportunity of sifting, scrutinising and referring issues for debate. It allowed me greater opportunity to express points of view and send items to other committees where useful debates might take place on behalf of the people we represented.

The difficulty I found was that although scrutiny was vital, it was also as dry as dust to the public and most of the business community. Last night I attended a function hosted by City of London Corporation and spoke to an individual who thought he knew about the European Union. I realised after a while that he did not. This man who was from the city was critical of the fact that we were not engaging with him and his interests through our work. However, I do not believe he understands the process which may be a criticism of us, as we may not be reaching the public in the way we want.

Through our structure, we try to hold Ministers to account, which is vital. We try to create debate on issues at our committee. Members will have received copies of a document which sets out in bureaucratic terms what we do and includes a statement to the effect that committees are under-valued. The committees to which we refer issues for consideration do not have a mass audience and not all members turn up for committee debates. For this reason, the projection of important items into the public arena is not as good as it should be.

Members have received a copy of a typical committee agenda. Much of our work is often done out of public view. For example, letters to and replies from Ministers are dealt with in private session and as such, are never seen by anybody but members of the committee. This is necessary if a Minister is to be persuaded to not necessarily shift his or her position but to reconsider it in terms of whether it would be approved by parliament. The documents in the A briefs are public documents, on which discussion and decisions are taken in public. They are then published on our website and in hard copy and available to everyone. Similarly, issues for debate by the European committees are included in the weekly parliamentary list of items for discussion. Previously, debates on European issues were announced by the Leader of the House during Business Questions on Thursday. They are now printed in the daily Order Paper. This means that people from outside who are interested in the European Union no longer turn up for Business Questions. In refining the process we have produced more documentation and lost the mechanisms for publication of our efforts.

On scrutiny committees, what one does as a member of such a committee and the manner in which it operates will determine the engagement one will have with the European Union. One must be an active member of COSAC which represents the scrutiny committees of parliaments of current member states of the European Union and those countries seeking to join and engage with people from other parliaments, not simply attend meetings, to put forward the view of one's own parliament. We must try to understand the Italian, French and German concerns in order to understand what is happening in the Union. Listening to others will also provide an opportunity to get across one's own point of view.

The document on scrutiny circulated to members refers to the House of Lords committee which organises the departmental sub-committees. There are seven sub-committees which seem to compile reports on each of the relevant subjects. Unlike the House of Commons, it does not have, in subject terms, select committees. That places more information in the public domain than would our very dry responses to the ongoing business of the Commission or the Council or communications from parliament.

Similarly, in the past year or so and since I became Chairman, all Green Papers and White Papers emanating from the European Union are referred to the select committees of the House of Commons, as a consultation body. That did not happen in the past when consultations took place with people outside parliament. I found that extremely strange when I took over as Chairman and the position has since been remedied.

Knowing that what we do is document-bound and not read with any great intensity, when we deal with documents, we refer many of them to the appropriate select committee. Yesterday, for example, we referred two documents to the International Development Committee and the Treasury Committee, while last week we referred two to the Foreign Affairs Committee. We are trying to engage the select committees of the House but it is difficult because we are accused of trying to set their agendas for them. They have their own business, to which we are adding a European dimension.

The final initiative that can be taken, as is the case with our committee, is to have evidence sessions with Ministers which tend to be controversial. The media like confrontational situations involving committees of the House and Ministers. As a result, we tend to have a press audience at such sessions and there are also follow-ups from members of the media. We do not arrange these sessions for that reason; we usually invite a Minister to come before us because we are not happy with his or her performance in respect of a particular dossier. On occasion, a Damascene conversion will take place in front of the committee. On other occasions, the process is much longer and a Minister will return from a meeting of the Council having stood by the committee's decision and, from the United Kingdom's perspective, won some victories that he or she might have been prepared to give up if we had not been so rigid in taking him or her to task during a public evidence session.

In our work we try to make the parliamentary process better and ensure it engages more with the European Union and that not everything is dumped on the European Scrutiny Committee. The Oireachtas has a Joint Committee on European Affairs, which is not the case in the House of Commons. However, dimensions of the work of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Defence Committee and the Treasury Committee relate to the European Union and we are trying to make them more conscious of that fact.

It is a pleasure to be here. I do not see it as a duty. There is an organisation in the Houses of Parliament called the Industry and Parliament Trust which partly involves encouraging people from the Houses to take on a study role with a company or section of business society. I took on such a role in the oil and gas industry because there was a petrochemical plant in my constituency. The other side of the process is to try to get people from the business sector to understand and engage with the work of parliament. On a monthly basis — I would be doing it today if I was not here — I speak to approximately 30 people from small and large business concerns involved in the study course about the process of European legislation, the role of the European Scrutiny Committee and the role of Ministers, and on how these individuals can discover what is of importance to them. Another member of my committee is doing this for me today.

The process to which I refer has become a gateway for many businesses towards understanding how Brussels and European business conducted in the British Parliament is relevant to them. I spoke to the Council for Voluntary Organisations about how it could engage with the committee, parliament and the European Parliament on matters relevant to it. We are trying to reach out beyond the committee. It is not, therefore, how the committee completes the dry business of scrutiny which is vital and important, it also involves how we can make the European Union more relevant to civic society, the business sector and, believe it or not, other Members of Parliament, many of whom believe we on the committee deal with European business and that it should all be left to us. If the latter were the case, the engagement with parliament would be extremely narrow in nature.

That is a summary of what the committee is attempting to achieve outwith and within its remit.

Chairman

I thank Mr. Connarty for his presentation.

Deputy Billy Timmins

I apologise for missing the end of this morning's session, which was due to Dáil business. I welcome Mr. Connarty and wish to ask him a few brief questions. Do members of the House of Commons committee have an interest in their work or do they see it as something that does not benefit them politically?

He mentioned the media coverage that ensues when the committee comes into conflict with a Minister. Does it receive regular coverage at other times? If the Lisbon treaty was ratified, would he see it as improving the role of the UK Parliament in dealing with affairs or would it take away powers?

How successful is the committee at influencing Ministers or the UK Government on policy matters? In the Oireachtas, the Minister gives a presentation to the Joint Committee on European Affairs and, while members can make their contributions, they do not seem to be able to influence policy.

I see on the committee agenda circulated by Mr. Connarty an item entitled "25 ideas for simplifying EU law". I am not sure if he can remember any of these ideas but perhaps he can supply us with the document at a later date.

