JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, EQUALITY, DEFENCE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (Sub-Committee on the Barron Report) debate -
Wednesday, 11 Feb 2004

Public Hearings on the Barron Report.

Chairman

I welcome everybody to the resumed public hearings being held by the sub-committee in consideration of the report of the independent commission of inquiry - the Barron report. We are continuing with the second day of module 4 of the programme of work. Yesterday contributions were made by the Garda Commissioner, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces and the director of the National Archives. Today the sub-committee will be hearing contributions from the former chief State forensic scientist, Dr. Jim Donovan, who is very welcome, and from his successor, Dr. Sheila Willis, who is also very welcome. We will also be discussing the report with a number of currently serving and retired Army explosives experts and with Mr. Sean Murphy, author of a book on the National Archives.

Before we hear from Dr. Donovan, there is one other matter. We have sent invitations to a number of people outside the jurisdiction. I wish to outline the gist of the invitation sent to them and their reply in this matter. The first person is the Chief Constable, Hugh Orde, to whom we sent a letter on 14 January 2004 noting that "the sub-committee appreciates that not all invitees are in a position to comment on all of the matters of the report but is anxious to hear the views relevant to its terms of reference". We said the terms of reference were, first, whether the report of the independent commission of inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974 addressed all of the issues covered in the terms of reference of the inquiry; second, the lessons to be drawn and any actions to be taken in the light of the report, its findings and conclusions; and, third, whether, having regard to the report's findings and following consultations with the inquiry, a further public inquiry into any aspect of the report would be required or fruitful.

In this regard, I invited the PSNI Chief Constable, Mr. Hugh Orde, to lodge a written or oral submission concerning the matter of co-operation by him and his office in the provision of all available documentation and information requested by Mr. Justice Henry Barron during the course of his investigation into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974. The final response we received from the Deputy Chief Constable, Paul Leighton, on behalf of Hugh Orde, dated 4 February 2004, states:

I refer to your letter dated 14 January 2004 addressed to the Chief Constable. The Chief Constable has seen your request to attend the hearing on Tuesday 10 February of the sub-committee on the Barron report. He has asked me to respectfully remind the sub-committee that all due assistance was provided to the Independent Commission of Inquiry by the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The Chief Constable has had sight of a memorandum attached to a letter of response from the Secretary of State. Other than associating himself with the memorandum, the Chief Constable feels that there is nothing he wishes to add by way of written submission or oral representation to the sub-committee.

We will come to that memorandum shortly. We also sent an invitation to Mr. R. A. Hall who was the forensic scientist in Northern Ireland at the time. He is now retired. We sent it through the Forensic Science Northern Ireland office. Again, we asked him to:

...confirm whether you wish to make a written submission, with a view to presenting to the members of the sub-committee during module 4 referred to in the proposed programme, [and whether he wanted to make] an oral submission based on any such written submission, and with particular reference to the relevant general policies that were in existence in 1974, the amount of cross-Border co-operation that was in existence at the pertinent time, any changes that have taken place since then, and the lessons to be drawn and action to be taken in light of the report.

On 21 January we received a reply from Forensic Science Northern Ireland, on behalf of Mr. Hall, which stated:

I refer to my letter of 31 December in which I undertook to relay to Mr Hall your invitation for him to make a submission to the sub-committee on the Barron report. I have spoken to Mr Hall but he has declined the sub-committee's invitation. Since there is no other knowledge of these matters within the laboratory it is unlikely that we can be of any further assistance to the sub-committee in its deliberations.

Invitations were sent to Mr. Paul Murphy, Mr. John Reid and Mr. Peter Mandelson, that is, the current Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and former Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland. Again we set out the terms of reference as follows:

The sub-committee on the Barron report has been formed by the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights to report back to the joint committee concerning the matters: [I have already stated them]. As part of the sub-committee's consideration of the report, it has been decided to invite the various interested parties and bodies and some of those persons referred to in the report to make submissions relevant to ... [those] terms of reference and to participate in discussions on the report.

We also stated:

The sub-committee appreciates that not all invitees are in a position to comment on all of the matters of the report, but is anxious to hear views relevant to its terms of reference. In this regard, I have been asked to invite you to lodge a written or oral submission concerning the matter of co-operation by you and your office in the provision of all available documentation and information requested by Mr. Justice Henry Barron during the course of his investigation into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974. Some parties will be asked to appear before the sub-committee during the hearing days ... . In this regard, please indicate whether you are in a position to attend the hearing to be held on Tuesday 10 February 2004.

I will read out, for the record, Mr. Murphy's reply. It was addressed to Mr. Seán Ardagh, TD, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on the Barron Report, Leinster House, Dublin 2, Ireland. It reads:

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Your clerk, Mairéad McCabe, wrote to me last month inviting me to appear before your sub-committee on 10th February. I understand that a similar invitation has been issued to my predecessors, John Reid and Peter Mandelson. Please take this response as being on behalf of all three holders of this Office during the period in which the Barron inquiry was underway.

As you know, successive British Governments have condemned the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. Like all the terrorist outrages that we have witnessed in these islands over the past 30 years, they were devastating in the personal tragedy that they caused. These two events were also doubly shocking, in the context of the history of the Troubles, given the scale of their destruction. The present British Government welcomed the establishment of the inquiry under chairmanship of Mr Justice Hamilton and then Mr Justice Barron and has sought to co-operate fully with it. This has required quite a considerable investment of resources, but it is a task that we have taken seriously and done our best to address diligently. Both my predecessors and I have taken a close personal interest in ensuing a thorough response to the judges' requests.

The relevant information that we have uncovered has been shared with the inquiry, including that from some very sensitive sources. I have personally ensured that the information has been provided in the fullest possible manner, consistent with my responsibilities to protect national security and the lives of individuals.

Additionally, none of us were in office at the time of the events and therefore able to recall the situation within Government at the time. I therefore do not believe that there is anything further of use that either I or John or Peter would be in a position to say in a hearing before your sub-committee.

I am therefore attaching a memorandum, setting out the steps we have taken to co-operate with the inquiry and the information that we have uncovered. I hope that this will help your sub-committee in its important work.

Yours sincerely,

Rt Hon Paul Murphy MP

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

The following is a memorandum from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights', sub-committee dealing with the Barron report. It reads:

INTRODUCTION

1. This memorandum is presented by the Secretary for State for Northern Ireland to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights' sub-Committee on the Barron Report. It addresses the way in which the British Government has sought to co-operate with the Barron inquiry, making reference to evidence we have supplied.

2. The attitude of successive British Governments to the bombings in Dublin and Monaghan was reflected in the statement I issued following the publication of the Barron report last December. The murder of those 34 individuals was an act of obscene evil. The pain of that tragedy is still vivid, not just for those caught up on the day but also for the families and friends of those who were killed and injured.

3. The British Government, from the Prime Minister down, has been committed to helping the inquiry as fully as possible. My predecessor and I have personally ensured that the search of historic records has been thorough and that, consistent with our responsibilities to protect national security and the lives of individuals, all the potentially relevant information that has been uncovered has been shared with Mr Justice Barron, including intelligence information.

BACKGROUND.

4. In response to a request for information from Mr Justice Barron, the Government initiated a scrutiny of files to see whether they contained any information relevant to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

5. There appears to have been some confusion about the number of potentially relevant files held by Departments, with a figure of 68,000 being quoted. This figure refers to the total number of files ever recorded on the Northern Ireland Office's computer database, dating back over the lifetime of the Department (some 30 years). In other, larger UK Government departments, the file totals would run into millions. The vast majority of these would have no relevance to the events into which the Barron inquiry was looking (though this was, in many cases, only apparent once the file had been examined), and there are no contemporaneous files dealing specifically with the Dublin or Monaghan bombings.

6. The task of scrutinising files to see whether any of the information contained in them might be relevant to the inquiry was, therefore, a time-consuming one. The searches yielded a limited amount of potentially relevant information. Wherever possible, copies of the original documents were provided to the inquiry.

7. There have been criticisms in some quarters that the British Government has not provided intelligence material to the Barron inquiry. It is the case that original documents relating to intelligence material have not been passed on. That is because the nature of these documents or some of the peripheral information in them (not relevant to the inquiry) could, if released, compromise intelligence assets or the lives of sources. However, consistent with my responsibilities to protect national security and the lives of individuals, all relevant intelligence information has been shared with the inquiry, including information drawn from sensitive sources.

8. In addition to the trawl of files, the British Government has also carried out further specific work following up on specific lines of enquiry on which Mr Justice Barron sought further information. These lines of enquiry have been pursued as fully as possible, though regrettably they have sometimes come to a dead end and it has not been possible to take them further.

EVIDENCE.

9. Only a small amount of information was found that was potentially relevant to Mr Justice Barron's inquiries. It is set out below in relation to the various allegations concerning the British security forces that have been made over the years and that were considered in the Barron report.

10. With all of these issues, it is unfortunately impossible to prove the negative - there is no evidence to suggest that there was a policy of collusion, but I recognise that, for those who suspect it, the absence of such evidence does little to dispel the myth. However, I give the Committee my personal assurance that, had any evidence that pointed to collusion been uncovered during our search of the files, it would have been passed to the inquiry.

The next section of the document addresses the question:British security forces knew about the attacks in advance but withheld information?

11. During the period leading up to the attacks, there was a small number of reports indicating a general wish on the part of loyalists paramilitaries to mount attacks in the Republic of Ireland. It is presumed that these were mentioned in the course of contacts by the British security forces with their Irish counter-parts, and in some cases there is evidence to show that this was so.

12. The majority of the information is general in nature, rather than specific. There was some intelligence information relating to possible loyalist activity in the Republic of Ireland in the period before the attacks in Dublin and Monaghan, though there was nothing to suggest that the information related to those attacks. On one occasion, where the intelligence indicated specific plans, the security forces in Northern Ireland successfully disrupted the loyalists' plans, with several successful arrests and prosecutions following. British records indicated that the Irish authorities were made aware of this at the time. Although none of this information related specifically to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, it reflects the degree of information sharing between the British authorities and their Irish counterparts. We therefore felt it helpful, contextually, to share this information with the Barron inquiry.

13. We have uncovered no evidence to suggest that information of relevance about loyalist planning for attacks in the Republic of Ireland - even of a general nature - was, or would have been, deliberately withheld by the Northern Ireland security forces from their Irish counterparts. The Barron inquiry accepted that there was no evidence to suggest that the British security forces knew about the Dublin or Monaghan bombings in advance.

The following section addresses the questions:RUC/UDR/British Army involvement in the bombings? Authorised from the top of the security hierarchy?

14. There have been persistent allegations over the years that members of the security forces in Northern Ireland colluded with the perpetrators of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. Mr Justice Barron concludes that while, in the circumstances, this is not a fanciful allegation, he has not seen any evidence to corroborate it and that it could not be inferred, even as a matter of probability.

15. It is a matter of record that some members of the RUC and UDR were convicted of collusion with loyalist paramilitaries in the 1970s. The fact that they were successfully prosecuted and convicted indicates that the authorities in Northern Ireland took such matters seriously. But, while it is impossible to prove the negative, nothing has emerged from British records to corroborate suspicions of collusion by any members of the RUC, UDR or other UK security agencies in the Dublin or Monaghan attacks.

16. At Mr Justice Barron's request, my officials have followed up a number of possible leads to obtain information on individuals alleged to have been seen in the vicinity of the bombs on the day in question. I am satisfied that these enquiries have been pursued to the fullest possible extent and regret that the leads they were following were not more detailed and therefore capable of leading to fuller results.

17. Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that senior members of the security forces were aware of, and condoned, the activities of those individual RUC and UDR members who were involved in collusion with the loyalist paramilitaries. We were unable to identify any material that would confirm this. Had we uncovered such evidence we would have shared it with the inquiry.

Then there is his comment that theNorthern Ireland security forces deliberately obstructed the Garda investigation.

18. There have been allegations that the Northern Ireland security forces deliberately obstructed the Garda investigation, including in order to protect informant relationships within loyalist organisations.

19. Despite a detailed search, we have been unable to uncover anything that would indicate or refute this allegation. Had we uncovered any information to indicate a policy of obstruction or even heel-dragging on the part of the UK authorities we would have shared this with the inquiry.

Under the heading,Information withheld from the Secreatry of State by the security forces, paragraph 20 reads:

Finally, the Barron inquiry concluded that the Secretary of State of the day was not fully informed on matters of which he should have been aware and extrapolates from this that I may be similarly left in the dark. In response, I can only say that I am satisfied that I am fully briefed by my officials and that no relevant information has been witheld.

That is the conclusion of the memorandum.

Deputy F. McGrath

Chairman, I wish to make a procedural point in regard to that letter, and you can advise me if it is not within the terms of reference. I express my extreme disappointment and annoyance at the letter from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy, MP, on behalf of Mr. Mandelson and Mr. Reid. This inquiry should have been shown more respect. This was the worst attrocity in the history of the Troubles, and there is no use in sending letters condemning the bombings and then not being prepared to come here to give us an hour or two of their time. It is very important that the message goes back very strongly that some of us on the sub-committee are extremely unhappy at the lack of co-operation from fellow parliamentarians.

Senator J. Walsh

I, too, am disappointed at the failure of the people to whom we wrote within the British jurisdiction to attend, give evidence and put themselves forward for questioning here. It strikes me in regard to Mr. Justice Barron's report that there has been very close choreography, given that the Secretary of State is responding on behalf of a number of interested parties, including the PSNI, who might have been helpful to us in the job we are doing. It does not sit well with me when compared to the verbal response received from the office of Peter Mandelson.

Deputy P. McGrath

Chairman, you have conducted a very important exercise this morning in reading into the public record of this sub-committee the responses we got from the Secretary of State, Paul Murphy, and his office. When one correlates what he is saying and what we saw in the Barron report, it is extremely disappointing for a number of reasons. First, in paragraph No. 7 of his response Mr. Murphy says:

There have been criticisms in some quarters that the British Government has not provided intelligence material to the Barron inquiry. It is the case that original documents in relation to intelligence material have not been passed on. This is because the nature of these documents or some of the peripheral information in them could, if released, compromise intelligence assets or the lives of sources.

