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Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach debate -
Wednesday, 12 Oct 2022

Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform

The next item on the agenda is engagement on the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924 with representatives from the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. We are joined by Mr. David Moloney, Ms Ciara Morgan and Mr. John Howlin. We will begin with an opening statement but before we do that, I have a little local matter to attend to.

We are joined in the Public Gallery by Pippa Gault, Ellen Gault and Eleanor Cleary. An in-house magazine was produced by their school for which I was interviewed. I have a copy here. It was a nice little publication by the school for which they went around and got the backgrounds of their Teachtaí Dála. They were anxious to come here today to see the Oireachtas and how we function, which is a great thing for the school. They are now attending the Model School and Kilkenny College. They will be going on a tour of the Seanad and Dáil afterwards, which I hope they will enjoy. I thank them for coming along today to see democracy in action and to see our Oireachtas members working. I acknowledge the very fine work they did in their magazine. They are very welcome.

We will move on to the opening statement. See the important things in life?

Mr. David Moloney

Absolutely. I thank the committee for the invitation to attend the meeting today. I am happy to have this opportunity to discuss issues related to the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924. The role and status of Ministers with regard to Departments and their responsibility to Dáil Éireann are set out in Article 28 of the Constitution and are further elaborated in the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924.

The 1924 Act has two distinct functions. First, it provides a legal basis for the Civil Service, outlining the structure and organisation of central administration while also defining ministerial responsibility. Second, the Act established the Departments of State, their remits and distributed the associated public activities. The Act also provides that the Government, on the recommendation of the Minister, appoint the principal officer of each Department, which is now known as the Secretary General.

The Minister for Finance was assigned the function of prescribing the terms and conditions of appointments for civil servants under section 2(3) of the Minister and Secretaries Act. Most recently, these functions were transferred to the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform on the formation of my Department in 2011.

Under section 17 of the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956, as amended, the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform has responsibility for a range of functions such as the regulation and control of the Civil Service, the classification, reclassification, numbers and remuneration of civil servants and the fixing of the terms and conditions and conditions governing the promotion of civil servants.

The Public Service Management Act 1997 provides a statutory basis for the management structure of the Civil Service. This Act assigns to Secretaries General certain functions, which include managing the Department, implementing Government policies appropriate to the Department, delivering outputs as determined by the Minister of the Government having charge of the Department and providing advice to the Minister. The Public Service Management Act also obliges Secretaries General to prepare a strategy statement setting out the key objectives, outputs and strategies of the Department. It is important to note that the provisions of the Public Service Management Act 1997 do not change the core policy responsibility of Ministers, who remain responsible for the functions of the Department under the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Ministers and Secretaries Act.

The Public Service Management Act also assigns responsibility for using resources so as to meet the requirements of the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act 1993 with regard to the regularity and propriety of public expenditure as well as to economy, efficiency and effectiveness. This relates to the role of Accounting Officer. The Secretary General of a Department acts as Accounting Officer and is accountable to the Oireachtas for the use of the Department’s resources. Secretaries General, in their Accounting Officer capacity, are answerable to the Committee of Public Accounts which, in turn, reports to the Dáil in respect of its stewardship of public funds. The Accounting Officer system means that while accountable as Secretary General to the Minister for managing the Department and for the other duties under the Public Service Management Act, the Accounting Officer is also answerable to the Committee of Public Accounts for regularity, propriety and value for money.

The Public Service Management Act also provides a formal structure for assigning authority and accountability within the Civil Service. Officers within Departments who are assigned functions are accountable to the Secretary General. The framework of assignments for each Department to principal officer level is published annually. The Public Service Management Act also gives the Secretary General responsibility for managing all matters relating to appointments, performance, discipline and dismissal of staff below the grade of principal or its equivalent in the Civil Service. Generally, the management of staff is assigned to the line manager, who is responsible for making civil servants aware of acceptable standards of attendance and conduct and for dealing with shortcomings promptly and fairly.

With regard to work performance, there are systems to support performance management. The performance of civil servants up to and including the grade of principal is managed under the performance management and development system, PMDS. There is a separate process of performance management, namely, the leadership evaluation and development system for senior grades in the Civil Service above the level of principal officer. Finally, for Secretary General level, there is an annual performance review process in place intended to support the performance of Secretaries General. On a more general point, I would note that Secretaries General are also employees and are covered by most of the existing employment and other legislation.

From an international perspective, even among countries with relatively similar systems, there does not seem to be a comprehensive solution that can be applied to issues of accountability in a categorical way. I would draw the committee’s attention to the ongoing work of the OECD in this regard, however, building on its Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability report.

Overall, there are a range of complex and interlinking responsibilities associated with the role of Secretary General. They are accountable to Ministers for certain functions and to the Oireachtas for others. They are appointed by, and accountable to, the Government. I am very interested in hearing the committee's views on these issues and welcome members' ongoing input.

I thank Mr. Moloney very much.

I thank the witnesses for appearing before the committee; I very much appreciate it. I have quite a number of questions to get my head around certain aspects.

My first question relates to the capacity in which Mr. Moloney is speaking in front of this committee today. The reason I ask is because the particular circular on guidelines for civil servants appearing before or providing information to Oireachtas committees states:

The following should be borne in mind by civil servants in contacts with these committees:

- a civil servant who appears before, or provides information to, an Oireachtas Committee does so on behalf of his Minister who, as a corporation sole, is legally responsible for the official acts of his civil servants.

Will Mr. Moloney comment on that?

Mr. David Moloney

I thank the Deputy. Yes, absolutely. That is correct. In my capacity in front of this committee, I am acting as Secretary General of the Department on behalf of the Minister. Therefore, in that capacity, for example, there are certain constraints on what I can and cannot comment on. I cannot comment on the merits and demerits of Government policy.

I speak largely on behalf of the Minister. There have been some amendments to the Oireachtas inquiries Acts that permit me to discuss what advice has been offered in certain circumstances but, again, not in the context of commenting on the merits and demerits of policy.

I am aware of that. For my own understanding, is it correct that Mr. Moloney will be speaking on behalf of the Minister, rather than in a personal capacity, when he is in front of a committee?

Mr. David Moloney

Yes, when I am in front of this committee. The Committee of Public Accounts is the one exception. When I appear in front of that committee, I speak in my own capacity, as Accounting Officer.

I thank Mr. Moloney. It is important for me to understand how these things work. Will he start by explaining the Carltona doctrine? I have to say that name in my head before I say it out loud. Will he say initially what the doctrine is and then whether there are limitations on it?