The Chairman may rule my next question out of order or Mr. Connarty may not wish to answer it. As a representative of our closest neighbour, what is his view of the Irish vote?

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

That is an agenda in itself.

Our committee genuinely strives for cross-party positions. Some of its Government members are eurosceptics because they oppose the liberal market, while some of its most notable Conservative members have been eurosceptics since Maastricht. Two of the latter spoke for 52% of the Opposition's time during the 14 days of debate on the Lisbon treaty.

Deputy Billy Timmins

We have a few of those.

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

I was especially struck by a 42-minute speech on changing "EC" to "EU". Even I could not do that.

Some of our members are interested in positions which they hold strongly about Europe, whereas others genuinely want to be there. It is not a committee with which everybody wants to be involved. Our agenda can be 3 inches thick with papers that we receive by 6 p.m. on Mondays or Tuesdays and we discuss each item at 2.30 p.m. on Wednesdays. The secret of success at the committee is to read all the papers, so the members are a committed group of people. Some who hold strong ideological positions are put forward by their parties because they will stand firm but others have an interest in the topic. As Chairman, I want these members because it is useful to have a variety of perspectives. As the committee does not operate a whip, decisions depend on personal motivation. The benefits obviously vary. Members feel they can achieve the debate they want and make their points heard. They can grill a Minister for 90 minutes without a civil servant to back him or her up and then air their views for a further hour. Their interest is often in generating a debate that allows their views to be fully expressed and holds the minister to account.

I have written an article for Public Service Review which answers the Deputy’s questions on the Lisbon treaty. In the article, I asked who is afraid of the treaty and argued that all the reasons given for Ireland’s rejection of it, from the point of view of its contents, were incorrect. Moreover, not everything that was alleged was in the treaty.

The difficulty about the Lisbon treaty is that I have called it a tipping point. One point we made publically in our first report was that in substance it was the same as the proposed constitution. Second, we stated it was a tipping point in that it would tip towards the European Parliament in a way that would give it co-decision-making powers in most affairs of the European Union. Therefore, we are obliged to step up to the plate and I stated I was excited by this development. As a national parliament, we must step up to the plate and engage much more closely with our colleagues in the European Parliament, particularly when one realises that most legislation comes from the Council and goes through the Parliament on a First Reading basis. This is done by the chair and reporter of the committee, as well as the chair of the COREPER group from the Council. It often then goes through the European Parliament on the nod. Although such measures are voted through, this is done without controversy and they do not go back for a Second Reading.

We must engage very closely with that process and respect our colleagues in the European Parliament. I met Avril Doyle earlier this week at a meeting we held with MEPs. She might be described as a formidable person and someone in whom one could have confidence and who would not be a shrinking violet on issues of interest to Ireland. This issue must be taken seriously and members should go to their colleagues who are equally committed to the European Parliament and engage in this debate. After the Lisbon treaty, very exciting times are in prospect which hold no great fears for me. However, it holds many great fears for the Eurosceptics on my committee, as it gives more power to the European Parliament. While it might be a democratic institution, it is not their democratic institution. For them, as it is not the British Parliament, it is not as good and, therefore, should be avoided. There are different views in this regard.

As for influence over Ministers, our committee does influence them. I can cite a good example which is on the record of a public evidence session in which a Minister came before us who clearly was opposed to the proposal to reduce roaming charges for mobile phones. The Minister put forward a strong line on behalf of the business department of the Government on behalf of the telecommunications industry. A full and frank discussion ensued with the Minister and one of the aforementioned Damascene conversions took place shortly after our committee meeting. She then attended the Council and argued strongly on behalf of the position our committee had put, rather than the one she had put to the committee. One can have influence in some matters.

Similarly, our committee has been used to the benefit of the United Kingdom. Ministers have attended the Council and won back positions they had been willing to give up in the Council consensus because of the strength of pressure from our committee. They have written to me to thank our committee because it strengthened the hand of the United Kingdom to such an extent that our scrutiny reserve made the other governments give in and allow the United Kingdom to win its position. Consequently, while we have influence, we also are of some benefit to Ministers. There are times when we give our expressed opinion in the debates at the standing committee of the European committees and the Government votes through its position. However, this, at least, allows Parliament to engage with Ministers and challenge their position.

The document on 25 ways to improve the European Union came from the Foreign Office. It is a public document and the Foreign Office will send it to the sub-committee.

Deputy Beverley Flynn

I welcome Mr. Connarty and thank him for his contribution. I will begin with his initial comment in which he stated much of the material with which he deals is as dry as dust and that it is very hard to engage the interest of the public or the business community. How hard is it to engage the interest of his parliamentary colleagues? I wish to ascertain the level of knowledge of the average MP of the workings of EU institutions. Has anything been done within the United Kingdom's Parliament to try to upskill its Members' knowledge of the workings of the European Union? While those Members who are involved in European affairs or scrutiny committees certainly will know more than the average Member, much of the reason for disinterest among parliamentarians is lack of knowledge. This is in addition to the aforementioned lack of knowledge in the public domain.

The speaker at this morning's session of the sub-committee mentioned that 17 member states operated the scrutiny reserve system that also obtains in the United Kingdom. While Mr. Connarty has answered this point to some extent, has his committee analysed, for example, the types of European scrutiny committees which operate in other member states? Is the British Parliament satisfied that the scrutiny reserve system operated in the United Kingdom fulfils its functions and aims when dealing with EU matters?

Would the witness like to see any changes in his committee system, having acted as a chairman and seen how it operated over the years? How is the work of the committee communicated to the general public and is there much media interest in the committee's work?

I see one of the sample agendas brought by the witness today is very extensive and he mentioned that meetings could go on for two and a half hours. Even with an agenda of this size, there are only so many items that can be discussed in a committee with a big membership in that length of time. Is it the case that most items go through as being noted and are ticked off or dealt with in that way? How would an agenda as extensive as the example be dealt with in a limited timeframe?

What resources are at the disposal of the committee to carry out its work with regard to research and analysis of information coming through? How involved is the committee in the transposition of the EU laws into the British legal system? Is the committee adequately involved in the decision making at an early enough stage? Does the committee get involved in looking at the legislation coming from the EU at an early enough stage — should it be considering it at the drafting stage?

I see one of the functions of the committee is to analyse outcomes but will the witness explain how that happens? Is the relevant Minister brought back to the committee after he or she returns from the Council where a decision has been made to explain exactly how the instruction from the committee was dealt with? What kind of feedback is received?

