Joint Committee on European Union Affairs debate -
Wednesday, 28 Jun 2023

EU Enlargement and the Western Balkans: Discussion

An Cathaoirleach

On behalf of the committee, I welcome Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, EU special representative for the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and other western Balkan regional issues who is joining us online. Due to a technical issue, we will have audio but we will not have a visual link for the moment. At today's meeting we will discuss EU enlargement in the western Balkans, focusing on the situation on the ground and the barriers to enlargement that ongoing conflicts create.

Before we begin, I will read a note on privilege. All witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of a person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply with any such direction.

Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside of the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. I also remind members of the constitutional requirement that they must be physically present within the confines of the Leinster House complex in order to participate in public meetings. I will not permit a member to participate where he or she is not adhering to this requirement. Therefore, any member who attempts to participate from outside the precincts will be asked to leave the meeting. In this regard, I ask any member participating via MS Teams to confirm he or she is on the grounds of the Leinster House campus prior to making a contribution.

I understand that we have until 11 a.m. Irish time for our engagement this morning. I invite Mr. Lajčák to make his opening statement and thank him for joining us this morning.

Mr. Miroslav Lajčák

Dia dhaoibh. I thank the committee for inviting me to address it today. I wish I could have been with the committee in person but, unfortunately, the serious crises we are encountering in north Kosovo mean I cannot leave Brussels. However, I appreciate the opportunity to speak and appreciate the committee's attention to the western Balkans. I will focus my introductory remarks on three important aspects: first, 2022 as an exceptional year for enlargement and how we get there; second, rethinking enlargement; and third, the challenges in the region.

I have 25 years of personal experience with the western Balkans in many different national and international capacities. Since April 2020, I have been responsible for the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and other regional issues so the views I will present are mostly based on my personal experience.

We had a moment of hope in Thessaloniki in 2003 when we promised that the future of the western Balkans is in the EU but, unfortunately, in the 20 years since, only one western Balkan country, Croatia, has joined the EU. That was in 2013, ten years ago. This is not the speed or level of progress that our leaders envisaged 20 years ago. What is worse is the opening speech of the then President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, in 2014 who said there would be no enlargement during the mandate of his Commission. That sent a very negative signal to the region and discouraged the pro-European forces there. The region started losing hope that it would one day join the EU and the EU’s credibility has eroded to the extent that we are no longer seen as a role model or example and we were criticised for mentoring and lecturing the region while not being honest and moving the goal posts. I would say the lowest point came in 2019-2020 but that was also the beginning of an awakening on the side of the EU and understanding that we are not doing well and we are losing the region and opening the space for other players who are not EU friends.

What changed the situation dramatically is Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. Ironically, with all the tragedies and the negative effects on the global architecture, the war did have a positive impact on EU enlargement policy because, first, it put an end to the illusion that Europe can be truly united, prosperous and at peace with the western Balkans still being left outside. In a way, the war has brought EU enlargement back to life and enlargement was made political again. For years, we had reduced enlargement into a bureaucratic, technical exercise, ticking boxes and speaking about chapters and clusters and not about values or joint positions on crucial international issues. The war in Ukraine made the bold decisions on the side of the European Union suddenly possible. Therefore, last year the EU delivered a number of important decisions which seemed unthinkable before, namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with Moldova and Ukraine, were granted candidate status, long overdue accession negotiations were launched with Albania and North Macedonia and Kosovo finally got the green light for visa liberalisation.

These are big things but let me be honest. They are not the result of the huge progress on the side of the region but rather these are overdue decisions on our side, and they are also seen and understood as such by the region.

The mood in the EU nowadays is different. Future membership and enlargement are no longer taboos. More and more member states realise that only EU membership can achieve what we aspire for in Europe.

This brings me to my second point, which is the need to rethink our approach to enlargement. We know that is a long process; it is a marathon rather than a sprint. What is most important is enlargement is a political process that is based on technical criteria. As I said, we prioritised the technical aspects of the process over years, neglecting the political aspects, which was a mistake. Now, the issue of joining our sanctions on Russia, aligning with our sanctions and our foreign policy and defence policy statements have become a prominent issue. However, that is how it should be because this is about shared values.

The process of enlargement does not work well. There are at least two examples that prove that. First, there is a clear disconnect between the progress on the technical aspects and progress in the accession process. We have analysis showing that the progress in implementing the technical criteria is not reflected in the speed of the progress of individual countries. Countries that are part of the accession negotiations for years are not meeting certain criteria that countries that have not yet started accession are already meeting. Normally, it is should be that when a country meets the technical criteria, it is given the green light to progress. This is not happening.

The second is the issue of the length of the accession process. My own country, Slovakia, together with Latvia and Lithuania, completed the accession negotiations in 34 months. Estonia, Poland and Slovenia completed their process in 56 months. Now Serbia is negotiating for 112 months and closed two chapters. Montenegro is negotiating for 130 months and closed three chapters. It is very clear that this process is going nowhere and that gives very little hope to the countries that the membership prospective is tangible and credible.

Therefore, we need to rethink our approach to enlargement, on which I would like to make three key points. First, we need to recommit to the enlargement and the message from Thessanoliki in 2003. Second, we need to overcome the fear of enlargement. It something I do not really understand because we invented the enlargement process, we are setting the rules, we are fully in control and the process is reversible. We should depoliticise the early stages when inviting parties to be part of the process and be political when we assess the progress and when we decide on closing the chapter. Third, we also need to have an honest discussion about practical interim solutions. One issue that is being discussed a lot in Brussels but outside of the European institutions is the gradual integration or staged accession. Basically, the philosophy is that we should end the binary system of limited pre-accession assistance and then massive post-accession funds after the country has joined. We should allow the countries to progress towards accession in stages according to the reforms achieved, with each stage giving access to increased funds. In addition, we should establish a consolidation phase at the end of the negotiation, before full membership - something like being in the room but with out the veto right, so that we know that the countries are fully ready. These are not official ideas but it is clear that we address the methodology of the process of enlargement.

It is also clear that the momentum that was created a year ago will not last forever. It is unfortunate that the positive developments on our side are not reflecting on the side of the western Balkans. The region still does not believe that we are honest when we speak about the European future and, as such, they do not seem to have the necessary motivation to undertake the actions that they are required to. We see very little progress on the reforms. There is very little progress on resolving bilateral disputes. We see increased political instability. We see a weakening of pro-European forces in these countries. Issues of the past are resurfacing and taking too much time of the current politicians. The future EU perspective is not the beacon that would guide their actions and steps the way it was in the case of countries in central Europe, for example.

This brings me to my last point, which is the challenges we are facing. We look at the region as such but, of course, there are six countries in the region and they are still grappling with unresolved challenges that have the potential to contribute instability and friction. In this context, I would like to draw members’ attention to some particular issue. I refer to North Macedonia. North Macedonia and Albania were invited to start accession negotiations last year. They are in the screening process. However, for North Macedonia to start the real accession process, it still needs to adopt constitutional changes related to the Bulgarian language. The country is struggling to collect the necessary number of votes. I believe we need to help the country the best we can to get over the last hurdle. Otherwise, we will face the risk of decoupling Albania and North Macedonia and leaving North Macedonia behind. That would be a bad mistake because North Macedonia has been very committed and has met every request coming from the European Union. It does not deserve to be left behind.