Mr. David Moloney

The Carltona doctrine is basically the idea that a civil servant may carry out actions on behalf of the Minister, acting in the place of the latter. The Minister is a corporation sole and the Department as a whole performs functions on his or her behalf. That does not require any act of express delegation; it is simply a way and means of carrying out the business of the Minister and the Department. It is sometimes set out specifically in legislation, sometimes by precedent, that certain functions cannot be carried out except by the Minister. Certain orders, for example, can only be signed by him or her. Broadly, however, in the day-to-day running of the Department, the Carltona doctrine, in effect, represents this idea of a corporation sole, whereby the officials of a Department are acting on behalf of the Minister in what they do.

I was looking at a recent submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces. As we know, civilian control over the military is a core principle of democracy. This submission expressed concerns about the overreliance by the Department of Defence on the Carltona doctrine as a means of exercising control and said this overuse needed scrutinising. I am not commenting on that but it is something I have noted. As far as Mr. Moloney is aware, has there ever been an external review carried out to see how well the doctrine is performing?

Mr. David Moloney

I am not aware of an external review of it. A lot of the time when we look at accountability issues in the Civil Service, it is centred around the exercise of the discretion within the Carltona doctrine and the relevant and appropriate division of responsibilities between Ministers and Secretaries General. The role of Departments and Ministers is set up under the Constitution and provided for in the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924.

Part of what the 1997 Act did was to try to provide further clarification around some separation of those responsibilities within the overall context of the delegation of authority, notwithstanding the Carltona principle. What the Act really tried to do was to separate the day-to-day issues of running a Department, move them away from being a direct responsibility of the Minister and make them more the responsibility of the Secretary General. While the Minister would retain policy responsibility, he or she would not necessarily be dragged into the minutiae of day-to-day issues. That is the thinking behind the Public Service Management Act.

I understand that. Is Mr. Moloney aware of whether there have ever been any resignations because of any potential breach of the Carltona doctrine? I am not aware of any such breach but I wonder whether it is something that ever occurred.

Mr. David Moloney

No. Where issues of controversy have arisen in regard to the interaction between senior public servants and their Ministers, they have not, as far as I am aware, related to the Carltona doctrine or the carrying out of functions on behalf of the Minister. They have tended to relate to different issues.

I asked whether there has ever been an external review of the working of the Carltona doctrine. Has there ever been any kind of review or even any concerns expressed as to whether agency loss could arise from the use of the doctrine? I am interested to know whether it has had that kind of impact or has led to any encroachment on the control of policy function.

Mr. David Moloney

The key report on issues in this area is the report of the independent panel on strengthening Civil Service accountability and performance, the Rafter report, which goes back to May 2014. That report looked at the interaction between Ministers and Secretaries General, the operation of the different roles and how accountability and performance could be strengthened. It looked at a wide variety of relevant issues that would come up in this context. As far as I know, the Carltona principle itself has not come under particular focus.

I am aware the Public Service Management Act 1997 made changes to the relationship between Ministers and Secretaries General and sought to place the accountability of the latter on a statutory footing. It was designed as well to minimise agency loss. The idea is that the principal, that is, the Minister, has his or her policy administered by the agent, that is, the Secretary General. However, in an extreme situation, say, where an agent was not happy or found the Minister's decisions and policy changes were undesirable and decided to sabotage them, what avenues are open to Ministers if they feel something like that has happened?

Mr. David Moloney

There are a number of ways in which Ministers can engage in that discussion. Obviously, there is an ongoing conversation between Ministers and their Secretaries General in regard to issues and the delivery of the statement of strategy and the business plan for Departments. There is a structure there, introduced in the 1997 Act, to allow a conversation, a setting of objectives and a review of those objectives. If specific issues arise whereby the Minister feels action has been taken without authority, the process allows him to raise those issues. In terms of the Deputy's net point, the Civil Service Regulation Acts make the Government the appropriate authority for Secretaries General because the latter are appointed by the Government. If an issue were to be escalated, it would be escalated to the level of Government.

Who does the reviewing of an objection? If it were felt such an objection was not met intentionally or whatever, does it then go to the Government rather than the Minister?

Mr. David Moloney

It depends on the level of sanction that is being considered. Any severe level of sanction that is being sought would have to go to the appropriate authority, and the appropriate authority for Secretaries General under the Civil Service Regulation Acts is the Government.

What is the highest level of sanction Ministers can impose on their own undertaking, without going to the Government?

Mr. David Moloney

There is a range of things a Minister can do. He or she can issue initial and subsequent written or verbal warnings to a Secretary General. There is a disciplinary code.

What would such a warning involve? If the highest level of sanction available to a Minister is a warning, against what is he or she warning? Would he or she just go to the Government at that point?

Mr. David Moloney

It would be bringing attention to the matter with which the Minister has an issue and setting out his or her view that the behaviour was not in keeping with the objectives and agreements made.

Not to diminish the process in any way but, in some sense, then, would it be a scolding rather than a warning insofar as the Minister is able to do anything about it? Is it correct that it would, in effect, be a decision for the Government?

Mr. David Moloney

I have just been given a more detailed answer for the Deputy. The context is the Civil Service disciplinary code, which begins with the issuing of a level 1 verbal warning, followed by a written warning, a level 3 written warning, extension of the period of validity of the warning, deferral of an increment, debarment from competitions and promotions, withdrawal of concessions, reassignment to a different location or duties and withdrawal of allowances. Those are all measures the Minister can take prior to going to the Government. There are elements of the Civil Service disciplinary code that do not apply to Secretaries General.

Because of their appointment by the Government, they do not apply by statute. Those elements are lower-rate remuneration, reduction to a lower grade and suspension without pay. Those are not available to the Minister in respect of a Secretary General. The final level of sanction is dismissal, which would be a matter for the Government.

It is a matter for the Government. I thank Mr. Moloney for that. Sometimes with these things there are so many different circulars etc. that it can be a bit confusing. As for the sanctions the Minister can do at that level, say the ones Mr. Moloney read out - barring the ones that cannot be given to a Secretary General - have they been done in the past? I am not asking him to comment on names or anything like that but out of interest, is that something that Mr. Moloney is aware has occurred?

Mr. David Moloney

I am not aware of it but then I would not be part of that. That would be like any other employee-employer disciplinary process. It would, by and large, be considered confidential to the people involved.

Of course. In terms of the ministerial-senior official relationship, does Mr. Moloney think that the concepts of accountability and responsibility and the differences between them are well clarified? Does he think that is clearly laid out or does he think there needs to be further clarification?

