I thank you warmly for this invitation to address this committee. We came to Dublin because Ireland holds the chair of the EU for the six-month period in which Cyprus will accede finally to the Union. We have had useful and interesting meetings with Government and parliamentary leaders. We know that Ireland has been very supportive of Cyprus and of a resolution to the Cyprus problem for many years. It has been very supportive of the aspiration of Cyprus to join the European Union and this is now becoming a reality.
This is my third term of office as Foreign Minister. Although Cyprus has a very active foreign policy on many issues, there are two pylons on which that policy has rested: to resolve the Cyprus problem and to join the European Union, in that order. It is a matter of regret for us that we are joining the Union on 1 May but have still not resolved the Cyprus problem. This is not because we have not tried. I reassert that acceding to the Union as a re-unified country is the major objective for us and has always been so. If we do not manage that, it will be a matter of great regret for us.
Many people refer to important dates in the calendar. One such date is 10 March of last year when the last inter-communal meeting under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, was held. The President of the Cyprus Government took office on 1 March 2003 following elections on 14 February. No one on the Greek Cypriot side claimed that because there were elections we could not negotiate. Also, we did not ask for additional time to study the 700 pages of the Annan plan. We negotiated right through the electoral campaign and were willing just 10 days after being installed as a Government to go to the Hague to negotiate.
While many people say that the Hague negotiations collapsed, and I sometimes say it myself, that is totally wrong. They did not collapse because they did not take place. In fact, when the UN Secretary General summoned the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, he told Mr. Annan he did not know why he had been brought there. He said he had told Mr. Annan on 26 and 28 February that he did not accept his plan, its philosophy or its parameters. He said he could not see why a sick old man like him had to be kept up until 3 a.m.
There was no attempt to negotiate. The plan was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side, by Mr. Denktash and by the Deputy Minister of Turkey, Mr. Zigal, who was present. He said he was not authorised to commit Turkey to the draft international treaties which were being presented by the Secretary General, Mr. Annan.
Since then, we have publicly urged the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot side to come to the negotiations. We said that the collapse of the Hague talks was lamented because on 16 April 2003 we were to sign the Treaty of Accession, which I had the privilege of signing with President Papadopoulous. However, in his speech during the signing of the Treaty of Accession, the President said we would not turn our backs on the negotiations but would continue to seek negotiations after 16 April. We did so in an open manner, inviting the UN Secretary General, the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to participate.
What did the Turkish side say over this period? I will only cite Mr. Denktash who repeatedly said the Annan plan was dead and buried. All of the Governments with which I was in touch told me to convene talks as soon as possible because there must be a comfortable margin for negotiations. However they said - this includes the United States Ambassador and the British High Commissioner - there was no point beginning talks as long as Mr. Denktash was the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor.
There is no chance of finding a solution while Mr. Denktash is in the saddle and leads the Turkish Cypriot community. We had to wait until the electoral process took place among the Turkish Cypriot community on 14 December last. That community gave much support to the opposition parties, which seemed more progressive and more amenable to a negotiated settlement.
Fearing a disaster in the elections, Mr. Denktash began importing voters in the pre-election period. The increase in the electorate was 4% within one year whereas it would normally be about 1%. Mr. Akinci, a Turkish Cypriot leader, confronted Mr. Erdogan, the Turkish Prime Minister, in a public meeting in Palma, Majorca, and told him to stop bringing settlers to Cyprus, adulterating the political will of the Turkish Cypriots. He paid for this dearly in the subsequent formation of the administration for he has been excluded completely for daring to voice a Turkish Cypriot view.
There was a time when 25 members were progressives and 25 were of the reactionary elements. Now, we have the old father, Mr. Rauf Denktash, who still represents the Turkish Cypriot community as an interlocutor and his son, Mr. Serder Denktash. Then there is Mr. Talat, the progressive without much spirit, caught in between the father and son. In my view, that is the current and completely indeterminate position in the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Prime Minister said that in any future talks, Mr. Denktash will be accompanied by Mr. Talat, but that Mr. Denktash will represent them. I do not know yet how much influence Mr. Talat will have and I will keep an open mind on the matter.
On 23 January, a body known as the National Security Council of Turkey met in Ankara and issued a public pronouncement that Turkey wants a solution of the Cyprus problem based on realities in Cyprus, having the plan of Mr. Kofi Annan as a reference, and giving full support to Mr. Denktash. This is the same Mr. Denktash that western countries have said is the main obstacle to a solution.
