Skip to main content
Normal View

Joint Committee on European Union Affairs debate -
Wednesday, 8 Feb 2023

Fiftieth Anniversary of Ireland’s Accession to the European Community: Discussion

The committee is working on a report on the 50th anniversary of Ireland's membership of the European Community. It is not to say all is well but to look with accurate glasses over the past 50 years and to bring in people who will share with us their lived experiences of that. I hope we will present a report that will help us to prepare better for the next 50 years of membership.

Today, we are privileged to have two exemplary guests. First, we have Mr. Rory Montgomery. I have had the pleasure of working in government with Rory. I know him to be an exemplary public servant who has given remarkable service to this country. We talk about the scale of our foreign service in comparison with others. Certainly, on a person-per-person basis our impact has been extraordinary. Rory has served as Ireland's permanent representative to the EU institutions and as second Secretary General in the office of the Department of the Taoiseach, with responsibility for EU affairs. We look forward to hearing from Rory.

We are also joined online by Tony Connelly, RTÉ's Europe editor. He is extraordinarily well-connected with all that happens in the European institutions. I hope it will not embarrass him when I say that in one of our interactions in Westminster, a Member of the Westminster Parliament said that he gets his most authoritative news on what is going on in Brussels by tuning into Tony Connelly. I think that underscores the level of real understanding of the minutiae of what is going on in real time that is provided by Tony. He is another extraordinary helpful voice in our deliberations.

I have been reminded to read the note on privilege. I am sorry to have to go through the technicality, but all witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that one should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name in such a way as to make him or her identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of any person. Therefore, if a statement is potentially defamatory - and I know they are not - in relation to any identifiable person or entity the witness will be directed to discontinue his or her remarks and must comply with that direction. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on or make charges against a person outside of the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. I remind members of the constitutional requirement that members participating must be physically present on the campus of Leinster House. That said, I invite Rory to make his opening statement.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

I thank the members and the Vice Chairman for his kind words. I am delighted to have this opportunity to share some personal reflections on Ireland’s membership of the European Union. Over half of my 36 years as an Irish official were spent on EU business, mostly in the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of the Taoiseach. I also spent a year in the European Commission in Brussels. I served at a senior level as Permanent Representative to the European Union from 2009 to 2013 and as Second Secretary General at the Departments of the Taoiseach and Foreign Affairs from 2014 until my retirement in 2019. I was heavily involved in the EU presidencies of 2004 and 2013, in the latter as chairman of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, COREPER, and head of what was, especially for the Presidency, a beefed-up team of 180 people in Brussels. Issues in which I was involved included: the negotiation of the Nice and Lisbon treaties, and the referendums on them; the financial and eurozone crises and the Irish bailout; the EU’s foreign policy, in particular on the Middle East and on Russia; the migration crisis; and, of course, Brexit, which dominated my last years.

I would be happy to answer questions on any of these subjects, or indeed on any other topic. However, I thought it might dovetail quite well with Tony's presentation, which I understand is going to give us a tour of the current issues, and be helpful if I offered some very brief and by no means exhaustive thoughts on the how, rather than the what, of Irish engagement with the EU. I am painting with a very broad brush and some of what I say may well be out of date.

The first point is that engagement is, and must be, a whole-of-government effort. To a greater or lesser extent, every Department has an EU role. Virtually every one of them has at least one official seconded to the Permanent Representation. Brussels tends to operate in a whole series of distinct institutional circles, but some important issues do involve overlaps and competing objectives. This makes proper co-ordination essential. While this has been strengthened over the past number of years under the Departments of the Taoiseach and of Foreign Affairs, our system, whether at political or official level, is still relatively loose and informal. This has its strengths – we can be agile and flexible – but also its weaknesses in terms of coherence and consistency. One of my former colleagues, Mr. David Cooney, who was Secretary General of the Department, used to say we are a very good cup team, but not always so good in the league.

Second, it is essential that officials all along the chain have a strong knowledge of the issues to enable them to assess our interests and formulate clear and realistic policies. This is often and usually, but not always, the case. The overall quality of the Irish civil servants working on EU issues is high and compares well with those of other countries, but I used to think that the focus of some colleagues could be quite narrow. Technical expertise is essential, but a broader awareness of the policy and political background, both in Brussels and in other member states, is also valuable. My experience was that many Departments' international and EU sections were understaffed and not in a position to acquire that kind of knowledge or to analyse issues as deeply as some of their counterparts from other member states. To increase the pool of expertise, increasing the number of secondments from Departments to the EU institutions has been a priority over recent years. In my view, it is at least as important as the permanent employment of Irish citizens in the institutions, which perhaps gets a lot more attention.

Third, the quality of Taoisigh and Ministers matters. It is they who make the big calls and interact with their opposite numbers. Indeed, in the case of Taoisigh, they are entirely on their own at European Councils, something which came as rather a surprise to the current Taoiseach when we first went to the European Council, because he had been used to attending Councils as a Minister with a battery of officials with him. The leaders, prime ministers and presidents sit entirely by themselves. They set standards and objectives for their officials, and communicate with the public, which is absolutely essential. On having to talk about the whole question of communicating on Europe as well, I was saying earlier that I am a member of the board of European Movement Ireland which has that responsibility as well. Even without the note on privilege, which the Vice Chairman read out, I would not dare comment on the individual performances of my former masters, but in general I think we have been well served.

Fourth, a small member state has to prioritise and to pick and choose its battles. We have always been good at identifying and negotiating hard and effectively on absolutely key issues, usually from a defensive angle, whether in regard to tax, agriculture, or security and defence. We could, perhaps, do more to help set the agenda on other important questions, as we have done, for example and to be fair, on the development of the Single Market. I would say that the current permanent representative, Mr. Tom Hanney, had a big role in that, in particular when he was deputy permanent representative and now as permanent representative. At the same time, I think we have to be realistic about the limits of our influence. Intervening on everything is not productive and does not win you friends. I used to sit at COREPER meetings and a Finnish colleague had a great saying. He would intervene and say: "Everything has been said, but not yet by everybody". Whenever somebody chose not to use his or her opportunity to intervene, there would be a certain sign of relief. Of course, we have to remember the great majority of issues - not all of them - are subject to qualified majority voting. In relative terms, it favours small member states, but our power is inevitably much less than those of the large states. We have to husband our power.

Fifth, building and nurturing relationships is key, whether with the EU institutions, not just the Commission but increasingly and crucially the Parliament, with other member states and at times with the media, as Tony will know. In my time in Brussels, because of the Lisbon Treaty referendum, the financial crisis and the Presidency, Ireland was more in the spotlight than it was used to being or would like to be, dealing with media, and not just Irish media. Tony was there at the time with Sean Whelan, Arthur Beesley and Suzanne Lynch of The Irish Times. We would also deal with a lot of the international media from the UK, France, Germany and elsewhere. This kind of networking requires a considerable investment of time and energy on the part of politicians and officials, which is not helped by our geographical position. It takes a bit longer to get places. The domestic demands on Irish Ministers, as far as I am aware, are probably greater because of the way this Parliament operates and the nature of constituency work and all of that. Some of this effort can be wasted, because inevitably there is a turnover of member state governments and ministers. Thinking about it statistically, some governments change much faster and some change more slowly, but we could take it that seven or eight governments rotate every year. I used to be struck by how rapidly an Irish Minister in office for two or three years could rocket up the seniority ladder among his or her peers, but it is work which has to be done. That makes the work of officials, whose counterparts tend to stay in place longer, also very important.

We are, by a long way, the smallest country to maintain embassies in all member states. I take the slightly heterodox view that I am not convinced that this is necessary, but it is certainly of benefit.

There are almost twice as many diplomats in our embassy in Paris as there were when I was ambassador ten years ago.

We have also developed a strategy of more structured networking with other member states, in particular like-minded ones such as the Netherlands and the Nordic and Baltic countries. Brexit has given this a strong push. At one level, networking happens in and between capitals but on the detail of legislation, it involves co-operation in Brussels and really granular co-operation between the teams in the permanent representations. Incidentally, it goes without saying that while we have done our best to mitigate the effects of the departure of the UK, it has weakened our negotiating position in some key areas such as trade, financial services and justice and home affairs. One statistic I used to quote is that if you look at the number of votes a member state has under qualified majority voting, if you were to add together Ireland, the Netherlands, the three Nordic states and the three Baltic states, you would have fewer votes than the UK had on its own.

I usually found that people like the Irish and we made lots of efforts to keep it that way. I would offer a warning, though. Friendly relations and mutual understanding only go so far. To quote the 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, who built Classiebawn Castle near Mullaghmore, "we have no perpetual allies... our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow". The same is true of every member state so you cannot be sentimental about it. You can have the best relations in the world with people individually but, ultimately, it comes down to questions of national interest which can, of course, include the wider European interest. That is a national interest as well.

Finally, on EU Presidencies, I was actively involved in two, including being at the very centre in 2013. This was the most physically and mentally demanding job of my career and was the most professionally demanding job, although maybe my work in Northern Ireland meant more to me emotionally, and I have tremendous memories of that time. However, I think at times the significance of the Presidency can be exaggerated and misunderstood. In no real way are you setting or shaping the EU agenda, all the more so since with the Lisbon Treaty, the Presidency no longer chairs the European Council or the Foreign Affairs Council. It would have been quite different when Deputy Haughey's father was President of the European Council in 1990. Nor are you in a position to pursue national interests - quite the reverse, unless sometimes at the margins where you can give an extra push to something if you have a national interest. However, you have to be seen as an honest broker, particularly if you are a small member state. The analogy I prefer to use often is that the Presidency is the engineer who tries to ensure that the EU machinery continues to function and the wheels continue to turn and are oiled and greased and deliver good outcomes as quickly as is possible. It does so through chairing the great majority of meetings, deciding on the agenda for each and drawing conclusions from debate. Much of this requires a great deal of work behind the scenes. These tasks require preparation, skill and determination and judgement. All the best Presidencies allow their teams in Brussels to lead day-to-day with Ministers often delivering deals at the end of the process but it often happens that circumstances and the different interests of member states can thwart you despite your best efforts. In 2013, we set what was at the time a record for the number of legislative files that got through the system but there were things we did not advance as much as we would have liked to do. I am thinking in particular of the now infamous GDPR, which was not resolved until two or three years later.