Mr. David Moloney

It is quite complex because there are those different blocks of legislation. There is the Ministers and Secretaries Act, the Public Service Management Act and the Civil Service Regulation Act. Then of course there are the responsibilities of the Accounting Officer, which operate almost as a separate pillar. The role is therefore a complex one. It is capable of causing some confusion, particularly in terms of the interaction between the Ministers and Secretaries Act and the Public Service Management Act. At a general level, Secretaries General are responsible for running their Department but a Minister of the Government might be forgiven for thinking that they were able to take decisions in relation to the day-to-day operation of a Department. The two Acts need to come together in that context. There is a level of complexity involved and that is something that we can always review. The international experience is that these same issues are grappled with. The OECD material underlines the idea that these issues are grappled with across many jurisdictions. Greater clarity is always possible but specific functions are set out in the different items of legislation. It is in the implementation of those functions that there is sometimes the potential for misunderstanding what is or is not allowable.

Ministers are held accountable by the Dáil. They are selected by the Dáil and they can be deselected by it. The concept of responsibility implies a direct personal involvement in a decision or an action with accompanying credit or blame. The Carltona doctrine then allows many actions to be taken in the name of the Minister, some of which I imagine they may be completely unaware of, given everything that happens in a Department. There could be a situation where the Minister would have to go before the Dáil or a committee like this one and can be held accountable in that way. Would it be fair to say that this could result in a situation where if things go right, even if it is because of the officials, that the Minister can get credit for that? By the same score, if things go wrong, and again the Minister might be unaware of this, could the Minister be held responsible in the same sense because of that?

Mr. David Moloney

There are big differences between the level of political accountability and scrutiny in terms of the Oireachtas and electorate compared to the administrative accountability, which is more in the nature of a different employment relationship and a more standard employment type of relationship. Fundamentally, Ministers are responsible for the operation of their Departments under the Ministers and Secretaries Act. That overall level of responsibility is quite comprehensive and places quite a deal of accountability and responsibility on them. The ideal operation of the Public Service Management Act was to in some ways try to lighten that load by referring to the Secretaries General. It does that by saying that if something very basic goes wrong in the operation of a Department, for example, if somebody trips on the stairs, then it is not the Minister’s responsibility. This is the day-to-day operation of the Department. The challenge, then, is where that line is drawn. When does it become the responsibility of the Minister and when is it that of the Secretary General? I do not think that there will be a one-size-fits-all. That is where the OECD talks about building up a relationship of trust and an open dialogue between the administrative and political levels in order that there can be a shared understanding of where the responsibilities lie. I think the principles are sound in their own way. It is right that the Secretaries General are responsible for the day-to-day operation of their Department. It is probably in many cases an unreasonable burden to expect a Minister to account for that. On the other hand, there is political responsibility under the Constitution and under the Ministers and Secretaries Act. A similar thing happens within the Departments. I spoke in my opening statement about the framework of responsibilities. I can delegate the responsibility within my Department down to principal officer level through a framework of assignments. Even as I delegate responsibility in particular areas, however, I remain responsible as Secretary General for those areas. There is that balance because you are the head of the Department, political or administrative, so you retain some responsibility for what goes on there.

That is what the crux comes down to because even despite the delegation, there still is that level of responsibility on the part of the Minister as well. We discussed the idea that there could be a need for clarification and that things could be looked at to make matters a bit clearer. Has there ever been consideration given to amending the Ministers and Secretaries Act and the Public Service Management Act whereby the relationship could be clarified in relation to all those issues we were speaking about? Is Mr. Moloney is aware that there has ever been a look to do that in a serious and comprehensive manner?

Mr. David Moloney

It is part of the current conversation. The committee produced a report earlier this year in relation to certain senior pay issues. The Minister set up an independent review panel that will look at many relevant issues. It is chaired by Dr. Donal de Buitléir and is on senior pay and remuneration.

The interaction between the kinds of accountability issues that the Deputy raises, the method and the ways and means by which senior civil servants are appointed and remunerated are an interlinked set of issues. To substantively restructure them would require a root-and-branch look at the three blocks of legislation, namely, the Ministers and Secretaries Act, the Public Service Management Act and the Civil Service Regulation Act. Those are the three blocks of legislation that determine the different pieces of that. The Deputy’s question relates to how the three come together. That is a set of issues that we are looking at. We have not made proposals at this stage. At this stage, we will probably await the finalisation of the independent review panel to do so but we are aware of the conversations that have gone on before committees and we are aware of the issues that have been raised in relation to it. We are happy to consider that and in due course to bring forward proposals to the Minister in relation to them. The only issue is that it would be quite a significant exercise. The reality is that the Ministers and Secretaries Act and the constitutional provisions are fairly fundamental building blocks for how governmental authority is structured. Moving to amend that in any significant way would potentially make a very fundamental difference.

I have one brief final question. Mr. Moloney listed the sanctions that the Minister can take before it goes to Government. He also spoke about the sanctions from which the Secretaries General were excluded. Can he read out the ones in which they are included, just for my own notes?

Mr. David Moloney

The range of sanctions are those set out in the Civil Service disciplinary code. The three sanctions that I mentioned, which do not apply to Secretaries General by means of their appointment by Government under the legislation, are: placing the civil servant on a lower rate of pay or remuneration; reducing the civil servant to a specified lower grade or rank; and suspending the civil servant without pay.

What about the ones that they do?

Mr. David Moloney

Level 1 is a verbal warning, level 2 is a written warning and level 3 is a final written warning. There is extension of a period of a validity of a warning, deferral of an increment, debarment from competitions or promotions, withdrawal of concessions, re-assignment to a different location or different duties and the withdrawal of allowances.

The Secretary General said that level 1 is a verbal warning, level 2 is a written warning and level 3 is a final written warning. Do all of those warnings relate to the deferral of the increments, etc?

Mr. David Moloney

Yes, it builds up. We can provide the Deputy with a note on that, to be helpful.

Yes, that would be great.

I thank the Secretary General and his colleagues for coming here this afternoon. There has not been a huge amount of academic research done on this interesting topic and it might merit research.

The traditional system of accountability is that civil servants are accountable to their superiors and, ultimately, to the Minister and then the Minister is accountable to the Dáil and obviously to the Taoiseach. Has that changed in recent years? Are there other bodies to whom civil servants are accountable now?

Mr. David Moloney

I do not believe that it has changed in recent years. A lot of the legislation that sets out the accountability has been unchanged for quite a while and some of it dates back quite far. The one change that I could identify relates to the level of accountability, this idea of the appropriate authority as being the person who can impose the most severe of sanctions. That used to be only the Minister and a Department and now for a principal officer it is the Secretary General and for a principal officer and the Assistant Secretary it is the Minister, with the Government being the appropriate authority only for the Secretary General. There has been some slight change in that. In terms of the line management responsibility for the day-to-day performance management regarding the Accounting Officer role, those are very well established roles.

