JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS debate -
Tuesday, 8 Sep 2009

EU Foreign Policy: Discussion.

Chairman

The first item on the agenda is a discussion on how best to achieve peace and stability in the western Balkans. We are joined by Mr. Reuf Bajrovic, a Bosnian political analyst. We are all aware of events in that region in recent years. We have to ensure we are kept up to date with such events. It is important that the people of the region are aware that other friendly European nations are taking a friendly interest in their well-being.

Before Mr. Bajrovic begins his presentation, I remind everyone present that while Members of the Oireachtas have absolute privilege, this does not apply to witnesses appearing before the joint committee. Members are reminded of the parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

Mr. Reuf Bajrovic

I greatly appreciate this opportunity to discuss some of the European Union's foreign policy challenges. I thank the joint committee for its continued interest in the western Balkans. Following the wars and the genocide of the 1990s, the European Union has invested heavily in the reconstruction and development of the western Balkans. This is greatly appreciated by the citizens of the region. The countries of the western Balkans have come a long way in building peace and stability since the 1990s. Croatia and Macedonia have acquired EU candidate status, while other Balkan countries have signed stabilisation and association agreements. Despite the progress made in the last decade, major challenges remain on the path to securing lasting peace and stability.

The country from which I come, Bosnia-Herzegovina, is suffering from its deepest political crisis since the end of the war in 1995. As it is in the heart of the region, Bosnia has historically been the most important factor in regional stability. As was pointed out in an article in The New York Times last weekend, any instability in Bosnia tends to spill over into the rest of the region. The Dayton peace accords stopped the war but created a complicated state structure which not only institutionalises ethnic division but also creates ample opportunity for abuse by the ruling nationalist parties. The entity voting mechanism which often translates into ethnic voting is not just conflict by other means, it also prevents Bosnia from making progress with a number of other key reforms which are necessary for its Euro-Atlantic integration.

A five party coalition has ruled Bosnia-Herzegovina since 2006 on a very divisive nationalist platform. Its political rhetoric has become extremely nationalist and, in some cases, openly fascist.

Major reforms required by the European Union, including police reform, have rarely been implemented due to the inability and unwillingness of the coalition partners to agree on anything. The only points of agreement are corruption and irresponsibility. Despite this, the international community in general and the European Union, in particular, have decided to let Bosnia sort itself out. The signing of the stabilisation and association agreement, SAA, was conditional on passing a set of laws which would amount to meaningful police reform. However, it was quickly apparent that the government would not pass the necessary laws. Facing a serious stability crisis at the time, the European Union nevertheless decided to relax the conditions and sign the SAA with Bosnia in June 2008 without the requirements having been met. This sent a very dangerous message to the ruling coalition in Bosnia, namely, that if it waits long enough, the EU would eventually relax conditions to fit its needs and reward its irresponsibility.

Having relaxed the conditions on police reform and rewarded the government with the stabilisation and association agreement, the European Union has decided to uphold its conditions in the case of visa liberalisation for Bosnia. Without any difficulty, the government-friendly media managed to create the perception that the decision was a punishment for the citizens of Bosnia, especially Bosnian Muslims, and the European Union's message about the country's integration prospects. If this decision had been made outside the regional context, it would have indicated an improvement in using conditionality to encourage reforms. However, other governments in the region have also failed to meet all the necessary conditions but were awarded conditional liberalisation starting next year. By doing this, the European Union undermined its credibility with the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and helped the nationalist forces ruling the country in convincing citizens that the blame lay somewhere else.

Unfortunately, the European Union's policy towards Bosnia appears to be focused solely on fulfilling the conditions necessary to close down the Office of the High Representative, OHR, and replace it with the EU special representative. On paper, for this to happen, Bosnia would need to fulfil five objectives and two conditions — the five plus two requirement — set by the Peace Implementation Council. The European Union seems eager to complete the transition process by the end of the year, allowing it to assume full responsibility for the situation in Bosnia. In reality, however, the five plus two requirement cannot be met by the end of 2009 and the Office of the High Representative will have to remain in Bosnia for another year. Recognising this, yet eager to complete the transition, some voices in the European Union are nevertheless calling for the closure of the Office of the High Representative without the fulfilment of the required conditions. These voices portray the OHR as the sole problem facing the country, the key obstacle on its path to European Union membership. Unfortunately, this is not the case and is, moreover, a dangerous proposition.