All seven Irish Presidencies would be deemed to have performed to a very high standard, which in 2013 helped to re-establish our credentials as we emerged from a very difficult period. I have no doubt that the 2026 Presidency under the leadership of the recently nominated Permanent Representative, Aingeal O’Donoghue, and Deputy Permanent Representative, Barbara Cullinane, will maintain the unbroken sequence. Another official at the Department, Cáit Moran, is planned to be our representative on the Political and Security Committee so we will have an all-female leadership team in the permanent representation in 2026. It is quite remarkable to think that it took over 40 years for a single woman to sit on COREPER and be the permanent representative of her member state. Ireland had the very first one in Anne Anderson, who also had a very distinguished career elsewhere.

I invite Mr. Connelly to make his opening statement.

Mr. Tony Connelly

I thank the committee and I also thank Mr. Montgomery for his very illuminating presentation. I am delighted to have this opportunity to share some of my experiences reporting on the EU. I was one of the people outside the window trying to peer into the room in which Mr. Montgomery and senior diplomats were sitting. It is thanks to those people on the inside who are happy to co-operate with and help the media that I can essentially do my job.

I am delighted to do a quick tour of where we are at EU level and where Ireland fits. The 50th anniversary of Ireland’s membership of the EU comes at a time of real upheaval at EU level with fundamental challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, enlargement and the legacy of the Covid-19 pandemic. Not only are deeply held assumptions about Europe’s security, budget, debt rules and centre of gravity being shaken on an almost monthly basis; the EU has been more or less in crisis mode since the financial crash of 2008. Since 2008, we have had the eurozone crisis, the debt crisis and the Greek and Irish bailouts. We have also had a long period of turbulence involving terrorism and the migration crisis in 2014 and 2015. That brought us to Brexit, which was another existential moment for the EU. Brexit is still obviously with us but we then had the Covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine so the EU has had a long period of crisis and turbulence. There has not been a period of settled calm for about 15 years.

During these upheavals, EU unity has been severely tested, not least by Brexit and the pandemic. The crises appear to have strengthened the EU’s internal unity, somewhat paradoxically because a lot of people thought Brexit would really tear the EU apart with some countries wanting a much more favourable relationship with and much more flexible approach to the UK while other countries did not. Despite a lot of attempts by the UK to bilateralise the whole process of Brexit, unity prevailed and was a key aspect of the Brexit process. Ireland benefited enormously from that sense of unity and solidarity.

The Ukraine war is seen as an existential threat to the multilateral, rules-based order, of which the EU is a pre-eminent part. Despite unity, there are divisions and fault lines within the EU. Depending on the issue, there are shifting and competing blocs along several axes such as north versus south, east versus west, debtor versus creditor, those who are tough on Russia versus those who want a bit more understanding for Russia, NATO members versus neutral member states, coastal versus non-coastal, migration facing countries versus non-migration facing countries and energy-dependent countries versus energy-self sufficient countries. The challenge for Ireland is navigating these different divisions and shifting positions and situations. This is going to be a challenge.

The EU’s unique, if slow, and sometimes bruising system of policy making does tend to deliver clear outcomes in the end mostly through consensus rather than via polarising votes at Council level but it will require vigilance on Ireland’s part to navigate the various blocs and policy choices through the rest of the decade.

I can give some figures on the question of Ireland's contribution to the EU budget because this will inform the debate in Ireland. Ireland has been a net contributor since 2013. In 2019 the net contribution was €0.5 billion so that represents €1.9 billion received and paying in €2.4 billion. From the €1.9 billion received 85% goes to the agricultural sector and to rural development projects. There are also direct payments to research funding. Overall, Ireland received €1.5 billion for sustainable growth and natural resources, €430 million for smart and inclusive growth and €24 million for security and citizenship. The impact of Brexit and Ireland's strong economic performance means Ireland will remain a net contributor to the EU for the foreseeable future.

I will say a bit about what the EU has been doing at budget level. As the committee knows, there was the Covid-19 pandemic recovery fund which, combined with the seven-year annual budgets running to 2027, combines to an amount of €1.8 trillion. This is designed to mitigate the impact of the pandemic but also to refit the European economy to be much more aligned to the digital age and to help Europe to meet its climate goals. Ireland will receive €1 billion from the recovery and resilience facility. To compare that to Italy which will receive €220 billion, that is an indication of the way the Irish economy is viewed by the EU in terms of responding to something like the Covid-19 pandemic and how Italy has to respond and to have a much more radical reboot of its economy. A lot of that work was championed and put through by the then Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Mario Draghi. A big issue at the moment is whether the current Italian Prime Minister, Ms Giorgia Meloni, will be able to continue with that budget programme. Ireland will also receive €89 million from the ReactEU fund which is essentially a top-up to regional and social funds, and €77 million from the just transition fund. That is designed to help member states to meet climate targets.

When the UK was a member, as Mr. Montgomery touched on, Ireland had the luxury of sheltering behind the well-researched and well-argued UK position on things like taxation, trade, the Single Market, and justice and home affairs. With the UK departure Ireland now has to seek new alliances, for example by joining what is called the New Hanseatic League or the bad weather club, that involves the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland and Sweden. This is a group of countries emphasising balanced budgets and caution in EU spending, that Economic and Monetary Union, EMU, should be strengthened without transferring new powers to Brussels and with the idea that citizens have to be kept on board at all times during a crisis. That was one of the problems of the debt crisis, especially in Greece. Despite aligning itself with the Hanseatic position of a much more frugal approach to spending Ireland did actually align itself with the Franco-Mediterranean approach in 2020 when it joined France and others in looking for a much more robust and bigger bazooka in terms of EU spending and borrowing to meet the needs of member states after the Covid-19 pandemic. Ireland obviously wants to be flexible enough to be able to shift between different blocs and that will take quite a bit of dexterity. I am sure Mr. Montgomery will have something to say on that.

Ireland is now the only member state, as far as I am aware, with an embassy in every other EU capital. That represents a very significant financial commitment and reflects the importance of building alliances with both small and large member states. Ireland relied very heavily on former German Chancellor, Ms Angela Merkel's, understanding and sympathy during the Brexit negotiations. With the new coalition in Berlin Ireland had done a lot of work, I think perhaps at political level through the Green Party, to get a foothold in the German thinking and that is why the programme for government in Berlin actually mentions the requirement of the UK to abide by the Northern Ireland protocol. France of course is now Ireland's closest member state geographically so that is another bond that has to be worked on very carefully.

The Brexit negotiations represented a graphic and nail-biting challenge which tested Ireland's diplomatic skills to the limit. It is important to remember that it was not a given at the outset that Ireland would get this support and solidarity. For the Irish Government, the initial concern was trade and the fact its very close and very important trading partner would suddenly be trading under much more trade friction. The Northern Ireland issue came in on the slipstream of that but it is important to remember that for a long time, as Mr. Montgomery can attest to, a lot of the work between Dublin and Brussels was looking at ways of having as soft a Border as possible. They were looking at technical solutions and looking at other border examples around the European Union. It then became a much more political project to try to shift the UK out of its comfort zone and come up with its own solutions rather than put the responsibility on Ireland and the EU to figure out how to deal with the Irish Border. It was not a given that the EU would have that solidarity at the outset but it clearly evolved as we went along and once that solidarity and support became embedded in the DNA of the negotiations it was very hard to shift. The more Ireland was supported and the more Ireland successfully outsourced the Brexit process to Michel Barnier and the European Commission and the European Council, the harder it was for individual member states to depart from the orthodoxy that Ireland's interests would have to be protected.

The question is what that means once we get beyond Brexit, and we may never get fully beyond it but we seem to be entering a bit of an end game at the moment. What will that mean for Ireland's position once the innate sympathy for Ireland dissipates? I think we will start to get into bigger geopolitical existential issues at EU level around security, defence and migration. These are issues that Ireland has always had not quite such a pre-eminent and prominent role and that will be a challenge over the coming years. We do not know where the Ukraine war will end up but, as I mentioned at the start, a lot of the assumptions about European security are being upended. Ireland will have to be fairly dexterous in how it positions itself in these debates.

I am happy to take questions on any of these subjects. I will leave it there. Thank-you.

I thank both our guests for painting an extraordinarily broad canvas for us and I certainly have lots of questions and my colleagues will also. I will take them in rounds and ask people to posit two or maybe three questions and then we can involve everyone. I will call Deputy Haughey, then Deputies Ó Murchú and Harkin, I will ask a question myself and then Senator Martin.

I have a question regarding Brexit and the Northern Ireland protocol, and a linked question of the Good Friday Agreement. I have a question on Ukraine and then a question on Irish neutrality. If we have time after I can ask a few more questions hopefully.

Yes, we will come back to you.

First, I thank both speakers. Both contributions were really interesting and I am delighted the committee invited them and that they agreed as we prepare to commemorate out 50 years of membership of the European Union. I note Tony Connelly has 177,000 followers on Twitter. He spoke about the upheavals, turbulence and crises over the last 15 years. It is fair to say that his tweets and retweets are followed very closely by many of us, particularly regarding the ongoing Brexit drama and Ukraine. Many of his retweets gave us extra information on Ukraine and various points of views.