Aside from the disciplinary responsibilities, I have noticed that a lot of civil servants come before Oireachtas committees now. I suppose that is a different form of accountability that civil servants have now that probably would not have been as frequent 30 or 40 years ago. Would it?

Mr. David Moloney

I would think that is true. Yes, I think that there is a greater engagement. There is greater engagement with committees. There is probably a greater number of committees now as well so there is much greater openness to scrutiny.

Yes. In terms of the spread of Civil Service accountability, under the Freedom of Information Act people within the Civil Service have a direct responsibility to citizens who apply for documents. Is that fair to say?

Mr. David Moloney

Yes, Deputy. It is very much so. Across the range of our activities, since the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform was established there has been a range of legislation which is really about openness and accountability of Government, including whistleblowing, lobbying, freedom of information, the establishment of an ombudsman and the extension of his remit. All of those things are things that civil servants engage with on a day-to-day basis.

I do not suggest that the following applies to the Secretary General. Can civil servants sometimes find themselves in a position where their interests or obligations for accountability and the interests of a Minister may not necessarily align? Does that pose difficulties for the civil servant?

Mr. David Moloney

It would be a very extreme case in the sense that, for the most part, the role of a Secretary General is to implement Government and ministerial policy within the Department. The one place that has been identified as, potentially, giving rise to a conflict has always between the role of Secretary General and the role of Accounting Officer. When the Mullarkey Report, which dates back to the early 2000s, looked at that issue it suggested a process that could be adopted if a conflict arose between a Secretary General and what he or she perceived to be his or her role as Accounting Officer. Other than that, given that our job is to advise on policy and then implement the policy, I would not think that those conflicts would arise.

Sometimes there are political controversies and it can result in civil servants or Secretaries General being at the centre of those disputes, on occasion, and that has happened. Is that something that is new? Is it something that is not desirable?

Mr. David Moloney

We talk these days about increased transparency. Obviously media is more fluid than it was and there is greater attention paid to various public conversations. Freedom of information has supported a huge increase in the amount of information that is available to a broader variety of people and that has given rise to discussions that are possible now that would not have been possible 20 years ago. Those discussions have, increasingly, involved what advice that civil servants have or have not offered. So that has become part of the general discussion and, in many ways, that is a sign of increased openness and transparency. It is probably a risk that needs to be managed about confusing the roles of civil servants, who are there to implement policy, and Governments, which are there to make it. In the main, we are aware of and seek to manage that risk.

I do not have a firm view on the following. Does the Secretary General think that advice given by civil servants to a Minister should be subject to questioning or public scrutiny if it does come into the public domain?

Mr. David Moloney

Once it is public then there is no reason not to. The only caveat is that the extent to which one can comment on the demerits and merits of a decision once it is taken is very limited.

Mr. David Moloney

Once a decision or policy has been made, we can explain what advice we offered but we cannot get into a discussion about the policy.

That does not necessarily mean that civil servants will not find themselves in the centre of a discussion. If one looks at how political controversy can develop, people can gain access to advice, through the freedom of information process, that gets into the public domain, the Minister then says, "I am following the advice that I was given", the advice is then questioned and at that stage civil servants do, it seems to me, end up at the centre of the public issue. Is that good or bad? Is it something that we must go along with as a fact of life?

Mr. David Moloney

I would feel that, in those discussions, we need to be aware of the limitations because civil servants cannot fully become involved in the discussion about a policy that is made. We need to also be aware of the risks that might be inherent in a public discourse that discouraged the collecting together of relevant policy, evidence and advice.

How much in the public eye does the Secretary General think a civil servant should be? I am conscious that if we were having this discussion here, and we probably would not have this discussion here 40 or 50 years ago, but 40 or 50 years ago I would have thought that very few senior civil servants would have been publicly well known whereas now quite a few of them are. How much in the public eye does the Secretary General think an effective Secretary General or civil servant should be?

Mr. David Moloney

I thank the Deputy for his question. I do not really think there is a right answer to that in the sense we are not, in ourselves, public figures but we do have a role in public policy formation and it is very legitimate for people to want to see how that role is discharged.

It seems to be the case that Secretaries General and civil servants are coming more into the public domain. Even if one looks over at what is happening in the United Kingdom now there seems to be an acceptance that when a new political regime comes in that they may want to change civil servants. Fortunately, that is something that we have not really had in Ireland as of yet. Is that correct?

Mr. David Moloney

That is correct, Deputy. That is not part of the legislative and administrative context in which senior public servants are appointed. They are appointed for the Government by the Government for a seven-year term, which is traditionally extended by three years. Those are the parameters within which we work so that is obviously not tied into an electoral cycle or change of Government. The expectation is that we will impartially and objectively advise on and implement Government policy regardless.

Does Mr. Moloney agree that if civil servants changed with political direction, it would necessarily mean that they would be seen as more politically associated?

Mr. David Moloney

It is hard to know how something would be perceived, but, in jurisdictions where that happens, that is the perception.

I call Deputy Clarke. She is welcome to the committee.

I thank the Chair. It is a pleasure. I am not a member of this committee; I am substituting for somebody else. It is my first time here.

Could I return to something Mr. Moloney said to my colleague, Deputy Mairéad Farrell. It related to the disciplinary options open to a Minister and written warnings. I fully accept that I may have picked up Mr. Moloney incorrectly. If I did, he should please tell me. At the beginning of this conversation, he said that when he was in front of committees, with the exception of the Committee of Public Accounts, he was the voice of the Minister. He said he almost has a dual reporting function, reporting on the one hand to the Minister and on the other hand to the Oireachtas. Am I correct in saying that?

Mr. David Moloney

Yes. Implementing the policies of the Minister in the Department is a Secretary General role. I report to the Minister, and the appropriate authority is the Government. With regard to the Accounting Officer function, which entails a separate body of legislation, I report in a personal capacity. I cannot delegate that function. It is separate from my duty in respect of the Minister. I report to the Committee of Public Accounts, and the Comptroller and Auditor General audits.

If the options raised by Deputy Mairéad Farrell are available to the Minister, is there another set of disciplinary options, or potential disciplinary options, open to the Oireachtas? Is Mr. Moloney subject to two separate disciplinary systems? I refer to actions such as written warnings and the removal of allowances. Are there two parallel systems?

Mr. David Moloney

I do not believe there are two parallel systems in that way. Accountability to the Oireachtas is structured such that the Comptroller and Auditor General produces a value-for-money report or audit report. I get questioned on that at an appearance before the Committee of Public Accounts. That committee then reports to the Dáil on it. That is the process. There is not really a Civil Service disciplinary process associated with that.