The question of the European commissioner has been important to us during the course of the Lisbon treaty campaign. How important does the committee regard having the country's own commissioner at the Commission table, and how comfortable would the witness be, as chairman of a committee, implementing EU legislation without a UK commissioner at the table?

The witness has given one already but I was going to ask for two areas where his committee has made a real difference. He has already mentioned mobile telephone roaming charges, which is very interesting. Will he give a few more examples of how the committee has been effective?

Does the UK EU Commissioner ever appear before the committee and has the President of the European Commission ever been invited or appeared before the committee? What interaction does the committee have with Members of the European Parliament? I have one last question.

Deputy Timmy Dooley

When Beverley takes on a role, she delivers on it.

Deputy Beverley Flynn

I do not like to speak when I have nothing to say. How do party political interests impact on the work of the committee?

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

I will go through the questions. Knowledge of the European Parliament in the UK Parliament is less than it was before 2005. The reason for this is something I have been critical of publicly on the floor of the House. What used to be called standing committees, or European committees — they are referred to in the document — are three committees with specific remits, much like the remit I mentioned when I got involved in the process.

They are actually false statements because there used to be fixed membership. When I went on the committee, 15 members were on it for the duration of a parliament term, unless there was a promotion or somebody went off to become something else, like a parliamentary secretary or junior Minister, or was promoted to a select committee and could not partake in the standing committee. There were 15 members, meaning there were 45 members in total learning the EU agenda.

As a result of a modernisation committee report, it was decided to suspend the fixed membership and randomise the membership. The Whips and Leader of the House know what I think about this. The Whips put people on these committees whom they know are not very busy, so they "share the pain" as one of the Whips stated. Some of these people do not turn up and many turn up and do not speak or ask questions. As it is a whipped committee these people maintain the majority for the British Government and shout "Aye" at the end of two and half hours, or sometimes the end of 20 minutes. There are members of the committee who refer issues for debate which are not capable of being debated because they are so narrowly defined in the documents. The problem is that because some members have certain obsessions, they send issues for debate which do not get an audience and offer little scope for discussion. I try to talk them out of this every week because it damages the reputation of the scrutiny committee.

We have supplemented the system by volunteering two members of our committee to go to every European scrutiny committee to set forth our position on issues and focus the discussion. Over the period of this parliament we have lost the collective knowledge of European business. With some 45 Members being supplemented from time to time, few of them have the opportunity to learn about European business unless they volunteer, as I did, to become a member of the scrutiny committee and thus become acquainted with a broader palette of European business. We are in a poor position. There is a perception that any business relating to the European Union is a matter for the European Scrutiny Committee. I am expected to turn up to any debate on the floor of the House with the word "Europe" in it. We are working to enhance the understanding of select committee chairmen, through our clerks talking to their clerks and so on, in order that they can take on European business which is more relevant to them than to us. However, the breadth of knowledge is not what it should be.

I am of the view that ours is the best scrutiny reserve system in Europe. Such a system is better than mandating because the latter is so rigid that people end up working out strategies to get around it. I will relate a well known story to illustrate this point. Our environment Minister in a previous parliament attended a Council meeting to discuss a European emissions trading scheme which was chaired by the Danes. The Danish representative approached our Minister and said it would be good for Britain to be at the fore by moving the proposal at the Council. The Minister proceeded to do so. However, this represented a breach of our scrutiny reserve because we had already expressed our dissatisfaction with the proposal. The Minister duly came before the committee to explain why he had broken the reserve. As it happened, the proposal did not go through because the Germans who were due to have an election were doing deals with the Green Party and did not want to do anything on emissions trading. As a result, the dossier was pulled. In the middle of his evidence the Minister's clerk conveyed some information to him, whereupon he turned bright red. He had just been informed, he told us, that the Danish Parliament had a scrutiny reserve on the emissions trading scheme at that Council meeting. In other words, the chair of the Danish environment group got our Minister to move the proposal in order that he could get it through against the mandated scrutiny reserve of his own parliament. Mandates are too rigid and people find ways around them. Ours is a persuasive system. We seek to persuade Ministers and offer the Parliament the chance to persuade Ministers. We do not always win but have considerable success in influencing Ministers. It is a good system. Members will see from the document the level of ongoing correspondence. I read all correspondence from the chairman of the House of Lords committee and vice versa. We get together and seek to massage Ministers through our correspondence.

One of the changes I would like to see would be a return to having a set membership of our European committees. This would ensure 45 Members were engaged regularly with the agenda from the European Union. They would attend all meetings of the standing committees and learn the business. They could then perform a useful role in the Chamber and possibly come onto my committee when other members were promoted. Many have gone through the committee and are now in the ministerial ranks.

We have an intensive agenda. We now look at the merits of all proposals, which was not the case before I became chairman. I am of the view that it is important not only to look at political, legal and financial issues but also at the merits of the particular proposal. However, this can go awry at times.

We have public minutes for all the A and B briefs, as well as pre and post-Council scrutiny. In addition, transcripts of the meetings are available in the Hansard record.

Some of the eurosceptics can link the simplest matter in the European Union to world government. We had a speech about this only yesterday, when reference was made to named individuals running an institute which promotes world government. The member said he was sure the Commission would be in touch with the people concerned. One gets all sorts of people coming in when one opens up the discussion. Mostly, however, that is not what happens, rather there is an intense discussion of the merits of the subject, particularly during discussion of the A and B briefs in public session. The discussion on ministerial correspondence during private session is also intense. The committee met for three hours last week and for almost two yesterday. It is my job to ensure committee members are provided with an opportunity to say their piece and argue their case. Sadly, we are voting more and more on issues. We are voting too often simply because the Eurosceptics want to push every issue to a vote, win or lose. Sadly, the committee, rather than being consensual, is becoming a place where differing views on the European Union are fought to a standstill.

On resources, we have 15 staff members, including a permanent secretary who is a Knight of the Realm, two former ambassadors, one former head of the agriculture Department, two legal advisers and one economic specialist. Altogether, we have seven advisers among 15 staff to cover all of the items from the European Union.

Chairman

I apologise for interrupting but did Mr. Connarty say his committee had 15 staff and seven specialists?

