I thank the Chairman and members of the sub-committee for inviting me to appear before them. I should make clear that I am a retired official of the Department of Foreign Affairs and, as such, my remarks will be based on past experience and what I read in newspapers. While I am flattered to be described as Dr. Dorr, I am embarrassed at using the title as it is arises from an honorary degree. Notwithstanding the fact that I chair the governing authority of NUI, Galway, I do not represent the university.
I appreciate that the sub-committee's concern in this module is not the Lisbon treaty or European Union but the effect of Ireland's "No" vote. Nevertheless, with the permission of the sub-committee, I will begin with some general comments which lead directly into what I wish to say about Ireland's role.
Over the years, I have become more convinced of the importance of the European Union and, correspondingly, glad of Ireland's role in its construction. This is because I am old enough to remember Europe without the European Union. When I was a child, Europe was at war. A totalitarian state occupied most of the European land mass, thousands of bomber air raids were devastating the central part of the Continent and European railway lines were carrying hundreds of thousands of people to genocidal death on an industrial scale.
After the war and for most of my adult life, the Continent was split into two hostile parts by a line running down the centre of Germany. Across that line two nuclear armed alliances confronted each other and one was willing to use nuclear weapons if the massed tanks of the other advanced across the north German plain. That was still true only 20 years ago.
In Europe today, 27 states, stretching from Connemara to Bulgaria and Sweden to Cyprus, have come together voluntarily and by democratic choice to form a wholly new kind of international structure, namely, a union of states and peoples — I emphasise the importance of the words "states" and "peoples". This union involves a certain pooling of sovereignty in limited, specified areas, which is exercised by institutions that are carefully structured to reflect the union's character as a union of states and peoples. The European Union is explicitly based on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. The relevant article, which was written by Ireland in precisely these terms, was incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.
While the European Union is not without its problems and difficulties, the contrast with the past and the childhood I described is so great that for all its inadequacies I marvel at and value greatly what has been achieved. I emphasise also the part played by Ireland in that achievement. We tend to talk about the vision of the founders of the European Community in the 1950s. What we have today is not only what Monnet and others planned but an organic growth which was shaped according to what successive generations of political leaders in European states, including Ireland, found it possible to agree together in a series of treaties over a half a century. Their negotiations reflected, on the one hand, a pragmatic concern by each member state to safeguard its identity and interest and, on the other, a shared commitment to a larger and more generous vision of a European continent at peace with itself for the first time in its history and capable of playing a constructive role in the world.
In July 1961, Ireland became the first state outside the original six members to apply for membership of the European Economic Community and has played a full part in the Community since joining 35 years ago. I emphasise that Ireland has played a part in shaping the European Union of today. It is in some part our creation and is shaped in a way that safeguards our interests and those of other small member states. In international life, larger countries can thrive without much structure, but smaller countries depend on a structured system. We have achieved that to a high degree in the European Union. This is evident from the fact that the Union has proved enormously attractive, in growing from six to 27 members. It has a sort of economic and political gravitational pull which has drawn country after country towards it. It is a kind of soft power exercise throughout the European region, a power based not on an impulse to control or dominate, but on attraction. This persuades other countries to accept its principles and values. They are willing to adopt democracy, commit themselves to it and human rights and share sovereignty in carefully specified areas. This pull is still at work in the Balkan area today and is quite important.
I turn now more specifically to Ireland's position as a member state. We are all rightly proud of the assertion of Ireland's sovereign independence by our parents and grandparents and we are right in wanting to maintain it. However, the world around us changes and it is important to understand how the sovereignty our ancestors achieved can best be preserved and exercised in the complex, interconnected, international system of today. I was very struck by a definition I came across some time ago. It suggests that sovereignty for a small country nowadays means having a seat at the table where the decisions which affect it deeply are made. Because Seán Lemass realised that, he submitted our application to join the Union in 1961. This has been fundamental to our membership over the years. It has also informed our decision to be in at the foundation of economic and monetary union. This idea of being at the centre of things, where one's interests are affected, is not too far from an Irish proverb I remember from my school days — Muna bhfuil ach pocaide gabhair agat, bí i lár an aonaigh leis. If you have nothing to sell but a he-goat, be in the centre of the fair with it.
I stress that from the outset, Ireland has followed the principle of seeking as far as possible to be fully involved and to play a full part, because that was in our interest. The question I am being asked to comment on by the sub-committee is whether our ability to do that has been affected by the Lisbon vote. I think it has. I say that, because from my experience, the fundamental point about the European Union is that it is built not on domination, but on compromise and the key to Ireland's success within it has been influence, not power — soft power. We have been influential within the Union.