It was starting to appear a bit like a spider's web to me, whereby you could be branching off into all kinds of separate angles at a rate of knots.

Mr. Moloney referred to civil servants above principal officer grade not being subject to the disciplinary code. Did I hear that correctly?

Mr. David Moloney

I must have misspoken. They are subject to the disciplinary code, but the appropriate authority in respect of them is different.

Is it the Government?

Mr. David Moloney

For principal officers and assistant secretaries, it is the Minister. For a Secretary General, it is the Government. For anyone below principal officer level, it is the Secretary General.

What is the process involved regarding Secretaries General? I am struggling to understand. There seem to be so many processes or potential processes.

Mr. David Moloney

We have very well-defined processes available to use in the Civil Service. The Civil Service disciplinary code sets out a multistage process. The reality of an issue that would arise between the head of a Department, namely, a Secretary General, and the Minister is very different. One could think about it as being the same as a conflict between a chief executive officer and a board. It is a more complex issue than other disciplinary issues within an organisation. The way in which the Government would seek to discharge its powers in relation to this as the appropriate authority would really depend on the case and its circumstances. The Mullarkey report considered in passing whether a more structured approach would be beneficial and more or less came down against it in the sense that the benefits would not outweigh-----

Am I correct in saying there is not really much of a structured approach and that situations could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis?

Mr. David Moloney

As things stand, the expectation is that they would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. We should bear in mind that there are some limitations and constraints concerning what the Government is allowed to do in such cases. There is, of course, the constitutional right to fair procedure. There are employment laws that may be relevant, although not all employment law applies to Secretaries General. There is the need for process. Given the seniority involved and the circumstances, it would probably require a bespoke response.

Even from a workers' rights perspective, I find that a little mind-boggling. That is probably the correct term to use.

Mr. Moloney referred to the Rafter report and the Mulcahy report. The accountability of Secretaries General was reviewed in 2002 by a working group. The report pointed out the potential of bringing Secretaries General within the remit of the existing disciplinary process, a move that would require legislation. Is Mr. Moloney aware of any legislation in that regard that is to be introduced or that is even being drafted?

Mr. David Moloney

There are two aspects to that. First, there was legislation in 2005 that effectively expanded the remit of the disciplinary process we have been talking about to Secretaries General. That was the Civil Service Regulation (Amendment) Act. It effectively brought Secretaries General into the net. The extent to which they are in the net is limited in the way I discussed with Deputy Mairéad Farrell because the nature of the appointment by the Government precludes certain of the steps. We are currently examining the Civil Service Regulation (Amendment) Act in terms of how we see disciplinary matters working broadly within the Civil Service. I do not believe we specifically intend for it to address Secretaries General at this point.

Mr. Moloney referred to the ongoing review into this issue. Let me refer to other jurisdictions, as referred to by Deputy Jim O'Callaghan. In the United States, for example, Ministers can dismiss senior officials within the limits set down by a certain law that is in place. In Canada, the Prime Minister appoints those in the two most senior levels of officials and has the power to remove or dismiss them. Is Mr. Moloney aware of whether this was ever considered in any of the reviews of the legislation or in respect of potential legislative changes that are needed?

Mr. David Moloney

The issue of accountability and who the most senior civil servants are accountable to does arise regarding the 2002 review that the Deputy mentioned. The Mullarkey report was a couple of years later. There was also the Rafter report, which I discussed with Deputy Mairéad Farrell. All of these things do arise. In effect, the arrangements remain as set out in the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924, the Civil Service Regulation Act 1924 and subsequent measures. The decision, as expressed in legislation, is that the appropriate authority is the Government. In other jurisdictions, it can be the Prime Minister or equivalent of the Minister for Finance. In our neighbouring jurisdiction, as I understand it from recent events, it is the Cabinet Secretary. There are different models; it is just that the OECD work does not necessarily point to one ideal solution. The legislative model we have used this as I have described.

It is rather peculiar. The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is considering amending and consolidating Acts that date back to the mid-1940s. I refer to really historical Acts. In Mr. Moloney's experience, does he believe there is a better way to do this? Does he believe the current system is working? If we have had so many reports, reviews and amendments of various Acts, is the arrangement fit for purpose at this point?

Mr. David Moloney

We will continue to develop it. As I said, there does not appear to be an obvious right answer in terms of the OECD, legislation and so on. What the OECD points to as the solution is more in the nature of culture and values and of a co-operative arrangement and relationship of trust between the heads of the Civil Service and their respective Ministers and the Government as a whole.

It is very hard to create a policy or legislative solution that tries to bridge any gap there.

I thank Mr. Moloney and his team.

I will start with Mr. Moloney's opening statement. I appreciate his coming in. Along with many Deputies and Senators, I am certainly interested in this topic from the point of view of improving the system. There is no other motive behind it. The opening statement refers to the 1924 Act. Under section 17 of the 1956 Act, as amended, the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform has responsibility for a range of functions including: the regulation and control of the Civil Service; classification and reclassification; numbers; remuneration of civil servants; and fixing the terms and conditions. That might be the case at a very senior management level, but the workings behind that are carried out by the officials. In general, the officials in each Department would recommend the range of responsibilities and functions. The classification and reclassification would be a matter for negotiation with the unions. The conditions governing the promotion of civil servants are part of the normal process within a company or business. The general level of activity on all of these issues is part and parcel of everyday stuff in the Civil Service. The Minister would act in those areas on instruction or recommendation from his or her Secretary General. Is that not generally how it functions?

Mr. David Moloney

There are a few parts relating to how it functions. Any of those day-to-day decisions are taken within a policy and legislative context. In effect regulations inform recruitment, promotion, the Civil Service disciplinary process, bullying and harassment legislation. There is a significant policy context within which any day-to-day decision is made. Of course, the Minister is fundamental to setting in place that policy context. Once that happens, the day-to-day operation of that is taken forward on his or her behalf by civil servants or public servants.

The unions are also involved in negotiating one part or the other.

Mr. David Moloney

There is active engagement with worker representatives, yes.

They have a key role to play in all this.

Mr. David Moloney

They are consulted on the policy process.

Would Mr. Moloney agree they have a key role? He seems to hesitate.

Mr. David Moloney

Not at all. The decision-making role is the Minister's.

I understand that. In reaching-----

Mr. David Moloney

Other stakeholders are consulted.

Yes, but in reaching any decision it is important that the unions are also there representing the staff. There is that ongoing engagement. It is not a trick question. It operates the same as a company.