In other words, he is saying that even a private viewing of those papers, as suggested by Mr. Justice Barron, would compromise intelligence sources. That is a huge imposition and a huge allegation against Mr. Justice Barron and the work he was doing.

This is further compounded by the fact that the Taoiseach, who has a very close working relationship with the British Prime Minister and with Mr. Murphy, specifically asked in writing on a number of occasions that there be co-operation between the Northern Ireland Office and Mr. Justice Barron in his work. It raises questions about the level of co-operation which they are prepared to give when, in a serious inquiry here, they were not prepared to even show privately documents on the matter to Mr. Justice Barron. This compromised the whole investigation. It is very disappointing. Chairman, I ask you to bring to the Taoiseach's attention the contents of this document and to ask his help on where we can go from here. It is extremely disappointing that we are not getting the level of co-operation we thought we might get.

Deputy P. Power

My colleagues have said all that I wish to say. I agree with everything Deputy Paul McGrath said. Practically all those who made a submission in writing have had the courage of their convictions to back it up by making an oral submission and presenting themselves before the sub-committee. Nobody could say the questioning by the sub-committee has been over-the-top in any instance and always our intention has been to flesh out some of the finer details in the written submission. In that context, the level of co-operation evident in the memorandum, which the Chairman has read out, is very disappointing. I can only say for my own part that this will weigh heavily in the conclusions the sub-committee will draw in due course.

Chairman

We will not come to any conclusion at this point in time.

Deputy Costello

I am glad we had this read into the record so that one can see the level of co-operation that has taken place. The letter and memorandum outlined by the Chairman is from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Paul Murphy. He is also speaking on behalf of his predecessors, Mr. John Reid and Mr. Peter Mandelson. The response is that none of those three is prepared to make an oral submission to the sub-committee. I would hope after we have written again to the then Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, that he will co-operate because he would have been the person directly relevant and on the spot at that particular time.

It is very disappointing that, so far, there has been no positive response from the Northern Ireland Office. In many ways, Mr. Murphy is underlining the importance of the amount of documentation in its original form. The number quoted is 68,000. Some millions of documents which have to be sifted through, yet he is not able to state even the quantity of documents which would be relevant to our inquiry. He also indicates that, in terms of the examination of documentation, certain intelligence information has been deliberately withheld.

There is no way for us to assess the quality of the inquiry that has taken place at this point in time. We have no access to the people who have trawled the documents, nor to anybody who has contact with the original documents. Therefore, it is impossible for us to assess anything in that respect. Mr. Justice Barron did not have access to any of it.

It is extremely disappointing that we have not gone beyond this point and even though we have made a second request to Mr. Murphy on this matter, we should write to him again and clearly reflect the disappointment of the sub-committee with regard to the response we received. We should specifically ask whether the various agencies of the British State - the British Army and the police force - would be allowed to make their decisions separately.

Deputy Hoctor

I endorse what my colleagues have said and I share their disappointment. We were looking to the North of Ireland, where these atrocities originated, to get whatever support and information we could to broaden our brief and get the clearest possible picture. I am not impressed with what we have received. While I am not certain what we can do about it, we should make known our disappointment. People were invited to meet with us and there is no doubt that vital information is still available to which we will not have access.

We also see the difficulties Mr. Justice Barron met in compiling his report. It is now 30 years later and so many efforts have been made to bring Northern Ireland and the Republic together, and now we see this. It is so easy to condemn the atrocities and not co-operate with our inquiry. I am very disappointed.

Chairman

I am very disappointed with the response from Mr. Paul Murphy. I would have hoped that if he was unable to attend that his deputy would have done so and answered before the sub-committee. We were led to believe and hope, particularly following his statement, that he was considering the invitation. It does not speak well for the type of co-operation that one would consider should be going on between two such friendly countries. We will have to consider the matter further when we go into private session.

I apologise to Dr. Donovan for the delay in calling him. I do not know whether you want to make a short statement in advance of any questions that might arise. Before you say anything, I must remind you that while Members of the Oireachtas enjoy parliamentary privilege, you do not enjoy the same privilege.

Dr. James Donovan

I want to put what little evidence I have in context. In the early 1970s, from about 1971 on, I was involved in the analysis of all seized explosive.

Chairman

Can you state who you are, what your position was, and what your experience is?

Dr. Donovan

My name is James Donovan. I qualified with a PhD in organic chemistry from UCC in 1970. It is one of the reasons people find it difficult to understand me as English is not my first language - I come from Cork.

I worked with Erin Foods for a year and a quarter and then I was offered a job in the State Laboratory, which operates under the Department of Finance. Its tradition is to collect money for the Government in excise duties etc., by analysing material. For many years, it also carried out human toxicology analysis in suicides, and examined explosives, commencing during the 1956-60 campaign, and looked for fire accelerants. It so happened that nobody wanted to appear in the Special Criminal Court. When I joined I was the youngest and was given the job of analysing explosives. Since we rot quickly and smell badly when we die, most members of staff did not want to do human toxicology. During my time in the State Laboratory, I gained various qualifications including chartered chemist, fellow of the Institute of Chemistry of Ireland, fellow of the Royal Society of Chemistry, EurChem, diploma in finance and accounting and associate of the London College of Music, the last of which, like my diploma in theology, is not relevant.

I was involved quite heavily in explosives analysis. At that time, the IRA was dissolving fertiliser in water. The ammonium nitrate was dissolved, the calcium carbonate sank to the bottom, the water was decanted and evaporated to leave large, pure grains of ammonium nitrate. IRA members doing this were caught very easily and, as they did not recognise the courts, they were easily convicted. It was the analysis of explosives on clothing and other objects which was relevant to me at the time. Apparently, the Garda found it difficult to get money to take objects from the bomb explosion in Upper Parnell Street for analysis elsewhere.

A number of gardaí had approached me on and off to deal with hit and run incidents and house-breakings. There is a great deal of evidence in these cases. The most obvious example would be if one were crossing Molesworth Street and was struck by a car, one would break the glass on the headlight. That would indicate the model of car. One's body would bounce off the bonnet taking paint with it, which would indicate the colour of car that hit one. That would allow an investigator to identify the make and colour of car by using a library. If one's head were smashed into the pillar of the windscreen, it would leave blood and tissue for DNA profiling.

There were many areas in which forensic science was quite useful up to 1974. However, the massive explosions across Dublin and Monaghan were the first we ever investigated. I received some material from Parnell Street. The most dramatic item was a first communion sandal a garda handed me which still contained a foot. It is not a nice thing to blow people up. The explosion does not cut, it tears. It fills with dirt and other material and its effects can last for a great many years.

I attempted to find chemicals consistent with explosive materials in the items I received from the Parnell Street bomb. The other bomb materials were allegedly taken to the laboratory in Belfast. My analysis and the analysis from the Northern Ireland laboratory were roughly similar. The results were what one would expect from an ammonium nitrate explosion which contained a booster of gelignite with a detonator. The mechanism of detonation is relevant, whether it be a timer or electronic. One learns a little from the analysis. For example, most countries pile material into Israel, therefore, one can identify the group that carried out the bombing from a particular molecule of strained atoms of oxygen, to which I believe only one group of Hamas has access. There is a certain amount of intelligence involved but it is quite limited. What I found is in fact what one would expect - ammonium nitrate/ANFO/diesel oil/booster charge of gelignite. That is as far as I can take it.

Chairman

I thank Dr. Donovan. That certainly opens up various lines of questioning.

Deputy P. McGrath

I welcome Dr. Donovan. It would be appropriate - he is retired - to say the State owes him a great compliment and reward for the fantastic work he did in this country over the years, particularly in difficult times when it was not popular to be in that job. He paid the consequences for that and I pay tribute to him for his work. On a lighter note, I also commend him on the fantastic array of qualifications to his name. It is a long time since I have met somebody with such an array of degrees. Perhaps it is his Cork origins which have led him to accumulate such a diversity of degrees.

On a more serious note, Dr. Donovan talked about obtaining material from the Parnell Street bomb scene. In that context, could he put in perspective for us the kind of technology available then vis-à-vis now? We are all used to looking at the Discovery television channel and programmes which appear late at night and seeing forensic science at work. We become, perhaps, lulled into thinking that it was always there. The state of technology in the early 1970s was very different from what it is now, as Dr. Willis will tell us later. Could Dr. Donovan give us some insight into the kind of analysis that could be done then and the kind of work brought to him on a regular basis?

Dr. Donovan

To an obvious extent very little money or resources were put into scene searching. As far as I remember, there were four men in what was called the ballistic section of the Garda technical bureau. These are the men who go to scenes of crimes. At that time they were out pretty much all of the time, day and night, because so much material was being found around the countryside. They did not have the white suits that everybody wears now. They did the job as quickly as possible and got back to work.

On the techniques of how much should be brought in - looking at what little I got - one of the things that has always intrigued me is that there were two prills of burned ammonium nitrate in the rubber from the car. This is what one would expect and is not unusual. However, it means if one searches enough one will find material. For example, in the Brighton bombing the British Government cut some of the tissue from corpses and digested it with an enzyme-supthalicin. They were able to filter the human tissue away and found a corner of a circuit board. It depends on how much work one can put into any one thing.

What I got in was very little considering, I believe, there were a number of vehicles macerated at every site of the explosion. Even what Alan Hall in Belfast got was also pretty limited. It was limited largely because nobody quite knew how much to gather with these sorts of bombings. As far as I recall, that was the first one of these sort of bombings in this jurisdiction. Subsequently there was the bomb in Dublin Airport that killed a worker. There was the bomb that killed two in Crowe Street in December of 1975. There was the bomb in the Special Criminal Court. There was the bomb that killed the British ambassador and there was a bomb that killed Garda Michael Clerkin in 1976.

We slowly built expertise in looking and finding. My attitude has always been that we are an independent country and we should do our own rubbish work, if you like. If you do not do it, you do not get experience in doing it, but then I can only analyse material that gardaí decide to bring in. Why some of it should have gone North I do not know, except there was the tradition then of taking firearms North to identify the bullet. As you know, if a bullet goes up a rifled weapon, it gets a particular spin and one can identify all bullets from that rifle.

Mr. Justice Barron asked me if I could provide all the cars that were damaged. It is difficult enough now when there is more money to pile things away, to store things, but then there was pretty well nothing. Resources were very limited. Storage space was essentially non-existent. To an extent, interest in forensic science was only beginning. The courts were barely beginning to understand and accept it. One could still get, for example, a hit and run dismissed by a District Court judge despite the build-up of evidence. It is normal now to talk about a learning curve and we were on one.

What we would like, obviously, would be to say there are bits and pieces I found that could only have come from one particular group. That is why I mentioned the two prills of ammonium nitrate which were ovoid prills. Somebody said to me, and it is totally gossip, not factual, that some UVF group in County Fermanagh was the only group with access to ovoid prills of ammonium nitrate, but I cannot vouch for that. I do not know. That is the sort of thing one would hope to find in an analysis.

There are certain things which Alan Hall refers to, that he did not get the exhibits in time. We now know that nitro-glycerine dries off pretty quickly. If you recall the Birmingham Six and more particularly the Maguire Seven, where after a long time nitro-glycerine was found on hands when it could not have been found because it seeps through the skin and is metabolised instantly underneath. In fact, if one has heart problems one can now buy a patch which puts nitro-glycerine into the body to combat the effect of angina. Basically, I think the gardaí brought what they thought were relevant but that was it. In reality, one should essentially get everything, including swab vehicles, and one should examine foam rubber and possibly examine the bodies to see what was in them.

When Lord Mountbatten was murdered, a young fellow with him, Paul Maxwell, had his chest blown in half. His chest had been stuffed with a green-painted wood. He had obviously been leaning over the bomb as it detonated, which must have been hidden behind green-painted wood. It was dramatic, to say the least, to see the child's chest stuffed with this green-painted wood from the boat. That was relevant because, obviously, the paint on the suspect who was subsequently convicted matched that paint. That is the sort of area where forensic science works.

Deputy P. McGrath

I thank Dr. Donovan for that. He obviously has vast experience of this work over the years. Even though he got a very limited supply of material from the Parnell Street bomb, is he convinced in his own mind about the type of explosive that was used?

Dr. Donovan

This is where being convinced is a bit difficult. If it is a high explosive, which at that time would have been a complete bomb of gelignite, normally it will the tear the metal like paper, but what bits of metal I got in were not torn like that. There was nothing unusual. It was not RDX or a military explosive. It was not a foreign explosive. One could only assume that what was got was comparable to the use of ammonium nitrate, diesel oil, nitrobenzene, a booster of gelignite, a detonator and some firing mechanism.

Since the bombers would appear to have left the car very quickly, or shortly before the bombs went off, it can be said that it was a timing devise as distinct from detonating it from a few yards away with a hand-held battery or detonator. As far as I would be aware, what was then found in the debris was a type of bomb that would normally have been used by terrorist groups at that time.

Deputy P. McGrath

It has been suggested to us that at that time the UVF did not have access to that type of explosive. Has Dr. Donovan gained any knowledge, in consultation with his counterparts from Northern Ireland, of whether this type of explosive would have been available to the UVF and others?

Dr. Donovan

I do not know. I cannot answer that. The only thing I do know was that the IRA was using them and had great experience with them and the detonating mechanism. At that time, I would say that the UVF, the UDA and other loyalist terrorist groups were pretty backward in planting and detonating bombs, but that is just a feeling I have from speaking to people in Northern Ireland.

Deputy P. McGrath

In effect, Dr. Donovan is saying that he does not think the UVF could have had access to that type of explosive and that it was not the normal type of explosive it used.