That is much appreciated. My first question relates to Brexit and is for Tony Connelly, but Rory Montgomery might also have a view on it. Where are we in negotiations and in implementing the Northern Ireland protocol? We hear talk of red and green lanes being agreed. We have heard about EU access to UK customs and IT systems. In so far as they can, will the witnesses bring the committee up to speed on those negotiations? The Government is being very private about it and giving space and time to the negotiators. It would be interesting to hear the journalistic point of view.

I also have a related question about the Good Friday Agreement and getting the institutions up and running. Is Mr. Montgomery optimistic about getting the institutions up and running and how does he view the position of the Democratic Unionist Party, DUP, in all of this? Does it perhaps deserve some sympathy or not? There are problems with the protocol.

Regarding the war in Ukraine, do the witnesses believe the EU sanctions are effective? There is talk of a tenth round of sanctions. I have to wonder why the first round was so ineffective. Do the witnesses believe we are on the eve of a new offensive by the Russian Federation? What do they think will happen next in Ukraine and how do they see it ending? It will have to come to an end at some stage.

I was asked about Ireland's traditional policy of military neutrality in the context of the Ukraine war on many occasions when I attended meetings of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of the parliaments of the European Union, COSAC. People asked me to explain Ireland's position. There was a critical article in The Economist on 19 January 2023 which stated:

Ireland has gone through diplomatic contortions to proclaim itself “not politically neutral, but militarily neutral”. Instead of sending guns to Ukraine it has delivered first-aid kits.

I am not advocating Ireland joining a military alliance such as NATO, but I am interested to know how the witnesses think our policy is viewed by other member states and in Brussels generally. We have the Common Security and Defence Policy and all it involves. There is talk of an EU rapid deployment capacity and sending an EU training mission to Ukraine. I am in favour of the ongoing development of the European Common Security and Defence Policy. Is our role in it criticised by some member states, especially in respect of Ukraine and our contribution to the European Peace Facility? Are we coming under pressure or is it understood by other EU member states and the Commission?

Mr. Tony Connelly

They are all friends and family on my twitter account, just to make that point.

There is definitely momentum towards an agreement on the Northern Ireland protocol. The question is "when" rather than "if" at this point. A lot of intense technical work has been done in the past few months and the Deputy is correct that, much to my frustration at times, this is being kept secret or tight by the Commission. The briefings to member states that used to take place are not happening so it is quite hard to get information. My understanding is that an outline of an agreement has been more or less drawn up and it is now up to Rishi Sunak to decide whether he is prepared to endorse this agreement and sell it to his party and to the DUP.

The trick is that the agreement will essentially proclaim an overall outcome, namely that there will be a reduced number of checks and controls on goods entering Northern Ireland, but the hard technical work will still have to be done by EU and UK officials and businesses in Northern Ireland on what data has to be uploaded when goods are shipped across the Irish Sea and how much and what kind of paperwork is required. Many of the parameters of this agreement are well-known. A category of trusted traders who qualify as such under various criteria is envisaged. The system will know they can be trusted to deliver what they say they will deliver and that their goods will not stay in Northern Ireland. As the Deputy mentioned, there is an ITC agreement under which EU officials can plug their laptops into one single system comprising a blend of five different His Majesty's Revenue and Customs, HMRC, and commercial databases. There is a drag and drop function to enable EU officials to look at what is coming across the Irish Sea in real time and identify unusual patterns over the period of a week, month or whatever. If patterns are noticed, a red flag can be raised and HMRC border force will be able to take action. A lorry can be pulled in. The principle is that instead of having routine checks, checks are carried out in response to a risk. Does that mean that there will not be any checks if there is no risk? We do not know that sort of detail. Clearly data from traders who are sending goods to Northern Ireland will be needed in order to be able to make that assessment. Information is needed for an IT system. How much data, how onerous it will be for traders and whether they will require a commodity code, which is a complicated and cumbersome piece of paperwork, will be decided.

The IT system being in place has opened the gates for an agreement. The EU can move in the direction of the UK towards this concept of risk. The UK position has always been that the EU's rigid regime on risk, which requires everything or a certain percentage of goods to be checked, was not needed. If a risk arises, that is when a response is needed. It could be argued that if a risk arises, it is too late. The system will work for customs as well as for agrifood sanitary and Phytosanitary, SPS, checks, which is a significant development and can calibrate the degree of required checks.

The question is whether this will be enough for Rishi Sunak to try to sell it to his backbenchers and to the DUP. We will have to wait and see. Rishi Sunak has a difficult budget in March. There could be a lot of unrest on his backbenches over tax cuts. He is seen to be in a fairly weak position. If he is going to make a deal with the EU, which I think he wants to, there is limited time to do that. We are talking about the next few weeks. That is where this will land. A lot more detailed work will have to follow the headline agreement on reducing routine checks on goods to zero. We will see.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

I have nothing to add to that. This week, Tony Connelly has again been the lead in telling people what is happening.

On the question of the DUP and the Good Friday Agreement, many people would say that the DUP made its bed and has to lie in it.

Reg Empey, the leading Ulster Unionist Party negotiator, was saying that just yesterday. I think it is also fair to say that a majority of people in Northern Ireland, including almost all nationalists, were essentially taken out of the EU against their will. Having said that, I can understand in a way some of the issues unionism has with the protocol. There is no doubt that it does to some extent differentiate further between the treatment of Northern Ireland and that of the UK. At least technically, it can be said to breach one of the provisions of the Act of Union, even though the courts in Northern Ireland have not found that. I believe there might be a ruling today in the Supreme Court-----

There is. The Supreme Court found the Irish protocol was legal. I would question whether the Act of Union was actually legal but that is for another day.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

For these purposes it does not matter because the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is that more recent legislation supersedes previous legislation. I think we can leave the Act of Union to one side, thank God. We will maybe leave the Government of Ireland Act out of it as well. That ruling is interesting. I do not know but I imagine the reaction from those who took the case will be to say that this does not solve their particular political problems, that this is a court operating within certain parameters and so on. There is a future question as well regarding the extent to which Britain and the EU will diverge in future regulation. If the regulations relevant to the movement of goods around the Single Market apply to Northern Ireland, then that does potentially widen the gap.

There is a democratic deficit question as well. I would not say Northern Ireland officials or members of the Assembly were very influential in the making of EU legislation but now they will not even have a formal role. That is one of the things that may be looked at as a kind of accompaniment to a core deal. Maroš Šefčovič has been at pains to say that, above all, he wants to solve practical problems. He has talked to businesses in Northern Ireland and from what Mr. Connelly says, it sounds as if they have gone a long way towards accommodating that. In a way you might say in brackets that greater flexibility earlier in the process might have been helpful but it is easy to be wise after the event. Having said all that, I think there was a possibility that the DUP under Arlene Foster could have eventually found its way to live with the protocol. She at one stage talked about Northern Ireland having the best of both worlds and making the best of it, etc. However, Boris Johnson was already willingly causing mischief about the protocol from the very beginning. Even though it was quickly resolved, the very brief evocation of Article 16 of the protocol with regard to medicines in Northern Ireland gave those who were opposed to it something to hang on to. Unfortunately, the reality is that unionist opposition to the protocol is extremely hard and it has hardened over time. Again you could ask if this is a reflection of real interests or a question of what has been said by leaders to followers. It is unrealistic to expect unionists to be more moderate than the British Government and for a long period with Johnson and Truss that was the situation they were in.

Although there should not be another Assembly election for some years, local elections will occur in the spring and it looks as if the DUP is not suffering electorally in opinion polls from its stance. If anything, the pressure from the TUV is greater than the pressure from the moderate side of the UUP etc. My assumption is that Jeffrey Donaldson and the other leadership figures in the DUP, and many of the Assembly members, would like to find a way back in. They know the alternative is almost certainly a greater role for the Irish Government in one way or another. It would be a strange irony if we effectively had a reproduction of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, about which Ian Paisley said "Never! Never! Never!" and the removal of which was a main objective of unionists during the Good Friday talks.

I have to say I am not particularly optimistic. I just do not know. Sunak bringing his party on board is a challenge too and it will be interesting to see to what extent the fact that Chris Heaton-Harris and Steve Baker are now inside the tent will have an effect. It is possible to imagine a situation where there would be agreement between the EU and the UK on measures that will be important in themselves and would give a great deal of certainty to Northern Ireland businesses, investors and consumers and would offer a chance for a reset of the UK-EU relationship. I do not know what the DUP thinks it would do in the future or how it thinks this would strategically help unionism but I would not be that optimistic, unfortunately.

What about the second tranche of questions?

Mr. Rory Montgomery

I will leave Ukraine to Mr. Connelly, except to say that the sanctions have evolved progressively as the war has gone on. They are comprehensive. However, I do not know what sanctions actually do in the longer term. I think they weaken the Russians. They obviously weaken Russia's war effort and economy, although having said that Russia is still getting a considerable level of support from China and other countries outside the West. While sanctions undoubtedly had an effect on the regime change in South Africa, which was a long time ago, the Americans have had very severe sanctions against Cuba and Iran for half a century and more. I am not saying I do not favour sanctions but we have to be realistic about how effective they will actually be. I do not think they will be decisive in a conflict but they could have an impact.

On the neutrality question, I was the political director of the Department of Foreign Affairs for four years and was therefore dealing with foreign and security policy from 2005 to 2009. The Irish Government's approach over the last many years has been on the one hand to stay within our red line, which relates to any mandatory defence obligation and the autonomy of the decision-making of the EU, while at the same time recognising that most of our partners - an even larger number now that the Finns and Swedes want to join NATO - see NATO as at the heart of their own national security and want the EU to play something of a bigger role. How big that role is differs a bit between different member states, with France at one end and Poland at the other. At the same time, we have started to ensure the policy is framed in such a way as to enable us to take part in peacekeeping operations and peace support operations run by the EU with a UN mandate. Mr. Connelly will know this better than I do but I do not think there is some recording angel there keeping score. The reality is that our military capacity is so limited that we would not bring a lot to the table as regards NATO. Even the importance of the island of Ireland in the Second World War, for example, was based on military capacities that were very different and much more primitive than now.