Bosnia has a deep structural problem and the Office of the High Representative must remain until the country is made fully functional. The present conundrum brokered by the international community and some of the responsibility for its failures rests on those who devised it. The key to achieving lasting stability in the region is to secure a functional Bosnian state. This can only be done through meaningful constitutional reform which would replace the current system of constructions. Constitutional reform cannot, however, be left solely to the current ruling elite which will not only fail to reach an agreement, as occurred in 2006, but will also likely try to use the issue to further arouse fear among citizens. The previous attempt at reform in 2006 failed just before an election and provided a context for the victory of the present ruling nationalist coalition and the current crisis in Bosnia.

Creating lasting peace and stability in Bosnia is not just the European Union's moral obligation and part of its lasting legacy, it could also be viewed as the first major test of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. We face a window of opportunity to lay solid groundwork for achieving success by creating a functional Bosnia and, consequently, closing down the Office of the High Representative.

I will offer a few recommendations for immediate consideration by the European Union and national policymakers, including the distinguished members of this committee. The EU should insist on fulfilment of the five plus two requirement before closing down the Office of the High Representative. The requirement is unlikely to be met before the end of this year and the European Union should think twice before rushing into making a decision which may have serious repercussions on what is left of Bosnian stability.

With all of its shortcomings, of which there are many, the presence of the Office of the High Representative offers a sense of security to the average Bosnian citizen. This should not be underestimated. Only when conditions are created in which every citizen can participate in and trust in the government of Bosnia can the international factor be safely removed.

My second recommendation in this context is that the European Union should help with constitutional reform by offering meaningful incentives, technical assistance and broad support. More importantly, it should help to shift the focus away from the nationalist agenda by insisting on finishing the constitutional reform by the end of 2009 or leaving it for the post-election period, by which I mean 2011, when a new Government will be formed. Constitutional issues should not dominate the 2010 election campaign at the expense of socio-economic issues. This is the only way to strip the nationalist parties of their power base.

My third recommendation is that in addition, the European Union should devise policies to boost support for multi-ethnic political forces ahead of the 2010 general elections. The European Union already has done so in other countries in the region with notable success. In the case of Serbia, for example, it helped the present Government there to defeat the radicals in May 2008 elections by offering economic incentives to the pro-European Government. We can discuss some other ways to achieve this objective in the question and answer session.

The fourth recommendation is in the regional context, the European Union should help insulate Bosnia from the negative influence of its neighbours. This is especially true for Serbia, which frequently uses its influence with the politicians in Republika Srpska as leverage with the international community on the issue of Kosovo. Serbia should be encouraged to follow the example of neighbouring Croatia, which has not only refrained from interfering in Bosnia's internal affairs, but also has actively discouraged Bosnian Croat politicians from expecting Croatia to take sides on internal issues. It is only when they are accountable to their own voters alone that Bosnian politicians will be forced to act in the best interests of their country. This concludes my introductory remarks and I look forward to taking members' questions.

Chairman

I thank Mr. Bajrovic for his fairly comprehensive presentation. This joint committee already has paid a visit to that region and has produced a report in which it made its own recommendations, some of which concur with Mr. Bajrovic's analysis. When the committee visited the region in March 2009 or thereabouts, a fairly thorough investigation was carried out, inasmuch as could be done in the short time available. However, it was most informative and all members are fully aware of the situation to which Mr. Bajrovic referred. We met the United Nations forces that were present, various civil society and political groups, as well as politicians in general. We produced a report, a copy of which we will give to Mr. Bajrovic unless he already has received one.

Members became aware of and were concerned by the possibility of the withdrawal of some United Nations observers and forces from certain areas. I refer in particular to the liaison observation team, LOT, houses that have been set up across the region whereby outside intelligence became aware of activity on the ground with a view to defusing any such situation before it happened. While we had some highly interesting meetings, members also wish to emphasise that the committee has previously and continues to express the same view as has Mr. Bajrovic, namely, this region is of particular importance both to the European Union and to the wider international community. As everyone is aware, historically that region has tended to be the focus of and feature in major events. The general thrust of our efforts, as the responsible committee in the House, was to try to bring to bear whatever influence we could in a positive way and that members would become more familiar with the subject on the ground. Members may choose to speak in whatever order they wish. Deputy Costello will be the first speaker for his sins.