Dr. Donovan

Well, just from speaking with people in Northern Ireland, it seems a bit unlikely. There is no doubt that if, for example, one put an ad in the Cork Evening Echo looking for a group to bomb areas, and one got a reply from a number of groups, including the provos, then that would be the group one would go for. They are efficient, have done it and do not have any qualms of conscience. From that point of view it is——

Deputy P. McGrath

It was their type of bomb, in other words.

Dr. Donovan

Yes.

Deputy P. Power

I thank Dr. Donovan for attending the sub-committee and helping us with our deliberations. I found his presentation extremely interesting, and I am disappointed, unfortunately, that he did not come before the sub-committee earlier in our deliberations. It certainly would have helped me in understanding subsequent interviews and submissions.

I echo Deputy P. McGrath in saying that Dr. Donovan has rendered enormous service to the State and that the State owes him an enormous debt. We are all aware of the enormous personal sacrifices he has made in the rendering of that service. Many people convicted of the most serious and heinous crimes in our country would not have served time but for Dr. Donovan's dedication and expertise.

On Judge Barron's report, it is stated on page 103, the second last paragraph at the bottom of the page, that, "In the course of an interview with Dr. Donovan carried out by Justice for the Forgotten, the following opinion was noted...". Did Judge Barron interview you directly?

Dr. Donovan

Yes, he did. I visited him in Upper Mount Street, or Government Buildings - where the State Laboratory used be. It looks much better now.

Chairman

Who is in the office of the State Laboratory now?

Dr. Donovan

I do not know. I was not allowed to go as far as that. It was at the back of the State Laboratory that they used haul corpses up in the 1920s. There were two rooms; the post-mortem was done in one room and the organs were taken immediately across a little hallway to be analysed because the lack of refrigeration encouraged the toxicologist to move fairly quickly.

Deputy P. Power

You must be an avid fan of the television programme "Crime Scene Investigation". How long was your interview with Judge Barron? Was it the same in-depth discussion we are having today?

Dr. Donovan

No. Largely, he asked me to explain a little of the report. He had other questions which were not really forensic. He asked other questions. I cannot answer. I am not evading the question. I am not sure but he had quite a few other questions on matters such as could things be done or not done, distances and methods of detonating bombs.

Deputy P. Power

Did he explore the issue of the chemical composition of the bomb in detail, particularly the ammonium nitrate prills you mentioned?

Dr. Donovan

No, we just went through the type of bomb available at that time. They were limited. It was ammonium nitrate and something else but we did not go into it. He subsequently sent me a dossier from an expert retained by Justice for the Forgotten asking for my views on that man's views on the whole position.

Deputy P. Power

Was that Mr. Wylde's report?

Dr. Donovan

That is right, yes.

Deputy P. Power

In your response to Deputy McGrath's question, you mentioned the two prills of burnt ammonium nitrate. Was that symptomatic of crystallised or uncrystallised ammonium nitrate?

Dr. Donovan

No, it was symptomatic of the ammonium nitrate in gelignite in that the main amount of ammonium nitrate is recrystallised from fertiliser but——

Deputy P. Power

Sorry, I meant recrystallised

Dr. Donovan

——when one buys gelignite, you actually have round or egg-shaped particles of ammonium nitrate. They detonate better.

Deputy P. Power

Around 1974 did you examine debris from any Provisional IRA bombs, although there would not have been a lot, if any, in the State.

Dr. Donovan

No, not in this State. That was the only one at that time. In fact, it was late in 1975 before the bomb went off in Dublin Airport killing one person and then the bomb on Crowe Street in Dundalk which killed two persons. There was massive destruction in 1976 when 16 incendiary devices were placed in large theatres and shops such as Clerys and Arnotts in Dublin.

Deputy P. Power

Was the Special Criminal Court bombed?

Dr. Donovan

It was bombed on 19 July 1976.

Deputy P. Power

That was a Provisional IRA bombing.

Dr. Donovan

Yes. It brought the explosives up from Portlaoise.

Deputy P. Power

Did you examine that debris?

Dr. Donovan

I did. The IRA had brought up gelignite from Portlaoise Prison that morning.

Deputy P. Power

I do not understand.

Dr. Donovan

Michael O'Rourke escaped. Gelignite was the explosive used to blow through the walls of the Special Criminal Court. Gelignite is a mixture of ammonium nitrate, nitro-glycerine and other things. The IRA had brought up that from the prison that morning.

Deputy P. Power

From your wide knowledge and expertise in this area, was the debris you examined consistent with debris from IRA bombs?

Dr. Donovan

No.

Deputy P. Power

Dr. Donovan mentioned something about the UVF in Fermanagh. Does he have a source for his information on the level of expertise the UVF had regarding such a bomb?

Dr. Donovan

All I had was that from talking to people in Northern Ireland on the security aspect and members of the Garda Síochána - I think it was C3 at the time - they did not have a great view of the abilities of the UVF. The only thing I heard was that the UVF in Fermanagh had access to ovoid prills of ammonium nitrate. While these could have come from gelignite, they could also come from another source of ammonium nitrate.

Deputy P. Power

I see. It could have come from gelignite.

Dr. Donovan

Yes, it could have come from gelignite.

Deputy P. Power

When Dr. Donovan says the UVF had access, does he mean that they had access from a third party or were able to construct them themselves?

Dr. Donovan

There was a story of a British Army sergeant who had left the ordnance corps and settled in Fermanagh. That is the level of the gossip I heard; it is not evidence. It is bits and pieces that one picks up, although it is another question as to whether they are true. Sometimes, one must conduct an analysis on what bits and pieces one hears.

Deputy P. Power

From what Dr. Donovan has told us, it seems that he had a fair amount of cross-Border contact at the time.

Dr. Donovan

I knew some of the people in the Belfast laboratory. Under no circumstances did we have anything to do with each other over this.

Deputy P. Power

I understand.

Dr. Donovan

However, we would discuss things in meetings abroad or in Ireland. The Garda decided to take these bombs North, other than the Parnell Street one I got.

Deputy P. Power

While I know much of it is hearsay, is Dr. Donovan saying that arising from his knowledge of the time and his examination of the scene, the construction of the bomb was not symptomatic of the construction of a UVF bomb?

Dr. Donovan

No. There was no religion which could have been ascribed to it, if you like. In my view, it was more likely to have been an IRA bomb. That is all I can say but I have no evidence for it.

Deputy P. Power

Thank you very much.

Chairman

What would have informed your view that it was more likely to have been an IRA bomb?

Dr. Donovan

I suppose I am somewhat simple-minded but sometimes the simple reason is the one which is accurate. It does not have to be highly complicated with a whole host of people coming in from here, there and everywhere. In my view, they were the group most experienced at killing and most experienced in planting bombs. Therefore, they were the group most likely to have planted the bomb. Many others could, of course, have done it but it is solely a simplistic view.

Chairman

It is the type of bomb about which you are talking

Dr. Donovan

It is the type of bomb which I knew they used. I know Alan Hall talks about finding sugar on something or other but I do not think they are particularly relevant. It was a straightforward bomb containing ammonium nitrate, something else plus the gelignite.

Chairman

While no bomb is simple, it is not a simple bomb?

Dr. Donovan

No.

Chairman

It is known that to put together ammonium nitrate, gelignite and a detonator - the type of bomb used - you would have to have expertise. You figure the IRA would be better at it than others?

Dr. Donovan

The point you are making is a very strong point. You are not necessarily going to have a correct bomb the first time you make one. You have got to make them many times. Maybe you are going to kill yourself a number of times before you reach the proper technique. The detonating mechanism is also highly relevant and very important. In fact it is probably far more important than just slapping a few chemicals together and getting them to explode. It is getting them to explode when you are a distance away. We are not suicide bombers. It is just a feeling I have for the thing rather than any evidence because it is devoid of specific evidence.

Chairman

Can you give us a layman's ABC of what a detonator is and how it works? Of what is it made up?

Dr. Donovan

A detonator is normally half a biro and copper coloured. It will have two wires going into it. The mechanism will be inside, of which I am not too sure, but there is a high explosive inside. If you put an electro-current across the terminals, they detonate the thing inside. The explosive inside is powerful in so far as it is fast and gives a thump to the explosive. You use gelignite as a booster, as they call them, to detonate the whole charge. If a detonator goes off in your hand, it blows the hand off. It is that strong or that weak but it does have the power of an instant thump. You need that. There are variations. There is cortex fuse wire which can be wrapped around it. It is long fuse wire which detonates a long charge. Normally the detonator would be just stuck into the gelignite. The detonator goes off; that detonates the charge of gelignite and that then detonates the main charge.

Chairman

Just a small ordinary battery would do. There is a switch that operates on a time basis.

Dr. Donovan

Yes. How you will detonate it really depends on what you are going to do. Do you want to be close to it - you do not want to be too close - or do you want it to go off fairly quickly? Most of the bombs in Dublin seemed to detonate around the same time to cause maximum confusion and maximum problems in getting the injured and dead to hospitals or somewhere like that. I presume a timer was used. There are variations on timers.

Deputy F. McGrath

I welcome Dr. Jim Donovan and commend him for attending and co-operating with our inquiry. You probably do not know this but over the last few weeks we have had many public servants co-operating with us and assisting us in making up our minds on this issue. I commend and thank you for your work. I know that on a personal and human level you have suffered the consequences of doing your job and hope you are recovering from your injuries in that horrific bomb attack. I express our deepest appreciation.

On the issue of forensic evidence, it is stated at page 275, section 2, under the heading, Conclusions, that the State was not equipped to conduct an adequate forensic analysis of the explosions. This was because the importance of preservation and prompt collection analysis was not appreciated. The effect of this was that potentially vital clues were lost. This is Mr. Justice Barron's reaction on the question of forensic analysis. What is your response to that section from a professional point of view?

Dr. Donovan

It is partly true. There were very few bombs to analyse before then. We did not have, for example, massive covers to put over bombed cars to be lifted up and taken away to some yard where they would be kept. Everything brought in was exposed to the elements - wind and rain. I do not know what the weather was like but they were exposed. Alan Hall said he would not touch them because they would have been exposed to the wind etc.

An adequate forensic analysis is quite difficult. It means, for example, that every piece of rubber in the cars should be gone through because of its ability to catch bits of trace evidence. There is no point in pretending that we were able to do that. In the State lab where I was and where I did this sort of work in my own time, it was a matter - when somebody else had left for the day - of trying to get space to look at the material. It would have been better if they had been brought in and sealed in packages - as far as I know, they were not sealed at all; in plastic packages, for example - because of the ability of nitrobenzene, nitroglycerine, trinitro or others to evaporate. You can get something from it but for a proper and decent one - which we say now 30 years later - you would need better systems and also better training for people.

Deputy F. McGrath

Is there better training available now? Has it changed radically?

Dr. Donovan

Yes, it has. For example, all the gardaí going to scenes are now equipped with white overshoes, white overalls and something to cover their heads so that hair does not leave itself at the scene and be picked up. There are tents, for example, to cover bodies, while the body is being looked at and any footprints around the body are being found or anything else that is left and so that the rain does not come in. Part of this is due to the fact that people do not like having a corpse uncovered in their locality. You would expect that most of these vehicles would have been covered by a tent and any dead bodies would have been covered at the time.

Deputy F. McGrath

On the training issue, has the system developed? In the last couple of weeks we have heard the families giving evidence and describing what happened. We heard from survivors of the horrific injuries they suffered and the trauma the families went through, yet people like yourselves have to go in and make decisions or observations on a forensic level. Is it part of your training to learn how to be able to deal with this on a human level and to respond to the horrific scenes in order that you can make a cold decision? Has this changed in the past five or ten years?

Dr. Donovan

I do not think it forms part of training, in so far as people do not get particular training but part of the idea is that you are unbiased and that if you see a corpse, you look at the corpse as a source of evidence. Obviously, a lot of corpses' semen will be highly relevant, as well as blood distribution patterns. Even in an explosion, the body, as one of the softest things around, will have seized pieces of metal flying through the air or bits of the firing mechanism.

Obviously, the first time you see a post mortem it is a bit stomach churning because you do not know that is what a post mortem is but after your first or second, then you are interested in the evidence. You see some rather odd things but it is the evidence. If one is interested in the job, you will not be perturbed by it. The only thing is, if the body is not found quickly, due to decomposition, the smell becomes quite ghastly.

Deputy F. McGrath

In talking about the bombs you mentioned ammonium nitrate, diesel and timing devices. I think you said that at that time, in 1974, the loyalist groups were pretty backward in regard to these explosives. Does that mean those people who suspect there was a more professional involvement should keep an open mind? Again, I am talking about the type of bomb used. We know, for example, that the UVF bombed Dublin. That is a fact and we are trying to deal with the facts here but what we are really trying to get at is, did they do it on their own and did they have professional help? What do you mean when you say that at that time the UVF was pretty backward? I think that is the phrase you used.

Dr. Donovan

Killing people is easy enough but killing them with fairly sophisticated devices is a bit more difficult. From what I have heard about the UVF at that time, I would have thought it would have needed direction of some sort to assemble the bomb, know where to park it for maximum effect, detonate it and get away. Most people from the North seem to have an unusual view of the Republic and need to be coerced or pushed into risking coming across the Border, planting a bomb and going off. I would think they would certainly need some help and assistance in doing that job.

Chairman

How similar was this bomb to loyalist bombs like the one detonated in Dundalk or in Crowe Street? Was there any similarity?

Dr. Donovan

As far as I know, from the bits and pieces, it was a much bigger bomb in Crowe Street. I thought that was an IRA bomb.

Chairman

Was there a difference between them? Obviously, there was one in so far as——

Dr. Donovan

Not really. The general bits and pieces that you got - chemicals - were much the same. That is why I say it was the type of bomb that was being used at that time.

Chairman

You are saying that the one in Crowe Street was much bigger. Was that because there would have been more ammonium nitrate or because it was more efficient due to be being more tightly packed and so on?

