I thank the committee for the invitation to make a presentation on reinforcing economic policy co-ordination in the European Union. It will cover the communications released on 12 May and 30 June by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
Prior to the financial crisis, the Directorate General had produced some reports on economic conditions in the EU and, in particular, the eurozone. As early as 2006, we had highlighted the growing divergences in the EU in growth inflation, competitiveness and external imbalances in current account surpluses in some countries and current account deficits in others. Since these imbalances had already developed when the financial crisis hit in 2008, not all countries were in a good position to deal with the fall-out from the crisis. If they had been in better positions with fewer imbalances, they would have had more room to manoeuvre.
Once the EU had co-ordinated itself to deal with and contain the financial crisis, it was then faced with other crises in individual member states, mainly the situation in Greece which developed last year and came to a head in February 2010. This brought back to us that all eurozone member states are integrated. When a crisis hits one, it affects others. We realised there was a threat to the stability of the euro area arising from the situation in Greece which could spread to other countries.
Two years ago, we highlighted the need to reinforce economic governance in the eurozone and the EU. We brought forward our proposals in this regard. We found we had sound rules in place, particularly with the Stability and Growth Pact. However, these were not enough and they needed to be reinforced.
The first communication was released on 12 May 2010. In the meantime, a task force established by the European Council to examine governance had its first meeting and produced its first report which was along the same lines as our communication. On 17 June, the European Council examined these reports and endorsed what had been done so far. We were asked to develop further our proposals in more detail. Accordingly, on 30 June, we released a second communication which is more detailed than the first.
In the 12 May communication, we outlined four areas where further reinforcement was needed. We recognised the Stability and Growth Pact had good mechanisms in place but there were various elements of it that needed to be strengthened. We wanted to go more deeply into the provisions around national debt as the pact mainly focuses on budget deficit. With the economic crisis, when there were bad dynamics the debt ratios of countries increased quickly.
Over time since the creation of the euro area, imbalances had increased across member states. Some countries, especially southern European countries, had moved into high budget deficits on their current accounts while others, like Germany, had large surpluses. We needed to see how this could be improved. We also wanted to see how the framework for policy co-ordination could be improved. In that context, we have proposed a European semester which I will outline later.
The final but also important element of the communication concerned the need to have a robust framework for crisis management in euro area countries. When the crisis hit Greece, we found ourselves with few tools to take care of it. In the end it was dealt with it by establishing a temporary mechanism. We examined how this could be made more permanent.
In the 30 June communication we elaborated further on the first three elements while we are still working on the fourth element. The Stability and Growth Pact is a solid set of rules but its major problem is compliance. Member states agree to an annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP and a national debt lower than 60% of GDP. However, they do not always manage to adhere to these reference values. The pact has a preventive arm which deals with problems before they get worse. It also has a corrective arm. There are measures to deal with a country once it has got into an excessive deficit above the 3% reference point.
To reinforce these, we decided to examine the ex ante co-ordination of fiscal policy. Up to now, we see the stability and convergence programmes when all decisions have been made. Instead, we would prefer to talk about the situation up front to provide guidance which would be horizontal across all member states. To achieve this, we have come up with the idea of a European semester.
The Stability and Growth Pact focuses almost exclusively on the deficit criterion, the 3% reference value. There was a reluctance to examine national debt even though the pact's reference value is 60%. It also states all countries which have a debt over 60% of GDP should reduce it. In fact, the focus on debt is rather important because we saw how quickly when deficits get out of control, as they did with the crisis, the debt can start to increase again. We need to focus on the debt. Another element about the debt relates to looking at the future because all countries are faced with aging populations, so we need to have an eye on the sustainability of the fiscal situation in view of expenditures related to aging populations.
One of the other elements we recognised in the existing Stability and Growth Pact was an incentive mechanism, like a carrot and stick mechanism: once member states get into excessive deficits we could impose fines and have measures related to the conditionality of the Cohesion Funds. The point is that this takes place once a member state is in excess of deficit, so it occurs quite late in the process. We should like to try and have the incentive or the essential mechanisms kicking in earlier in order to get member states to react before they are at what may be termed the "nuclear option" phase in the excessive deficit.
For that we are proposing that the EU funds would be conditional on compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. We are also proposing for eurozone states interest bearing deposits in case of non-compliance. We are imposing tougher treatment for what we call the "sinners", namely, those that recurrently are in non-compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. That I will explain later on.
I will now turn to one of the other elements of our proposal, macroeconomic imbalance and competitiveness. Because competitiveness had deteriorated in many countries, they were in a bad situation, such as Spain, for example, which was in a bad position to deal with the crisis when it happened. When we are dealing with macroeconomic imbalance and competitiveness, we try to look not only at external imbalances related to competitiveness and current account, but also at internal imbalances. These are cases where countries would have gone through a period of overheating, resulting for example, in the housing bubble as it occurred in Spain. We want to try to nip such imbalances in the bud before they develop into full-blown problems.