I have two personal hobby horses. Without reviewing the question of Irish membership of NATO, and it is probably clear that there would not be public support for that, there are two things we can do. One issue is that the triple lock is entirely out of date. The idea that you need UN support, and a Security Council resolution in particular, to launch a mission gives a veto to Russia, China and the US and others too. We have only once been prevented from taking part in a mission but it also means there are missions launched by others that are clearly in the national and European interest but which we are unable to contemplate taking part in. That is something that at the very least should be carefully examined. To quote a former colleague, it is a bit absurd that on the one hand we are happy to require a decision by the UN Security Council, on which we are not represented and where other countries have vetoes, but are not prepared to accept a unanimous decision by the European Council, on which we are represented and where we do have a veto.

Second, there is in the Lisbon treaty a solidarity clause, so called, which requires member states to come to the aid of other members states by all means in their power. We went through lots of contortions during the Lisbon treaty campaign to secure a declaration stating, to paraphrase and simplify, that this would be interpreted by our partners as not including, necessarily, military participation. Again, one has to ask the question whether that a moral and appropriate stance for a member state of the European Union? It seems to me that we would still have the capacity to make our own decisions on exactly how to operate. If, for example, Estonia, Lithuania or wherever were to be the victim of a Russian attack, are we really saying that we would tie our own hands to a point where we would not offer such limited support as we might? Those are my personal opinions.

Mr. Tony Connelly

There is clearly a debate about whether sanctions are effective given that when the war happened there were a lot of dire warnings within Russia that GDP would collapse to Soviet-era levels. Clearly, whatever sanctions were put in place have not deterred Vladimir Putin at all and have not constrained his actions.

The view in the European Commission is that sanctions are a long game. There was a team of economists and economic experts around Vladimir Putin who apparently did a lot of work to try to mitigate the effect of sanctions and asset freezes on the Russian central bank and so on. There was a very big debate within the community of economists in Russia about whether people should morally take part in that kind of activity or should leave Russia. I think those who stayed simply swallowed their discomfort and are now working in Russia's national interest to make sure sanctions do not have an effect and they have been quite successful in that regard.

Mr. Montgomery is right to say there is a lot of what is called "backfilling" by China, India and Türkiye on essential goods for Russia. The view in the EU is that sanctions are a long game and export controls especially will start to take effect. These would be on dual-use goods. The tenth sanctions package due out in the next couple of weeks is expected to hit products quite hard in terms of export controls. Essentially, these are goods that Russia needs for running the military operation and that it needs in energy. I was given the example of a certain kind of tool needed for use in oil refineries which has to be replaced every six months. These tools are made in Germany and nowhere else. If those tools are banned from entering Russia, the country will start to feel the impact of export controls.

There is also a view that, in conjunction with the G7, the price cap on Russian oil is starting to have an effect. We have seen the impact of that in countries only paying a certain amount for Russian oil. According to the European Commission, the cap is costing Russia €160 million per day, which is a significant amount of money. There is a belief that this will start to really hurt the Russian economy even if countries are helping Russia. By the same token, if India is buying Russian oil, it will not necessarily pay above what other countries are paying for Russian oil.

Another aspect is that Ukrainians are extreme diligent. Ukraine's intelligence services retrieve drones and missiles that are shot down over the country, take them apart and let the European Commission know whether any of the components are European made. They were alarmed to discover that the rotors on the Iranian drones they shot down are made in Austria, of all places. That is how the EU can take action when it gets indications that sanctions or export controls are being breached.

From an Irish point of view, interestingly, David O'Sullivan, a former senior Irish civil servant in the European Commission, is now part of a task force that travels around the world with the US and UK checking on what companies are evading sanctions. Those companies can then be listed by the EU and potentially sanctioned themselves. That is all part of the work to target the companies and countries that circumvent sanctions for Russia's benefit. Clearly, overall the sanctions so far have not really changed Russia's posture on the war in Ukraine. It could be argued, however, that Russia is suffering in terms of ammunition and its ability to produce weapons in Russia if it is not getting semi-conductors, for example, and other key parts. Sanctions have not delivered precisely the immediate results the West was hoping for but the belief is that they will start to bite over time.

Does Mr. Connelly wish to comment on the neutrality issue and the attitude towards neutrality?

Mr. Tony Connelly

I do not detect any annoyance at EU level about Ireland's neutral position on Ukraine. We are not the only neutral or non-aligned country. There seems to be broad accommodation of the different views at EU level.

I was in Ukraine in November and interviewed Yuriy Sak who is the senior adviser to the Ukrainian Government on military and strategic issues. He made the point that if Ireland could send heavy weaponry, that would be great but that Ukraine also appreciated Ireland's position on the United Nation's Security Council in terms of refugees and generally supporting the Ukraine position at EU level. Ireland was only one of two western countries that called for Ukraine's accession candidate status to be granted back in May of last year. Ireland is asserting itself on that issue and perhaps making up for a lack of heavy weaponry. One certainly does not hear any commentary in Brussels about Ireland's neutrality on this issue.

It is great to have Mr. Montgomery and Mr. Connelly here. A friend of mine would always tell me, if I attempted to be smart by dissing experts or people with seniority, to take out my CV and see how it stacked up against theirs. I defer to Mr. Montgomery in that sense because he has put an impressive CV in front of us. The Vice Chair has already described Mr. Connelly as the experts' expert. I must admit that I follow Mr. Connelly and I would hate if anyone ever checked how many times I have checked his Brexit protocol news. I thank him for all of his work.

Strangely, Deputy Haughey jumped straight to the Irish protocol, which is the issue on which I wanted to start. Obviously we are all a lot happier that there is a will. We were always going to find some technological means of sorting out the problem if the two parties, in particular the British Government, were up for doing so. Like others, I think Rishi Sunak has an awful lot of plates spinning and we would like to think he needs a deal. The DUP has done what political unionism often does. It went into a cul de sac but it was given cover by the British Government, particular under Boris Johnson who made moves on the protocol for his own reasons. We are in a better place. European Union solidarity has held up. The process seems to be moving in the right direction. I will not ask to for a crystal ball decisions on that but I will ask for other crystal ball determinations.

At this point, the biggest show in town for us is getting agreement on the protocol across the line. We would like to see that happen.

Beyond that, have there been any discussions around the sense that Brexit has changed the conversation in Ireland on Irish unity? It is a conversation that is happening. People may not want to make political calls at this point in time and might feel safer once we get beyond the protocol issue. The British Government is selling that resolution to the DUP, but it is a question now of the DUP finding a way to get itself off its own hook. Be that as it may, the conversation on Irish unity is happening. There is a considerable degree of thinking, even among those who never would have thought it was possible before, that unity is a definite likelihood within the next while. What is the feeling in Europe on this issue?

Mr. Montgomery spoke about how Ireland is well liked but everybody has their own interests. It is a case of Moses is Moses but business is business. It was often said that this State was reliant on Britain to do due diligence on legislation and whatever else was coming through from the EU. We have seen attempts to get more engagement on Europe, as difficult as it is to get engagement in politics, at everything from the societal level right up to parliamentary involvement. What do the witnesses see as the moves that are necessary to make in this regard, particularly if there is a weakness at present and if we are not doing the piece of work we need to do?

I was lucky to sit on the Conference on the Future of Europe. It was an impressive forum on some levels. It probably started badly and found its shape as it went on. It then went into a cul-de-sac at times in its overemphasis on qualified majority voting, QMV, versus unanimity. That was understandable given the rule of law issues across Europe. For all the EU's faults, when we check it against the world in which the politics of the strong man reigns - I am thinking of Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin at this time - the Union could almost be called a hopeful beacon.

However, we are looking back over the past 50 years and there have been wrong turns made by the European Union over that time. Do the witnesses agree there is now an acceptance that the austerity policies the EU operated at times were wrong? The Commission was probably far worse far than the International Monetary Fund, IMF, in this regard. There were issues with state aid rules and there was almost a belief that the market and privatisation would sort everything. The EU's stance on Brexit showed solidarity with this State. The response to Covid showed a different type of solidarity and made the argument that, particularly in regard to health services, we need a public sector that is able to do business. There is now the Ukrainian situation. We see that there needs to be, as there has been during the Covid period, flexibility at times on fiscal constraints.

We are only now having a real engagement on Ukraine's accession. The Russian invasion of Ukraine amounts to a complete reorientation of the world, right down to supply chain issues and the discussion around drones and finding out what are the individual parts and where they are from. Strategic autonomy is a term we used but now it is something real. I have already asked for some gazing into the crystal ball. It is a question now of going a bit further and looking at how we see this progressing. We all hope to get to the stage at some point where there is some element of a peace process. I imagine there will be a lot of pain for the Ukrainian people before we get to that point.

I will finish there because I have asked quite a few questions.

Deputy Ó Murchú has provided a smorgasbord for our witnesses. We are used to his flow of consciousness. Mr. Montgomery might like to come in first on those questions.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

Certainly. There were many interesting questions but I am conscious of the time. Will the Vice Chairman remind me of our finishing time?

We have until 12.30 p.m, if Mr. Montgomery is available until then.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

Of course. Without getting into the question of unity generally, I will make a couple of points. It certainly was important from more than a symbolic point of view to nail the issue down at the European Council meeting at the end of April 2017, which set the broad negotiating parameters. The then Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, did not secure a declaration that in the event of Irish unity, Northern Ireland would automatically enter into the EU, as was the case with East Germany. Some people are still asking that question and it is useful to consider it. I think other member states will regard the question of unity as one entirely for the Irish people to determine in the first instance and then for the Irish and British Governments to work out after that. I remain in touch with quite a few ambassadors here and they all have a keen interest in this question and how it is evolving.