Dr. Donovan

You make a good point. Obviously, a good quality bomb has to be properly packed. A chap who owned a meat factory - I better leave his name alone——

Chairman

No, do not mention any names.

Dr. Donovan

His factory was bombed, and fistfuls of ammonium nitrate and diesel oil were around the place, so whoever put that together did not do a good job at all but when Garda Michael Reynolds was murdered at the end of 1976, I believe there was only a small quantity of him left to be put in the coffin. I got tiny pieces of his uniform. If you have a large, strong bomb, it will do a lot of damage.

Deputy Costello

I thank Dr. Donovan for coming. We appreciate it very much because, of course, he endured the same bombing experience himself and has suffered ever since. We appreciate his coming and discussing sensitive issues of this nature. By the way, I have been reading your book, Cracking Crime, which I can recommend to everybody. It is a cracking good story.

On the items you got, a second sample of debris was brought to you three days later. Was that from the scene of the Parnell Street bombing also?

Dr. Donovan

Yes, both samples were from Parnell Street.

Deputy Costello

Would you have expected to get samples from all of the scenes of the bombings?

Dr. Donovan

Yes.

Deputy Costello

Is there any explanation as to why, instead of giving you samples from all of the scenes of the bombings, the other samples were taken to Northern Ireland?

Dr. Donovan

I did not hear any. The Garda had a practice at that time of taking firearms to Springfield in the North, where they had a library, if you like, of discharged bullets to link a gun to a bullet and thereby link various crimes. They had a certain established pattern with Springfield RUC, whereas the lab was in a different place. They decided to take the other bombs there and it had nothing to do with me. I provide a service to the Garda Síochána if they wish to use it.

Deputy Costello

Prior to this, one of your functions in the State Laboratory was to examine explosives seizures. Would the Garda have had a regular pattern of bringing to you any undetonated explosives that might have been seized from the IRA or UVF?

Dr. Donovan

At the time it was the norm to buy a large quantity of calcium ammonium nitrate fertiliser and then, in some field, pour bags of it into water. Ammonium nitrate dissolves and calcium carbonate settles through the bottom. The aqueous solution is decanted. You have a gas burner under a container and you just boil off the water to get fantastic elongated crystals - they are extremely interesting - of ammonium nitrate. That was what they thought they should do. Then they found that if they ground the fertiliser and added 10% icing sugar, they got something as strong as 80% gelignite. But for a long time the Garda was finding, without any difficulty, people out in fields extracting ammonium nitrate.

Jack Lynch had signed, on 1 July 1972, SI 191 of 1970, the Ammonium Nitrate and Sodium Chlorate Explosives Order. I did all of that from 1971.

Deputy Costello

Would the Garda have regularly brought seizures of explosives to you for examination prior to 1974?

Dr. Donovan

Yes.

Deputy Costello

If they had seized explosives would they have gone to Northern Ireland with them?

Dr. Donovan

No. I got a sample of the explosives seized in every instance and I then went to the Special Criminal Court to give evidence on that. I do not know whether the Garda took samples to the North. I have heard of that but I do not know.

Deputy Costello

Do you think this was something of a departure from practice, that you did not get samples from all of the bombing sites?

Dr. Donovan

Yes. It is possible they felt that the man who brought the stuff to me was a person who was of very definite views, as I was, that we should also do our own work down here, and that even if we made a mess of it, we should do it and get used to it after a while. Obviously he was a detective Garda and would have been overruled by other people. However, it is possible that authorities felt that this was of such seriousness that it should go somewhere where they would have more experience at doing this work.

Deputy Costello

What was Dr. Donovan's professional opinion of Dr. Hall in Belfast?

Dr. Donovan

I got on very well with him. He spent many, many years on explosives and had a very deep grasp of explosives, traces and timing mechanisms. He was highly competent in the explosives field. However, this particular thing was more about trying to find out if anything unusual would turn up because it is the unusual things that sometimes point one in certain directions and perhaps the Garda felt that he would be more competent to do that than I.

Deputy Costello

On another line of thought, I am somewhat puzzled by the fact that Dr. Donovan only uncovered blackened prills of ammonium nitrate, that there was no sign of crystals. Crystals would have been identified with IRA explosives whereas the prills would be more commercial gelignite. Dr. Donovan seemed to feel the direction, on the balance of probability, was that it was an IRA-type bomb, and yet the prills were ovoids rather than crystals.

Dr. Donovan

To an extent, for the past 30 years or more, ships have come into Drogheda with nitroglycerine on guncotton or nitrocotton, and then with a large hold of ammonium nitrate. Normally it is around ammonium nitrate but at times there are ovoid prills of ammonium nitrate.

It is also possible, though, for people to get their hands on pure ammonium nitrate in prill form. The material in Dundalk is taken reasonably quickly by the Army to Enfield for mixing into gelignite but there was talk that in Scotland there was stuff which was flying around or could be bought for a certain amount.

I see the point. There is the possibility that what I found came from the gelignite and has no significance whatsoever. If somebody had, or could get, pure prills of ammonium nitrate - not just crystals that had been re-crystallised - that might be of some evidential value. The gardaí do not necessarily tell one that a piece of information was interesting. One sends out one's report and that is it.

Deputy Costello

As it was prills, the likelihood is that it came from commercial explosives and what Dr. Donovan examined was the detonating booster gelignite rather than the main part of the bomb. Commercial explosives, which were regularly used by the IRA and the UVF in Northern Ireland at the time, could be obtained in a quarry.

Dr. Donovan

There is no doubt that what I found could have come from the gelignite.

Deputy Costello

Page 68 of the report states that hydrocarbon oils or nitro-benzene were not detected in any of the samples. If that is the case, then I conclude that there was a combination of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil as the base of the explosive, in other words, that is, it could not be ANFO. This is an area on which Mr. Justice Barron and Nigel Wylde from the British ordnance differed.

Dr. Donovan

That is so, assuming that the hydrocarbon - if it was there - would not be vaporised by the heat of the explosion or was in the open sufficiently long to evaporate. Hydrocarbon oil is effectively diesel oil and will evaporate. What the Deputy has read is correct.

Deputy Costello

What lifespan does diesel oil have? One sees it lying on roads or footpaths for days and months. Dr. Donovan got the material on 20 May, three days after the explosion, and the other debris on 23 May. He got this before Dr. Hall and within a week of the explosion.

Dr. Donovan

I would expect that it would be found. Equally, I cannot definitely say there was no hydrocarbon there. The power in explosions is considerable. The heat and the movement make it quite difficult to find things afterwards. If one finds something it is a positive and I did not find a positive.

Deputy Costello

Would the hosing down with water of the bomb scene have a major effect on the hydrocarbon oil?

Dr. Donovan

It would.

Deputy Costello

What is Dr. Donovan's opinion of the materials used in the bomb? Is he in a position to give us a definite answer on this?

Dr. Donovan

Assuming a number of things, I feel it was definitely detonated by a booster charge of gelignite which was placed into ammonium nitrate and hydrocarbon oil or diesel oil.

Deputy Costello

Even though he did not detect that.

Dr. Donovan

Even though I did not find it. That is the most likely conclusion that one can make.

Deputy Costello

If this was not the case and no hydrocarbon oil was detected, fuel oil could be ruled out. Is there a possible alternative?

Dr. Donovan

Pure gelignite would be an alternative.

Deputy Costello

Is it possible it was all commercial?

Dr. Donovan

That is a strong possibility. One is at a disadvantage in not having all the pieces of metal from the cars in order to see how they were torn and to examine them. They are pretty powerful bombs and this was a powerful one.

Deputy Hoctor

I too would like to be associated with the deserved tributes to Dr. Donovan. I thank him for giving his time and his valuable presentation. Deputy Costello has asked many of the questions I had. How long did Dr. Donovan spend with Mr. Justice Barron, was it a matter of hours or did they meet on a number of occasions?

Dr. Donovan

No, it was quick. It was just under an hour or so. He had my reports and the Belfast report. In essence we agreed, he at his suggestion, that what I found was what one would expect to find in bombs being used by terrorist groups at that time. It was nothing unusual. He talked a bit about where the exhibits were kept. In those days it was a matter of wherever one could find or where one would be allowed to put something in. He also had some specific questions about matters not relevant to my reports at all. I was quite a short time with him as he felt the forensics had nothing much to tell him.

Deputy Hoctor

Page 63 of the Barron report refers to Garda sergeant Patrick Dickson. It matches what Dr. Donovan told us - that the gardaí requested him to examine the debris from the Avenger car in Parnell Street. I understand from the final paragraph on that page that scrapings and samples were taken from large debris which was housed in a dance hall nearby and that these scrapings and samples were then brought to Dr. Donovan. Is it true that Dr. Donovan got samples rather than getting to see the entire debris left of that car?

Dr. Donovan

I did not see the entire debris. Mr. Ted Jones brought me scrapings - on a comparative basis very small quantities - from the site of the damage done at each bomb site. I got only small quantities of scrapings and did not see the main debris. Nowadays one would more or less insist that the forensic scientist goes out and sees the whole thing. However, at that time, I was trying to balance a few jobs and I was not invited out.

Deputy Hoctor

According to the report, further debris was brought to Dr. Donovan later in the week - on the Thursday - at his request, judging from the report we have here. Had the debris already been hosed down by the fire services in Parnell Street when it was presented to Dr. Donovan?

Dr. Donovan

It was damp or wet. It was generally wet but little enough. I can not really remember. It was not in plastic bags. Nylon bags would be relevant to maintain nitro-glycerine or whatever. Thick liquids like hydrocarbonoids would be there.

Senator J. Walsh

I welcome Dr. Donovan and concur with the compliments made to him. Would he have been aware in 1974 that nylon bags should have been used for the collection of debris?

Dr. Donovan

No. I would know, but getting the Garda to cough up the money to provide them would have been a bit difficult. It was just the start of trying to get them to have paper bags for clothing and things like that.

Senator J. Walsh

Am I incorrect in assuming you never visited the scene?

Dr. Donovan

No, I did not.

Senator J. Walsh

Did you say earlier that you examined some body part or parts from the scene?

Dr. Donovan

No, not from that event. Other bodies, yes, but not from that event.

Senator J. Walsh

I thought a reference was made earlier to a foot.

In regard to page 246 of the Barron report, you were clear in your opinion on the likely composition of the bomb; that it was probably ANFO-boosted by gelignite. The report states that, in his first forensic report, based on analysing samples received on 20 May 1974, Dr. Donovan concluded that the results suggest the use of gelignite-dynamite as the explosive substance. Later, the report states that, even those findings of Dr. Donovan - Nigel Wylde is referred to - are made questionable by the manner in which the samples were collected and stored by Garda ballistics officers. Mr. Justice Barron concluded that, in any event Dr. Donovan' s findings of 23 May could at best identify commercial explosives as an element of the bombs. He also said that the use of ANFO in conjunction with a small amount of commercial explosives could not be ruled out. This suggests that Mr. Justice Barron interpreted Dr. Donovan's findings to mean that the explosion was more likely to be gelignite-dynamite, rather than the ANFO which was referred to.

Dr. Donovan

A huge amount of damage was done. I think I mentioned that there was a sandal on top of a roof with a foot in it.

Senator J. Walsh

I thought you examined that.

Dr. Donovan

I saw it. I did not examine it. Maybe I was being pedantic. I did not do anything with it. The garda——

Senator J. Walsh

How or where did you see it?

Dr. Donovan

A garda brought it up to me, I think it was Ted Jones.

Senator J. Walsh

That was my understanding of your earlier evidence. That is why I asked about the body parts.

Dr. Donovan

Sorry, I was a bit pedantic. I did not actually examine it for anything.

Senator J. Walsh

Why not?

Chairman

There is no evidence. This is not an inquiry. The Senator should mind where he is going.

Senator J. Walsh

I know, but I am not doing it for that reason. I am doing it for a different reason. I refer the Chairman to page 105 of the report. Can I pursue this point. Why did Dr. Donovan not examine it?

Dr. Donovan

There were other bits of exhibits around. There are times when one has to examine bits of bodies. It is not something I particularly like or feel should be done.

Senator J. Walsh

I can understand that.

Dr. Donovan

In fact, having been blown up myself I would like to feel that one's bits and pieces are handled respectfully. With regard to gelignite-dynamite——

Senator J. Walsh

I thought your submission would have stated that the examination of body parts can be often more fruitful in identifying the source and nature of the bomb.

Dr. Donovan

There was a sandal within which was left a foot. It did not seem particularly relevant if they were trying to identify bodies. If it was to be kept back for hours or days on end it would have to go into a fridge and I knew the problems I would have in the State Laboratory if a foot was found in a fridge.

Senator J. Walsh

Did Mr. Justice Barron ask you any questions in regard to that? I refer you to the fourth paragraph on page 105 where reference is made to it.

Dr. Donovan

Sorry, which page?

Senator J. Walsh

Page 105 of the inquiry report, paragraph four, just above where it says "Chain of Custody for Debris." I will read it if you like. It states:

It has been suggested that forensic samples should have been collected from clothing or from bodies of victims. However, the apparent failure to do this was not remarked on either by Dr. Donovan or Mr. Hall in their reports.

Did Mr. Justice Barron ask you about collecting body parts or clothes?

Dr. Donovan

We did discuss how the Garda collected and packaged things to bring in to me. They should have been packaged. As far as I know, Ted Jones brought them in by hand, but they should have been packaged. I mentioned that bodies, like any soft surface, are good for hanging on, but obviously clothing is extremely effective.

Senator J. Walsh

Did you examine any of the clothing?

Dr. Donovan

I did not get any of the clothing.

Senator J. Walsh

Presumably you would have been in a similar position with regard to the 1972-73 bombings, the Sackville Place one in particular.

Dr. Donovan

Yes, I knew of those but I did not get them.

Senator J. Walsh

You did not get those at all. Would they have been brought to anybody?