One of the things we could do was to introduce another mechanism similar to that used for the Stability and Growth Pact, and this mechanism would have a number of elements. First, we would look at standard economic and financial indicators such as current account balances, competitiveness indicators, credit growth in the private sector to households and corporations and so on. We would look at these variables and get a scoreboard on the basis of that. If a good many variables were over a threshold value, this would indicate that the country in question was developing a harmful economic imbalance. This mechanism consists, first, of a scoreboard and then, like the Stability and Growth Pact, we would have a preventative arm and a corrective arm.
Having done an analysis of the situation in member states, the preventive arm aspect would mean issuing recommendations to them to deal with their imbalances, in the event. Again, as with the Stability and Growth Pact, the corrective arm would work where a member state had got into the position of having a harmful imbalance, when we would see how to deal with that.
Under this aspect of broader surveillance, one element I have just discussed is the imbalances. There is also a second element, namely, the surveillance of structural reforms. The Europe 2020 document that we released earlier this year and which was agreed by the European Council, has objectives and headline targets. The headline targets cover employment, research and development expenditure, social inclusion, education, climate and energy. These are targets that have been set out and we shall follow up on them by having an assessment made of the progress made towards meeting them. The progress will be reported in the individual countries' national reform programmes, and then the Commission will carry out an assessment of the progress that has been made. Here again there is an evaluation and where countries are considered not to have made sufficient progress in terms of these objectives and targets we envisage the possibility of issuing country-specific recommendations and warnings to the particular member states.
As I said, the idea of the European semester is to have a new structure which will help to produce reinforced economic policy co-ordination. The problem with the system we have now is that there is rather loose integration of the various policies. We have one stream going on the fiscal side, another on the structural side, and they are not aligned in time. We want to integrate it all because the room for manoeuvre for pursuing policies to enhance growth, or improve productivity or the adjustment of the economy depends on having a good macro and fiscal framework. We want to put the alignment of the whole operation together, so that we get a better integration of the various policy lines.
The second element we want to take care of here is to allow for ex ante co-ordination at the European level when national budgets and national reform programmes are being prepared. The idea here is that in the past, too often we were being faced with decisions that had already been made, without any discussion having taken place at the European level. We want to change that and have some ex-ante co-ordination across eurozone states and EU member states in order to ensure that the cohesion of the whole euro area is respected.
To give members an idea of what the European semester that will take place will be like, we have produced this chart which shows how the whole system will operate. We hope, if this is agreed at the ECOFIN Council today, that it will operate from the beginning of next year. We hope to have an annual growth survey from the European Commission at the beginning of the year. This growth survey would look at what has been happening, on an horizontal basis, across member states in the past year. It would make an assessment of what has been happening and then have a forward looking part to it providing guidance for the coming years. It would have a macroeconomic scenario and include general suggestions as regards policy guidance for member states.
Once that was completed, there would be a debate at the Council of Ministers, which would provide orientations based on that input. It would then be discussed at the European Parliament and next it would be agreed at the European Council. There would be an annual economic summit, which would take place at the end of February or the beginning of March. Once all of this analysis and presentation has been gone through, all the information would then be on the table for member states to adopt their national reform programmes as well as their stability and convergence programmes.
All the information would have been provided. Already, there would have been a debate at eurozone state and EU member state levels from which the programmes would have come. In this case the national reform programmes and the stability and convergence programmes would be adopted at the same time. Once those have been adopted, we would carry out an assessment based on our spring forecast, which is usually published at the start of May. We would carry out an assessment, and then we would provide policy guidance in June, including Council opinions on the stability and convergence programmes, and including policy implementations and recommendations on the other elements, which are the imbalances and the structural reforms. Then there would be an endorsement of that guidance by the European Council and then we would go into the autumn period where member states would be in their own realm, developing their own budgets and so on. We would then arrive at the end of the year and the cycle would start again.
The final element in the proposal is the crisis management framework. We were faced with a crisis on Greece. We had no instrument to deal with that crisis because the facility for a balance of payments crisis is restricted for non-euro area member states. Given the crisis situation, the Council adopted a temporary stabilisation mechanism on 9 May. The idea is to help with financial assistance member states that are already in difficulty, or are seriously threatened by severe difficulties caused by exceptional circumstances beyond their control. The form of assistance that exists is a loan or a credit line. This is not a community mechanism. This is an agreement among member states. It does not come under the community mechanisms that operate for non-eurozone member states.
The total amount for this mechanism is up to €500 billion, of which €60 billion is in financial support and is subject to strong conditionality. For example, together with the IMF, we adopted strong conditionality on the loan that was provided to Greece. There is a stand-by of up to €440 billion, which is guaranteed by eurozone member states. We are in the process of developing a proposal for a permanent crisis mechanism, and the committee will hear more about this in the course of the rest of the year.
Much of this is being worked on at the moment. I will not be able to give the committee all the details, but we will be producing some drafts for secondary legislation in September that will deal with the various elements of the proposal for enhancing economic policy co-ordination. Thank you.