My second point, which I see as the most strategic challenge we are facing in the Balkans, is the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. This affects the entire region. In February and March of this year, we achieved landmark agreements on the path towards normalisation, which represents a solid platform to make rapid progress towards normalisation. However, unfortunately, since the end of May, we again in the midst of a crisis and this crisis is distracting us from our efforts. Instead of focusing on normalisation, we are again fully busy with crisis management. European Union’s 27 member states presented a proposal consisting of three points: de-escalation; new elections in the north with the participation of Kosovo Serbs; and a return to the dialogue and normalisation. I ask members for their support for this plan also.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is deeply dysfunctional. There have been some promising developments in the federation, but still, the underlying issues are very much present and prevent the country from progressing. We need to address the issue of the dysfunctionality of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Finally, do not lose sight of Montenegro. The country has been seen as most successful and has been a frontrunner on enlargement but, for the past three years, has dealt more with internal issues and issues of the past, such as ethnicity, religion or culture, rather than progressing on the EU path. Now, it is forming a new government after the elections. It has a chance to catch up and reconfirm its role of being a front-runner. However, it needs to put together a pro-European government and we need to be very clear on that.

We need act quickly, politically and now. If we want to see the EU as a global player, particularly after the war in Ukraine, when the new world order will be discussed, we want the Union to be at the table. It will not happen if we are still busy with the western Balkans, the same way we have been busy five or ten years ago - or now. Therefore, the only way is to offer a European future to the next generations in the western Balkans. I do not see a credible alternative. For this, we need full commitment, out-of-the-box thinking and we need to be credible again. I thank members for their attention.

An Cathaoirleach

I thank Mr. Lajcák for his opening remarks. A number of members who would like to ask him questions. It was an interesting contribution. He covered quite a range of areas. I have one comment. I appreciate what he said about examining again at how membership could be developed and the interim stage idea. Perhaps it is something in the Irish way of thinking or whatever, but I always caution against a temporary solution.

Temporary solutions have a way of becoming very long term and could effectively result in a two-tier EU, which is I something I have reservations about. As Mr. Lajčák knows, both at Oireachtas and Government level, we have a strong commitment to enlargement and working to ensure that enlargement is carried out as effectively and speedily as possible. That is the premise of much of the work this committee has done. We have met representatives of many of the countries involved, including parliamentary and, in some instances, ministerial delegations, and have conveyed that message to them.

Our members have a number of questions for Mr. Lajčák.

Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú

I thank Mr. Lajčák. His presentation was not only comprehensive but very interesting. We expected some of it. It is fair to say, and this is a point that many of us have made many times, that prior to the Ukrainian crisis and the Russian invasion the EU was not particularly serious about further accession. Let us be clear, the EU had its own worries regarding rule-of-law issues, particularly in Hungary. As we saw in commentary even up until recent times, especially from France, there was an element of getting our own house in order before anyone else is let in. Geopolitics has now completely changed. Mr. Lajčák made the biggest point: people have to be offered a European future or they will have no choice but to find something else. While I share the Chair's worries regarding some interim solution that becomes long term, I understand, because it has been said by many previously regarding accession, that there needs to be an element of the EU not only providing people with a route map but meeting them along the road. That means that success has to be fostered and developed.

Let us be clear, however, that the Copenhagen criteria are there. We are in a better place in the sense that at least there is now a real conversation about accession. I imagine people in North Macedonia are incredibly annoyed. I have a certain element of sensitivity in that regard, as they want to be considered as almost being on their own due to the huge strides they have made, and believe they have been treated unfairly. That is something that has to be taken into account.

We all know the history of the Balkans. It is part of the reason this European future is necessary from a stability point of view. There are game players who are playing games. We hear of Russian involvement and stories out of Kosovo about boycotts of Serbian-Kosovar politicians. There have been border disputes. Three Kosovan police officers were arrested for a period in what were obviously contested circumstances and have been released. None of this is particularly good. Laws have been passed recently in Republika Srpska that basically reject the constitutional court. This is almost a row-back from the peace deals that got us through the wars of the 1990s. All this has to be taken into account.

While people have to be provided with a route map and a means of a European future, we need to ensure we foster relationships with those who, for want of a better term, want to do the right thing. We have to address some of these issues. I would like Mr. Lajčák's opinions on what the involvement is from outside players. We hear about Chinese investment and, as I said, particularly Russian involvement, and we know about Russia's long-term relationship with many countries across the Balkans.

Mr. Miroslav Lajčák

It is clear we need a fresh approach and out-of-the-box thinking because the old methodology is not producing the results we wish to see. I fully understand the Chair's fear of temporary solutions and the risk of ending up with a two- or three-speed Europe. At the same time, what I see on the side of a number of member states is fear of the ethical dilemma of enlargement versus functionality. We know how important the functionality of the EU is in these difficult times. I see that many member states are afraid that bringing new members in would further weaken our ability to decide swiftly. Of course, the issue of decision-making will have to be addressed but that is a very complex issue. Therefore, during this consultation period, and I am now speaking more in a personal capacity, countries of the western Balkans would be very happy to be able to sit at the table to discuss their European issues because normally, when these countries are invited, it is because we are talking about them. They would then believe we are serious and that their European future is a reality. Of course, under certain rules, it has to be defined when they will become fully fledged members because we do not want them to be second-class members. The issue of functionality is very much an issue in Brussels.

I thank Deputy Ó Murchú for his comments and remarks. I see he is very well oriented in complex Balkan affairs. The thesis or narrative that we need to get our house in order first and then deal with the Balkans has been around for many years and, unfortunately, has been responsible for the problems we have there. These countries cannot wait. They are real countries, and real people, political parties and political life are there. We cannot put them on the back burner and say, "Wait until we are ready for you" because when we are finally ready, they might no longer be ready for us. We have weakened European political forces in the region. We said five years ago that you cannot win elections in Europe running on the enlargement ticket. Now, you do not win elections in the Balkans running on the EU ticket. I believe the EU has the capacity to address both issues in parallel, that is, to deal with our own issues but at the same time to let the parties show how committed they are to meeting the criteria. We should not offer any short cuts or discounts. We should also not be moving the goalposts as we have done in the past.

It is a mistake to make politics out of entering into accession negotiations, which we do. Let these countries enter the process and let us be very demanding when they present the results because this is what is fully in our hands. We should make sure that when they progress and close chapters, they have met all the criteria. This is a political decision but it should not be politicised. Again, we should not allow political games to be played by letting issues be put in the way of these countries making progress. It is a dilemma because we have a commitment to the region but the region is not ready. I even dare to say it is less ready, or less committed, than five years ago. Still, I do not think there is a better solution than full membership and, therefore, we need to make sure the process is credible and, at the end of the process, these countries are fully ready to join. This will improve our credibility and strengthen pro-European forces in the western Balkans. This game of pretending, which we both play, has produced the results where we have more past than future in the political agenda in the Balkans.

On third actors, they use the space we leave empty for them. We have the capacity to fill the political, economic, social and cultural space. If we do not engage, then others do. That is why we cannot blame these countries for that. The credibility of the European agenda and European future is the right answer. China is present in six of the western Balkan countries, mostly through investment.