Mr. David Moloney

Typically, we would also have public consultation and other forms of stakeholder engagement broader than worker representation on that.

The point I am making is that going down through this work and the changes that might be spoken about there are many more parties involved than just the Minister and the Secretary General. Many other strands come together to work in the interest of the Department. That is the only point I am making on that.

Is there a need for a Secretary General and a Department that would be in control of the overall performance of Secretaries General? Therefore, there would be a boss, one Secretary General, who would deal with complaints and other stuff that normally arises in the management of a big entity like the State because that is not the case today. A Secretary General appeared before this committee and explained that there really is no boss because each Department is structured in such a way that the boss is the Secretary General or the Minister, depending on what is going on. However, there is no layer above Secretaries General to pull them in line should they depart for any reason.

Mr. David Moloney

I refer to my opening statement. The Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924 makes the Minister for Finance responsible for the Civil Service. That has changed a few times. It became the Minister for the Public Service at one point, back to the Minister for Finance and now it is the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform. Section 17 of the Civil Service Regulation Act is fundamental to the Chairman's question because it places the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform as the person politically responsible for the regulation and control of all the Civil Service and all that flows from that.

We also need to bear in mind the point about the appropriate authority. The Government is the appropriate authority for the Secretaries General. That is also set out in the Civil Service Regulation Act. The statutory provisions we have there set out a large and significant role for the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, but there is also a role for the Government as a whole. One of the changes made since 1924 is exactly the one the Chairman mentioned, which is that the responsibility for employing people is no longer a central responsibility but is now within the remit of individual Departments. A set of responsibilities goes up from individual Departments to Ministers and then, of course, Government has a collective responsibility. I suppose that is-----

If for some reason there was an issue with a Secretary General, is it then for the Minister to bring it to the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform and then to Government?

Mr. David Moloney

That is one potential route. As I said earlier, I think these-----

What is the other route?

Mr. David Moloney

The Minister, himself or herself, could bring it to the Taoiseach or the Government. I suppose they are the two obvious ones.

Ministers have that political ability to raise an issue about a Secretary General's performance. There may be a clash of personality and all sorts of things that can happen in the workplace today. However, that is generally channelled through the Minister to the Government.

Mr. David Moloney

The legislative provisions make Government the appropriate authority, meaning that Government has the potential to act as the appropriate authority. As it is an employment relationship, it is necessary to be careful about the range of issues we are discussing. In the case of a serious disciplinary issue, the Government is the appropriate authority and can take measures.

Mr. Moloney has spent a number of years in the Civil Service. In his position looking back, can he ever remember a Secretary General who was fired for any reason? Was anyone ever sacked, even down through the various lower levels of the Civil Service? I am trying to determine how effective the system of employment is. Based on the seven-year contract, regardless of what happens, the person is there for seven years. Over the past ten years, was anyone ever sacked from the Civil Service?

Mr. David Moloney

Obviously, going back over time, I would not have been as involved in all these issues as I am in my current role. I am not aware of anything of the nature the Chairman described regarding Secretaries General in the past ten years.

Going beyond that, it is difficult to assess from afar exactly what happened.

To go lower than the level of Secretary General, is it fair to say that no one has been sacked?

Mr. David Moloney

No, that is definitely not correct. There definitely people are whose employment has been terminated. It is not the objective of the Civil Service disciplinary code or the performance management process to sack people. The objective is to work with them and to make sure they are fit for purpose but there are severe breaches of trust. There have been issues. The most obvious thing to think about would be theft. If someone was found guilty of a criminal offence, or misused their position in some way, these are very severe things for which people have faced termination.

In terms of the workings of the Committee of Public Accounts, I have seen and read the many reports over the years that have been sent to the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. As for some of these reports on protecting taxpayers' money and getting greater efficiency in terms of the spend, I will not say they have been ignored because somebody obviously has read them but in terms of the extent of change demanded, very little change is seen in the mechanisms there to guard loss of money or efficiency. There are many examples over the years. How much input does a Minister have into those reports? In Mr. Moloney's case, it a question of the reports being read and that is the extent of it? I have not seen any major change in my time here on the Committee of Public Accounts or other committees that would lead me to believe there was a mechanism in place that fully looked at these reports with a view to making the changes that might be necessary.

Mr. David Moloney

As I understand it, the process for reports on the Committee of Public Accounts is that any recommendations are responded to by the relevant Department in some detail. The Department says whether it accepts, does not accept or partially accepts the recommendation and gives some indication of what action will be taken. There is quite detailed consideration and the final part of the process is a minute signed on behalf of the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, which is put to him for approval.

Why does Mr. Moloney think there is not much change then? Going back to the second page in Mr. Moloney's submission, the Committee of Public Accounts and other committees are said to examine various aspects of a Department's work, make recommendations to either the line committee of the Department, or in the case of the Committee of Public Accounts, to the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, which would then send these to the relevant Department, which comes back with the recommendations or a rebuttal of the points that were made. The Committee of Public Accounts then gets a minute on that, as the Secretary General noted. I have read many of those reports and have looked at the recommendations. Very few recommendations are taken on board by the Department, in spite of the fact that a considerable amount of money could have been wasted. Procurement or administration of one kind or another could have gone wrong and it just goes on like that. It seems to be a process with lip service to the Committee of Public Accounts but no real analysis of what is required, or the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform not forcing the Department at fault to question itself enough to bring about the necessary reform so that the issue will not arise again.

Mr. David Moloney

Procurement, which the Chairman mentioned, is an example of where a radically different approach has taken hold over the last ten years in terms of the establishment of the Office for Government Procurement and the aggregation of procurement knowledge, expertise and funding of common goods and services. From where I sit, I would say there has been significant structural and behavioural change in the last decade. That is not to say there cannot be more and there are not other issues that need to be progressed further. Certainly the recommendations to the Committee for Public Accounts are taken very seriously. There is a reluctance to not accept them.

They are never accepted. There is a huge volume of recommendations made through various reports, that have, by and large, been ignored. I have often asked this committee how many recommendations through all of the reports were made and how many of those were actually accepted. It would be a very worthwhile piece of work to do to find out. It tells you a lot about Departments if you take the time, as I do, to see how it all functions. My interest is not to catch anyone out but to understand why the Committee of Public Accounts is still in business. The overriding desire should be to put it out of business because we have such an efficient operation that very little will happen. I see the waste and very little scrutiny in terms of the public accounts side of the work at local government level. Even though there might be local audit committees, they do not function in the way I would expect them to function from a business perspective. I can name many outstanding pieces of work of complaint that just rest there. There is a resistance either within local government or the broader Civil Service to having one master audit committee that is a Comptroller and Auditor General to deal with local government and with every other aspect of government. There is a resistance to that. I wonder about the resistance to change right across the different Departments. Changes are happening slowly but in terms of the vast amounts of money Departments are now spending, there should be a far greater drive at that level to get the necessary change and to drive it down through the Civil Service structure itself.

