I thank the Chairman and the members for their interesting questions. With regard to what Ireland can do, the first requirement is knowledge and understanding of the problems. I listened to my compatriot, Jan Eliasson, the Swedish Foreign Minister, as he concluded his terms as President of the General Assembly in New York last Wednesday. He spoke before non-governmental organisations, as I did. He stated two things were required - passion for the subject and doing something and compassion for the victims. I would like to add knowledge. It is fine to base oneself on passion and compassion but more is needed. To debate and argue, one needs to have tenable facts. It is not certain that one will be listened to anyway but one stands a better chance.
I am impressed by the knowledge of members and by their reading of the report. Fourteen experts were involved. They were not political nor were they engineers. They are experienced in disarmament. That did not make it easier to achieve unanimity but everybody was knowledgeable. However, it served a purpose and it was useful that we did it. The report is the stronger for it. While some points can be quarrelled over or we have misunderstood something, nitpicking is not meaningful. Nevertheless the report is a comprehensive survey of the weapons of mass destruction. It does not talk about small arms. It does not talk about conventional weapons but it does talk about the three categories of weapons of mass destruction, two of which are created already for production, stocking and use. These are the biological and chemical weapons. Nevertheless, there are still things to be done about those, not least about the biological weapons. However, nuclear weapons are in a category by themselves and that is why the report devotes half of its recommendations to the nuclear weapons.
In reply to your first question, Chairman, about what Ireland can do, the importance of knowledge cannot be overstated. Ireland is a member of the European Union and this puts some limitations on what it can achieve. It must make compromises and go along with the other member states in order to get the strength of the Union behind any action. This hampers Ireland's individual freedom to come out with separate actions. That is the price one has to pay.
However, having read the Union's strategy against weapons of mass destruction, I am very much in favour of it. It is a good document written in 2003 and accepted by the Union towards the end of that year. It puts the emphasis on looking at what one can do to remove the incentive to opt for nuclear weapons. To prevent a country from choosing nuclear weapons one must make it feel it does not need them. The solution lies in foreign policy. Detente is, perhaps, the greatest thing that has happened to the world. The end of the Cold War lowered the tension globally very much, but the tension must also be lowered regionally. In Latin America, for example, Argentina and Brazil were once rumoured to be moving in the direction of nuclear weapons until detente developed between them with the end of military governments. They then began to co-operate. This is a good example of regional detente. In Africa, once South Africa abandoned apartheid the new government no longer felt the need to defend itself against perceived threats from the communist world through Angola or Mozambique. Once that obstacle was gone Africa became a nuclear weapon-free zone. The answer, therefore, lies in foreign policy and not in military policies. The European Union stresses precisely that.
The European Union also stresses the need to move the world towards the rule of law. This differs very much from the United States policy, which does not seem to put any emphasis on it. The statements of the United States ambassador to the United Nations seem to doubt the relevance or even the existence of binding international law. The rule of law is something which Europeans stand for and the EU strategy document emphasises this. The European Union also emphasises the position of the United Nations in saying the Security Council is the ultimate authority. This is wise. We may have reservations about the United Nations and its deficiencies. Reforms in the United Nations have overcome some of these deficiencies in the past year but it remains an organisation which cannot achieve more than the sum of what the members can achieve. However, we have only one United Nations. We do not have an alternative. I heard someone say that if the United Nations is not good at the solution of difficult differences then we should go to some other problem solver. There are not so many available and we must be content with what we have. If one is historically minded one must agree that the United Nations is a vast improvement on the League of Nations. The league existed after the First World War and before that one had the Hague peace conferences in the 19th century. We have only had the United Nations since 1945, which is a relatively short time. This gives some encouragement although we cannot be satisfied.
I have been familiar for a long time with the role of international inspection. I was the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency for 16 years. The inspection system that we had in operation did not discover during the 1980s what the Iraqis were doing. On-site inspection was something new to the world in the 1960s and 1970s and there was a great deal of reluctance to have international civil servants moving into sensitive installations. The system was resisted by many states who said that they, the non-nuclear weapons states, had to have these inspections but the nuclear weapons states did not have inspections. That was the resistance. It was a weak system. Inspectors could only go to declared installations and even in those installations there were restrictions on their movements. As a result we did not see that the Iraqis during the 1980s were preparing for a nuclear weapon. We only went to one site.