There is no clear geopolitical strategy, other than just to be there in case. Chinese investment in the region has been a big failure in most cases, through not meeting the deadlines, the price ceilings or environmental standards. I would say that each Chinese investment is a good reason for not going into the next Chinese investment. Of course, the Montenegrin highway is the most striking exercise, but there are investments in Serbia, which are problematic, and people protest against them. There is a highway in North Macedonia that goes from nowhere to nowhere and nobody remembers when it was signed and how it will end. I would therefore not be overly worried.

Russia is a different story. Russia has a concrete political agenda, which is to prevent the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the region, to prevent enlargement of NATO and even to eventually get some countries out of NATO if possible, and spread disinformation about the European Union policy. It is present through an army of trolls, journalists and politicians, whom they pay. It has local TV and radio stations, and uses every mistake we make, or lack of clarity in our policies, to contribute to the mess that is there. The best answer, therefore, is for us to be credible and clear and to give the region the feeling that we are serious about it and its European future.

An Cathaoirleach

I am conscious, unless there has been a change, that we only have about 17 or 18 minutes left. A number of people want to contribute.

Mr. Miroslav Lajčák

I can stay longer and extend the session if there is interest.

An Cathaoirleach

We appreciate that flexibility.

Deputy Seán Haughey

I thank Mr. Lajčák for his comprehensive report on the situation in the western Balkans. I also reiterate that Ireland, as a matter of principle, favours enlargement. We believe it is good for the member states, for the European Union, and for the applicant states.

I take on board the point made strongly by Mr. Lajčák that it cannot just be about the Copenhagen criteria or a box-ticking exercise. We need to consider the values of the European Union and the geopolitical situation. I also take the point that the mood has changed since the awful invasion of Ukraine by Russia. It seems to me that there is movement towards considering the geopolitical considerations, and giving them more weight. President Macron seems to be heading in that direction too, so there is some hope that we can overcome these problems for the applicant countries in the western Balkans.

Mr. Lajčák mentioned the possibility of countries joining in stages, or something along those lines, and getting financial assistance by degrees. What is his view of the newly established European Political Community, which is again the brainchild of President Macron? Does Mr. Lajčák think it is a good thing, or is it just delaying the applicant countries from joining? Where does he think the resistance is coming from? Is there a fear among some member states that the European Union is moving more to the east, and therefore other states lose out? Is that a genuine fear? I would be interested to hear his views on that. Is it just a matter of concerns about functionality, and that enlargement will create problems in that area? My third question is about how Russian influence, and its attempts to destabilise these countries, are manifesting themselves on the ground? Can we have some detail on that? How significant is it, and how worried should the European Union and the applicant countries be about that?

Mr. Miroslav Lajčák

I am aware that Ireland has traditionally been a strong supporter of the European Union, and of enlargement. I thank it for that. The issue of staged accession or gradual integration has been circulating around the European institutions. There are several known interesting papers produced by serious think-tanks, which have not yet made their way into the system to be discussed. I suggest we look into this. The bottom line is basically to bring the countries into the room whenever possible under existing treaties, so they are part of our life and can see that we are serious. They will also get used to how the EU works, and we will get used to their presence and learn about their views on our issues.

I think it is still too early to assess what the European Political Community will become. We had two meetings, and they were seen as positive first and foremost because there were no formal documents adopted. There were no negotiations about declarations or anything. It was an opportunity for the leaders to have informal discussions. In Chiinu, in particular, the side events or the bilateral discussions were dominating over the plenary session. Whether this is good enough for this project to survive I am not sure yet. It certainly should not turn into a permanent waiting room for those who want to join the European Union. It should stay separate from the European accession process. If it becomes a platform where EU and NATO member states have the chance to engage with future potential candidate member states, that is fine. However, so far there is little substance to define what will be the future of this project. As I have said, we have to be clear about what we do not want this to be, that is, an alternative or plan B.

The Deputy asked where the resistance is coming from. There are several factors, both objective and subjective. First of all, objectively the big bang enlargement in 2004 did not prove to be as much of a success as initially expected. As has been mentioned, we have problems with the rule of law in some member states and some member states are bringing bilateral issues onto the European agenda. There is also the issue of social dumping. The presence of cheaper labour from central and eastern European countries has created issues in some traditional western European members of the Union. Of course, the prospect of enlarging the European Union further clearly brings with it the prospect of more labour coming and offering its services for a cheaper price, which is not appreciated. There are also issues with people using and misusing the social system and so on.

There is also the issue of functionality. It is a natural instinct for member states to ask how countries can contribute to the EU's greater functionality if a region or some of the countries in it are dysfunctional. They see that regional co-operation is limited, so they ask for proof that these countries will be able to function in a wider family of 30-plus countries. This is a relevant issue that cannot be easily dismissed. That is why the answer is a credible accession process, based on real reforms and progress, and not on papers and promises.

On the subject of Russia's influence, it is of course present, but to a different extent. I would say it is most strongly present in Serbia, with a wide network in terms of its presence in different segments of society. It also has a presence in Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where President Dodik overplays the Russian card, and positions himself as the number one Russian player in the region.

Russia has the least influence - it is almost non-existent - in Kosovo and Albania. Due their past and their clear orientation, these countries do not open space for Russia. Russia is present in North Macedonia and is trying to influence the debate on crucial issues. For example, Russia played an active and unfair role during the time of the ratification of the Prespa agreement. It is different. Russia uses every opportunity, every crack in the wall and every hole to enter and spread its narrative, which is dangerous and contradicts our narrative.

Deputy Brendan Howlin

I thank Mr. Lajčák for a comprehensive paper and incisive presentation on the questions posed to date. We have a clear understanding.

I would like to grapple with the practicalities of delivering the vision. The vision he set out is commonly shared across the political parties in this country, which is that we want a broadening of the European family. We need to do that in a way that gives people real prospects, not puts people on what we would call "a never, never" road, which is disheartening. As of this minute, there are eight formal candidate countries, but they include Turkey which most people would regard - let me put it diplomatically - to be a long way from any prospect of accession, if it ever happens. Clearly the view of the current administration in Turkey is not pro-European. There are two further potential candidate countries, including Georgia. It is a large and diverse group of countries that have different issues that need to be resolved.

I want to focus on how we can progress the candidacies of those that are serious about encompassing, not only what Mr. Lajčák called the bureaucratic rules, such as the Copenhagen criteria or the European neighbourhood policy, but also the core value systems of Europe, as the maintenance of these are most important to European politicians. There is a fear they could be diluted with expansion. That has been an impediment to political systems and European populations fully embracing a speedy enlargement process for a number of countries. In essence, I am interested in Mr. Lajčák's take on that.

I have been in politics a long time. Mr. Lajčák is correct that we put up legal structures for a process of enlargement, but often exigencies and political realities overcome that. A long time ago, Spain and Portugal were admitted to ensure that countries emerging from dictatorial regimes were embraced in the European norm. Political parties, including my own - the social democrats at the time - were impactive in supporting the democratic building process, even post-accession. That was also true of Greece, where, as we know, from an economic perspective, some of the box-ticking exercises were opaque. The reality was that we wanted them in the European democratic family. My fundamental question is, how we can reassure current populations of European Union citizens that the value systems that are intrinsically part of the European Union will be maintained in enlargement? How can we set out a roadmap to ensure people in applicant countries are not disheartened and believe that the ultimate destination of full membership is achievable?