Mr. David Moloney

In terms of the pieces I have visibility on, which are more in central government, and the reports that the Committee of Public Accounts does in relation to that, I see Accounting Officers putting considerable energy into those reports. They take the recommendations very seriously and are very reluctant to not accept them. Constant improvement is what we all seek and I am not suggesting this is not possible. The Civil Service now is not recognisable from that of ten to 20 years ago. We have a National Shared Services Office, we have increasing ICT-----

That may be the case but is it the structure and the Civil Service actors within that structure that are required for current and future times, because those times have changed considerably as well? I see a huge effort being made in businesses big and small to ensure IT and reporting are up to scratch and that change can happen immediately. You just have to take the HSE, the Department of Finance and you find there is little or no IT infrastructure there to record the necessary financial reports and outputs from all of the various sections. That would not happen in business and if it did, that business would not be in business for very long. I do not see that type of real step change being made in big Departments and that really concerns me. Before I go away from that, I have one more comment on the reports that come through the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform and are channelled to the different Departments, with the minute then being channelled back to the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform and then to the Committee of Public Accounts.

Would it be a worthwhile exercise to look at the various reports from the Committee of Public Accounts going to the various different Departments and do an exercise to find out how many recommendations were accepted, how many were totally rejected and how many were partially acted on? That would be a worthwhile exercise and would give some sort of insight into how it all operates.

Will Mr. Moloney explain the recruitment process at senior level? That is a public process. It is a process that tries to attract others within the Civil Service to come forward. There is a public end of it to try and get people from the private sector in. How many private sector people have been employed within the Civil Service in the past ten years at that level?

Mr. David Moloney

At Secretary General level-----

Yes, or assistant secretary general.

Mr. David Moloney

-----or assistant secretary general level, I do not have those data to hand but I can get them to the Chairman. It is probably fair to say that the number of people employed at that level will be relatively small. In terms of our recruitment processes, obviously, they are all at that level open recruitment processes with the exception of posts, as the Chairman will be aware, that Government decides not to fill through the Top-Level Appointments Committee, TLAC, process. However, through the TLAC process conducted by the Public Appointments Service, they are competitive open competitions. I can get the data for the Chairman.

I would say-----

I do not remember anyone being taken in from the private sector.

Mr. David Moloney

I know for a fact it is not a zero answer.

It is very close.

Mr. David Moloney

I do not have the number. I know for a fact it is not zero.

If Mr. Moloney gets the number, I would like to see it.

Mr. David Moloney

I will get the Chairman the number. It is difficulty because of the seniority that one is asking people to transfer into a very different organisation from. Now there are people with previous experience in the public sector.

I would say that among the Secretaries General there are people who worked in the private sector, came in as principal officers, POs, and were promoted. The current Secretary General cohort has people with significant non-Civil Service experience at that level.

How long would it take, when one is in as PO, to get to Secretary General?

Mr. David Moloney

That is not a fixed quantity.

Mr. Moloney could have a stab at it there, we will say, for the sake of ten years.

Mr. David Moloney

Of the ones who are currently Secretary General, I would guess it varies between five years and ten years - something like that. That is a guess now.

In the commercial world, a lot of change happens in five years and ten years.

Mr. David Moloney

Yes.

I am making the point that we need to be more open. We need to do far more to attract people in. It needs to be addressed. I note recently they spoke about how the level of salary etc. needs to be looked at. Fine, if that is the case. If we can continue to open it up, get those within the service and give the potential to recruit outside from the private sector as well, that would help. Who appoints TLAC?

Mr. David Moloney

A Government memorandum s brought by the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform.

To appoint the members of TLAC.

Mr. David Moloney

To appoint the members of TLAC, yes.

Does Mr. Moloney know, without giving names, are they all civil servants, ex-civil servants or from the private sector? What number are on TLAC and how many are from the private sector?

Mr. David Moloney

I cannot remember exactly how many external members we have now. There are approximately nine external and six internal members but I will check those numbers for the Chairman.

In terms of their background, typically, their background is HR and law. There is one person there who has a public sector background, nine with one to be filled, and seven internal. There background generally-----

Law, HR.

Mr. David Moloney

-----is HR, law, recruitment.

I want to move on to reports. Earlier we mentioned the Mullarkey and Rafter reviews.

Mr. David Moloney

Rafter, yes.

In doing those reports or in doing a review of a Department or taking an issue and dealing with it, what effort is made from within the senior Civil Service to ensure that there is real independence there from the private sector? One would often see people who worked previously for the HSE or previously for a Department and they are given a job to review something or other or to create a report on some issue or other. Does the Civil Service reach beyond that? Are there independent bodies out there that can be used to give a greater indication to the public that there is a drive here for greater transparency? I am not questioning the credentials of these people.

Mr. David Moloney

The people who are appointed are appointed to act independently and I suppose we have to trust them to do that. Obviously, they are appointed by the relevant Minister or Government or both to the position. That is a question of trying to look around and see who is available with an expertise in any particular area. For State bodies, we have a State bodies appointments process now. There is a greater degree of transparency, hosted by the PAS, in relation to that. However, we are a relatively small country. By the time one is looking for something, a relatively particular piece of expertise and independence in that, there generally are not a large number of experts available.

Have we ever compared ourselves to other jurisdictions? Mr. Moloney mentioned earlier on that in some countries they do it this way and that way. How do we compare with other jurisdictions? Are we at the top end of it?

Mr. David Moloney

When we look to the OECD trust surveys, we do very well in terms of our Civil Service and our trust in the Government. Broadly speaking, it is difficult to measure yourself against other countries. What we normally do is look to the OECD or other international organisations that undertake comparisons of how countries operate in particular ways. It is often difficult to see into the detail of that, for instance, other countries, other cultures, other systems.

Is there a better model of administration out there or a mixture of how other countries might do their business as a state in order that we can improve ours? Has that comparison ever been made?

Mr. David Moloney

We always look to see if there are ideas there but our trust-in-Government figures in these surveys are very high. Our ranking on the traditional public service values indicator, that is, on independence, freedom from bribery and corruption, transparency of liability and administrative fairness, has been well above the EU average with Ireland ranking sixth of the EU 28 in this indicator in 2020. To the extent that there are data, in terms of these surveys which are only surveys, the data are positive about the operation and the integrity of our civil administration. That is not to say that there are not ideas there that we could bring in and use, and we engage with the OECD and others in relation to that.