What do "realities" in Cyprus mean? Presumably, it means the effects of the invasion such as ethnic cleansing and the creation of approximately 160,000 refugees. Why was it difficult for the National Security Council to say that it wanted a negotiated settlement based on the Annan plan? Why was it so difficult to specify the Annan plan as a basis of the future inter-communal negotiations? How is using the Annan plan as a reference to be interpreted? Immediately afterwards, there was a concerted public relations exercise, a spin, which took the form of announcement after announcement stressing the goodwill exhibited by the Government of Turkey in the efforts to find a solution to the problem of Cyprus.
I remind the committee that the European Commission published four reports on the candidacy of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. One of them is a strategy paper in which it warned Turkey that unless the Cyprus problem was resolved, the EU would find it difficult to give Turkey a date for negotiations. It was formulated in various ways but the net result is that Turkey will have an easier path in its European aspirations if it resolves the problem of Cyprus.
Many of Turkey's friends impressed upon the Government of Turkey the need to resolve the Cyprus problem. At the Thessaloniki summit, and at the Brussels summit last December, the European Union pointed the finger at the Turkish Cypriots and at Turkey as being major obstacles to the solution of the Cyprus problem.
We waited to see what Turkey would do. The action started in Davos where discussions took place with the Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, and then it moved to the United States, where the Prime Minister, Mr. Erdogan, and Mr. Abdullah Gul, the Foreign Minister, made several public statements, which all gave the impression of a positive attitude to negotiating to find a solution before 1 May.
What is the truth? Spin lasts for so long and no longer but in the end the chips are down and the people that have to take the decisions know precisely what has happened. I am sure the public relations exercise will not last forever.
A Security Council resolution gives us the means to resolve the Cyprus problem. The Secretary General of the United Nations is offering his good offices to the two communities in Cyprus to resolve the problem. As a consequence of this process, a document, generally known as the Annan plan, exists. We say that the Annan plan is on the table and we have been waiting for 11 months to have it negotiated towards a solution of the Cyprus problem.
I do not break any confidences when I say what Mr. Erdogan told the Secretary General as it is a matter of public record and not based on information which I have from the Secretary General. They said that the document is too long at 700 pages and that it is impossible to negotiate on the basis of this document in the time available until 30 March when everything has to be agreed, as it has to be implemented by 1 May, allowing time for referenda. It is too long. Why they did not decide a little earlier to allow ample negotiating time is a secret closely kept by the Turkish Government?
They said that they cannot negotiate on the Annan plan, that we now have to negotiate three different things, a basic agreement, a map which marks the territorial aspect of the problem and a constitution. All other issues will be negotiated after 1 May. This is a violation of a number of concepts inherent in the good offices of the Secretary General. In his report, he says his document is comprehensive and self-executing and it is inherent in the document that nothing is binding until everything is agreed. This is fully in conformity with the concept of offering a mission of good offices.
A document exists as a basis for negotiation and we said to the Secretary General in the Hague that we accept it as such, which means that we accept its philosophy and its basic parameters. We will not raise fundamental issues in any future negotiation unless the other side raises fundamental issues. We will raise issues of functionality in the wake of our accession to the EU because we want to be a fully functioning and not a stalled member.
The Turkish proposal is three different documents - not the Annan plan, which is too long - and everything else will be negotiated after 1 May 2004. In effect it is an interim proposal for an interim period which leaves a great deal to be negotiated in the future. Of course, in the meantime, what is implied is that the Republic of Cyprus should divest itself of its international legality and recognition and cease to exist from 1 May and will be taken over by an interim administration. Who the negotiators will be, God only knows. No one has said anything about the future negotiations and as it will be a joint government linked together with only a partial agreement, presumably the negotiations will be carried out within this new government, thus introducing all kinds of centrifugal forces in an already very tentative kind of agreement.
The Turkish Government told the Secretary General also that Mr. de Soto, his special representative, was not to its liking and would prefer a facilitator from a major nation trusted by both sides to facilitate the solution - in effect changing the basic process. I do not think the Secretary General will accept the discarding of his plan or agree to start negotiations on a foundation agreement and three other parts of a new agreement. I believe he will insist on negotiations on the basis of the Annan plan.
In all honesty I hope I am wrong, that the Turkish position will be clarified and that it will negotiate in order to find a solution before 1 May. As I said, we want it. People have said that the Republic of Cyprus will join the EU and then start threatening to block Turkey's accession and try to extract maximum advantage by doing so. We made a declaration in the Council that we would not block Turkey's accession. In fact, we want Turkey to join the EU and we are probably one of the few countries to have been forthcoming in saying so.
A Turkey that is part of the EU is a Turkey that respects human rights, sends the military back to barracks and does not allow the military to participate in decisions relating to foreign policy, a country that respects international law. This is why we unequivocally want Turkey in the European Union. If conditions are ripe and if we are invited, we will burn the midnight oil in the process of negotiating to find a solution before 1 May 2004.