Deputy Joe Costello

I apologise for missing some of the opening remarks. Mr. Bajrovic is welcome and I wish to ask him a couple of questions about his comments, particularly his recommendations. In terms of observers and troops, could Mr. Bajrovic give us his assessment of the importance of having outside people to monitor the situation on the ground? What dangers exist that require the presence of troops and what timescale is envisaged?

I ask for further elaboration on reconstruction in respect of the levels of technical aid and funding required and whether a specific programme and timeframe has been devised. Has a formal application been made to join the European Union and what is the status of membership negotiations?

Finally, perhaps Mr. Bajrovic can outline to the committee the parties contesting the elections in 2010 in terms of their relative strengths and the level of monitoring required by outside observers to ensure a fair and honest outcome.

Deputy Seán Power

I would like to express my appreciation to Mr. Bajrovic for his presentation. He was very critical of the ineffectiveness of the EU's policies. To what would he attribute this ineffectiveness? Does it come from a lack of understanding or appreciation of the real issues?

He has had an opportunity to present his case and make recommendations to this committee. What other opportunities are available to educate people on the position as he sees it? He emphasised the need for reform of the police and the constitution. What are the main priorities in this regard?

Senator Feargal Quinn

I thank Mr. Bajrovic for giving us the opportunity to learn more about these matters. I was not part of the visit to Bosnia earlier this year and I am unsure whether I understand the situation. He stated: "Unfortunately, the European Union's policy towards Bosnia appears to be focused solely on fulfilling the conditions necessary to close down the Office of the High Representative, OHR, and replace it with the EU special representative." Perhaps he would explain the motive behind this policy. Earlier this year, the former high representative, Dr. Miroslav Lajcák, stated on his resignation that he did not want to be the rider of a dead horse. I thought that he used a great term but I gather that he was referring to his position rather than to Bosnia. However, I do not quite understand Mr. Bajrovic's claim that the EU wishes to replace the office.

Senator John Hanafin

I ask our guest to outline how a solution can be found through the EU. In other words, it would be beneficial to the western Balkan states if they joined the EU and many aspire to membership in the long term. In that regard, there will be cognisance of the need to avoid creating difficulties within Bosnia if by doing so its prospects for membership would be affected. Can he suggest a better way of addressing the difficulties that have arisen in Bosnia, with a particular emphasis on the division of power? As we know, power sharing often takes time to achieve but the current division of power appears exceptionally cumbersome, with responsibility for particular areas allocated to a variety of factions.

Mr. Reuf Bajrovic

I will start with Deputy Costello's questions. At present, approximately 2,000 EU troops are in Bosnia as part of the EUFOR mission. The Deputy's question concerned the real danger to troops and the actual deterrent such troops could provide. The problem is that no one knows. The EUFOR troops are tasked with checking the numbers of weapons available to citizens, making random checks and so on, which they often do not perform. I am not an expert in this area but, according to serious analysts and players, it is more than obvious that weapons are available. These include the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, which states that more than 500,000 light weapons are available to citizens. There are also some security firms which are not accounted for. No one knows how many there are and what they do. This is a grey zone and there should not be a grey zone in a country such as Bosnia.

Regarding the question about reconstruction and technical aid, we are now in a post-reconstruction phase. We are starting a tradition and are now where, for example, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were in 1993-95. That does not mean the reconstruction has been completely and satisfactorily done but economically we are able to make our own decisions. Unfortunately, specific programmes for this do not exist because the Government deals with ethnic issues and for the most part thinks of how to devise new national rhetoric instead of thinking about how to bring about development plans, etc. For example, we have not had a development plan since 2007. In two years the present Government has not been able to draft a development plan for the country. That tells a great deal about its priorities.

The state of talks with the EU is post-SA. There are some people in the EU who have said that we cannot become a candidate unless the OHR is closed down. I do not see why those two should be tied but we are now probably a year to 18 months away from candidacy status if things turn out right.

With regard to elections, we have the ruling coalition which has five members. There is one formerly moderate party which, in my opinion, has turned into a far-right party and the other four are already known as nationalist parties. As things stand, these would probably not do as well as they did in 2006 but the opposition has some chance. The 2008 local elections would be a good indicator because they gave a fairly different picture of the country from that of 2006. There was an indication of change. The citizens did not quite send an elective signal to the ruling coalition but the big cities are ruled by multi-ethnic parties which are allied to the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party.