Mr. Miroslav Lajčák

That is a serious, important and difficult question because we also see the adherence to European values being eroded in our member states. It looks like our people are turning towards parties that are not necessarily built on European values. Therefore this issue is bigger than enlargement. It is about how the European Union is perceived in our countries, what messages we receive from the European Union and the EU's ability to communicate its policies correctly to its citizens. Every European election is anticipated with the fear that more MEPs will come from parties that are not traditionally pro-European. That is a worrying trend.

Going back to regional enlargement, the Deputy is correct that the group of candidates and future candidates is large and quite diverse. Turkey is making it clear that it would like to be seen as part of the enlargement group and to be invited to every forum to which the countries of the western Balkans are invited. It is important for Turkey to be seen as a country in the accession process. It is a complex issue which I do not want to elaborate on right now, as this is not the purpose of the discussion.

However, the western Balkans are carefully following the European Union's decisions with regard to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova with a sense of jealousy and a feeling that there are double standards. They believe we have been political when it comes to Ukraine in particular and Moldova, while we are bureaucratic when it comes to their region. There have been accusations that preferential treatment was given to eastern Europe. Issues that we do not see as a problem in the east, such as a country being at war or not controlling its territory, have been used as an excuse in the western Balkans. Therefore, we must be sensitive about the impact on the western Balkans when we make decisions about Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The best response would be increased European enthusiasm. We see this enthusiasm in Ukraine. We do not see it in the western Balkans but we do not want to end up with the western Balkans being even further disheartened as a consequence of our decisions on the east.

We need to strengthen the connection between the technical and political aspects of enlargement. For example, the European Commission stated six times that North Macedonia has met the conditions to start accession negotiations and every time the Council was unable to make this decision. Of course, this has a negative impact on the pro-European forces in that country and the credibility of the European Union. We must make it clear that if a country meets the technical criteria, the political decision should be almost automatic. We must trust that the Commission, that tells us its assessment, is professional.

Second, we must strengthen the political or value-based aspect of the accession process. Values have not been mentioned in the past ten years. It was all about Chapters 23 and 24, but not about wanting to be part of our family and sharing our values. For example, three countries have 100% alignment with European Union foreign policy statements. I would strongly advocate for these countries to be given some preferential treatment by being invited to our discussions. They have shown for years that they share our values and automatically join us. They should be rewarded by being invited more often to our meetings to show that this is important. For a number of member states, after the beginning of the war, it has been mostly, if not exclusively about joining our sanctions and aligning with our statements, but so far we have not found a way to express that we see the difference. This is also important.

We ought to have a serious discussion among ourselves about how we see the future of the alignment process and follow up with serious, practical policies on that. We have almost become lost in phrases like "One day you will join our family", which I can tell the committee no longer works in the region. We must change our approach. The war in Ukraine should be a wake-up call for us to be more focused, more political and more serious.

An Cathaoirleach

I thank Mr. Lajčák No one else is indicating they wish to engage, so I will conclude. I return to a central point I raised with Mr. Lajčák at the start on the risks associated with a temporary solution. I appreciate what he said. I remain of the view, however, that it would quickly evolve into a solution that would work for a time and that it would possibly create more problems over a longer period in the form of a greater risk of disillusionment with and rejection of the EU if states were to be offered partial membership, particularly depending on how long the latter was to last. The scenario, as I see it and which Deputy Howlin alluded to, although it may be difficult for Mr. Lajčák to comment, is that there is a problem, as he mentioned, within the existing EU on what the principles, ideals and enunciated public statements are and what the reality is with enlargement. That is coming home to roost now. The appalling war in Ukraine has brought that to a head. From the EU perspective, we need to quickly realise that if we do not move to a position on enlargement that brings in countries in which there are four or five generations of people who have seen their country effectively rebuffed or not embraced regularly, we run the risk of alienating generations of young people across the Balkans and parts of Europe from the EU and from wanting to be involved in it. That is such an appalling vista in the context of the future of Europe. It is time for the EU to recognise that if it does not do something in this area, and relatively quickly, we are facing what could become, over the coming decades, a threat to stability as great as the war in Ukraine. That is why we must look again at everything, including the Copenhagen criteria, to see what we can do to bring about a sea change in how we tackle enlargement.

Mr. Miroslav Lajčák

I fully agree with the Cathaoirleach. I see his point and understand his fears. My bottom line is that the current approach does not work and, therefore, we probably need to have a serious discussion among ourselves. Maybe it could be within our member states and then at European level, but at the senior political of Heads of State and Government, we must ask how we are going to address the issue of enlargement in the five years after the next European elections.

As I said, we are losing the region. We take it for granted these states will be on our side when it comes to migration, the fight against terrorism or energy issues. However, this cannot be taken for granted. If we lose the pro-European forces such that the Balkans are working against us and not automatically with us, then we have a problem. They must meet the criteria and there should be no discount, but it is also a reality that they are far from meeting the criteria, to be honest and open about it. Thus, there is no way back. We must find a way forward. What is happening in the meantime is an exodus of young people. Students in universities dream only of finding a job in the EU and three out of four do not see their future in their own countries. That is not the future we want to see for the Balkans. We need to give these people a future and a hope they can realise their professional and personal dreams in their own countries. That is in our hands.

This is the moment for serious reflection. It is 20 years since Thessaloniki. The results in the context of implementing the promises given then are very poor. It should be a good opportunity to reflect so we know what we actually want. Keeping the ball rolling without knowing when and how it should end has been the situation there for too many years and we need to be clear among ourselves and with our partners in the western Balkans. Ireland can play a constructive role in this discussion.

I again thank the committee for having me and for giving of its time. I could see members but, unfortunately, they could not see me. I am grateful for the discussion and for having had the opportunity to listen to their views.

An Cathaoirleach

I thank Mr. Lajčák for joining us. We appreciate it. It is a pity we did not have the video connection working perfectly, but it did not detract in any way from the level of engagement. The conversation we had just was very worthwhile. I thank Mr. Lajčák on behalf of the committee. We will conclude our first session, go into private sessions briefly and then resume in public session.

The joint committee went into private session at 11.07 a.m. and resumed in public session at 11.11 a.m.

An Cathaoirleach

This is our second discussion today on EU enlargement and the western Balkans. We are joined in the committee room by Dr. Gëzim Visoka, who is associate professor of peace and conflict studies at the Dublin City University, DCU, centre for international conflict resolution and reconstruction. I welcome Dr. Visoka and thank him for joining us today.

I will briefly read the note on privilege as Dr. Visoka was not here when it was read in the first session. He is reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that he should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable or otherwise engage in any speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of a person or entity. Therefore, if his statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that he comply with any such direction.

With that, I invite Dr. Visoka to make his opening statement.

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

Honourable members of the committee, I am an associate professor of peace and conflict studies in the school of law and government at Dublin City University, where I have been based since 2010. I have published extensively on international interventions, the western Balkans, peace building in Kosovo, and on state recognition. I am honoured to be here and I thank the members for the invitation.