I will give a little plug in saying I am a member of the steering committee of the Analysing and Researching Ireland, North and South, ARINS, project, which is a joint Royal Irish Academy-University of Notre Dame project to engage in research in a non-partisan way on the future of the island. We have came to notice because we co-sponsored with The Irish Times the recent series of polls on attitudes to unity and so on. There is a lot of information there. We have published 31 articles and I have done 19 podcasts. There is a lot of material if anybody wants to read it.

Regarding Britain's role as an ally to us in Europe, as I said, Britain was an important ally on a number of subjects. I have a couple of observations to make on this point. At times, people would talk as if we had spent 40-plus years speaking only to the British, which clearly is not the case. We always had other partners. France, for example, was our main ally on agriculture. When it came to the creation of the Structural Fund, we worked with the Spanish, Portuguese and Greeks. We have put a lot of effort, as Mr. Connelly said, into trying to structure and systemise relationships with other like-minded countries, but the fact is we always had good relationships with a number of key partners. It is interesting to look back to the 1970s and 1980s when the big issues on the agenda for a long time were the budget, with Mrs. Thatcher wanting to get her money back, and the agricultural fund. On those issues, Ireland and Britain were diametrically opposed. Funnily enough, that coincided with things beginning to evolve towards the peace process.

Deputy Ó Murchú is absolutely right on the rule of law question. Hungary has shown it is possible for a member state, in effect, to flout European norms. I do not know exactly how that can be dealt with. There is some use of finance as a kind of lever on Hungary but it is not easy. The Polish Government is shortly to decide on which way it will jump on certain recommendations to roll back some of its judicial reforms. We shall see. Incidentally, I think this is one of the issues that will be on people's minds when they consider Ukraine's application for membership because Ukraine is a country that has suffered a great deal of corruption and a degree of political instability. Whatever about the war, the question is whether Ukraine is in a position in the long term to fulfil all the obligations of membership. That is a question some member states will ask. They might not ask it publicly but it is a question that is there.

On austerity, I very much lived through all of that activity.

We soldiered together.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

Exactly. I started off in Brussels in 2009. The late Brian Lenihan was a great friend of mine and used to stay with me in Brussels when he was there for Council of Ministers meetings. The great thing about it was that the people in the Department of Finance, who were not generally keen on sharing information with me or with diplomats, knew Brian would tell me exactly what was going on, so they did not bother trying to pull the wool over my eyes. I had great friends in the Department, I have to say.

There is a debate to be had on the approach that was taken to austerity. The balance of economic argument has shifted since that time. I have a couple of things to say, if not in favour then in exculpation of the EU's actions. First, it found itself in an absolutely unprecedented situation. None of the tools necessary either to deal with the banking sector or more broadly were present. A whole range of things have since been put in place, including the stability mechanism and various banking reforms. In a way, everybody was kind of groping in the dark. The second thing I would say, to state the obvious, is that, fundamentally, we brought the necessity of support from elsewhere on ourselves.

We mishandled our economy very badly in the run up to austerity, as was obvious.

Less of the "we."

Would you like to direct these?

Mr. Rory Montgomery

To quote my old friend, "did we all party?" I do not know. However, one other point I will make is that there was an active debate on the reform of economic and monetary union, EMU, up to 2015 or 2016. When I was in the Department of the Taoiseach, I represented Government at official level in a lot of discussions about reform. The recovery of the economy and a lot of the issues that have come along since have swept a lot of this away. There is still a long-term question about whether there is sufficient fiscal and economic integration within the Union to sustain monetary union in the long term. These are issues that will come back sooner or later. However, thank God, they are not on the agenda at the moment. I have one more anecdote about the importance of communicating with the media. In hindsight, one of my stickier moments as permanent representative was in autumn 2010, about a month before the bailout. Deirdre Farrell, my wonderful press officer in the permanent representative's office, decided it would be a good idea for me to brief German journalists about the state of our economy. They were very polite and professional. However, as I went through the narrative of "fully funded" and "fundamentals are sound" and so on, I could sense their disbelief coming towards me in waves. It shows that you are performing, and in moments of crisis you have not only to persuade the domestic public but also on the wider European stage, if not the public then the infrastructure of politicians and media, that you are doing the right thing.

Liz Truss found that out too.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

She did.

Mr. Tony Connelly

I thank the Deputy for his questions. On Irish unity, the EU tends to run a mile from delicate constitutional questions that affect member states. We have seen this with Spain. Any time there are questions about an independent Scotland getting into the European Union, you will not get an official response because the doctrine is that this is left for national governments to decide. Once they have decided and resolved their constitutional questions, they can talk to the EU at that point for whatever reason. I also want to expand on Mr. Montgomery's anecdote about the 2017 European Council which established-----

(Interruptions).

Mr. Tony Connelly

The Irish Government and the then Taoiseach managed to have language inserted that essentially stated Northern Ireland would automatically be part of the European Union in the event of Irish unity. That took quite a battle. I am sure the Deputy has recollections of this. My understanding at the time was that the French were a little worried about what this language might mean. Would it put Europe on the hook for recommending or promoting Irish unity? Of course, capitals do not want to be involved in that. They do not want to know. I think there were also concerns raised by Cyprus over the EU's commitment to resolving the Irish border question and about whether this might set a precedent for Türkiye. Irish unity is never seen in isolation and in general ,the EU would not want to get involved until there is a settlement between the London and Dublin Governments, and the parties in Northern Ireland. That said, they were very keen to get involved in the Brexit negotiations because of the legacy of the Good Friday Agreement and the EU's contribution, not so much to the agreement itself, but afterwards to the funding and so on. They saw the Irish peace process as one of the few success stories with EU money stamped on it. I think EU officials went to Colombia some time afterwards to talk to Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC, guerrillas about spending money to break down barriers within communities, using EU structural funding, peace funds and so on. They were using Northern Ireland as an example.

I will turn to the question on austerity. I covered the Greek and the Irish bailouts. I was in Athens quite a few times over that period and it was a tremendously violent and awful period. There is certainly a consensus that the European Commission and the IMF recipe at the time was too strict for the cycle that the Greek economy was in. I remember talking to an Irish official who was part of the European Commission's delegation in Greece. He said that ultimately Greece could not borrow money anywhere so the EU and IMF were the only people who would lend money, and it would be European taxpayers footing the bill if there was a default. He said there were Slovak taxpayers who would be on the hook for this and their standard of living was lower than the Greek standard of living. There was a lot of politics around this. There was a lot of politics at the time. A lot of different constituencies were having to be balanced and, as Mr. Montgomery said, the EU simply did not have the tools to respond to this. I remember at the time there was a real existential threat to the euro, and possibly to the EU. The stakes were extremely high and mistakes were certainly made because of that. However, in retrospect it is generally correct to state that the EU would probably say it was too hard, certainly on Greece, at a time when the Greek economy simply could not cope with the level of austerity being applied.

There is a vibrant debate at the moment on the question of state aid. The state aid rules have been relaxed since Covid hit because countries are having to spend a lot more and they have used an exceptional clause in the Stability and Growth Pact to allow countries to spend more on essential issues. That will feed into a wider debate on the future of economic and monetary union. That debate will be kicking off in the next year or so. Along comes the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States, which is unfortunately referred to as the IRA in all of the correspondence and commentary at the moment. It usually causes me to jump whenever I hear it. I have still not internalised that. The Inflation Reduction Act has caused a lot of nervousness in Europe about the size of the state aid subsidies and spending the Biden Administration envisages for the green tech sector in the US, and how that will suck investment out of Europe. There is an ongoing debate on how much state aid we should have, and if countries should be allowed spend both to cope with the legacy of the pandemic and to try to counter the effect of the Inflation Reduction Act in the US. My indication so far from the Irish Government is that the Taoiseach, Deputy Varadkar, is a bit squeamish about simply loosening state aid strings too much. He says that ultimately taxpayers are on the hook for that money and often these projects may not be value for money. We will hear more about that in the coming weeks.

I thank the witnesses. I apologise for being late as I was doing local radio at 10.30 a.m. For anybody who has been in the European Parliament, we know that is the meat and potatoes to make sure people have some concept of what is happening at European level. I have one or two comments to be followed by one or two questions. Like Mr. Montgomery I am also one of Mr. Connelly's family and friends. Many times I have used his simple, clear and concise explanations.

I thank him for that because, again, it is all about communicating what is happening in a way people can understand.

There have been one or two interesting comments so far. Mr. Connelly mentioned the fact that when we outsourced responsibility for Brexit to the Commission and Mr. Barnier, we became stronger. Part of the debate here at that time was about bilaterals and going to capitals in other member states. There is nothing wrong with cementing relationships but when it came to Brexit, the fact that we relied on the EU made us so much stronger. We cannot always choose our battlefields but we can choose our tactics, which, in this case, were the right ones. I will make one other comment about Brexit that has been made in respect of the Commission and the Council. The Parliament was also hugely reliant on UK colleagues because there was a common understanding, common legal system and common way of doing things. On many occasions, I was very happy to see British Conservative and Labour Party rapporteurs of dossiers because there was a connection that made a real difference.

Mr. Montgomery commented on whether we have the systems to sustain physical integration. He mentioned the banking union and all of that. The Parliament, the Commission and the various institutions did some of that work but there is a lot more to be done. It is still a weak link and when other issues arise, links like that can sunder. We still have more to do there.