I would not regard election monitoring as a problem. There is not much contesting of election results. There are problems with voting stations here and there but in general the outcome of the elections is considered fair and legitimate by major political players, including the civil society groups.

Deputy Power asked whether the EU is ineffective, why I am so critical of the EU and what the opportunities are to educate EU decision makers. The problem is that the EU does not speak with one voice in Bosnia. Member states have different voices but there is one voice from Mr. Solana and Mr. Rehn tends to follow what Mr. Solana says. When one puts on one side what some member states say and on the other what Mr. Solana says, generally they are not the same. The key issue for Bosnia is that the EU should reach a consensus about what needs to be done. For example, if I were a person who had influence in the EU I would explain the importance of EU consensus for the players on the ground. Once a consensus is reached, whatever it may be, even if I might not agree with, it is better to have that than to have a divided European Union which, as now, sends different signals all over the place. A key point for EU decision makers to know is that Bosnia is a very serious challenge for EU foreign policy. If the EU corrects Bosnia and takes it forward by using the existing foreign policy mechanism, this will prove the EU actually has a foreign and security policy. However, failure to succeed would mean a great deal to Bosnian citizens. It would be playing with our lives again, because the situation on the ground is such that failure would cost us. I do not wish to talk about anything other than peace but I would not like to put a bet on it.

With regard to police versus constitution, police is a done deal. Police reform passed but it essentially was not a reform. The EU put in a set of conditions in 2005 and two years later the government adopted completely different laws and the EU said: "Okay, this is fine. This is what we meant in the first place." The government therefore realised that the conditions can be relaxed over time, as long as it sticks by what it wants to do. This is not on the agenda any more. The constitution is, of course, a priority but it is quite unrealistic to expect us to have anything close to a functional state by the end of this year. Next year should be left to the pre-election campaign and for socioeconomic issues to take over the agenda.

Senator Quinn asked about the OHR versus the EU and what Dr. Miroslav Lajcák said. Dr. Lajcák was referring, I believe, to the split in the EU. I was very critical of him, to be honest; I am not very positive about him. He had a problem with the people who gave him legitimacy, namely the Peace Implementation Council and the European Union as well. Some members of the European Union turned their backs on Dr. Lajcák in the middle of his mandate, and that is what he referred to when he said he does not want to be under that horse. In theory he has powers but it would be unwise to exercise them without the full support of member states, particularly key member states.

The new mission, the so-called European Union Special Representative, EUSR, would take over the present OHR, would merge with the European delegation mission and would have some increased powers. It would not be an ordinary EU mission as in a candidate country but would have more powers. However, the problem is that nobody knows what those powers will be. In a country such as Bosnia these things must be clear from the beginning. As matters stand, it appears that the people in the EU who make decisions on these issues are dead set on closing down the OHR. If one asks people what they want to achieve, they will say they wish to close down the OHR, which, in my opinion, by itself does not mean anything. It could potentially even be extremely dangerous. Before there is a clear mandate for the EUSR, I would not recommend it. The EU's key leverage over our government is the conditionality. It should be strict and not relax any of the conditions. Once they are set, they should be there until the government fulfils them.

Senator Hanafin asked how the EU can find a solution. As I just said, the answer is conditionality. Conditionality must be very strict on all countries because countries need change and reform. If the EU relaxes the conditions, countries will know the EU will not force them to change and that they can remain as they are and do whatever they wish. It is true the division of power is a functionality issue. In the past 12 months major analysts from the United States and the European Union have agreed on one thing, that before the OHR is closed down Bosnia must have a functional government. We need a government that can function without an outside arbiter.

The OHR was devised in 1997, a year and a half after the signing of the Dayton accords. In that first 18 months the state was so dysfunctional that people realised they needed an outside arbiter with what was called the "Bonn powers". At the Bonn conference it was agreed that the high representative would have the power to remove officials, impose laws and so forth. The system is not one made for governance but is a compromise from a time of extremely bloody war. Since then we have not moved forward. Most of the forward movement came through OHR decisions, laws and removals made by the high representative, be it Mr. Lajcák, Mr. Ashdown, Dr. Schwarz-Schilling or, before him, Mr. Petritsch.