Dr. Donovan

I presume they were taken to Belfast.

Senator J. Walsh

You say it was consistent with ANFO and the use of gelignite as a booster. Did you make any estimation of the quantities of ANFO that might have been required for the explosion? I appreciate that if you were not at the site you may not have been able to do that.

Dr. Donovan

No, that is always——

Senator J. Walsh

An explosives expert.

Dr. Donovan

Yes, they can understand or detonate explosions.

Senator J. Walsh

Heavy play has been made in the report on the comments of Mr. Hall with regard to the delay in him receiving the debris from the bomb sites. I think he mentioned that one cannot base any reliable information on debris which is received more than six hours after the event. What are your comments in that regard? Would you accept that this was correct to say of the analysis that would have taken place at that time?

Dr. Donovan

I do not know about not putting any trust in anything that emerges. There is no doubt that if the stuff is packaged in nylon bags, for example, it will last pretty well indefinitely. There were in nylon bags then anyway.

Senator J. Walsh

I do not want to interrupt you, but on that point, is the nylon bag only an aid with regard to the detection of nitro-glycerine?

Dr. Donovan

No, the nylon bag is the protection of the exhibit from outside influences or other influences——

Senator J. Walsh

Any type of contamination.

Dr. Donovan

It is a protection from contamination or whatever else, and from drying off and so on. He is right. You get the best answers if it is either sealed in nylon bags - in 1974, I do not think they were using nylon bags either - or brought quickly to the laboratory, which could package them in something. At the same time you can benefit somewhat from some sort of analysis.

Chairman

It appears that it is generally accepted that commercial explosives is what was used in this bomb. Have you come across any loyalist bomb, apart from this one, where a similar type of commercial explosive was also used?

Dr. Donovan

No. First, I think our experience in the laboratory here of loyalists would be very limited. They have not detonated bombs frequently down here at all, as far as we know. I think it would be the same. Whatever intelligence the IRA have will not be kept a secret. Other groups will——

Chairman

Pick it up.

Dr. Donovan

——pick it up and do experiments and so on. The IRA has always had quite a vigorous research campaign of improving rockets and improving mixtures of explosives. This is why, in 1979, it began to use 10% icing sugar with the fertiliser, without extracting the fertiliser - just mixing them together. That was a major advantage because it prevented an awful lot of them from being arrested by the Garda. Unfortunately at that stage, and even still today, one cannot separate the originator of an explosion solely by the debris and traces left subsequently.

Chairman

Do you believe, on the basis of probability or on some standard of evidence, that this bomb that was used was previously an IRA produced form of bomb or explosive?

Dr. Donovan

There were a number of years, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it was said they were doing work for each other. It is nothing against the IRA selling a bomb, but there is nothing there which gives its religion. Gelignite walked out of quarries at a fantastic rate. Ammonium nitrate, whether pure or as fertiliser, was very freely available and one could buy it by the tonne. These were the ingredients. If one wanted nitrobenzene, it was more difficult. That was made an explosive in SI 233 of 1972, which took much of it out of circulation. Nevertheless, there always has been plenty of explosives around the place and one could convert things.

Chairman

Is there any way you can substantively decide or come to a conclusion that it was a loyalist made bomb or that it could not have been a loyalist made bomb?

Dr. Donovan

No, definitely not.

Deputy P. Power

Do I take that to mean that Dr. Donovan cannot make that definite conclusion or that it definitely was not a loyalist bomb?

Dr. Donovan

One cannot definitely make the conclusion.

Chairman

Dr. Donovan, thank you very much for attending the sub-committee and giving us so much of your time. As everybody has stated, you have been of great service to the State over your long period of service for which we thank you. We wish you a continued long, fruitful and happy retirement.

I also thank Dr. Sheila Willis for attending. Dr. Willis, I know that you were not there at the time and are currently director of the forensic science laboratory. Will you, please, state your expertise?

Dr. Sheila Willis

I have a PhD from UCD. I was employed as chief chemist in Clondalkin Paper Mills for a few years before joining the forensic science laboratory in 1979, where I have worked since.

Chairman

As I mentioned to Dr. Donovan, Members of the Oireachtas have parliamentary privilege. I am obliged to say to you that do not enjoy the same privilege. It is unlikely that you will say anything that will require privilege. We have your submission. I would be obliged if you would contextualise it for everybody and give a synopsis of what you have sent to us.

Dr. Willis

I tried to emphasise the differences between what I understood to be the position then and now given that I was not working at that time. I thought I would share with the committee the complexity and difficulty about bomb scenes because you asked me to address the issue under four headings, one of which was the preservation and collection of forensic evidence at scenes. I emphasise that if the scene if not correctly examined, it is very difficult to make up this at a later stage. Once a scene is not examined correctly, you are treading water to try to catch up afterwards. This is particularly so in a bomb scene. Maybe there is a tendency for people to think that a bomb scene is so complex that nothing useful can be gained from it. That was one of the main points I wanted to make.

I tried to help the committee by outlining the types of information that would have been available from the examination of the scene - for example, the type of explosive Dr. Donovan has spoken about extensively but also the types detonators and timing units used. There is different technology in looking for those two materials. The main source of such material would have been the scene or crater of the bomb, or items of the bomb - if recovered. Timing units and detonators or other items are particulate matter and may not be particularly identifiable, so you are talking about trying to search large volumes of debris looking for material. You are looking for material in the context of having seen it in other situations. Searchers need to have background information.

I was also asked to give some or any information on the possible perpetrators or organisations that may have given rise to the bomb - any links that might point you towards the direction of the perpetrators. This might be physical links that you would find later in houses, or it might be of an intelligence nature that would indicate that a certain type of explosive was used by one group or a certain type of mechanism was used by another.

I am giving you this information in the context of saying how difficult it is to get sensible inferences from small amounts of information. I think that is the situation we are in with the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. It seems to me that in terms of the amount of concrete information available vis-à-vis the amount of speculation there is a very big discrepancy. The amount of real information we have is very little. It seems that real information would have been available at the scene and that the expertise could not have been there. The obvious question of whether or not it is there now is also a moot point because I am delighted to say I do not have experience of dealing with anything like the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. Neither does anybody else in the country. While we keep up to date on trends and technologies and so on, we do not have the practical experience of dealing with this kind of complex scene. The Garda is aware of this and is attempting to have and run cross-discipline courses. This is necessary and useful. However, because of the situation over the past while this is not an area in which there is any expertise in the State at the moment, other than of a theoretical nature.

The major difference between then and now in terms of technology is the sensitivity of instrumentation. More information can now be got from smaller samples. This is not to say that one would still remove just a small percentage of the bomb scene debris. However, it is possible to extract more information from small traces which might be present in debris. There is an inference in the report that somebody at the scene saw nothing. That approach would not be taken now. Nowadays chemical traces would be expected to be found whether anything was seen or not. That is not explicit throughout the report but the inference is there that somebody visited the scene and saw nothing of significance.

On avoidance of contamination, Dr. Donovan referred to the use of suits at a scene. There is a keener awareness nowadays of the need to avoid contamination. I have dealt briefly with some of the points. Are there any points the committee would like me to pick up on?

Chairman

I am sure there will be a number of questions but they will not be as extensive as those to Dr. Donovan. Having read the Barron report, has Dr. Willis learnt any lessons from it or does she see any deficiencies which need to be addressed?

Dr. Willis

I tried to address those at the end of my submission. A visit by a scientist to a scene would be vital. I will refresh the committee's memory of what I wrote. There should be up to date knowledge from forensic scientists available at the earliest opportunity, best achieved by attendance of the scientist at the scene. I harp back again that there should be competent examination of the site. This is always necessary if a successful conclusion is to be achieved. That operation cannot be repeated and it will govern all follow-on examinations. Therefore, expertise in scene of crime examination needs to be continually updated. Forensic scientists need to keep their information up to date. Also, the necessity to have a dedicated trace explosive facility available within the country needs to be reviewed on a regular basis in light of wider political issues. Knowledge of detonators, timers and other paraphernalia should be kept up to date and this knowledge should be shared with all necessary personnel. The best results will be obtained from a multi-disciplinary team. Therefore, effective communication strategies and an emphasis on continually reviewing the direction of the investigation would be advised.

Deputy P. Power

I thank Dr. Willis for attending the sub-commmittee. I know she is hampered to a large extent by not having been intimately involved in this matter at the time. However, her expertise is very welcome.

I doubt if Dr. Willis received the submission of Mr. Wylde who prepared reports on this matter. I understand that his reports were based, almost exclusively, on high quality photographic evidence of the bomb scenes. He also claims a high level of expertise in the interpretation of photographs. Bearing these points in mind and that Dr. Willis has not seen his submission, in view of what she has said in her submission what is the likelihood or possibility of Mr. Wylde being in a position to give an informed or reasoned judgment as to the composition of the explosive used in the bombs?

Dr. Willis

That is a loaded question. I do not know anything about him or what he said but I will attempt to help the Deputy. There is a quite a lot of information on the amount of damage expected, for instance, to happen to cars with given levels of explosives. For example, the Forensic Explosives Laboratory in the south of England has carried out testing in the desert in Mexico, or somewhere. They put cars in certain configurations, detonate levels of explosives and check the impact or what the consequence is. If he does not have access to that type of information, theoretically it is possible to make inferences about the strength of the bomb from the damage seen.

Deputy P. Power

Whatever about the strength of the bomb, is it possible to determine the composition of the bomb from photographic evidence in terms of the nature of the explosive?

Dr. Willis

I think that would be pushing it. The strength of the bomb is often quoted in the literature according to a given standard, so a smaller amount of commercial explosives would give the same impact as a larger amount of improvised explosive. To that extent, relating it to TNT standard, you could it is this quantity of commercial explosive versus a larger quantity of improvised explosive but I do not think it is possible to actually say it is one over the other.

Deputy P. Power

You are saying it is very improbable.

Dr. Willis

I think it is unlikely.

Deputy P. Power

What you are really saying is that based upon the photographic evidence Mr. Wylde or anybody else for that matter who would be asked to look at this afresh could not come to any definitive conclusion.

Dr. Willis

I do not think so.

Deputy Costello

I very much thank Dr. Willis for coming. It is appreciated. My question follows on from Deputy Power's. Some 30 years down the road, the scene could be preserved for examination with good quality photographs showing the nature of the crater, its extent, depth and width and the impact of the explosion on the environment. Would it be possible to determine the nature of the substance in the explosive from photographs, or would they merely be of ancillary assistance?

Dr. Willis

I do not think one would get an absolute answer as to the type of explosive. Is that the same question?

Deputy Costello

It is related.

Dr. Willis

I do not think so but it is not my area of expertise. I have not examined craters but I do not think so.

Deputy Costello

In your conclusions you say the infrastructure to deal with large-scale trace work in explosives is not in place in the Republic. What do you mean by this?

Dr. Willis

Because the technology is so sensitive at the moment, carrying out analysis to check the presence of traces of explosives left at a bomb scene, for example, would need very specific facilities like a room that is not used for anything else, a room that will never be in contact with bulk explosives. Given that we have not had a need to use such a facility, we have not got it.

Deputy Costello

If what happened in 1974 was to happen in 2004, we would still have to go to Belfast.

Dr. Willis

We would be in difficulties.

Deputy Costello

We have not fully learned the lessons of 30 years ago.

Dr. Willis

I think we know the lessons and, if there is a decision made to resource——

Deputy Costello

It needsto be acted upon.

Dr. Willis

——to put in place a full facility, that could be done relatively easily. The expertise and technology are available in the laboratory but, as I say, the infrastructure - space - is at a premium in our organisation. We use that space to carry out the analysis that we do on an everyday basis, as opposed to a speculative one that has not cropped up.

Deputy Costello

You are not due to be decentralised.

Dr. Willis

I do not know that yet.

Deputy Costello

Thank you very much.

Deputy F. McGrath

I thank Dr. Willis for coming and co-operating with the sub-committee. On page 2 of your submission, in the contamination avoidance section, you talk about inadvertent contamination as being a very real issue at every crime scene. You say that undoubtedly such information was known in 1974 but it may not have been emphasised. Is there a coded professional criticism in the words "may not have been emphasised"?

Dr. Willis

Even the information we have got this morning from Dr. Donovan would suggest that not only it was not emphasised but that also it was not taken into consideration because, at the very minimum, samples would need to be packed and sealed at the scene. That was not done, so sufficient thought or emphasis was not put on contamination avoidance.

Deputy F. McGrath

My second question relates to page 3 of your submission. We all accept that the whole area of forensic science has moved on since 1974. You talk about the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, a liaison body for international co-operation. You also talk about meetings north and south of the Border which have been held twice in recent years. Did the issue of the Dublin-Monaghan bombings ever come up at a professional level in discussions at those conferences?

Dr. Willis

Not that I can recall.

Deputy F. McGrath

Do you not find it very strange that forensic scientists would get together and an atrocity like this would not come up as an issue?

Dr. Willis

No——

Deputy F. McGrath

I thought professionals like that would regularly discuss international atrocities.

Dr. Willis

Yes, they do——

Deputy F. McGrath

But the Dublin-Monaghan bombings were never discussed, from your recollection.

Dr. Willis

Not that I can recall.

Chairman

With regard to photographic interpretation and the skills that people might have, are you aware of any courses available or any places where those skills can be honed?

Dr. Willis

I am not aware of any courses per se. If I was to think of where I would go to check on the expertise, it would be to the explosives laboratory in Woolwich, England.

Chairman

For photographic interpretation. It is an army matter——

Dr. Willis

It was originally the Royal Armament which has had several incarnations since. It keeps changing its name. Its present name is the Forensic Explosives Laboratory.

Chairman

They can give an opinion on types of explosives from photographs.

Dr. Willis

I suspect they would be prepared to.