I have two questions. The first relates to the role of the European Parliament. Many people think in terms of the Council and the Commission. In my 15 years as an MEP, we had a very strong Commission from the very beginning with Mr. Barroso but, as time went on, and especially during the Juncker Commission, I definitely saw the Parliament gain more ground. Of course, we had the various treaties in the middle of all that. I sometimes think that because I was an MEP, I could see what was happening. There is an idea that it is really only ministers, prime ministers, commissioners and the Council that make a difference to European legislation but it absolutely is not. I have seen that very good, strong rapporteurs in trilogues - I have been a rapporteur - can have a huge impact on legislation and outcomes, for example, the fact that the Parliament was so strong in support of Ireland during Brexit, with involvement by the likes of Guy Verhofstadt. Indeed, those from all Irish parties and none played a real role in ensuring that support came. I sometimes feel the role of the Parliament is a little underrated. The people we send to represent us there really matters.

My other question relates to a matter mentioned by Mr. Connelly, namely, the Inflation Reduction Act in the US. My question is on the future of globalisation. Part of the raison d'être of the EU is around globalisation. With this new Act, President Biden is pumping hundreds of billions of dollars into companies who will produce green tech in the EU. We have just seen in the past day or two, President von der Leyen's green deal industrial plan, which is an attempt to counteract the Inflation Reduction Act. Part of that is around state aid and trade deals; she has four pillars, but those are two of them. Given that is how we are moving at present, how do the witnesses see globalisation and the role the EU will play? Germany and some of the larger European countries are looking very enviously at what is happening in the US; they want a slice of that cake. How do the witnesses see co-operation between the EU and the US?

We need more democratic input into how we transpose European legislation, not at the beginning but at the end. I have seen a number of examples where there is flexibility regarding legislation that may or may not be used by governments in member states in respect of directives. That is something we are lacking. In addition, and this is where we see the loss of the British, when we have draft legislation - of course governments have an input into it before it ever arrives in a document - we need within each Department, and at a centralised level, greater monitoring of very important draft documents, legislation, regulation etc. I do not think our input into that is anything like what it should be. I ask for comments on that.

Mr. Tony Connelly

I thank the Deputy. It is good to see her again. I remember meeting her many times in Brussels, although probably not as often as she would have preferred at the time. I take her point that the European Parliament does not get a fair crack of the whip as regards its profile. Certainly, RTÉ and other media tend to cover the plenary sessions in Strasbourg. The day-to-day work often gets overlooked, which is a pity. The Parliament does a massive amount of co-legislation. It is a very important institution but it is also a clearing house for many of the big issues that flow through Brussels. That is perhaps to its detriment in light of the Qatargate scandal, where there are allegations that Qatar and Morocco in particular have been funding MEPs and organisations to try to influence the Parliament and the complexion of different policies towards Gulf states.

As the Deputy said, significant work is done by rapporteurs and committees. Much of that work involves the very hard processing of EU legislation. It is very important that work is given its due consideration and coverage, where possible. The problem is it is just so vast. There are so many angles to it and more than 700 MEPs. The secret from a news point of view is to know, when it is covered, not every twist and turn can be covered but it should be covered when there is an outcome. Many of these outcomes are through, as the Deputy said, trilogues, which are very complicated pieces of machinery that bring the Commission, Parliament and Council together to try to reach a consensus on a particular topic. That is often done at 4 a.m.

I accept the Deputy's point regarding the importance of the Parliament. It is going through a difficult period in knowing how to respond to these allegations of corruption. Ms Roberta Metsola, the President of the Parliament, was in Dublin last week. She has a 14-point plan that would see quite a few changes, including much more transparency regarding who MEPs meet and when, and abolishing the friendship groups between MEPs and outside interests. The overall view is that there has to be legislation at EU level covering all the institutions. Ms Ursula von der Leyen proposed that when she became president of the Commission but nothing has really happened. The problem is that in order to have an EU ethics body, it has to essentially be proposed by the Commission and then agreed by the member states and the Parliament. That will take quite a long time. The Parliament is trying to produce something more quickly in the short term that will deal with that issue.

To address the globalisation question, there is a real debate at present about whether we are in a period of deglobalisation or even re-globalisation, whatever that means. This was the big theme at the World Economic Forum in January. The pandemic showed that globalisation does not often work when it comes to essential medical supplies, for example. Countries will hoard things in a pandemic and, therefore, other countries cannot get them. That then casts doubt on the effectiveness of supply chains.

The EU is now looking at ways to have much more autonomy on that level.

Loosening state aid rules is part of the Commission’s response to the Inflation Reduction Act. The problem is that a country like Germany, which has huge coffers, can spend much more on public works and supporting green tech. That puts it at an advantage over other countries. The principle of solidarity, which is supposed to underpin the Single Market, is then lost. I am not sure how the EU and the US will resolve their differences on this. Both sides have worked very well on this EU-US technical council. They have had quite a few meetings which seem to go quite well in terms of regulating huge digital corporations and how to manage that sphere between the EU and the US. If the EU and US cannot get it right, other actors will step in to take up the baton, perhaps China or others, which is not something that the West seems to be too much in favour of.

I do not see any appetite for an EU-US trade agreement that could deal with some of these issues. That seems to be off the table for now. In the meantime, we will get into a messy situation where the US does its thing on the Inflation Reduction Act and the EU tries to follow and will have to follow in such a way as to bring 27 countries along with it. That will be quite difficult. We should see more about this over the next few days.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

I have a brief footnote to what I said earlier in responding to what Mr. Connelly said about the European Council of April 2017, which adopted a negotiating mandate and also kind of confirmed Northern Ireland’s position in the European Union in the event of unity. It is an example of the kind of diplomatic-linguistic play that has to be engaged in. There was no willingness to have this statement as part of the negotiating mandate. It was not germane to negotiations between the EU and the UK. There was no appetite for the declaration, as such, for a similar reason. In the end, it appeared in the minutes of the European Council. There is such a thing. They were prepared by the secretariat, came around and they are authoritative, but they are not exactly widely publicised or widely known.

I have a couple of points. On the Parliament, I absolutely agree. When I was permanent representative, I always made an effort to travel to Strasbourg, to keep in touch with the Irish MEPs in Brussels and elsewhere, but also with the chairs of other committees and rapporteur and so on. It took a bit of effort. Strasbourg was the best place to do it and it is a five-hour drive, if I remember correctly. It was not easy. Again, however, as chair of COREPER, as I said at the outset, one of the key tasks in fact of a Presidency is negotiating with the Parliament on behalf of the Council. Many people think that when the member states reach an agreement, that is kind of it; however, it is not. For example, major legislation is going through at the moment. It is the alternative investment fund managers directive, which is very important for the funds industry in Ireland and so on. The ECON committee has come to a position the Council has agreed, but then there will be tough back and forth. I do not know how I was ever up until 4 a.m. As already stated, I was involved in many trilogues. One of these, which related to the capital requirements directive, which involved also the introduction of the bankers bonus measure, was the only occasion on which a parliamentarian ever used a four-letter word in my direction. I will tell you who it was in private on another occasion. That was important.

On the other institutional question of more input into scrutiny, this is a constant issue. There is an obligation on the Government and the Oireachtas. After the first Nice referendum was defeated, the European Union (Scrutiny) Act was introduced. I was involved in its preparation. In my experience, it improved matters. Did it go far enough in terms of the engagement of specialist committees? I do not know. Perhaps not. Secondary legislation can be horrendously technical. The Deputy is right that there is very often a view - again, I found it hard to know authoritatively - of gold-plating, namely, that in the context of directives we do not necessarily use the discretion we have to implement the rules in a sensitive way. That is an ongoing matter.

Mr. Connelly made a point about the IRA and globalisation. In the US, the term "IRA" also stands for individual retirement account, which complicates matters further. This is a difficult issue. I would not underestimate the consensus across the board in the US on taking advantage of these measures. I watched an interview on Sunday on the American politics show, “Meet the Press”, with Pete Buttigieg, who is the Secretary of Transportation and the once, and perhaps future, presidential candidate. Mr. Buttigieg is extremely able man. He stated that the objective was to have cars made in America. He wants things made in America. The US will not be diverted from that fundamental objective of “reshoring”, as they put it. At the same time, the EU has been making the point, and not unreasonably, that there are special provisions for Mexico and Canada that the EU should have as well. There is a full press. Commission representatives have travelled over. I think the French and the German economy ministers or finance ministers are there at the moment. We will see what happens.

On the trade agreement, the Deputy is absolutely right. I refer to one of our achievements in our presidency. Deputy Richard Bruton was the Minister involved and I well remember the long day and night in Luxembourg we had getting a mandate for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP, which President Obama said he believed could be concluded on one tank of gas. Well, the car ran out of petrol a certain way into the journey and it was never refilled. What Mr. Connelly said is right. The answer is more in dealing with particular issues as they arise. Of course, regulation of the digital sector is perhaps the single greatest challenge we should face in that kind of space.

I will ask a couple of questions and then give the floor to Senator Martin. I thank our guests for their forbearance. This has been a most interesting session. Needless to say, much of the ground that I had initially taken note of has been well covered. It is understandable that a lot of the discussions are not actually looking in the rear-view mirror of the past 50 years. They are quite rightly looking forward to prepare for the next 50 years, as I said. I have experience of chairing Council meetings, trilogues in the Parliament and so on. How can we do these things better is one of things I hope that will emerge from our considerations

My first question is for Mr. Montgomery. In my experience, there is a certain balancing to be done between the Departments of the Taoiseach and Foreign Affairs in terms of European affairs. The centre of gravity has moved between both. Most of the time, it has overlapped. Now that Mr. Montgomery is free of the public service constraints, I would be interested in his take on where the most effective location for driving the European agenda lies. Alternatively, does it, by necessity, require that overlap, with a Department of Foreign Affairs official becoming an official of the Department of the Taoiseach or vice versa?