Today, I would like to make three fundamental points. First, while the EU’s enlargement policy is supposed to be guided by a clear merit-based methodology, in practice it is often crisis-driven, geopolitical, and uneven, which has had far-reaching consequences for the EU and the region. Second, without clear resolution of two nodal conflicts, namely, the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and the preservation of Bosnia's territorial integrity and political functionality, the EU's enlargement policy is unlikely to succeed. Third, Ireland should continue to promote EU enlargement and encourage the speedy accession while also sharing its unique experience of peace, prosperity, and economic growth due to European integration.

I will start with this first point. The EU’s enlargement policy is one of the central pillars in managing relations with its neighbours and a powerful stimulus for extending democratic and economic reforms in countries that aspire to join the EU. Over the past 20 years, the EU has offered a clear perspective of membership to the western Balkan countries, as well as investing over €30 billion through its pre-accession investments. Despite this extensive support, the six countries from the western Balkans are still behind in meeting the key criteria. However, due to internal disagreements within the EU, the enlargement policy increasingly looks more like a containment policy, where the EU member states tend to drag and prolong the accession process and move the targets while offering countries in the region incentives to only comply with the EU's own foreign policy. The containment policy was formalised in 2014 by the Juncker Commission, which announced that no country would join the EU in the next five years, and then it was championed by France, which overwhelmingly has had a negative view of the enlargement until recently. However, the containment policy has contributed to many domestic and regional crises in the western Balkans. Paradoxically, it has been the main driver for the EU member states to unite and put the enlargement back on the EU's agenda. The EU's recent decision to grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status has raised many questions in the western Balkans about the credibility of the enlargement process. In response, the western Balkans leaders are gradually renouncing EU frameworks and turning to ethnonationalist rhetoric to settle bilateral disputes. Again, one could argue that this is partially due to the EU's ambiguous political commitment and unclear timeline for accession. A case in point is Serbia, where we see a serious erosion of democratic principles, an aggressive approach towards the Kosovo issue, and ever-closer ties to both Russia and China. Political polarisation is resurfacing in Montenegro and reforms are progressively slowing down. In Kosovo, the EU’s influence is waning due to its divided approach to the country’s independence and an inability to effectively follow through on commitments, such as on visa liberalisation.

Even though the EU has recently taken steps to increase regional connectivity and has reaffirmed its commitment to an accelerated accession process, concrete actions should support these initiatives. Accession talks must intensify with all countries in the region and necessary supports should be provided to ensure a speedy progress through the negotiating chapters. Finally, the EU should end experimentation with different proposals on the enlargement methodology and settle for one which is fair, realistic, credible, and mutually beneficial. Moreover, the western Balkan countries should join as a group. Otherwise, we run the risk of experiencing within-region conditionality, in instances where countries that join the EU first impose unfavourable conditions on their neighbours who want to join. This has been an overwhelming problem in the region in the past 20 years.

I will now move to the second point. One of the most challenging features of the EU’s enlargement policy has been the focus on resolving outstanding disputes between states in the western Balkans prior to joining the EU. While we have seen progress in the resolution of outstanding issues in North Macedonia, the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be of great concern. Despite strong diplomatic investment, the EU has proven so far unsuccessful in delivering on its goal to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia through a legally-binding agreement that would resolve the question of mutual recognition, as well as finding appropriate accommodations for the Serb minority in Kosovo. Instead, we have recently seen a reversal of progress with an escalation of violence in the north of Kosovo, obliging the EU to change its focus from normalisation to crisis management and threatening to impose sanctions on Kosovo in an effort to de-escalate the situation. However, these tensions are also a byproduct of EU talks themselves, which lack a clear framework and mutually-agreed end goals, as well as insufficient monitoring of the implementation of agreements and the exertion of unbalanced pressure on the parties, especially Kosovo. Although the EU has set the normalisation of relations as a precondition for both Serbia and Kosovo, Kosovo’s perspective is uncertain since five EU member states, namely, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain, still refuse to recognise its independence. For as long as the EU, and these five member states in particular, do not recognise Kosovo’s independence, other actors in the region, including Russia, are likely to exploit these loopholes to create frozen conflicts and ultimately derail the Euro-Atlantic perspective of the region.

The second nodal conflict in the western Balkans is the political dysfunctionality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which goes back to the complex power-sharing system, coupled as well with recent threats for secession by Republika Srpska. For Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a functional state ready to join the EU, fundamental reforms are required. However, these reforms tend to threaten the political agency and influence of ethnonationalist parties that continue to capture the state and hold back societal progress. The EU made the right call last December in offering Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate status to prevent further internal strife, quell calls for independence among the Bosnian Serbs, and weaken Russia’s malign role. However, more robust measures by the EU are required to end the appeasement policy towards these spoilers in the country and also to mitigate the destabilising role which even Serbia and other original actors have played in this instance.

I now move to the third and final point. Ireland has had, and continues to have, a long-standing supportive attitude towards the EU’s enlargement in the western Balkans and has also welcomed the decision to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. However, there is a case for a more active Irish involvement in the western Balkans. Ireland’s support for EU enlargement in the western Balkans should be seen as a valuable and long-term investment to strengthen existing goodwill and build new alliances in Europe to defend common security and prosperity.

Thus, Ireland should join existing EU member states from central and eastern Europe that promote a credible and fast accession for western Balkan countries and discourage veto positions among member states that risk and have risked the EU’s credibility, values and geopolitical interests. A swift and merit-based EU membership for the western Balkans is crucial to prevent a repeat of a Ukraine-type crisis and to reduce Russia’s interference in a region encircled by EU and NATO member states. Most important, supporting EU enlargement for the western Balkans could be a significant way for Ireland to pay back its central and east European allies for the crucial diplomatic support they provided to Ireland when it came to Brexit and the Northern Ireland protocol. Since Ireland is unlikely to join NATO in the near future, aligning with these allies in central and eastern Europe, especially those within the enlargement portfolio, could send a positive and important message that Ireland is keen to contribute to European security in a different way.

To promote this strategic alignment, Ireland should lobby for the collective recognition of Kosovo by the EU, including the five non-recognisers, and also reiterate support for a functioning state in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is crucial that the EU forms a joint and collective position on Kosovo; otherwise, it risks undermining its own credibility and efforts to resolve the conflict, as well as moving the EU integration process on. Moreover, Ireland should consider setting up different support schemes, from diplomatic to technical areas, to offer civil servants, students and future leaders a perspective and a shared knowledge and experience of Ireland's own beneficial experience of European integration. I thank the committee very much.

Deputy Brendan Howlin

I thank Dr. Visoka for attending in person and for his paper. He was in attendance for the previous discussion and we are now covering much of the same ground. I am intrigued and I am trying to get to the heart of this issue. Both witnesses have said we must have a swift process of enlargement and allow the western Balkan countries to be members of the European Union or there will be dire consequences. At the same time, both stated that these countries are not ready and do not meet the criteria. That is a dilemma. I am interested in teasing that issue out a little. I will focus, in particular, on a country of great concern to all of us, namely, Serbia. Last year, I attended a plenary session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, IPU, in Kigali at which there was an intense debate on the invasion of Ukraine. Ireland, together with all like-minded countries of the EU and other western-minded countries, strongly supported the resolution. Serbia, which is part of our group, abstained. I engaged with the Serbian delegates and they felt that, politically, they could not take that step. I would be interested in hearing a little more of Dr. Visoka’s view of where Serbia is now. President Vučić has a very strong mandate, having secured 55% of the first preference vote in the most recent presidential election. He started out as Eurosceptic nationalist and hardline right-winger and has apparently migrated on a route towards being pro-European. That is the official and clear line. What is the reality with respect to both the government and popular opinion in Serbia in Dr. Visoka’s view?