Okay. I refer to the outsourcing of parts of the work of a Department or an agency where, let us say, citizens information or some other organisation like that is created. Is that happening widely now in the organisation where there is a certain shedding of different responsibilities and they are being farmed out with new agencies being created? The big example would be the Department and the HSE. It can come down to much smaller agencies. Is that a big change in the organisation?

Mr. David Moloney

There is flexibility in how things are rolled out in different policy areas and different choices are made. If one is thinking about our new agencies being created, the Oireachtas created two new agencies. It has created one, in terms of the Maritime Area Regulatory Authority, MARA, and will, if it has not already, create a media commission. They are two areas where it is felt that is the best way of delivering on the ambitions in those areas.

There has been great growth in both of those areas in the Irish context with the offshore renewable ambitions for the Maritime Area Regulatory Authority, MARA, and the prevalence of particular types of companies in the Irish industrial landscape for the media commission. Those are two areas where new agencies are being created.

In other areas, the administration of some services can be achieved through partial outsourcing but that only happens where the existing administration is incapable of fulfilling what needs to be done. Overall, we address different challenges in different ways. We have changed organisational arrangements and used different ways of delivery over time. Obviously Revenue is an example. The Chairman earlier mentioned ICT and I agree that the future of the Civil Service and public service requires a shift towards ICT. That is reflected in the Civil Service renewal plan. There is an idea for 24-7 public service delivery by 2030 and that sort of thing, and there are EU targets in that regard. We are mindful of those issues. We are open-minded about how to deliver on some of those issues.

Without naming any particular Department, let us consider a big-spending Department from which the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform wants greater accountability. IT is essential to do that. In such a case, does the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform get involved by telling the line Department we are not getting anywhere, we need greater transparency and accountability in respect of where the money is going and how we can improve on the structures and the big-spending Department does not have the appropriate IT systems. Those systems might be too old and do not speak to each other. Would the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform get involved in that type of action with a Department? Does it conduct a critical analysis of these big Departments in respect of how they are controlling everything?

Mr. David Moloney

The Office of the Government Chief Information Officer is a division of the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. It provides advice and a resource to Departments that want to achieve ICT transformation. It has relationships with the chief information officers in most Departments. There is a network of people who share best practice and link in with each other. We would have traditionally taken an active role in trying to support those types of projects. The Chairman earlier mentioned the HSE IT and financial management system. We have become involved in groups trying to push that forward. We facilitate to the extent we can from the centre of those projects. However, at the end of the day, the organisations themselves must deliver.

Mr. Moloney mentioned the HSE and we can take it as an example. Considering the amount of money the HSE spends, is it not essential for the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform to demand the type of IT infrastructure that would give the managers in the HSE and the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform the necessary information? I attended a trade fair when I was Minister of State with responsibility for trade and commerce. There are companies that excel in that area around the world and yet we do not seem to be able to get to grips with the provision of technological advancement to an extent that would allow us to say it is all working.

I attended the opening of a wing in St. Luke's Hospital in Kilkenny. It has single rooms and state-of-the-art technology which tells the medical professionals everything about the patients. We need to get to the point where we are getting all of the information from the likes of the HSE or any big-spending Department. What is the role of the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform in that regard. Does the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform get annoyed with Departments that do not deliver with the efficiency or speed it would expect, given the money they are controlling? Surely Accounting Officers across the board would want to have those systems in place so they could stand over whatever happened, what went wrong and right, and so on. Mr. Moloney can tell me I am wrong if I am, but it seems that certain bodies within the Civil Service are very slow and we do not achieve levels of efficiency as quickly as we should. If there was a single manager for all these Departments, I would be asking him or her what is going on in the Department and why is something not happening. Those managers could be moved on if they were unable to deliver. Is the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform concerned about the weaknesses around the financial reporting that is now necessary in respect of these big sums of money?

Mr. David Moloney

I agree with the Chairman. The Department has a large and active interest in the development of appropriate ICT, both financial and broader, across the Civil Service and public service. It is the only way to effectively deliver cost-effective and impactful services. That is very much at the core of the Civil Service renewal strategy, which we are driving. We have a digital leaders group, which is chaired by the Government chief information officer, whose office is a division of our Department. We play an active role in encouraging and exchanging best practice. In respect of finances, we support different ICT projects. However, it comes back to the reality we spoke about earlier in respect of where responsibility lies and who the decision-makers are. The decision-makers, as is set out in different pieces of legislation, are either the Department or the agency involved. We cajole, oversee, encourage, support where we can, and provide advice, networks and best practice. Our role is in that sphere.

That part of it disappoints me a lot. In big organisations, one sometimes has to take steps to make sure the organisation is moving in the desired direction. It sometimes takes an intervention far greater than just cajoling. I would have thought there would be competition among civil servants to make their Departments the key players or the models to follow. I do not get the impression that is the case.

I am trying to examine the role of the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. I would have thought its role would be far more authoritative and that it would if not dictate, force through the agenda of change and technological transformation in each area. I do not see the same pace of change everywhere. I would have thought the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform would insist on that pace of change so that those different Departments and agencies were reporting on all fronts, including financial and administrative, and in respect their governance role, which is also important. Am I wrong?

Mr. David Moloney

I am not aware that I said anything that contradicts anything the Chairman has said. That is absolutely right. We are central to driving forward transformation in ICT. That is fundamental to the Civil Service renewal plan. It is one of the key roles of the Government chief information officer. The point I made was that the prioritisation and allocation of resources within the Departments remains fundamentally a matter for the Minister, Secretary General or Accounting Officer of individual Departments.

I see. So therefore-----

Mr. David Moloney

At the centre, we are certainly pushing very hard for the kinds of things the Chairman has described.

I am not going to labour the part any further. There needs to be a step change in that area. I have come to the end of my questions and the areas in which I am interested.

Does it take much time for officials to prepare for meetings like these?

Mr. David Moloney

Yes, it does. It takes some time-----

Is it a lot of hassle for people?

Mr. David Moloney

It is part of what we do but it does take time. It is very helpful to have, as the Chairman has set out, an agenda that specifies the area of interest for the committee. That helps us focus our preparation. We want to be able to come before a committee and give answers to the questions it asks so we prepare for that.

It takes time.

Mr. David Moloney

Certainly.

I thank everyone for taking the time to be here and for the questions that have been put and answered. It is an interesting topic. I hope we can get this type of change as quickly as we can. I wish the witnesses well in their work.

The joint committee adjourned at 3.01 p.m. until 1.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 19 October 2022.
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