In defence of the IAEA, or rather its member states, I should say that they learned the lesson in 1991 when we discovered that the Iraqis had been cheating and we said we needed to have stronger and better access to sites, better access to information and access to the Security Council if need be. We set in motion a system of upgrading the safeguards and verification that was finalised and accepted by the so-called additional protocols in 1997, which are much sharper and allow the agency to take environmental samples, demand much more information and also to go to places it wants to go. There has been an improvement. Not all states have accepted the additional protocols. Iran in particular applied them voluntarily after having signed them but it has not ratified them. This is one of the pieces in the game - the bazaar - namely, whether Iran would accept these more far-reaching safeguards.
What I am getting at is that the facts are important. What is actually the situation in Iran or Iraq? We saw in the case of Iraq how the results of the inspections were ridiculed and we saw how some states wanted to point to their own national intelligence and invoke that as the reason for armed action when the international inspectors, after 700 inspections of 500 different sites, said that we had done this professionally and independently and did not see any weapons of mass destruction. We did not say that there are no weapons of mass destruction. Some have subsequently accused us, asking why we did not say this and saying we could have prevented the whole thing if we had said there were no weapons of mass destruction. If we had done so, we would have failed in terms of intellectual honesty. To prove the negative is next to impossible. In a big country with many caves, cities, etc., one can hide a prototype of a centrifuge. Nine kilograms of plutonium is no bigger than my hand. Such a statement would not have been credible. We said we had carried out diligent inspections, we had been everywhere where UNSCOM had been in the 1990s, we knew a lot about the country and we had gone through these and many other places. We had also made surprise inspections and did not find anything.
While the US attitude was one of greater and greater suspicion and a readiness to go for arms, we started at a fairly high level of suspicion because we, too, had watched how the Iraqis had played cat and mouse during the 1980s. We were, therefore, suspicious of what they were doing and started with a high degree of suspicion. We read the report of the Iraqis, amounting to 12,000 pages, and said that this did not really explain many of the concerns we had. However, as we went on with inspections, gradually we began to wonder how much there really was. Added to this was seeing the evidence that was adduced by the other side. We went through this and asked what were the conversations that were being played in the Security Council, who was actually talking and how strong the evidence was. I had some experts who looked at particular cases where we had been and they were sceptical. I felt I had a duty to go to the Security Council and say, in the most cautious terms one can imagine, that we were not very convinced by this. This is how far we came. I think we would have done a discredit to international independent inspection if we had gone beyond what we actually said. That is my defence. I wish we could have prevented the war; we did not.
If inspections had continued for a few months more, which the Europeans wanted and for which the British tried hard, then the United States and the United Kingdom would have had a hard time taking armed action. We went to sites which were given to us by national intelligence agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and elsewhere, but we did not find weapons of mass destruction in any of them. We found conventional weapons in some of these places, while other places were empty. We went back to the intelligence agencies and the UN Security Council and told them there was nothing. These agencies ought to have realised then that their sources were poor. Their sources came from espionage, defections and satellite images to which we had access. If we had a few months more, we would have been able to go through all the cases which they suspected and they would have seen that nothing was there. A few months more would have made a great difference. It would have been hard to start the war in that situation.
This brings me to the importance of the impartial collection of the evidence. We now know how scandalous some things were. People have spoken about faith-based intelligence, but I have gone further to talk about fake-based intelligence, such as the alleged agreement between Iraq and Niger for the import of uranium yellowcake. We felt that civil servants - that is what the secretariat of the United Nations should be - ought to bring the facts before the policymakers. We were not policymakers. The UN Security Council and governments make the policy, but they ought to have facts on the table which are as impartial, independent and professional as possible. One can never get 100% objectivity in this world, but one can go a long way.
We referred to the draft treaty for a convention on the prohibition of the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, a project that has been on the table for discussion for a long time. It was agreed years ago among western countries that there must be effective inspection, including the inspection of all enrichment plants and plutonium plants in every country, including the nuclear weapon states. This was supported at the time by the United States. We now have a US proposal on the table at the Geneva conference on disarmament in which such a ban is urged, but in which only national intelligence and national means of verification are accepted. The Americans will not accept international inspection. There are many countries in the world that do not have any national means of inspecting the great powers. It is alleged that there cannot be credible inspection of enrichment plants and reprocessing plants. However, Brazil and Japan, two countries that are parties to the non-proliferation treaty and are non-nuclear weapons states, have enrichment and reprocessing plants under international inspection. The world relies upon these inspections to ensure that there is no diversion in these countries, so they should be able to do so in the case of a cut-off agreement.