I will ask Mr. Montgomery three questions. On the embassies issue, just for the future, I was interested in his take of quality rather than quantity, which is a cheap way of describing what he said. We need more in-depth focus on the most influential rather than a broad spread to include everybody. Is that an unfair characterisation of what he said? What does he mean in the context of what we need to be doing with the French? The French have put enormous effort into strengthening their relationship with Ireland since Brexit. I have not, I must say, noticed the same focus from Germany. However, France certainly has, and there is clear drive to deepen that. Is that the sort of thing we should be doing with France and Germany on a regional basis?

When I was in government, I wanted to develop the role of the European Parliament. My view was that we looked entirely at the European Council and the European Commission. We did not put in an awful lot of effort, except during our Presidency, when we were involved in trilogues with the Parliament.

One of my bugbears in dealing with legislation that comes here is that legislative requirements that have been years in the making are often presented to us in the Oireachtas with a deadline of months or sometimes weeks as if this is a rubber-stamping effort. I am conscious that I started in politics a long time ago. We had a secondary legislation committee of the Oireachtas, but the volume of work was infinitely less than at present. It would be overwhelming to deal with it now, but we need to deal with it in some shape or form. If democratic accountability and scrutiny are to be effective, we need to do it in a better way than to be presented with basically a finished article and told we have no manoeuvre on it because it is all agreed except for our rubber stamp, as if the Oireachtas were of no consequence in the process.

I wish to ask Mr. Connelly about where Ireland fits, oscillating between the Hanseatic League countries, prudent fiscal people, and the more expansive Franco-Mediterranean people. Where do we fit in that regard? Ours is obviously now a successful economy. We are a net contributor to the EU budget, as Mr. Connelly clearly outlined in his submission, but where do we fit in terms of building those alliances? Is it possible to be promiscuous in the alliances and partnerships one builds on a given issue, or is a long-term settling partnership the most effective way of dealing with the European institutions?

I have one add-on question to the Inflation Reduction Act, IRA, question. I have just looked at the figures. Since the lessening of state aid rules from early last year until the end of last year, more than two thirds of all state aid allocated or endorsed by the European Commission has come from France and Germany. If state aid means that those with the deepest pockets can afford to distort the internal market, where does that leave us and where should Ireland be in that regard? Are our pockets sufficiently deep to compete in our little domestic market with the best of them or should that cause us deep concern?

My final question is a fundamental one with which we have been grappling for a while, and it has been touched on in a number of the contributions. For the future, how do we deal with a country such as Hungary where what we understood were the essential values of the European Union are no longer applicable? I read an article in, I think, The Irish Times today. I think it was a transposition of an article in The New York Times about the treatment of the new US ambassador to Hungary, whereby values we hold dear are shredded. Should we simply determine that there is no space for that within the Union? Do we retreat from it or confront it? I am not sure there is a solution but I would be interested in hearing an opinion.

Maybe we will start with Mr. Montgomery this time.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

On the European Parliament, engagement as much as possible is important. The trouble at political level is, as I said at the beginning, that there are so many demands on Ministers' and Deputies' time. Geographically, getting to Strasbourg from here, as Deputy Harkin will know, is not so easy, but engagement is certainly something we should do as far as possible.

Most importantly, there are no votes in it.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

Yes, exactly. Having said that, one thing Mr. Connelly alluded to that we have not mentioned as being increasingly important is the role of not only the groups in the European Parliament but also the Parliament political families. I was very struck during my time, whether it was Brian Cowen initially or Enda Kenny afterwards, that the first port of call before a European Council meeting was always the meeting of the Taoiseach's political family. There are similar meetings at finance level, foreign affairs level and so on. At times, politically, we can find ourselves supporting a particular viewpoint because it is the consensus in the Taoiseach's political family, even if it is not necessarily the political consensus or directly in our national interest. Fundamentally, however, such engagement is a very good thing. That is my first point.

As for the balance between the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Foreign Affairs, I spent three years all together in the former, one year as a counsellor and two years as a second secretary. It is a difficult question. A small number of countries have moved to bring everything over to the prime minister's office. Sweden is the best example of that. It is not the case in most countries. The reality is that, over the years, and in particular because the European Council, after Lisbon, is attended only by the Taoiseach and not, as was the case previously, also by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, occasionally, the Minister for Finance, there has without question been a shift. In this crisis mode many of the big decisions have had to be made by the leaders, as opposed to the normal legislative business, which is more for the Council. Having said that, I think a balance is possible. I think the Taoiseach's Department, above all, sees itself as servicing the Taoiseach in his or her ventures. Also, when big calls come to be made before a European Council meeting or something, it makes sense for the Taoiseach's Department to drive that. At the same time, mostly because of the economic crisis, as the committee will know, there was a shift for five years from 2011 to 2016. One of the problems which I think the then Secretary General of the Department of the Taoiseach felt was that the overall architecture of the Department meant there were far too many people leading on European affairs compared with the other things the Department was doing. In many ways, therefore, it made sense to bring most of the day-to-day work, as well as the networking and the contact building, back to the Department of Foreign Affairs. Also, the Department of Foreign Affairs has the direct relationship with our embassies in a way the Taoiseach's Department would not have the time, the capacity or even the institutional role to do. I think it is balanced. Like with all these things, it depends a huge amount on personalities and common sense. I introduced in the Taoiseach's Department a more systematic co-ordination arrangement, which we intensified during Brexit, and that continues to this day, I believe. Then the Taoiseach's Department steps in as necessary, so I think it can work.

On embassies, it is undoubtedly good we have an embassy in every member state. We should not be closing them down. I remember very well the decision taken in autumn 2004, just after our 2004 Presidency, and the feeling after the great enlargement of 1 May 2004. I would not say the embassies are not doing useful work. The reality, of course, is that, as the Vice Chairman said, when it comes to debate in the Union, the people who really count in most things are the French and the Germans and a few of the other big countries. Then, when it comes to our specific interests, there are like-minded countries with which it is useful to build networks and relationships. I am not saying it is not worth having the input, but a small country far away - I will not mention any particular country - will not take a particular line on Brexit one way or the other. It will take its cue from the general consensus. The idea that having a representative in a specific country made a big difference is therefore not correct, in my opinion. Having said that, to close down the embassies we have would send the wrong signals.

As I said in my opening remarks, that we have greatly increased the capacities of our missions in France and Germany and expanded a number of others, often with local and expert staff coming in to supplement the diplomats, can be very important. We have worked very hard with the French. In fairness to the Germans, I do not know whether this continues, but when Niall Burgess was Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, he instituted a system of consultations between Secretaries General, with a number of them on each side. The Germans have shown a lot of interest in talking. The German foreign ministry has a dialogue with the Department of Foreign Affairs. In fairness, I think the Germans are making an effort. It is true there was the French Presidency last year, but Niall Burgess, who is now ambassador in Paris, told me some incredible number of Irish Ministers were in Paris during that year, some for EU business but many for other business as well, and that is very valuable and important.

I have nothing more to say about the amount of state aid except that, during the Brexit negotiations, I remember having a look at who was availing of state aid. There was a great deal of anxiety that the British would somehow unsettle the level playing field. The reality was the British proportion of state aid was the second lowest, in fact, in the entire European Union. The lowest proportion of state aid as a percentage of GDP was Ireland's, and the French and the Germans' were much higher. The Vice Chairman is correct that there are questions there.

On values, I do not have an answer. On the treaties, in the Nice treaty, if the members remember, for the first time the People's Party in Austria had come into Government and there was an element of sending them to Coventry for a period. The former taoisigh, Mr. Brian Cowen and Mr. Bertie Ahern, both in a human way, would sit beside their Austrian colleagues to keep them company and cheer them up, but it was difficult. Then the provision for suspension was put into the treaties, but it cannot work because it requires unanimity bar the country concerned. Up to now at least, Poland and Hungary have been involved in an alliance. Others would be very uncomfortable about seeing this used. Therefore, I do not know what one can do.

Coming back to the American ambassador in Hungary, the fact he is a gay is a huge issue. We had more than one, but we had, in particular, a gay ambassador to one quite large country. He found his husband was not treated in the same way as spouses of other ambassadors would have been and it was difficult. I will say our embassies have made efforts as far as they can within the parameters of diplomatic relations. Professor Michael Ignatieff, the former Canadian politician and intellectual and founder of the Central European University, when he visited Dublin in the autumn, spoke to me warmly about one of my former colleagues, Counsellor Pat Kelly, who had helped fund a series of lectures about liberal values. We do our best but, to be honest, there is not an answer. It is hard because the treaties would need to be changed. Maybe money gives some leverage but it only goes so far. For all that the Hungarians want to get their full share of the Structural Funds and the Renew Europe money, there is not much sign they are changing their course.

Mr. Tony Connelly

To pick up on Mr. Montgomery's point about embassies, I would make one observation. Obviously, when the decision to open embassies in every member state was taken, none of this could have been envisaged but the Government is probably happy now there are embassies in the Baltic states at this time because the centre of gravity is shifting east in terms of the war in Ukraine and in terms of Ukaine's accession. I am sure the political reporting from those countries is vital.

On the question of where Ireland fits, the way it was put to me by a senior Irish official only a few weeks ago was that we are a constructive, progressive member state and we take positions and we argue our case. It is true Ireland has always - it is a bit of a cliché - punched above its weight. Certainly, in the Brexit negotiations, the Irish question was well handled. It was prominent in the minds of member states which perhaps would not have had any innate sense of Irish political history. There was, obviously, a huge pedagogical operation ongoing by the Irish Government, of which effort Mr. Montgomery was part.