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

No, we have 15 staff who include seven specialists. Also, we have two staff members in our parliamentary office in Brussels. What they do there is unique in that they produce for us a bulletin — this document is referred to in the agenda — which is a private and confidential document on everything going on in Brussels. They attend every meeting and inform us of what is said, what forces are gathering on particular issues and where we stand compared to others on these issues. The document is for our eyes only. It ensures we know where to go, as we did on Monday and Tuesday. We spent time on Monday with Commissioner Piebalgs, the Commissioner for Energy, the Directorate General for Freedom, Security and Justice, formerly known as the Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs, and the secretariat of the Council and its two legal advisers. We also spent time with the chairperson of a committee which is going through a First Reading negotiation and a great deal of time with UKREP, UK representatives, which I am told is the second highest ambassadorial position in Brussels. We met up to 20 experts from UKREP on a wide range of issues. The positioning of our staff in Brussels allows us to plug right into the system when we need to and provides us with invaluable support.

On transposition, everything we did yesterday is available on our parliamentary website today. Our public discussion will be translated by Hansard and sent for amendment to members next week. It will then be published as a document and available in bound form a week later. Everything we did in regard to the A briefs — what we call the chapters — is included in the document and published, although usually two weeks following the discussion. The document which members of the sub-committee have relates to the 32nd report of the last session.

On Council reports and whether we receive information early enough, the answer is we do. We produced a report on the value of the annual policy strategy document, a document produced a year prior to the work programme for the European Commission. We sent a copy of that report to the chairperson of each select committee. We now ensure the chairperson of each select committee receives a copy of the annual policy strategy document, not only the work programme. Often, by the time the Commission commences its work programme, one is hanging on to its coat tails. One needs to be informed earlier of what is happening to ensure one will confront issues as they arise, rather than running after them. Green and White Papers are forwarded to select committees when published by Departments. We are trying to achieve greater involvement in the process and engaging with chairpersons dealing with First Reading documents from the Council. We hold the Government to account and want to know that what it will do down the line will be consistent with what we have been told it will do in Council. We try to engage with it to a large degree.

Chairman

I propose that Deputy Costello ask his questions and that we can return later to any points to which Mr. Connarty has not responded.

Deputy Joe Costello

I thank Mr. Connarty for his informative contribution. From what he stated and our knowledge of his committee's operation, it is clear that it has a tremendous workload and gets through a major amount of work. Does much of this work happen largely after the event? In other words, has the committee missed the boat by the time it embarks upon its work because, as happens in the Oireachtas, it does not have an input into the original decisions made or the drafting of legislation? Does his committee, by and large, tidy up what has already been decided in the European Union? Is an enormous burden placed on the committee for a small return, given that the important decisions have already been taken and the major elements are already in place?

Is Mr. Connarty of the view that the European Union has progressed in a fashion that has created an imbalance, diminished the powers of national parliaments and conferred greater powers on the European institutions? Does he believe we have been losing out and that what we are doing in order to catch up is not sufficient? Does he have any ideas as to how the balance might be shifted? Should we have an enhanced role at an earlier stage in order to improve our position as parliamentarians?

The Oireachtas has a Joint Committee on European Scrutiny, the membership of which comprises Members of the Upper and Lower Houses. However, the House of Commons and House of Lords have separate committees. Is there not an overlap between the two and could they not conduct their business better if both were not covering the same ground? If they do cover the same ground, what interaction takes place between the two? Do they co-operate with each other? If there was a need to bring in a Minister to discuss an issue relating to the scrutiny reserve, is it possible that the House of Lords committee might adopt one position, while Mr. Connarty's committee might adopt another?

How does the European Scrutiny Committee operate in the context of the Houses of Parliament? How do Mr. Connarty and his counterpart in the Lords ensure matters are debated in the House of Commons and the House of Lords rather than in committee? What is the connection between plenary sessions of Parliament and Mr. Connarty's committee?

The European Scrutiny Committee, with its scrutiny reserve, seems to operate in a somewhat different manner to its counterpart in Denmark which has a mandate system. The Danish committee does not actually mandate Ministers to come before it. However, Danish Ministers must make decisions as to what matters are important and might require a mandate. The European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons carries out an initial scrutiny, determines what is important and contacts the relevant Minister who then responds. If a difficulty arises in that the committee adopts one view of a particular matter and the Minister adopts another, how are decisions made? Does the committee have the authority to hold him or her to account and does its scrutiny reserve effectively become a mandate at that stage?

Mr. Connarty referred to the committee's resources which seem substantial. I have a question regarding the committee's workload. How can Mr. Connarty find sufficient people who are prepared to devote the time required? Perhaps he can outline the committee's working arrangements.

He made the interesting comment that if he was not with us he would probably be addressing a group of business people. Does his committee play a proactive role in raising public awareness among civil society by visiting schools, businesses and, possibly, factories?

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

In regard to the purpose of our committee, it was established long before I joined it ten years ago. Its remit is influencing Ministers on EU proposals and holding them to account. We do not necessarily have a role in holding the Commission or the Council to account, although we now realise that the movement to co-decision making means that the process of engaging with the European Parliament subsequent to the Council's involvement is becoming more important. Last year, when I had the pleasure of being awarded the title of inquisitor of the year for putting more Ministers to the sword than anyone else, I had to remind those who gave me the award that I am a Government sceptic rather than a eurosceptic.

The first role of a backbencher is not to be partisan but to hold the Government to account, regardless of the party from which he or she comes. Our involvement does not come too late because that is our role. By focusing on policy strategy documents, which are produced in the year prior to the Commission's work programme and then become the dossiers negotiated at Council level, we have two years for scrutiny and can engage with the topics and work programme as they are being designed and before they go to Council. We then engage with the Minister when he or she goes to the Council and, more importantly, will now be engaging with MEPs at the co-decision stage.

The select committee was in the unusual situation whereby Green Papers and White Papers from the Commission did not go to sectoral select committees until I asked through the liaison committee for this to happen. The consultation list comprised everyone outside the Parliament. I hope we can now engage more people at an early stage, when ideas are coming to fruition in the work programme. We respond specifically when Ministers give us an explanatory memorandum of the Commission's proposals and the departmental position on these proposals. These are signed by Ministers and represent their evidence in submission to the committee. They set out the position they plan to take at the Council negotiations but we may impose a scrutiny reserve where we think a proposal is not properly thought out, inconsistent with previous policy or not beneficial for the UK.

An impact assessment may, for example, reveal that a proposal is not financially or socially beneficial. We engage in that dialogue in the hope of influencing the outcome. Unless Ministers have special reasons in terms of the UK's security or economic interests, they will not easily break the scrutiny reserve because members on all sides of the committee will give them a hard time when they come before us. We regard the scrutiny reserve as precious and a Minister cannot get away with breaking it. I can think of a few ministerial scalps which are no longer hanging in ministerial offices.