Senator J. Walsh

In view of your comment that you are not equipped at present to deal with a similar occurrence, what needs to be done to get to that state of readiness? It strikes me from what Dr. Donovan has been saying that the gardaí who take command of a bomb site may not have the appropriate training or expertise to preserve the evidence. I know there are other priorities also subsequent to a bombing but is there a stage at which somebody technically expert should be placed in charge of the site to ensure preservation of material which could be very important in reaching conclusions subsequently?

Dr. Willis

There are a number of questions. I will take the middle one first relating to gardaí and information about bomb sites. I did say in my submission that a course is actually due to be held dealing with a post-explosion situation. The FBI is planning to come to give that course. It is being addressed in that sense.

Regarding the facilities that would need to be available, they would include a dedicated small laboratory. I do not mean a separate laboratory, just additional space or area. It would be a relatively small commitment.

As to whether somebody should be placed in charge, as I said, there would be a multi-disciplinary approach. Obviously, somebody has to be in charge but whoever is in charge needs to take into consideration the inputs from the various people who would have something to say and to take advice. The Garda is in charge at all crime scenes and has responsibility for them but I am sure it would be open to advice if and when it is available.

Chairman

Do you believe, Dr. Willis - perhaps Dr. Donovan might answer this question also - in regard to the 1974 bombing, that photographs taken at the time could now be interpreted as to explosive types or size?

Dr. Willis

I think it could give you an indication of size. I have great hesitation about it giving an indication of type, but perhaps you will find somebody who thinks you can. I do not think you could.

Chairman

Dr. Donovan, do you have a view?

Dr. Donovan

I know there have been attempts to assess the size of a bomb. I think they could give a rough assessment of the size of a bomb but they certainly could not give any indication as to the make-up of that bomb. It just does not hang true.

Chairman

Thank you very much Dr. Willis for coming in and giving us your time and expertise. We appreciate it very much and it has been very helpful.

Sitting suspended at 12.26 p.m. and resumed at 12.41 p.m.

Chairman

I welcome Mr. Seán Murphy, author of a book on the National Archives. I very much thank him for accepting the invitation of the committee to come here today. Before you start, I am obliged to state and tell you that while Oireachtas Members have parliamentary privilege, this does not extend to you. Therefore, anything you say is not in any way privileged. You would have to get advice on the matter. Therefore, do not defame or libel anyone or anything like that. You do not have privilege. We have received your comprehensive e-mail on the points you wish to make. I would like you to give us a very brief synopsis of your submission and we will then take questions on it.

Mr. Seán Murphy

I am author of a booklet, a small book, A Guide to the National Archives. On the main points I would emphasise, first, in relation to the question of justice for the victims and survivors of the bombings, I am one of those - I know there are many - who believe some sort of further public inquiry is necessary which would look into matters such as shortcomings in the investigation of the bombings. I note with concern that some security files are not to be found; the belief that the Government of the day could have done a little more; and the unproven, admittedly, suspicion of security force collusion in the North.

The fifth point relates to our National Archives, one of our most precious cultural possessions. There have been problems in relation to resources and staffing in the archives. I am a long-term and appreciative user of the archives. I note that the small number of dedicated staff cannot tackle all the work imposed on them, particularly every year when they receive a massive quantity of governmental- departmental records. They have frankly had to admit in the director's report that they are running out of space to store our national archives. We all know how we started our independence in 1922, in the fury of Civil War, by destroying the then national archives in the Four Courts.

Next January will be a key time for this inquiry because Government records relating to 1974 will be released. I am concerned that the archives will have the staff and facilities to process the records and make them available to the much wider range of people who will want to see them come January. They are my principal points.

Chairman

Thank you very much. You certainly have made them. All of the points you have made are self-explanatory and we will certainly take them on board.

Deputy F. McGrath

I welcome Mr. Murphy to the sub-committee and thank him for his submission and co-operation. I have a broad question for him first. Outside of his interest in the National Archives he obviously has a broader view on the Dublin-Monaghan bombing. Is there a personal connection or has he just a genuine interest for justice?

Mr. Murphy

It is the interest of a citizen who well remembers the trauma involved. I am a private citizen.

Deputy F. McGrath

Mr. Murphy was critical in his submission of the shortcomings of the Garda investigations of the bombings, particularly as recorded on pages 270 and 272 of the report. Will he expand a little on these criticisms?

Mr. Murphy

I had an impression that the Garda, for whatever reason, perhaps did not feel able to or did not wish to proceed with a more thorough investigation, or that perhaps members of the force had been instructed not to proceed. All these suspicions were around. However, when the Barron report was issued, those of us who had such concerns found them supported. I am merely supporting what the Barron report said with regard to the shortcomings in the inquiry. Enough was not done. Even at this stage, looking at the events again could be of help.

Deputy F. McGrath

In section 3 of his submission, Mr. Murphy refers to the sense of weariness with the many judicial inquiries under way in terms of their cost and length. He puts forward the proposal that it is time to supplement these inquiries with a two-tier speedier system to deal with such issues. Towards the end of his submission, he says that only an additional judicial inquiry will suffice. Has he any ideas on that? Can he suggest what type of inquiry would facilitate such an issue as the Dublin-Monaghan bombings?

Mr. Murphy

Indeed. I must admit I am not certain on this. One knows that when dealing with a serious matter one needs a judicial inquiry. There have been repeated concerns about the length and cost of the existing tribunals. I fear that some people would say we should not add another tribunal to the existing ones and would ask if there is not some other way. I have noticed that politicians have been talking about looking for other ways, supported by legislation. Dáil committees tend to be speedier but they can only do so much. Is it not possible that this could provide a way forward? As against that, we may need a judicial, strongly backed legal element when dealing with serious matters. I have not made up my mind. However, something needs to be done to speed up and make the inquiry system more efficient.

Deputy F. McGrath

There are models in other countries.

Deputy Hoctor

I thank Mr. Murphy for his written submission and for his attendance today. From his experience, does he know of instances in the past where files that were missing and not available in the archives were found or retrieved in their place when the search and preparation for the 30 year rule took place?

Mr. Murphy

This happened in 2000 when the governmental records for 1969 were being released. There was considerable newspaper coverage stating that key records relating to the North had gone missing and that they had never been given to the National Archives as they should have been. However, when the National Archives double checked, it found the records. They had been submitted but had been misplaced. In an attempt to be as sympathetic as possible I related that to the great strains placed on the National Archives staff. We need more staff and more facilities to deal with the large quantity of records, particularly when dealing with records relating to controversial events.

Deputy Hoctor

Is it possible perhaps that they may still be found by January of next year? We would hope so.

Mr. Murphy

Hopefully. I say we should prepare in advance. I see next January as being very busy because more people than ever will want to see the governmental records - not just the press and scholars but people with concerns about the bombings of 1974.

Deputy Hoctor

With regard to the impact of technology on the archives, given that nowadays Departments communicate through e-mail etc., how will that be documented and kept on record for the future? Has the National Archives addressed this issue?

Mr. Murphy

I believe it is addressing it. There is a problem. How can we preserve the great mass of electronic records? I note, reading the National Archives website, that it has set up an electronic records department. However, I wonder if it has the budget and computer technology to deal with all the records generated.

Deputy Costello

I welcome Mr. Murphy. In his submission, he stated that the number of Departments which transferred substantial quantities of records remains disappointingly small. I thought that under the 1988 Act, all Departments were obliged to make their records available, unless they had some exemption on the grounds of confidentiality or whatever. Can they refuse to do so?

Mr. Murphy

I should clarify that I am quoting directly from the director's report for 2001. The director of the National Archives made that point. He said, first, that it is short of space and, second, that it has not received the full complement of records. I refer the Deputy to the director's report. The last one was issued in 2001. It would be interesting to see what the situation is for 2002 and 2003.

Deputy Costello

With regard to the 30 year rule, the National Archives will be receiving documents and files from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. A great deal of concern was expressed in Mr. Justice Barron's report about missing files, misplaced files or whatever. Does the National Archives have any authority to supervise or monitor the retrieval of files under the 30-year rule so that it can be assured it gets all the files and that, if there are misplaced files in a Department, a search can be carried out for them?

Mr. Murphy

It is my personal belief that because of the aforesaid lack of resources and sufficient staff, the National Archives may not be able to keep an eye on the whole range of records. With the best will and effort in the world, certain things may escape its attention.

Deputy Costello

Is the National Archives entitled to request from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform files which fall due under the 30 year rule and that it will expect relevant files to be ready for transfer by 1 January 2005? Is it entitled to supervise the trawling and retrieval of documents?

Mr. Murphy

Not being a member of staff of the National Archives, I cannot speak authoritatively. It is my understanding that, under the National Archives Act, the National Archives has powers. At the same time, and this is understandable, Departments can withhold certain records on grounds of confidentiality, security or need for present day administrative use.

Deputy Costello

Do Departments need to inform the National Archives if they are withholding documents? Is there an obligation to say what is withheld and the reason for it?

Mr. Murphy

That is where I am a little puzzled. I have not been able to establish whether lists of exempted records exist. That is one thing that should be done before next January. Any records that are withheld on grounds of security or confidentiality should be clearly specified.

Senator J. Walsh

I welcome Mr. Murphy. He identified four matters which require further investigation. He included in that the fate of the missing Garda files, but he did not mention the missing files from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Is there any reason for this omission?

Mr. Murphy

I must confess to having missed that specifically. I thought there were only Garda files in question. Senator Walsh referred to files from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, which makes the matter even more serious. I should have seen that.

Chairman

I thank Mr. Murphy. We appreciate his attendance before the sub-committee. His contribution was most helpful. He is now excused.

Sitting suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 2.35 p.m.

Chairman

I welcome to the hearings Lieutenant Colonel Rory Kelleher and Colonel Joseph O'Sullivan. I understand Colonel O'Sullivan is director of the ordinance corps with overall responsibility for the EOD, explosive ordinance division - is it?

Colonel Joseph O’Sullivan

Explosives ordinance disposal, bombing disposal in simple terms.

Chairman

You assisted Judge Henry Barron in his inquiry.

Colonel O’Sullivan

I did.

Chairman

You are very welcome, as is Lieutenant Colonel Rory Kelleher who I thank, in particular, for coming such a distance. Your presence is very important to us. I know that you are currently on secondment to the OSCE where you are performing a very valuable role. You have facilitated the committee very much by coming here. I thank you for this. You are very welcome.

Before we start, I am obliged to tell you that the members of the committee have parliamentary privilege in regard to anything they may say but that same privilege does not attach to you. You may have ordinary privilege which I hope will not be needed. As I know that Colonel Kelleher was present at the bombings, I ask him to say briefly what he might wish to say. We will then have questions from the members.

Lieutenant Colonel Rory Kelleher

The day after the bombs went off, I was contacted and called in. By the time I got into Clancy Barracks, the control centre for the problem, two of my fellow officers had already gone into town to do their work. I was asked to carry out an analysis or guesstimate of the quantity of explosives used. That was my function on the day, to go to the three sites in Dublin and make an estimate of the quantity of explosives used.

Chairman

Thank you, Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher. We will have questions. If there are other matters that you feel need to be addressed, please raise them later.

Senator J. Walsh

I thank the Lieutenant Colonel for attending. On the quantities he estimated, Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher stated in his letter to the sub-committee that the Barron report fairly accurately reflected the information he provided. Is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

That is so.

Senator J. Walsh

He referred us to page 66 of the report - actually it is on page 67. He estimated that there were approximately 50 lbs of explosives used in the South Leinster Street.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The paragraph started on the previous page and that is why I stated that page.

Senator J. Walsh

I understand that.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, that is my estimate.

Chairman

To what page are you referring, Senator?

Senator J. Walsh

Page 67 of the Barron report. The Lieutenant Colonel estimated there were 150 lbs of explosive in the Talbot Street bomb and 100 lbs of explosives in the Parnell Street bomb.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Senator J. Walsh

That accords with Mr. Justice Barron's report on page 245 where he stated that according to EOD officers, 300 lbs of commercial explosive would have been needed if it were the sole ingredient used.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes. I will explain how I arrived at those figures. We have a table——

Senator J. Walsh

TNT table.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

——a TNT table, which I think is in the possession of Mr. Justice Barron, which allows us to estimate. It is based on the distance of broken glass. So much, say, 100 lbs of explosives breaks glass at, say, 300 metres. Therefore you can extrapolate with higher or lower figures and determine the poundage from the longest distance at which glass is broken. This was the method I used. This would be for bulk TNT which was uncontained, in other words, in a box or something like that. From looking at the holes in the ground, I made an estimate based on those figures and of course walking the distance to the limit of the broken glass. That is how I made an estimate of these figures.

Senator J. Walsh

That 300 lbs would have been pure explosives such as gelignite, is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

In my statement?

Senator J. Walsh

No, in the estimate.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

My estimate was that this would have been equivalent to 300 lbs of bulk explosive. I was not in a position to determine whether there was bulk explosive plus home-made explosive or if there was a mix, the percentage of the mix. Obviously the use of home-made explosives deteriorates the power of commercial explosive.

Senator J. Walsh

Yes, but I think Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher's conclusion was that it was mostly commercial explosive, is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

That was my conclusion, yes, because of the sharpness of the craters in the ground. The crater on Nassau Street, the one I can remember particularly, was quite sharp. It was a very well constructed road and one could see that it had been a massive explosion.

Senator J. Walsh

When Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher says commercial explosives, what is he talking about - gelignite, dynamite?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Any one of them. TNT is equivalent to a commercial explosive.

Senator J. Walsh

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher is not talking about ANFO.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No.

Senator J. Walsh

Is the ratio four to one?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I only heard that figure for the first time today. I had never heard it before even though I have done courses in England and was an instructor in the ordinance school for years. I did not hear that figure until today and cannot comment on it. I gather it has been given in evidence by someone else.