Dr. Visoka made a very useful statement which we can take note of. There is a role for Ireland to be more active in supporting the western Balkans because we have long experience of the European Union and its functioning and a very good administration. It would be very useful to establish a formal assistance and support system for applicant countries.

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

I thank Deputy Howlin very much for his questions. With regard to his first question, in a way I was intrigued by Mr. Lajčák’s assessment, which I completely share when it comes to regional affairs, although there are nuances on which we have different opinions. The dilemma between a swift process and one which is merit-based has been an ongoing and long-term one. I do not believe the western Balkan countries want immediate membership. They want clarity and serious commitment. In the past 20 years, there have been many back-and-forth promises, a stepping back and a failure to hold to those promises, so one must ask how does one restore credibility. That is the main point. All of these countries have set up the infrastructure to implement the required reforms. I do not believe they have ill intentions although some of them try to delay and benefit from the status quo but, mostly, society, civil society and the political spectrum in each country are committed to the European project. We just need clarity and a timeline, so to speak. North Macedonia, for example, applied for membership in 2003 and it was only 20 years later that accession talks opened. That is significant loss of social and political time. It is in fact a generation in time.

Something that is often missed is that Europeanisation is a social intervention project. It is a deep cultural and political transformation, which takes time. Despite reforms that may be made at institutional level, at a societal level, it is a long-term process. It is not easy to meet the benchmarks set by the EU. The EU has set very high benchmarks for the region but it has not followed the political realisation of those promises. In turn, countries in the region have lost faith, benefited from the status quo and reversed progress.

My view is that the recent geopolitical moves to overcome this fatigue or blockages are positive. I share the concern of the Chairman with regard to the two-tier or phased integration. In the interim, they are useful steps to break down the process. I share the Chairman's view that there should be a clear legally binding commitment both as regards time and targets. The countries in question can then say they are happy to go with this phased, gradual integration. Mr. Lajčák mentioned the idea that if some countries align with the EU on foreign policy, they should be invited to meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committee meetings or have a back seat in this process. These would be important signals to countries in the region that the EU is serious about their integration.

Where I would be cautious is the fear that in the long term the EU will back off. What we are seeing are political commitments of actual leaders. Elections happen, people move and promises fade away.

Serbia is a country which tries to benefit from both eastern and western systems and has had this historical and geopolitical position. That is also its position with regard to EU integration. It has always remained open to the European integration process but it has never cut ties with anti-European forces. That is coming to a point where we now see dilemmas. Serbia is the only country in the region which is not aligning with the EU when it comes to sanctions. In fact, it has deepened its political, intelligence and security ties with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. Over 100,000 Russians have moved to Serbia and it is becoming the hub of the Russian intelligence community.

Deputy Brendan Howlin

Are these Putin’s dissidents or-----

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

Not necessarily, no, because Serbia is the most pro-Russian country in Europe. Russia has a covert centre, what is called a "humanitarian centre", and there are serious fears that it is being used for espionage and cyber activities. It has strong involvement with the Orthodox Church, in cultural and political societies and it has created this hybrid infrastructure of para-militia groups, from youth to other associations. They are being used in Bosnia and we have seen that in north Kosovo. In fact, the Wagner model has its origins in the time of Yugoslavia. Milošević created paramilitary groups, the Arkan groups, to use them at the forefront. There is much learning to be gained from Russia and Serbia historically, as regards how they navigate between east and west.

Support for European integration in Serbia has always been 50-50 and it increases and decreases. At the moment, it is not looking good. In fact, across the western Balkans, support for European integration is down to 60%.

Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú

What is the figure?

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

Overall across the western Balkans, support is down to 60%, the lowest figure we have seen in a long time. It is a kind of warning.

That mostly comes from Serbia, which has the lowest support for the European integration project. We are found in a complicated situation where the West, especially the EU and the US, are keen to appease Serbia so that they do not become adversary or a hub that endangers the EU's interests. That is why in a way they are willing to sacrifice Kosovo and Bosnia for the sake of holding Serbia in some sort of balanced path and so it does not deviate further. That is the main security concern of the US and the EU when it comes to geopolitics. It is a matter of how they can appease Serbia to a point that they do not really offer Russia and other non-western allies a hub to undermine western interests, values and stability.

When it comes to Kosovo, Serbia has a view that they do not want to recognise Kosovo. They are open to the process of normalising relations but their key and open agenda is partition. They are not willing to let Kosovo exist as a sovereign state, and that leads to open conflict. The debate about the association of Serb municipalities in Kosovo has raised fears that this is just a starting point for something more serious, such as something like Bosnia or the Republika Srpska partition. By doing that, Serbia then manages to divide and make Kosovo as dysfunctional as Bosnia. This indirectly then leads to a divided country and a divided region. Bosnia has no perspective internally to try to create a consensus to move forward when it comes to NATO and the EU.

This is the real risk. This is the hybrid threat that the EU and the west are sometimes sleepwalking around, as was mentioned here, by coming up with these temporal solutions. The Dayton Agreement was a war-ending agreement, but it was not a long-term peace settlement. In a way, it was designed to end the war. It was only later that we realised that it was actually difficult to implement. It in itself became a blockage for European integration, because the EU could not really have member states that had such a complex, three-tiered governance that was divided by all these ingrained power-sharing instruments. The European integration process itself tries to reform the Dayton Agreement and enhance the resistance from Republika Srpska. It is important to know that our own makings in the early stages are undermining the stability of these fragile regions and, in turn, they are also agitating our attitude towards this country and hence adding more conditions, delays and so on and so forth.

With regard to Ireland's role, Ireland has been steadfast and consistent in its position. It is one of the only countries in the EU that has never deviated from that commitment. I am proud to also be an Irish citizen and to see that support that has always been there. As someone who is based in DCU, where we have a strong interest in and commitment to understanding conflict and democratisation, we see that Ireland could play a much stronger role when it comes to building scholarships schemes or offering its expertise - soft power. There have been a number of initiatives in the past but there is scope for more structure and intervention at a technical level and also at a political level. As I said earlier, Ireland should align with central and eastern European countries when it comes to enlargement. It should be more active for the sake of peace but also because of its own commitment to share the burden. There is a big divide in the EU when it comes to the Western Balkans between the traditional western Europe front and the central and eastern European front. Over the years, France has feared that if the Western Balkans countries join, they will tip the balance when it comes to votes and long-term influence, and that the EU will become an eastern European or central European project. In fact, many argue that Poland will be the next epicentre of European strength. I, therefore, would not rule out internal divisions of that nature in the EU. They are hidden but they are also undermining the entire enlargement process.

Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú

I thank Dr. Visoka. His last point on the fear of an eastern shift is one of the first points we made. To a degree, that has created the stasis. The language has changed somewhat since the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, but the impression I get from Dr. Visoka and the previous speaker is that people are not seeing this in real terms. Representatives from North Macedonia were before the committee and, on some level, they said as much. They made all the complaints that Dr. Visoka did but they did say that the engagement was at least a bit more real now. I would like that to be the case. In fairness, though, I went through his opening statement, which dealt with all the issues. He said that the EU at times is crisis managing and possibly has not been the perfect player in this and the problem is there is a lot of unfinished business in respect of Kosovo, Republika Srpska and all these issues. What can Ireland and the EU do to move this on? I imagine that a certain element in Serbia, which is probably supported by the Russians, does not really intend for this situation to be normalised. We are getting into the issue of territorial disputes and I do understand the importance of that. However, it is a matter of how we move this on because we all accept that we need to give these people a European future. We all know that this matters to Europe on a geopolitical level but there are particular issues that need to be dealt with. That also includes the rule of law issues.

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

I will go back to the beginning of the question, which was on border disputes and open issues. The EU's long-standing position after Cyprus has been that it will not accept a country that has open territorial disputes or frozen conflict. That is why most of the focus of the enlargement at a political level has been on trying resolve inter-state disputes in the Western Balkans. I refer to the boundary dispute between Slovenia and Croatia. The demarcation of the border between Kosovo and Montenegro was also a crucial issue before Montenegro joined NATO. Actually, Kosovo had to make concessions, and this became a political dispute in the country, where the government fell. The EU promised visa liberalisation for Kosovo but it did not deliver on that. In North Macedonia, there is the name issue, as well as the issue of the language with Bulgaria. In a way, the EU has tried to learn from past mistakes but then Ukraine and Moldova came, especially Ukraine, which is in the middle of a war. A big fraction of its territory is being annexed and occupied by Russia. Moldova has an issue with Transnistria. The EU has given both of them a status and, in the process of enlargement, that is a big move. It has taken some other countries 20.

In a way, therefore, the EU has shown they actually can overcome all of these principles that have sat in the past, such as good neighbourly relations, no territorial disputes and all of that which is based in international law. Now, with Ukraine and Moldova, we no longer know what the standard should be. For the EU to include them - and again I am not against Ukraine and Moldova's association or their coming into the EU family - it shows a double standard because it has taken the countries in the Western Balkans decades to try to resolve these issues before the EU has given any promise to them. Yet, in the other part of eastern Europe, that was not an issue. What I see as a solution to resolving the dispute in the Balkans is a clear position from the EU. When it comes to Kosovo, the EU should be united and have a collective position, like they did in Montenegro in 2005 and 2006 around the independence referendum. That matter was closed and Russia and Serbia's influence in the country reduced over the years. For as long as the EU does not have a clear position on Kosovo, five member states will dispute it, will consider it a part of Serbia and it will be impossible for Kosovo to make concessions towards Serbia. As well as this, it will be impossible for the EU itself to offer Kosovo a clear perspective.

Membership of the EU is open only to European states. That is clear in the treaty. These five non-recognisers have said that they will not recognise Kosovo and they will not permit Kosovo's progress with regard to accession and the rest until the issue of Serbia is resolved.

I have done research on this matter and I am not even sure that if Serbia recognises Kosovo, countries such as Cyprus would recognise Kosovo afterwards because they feel that if the Kosovo issue is resolved, they will be next and they will have to deal with Northern Cyprus. They are hiding behind one another. Spain also has concerns about Catalonia and other regions. It is a multi-layered conflict and the EU is not managing to create internal unity. Ireland could make an impact here by taking a more proactive role to see whether Slovakia, Romania or Greece can move forward and overcome their position on Kosovo. If this matter is resolved, Kosovo will make concessions towards Serbia and it is likely the dispute in the north will be settled and there will be one conflict less in the EU. In Bosnia, the situation is different.

Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú

What sort of concessions?

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

The main question in Kosovo is whether the Serb community should be granted further functional autonomy. The concern of the Government in Kosovo is that without having a clear European and Euro-Atlantic future, without its statehood being secure and recognised by everyone, any such concessions will turn Kosovo into a dysfunctional frozen conflict. Kosovo wants to make sure the EU offers it full recognition and its territorial integrity and functionality are not undermined. It is not a question of generosity here; Kosovo is willing to offer more rights. In fact, the Ahtisaari platform, which settled independence in 2008, offered an extensive list of minority protection mechanisms. The question is implementation. Kosovo's existence is threatened by non-recognition. Ireland, in its early stage of statehood had 20 years of uncertainty and Kosovo is experiencing that sort of path until it consolidates. It is not a member of the UN and there is not a clear perspective for it in regard to the EU or NATO. If it makes further concessions, the theory is that it will just separate and become very dysfunctional.

Senator Michael McDowell

Dr. Visoka is very welcome. A number of things occur to me arising out of this morning's proceedings. First, hanging over the whole discussion is that it is almost impossible to see how much progress can be made on any of these fronts as long as the Ukraine war is going on because it is unfinished business. It is one in which Putin is advancing his agenda. If his agenda succeeds, people like the Serbs will take one view and if it fails or is contained, then a different view will be taken. In the next two years, everything depends on what happens in the Ukraine war.

The second point is that going back to what was said about concerns about the shift in the centre of gravity of the EU to the east and south, I was a Minister in the Irish Government in 2004 and I remember the French being very concerned about old Europe, new Europe and all the rest of it. If you think about it, whatever problems there are in Brussels or in other European capitals such as Budapest and Warsaw, they are small compared with the alternative problem, which would have been to adopt the French position to say, "Let them stay out." I do not know where we would be if those mistakes had been made. I think Ireland has been correct to be pro-enlargement. The French are going to have to realise that the centre of gravity is shifting east and eventually south east.

I want to ask Dr. Visoka two questions in regard to two EU member states, one is Romania and the other is Bulgaria. First, in regard to Romania, I presume it has a strong view about Moldova, Transnistria and the like. Is it actively pursuing a positive approach towards Moldova?

In regard to Bulgaria, as a Slavic country that was more traditionally aligned with Slavic ideas, what is its position on Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia and the like? Is it with the agenda, so to speak, of bringing those countries within the European Union or is it looking over its shoulder at pan-Slavic concepts?

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

With regard to Romania and Bulgaria, Romania's position when it comes to Moldova is that they are brotherly nations, and they are open. They are happy that they got EU status because they had been lobbying for a long time. They are against the independence of Transnistria and their position is clear. Certainly for them, Moldova turning westwards is very positive and important for geopolitical reasons but also for ethnic and historical reasons. The Ukraine crisis has played well for Romania's foreign policy and geopolitical interests. It has had that long-standing position.

Romania does not recognise Kosovo and aligns with Serbia, partially because Romania has its own concerns when it comes to a Hungarian minority. It believes that a Kosovan precedent could affect Romania but it is happy to switch sides. If it sees that Serbia is aligning further with Russia, the indications are that Romania would switch, so it is a pragmatic recogniser, if I may say so.

When it comes to Serbia, Romania has also conditions for the Vlach community, a small minority in Serbia. Its strategic position is to wait until Serbia gets close enough before bringing up its own list of conditions. The problem with enlargement is that each country in the region has historical legacy problems with the neighbours. Those who are in use the EU as a platform to block others.