We are under the spotlight in terms of the big digital technological companies in Ireland, the question of the general data protection regulation, GDPR, and whether the Irish Data Protection Commissioner is able to handle all of these cases in a bipartisan manner. One will always get that suspicion in some quarters. Of course, there is new legislation coming down the tracks on e-evidence and social media requirements to provide information on hate speech etc. This will place a burden on the Irish Data Protection Commissioner in terms of providing information, if other member states need it, when it comes to e-evidence that might be part of a social media company that has its headquarters in Ireland.

On climate change, we have our own particular problems but the Irish position is well understood. There is much more accommodation of diverging issues at EU level.

The NGO VoteWatch, which does a lot of analysis of votes in Parliament and at Council level, has a chart of how member states view their friendships and alliances. The hard reality is, as far as I am aware, that countries such as Ireland do not feature obviously as much as perhaps we think we do in terms of when a country wants to have a particular position and defend it or promote it. Ireland is not necessarily the first country they will go to. They go to the big countries which have the higher numbers of votes at Council. That is merely a function of our size and population, but it is true to say we have an outsized influence. We are English speaking. We have a unique relationship with America. We have a unique relationship with the UK. I remember speaking to a senior figure in the European Council who said he relied on the then Taoiseach and now Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Micheál Martin, to tell him what was happening in the UK and the US in terms of understanding even the UK tabloid culture. Therefore, Ireland has assets it can and should continue to use in that regard.

On Hungary, I would agree with Mr. Montgomery. It is difficult for the EU. People have argued that Hungary was tolerated for too long in the European People's Party group in the European Parliament. They have since left the European People's Party, EPP. The carrot-and-stick approach appears not to have worked. I have a friend who was there last weekend and he said the degree of billboarding around attacking sanctions against Russia is overwhelming. Speaking to a Hungarian journalist a few weeks ago, he said the Prime Minister of Hungary, Mr. Viktor Orbán, does not kill journalists; he kills newspapers. There are ways in which he does that. That is clearly worrying to the EU, but the threat to withdraw funds does not seem to have changed Mr. Orbán's approach all that much. The one difference now is that Poland is not quite such an ally of Hungary since the invasion of Ukraine, and that may rearrange the furniture a little in terms of how Hungary deports itself at EU level.

I thank the Vice Chairperson and our guest expert speakers. It has been a long but most invigorating session and much ground has been covered. I will conclude by asking two Brexit-related questions because our guests' viewpoints are truly valued. With the true expertise they have comes, it goes without saying, inherent objectivity, impartiality and independence.

I am concerned about the protocol. At the end of the day, if Northern Ireland has the best of both worlds, one of those worlds is clearly the Single Market, which comes with benefits such as access to that market but also obligations. Considering that indisputable fact, I would like our guests' opinion on the following political thorny issue. Must they not be subject to some sort of European court jurisdiction and have some accountability? That might well be politically unpalatable to the unionist community. I do not say it with glee. I merely say it from a realistic point of view. Would our guests agree? If they could look into their crystal ball, is that unfudgeable,as it were? It is difficult to park that one completely.

The next one is a little more long term. I have sympathies with Scotland. We have much in common.

The majority of both the Northern Ireland and the Scottish jurisdiction voted to stay in Europe. However, Northern Ireland has two extra dimensions, which I am sure Mr. Montgomery appreciates. It will get the best of both worlds and has a unique situation with the Good Friday Agreement, where people in Northern Ireland are entitled to citizenship, in that context.

I know corridors of power have opened up in Strasbourg and Brussels. What is Mr. Montgomery's opinion on the possibility of Northern Ireland having a formal voice in EU business? Ought the Republic of Ireland, as its name is designated in statute, be front and centre in facilitating a voice to come into the Twenty-six Counties and lobby for that, or is the way forward via Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom to insist on a voice around the table for the residents of Northern Ireland? Mr. Montgomery might update us on that access. I believe it is improving all the time. Northern Ireland has indirect and informal access. That is all very good, but I wish to see a more overt, front-of-shop, legitimate and valid voice for the people of Northern Ireland in the EU. After all, the majority of them wanted to embrace and be part of it.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

A couple of the questions bear on ongoing parts of the negotiation which Mr. Connelly spoke about earlier. There is no way to get away from the European Court of Justice, ECJ, having the final role in interpreting the application of EU law. The protocol is not an ordinary trade agreement or even the EU-UK free trade agreement, where one can have a system of arbitration at the apex of the system. It is not necessary to have the ultimate recourse to the ECJ, where something happens which raises serious questions. It may well be. There are discussions about this - I do not know how it might be solved - whereby an additional layer might be put between the structures for dispute resolution and the ECJ and some sort of arbitration could be provided for. However, sooner or later, I do not see how one could get away from the ECJ. This is a neuralgic sovereignty point. The trouble is that with the DUP, which has not made much of this and especially with the European Research Group, ERG, and the Tories, there are practical issues which can be effectively 95% sorted out in the way Mr. Connelly was describing and then there are the ideological issues of principles involved. I just do not see how those can be gotten over.

I will add a footnote. Keir Starmer gave his clear support to Rishi Sunak. I remember back in 2019, when Theresa May was struggling to get her deal through, David Lidington and Keir Starmer had many exchanges. Simon Coveney was talking to them, individually, all the time. If it had been left to people's good will, it might have been possible to sort something out. Theresa May, however, knew that her exit would be hastened even further if she relied upon the Labour Party, and Jeremy Corbyn was never going to rescue the Tories from their own mess.

The question of a democratic deficit for Northern Ireland is an important point in the longer term. Katy Hayward, professor at Queen's University in Belfast, has raised this point. There are mechanisms in Brussels whereby non-EU countries in the EEA and Schengen arrangement, for that matter, are part of structures of consultation and involvement. It might seem a bit over-elaborate to institute such an arrangement specifically for Northern Ireland, but I wonder whether there is a way this could creatively be used as a model. I do not know whether this is being talked about. At the very least, it seems to be a potential flanking measure to be worked out in the future.

As far as the Government is concerned, it is interesting, because the Good Friday Agreement and the North-South Ministerial Council provisions talk about EU issues being discussed and the Government taking account. The basic problem is that I do not think the unionists would ever accept, in any formal way, that the Government was some kind of voice for Northern Ireland in the EU. Having said that, we are able to play our part. The chair, as Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, would have been very much involved in the negotiations over the EU budget and financial framework. Part of that was the continuation of the PEACE programme.

Even though the great bulk of the PEACE programme money was going to Northern Ireland, for two years on the Committee of Permanent Representatives, COREPER, as we were discussing the future EU budget, I invariably mentioned PEACE. I remember Eamon Gilmore mentioning it to Herman Van Rompuy, who was the President of the European Council. I met Arlene Foster last week and the only previous occasion we had met each other was back in approximately 2010, when the Northern Ireland Executive, with the British, was looking for state aid approval for a large investment in Bombardier, the aircraft manufacturer in Belfast, which is now owned by Embraer. Behind the scenes, as best we could, we spoke in favour of this application. In fact, a dinner was organised in Brussels to celebrate the fact that they got it. I was invited, as were my colleagues from the permanent representation. In the glory days in the European Parliament, Ian Paisley and John Hume used to work together on agricultural matters, but to create a structure is quite difficult.

I remember those negotiations and going to the Cabinet Office in London. The British position on the European budget at the time was that they did not want a cent of additionality and would not ask for anything. The agreement we had to come to was that, if we asked, the British would not object.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

Exactly. I remember meeting with Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness during the Presidency. I had to explain this to them. The British permanent representative was not even able to meet them at the time. We did our best with them.

We will give Mr. Connelly the final word.

Mr. Tony Connelly

I agree with what Mr. Montgomery said about the ECJ. This is an extremely difficult issue for the European Union, especially given the strong suspicion among member states that it is an ideological issue brought in by David Frost with the command paper in July 2021, as a kind of a stop to Brexiteer ideologues in the ERG, and that it was not something that had ever been raised by Northern Ireland businesses, stakeholders or even parties, in the talks up to that point. At the same time, anybody I get to speak to who is close to these negotiations say that if they get through all the other issues and get agreement on customs and sanitary and phytosanitary, SPS, checks and if the ECJ thing is the last hurdle before agreements, they will find some form of words or a mechanism.

There has been speculation about having a layer of arbitration somewhere in between in order that if an issue of EU law had to be clarified, it would go to the ECJ and ECJ's opinion would then go to the arbitration layer in between, to say this is the ECJ's orthodoxy on this and that would essentially be binding. However, that is just speculation. I do not know where this will end up. Certainly the ERG will not get its demands that the ECJ be stripped out of the protocol altogether, but it may find some form of words.

I know when I looked at Northern Ireland getting some representation before, certainly to have some kind of observer status at the European Parliament would be difficult, because the fear is that the Catalans might want something similar. One always runs into these problems. There is a joint consultative working group, which is part of the protocol. The UK has been pushing for that layer to be much more active, much sooner, in order that, essentially if the EU is bringing out new legislation or updating existing rules, the machinery will be alerted in quicker time, in order that the UK and Northern Ireland stakeholders can observe and look at what is promised.

According to the protocol, if there is brand new legislation coming in that does not exist already and which will have an effect on the movement of goods into Northern Ireland, then the UK can raise a flag and object but it would need to have a very good reason to do that. One would have to ask what the existential worry would be for the UK about a particular Bill. I know there are strong issues around medicines, state aid and energy with the cost-of-living crisis at the moment. In the final package, we will see something on what is called governance, which will deal with this question of having some kind of stronger role for Northern Ireland institutions. We just have not seen the detail of that just yet.

I thank both the witnesses. It has been a most interesting session from all our perspectives and we are very grateful for their expertise and time. The committee will not meet next week as members will travel to Strasbourg.

The joint committee adjourned at 12.51 p.m. until 9.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 22 February 2023.
Top
Share