The process is quite rigorous, although perhaps the sub-committee has a preference for a select committee that could engage earlier in the process. If we were a committee on European affairs, our approach might differ. We communicate all the time. I copy all my correspondence to Lord Grenfell and he copies all his to me. We negotiate with the Minister and often on the same lines. We do not always reach the same conclusion and our views may differ on how strong a scrutiny reserve should be on an issue for the interest of the House of Lords which complements our activities. It sifts everything through the chairman who sends topics to the seven sub-committees, following negotiations with the chairs of those sub-committees, to take evidence and produce reports. It conducts three or four-week studies of various topics. I always describe our process as being akin to a very fast game of political tennis. Balls whizz in from the European Union and one must ensure one hits them cleanly and gets them back into the area of the court into which they are supposed to go. Our process differs from that in the House of Lords. It is complementary and both are useful to the parliamentary process.

As for plenary sessions, many European matters come up in plenary sessions of our Parliament that do not necessarily come through a scrutiny referral for a debate. We have approximately three or four debates every year. If we produce a report, as we did on the Lisbon treaty, it becomes a document which people debate while debating the Lisbon treaty proper. We have just completed a report on subsidiarity, parliaments and the Lisbon treaty. It probably will go to the floor of the House and create a plenary debate. However many issues such as, for example, the decision just taken on changing the accounting rules in banks will be debated on the floor of the House. This can be done by the Government, if it wishes to move something formal to change legislation, or an Opposition day debate can be called on an issue that comes from the European Union. There are many ways to hold plenary debates without a requirement to come through our committee. They may come through select committees such as, for example, the economic co-operation agreements with Africa which probably will come up via the Department for International Development through the select committee report on that issue. It will be debated on the floor of the House, although it clearly has a European agenda. The more that come from other committees, the happier I am as a scrutiny committee chairman.

Deputy Joe Costello

My question is whether Mr. Connarty's committee can place items on the floor of the House directly. Do its standing orders allow it to do so?

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

We can request it. We usually get approximately three debates because of the huge agenda for Opposition day debates and Government business. However, there was a 14-day debate on the Lisbon treaty, all of which was centred on the report from our committee. It became the document that everyone, on both sides, quoted in defence of their positions, which was interesting.

As for differences of views with Ministers, as I noted, we influence some and believe we can persuade them. However, it is not our function to make Government policy. Ours is a consensus committee and many select committee reports go to Ministers and although they receive a ministerial reply, do not get ministerial acceptance. We do not differ greatly, except that Ministers are aware that at the sharp end we can hold up something they want put through, if they cannot persuade their colleagues on the Council and they do not bend towards us. It is a very tight timetable and they will lose it. There is in our interest, perhaps, an ability to persuade them that in a swift moving game it is better to be consensual with us and push harder in the Council than to be consensual in the Council and ignore us. That is how it works.

Senator Rónán Mullen

Fáilte go hÉirinn. Mr. Connarty is welcome to Ireland and I thank him for his attendance.

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

I simply have come home.

Senator Rónán Mullen

Mr. Connarty is among his own. Although some of my questions have been picked up by other members of the sub-committee, I wish to tease out further the question of the mandate system. If one approaches this from a separation of powers viewpoint, it could be argued that only the mandate system really returns control. As members of our Executive end up as legislators at European level, it could be argued that only a mandate system allows legislators to maintain a level of control over what Ministers do in the Council of Ministers and so on. Therefore, in strict separation of powers thinking, no matter how consensual one is about it, all one really has with a scrutiny system is the right of respectful audience from the Minister. If I understand it correctly, ultimately, if one has a scrutiny reserve, the Minister can note the concerns expressed following scrutiny and then take another approach. Having heard Mr. Connarty's comments on the limitations of the mandate system, although I did not catch all the details of the example he gave in respect of the Danes and the British, it comes down to flexibility and the ability to move and roll with the punches at the Council of Ministers meeting.

Is it possible to have some kind of compromise arrangement, whereby there are some aspects of a mandate system but the Minister would have the necessary freedom of movement he or she might need? Is it possible to have a via media between a mandate and scrutiny system in order to return to legislators the power that they should have, strictly speaking, given that legislation is what is dealt with at the Council of Ministers?

At EU level it is not just about legislation and there are all sorts of executive functions being carried out. Part of that is vested in the Council of Ministers, as well as the Commission and elsewhere. Taking, for example, funding by the EU of non-governmental organisations or bodies and stances taken by the EU in international fora on various issues, and even taking interpretation of existing directives by the European Commission, does the scrutiny committee have any remit in this respect? Has it any view on how well that is working or if change is required?

Clearly the system in Britain is very different as it does not have a written constitution. Are there instances where the British courts have held EU institutions to account, indicating they can go thus far but no further, or that some areas do not fall within the requirements of the treaties as they understand it? In other words, does the British judiciary have a role in the scrutiny area with regard to EU competence?

I listened with interest to Deputy Costello's questions about the Lords and Commons committees and the reply of the witness. The witness may have answered this along the way but does the House of Lords have exactly the same power to put a scrutiny reserve on issues?

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Yes.

Senator Rónán Mullen

The level of power is equivalent between the committees of the House of Lords and House of Commons.

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

I am not sure the Lords committee invites Ministers for such a gruelling session as we would if they broke the scrutiny reserve. When voting in the House of Lords, one does not vote "Yes" or "No", but rather "Content" or "Not content". It is a qualitative difference. I am sure the Minister will get a very well-worded letter from Lord Grenfell which he or she will feel very sharply, as he is a master wordsmith. He would not necessarily call Ministers in as we would and give them a roughing up in public.

Senator Rónán Mullen

There are probably too many bad memories of roughing up the commoners. Does the role of the scrutiny reserve act in any instances to delay what happens at European level or is the timing such that matters arrive before the committee well in advance of them being discussed or bartered about at European level? Does it happen prior to the Minister in question having to negotiate at the Council of Ministers? Are there occasions when, as a result of scrutiny reserve placed by a British committee domestically, the legislative process at European level is held up? What has been the reaction to that?

One of the issues raised in the context of the Lisbon treaty result in Ireland has been the impact of the treaty on Ireland's relationship with the European Union in the event of there being a change of government in Westminster. I am sure the witness is not anticipating a change of government in the next election. That has been brought up in a vaguely threatening way and the message sent out is that if Mr. Cameron leads the Conservatives to victory, Britain will pull back in a big way from the EU and Ireland could find itself in splendid isolation all over again. The trouble with that is it is vague and emotive language.