We have still this Dayton structure which simply cannot function without the OHR. If the OHR were closed today I guarantee the committee that within six months we would have a significant constitutional crisis. The RS Government and the RS national assembly have openly stated — it is on the public record and perhaps I should have brought this to the committee as I have it translated — that it will disobey the constitution of the country once the OHR leaves under the present constitutional arrangement. It is difficult for me to understand how people who understand Bosnia, who have been there many times and who have made decisions on Bosnia can call for the closure of the OHR without the fulfilment of strategic goal 5.2 and, in my opinion, the making of a functional state.

Chairman

The committee, when it visited Bosnia, observed many of the matters to which Mr. Bajrovic referred. We must bear in mind at all times that when freedom comes following war, in Bosnia as in any similar situation, such as in this country, as we know from experience, and several European countries, it does not necessarily follow that peace comes as well. When communities that have not been accustomed to a great deal of freedom find their freedom, there is a tendency for something else to happen.

Mr. Bajrovic referred generally to the European Union. The war took place in public while the rest of the world, the European Union included, looked on. The reason for that, as we all know, was because most European countries had some kind of historical association with that region. I was a member of the Joint Committee on European Affairs at the time and the ambassadors from Russia, France, Germany, Italy and all the surrounding nations, all of which had historic relations with that region, were invited to address the committee.

In the past six or seven years, while on holiday, I visited Mostar. It was interesting because there were two cemeteries, one on either side of the road, and all of the surrounding buildings were full of bullet holes and evidence of mortar attack. The spires of churches were bullet riddled and the entire area showed all the evidence of serious strife and that there had been serious warfare in the area. However, the two cemeteries were peaceful. They had found peace at last. There were about 700 in each, all of whom were aged between 18 and 23. One cemetery was Christian, the other Muslim. We in this country know better than most that the people of the region will recognise eventually that it is easier to live in peace than to find peace in death. Unfortunately, that is the way it works out. It was a sobering experience from our point of view because we saw what had happened at the time and we saw the inability of the world community to do anything about it. It was a strange scene but it had happened previously. Those things do happen. Members may wish to comment on that again before we proceed.

One feeling we had at the time was that the institutions now in place should remain in place for some considerable time until the authorities were at least able to take responsibility for themselves and to ensure there was no falling back into war such as before. Not everyone there agrees with that. Mr. Bajrovic might not agree with all of that either. However, from the Irish experience and from similar experiences elsewhere, it would occur to us that while the phrase often referred to has been, "Let them at it, let them solve it themselves", unfortunately it does not work that way.

Ultimately, the idea is that the region will become part of the European Union and the acquis must be observed and complied with. If it is observed for one reason or another, then that objective will have been realised. However, there are those who state countries involved in chaos, warfare and strife should not be allowed to solve their own difficulties. I do not agree with that assertion. In order that peace might prosper, people must be shown that if they work towards particular objectives by means of the acquis to which I refer, their efforts will be successful.

Mr. Reuf Bajrovic

I agree that we should solve our own difficulties. However, we simply do not have the institutional structures in place to allow us to do this in a completely peaceful way. The rules are not in place for it to happen. No one is saying the institutions should be completely scrapped. I do not believe there should be a big bang approach and that a new constitution should be drawn up. However, the rules currently in place cannot produce legitimate outcomes. That is a huge problem. All of the players involved do not have the best interests of the entire country at heart. That simply must be addressed.

Chairman

Is Mr. Bajrovic stating the European or NATO peacekeeping forces in place should be replaced or that they should continue with their operations?

Mr. Reuf Bajrovic

They should definitely stay there and continue to do what they are doing. They are very few in number. There are only 2,000 of them but the psychological effect they have is very big.

Chairman

Mr. Bajrovic's assessment is in accord with the committee's report on the matter. When carrying out our research, we were informed that this was the case because it was too early to remove the support of the institutions in place, particularly in view of the fact that these institutions were established for peaceful purposes. An opinion to the effect that the United Nations was not necessarily the greatest protector of the peace was strongly expressed to members. There were, of course, recent historical reasons for this. However, we do not propose to discuss that matter at this stage.

Mr. Bajrovic has confirmed the findings of the Joint Committee on European Affairs at the time. The reason the committee became involved in the matter was, in the first instance, it was part of its work programme. However, it also became involved on foot of members expressing concerns to the effect that there had been conflict in the region in the recent past, that it had a history of attracting attention from surrounding regions and that it had the potential to achieve membership of the European Union.