At home, the focus has often been on the economic and financial benefits of membership, the CAP and Structural Funds. However, in Brussels, from the beginning, as far back as the public statements of Lemass in 1961 and of Jack Lynch in 1972 during the negotiations, we have presented ourselves not as a reluctant member, but as a small democratic country that understood the fundamental concepts underlying the European project and wanted to work to achieve them. Naturally, Ireland had its own interests and concerns, but once they were safeguarded, we showed a willingness to work with others and help to find compromises. This was most evident in the handling by Irish Ministers and officials of six successive Presidencies of the Union.
For all these reasons, we were seen by our partners as a good member state. We benefited accordingly and also gained a reputation for having put the funds we received to good use. I do not want to labour the point, but we must remember that the benefits Ireland received from the various EU funds were never simply there for the taking. They were a matter for negotiation at all times and Ireland gained in that negotiation from its good reputation. I venture to say that the high point of this positive image of Ireland must have been that May morning in 2004 when 27 Heads of State and Government gathered at Áras an Uachtaráin to welcome the ten new members. We were at the pinnacle of our influence in Europe at that time.
The sub-committee might ask why I say this good reputation has been affected by the result of the Lisbon referendum. Before I respond, I wish to make it clear that the Irish electorate was fully entitled to make the decision it did. That is not in dispute, nor do I dispute it. The treaty can come into force only if it is ratified in due form by all 27 member states, but by a substantial majority, we have said "No" to it. However, in this, as in every aspect of human life, decisions have consequences. These often give rise to other decisions and choices for the road ahead. One consequence of our decision of 12 June was to leave most of our EU partners puzzled and disappointed. This, in turn, has weakened our influence and standing among them, which had been very high. It has temporarily weakened the position of the Union itself because it is still regarded as being divided.
Two reasons added in a particular way to the reaction of other member states. First, the treaty was the outcome of seven years of difficult negotiations. It was certainly not perfect, but for the most part our partners were ready to accept it as a reasonable compromise that would not give them all they wanted but would free the Union for a long time from the seemingly interminable debate on its own structures and procedures — this has been called naval gazing — and allow it to focus more effectively on the many serious and substantive issues it faces and on what it could do about them. For this reason, our partners accepted it as a compromise and persuaded their respective parliaments to accept and ratify it, as the Irish Government did through the Dáil and Seanad. The member states now face a dilemma. They are willing to allow Ireland time to think through its position but, as I read it — I am dependent on what I read — they have absolutely no appetite for renegotiation.
The second reason that has added to member states' disappointment is that while they accept the right of the Irish electorate to say "No", as they must, they find it rather hard to understand clearly just why it did so. We know ourselves there was a variety of reasons, some of which were based on legitimate criticisms of the treaty or on its complexity and others of which were based on simple misunderstandings or misinformation. Our partners are that much less patient with our decision because they believe that even if they were open to renegotiation, which I do not believe they are, we would find it very hard to suggest what reasonable changes the Irish Government could look for. Even if the electorate was fully within its rights, we must accept there was a consequence to its decision. What we did has greatly weakened our influence among member states. This matters because, as I stated, influence and the ability to build alliances and coalitions within the Council have been the key to our success in the Union.
It is deeply ironic that the argument that the Lisbon treaty would mean a loss of power by Ireland carried such weight in our referendum. Our present voting weight in the Council is seven out of 345, which is just over 2% of the total. Votes are rare in the Council but if there were a vote, waiving our 2% would count for little. It is strange that, in an endeavour to hold on to what we believed was power, we may have given up much of the influence that was always of real importance and benefit to us.
I will conclude by acknowledging that the Lisbon treaty referendum result in Ireland and the similar results of referenda on the constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands point to a serious problem of communication with the public that the institutions and the political leaders of the European Union need to address. It is not entirely on our side. In the future, when a treaty is being negotiated, serious thought will have to be given to how it is presented. It must be explained to the citizens of the Union. I have suggested elsewhere that, as a minimum, the Council's secretariat in Brussels should be asked to provide an authoritative explanatory memorandum to the treaty in readable terms, just as a complex Bill before the Dáil is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. The Council's explanatory memorandum could, if necessary, be approved by the EU leaders. That would be a basis for discussion and debate, especially in a country like ours which seems to need to have referenda.
I am glad the Irish feel a sense of ownership of their Constitution but I do not believe they should be asked to vote in a referendum on a complex treaty of that kind if it is not necessary to do so. If it is not necessary to change the Constitution, people should not be asked to do so. As I have suggested elsewhere, just as we have a provision in the Constitution that allows the President to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court for a decision on its constitutionality before signing it, at some future date it will be important to have a similar provision to allow the President to refer a draft treaty to the Supreme Court for a judgment on whether a constitutional amendment is necessary before ratification. These, however, are very long-term issues and are not immediately relevant. I mentioned them because they are important.
I was asked for my view on whether the referendum result has affected Ireland's position of influence in the European Union. Sadly, I believe it has.
