I am delighted to have this opportunity to address members of Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation Committees from across the enlarged European Union. As trade talks pick up again after a post Cancún re-grouping it is timely to discuss these issues now. It is also an appropriate topic with which this conference should deal. The more national parliaments, and parliamentarians with an interest in development in particular, engage in trade issues the more likely we are to achieve international trade rules that enable developing countries to work their way out of poverty, something that is often not the case at present.
In this context there are three questions I want to address. Why does trade matter to development? What has changed since Cancún? What can parliamentarians do now? We all know that aid is the central plank of any development co-operation programme. The issue of debt cancellation came to the top of the agenda during the 1990s, but why does trade matter to development? The 49 least developed countries, LDCs, already earn eight times more from trade than they receive in aid. They also depend more on trade than rich countries. Half their GDP comes from trade, more than twice the average trade dependence of OECD members.
However, trade is not contributing what it could to poverty reduction. The LDCs share of world trade halved between 1980 and 1999 and Africa's share fell from 3% to 2% during the 1990s. While global aid flows in 2002 stood at approximately US$50 billion, trade restrictions in rich countries cost developing countries an estimated US$100 billion. That annual loss is the same as the total one-off debt relief promised by the G8 in 1999. The G8 and the rest of the international community has delivered only one third of the promised debt relief. One can see how trade could make the real difference in meeting the MDGs of which we have been hearing so much.
Christian Aid believes that pro-poor trade policy is not simply, or even primarily, about access to rich country markets. Its priority is establishing the right of developing countries to choose the trade polices that best suit their level of development and the particular needs of their economy and society. Common sense one might think, but not common practice. One of the most striking examples we have come across recently is in Ghana. It has 400,000 chicken farmers who until recently supplied most of the local market. However, they are now being squeezed out of the market by an influx of imported chicken parts, more than 23,000 tonnes in 2002.
Last year, Ghana's Minister for Finance announced tariff increases in his budget programme of 20% on poultry and 5% on rice to protect local farmers from cheap subsidised imports and to allow breathing space for modernisation. The tariffs were well within the limits allowed under WTO rules and were approved by the Ghanaian parliament. However, they were never implemented as the International Monetary Fund, IMF, advised the government against proceeding. Ghana took the advice because a previous disagreement with the IMF in 2002 led to that country being labelled off-track, resulting in the suspension of direct assistance from the IMF and World Bank until April 2003. Most other donors followed suit.
For us, a pro-poor international trade regime must include policy space for countries like Ghana to choose those policies which it believes best advances progress in that country. Christian Aid believes it is about more than a level playing field. One of our Ghanaian partners suggests that even if it had a level playing field, trade between it and Europe is like a giraffe and a gazelle competing for leaves from the tree. It does not make for trade justice because it will lose out time and again. To really contribute to global poverty reduction, we need trade rules that are biased in favour of developing countries to give them the opportunity to work their way out of poverty. It is not easy to achieve such an outcome in trade talks, more often described as pitting foxes against chickens.
What has changed since Cancún? Watching the talks unfold and then collapse in Cancún it was clear that we were seeing the end of business as usual in international trade talks. For five decades world trade deals were essentially hammered out between the major trading blocs, primarily the US and Europe. At the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, the agreement on agriculture was based on a bilateral deal between the EU and the US to which everyone else signed up. It was clear in Cancún that developing countries were not going to sign up to a deal that was not in their interests no matter how much pressure the richer countries put them under. The bullying which occurred in Doha two years earlier is well documented with threats to cut aid, a favoured tactic to help produce consensus.
This new determination on the part of developing countries was accompanied by a shift in the balance of power within the WTO that helped convert this position of principle into negotiating muscle. China's accession to the WTO and the election of President Lula in Brazil were important factors in this regard. The crucial development, however, was the formation of its alliance with India, South Africa and Indonesia at the heart of a new group of 20 countries representing more than half the world's population and two thirds of the world's farmers. Then, the least development countries and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries formed a group of 90. The emergence of these two groupings radically altered the dynamic of the negotiations — one group represented potential markets too large to ignore and the other grouped countries too deserving to dismiss. Cancún was about progressing the Doha development agenda.