Senator J. Walsh

The Lieutenant Colonel's information would be that the bomb consisted primarily of commercial explosive. Would he therefore discount the possibility that it was made up primarily of ANFO and some small explosives used as the booster to detonate?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I would not be in a position to determine the make up of the mix. I felt there was a mix of ANFO and commercial explosive, but I would not be in a position to determine that.

Senator J. Walsh

On page 67 of his report, Mr. Justice Barron states that the Lieutenant Colonel's estimate for South Leinster Street was 50 lbs of explosives, with the explosive material containing a very high percentage of commercial explosives.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Senator J. Walsh

That seems at variance with a thesis that one would use ANFO where one would use a very small percentage of explosives in order to create the detonation. Would that be correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The 50 lbs of explosives is quite a small quantity in our terms. It can do quite a lot of destruction. Given the shape of the crater, I felt there was a high percentage of commercial explosive. There was a certain sharpness about it.

Senator J. Walsh

Which would not have been the same——

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

ANFO would not be as powerful as an explosive. The Senator has already quoted a figure to suggest that it may be 25% as powerful as TNT. That was the one to four ratio referred to. One would not expect the same sharpness with a less powerful bomb, definitely not with one that is only 25% as powerful as TNT.

Senator J. Walsh

I find that at variance with Mr. Justice Barron's findings, which effectively would be that ANFO was used primarily and that there was a small quantum of explosives in order to assist the detonation. Am I correct in that?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The South Leinster Street bomb was the smallest, so my estimate there was for the smallest quantity. It could be argued that a higher quantity of commercial explosive would be put in to ensure the propagation of the damage in that one, whereas the other bombs contained larger quantities of total explosive mixture. It might have been felt that the same quantity of commercial explosive was needed to get the effect.

Senator J. Walsh

Is what the Lieutenant Colonel saying to us consistent with the use of ANFO as well as some explosives to boost or assist the detonation?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, my interpretation of the site was that there was a mixture of commercial explosive and ANFO, or home-made explosive.

Senator J. Walsh

Is the Lieutenant Colonel familiar with the evidence given by Mr. Wylde in connection with the photographs and their interpretation?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, I have read that in the Barron report.

Senator J. Walsh

Does theLieutenant Colonel have any expertise in that area?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No.

Senator J. Walsh

Does he have any expertise in the area of detonators?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, I would have worked with detonators.

Senator J. Walsh

What would his findings have been with regard to the type of detonation that was used?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Colonel O'Sullivan has submitted a paper which provides a certain number of definitions. We look upon two types of explosives - high explosive and low explosive. An example of a low explosive would be something like gunpowder and an example of high explosive would be TNT or nitroglycerin-based explosives. A detonator is not needed for a low explosive. It is different concept in terms of explosion. The detonators would have been associated only with the use of a high explosive, which would be ANFO or commercial high explosive.

Senator J. Walsh

So the detonators would have been used in all the Dublin bombings?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, they would not have initiated otherwise.

Senator J. Walsh

What type would it have been, the TPU or SNA?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The TPU is the light switch, if one wants to call it that. The clock closes, and the power unit then would be the battery, which would energise the electrical element - like the element in an electric fire - in the electric detonator.

Senator J. Walsh

What were the Lieutenant Colonel's findings with regard to what was likely to have been used, or did he come to any conclusion in that regard?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I am afraid I would have come to no conclusions. I would have assumed that it was an electric initiation on the basis that it is much easier to control the timing. With a non-electric method timing would not have the same level of accuracy.

Senator J. Walsh

Can the Lieutenant Colonel explain what he means when distinguishing between electric and non-electric? The report seems to indicate that the probability was that some form of hour clock was used and that the hour hand was used to prime.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, that would be a standard, old fashioned alarm clock. Basically, an electric detonator is as I described. It contains a little element that sits into high explosive. When an electric current is passed through it the element heats up and the explosive, which is sensitive to heat, detonates the main charge. With the non-electric, one uses a slightly different system. It is basically a flash or spark. A burning fuse is inserted into the detonator, and when it burns through it gives out a little flash or spark, to which the composition operating inside the detonator is sensitive. One is a heating mechanism and the other is a flash or spark.

Senator J. Walsh

The Lieutenant Colonel is not drawing any conclusions as to which was likely to have been used in these instances?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No, but for better control one would definitely use a timing system, which would be an electrical system consisting of a clock, wrist watch or other similar electronic device.

Senator J. Walsh

Given that three bombs exploded within, I think, 90 seconds of each other and that one is working on an hourly clock, what level of skill would be required to set the clock and complete that type of synchronisation?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No great level of skill would be required to set a clock. One would probably have a pin sticking up, with the minute hand sweeping around and touching it. That is basically all we are talking about. The pin would be put, to take an example, somewhere around 12 o'clock, and the minute hand would swing around make contact with that pin, thereby closing the circuit. That would not require any great difficulty.

Senator J. Walsh

There was some comment on the time it took for the Army to get to the actual locations on the day. Can the Lieutenant Colonel comment on that? He was based in Dublin, is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, I live——

Senator J. Walsh

How long did it take him to get there?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I live on the south side. On the day I was not in my house. The telephone call came to my house but I was not contactable because while the telephone rang where I was nobody would answer it. My wife had to get a neighbour to come down and get me. I had the car and drove into the barracks. It was at least an hour after the incident by the time I started to move towards Clancy Barracks, which was the control centre on the day. I would then have got a team, who would have been called in also, and we would have proceeded down town.

Senator J. Walsh

Therefore, there were a few hours involved.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

There were, yes.

Senator J. Walsh

There was evidence given to us that the chances of individuals recognising what was on the ground were very remote, even if some particles had been there to indicate what type of bomb had been used in the first instance, probably because there would not have been any familiarity with, say, an ANFO based bomb.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

This was 1974. We would have worked with ANFO material for a number of years before that. The other two officers and I would have been quite familiar with ANFO material. We would have come across it, either in finds in realistic situations or as shown to us on a refresher course. We would have been familiar with it.

Senator J. Walsh

If there had been any evidence of ANFO at that time, you would have accepted it.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Senator J. Walsh

Had the site been washed when you arrived?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Had it been washed?

Senator J. Walsh

Yes, had it been washed away?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

At one of the sites I think there had been a burst pipe, so that would have washed material away. I honestly cannot remember which site that was.

Senator J. Walsh

The fire brigade was there also and would have been putting out fires in certain places.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The fire brigade, of course, would have been there. I can remember that one of the parts of the vehicles still seemed to be - I will not say smoking - steaming an hour and a half or two hours later. The fire brigade would have been called in to wash.

Senator J. Walsh

Did you attend any of the bombing sites in 1972 or 1973?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

In 1972.

Senator J. Walsh

At Sackville Place or at any of the other ones that occurred around that time.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No.

Senator J. Walsh

Was that the first bomb site you had seen?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

That was the first one I had seen. Previous to that I would have seen, or been involved with, a police find of ammonium nitrate based home-made explosive.

Senator J. Walsh

Did you have any knowledge of, or acquaintance or contact with, Lieutenant Colonel George Styles in Northern Ireland?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No. I have read his book.

Senator J. Walsh

Therefore, you cannot comment on that. There was evidence given that, depending on the quality of the mixture, an explosion can detonate at over 4,000 metres a second, or over 6,000 metres a second if it is commercially produced. Did you draw any conclusions from that evidence or did you, in fact, look at the site to see how it would compare with that evidence?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Those two figures of 4,000 metres a second and 6,000 metres a second are in the area in which high explosive detonates - it goes up to about 9,000 metres a second. It would be impossible to tell the speed of detonation from looking at a site. All you could say is that the sharpness of the edge of the crater would give you an idea that it was nearer the top end of the scale than the bottom end of the scale.

Senator J. Walsh

When you say the top end——

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

That would be where it would be almost 100% pure military or commercial explosive - up around 8,000 metres or 9,000 metres a second.

Senator J. Walsh

Where did you rate this one?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I rated this one in the middle of the scale, in other words, I would have felt that the commercial high explosive had been contaminated with home-made explosive, which would have reduced the power of the explosive.

Senator J. Walsh

Would you like to comment - maybe you do not have any knowledge or expertise in this area - on the source of the materials? If you are inconclusive on whether the explosive used was wholly commercial or partially commercial, or whether ANFO was used or not, it will obviously be difficult to answer this question. Let me put it another way. Did you look at any other bombings in the State with a similarity to this one?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No.

Senator J. Walsh

It would be difficult for you to come to a conclusion on anything to do with the source of the material or anything like that.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

This would have been outside my competence. If I had come across a similar one, yes, I could have said that it seemed to have been made by the same hand or person. Outside of that, I would not be competent.

Senator J. Walsh

Just to summarise, you would say the materials used in the explosion could have been wholly commercial or a combination of commercial and ANFO but that there would have been a higher proportion of commercial than might normally have been associated with a typical ANFO-type bomb. Is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes. To amplify a little, to enhance the effect of the ANFO they would have had to use a certain quantity of commercial high explosive. Otherwise one would not get as good an effect.

Deputy Costello

I welcome Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher and Colonel O'Sullivan. Senator Walsh has gone through a lot of the areas covered. Mr. Justice Barron referred to your expertise, evidence etc. I would like to tease out one or two of them. You arrived first at South Leinster Street approximately two hours after the explosion.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, I would accept that.

Deputy Costello

You then went next to Talbot Street, in a geographical fashion, and finally Parnell Street. How long would you have spent at South Leinster Street?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I would say something in the order of 20 minutes.

Deputy Costello

At that time you knew about the bombing on Talbot Street, about the three of them.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, I knew about the three explosions.

Deputy Costello

I understand there was a second team on standby which was not called out.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, we had two teams deployed initially. They had done their bit and, as I say, I was subsequently sent out, probably 30 to 40 minutes after they had gone out, to do a different task. Their job would have been to declare the place safe for the police to continue taking forensic samples or for the roads in the area to be used again, that there was no hazard. My job was to examine the craters and try to make an estimate of the quantity of explosives used.

Deputy Costello

You would have been at the first site around two hours later and at the second site two and a half hours later.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Deputy Costello

And the third site.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Three hours approximately.

Deputy Costello

Detective Sergeant Ó Fiacháin was also at the South Leinster Street site shortly afterwards, as we know from his information on page 64 of the Barron report. We are also told in the Barron report that the fire brigade was on the scene within minutes of the South Leinster Street fire and hosed down the blaze with water. Clearly, the fire brigade would have hosed the scene prior to your arrival at the first site.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

That would be correct. I can remember water in the area of at least one of the sites but I cannot be sure on the other ones.

Deputy Costello

That seems to indicate that a substantial quantity of water would have been directed onto the debris. Would that be sufficient to remove the residues that might otherwise have been apparent, or should they still have been there?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I would think that the power of a fire brigade hose delivering a large quantity of water would remove a lot of evidence of a forensic nature. All that might have been left behind is carbonised material that would have adhered to some metallic surface or something like that. I would accept that the fire brigade hose pipes would have eliminated or removed to a distance most of the residue that might have been of value.

Deputy Costello

That would seem to support Mr. Wylde's claim, in page 3 of his statement, that no residues might have been found. The reasons no residues might have been found would include, in the case of ANFO, the use of water hoses by firemen. If ANFO was there, is there a possibility that it was removed by the hoses?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

If there were residues of anything there, I think they would have been removed by the power of a fire brigade hose.

Deputy Costello

But ANFO, in particular, would have disintegrated. Is it not true that the ammonium nitrate disintegrated very quickly and disappeared from the scene?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

If there was anything of a particular nature, I think it would have been blasted away by the power of a fire brigade hose.

Deputy Costello

Page 69 of the Barron report contains the assertion of Mr. Hall in Belfast that anything for laboratory examination really had to be received within six hours for the results to be accurate. Is that a reasonable assessment of the time-frame in which material must be examined in a forensic laboratory?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I would not be competent to comment on that. Mr. Hall has probably a Ph.D. in chemistry or forensic science. I would not approach that level of knowledge so it would be unfair to comment.

Deputy Costello

Would information have been circulating at the time within the Army explosives disposal unit that if you did not get the material from the scene of a bombing very quickly, it was not much use?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No. Part of our task - the third or fourth element - would have been to preserve evidence that could be used in a forensic analysis and give that to the Garda. Really we would not have known how long it took them to process it to the next stage. I was definitely not aware that there was a time scale involved.

Deputy Costello

Was the other officer, Captain Patrick Trears, with Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher at the time?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No. Captain Trears and Captain John Fahy were the first two operators who went out; I followed them. They were there before me. They had probably gone back to barracks because the task had moved on and was now into the area of trying to find out how much explosive had been used. It was now a police matter in that we had declared the area safe and forensic evidence was being collected.

Deputy Costello

Did Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher attempt to get any forensic samples?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No.

Deputy Costello

Commandant Trears stated to Mr. Justice Barron, according to page 68 of the report, "that no timing devices, unexploded bomb portions or explosive residue were found at any of the Dublin sites." While Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher did not take samples, obviously an intensive search was done by the EOD as well as the Garda.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

We would have looked very severely at the area around the site to see if there was anything that we considered might be of forensic interest.

Deputy Costello

I take it that no evidence of ANFO was discovered and there was no sign of it.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

That is correct.

Deputy Costello

In his conclusions of what he examined, Mr. Hall indicates, on page 70, that "The presence of nitrite in the foam rubber is .... strongly indicative of the use of a nitrate containing explosive in this explosion." Could a nitrate come only from one or other of the mixtures - ammonium nitrate - used at the time by either the UVF or the Provisional IRA? Could it have come from commercial explosives?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The nitrates supply the oxygen in an explosion and there would be a quantity of oxidising agents - it could be nitrate - in commercial explosives as well.

Deputy Costello

When, on page 70, Mr. Hall goes on to say, "The presence of sodium, ammonium, nitrate, nitrite and possibly sugar on the one part of the surface of one of the fragments .... is indicative of an explosive containing these entities.", can he be referring to commercial explosives in that case?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Is this the Monaghan one?