Will Mr. Connarty comment on the different possible outcomes? In the event that the Conservative Party comes to power, is there likely to be a change of approach to European issues? If so, what might that mean for Britain's position in the European Union and, as a consequence, that of Ireland? We do not expect Mr. Connarty to be an expert on Irish affairs but it would be helpful for members to have his perspective.

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

I cannot say with certainty what the Conservative Party's policy is on Britain's position in the European Union. In the debate on the Lisbon treaty Mr. William Hague commented that even in the case of ratification by all member states, that would not be the end of the matter. I am not sure what he meant by this. There was no definition of what might come next.

We are assured by the eurosceptics that they will have a blocking minority in a Cameron government on the basis that they pledged their support to him in the leadership competition. They have given a commitment to hold a referendum on the Lisbon treaty if it is not ratified by all member states if and when they come to power. The ultimate objective of the most eurosceptical among this group is to renegotiate the 1972 treaty of entry. They want the free market but not the social market. On the other hand, some left-wing members of my committee would like to renegotiate on the basis of getting rid of the free market and introducing more social programmes. We do not know where the Conservative Party falls in the middle. I have said in the House of Commons that although he is one of the best speechmakers in the House, I am not convinced of the determination of the shadow Foreign Secretary to renegotiate the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union should the Conservative Party come to power.

I will be frank in my response to Deputy Flynn's question on the issue of each member state retaining a Commissioner. It makes no difference to a parliamentarian whether one's country has a Commissioner. It may make a difference to a government but not to a backbencher. We were scheduled to meet the Commissioner for Trade on Monday for the first time since his appointment. However, he had ceased to be the Commissioner for Trade by then. Several Commissioners, including the vice president, Ms Margot Wallström, have come before the committee. When we undertake an inquiry, we are as likely to call on the evidence of Commissioners as that of anybody else. However, from the perspective of backbenchers and in terms of the process of parliament, it does not matter whether one has a Commissioner, although it may be important for governments. However, I do not know how governments work with their Commissioners, whether the latter go native and do what they want to do or whether they still have a connection with the country which put them there. I am not close enough to offer a definitive reply.

Many of the powers utilised by the Commission relate to the making of regulations. If the Commission did not have the power of regulation over the health checks on United Kingdom lamb, we would still be unable to sell our lamb in France. The Commission would have been able to go to the European Court of Justice on an issue of infraction and force France to take United Kingdom lamb.

Some Commission decisions are controversial such as the recent funding for the European Union programme in Georgia. The funding and progress of that programme will be reported on to the scrutiny process but will then be given over to the joint forum of the European Union. There are many such issues where power has been given to the Commission to initiate and implement actions. For example, genetically modified crops are entirely covered by regulation. This is not open to challenge and does not require even a vote in Council. In such cases, if the Commission cannot secure a majority in Council, which it often cannot, it will proceed regardless. We have had many discussions on this issue because the United Kingdom supports genetically modified crops. The reality is that the Commission has never had a majority in Council for that decision.

Chairman

Senator Déirdre de Búrca

I welcome Mr. Connarty and thank him for his presentation. I am impressed by his description of the UK scrutiny system. One of the speakers who attended the sub-committee yesterday advised us on the need for the Europeanisation of Parliament here, with which I agree. However, the last place I would have expected to see a Europeanisation of parliament is in the United Kingdom, given that it has always appeared eurosceptic. It now appears, having listened to Mr. Connarty's description of the scrutiny committee and its impact in working with other sectoral committees and Ministers, his briefing of committee chairpersons, visits to Brussels and liaising with representatives there, visits to schools and speaking about the work of the committee and European affairs generally, that the UK Parliament is a lot more engaged with European issues. It has brought the European dimension into the business of parliament in a way that Ireland has not yet done. We are still at the stage where European affairs are limited to discussion by a number of European committees. Other committees and the Parliament generally view European issues as relevant only to those committees established to deal with them.

We have a lot to learn. Much of what Mr. Connarty described could be adopted and implemented by this Parliament.

Mr. Connarty also referred to the experience and expertise people built up while serving on his committee and stated that this might make them more eligible to serve as Ministers in due course. When one considers that most Ministers are increasingly called upon to operate effectively at European level, it should almost be a requirement that if a parliamentarian has aspirations towards attaining ministerial rank, he or she should spend some time as a member of a committee which deals with European affairs or which is charged with European scrutiny.

Mr. Connarty referred to the complementary role the House of Lords plays. Perhaps the Seanad, the Upper House of the Oireachtas, could engage in the more in-depth exploration of different policy areas being discussed and examined by the European institutions he outlined.

The European Scrutiny Committee seems to operate in an extremely transparent way. It publishes all of its documents and details of the various discussions in which it engages. Does the issue of confidentiality ever arise in respect of those documents or discussions? Is the committee ever obliged to keep any of them out of the public domain? If so, what kind of material would be involved? The committee's agenda refers to ministerial correspondence. Is it possible to make all such correspondence public or is there a need to maintain confidentiality regarding certain aspects of it?

Mr. Connarty referred to COSAC. What are the benefits of a scrutiny committee such as that of which he is chairman belonging to COSAC?

Mr. Proinsias De Rossa, MEP

I welcome Mr. Connarty. We know each other from his trips to the European Parliament and my visits to Westminster. We have also met at a number of other events.

Mr. Connarty referred to COSAC. Is he of the view that COSAC is a useful co-ordination process between national parliaments and the European Parliament? To what extent does it assist in clarifying how matters are developing in respect of any particular political issue or is it purely a technical organisation? Is there room for reform in the context of improving the role national parliaments can play in decision making?

Strictly speaking, regulation is an issue for the Commission. I am sure representatives of the Commission will come before the sub-committee to discuss it. Regulations can only be made by the Commission in the context of powers already conferred upon it by means of directives that have already been approved. Is the position similar to that which applies in Ireland, where the Dáil passes primary legislation and the relevant Minister then introduces regulations, which are laid before the House but which, 99% of the time, are not debated? Has Mr. Connarty's committee raised concerns in respect of this matter or has it made proposals regarding how the process might be improved, particularly in the context of transparency, by involving national parliaments in the making of regulations?

Senator Mullen referred to stances taken by the Council or Commission at international fora and also to the funding by the Commission of NGOs. In my experience, these matters are contemplated within the legal obligations under which the Commission operates and also within the political mandates given to it by the Council. Will Mr. Connarty confirm whether this is the case?