Cancún also revealed that the agreement in Doha to launch a new round of multilateral talks was based on a fudge. In Doha developing countries agreed to new negotiations which would see them further liberalise the trade in goods and services in return for a promise that the EU would reform its agricultural subsidies which so damage the markets and livelihoods of the world's rural poor. In Cancún it transpired that the EU's understanding was that its promise of agricultural reform was conditional on developing countries agreeing to negotiations on four new and controversial issues first tabled in Singapore in 1996. Developing countries were not prepared to pay twice for the same promise.
If previous agreements have seen developing countries bow to a fait accompli presented to them by the major trading blocs, the period since Cancún has seen the EU adapt to the new realpolitik of trade talks. Throughout the talks in Cancún the EU repeatedly predicted the demise of the G20, suggesting it would break up before the week was out. Eight months on the G20 remains a force to be reckoned with and Commissioner Lamy has devoted considerable time to engaging it. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse in Cancún, Commissioner Lamy called for a complete overhaul of WTO decision-making procedures, perhaps because Europe had not got its way. Now, the spotlight is back on the outline of a substantive deal. Last week the chair of the WTO general council expressed his understanding that three of the four Singapore issues are off the table for the duration of the Doha Round. It is only fair to note that in January the General Affairs Council of the European Union concluded that to revive the Doha development agenda the real priority must be on achieving benefits for the least developed countries. That is a welcome statement.
While there is now renewed energy in Geneva and the real possibility of progress before the end of July, the time since Cancún has also seen a growing focus on the trade talks which the EU is pursuing with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries under the auspices of the Cotonou Agreement. The Cotonou Agreement is of particular relevance to all of us gathered here today because, while it now includes trade and political co-operation, its origins are as a development co-operation instrument and it retains the overarching objective of poverty reduction by which everything else is to be measured.
As the EU opens talks on economic partnership agreements, EPAs, with various regional groupings of the ACP we all have a role in making sure those representing us in the talks remember that point. It is our trade officials who are in the room, not our development officials. EU trade officials are trained to negotiate deals, not to support development. Perhaps that is the reason the EU is seeking to introduce the Singapore issues, so firmly opposed at the WTO, into the talks with the regional groups of the ACP. I understand the World Bank's analysis is that if the EU is serious about the EPAs having a positive development impact, then it must subordinate commercial advantage to poverty reduction. The EU can make a start by clarifying that it will not push the Singapore issues in the EPA talks.
What can parliamentarians do now? The principal role of parliamentarians is to bring democratic transparency and accountability to the actions our governments take on these issues in Brussels, Geneva, New York and Washington, far from the streets and televisions of our populaces, and to ensure that the fine words of the conference halls translate into good deals at the negotiating tables.
Each EU member state has promised to reach aid spending of 0.33% of gross national product by 2006. However, if we are to meet the millennium development goals, rich countries must move quickly to reach the UN target of 0.7% and aid spending must become more targeted on poverty reduction, not less. Four EU member states, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and Luxembourg, have reached the target. Three more have stated a year by which they plan to meet it, Ireland by 2007, Belgium by 2010 and France by 2012. The Council of EU Foreign Ministers in April encouraged all countries that have not yet set a timeframe to do so. I understand the new Spanish Government has already spoken about a date.
For those representing new member states who are only setting up development co-operation programmes, it is worth noting that before Ireland joined the EEC in 1973, we had no aid programme either. However, in the intervening period, our programme has become one of the best known and most admired elements of our foreign policy profile.
If any new member state's government has not set out a timetable, the foreign affairs committee should ask it to do so. More importantly, once a government sets targets, the committee should monitor progress closely. It should invite not only the foreign and development Ministers to speak to the committee, but also the finance Minister and ask how the government will implement its decision. The committee should push for multi-annual budgeting to increase predictability and facilitate good planning.