If there is no international inspection of such facilities, there is a risk that allegations are made based on international espionage. I do not believe that there is a conflict between the use of national means of verification and intelligence and international verification and intelligence, because governments receive both. They will get much information from them and they will then listen to international inspectors. If national and international agencies go in the same direction, then that is corroboration, but if they go in different directions, then they ought to be careful. The different agencies use different techniques. The national agencies have spies and they listen to what we say on our mobile phones and so on, using an enormously expensive apparatus. The international inspections are based upon agreements in which the inspectors go on-site and into buildings. If suspicions are passed on to them, they can examine them.
In 2002 President Bush pointed to some pictures of buildings and said: "Here is where they used to work on nuclear matters. We now see that the roofs are extended. What more evidence do you need?" Not long thereafter, inspectors visited the site and found nothing in the buildings. Satellites are helpful but having people on the ground and having the right to demand access is important. If they are denied access, that is also a signal. The report is strongly in favour of a continuation of international inspections without ruling out national intelligence information at the same time.
Deputy Durkan asked about the outlook for disarmament. It is clear that 2006 will not be the year of international disarmament but rather the year when we see increased militarisation of space, the risk of a race due to the missile shield and the possibility of a race in Asia due to the India-US deal. Therefore, 2006 is not a hopeful year. However, there is at least one factor that may help in the longer run, namely, the realisation that military means of attacking or doing away with weapons of mass destruction have their limitations.
Iraq was a great tragedy. The armed action could not have been sold to the Parliament in London or the US Congress if the emphasis had not been put on weapons of mass destruction. It was a war that was mainly argued on the basis of non-proliferation of weapons which did not exist. That is an indication of the limitations of military means. Without dealing with weapons of mass destruction, Lebanon is a similar case. I do not see that any party has come out of that conflict with its objectives obtained. Again, the limitations of military means have been indicated and there is increased talk of using negotiations and discussion.
All preparations for disarmament take much time. Therefore, it is important that we begin immediately. One would buy shares when the stock exchange is low. As the stock exchange for disarmament is very low, it might be a good moment to start.
Several questions referred to the DPRK and Iran. I remarked that the European strategy starts from the right premise, namely, if one wants to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons, one must make states feel they do not need them. This applies to both North Korea and Iran. The report refers to several reasons states may be bent on nuclear weapons, of which security is the most important, although it is not the only one. Russia developed nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the United States, China vis-à-vis Russia and the United States, India vis-à-vis China, Pakistan vis-à-vis India, Israel vis-à-vis the Arab world, and so on. In all these cases security played an important role but it is not the only factor. Status and acceptance are also relevant. With regard to Saddam Hussein’s wish for nuclear weapons, I do not believe he was really scared of Israel. He was more like a Nebuchadnezzer who wanted to expand the realm of Iraq.
Security is not the only factor but it is the most important one. Therefore, when one considers the cases of North Korea and Iran, one must ask whether security is a factor they worry about and whether that concern can be allayed in order that they believe they do not need nuclear weapons. If we examine the negotiations with North Korea, which are carried on in six-power talks, we find that in the offer made North Korea is given assurances or told that it will be assured against attacks from the outside or even against subversion from the inside. To strengthen that approach, it has also been stated that if North Korea was to abandon its nuclear programme, it could foresee diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan. Hence, the negotiations actively cater for the North Korean concerns regarding safety.
The question as to why this process has now broken down was also raised. Another question asked whether the sanctions imposed by the United States were due to allegations concerning counterfeited United States dollars and some banks in Macau. Some writings on this issue have appeared recently, as well as some questioning as to whether the links were such that the sanctions were justified. While I am unsure whether the lifting of sanctions would achieve North Korea's return to the table, I am sure that humiliation is an important factor in the cases of both Iran and North Korea. I refer to the condescending or neocolonialist tone of phrases such as "axis of evil". While the latter might have been an excellent expression to acquire votes in Wyoming, it was not particularly good in terms of being more persuasive at the negotiating table the next day. Recent comments regarding the Iranians to the effect that they must behave themselves constitute a neocolonialist tone that will not make matters easier.
Hence, while one may have views regarding the regime in Tehran or human rights in North Korea, correct diplomacy is required if one is eager to get a result in a negotiation. One does not have diplomatic relations because one loves someone and one does not have talks out of love, but because one wants to achieve something. This is a better mode in which to deal with both North Korea and Iran.