Deputy Joe Costello

Does Mr. Bajrovic have any advice to offer the Joint Committee on European Affairs — or would he make any request of it — in respect of what it or Ireland as a whole might do with regard to this matter?

Mr. Reuf Bajrovic

Yes. Bosnia, as an issue, is not very important among the big EU member states. Very few member states really care about it as an issue. If Ireland, with all its power and prestige within the European Union, tried to develop a common Union stance on Bosnia, this could result in success. Outside of Sweden which currently holds the Presidency of the Union, I do not know of any country that truly cares enough about the region in general but also about Bosnia, as a key element for stability in the region, in particular, to spend any political capital on Bosnia. I accept that this is a major request and that the joint committee could pursue other issues. However, in the light of Ireland's historical experience, members are aware of what being a small country entails, particularly if the said country is outside the European Union.

Chairman

We agree with Mr. Bajrovic in respect of that matter.

Deputy Billy Timmins

Has Kosovo's declaration of independence almost a year ago had any implications for the wider region?

Mr. Reuf Bajrovic

The Kosovo decision is completely isolated from Bosnia. Kosovo is a special case, which is something that big powers must deal with. Our position on Kosovo is neutral. Whatever the players agree, we are fine with. Some people said the implications for Bosnia would be big but that did not turn out to be so. Throughout history, despite the fact that Bosnia and Kosovo were part of the same country, we have not been that connected. We have a common neighbour but, outside of that, in reality not much connects us. However, Serbia has tried to use the situation in Kosovo for political gain within Bosnia. I am very disappointed with the new Belgrade government's stance on Bosnia but it has become a political player in Bosnia and that should stop. The Czechs will not get anything out of it. Historically we know that never succeeds but outside of that Kosovo is not even part of the political debate in Bosnia anymore, despite the fact it is close to Bosnia. The Czech Republic and Slovakia care more about Kosovo than most politicians in Bosnia.

Deputy Pat Breen

I regret I missed the presentation. When we visited Bosnia, there were three police forces. Given that many of the drugs coming into the EU from Asia pass through the country, should the EU take a stronger interest in policing there?

Mr. Reuf Bajrovic

Organised crime is a serious problem. It has a history of close ties to nationalism. Nationalist parties prefer dealing with organised crime in the long run because that is a way for them to create a lack of responsibility and keep the country where it is now. That is in their best interests. I am not an expert on this but Bosnia is one of the transit points for drug trafficking. However, it is not the only one. I attended a conference recently in Sarajevo and my understanding is the main route to the EU is through Bulgaria.

Chairman

A direct route.

Mr. Reuf Bajrovic

Yes. The police forces have recently cracked down on the big drug lords but this is not the biggest problem we have now. Despite the fact the police forces are still separate, the original intention was to bring them together the way that the military was integrated. There is not a completely integrated structure but there is sufficient integration. That did not happen because the EU relaxed the conditions at the last moment, which was wrong. However, they do their job. When there is political support, the police in Bosnia are effective. The country is governed and secure as along as there is political willingness to do so.

Chairman

I thank Mr. Bajrovic for attending. Members have shown interest in Bosnia in the past for good reasons and they will continue to do so. There are parallels between what has happened in his region and what happened on this island. A number of members visited Gaza recently, which is facing a similar situation. Everyone will say these situations have existed for centuries and they cannot be resolved but, ultimately, many people die and the problem still has to be solved because death does not solve it. The committee has decided to use its good offices to ensure whatever can be done to focus attention on the western Balkans will be done. It is hoped this will be done in a positive way and that the experiences in this country, where applicable, can be applied there. There is no situation that does not bear some resemblance to another. The two situations are similar. However, we will not go into that now.

We will ensure Mr. Bajrovic receives a copy of our report and will bring his submission to the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs who will be attending the committee later this afternoon. Ireland has been influential in terms of bringing about a peaceful resolution to problems that have existed elsewhere by using its experience as a template, and it will continue to do so. We will keep Mr. Bajrovic informed of developments and hope he will do likewise. I thank him for his submission today and for previous submissions to the joint committee.

The joint committee went into private session at 2.50 p.m. and resumed in public session at 3.30 p.m.