By way of information, the issue of the stances taken by the Council in international fora would, under Lisbon, be moved from the third to the first pillar. The third pillar will be abolished, making those decisions subject to approval by the European Parliament. Inevitably, this would also involve the national parliaments because they will scrutinise the proposals. Similarly, where approximately 50% of the EU budget is at present subject to scrutiny by the European Parliament, close to 100% will be scrutinised under Lisbon. Has Mr. Connarty had occasion to raise issues other than legislation with Ministers, whether in regard to budgets or international matters such as world trade?

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

I thank Senator de Búrca for her compliments. However, our work is never as perfect as it seems because problems always arise. In the UK probably more than anywhere else, the tensions inherent in the process of looking at Europe are overlaid by a malevolent anti-European sentiment in the broadsheets and popular press because many are owned by an organisation with a particular and influential view on Europe. Over lunch yesterday, Avril Doyle, MEP, put the point very well to one of my eurosceptic colleagues when she said the myths could be repeated as often as one liked but that will not make them true. She said it with a laugh and got everyone else on her side but the myths are repeated so regularly that people believe the Commission is doing things it has no power to do. The Commission's mandate was given to it by duly elected parliaments and their Ministers but it is portrayed to be using powers it does not have.

In regard to confidentiality, we do not put ministerial correspondence into the public domain because it is a work in progress for the committee, which debates the issues at some length in private session. If this business was not handled on a confidential basis, we would not have the frankness we desire from Ministers and, as a result, would not be able to influence them. We are at present experiencing problems with our public sessions because they are turning into bizarre expositions of myths by the eurosceptics. They will sit there and bore everyone else until they leave the committee in order to get a majority. It reminds me of the period when Militant was in the Labour Party. It takes determination to get through our business when we face that. The public sessions, which we commenced only during the last session of Parliament, are therefore troublesome and do not necessarily enlighten the public about the documents put before us. We are currently holding a debate on whether the system is justifiable in light of this abuse. I would prefer our business to be conducted in public with proper discipline and reported in Hansard.

COSAC is becoming better at discussing issues. These do not necessarily arise as part of its formal agenda, which focuses on subsidiarity and proportionality. I take COSAC very seriously and have worked hard to make contact with my colleagues from each of the parliaments and to learn about their problems.

The hope is that when issues are being discussed about which there would be some assumptions that the United Kingdom would be eurosceptic, as the Anglo-Saxon model somehow was against the central European model, we can get an audience to let people understand the differences are minor and are more about image than substance and, consequently, that we could move forward together.

COSAC is becoming better that way and could improve if it moved away from the subsidiarity issue alone and began to run some symposiums. At present, it relies heavily on the European Parliament or the Presidency to generate topics, rather than matters that might come from within COSAC. However, it is learning. It now has a secretariat and an ability to hold discussions on issues that would bring people together to solve problems, rather than simply to worry about matters. While I am not telling secrets out of school, it is very rare for a proposed directive from the Commission in its entirety to breach subsidiarity. Even if the yellow and orange card triggers were available to hold them back, which would not be used often, there may be other points of substance in which we may wish to get involved.

With or without the Lisbon treaty, we must discuss how we engage with the First Reading process. Before Mr. De Rossa joined the meeting, I had mentioned our realisation that increasingly, the First Reading process, which we examined last Monday and Tuesday in the European Parliament, Council and Commission, is how legislation is going to be made. How should national parliaments engage with Mr. De Rossa and his colleagues to discuss the finer points of the final draft of a First Reading directive? This is very important for us and I am not sure that many parliaments understand this. It is much more important than getting involved in subsidiarity orange or yellow cards. It will be important to actually influence the design of the final draft of an item of legislation.

As parliamentarians become somewhat knowledgeable on European matters, we know the Commission is doing what it does because it has been given the power to so do. However, people who do not know this hear, for example, some Members of Parliament in Scotland talking about the Commission's destruction of the fish stocks in Scotland because of the Common Fisheries Policy, and advocating its repatriation. Such Members may state they would not vote for the Lisbon treaty because we did not demand the repatriation of the Common Fisheries Policy. However, they do not tell people that this was signed up to in 1972 or that part of the arrangement regarding joining the European Union in the first place involved the establishment of a Common Fisheries Policy that, apart from within territorial waters, would be run solely on an EU-wide basis.

Parliamentarians forget that people do not know the reason the Commission takes such actions. It may be boring to keep repeating that the Commission only does so because the sovereign parliaments gave it such power on our behalf, as it was an area we thought would be better regulated without the interference and prejudice of individual member states. However, one cannot continue doing this because the public either will not believe one or will become bored hearing it. I am unsure of the reason but I understand the problem.

Chairman

Senator Mullen will ask a final question after which we will conclude this part of this briefing.

Senator Rónán Mullen

The points made by both Mr. De Rossa and Mr. Connarty were highly interesting. In many ways a useful parallel exists because it is important to understand that people do not always realise what they have signed up for. Consequently, they may have concerns that some issues which would alarm them or which they were not expecting, might be in the post. It certainly is an issue, both for people themselves and obviously for domestic legislators, to inform people on what each proposal involves.

However, it also is fair to state that just as courts sometimes can unpack an item of legislation to give it an interpretation no one expected, this also can be the case in this respect. I say this with due regard to what Mr. De Rossa rightly observed in respect of decisions made by the Commission. My question was focused on establishing whether scrutiny committees will have any role in looking at or challenging matters arising from treaties already signed up to or directives already passed. I gave the specific example in respect of employment equality legislation precisely because the Commission's asking questions about Ireland's implementation of that measure was unexpected.

In addition, there seemed to be a somewhat arbitrary decision made by the Commission in a referendum context to move, or not, on Ireland. Therefore, it is fair to say that although powers may be given and legitimately enjoyed by the Commission, it does not mean issues do not arise which are unpredictable and which people might feel should be held up to scrutiny or called to account in some way.

No, as it is not really the role of the scrutiny committee. I like the persuasive system and we have made huge strides with it. There have been very few breaches of scrutiny reserves, with most of those being technicalities. For example, we do not come back during the summer to look at business going to the first set of Council meetings, so we now recall around 10 September to look at business coming to late September or early October Councils, so we are one step ahead.

We have had very few breaches of scrutiny and Ministers are very sensitive to it. We have had some very well-publicised and strong meetings with Ministers. Those who insisted on doing what they should not do are no longer Ministers. I like the system.