In the case of North Korea, the issue of safety is catered for and it is interesting and instructive to compare how the governments are approaching the two cases. As for North Korea, the United States and others are dying to return to the table to talk without preconditions and without any talk about going to the Security Council or sanctions. This is an intelligent approach which suggests a desire to include North Korea in the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN, and to bring it back as a member of that organisation, however much one may resent or disagree with its domestic system.
On the other hand, such an approach is not present in the case of Iran and the stick in the air has been more in evidence. The Europeans have done well by tackling first the question of how Iran can be assured that it will have fuel for its reactors. The Russians have offered to undertake enrichment in Russia, thereby providing the Iranians with an assurance, possibly at a multilateral level. Another positive element in their approach was to state they were not opposed to the entry of Iran into the nuclear world. Some people have stated that as Iran possesses oil, it does not require nuclear power. However, the Iranians reply by noting it will be depleted one day and in any event, as oil prices are rising, it might be profitable to produce its electricity by nuclear means and to sell the oil. The Europeans have not negated this and have affirmed that Iran may move into the nuclear age and into high technology.
However, they also note there is circumstantial evidence that some in Iran would like to make use of enrichment to make weapons. I agree there is some circumstantial, albeit not conclusive, evidence which points in that direction. The 40 MW research reactor in Arak, which uses heavy water, is an excellent plutonium producer and a different model could have been selected. Moreover, some of Iran's connections with Pakistanis, such as the acceptance of drawings of nuclear weapons, also point in that direction. I cannot see any economic advantage to enrichment. While there may be an economic advantage in opting for nuclear power, it is more doubtful for enrichment. Iran has two nuclear reactors and it will take ten to 15 years to build more. My native country of Sweden has ten nuclear reactors and we import enriched uranium, as do Finland and Switzerland, because it is cheaper than enriching it oneself.
The Iranians might state that it provides them with a certain amount of independence, which is true. They could argue that while help and assurances from the Russians might be forthcoming, the latter's actions in Ukraine should be considered and, consequently, they would like to be independent. However, Iran could not use economic reasons. As it does not have much uranium, it would be dependent on imports of fuel for many of its reactors.
While these are circumstantial pieces of evidence, I have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that it would be desirable for Iran to suspend its enrichment programme. The question is how one goes about it. In part, I have affirmed and applauded the attitudes taken by the European states, but there are some shortcomings, to one of which a member of the committee alluded. European states asking the Iranians to suspend their enrichment programme before sitting down and talking about the "carrots" to be given to them is a little like telling the striking taxi drivers to call off their strike before talks can happen. It is like asking someone to toss away his or her trump card, the most important piece of the negotiation, after which the parties can discuss what will be given in return. These preconditions form a bizarre element, but are not really discussed in public. That said, the President of Senegal wrote a letter to the Financial Times and pointed to this matter. There may be a way out. For example, there is talk of Iran suspending enrichment for two months and restarting at the moment it sits down at the table.
I wish Dr. Javier Solana all the best in this regard because Iran is not a country that has a strong security need for a weapons programme. It is no longer threatened by Turkey, Iraq or Pakistan. It might be worried about the United States, which says that all options are on the table. With 130,000 American soldiers in Iraq, American bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan and NATO bases in Turkey to the west, Iran might be worried. Objectively, however, I wonder about whether Iran could claim that it is threatened. It is not threatened by the Israelis and, despite rhetoric, has not taken steps towards an armed clash with Israel. I am relatively optimistic that a deal is possible. The preconditions remain bizarre, as there is a price.
Until the Western states, including Russia and China, have tried the various cards, it is premature for the Security Council to impose sanctions. Iran could be given security guarantees, but that has not happened. Western Europeans cannot give these guarantees, as they are not militarily important.
There is also the question of diplomatic relations. As Europeans can do nothing about this, it would be in the hands of the United States to move on these matters before sanctions are imposed. Iran has not exhausted the negotiations, the gains from which are more desirable than risks of attacks by Israel or America. However, those threats are not really taken seriously because people seem to believe it to be an impossible proposition. They do not know where all of the installations in Iran are and it would further exacerbate a bad situation.
I was asked about the security of the 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world. While we have lived with these weapons for a long time and there have been no accidents, there have been near accidents. A much written about case involves a discovery in a Russian control room of signs of the firing of missiles from the United States. It was only luck that the Russian officer in charge did not report the signs as a possible attack, which would have released horrors. As long as we have a large quantity of weapons, there is certainly a risk, particularly when they are on hair trigger alert. There are few excuses for such an alert. I recently read in newspapers that the Russians are revising and upgrading their weapons to further improve security.