Senator Michael McDowell

It has to be simultaneous.

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

Yes. This is a major problem. There are opinions that this is important because it has to be resolved and the EU has offered this process. Others argue that it is conflict-inducing because it brings back historical conflicts, especially with regard to the situation with Bulgaria and north Macedonia.

When it comes to Bulgaria, it has clear issues with Macedonia in regard to identity and language. It is firm on those. Bulgarians are very proud of their heritage and they fear that Macedonia, as a state that was created as part of Yugoslavia, has borrowed a lot from their historical culture and they do not recognise it sufficiently.

Bulgaria has been very supportive of Kosovo because of historical division with Serbia. You have to know the history. Bulgaria recognised Kosovo immediately and offered full support. It is friendly and positive about Serbia but when it comes to Kosovo it has made up its mind and it is clear.

Bulgaria has always been a Euro-Atlantic partner, but it also has had ties with Russia for gas and other reasons of political connection. It has never undermined its overall political commitment.

Senator Michael McDowell

I thank Dr. Visoka.

Deputy Seán Haughey

Listening to the debate this morning, it is clear this is a complex region, which raises a lot of complex issues, but I think we have a better understanding of it. I thank Dr. Visoka for his presentation.

I put a question to the previous speaker regarding resistance to these applicant countries. He made the point about fears that cheaper labour would come to the existing EU member states. What is Dr. Visoka's view on that? Does he think it is a factor? I now appreciate the resistance and where it is coming from and so forth, having listened to our debate, but I raise the specific point regarding cheaper labour.

This committee does not have a brief for NATO but could Dr. Visoka briefly outline NATO's role and ambitions in that region? That would add to our understanding of the situation.

To be clear in my own mind, is the ideal position that all these countries would join as a group?

How real is that fear of decoupling? I will leave it at that.

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

I thank Deputy Haughey. With regard to resistance and fear of cheap labour, demographics is a major problem for western Balkans. Croatia has lost almost 10% of its population. Albania and Serbia are losing en masse. The western European member states have not really utilised structurally the labour force from the western Balkans but Germany, Switzerland and Austria have integrated that in their national policies. They create special schemes to get the brains, the most educated and the most talented to their labour force. The major issue is not en masse migration but draining these societies of staff, civilians and personnel around the country. All countries are experiencing shortages.

Kosovo itself is losing a lot of its population to migration. Albania cannot find a labour force. They have to bring people from Asia. Bangladesh and other countries are using schemes to come to the Balkans. In waves of migration, western Balkan countries' citizens come to the EU and then Asian ones replace them in the region. There is an increasing number of Indonesian and southern African countries which try to fill the void. It is a big complaint among companies across the region that they cannot fill jobs. Obviously, it is the very low payment there.

For the EU, I share the view that they might agree to do cheaper work, but certainly it is a gain for the EU to get a ready-made labour force. Each of them has cost those countries €100,000 or more to educate and then the EU takes them prepared. The damage is done in the long term for the region. The question is how to control that and make sure that it is balanced. Integration into the EU can halt that. It is a 17 million customer market. It is not big and the EU can absorb and manage it. The EU is the main partner already when it comes to trade and relations.

On NATO's role, it is a really important question. NATO has an open-door policy for all countries in the region. The only country that has openly opposed NATO's membership is Serbia. They have signed Partnership for Peace but they try to maintain their military neutrality policy. In fact, it has not been a military neutrality policy because it has mostly shifted when it comes to security to Russia and China in terms of their purchases and strategic alliances.

NATO has opened its door to North Macedonia and Montenegro recently - they being the newest members - and that has offered a lot of stability to those countries. The long-term prediction has been that for these countries to join the EU, they had to join NATO first. That has been the expectation, because NATO brings more stability and certainty than the EU itself. I know that Ireland may have had in the past two weeks the debate about neutrality, but countries in the Western Balkans have the opposite view. They really would like to join NATO for historical reasons and they see it as the only way to secure and safeguard their long-term safety and existence as states.

The two countries that are in trouble are Kosovo and Bosnia. Bosnia, especially the Serbian part, cannot agree to join NATO. The Bosnian Serbs, backed by Russia and to a certain extent by Serbia, are opposing integration in NATO. On the other side, Croats and Bosniaks are willing to join NATO because of historical fears that being outside this alliance, they will be prey for external interventions. Russia's role comes through that, utilising Serbs in Bosnia as well as via Serbia to undermine the EU. They tried that in North Macedonia and Montenegro but they failed.

When it comes to Kosovo, four member states of NATO do not recognise Kosovo - similar to those that are in the EU, excluding Cyprus. They have continuously blocked Kosovo's progress with regard to NATO membership. NATO has the largest peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. They are working with the Kosovo security force but there is a political blockage in Brussels when it comes to Kosovo's perspective and that is being utilised by non-western forces, especially hybrid forces in north Kosovo.

The third point was decoupling. The example of North Macedonia and Albania was really a significant one when it came to decoupling. It became an issue for approximately two years between 2018 and 2022, whereby the EU was willing to let Albania get the candidate status but block North Macedonia because of Bulgaria's veto. France hid behind Bulgaria to block both countries opening of accession talks. Certainly, we have seen that individual accession or progress has been troublesome. Only en bloc or collective progress seems to be the way that they perceive as fair, as just and also balanced to avoid within a region these conditionalities that come later. Certainly, a view of bloc integration is seen as more important and less destabilising that one after the other.

Senator Michael McDowell

Chairman, could I ask one question?

An Cathaoirleach

Yes. We have approximately 30 seconds.

Senator Michael McDowell

Is it possible to have a differential approach to recently admitted candidates to say they cannot block for five years or ten years, and to give them second-class status, as it were, for five years so that the unanimity rule does not apply? Is that possible?

Deputy Brendan Howlin

I would suggest that one puts all one's objections on the table at the same time, so that one cannot ask people to resolve difficult issues and then, when that has been resolved, to declare that there is another one for them to resolve. If one needs to have an objection, it should all be tabled simultaneously and there is no further go at it.

Dr. Gëzim Visoka

It has been tried with regard to Croatia and Bulgaria but there is no legally-binding one which prevents these countries because of the decision-making rules within the Union and equality of vote, etc. They are trying to resolve these issues before they emerge as key issues at the end of the accession talks. Certainly, I share the view that there should be some legally-binding changes and elements that prevent exploitation of this privilege that some states have to block others. These are bilateral issues. They can resolve them through arbitration or other platforms. They should not hold back the entire European interest and common prosperity.

An Cathaoirleach

My level of cynicism on it would be that all the Senator's suggestion would achieve is that certain larger member states would have to eventually show their hand to very conveniently sit behind, as Dr. Visoka quite correctly mentioned, the smaller member states when they would use their veto. It suits them.

I thank Dr. Visoka for a very interesting second contribution to the meeting on the sheer complexity of all the moving and interlocking parts. The fact that if one thing moves in a particular way, it has a three-domino knock-on, which creates its own problems in another area was really brought home to us by so much of the information he gave us. I look forward to us having further engagement on it. I thank the members of the committee for all their contributions.

The joint committee adjourned at 11.58 a.m. until 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 5 July 2023.