Senator Rónán Mullen

I take it from his comments that Mr. Connarty is not recommending a Polish-style position where joint delegations go out, with the Minister and the scrutiny committee going together.

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

One of the ideas of the modernisation committee was to have some kind of grand committee on Europe where MEPs would come back to the British Parliament and debate in the grand committee room on issues before the European Parliament as another way of trying to engage people. It was not progressed because we do not seem to have a willingness on our side to broaden the number of people partaking in the debate. Therefore, we must go to Europe more often.

Somebody asked me about contact with MEPs. Apart from when we go to Brussels as a committee specifically for the purpose of doing investigations and a couple of days of searching through procedures, we always meet with our MEP colleagues. If we can manage it we sometimes deliberately get out the night before and meet with appropriate political groups. I respect that it is a political group-based system in the European Parliament. We meet with all our members, from Liberals and Scottish Nationalists, from the Conservatives and Labour, to discuss general business.

We also have a tripartite meeting every three months or three times a year. There is one hosted by the House of Commons but again it comprises MEPs and Members of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. We have one hosted in Brussels and Members of the House of Lords and House of Commons go to them. On a quarterly basis I also meet the chairmen of committees of the devolved parliaments and assemblies in the United Kingdom. I was in Edinburgh meeting the Northern Ireland, Scottish and Welsh members of the European committee. The next meeting will be in Wales or Northern Ireland. We try to keep in contact with all the levels with an interest in the European Union. It is very successful.

Chairman

If Deputy Costello does not mind, I will give the final word to Proinsias De Rossa.

Deputy Joe Costello

Let me ask one brief question on the scrutiny reserve. I understand 15 or 16 other countries have a system similar to that in the United Kingdom. Can Mr. Connarty give us some information on the origins of the committee? Who initiated it and how did it come about? It seems to be the most efficient or effective system operating.

Mr. Connarty said he had two staff members in Brussels on a permanent basis. Does the House of Lords have staff members there? How effective are they in communicating material to the committee in advance?

Proinsias De Rossa, MEP

This issue of a mandated system or otherwise is an important one. If it is to become an issue, we should look at how the system in Denmark works. My colleagues in the European Parliament are of the view that it does not work. They suggest it is gummed up and that the mountain of material they have to deal with is such that it is impossible to seriously address all the critical issues. They use a pin to decide which issues they are going to look at. There is a serious question mark in this regard.

However, a more fundamental issue is that of who has a right to give a mandate to a Minister. We live in a representative democracy. The majority elected to a parliament form the government and the parliament then appoints the Prime Minister who then appoints Ministers. They have a mandate from the electorate to govern and that is their role. The role of committees is to hold Ministers to account in terms of decisions they make or propose to make.

We need to be careful about the whole issue of looking at whether a committee of the Dáil would have the right to mandate a Minister to do, or not to do, X. In what way would the Dáil or the Oireachtas react to such a mandate? It would not necessarily be representative of a majority of the House. If one were to bring the issue to the floor of the House, the majority would make the decision in line with the Government's decision, not necessarily in line with the committee's decision. It is a circular argument. It would be physically impossible for the Dáil to deal with the mandate on every issue that every Minister has to deal with in terms of EU affairs. One is talking about 14 or 15 ministries dealing with perhaps 20 or 30 issues at any given time, and also perhaps weekly meetings. It would be physically impossible for a mandate system to operate. There are democratic issues but there are also practical issues.

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

I will first deal with the genesis of the persuasive system. I am not sure when it started because it was up and running when I came to Parliament in 1992 and has developed quite a bit. For example, we have just won what I think is a major victory. One has things such as common and general positions. These are phrases that really mean "agreement" in Council. We have had a long running dispute with the Cabinet Office in regard to the use of another permutation of the word "common" which meant an issue had been agreed and could not be amended. However, our Minister would have agreed only to the taking of a common position on a matter. We have battled on this issue for the past couple of years. The Government has agreed that our scrutiny reserve definition will take in all definitions that mean the position is common and agreed in Council by any means even if the scrutiny reserve is on. Our Ministers will no longer be able to do that. We are becoming much more persuasive.

A mandate provides that a parliament must first decide what it wants to do. This means the Government will put its whip on and have its position agreed. It is much better to have a flexible system which allows for persuasion of a Minister in the Council processes to shift a position. He or she will then test the waters and inform other members on the Council that the committee is putting pressure on him or her and has applied a scrutiny reserve which means that unless they are more flexible and open to change, he or she will not be able to agree to a particular issue. It is a useful tool for Ministers attending Council meetings. Ministers who are given a mandate are restricted in terms of what they can do.

Questions were asked about the role of our staff in Brussels. Included on our agenda is a document entitled the Brussels Bulletin. This informs us of what, say, Proinsias De Rossa and his colleagues are saying in committee, what Ministers from different governments said and what is the latest rant from the Polish chairman of the foreign affairs committee who basically says that when the Lisbon treaty has been passed, the job of MEPs will be to go to their governments and tell them what the European Parliament wants, a singular view of what the Treaty of Lisbon will do.

Our staff attend meetings and provide us with information in regard to what is going on so that we know the context in which our Ministers are operating or the direction a particular piece of legislation is taking, which is valuable information. Every Monday morning all of the parliamentary representatives network and discuss business for the forthcoming week. For example, people in the Scandinavian countries often have the draft conclusions of Council — which we do not see — and will share them with their colleagues. They are not public documents but the Scandinavians get them because they have to take them back to their grand committees for debate before the Prime Minister can agree them in Council. This information filters back to our committee and keeps us informed about what is going on, which is very useful.

Chairman

My colleagues have covered all of the substantial issues in which I am interested. However, I have one question for Mr. Connarty.

I thank Mr. Connarty for his presentation and providing such comprehensive answers to the questions posed. The information he provided will be of major assistance to the sub-committee in completing this part of its work programme. On behalf of members, I thank him for his time, courtesy and patience.

The sub-committee went into private session at 3.50 p.m. and adjourned at 4.15 p.m. until 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 21 October 2008.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (Sub-Committee on Ireland's Future in the European Union) debate - Thursday, 16 Oct 2008

Role of Houses of the Oireachtas in EU Affairs: Discussion.

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Professor Deirdre Curtin

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Proinsias De Rossa, MEP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Proinsias De Rossa, MEP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

Mr. Michael Connarty, MP

JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (Sub-Committee on Ireland's Future in the European Union) debate -
Thursday, 16 Oct 2008