Is the non-proliferation treaty a failure? I do not believe so. We can see what has gone wrong and what the NPT has not achieved, such as the adherence of India, Pakistan and Israel.
North Korea, Iraq and Libya breached the agreement but it had the merit of making evident the commitment of a great many countries to the terms of the treaty and that the countries accept an international verification of the nuclear programme to demonstrate that there is no diversion for weapons purposes. It has not succeeded to the extent we would have wanted but it has been of tremendous use. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia joined the treaty when Russia took over the bombs. South Africa formalised its position by moving to a non-nuclear weapons status.
It may be useful to hold a NPT day. I agree with Deputy Tony Dempsey's comment that the public is no longer engaged. In the 1980s and during the Cold War the public was engaged and we all knew of mutually assured destruction and that we would be collateral damage. There are no more marches to Aldermaston. The public worries more about global warming, a threat that is as serious in the long term as the threat of weapons of mass destruction is today.
The report seeks to highlight that this is not a comfortable situation. We are in the rearmament phase. Armies of engineers are improving the use of outer space for our mobile telephones while other armies seek to shoot down each others' satellites. If that were to occur, the investment in outer space could suffer horrible damage. The public should wake up to this and, in a period of détente, it should be less difficult to make progress than it is.
As to the deal between the United States and India, the report is balanced, does not address the energy issue and does not take a stance on nuclear power. This was not our job. I am in favour of peaceful nuclear power, mainly for environmental reasons, but we did not address this issue. Competition for oil will be a source of friction in the world when India and China increase imports significantly. High consumption of fossil fuels will lead to greater emission of carbon dioxide. I welcome the development of nuclear power by India and China because wind power will not suffice to meet the electricity needs of Calcutta or Shanghai. However, the report discusses the proliferation aspects and we do not see an obstacle in the NPT to the deal. The NPT encourages exchanges between those who are party to the treaty and facilitates the access of non-nuclear weapons states to nuclear technology. It does not prohibit any transfer of such technology.
The nuclear suppliers' group has a rule that its members will not export nuclear power to states that do not have the full scope of safeguards, namely, states which are not party to the NPT. That particular rule is now the subject of discussion. The report does not make recommendations on this issue but points out a possible solution to the dilemma. The United States has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and is preparing a draft of a cut-off treaty that contains nothing about verification. It is difficult for the United States to urge India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or agree to a cut-off treaty that is as yet incomplete as part of the deal. However, these two treaties are extremely important for the world to move towards disarmament. It is not absurd to consider the United States ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or a cut-off treaty. It could happen with changes in attitude. The United States could then agree a treaty with India.
In the current climate there is a risk of an arms race. Both Pakistan and China may fear India could import more raw uranium and enrich it, thereby adding to the quantities of its weapons and stocks. They may, therefore, decide that they cannot stop their production of enriched uranium or plutonium but must retain and add to their stocks. The impression is China is not adding to its stock. There is a risk in the absence of these agreements and it would provide reassurance if they came into being.
A question was asked on Israel and Iran. The report points to a number of measures which could induce Iran to refrain from proceeding with an enrichment programme, including one which could be taken by Israel. It describes a solution on the Korean peninsula, whereby North and South Korea would refrain from reprocessing and the enrichment of uranium and plutonium. In general, parties to the non-proliferation treaty are allowed to enrich to generate nuclear power. However, as the position on the Korean peninsula is sensitive, it is recognised that it would be desirable for both countries to abstain.
A similar solution could be considered for the Middle East, where the position is also sensitive. The request made of Iran to refrain from proceeding with enrichment programmes could be expanded and made to the entire Middle East, including Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Israel. We assume Israel has nuclear weapons, although it neither denies or confirms this. If Israel is so anxious that Iran does not enrich, it could state it would also suspend enrichment and reprocessing, which would be one step towards creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, but I have never heard it mentioned. Ambassadors from both sides seem to be negative, which I take as a good sign. More imagination may be needed to establish what makes them tick. It would be premature to go to the Security Council, which may involve humiliation and actions which would not be far-reaching. Sanctions to stop Iranian politicians or diplomats from travelling by air would not be effective. I hope Mr. Solana will succeed in bringing them back to the negotiating table.
I may not have answered all of the questions asked but I have taken up enough of the committee's time. I have answered some of the interesting questions, which I appreciate.