As we know in Ireland, it is not the promise that counts but the delivery. Ireland was showered with international praise for making the announcement at the millennium summit that we would reach 0.7% aid spending by 2007. It helped us secure election to the UN Security Council. Four years later, progress has stalled at 0.41%, and unless we make up the lost ground quickly, we risk international embarrassment.
I have a couple of straightforward questions and proposals on the issue of trade. When did each member state's trade minister last appear before its foreign affairs committee? I am delighted to be able to report that, after some NGO prompting, the Irish Ministers for both trade and development recently appeared together for the first time before the committee on development co-operation to discuss the links between trade policy and development.
Our Government is about to publish a national statement on trade policy with a substantial chapter on the development agenda, which is welcome. NGOs have proposed that once a year a joint sitting of the trade committee and the development committee should discuss progress in implementing that policy with both relevant Ministers. That may offer a model for other parliaments also.
The longer trade policy remains the preserve of EU Commission officials and the 133 Committee in Brussels, the less responsive it will be to development concerns. The more the trade Ministers who approve the Commission's negotiating mandate know that they will have to account back home for the content and conduct of trade negotiations, the more assiduous they will be in ensuring trade policy supports broader foreign policy goals such as poverty reduction.
I would argue that one of the reasons Cancún failed was because trade Ministers did not reign in their chief negotiator enough. Commissioner Lamy misread the balance of the meeting and overplayed the EU's hand. Perhaps also, the accountability mechanisms were not robust enough to enable Ministers to take an informed decision soon enough. One national trade official commented to me in Cancún that the 133 Committee was great for finding out what happened yesterday but not so good for finding out what the EU was going to do today.
This brings me to my next question. How many of the delegates here or their colleagues were in Cancún last September? I saw very few parliamentarians from Europe there and they were certainly outnumbered by European NGOs. Parliamentarians and NGOs share a common interest here. In an important area of policy which is formulated and implemented collectively within the EU, both NGOs and parliamentarians have a role in enhancing public understanding and government accountability. However, it is not ideal if committees have to rely exclusively on NGOs for first-hand testimony of the conduct of WTO negotiations. My advice would be to plan now for representatives of committees to attend the next ministerial conference of the WTO, in Hong Kong next year, and do not go empty handed.
It was already mentioned today that the British international development select committee published a report after Cancún on the lessons learned on how to revive a genuine development round. I understand also there is now a parliamentary commission on globalisation in Belgium. Now is the time for committees to commission research or compile materials to inform their discussions. The autumn parliamentary session is the time to hold hearings to thrash out the various perspectives. Perhaps committees can produce a report in time to influence their governments' approach to a final deal.
I have outlined why trade matters to development. It generates so much more revenue for developing countries than either aid or debt relief. However, current trade rules do not favour poverty reduction. The LDC's share of world trade has been dropping. Moreover, the livelihoods of millions of poor farmers are threatened by subsidised imports from rich countries. Reform of trade rules must give developing countries the flexibility to choose the trade policies that work for them.
Cancún saw the end of business as usual in international trade talks with the emergence of the two groupings already mentioned, the G20 and G90. There has been a new emphasis on bilateral and regional trade negotiations since Cancún and in the case of the EU the Cotonou EPAs have come centre stage. EPAs are supposed to be a development co-operation instrument but all the signs are that the EU is looking to drive a hard bargain. Back in Geneva, the outlines of a workable framework for the WTO talks on the Doha development agenda have recently emerged. There is a real role for European parliamentarians to monitor and influence these trade talks to ensure their conduct and content are in line with the fine pro-development rhetoric that accompanies them.
I urge all here to return home and get to grips with their national trade policy, to invite their trade and development Ministers to address them regularly and to prepare to push the development agenda in advance of the next WTO ministerial conference. I look forward to seeing all the delegates present today next year in Hong Kong.