Deputy Costello

I think he is referring to them all at this stage.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I think case No. 2588/74 is the Monaghan one.

Deputy Costello

Case No. 2587/74 is the Monaghan one.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The Deputy is correct.

Deputy Costello

Do the cases before that - cases No. 2588/74 and 2589/74 - refer to the Monaghan bomb? This is the summary on all of them.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I do not know the case numbers.

Deputy Costello

It would seem, from Mr. Hall's point of view, that there would be a suggestion, if that is the Monaghan bomb, that it would contain something other than commercial explosives. Is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Deputy Costello

The description of the Monaghan bombing was given by Commandant Boyle. He, again, indicated that it was a 150 lb high quality explosive, such as blasting gelignite. Would this be in line with Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher's description by and large?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes. There was a high percentage of commercial explosives.

Deputy Costello

Dr. Donovan was before the sub-committee this morning. Despite the fact that it is stated on page 68 that hydrocarbon oils or nitrobenzene were not detected in any of the samples, he concluded, and gave as an opinion to us, that ANFO formed part of the bomb he examined. He had only examined debris from the Parnell Street crater. Does Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher think that is merely an opinion? Would he come to that conclusion?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

In the area of the engine of a car one will have oil because the lubrication system is oil based.

Deputy Costello

There were no oil samples. He received no oil samples.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No. With the temperature of the explosion, etc., everything in the engine would have been destroyed but there could be cross-contamination by oil from the vehicle in the area.

Deputy Costello

So that could be either a component of the bomb or something else.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Exactly, yes. It would be hard to separate it.

Deputy Costello

Given that the Lieutenant Colonel is describing a very powerful explosive which indicates to him that it contained a strong element of, if not solely, commercial explosive, what would be his opinion on the origin of the bombs he examined?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I would not be competent to even give an opinion or a guesstimate as to the origin of the bomb itself. The explosives would have been my area.

Deputy Costello

I do not mean the origin in that sense. What I am looking for is a comparison between the type of bombs used by the Army, which undoubtedly would comprise 100% commercial explosives, by the Provisional IRA which are generally a mixture with only a booster of commercial explosives or by the UVF. Would the UVF bombs be seen to be the same? In your opinion, was this a different bomb from the kind that would have been used by any of the paramilitary organisations of which you might have had experience of examining during your time in the ordnance sector of the Army?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No components were available or found. These would have been a major clue as to who had assembled the device. Different organisations have different techniques. The information on how to make the bulk explosive was freely available in various books like The Anarchist Cookbook. It was pre-Internet days but this information would have been relatively freely available in the marketplace——

Deputy Costello

At the time.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes. It is the main area that would give a clue as to who the originators were. Particularly with the time power unit, you would try to find out what type of clock was used, if it was a wrist-watch, a clock or electronic. These are a little bit like fingerprints. You can say, "Yes, that person made that one; that is his style." As no components were available and I did not see any, I am not competent to comment.

Deputy Costello

Would it be a reasonable conclusion that all three were high quality bombs detonated within 90 seconds of each other with an extraordinary degree of precision and that that pattern of bombing had not been seen up to that time or subsequently in the Republic of Ireland? You would have had an acquaintance with some of the bombs exploded later in the 1970s.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

It is the only mass attack of which we are aware which was successful. The timings were within 90 seconds, which is quite a tight timescale.

Deputy Costello

Was it unique?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

It was unique. It has not been repeated, though we do not know if there were other attempts to do similar things. It was unique, definitely, in its disastrous success.

Deputy Costello

Absolutely. In your opinion as an Army officer working in this area, do you think it required a high degree of professional expertise?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The timing would not require a high level of expertise. I am just supposing that it was what you call the simple old-fashioned alarm clock. You put a pin in the face and set the sweep hand to whatever time. That would be relatively simple to do. It would require a certain confidence in the mechanism that when you set the time, it will not go off for, say, ten or twelve minutes or whatever it is. To get three bombs to go off in 90 seconds maybe required luck because very often these timers do not work but they went off.

Deputy Costello

Have you had an opportunity to read Mr. Wylde's submission to us?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No. I have only read extracts in the Barron report.

Deputy Costello

Do you have any opinion to give us on the extracts you have read?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The only thing that stood out as unusual was his interpretation of press photographs in which he felt he could determine specks of ANFO. While I do not know when he saw these photographs, they were at least 25 years old. I know little about photography but I would assume that photographs would deteriorate over the period. I also assume they were black and white photographs and it would be almost impossible to determine if a little speck was ANFO.

Deputy Costello

The Lieutenant Colonel has serious doubts.

Senator J. Walsh

I thought he said he was not an expert in this area.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I said I thought it would be impossible as photographs deteriorate over a period. In examining a photograph, even if it were enlarged, it would be almost impossible to say that a speck was ANFO.

Deputy Costello

One would also look at it in the context of the fallout from the type of ANFO bomb, evidenced by the environment surrounding it. It is not just about identifying the specks of ANFO. Do you have expertise in the area?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I do not. It was a May evening and would probably have been dark by 9 o'clock. I do not know when these photographs were taken. Light levels may have been quite poor by the time the press photographer was allowed into the scene. It would be almost impossible to determine what was on the ground from photographic evidence only.

Deputy Costello

Thank you.

Deputy P. Power

I thank the Lieutenant Colonel for assisting us with our work. Did he say he trained in Britain?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Deputy P. Power

Whereabouts?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

In Bramley. It was an ammunition school near Basingstoke but it is now closed. I trained there in 1970 and it closed down about four years later. It is now a Tesco warehouse.

Deputy P. Power

I will not pass any comment on that. He attended the school for four years——

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No, it was a six month ammunition course. There were no British Army officers on the course, they were Commonwealth officers and I was the only foreigner. The course involved the theory of ammunition, handling and use and EOD.

Deputy P. Power

Did those conducting training have experience in bomb disposal in Northern Ireland? Was this part of the course? Did they draw their experience from Northern Ireland?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I took the course in 1970 and it was only six or seven months after the start of the problems in Northern Ireland. They would not have built up expertise at that stage.

Deputy P. Power

The Lieutenant Colonel was an explosives expert in the Army and would have general knowledge in the area. I have heard specialists say that each bomb leaves a signature that can identify who may or may not have made it. This was particularly difficult in this case. In his contribution to the "Hidden Hand - the Forgotten Massacre" programme, Commandant Trears said that it was 100% efficient; the entire bomb was expended and it was hard to get a read of the signature or fingerprint.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes. If you presented me with, say, three unexploded bombs, at that stage I might have been in a position to say, "Yes, that was made by A; he also made that one and B made that one."

Deputy P. Power

Would that include the Provisional IRA at the time? You would have been able to say, "That is an IRA bomb."

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No, I would have said, "That is similar to one I have seen before and I think that one was made by...," but putting the names on the assemblers was not our area. That would have been a police matter.

Deputy P. Power

Did I read in the report that youhad a number of meetings with Judge Barron? How many times did you meet him?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I only met the late Mr. Justice Hamilton.

Deputy P. Power

How many meetings did you have with Mr. Justice Hamilton?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

One.

Deputy P. Power

I think the report says there were a number of meetings but it is not major. Could you explain the idea about the sharpness of a bomb crater? I am intrigued by this. It would imply that some bombs might leave a blunt-type crater.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Deputy P. Power

Could you elaborate on this?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

To take an equivalent, let us suppose one is breaking a bit of wood with a sledgehammer. If you use a very heavy hammer and swing it very quickly, you will get almost a sharp edge, whereas if you use a light hammer and did not swing as fast, one will get a more jagged edge. The edges of the craters I saw were relatively sharp - they were not soft - as if something travelling at high speed had caused the damage.

Deputy P. Power

That is your basis for indicating that it was a commercial high explosive as distinct from non-commercial.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, for instance, if it had been a low explosive like, say, gun powder, which is of a much lower velocity, you would have got softer edges on the crater. The higher the velocity of the explosion the sharper the edges.

Deputy P. Power

If you think it is more probable that commercial explosive was used, as distinct from an ANFO-commercial mix or commercial explosive just for detonation purposes, that would therefore require a higher level of commercial explosive. Was that sort of level of commercial explosive around at the time? My understanding is that the reason paramilitary groups had to go through all of this process of recrystalisation and so on was they could not get their hands on it. If it is your view that a high amount of commercial explosive was used, would it not imply that the paramilitary group had access to it? Of course, it does.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

From a paramilitary group's point of view, to use, say, 100% commercial explosive would be foolish because it would cut down its capabilities to enhance home-made explosive in a subsequent device. My guess from the craters I saw was that the bombs had not been 100% high explosive. That was based on the viewing of the craters and also on the fact that it would have been a waste of "good explosive" when you did not need to use that quantity and could have degraded it with home-made explosive that would almost have the same effect in a densely populated area. There would be very little difference in the effect.

Deputy P. Power

As we say down the country, one might be led to think that whoever constructed these bombs was flaithiúlach. In other words, they had a bountiful supply of commercial explosives.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

They had a supply. Bountiful——

Deputy P. Power

Of course, you would need less because of the high explosive.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Even a small quantity will cause chaos in a populated area. A very small quantity - a couple of pounds - would cause a car to disintegrate. Whoever set them wanted to ensure they caused maximum damage.

Chairman

What volume would the bomb have taken up? If it was ANFO, would it have been a different volume?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Chairman

What sort of volume? Would it have been seen in the back of a car?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

An 8 ounce stick of explosive has about the diameter of a broom handle. It is about six inches long. A 25 lb box of about 2 ft by 18 in by 18 in would hold 50 of those.

Chairman

That would be a pretty big box relatively.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Big and small at the same time.

Chairman

That was for gelignite. If it was ANFO——

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Obviously, it would be a little bulkier because ANFO is not solid. Of course, it is not liquid either but it is loose. It is like clay, so it would take up a bigger volume than if it was compressed and hard packed. They would not bother doing that.

Chairman

As Senator Walsh mentioned, somebody informed us that there was a 4:1 ratio in volume.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Chairman

If there was a substantial amount of ANFO, are you talking about double the size you mentioned?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

If it was a 4:1 ratio of which I was not aware until today.

Chairman

Obviously, there must have been some gelignite.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, there must have been. The volume would be bigger. If it was a 4:1 ratio, in theory it should be four times bigger than what I have described. You can put a lot of explosive into the boot of a car. You can put a lot on the back seat.

Chairman

Any boot of any car would have been sufficient to hold the explosive.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Maybe, in conjunction with the rear seat as well.

Chairman

If there was a timing device and somebody had to arm it, obviously if they had got out and opened the boot——

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No, he would probably keep the timing device under the passenger seat with wires running back. That would be the simplest way. He would just have to lean over, set the clock, finally connect two wires and move off.

Chairman

How difficult would it be to finally connect the two wires to set the detonator? What sort of expertise would be needed?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The detonator would be in the explosive.

Chairman

The timing device.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

On the timing device, it might only be a matter of just pulling a rod. The bomber would have to have a safety measure built into the timing system so that it would not go off and that he would not score an own goal. He would probably have a rod - that was one method - which you would pull out as it would stop the hand from moving. That is one method. A driver delivering a bomb would have to be confident that what he was carrying was safe for him to carry. This would be one of the ways of ensuring this. He would have some simple item that he would pull out and walk away with. There could be another way with the timer in that he could twist wires but I would not find that as attractive.

Chairman

How safe would it have been to drive around with a bomb like that in the back? What confidence would the bomber have that it would not go off?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

One would want a lot of confidence in it. The bomber would have had to be shown that the safety system works. If I was asked or told to do it, I would have asked to see how the safety system operates. I would have asked if a jolt would set off the clock and initiate the bomb. I would have to be sure that the system was locked in an "off" position. The use of a little rod is one way of doing this.

Chairman

Is it likely that the final touches were put to the mechanisms close to where the bombs exploded?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I would say they did the final action when they parked the vehicle. They would have removed the rod, twisted wires or threw an electrical switch.

Chairman

Would it have been safe enough to drive it down from the Border?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

They would have tested the safety and ensured that it was vibration proof so that it would allow the bombers to drive on rough surfaces or suddenly stop at traffic lights and not cause the mechanism to commence.

Chairman

One would want a certain amount of expertise to have confidence in the organisation of a such a bombing to ensure that three bombs would arrive on time without exploding and would explode at the one time.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

One would have to have confidence in the bomb maker or makers. One would also need training in how to set the timing unit. If a rod was used, one would have to be confident that the bomb did not immediately explode when it was removed. Those that assemble bombs are too valuable to be used in delivering them. The "donkeys" must deliver them and they are more expendable.

Chairman

Having read the report and having an interest in the bombings, are you satisfied that the UVF would have had the expertise, capacity and confidence to carry out the bombings in the manner they were carried out?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I would not be competent to comment on that.

Deputy F. McGrath

I welcome Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher to the sub-committee. He said that timers often do not work. What does he mean by this? From his experience, what percentage of timers would not work? Do most paramilitary bombs not go off?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

While I cannot comment on percentages, I will give the Deputy an example. Shellac was used on the arms of old alarm clocks to stop them from rusting. Shellac is an insulator, and if this was not removed or polished, it would not make good contact when it was supposed to and would not work.

Deputy F. McGrath

Were there many instances of this over the years?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Thankfully, yes.

Deputy F. McGrath

The Lieutenant Colonel believes the bomb was set in Parnell Street or the other locations. Other people seem to think the bombs were primed in a car park in Whitehall and then driven into the city centre. What is your view of this? Would it be risky from the perspective of the bombers?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I would think that would be almost crazy because of the traffic conditions. For instance, from Whitehall to the centre of Dublin would take, say, 30 minutes driving under normal conditions but one does not know what hold-ups there would be. I definitely would not drive a car, having set it for 30 minutes in Whitehall.

Chairman

Not in today's traffic anyway.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No.

Deputy F. McGrath

On bomb sites generally and atrocities, in his job has the Lieutenant Colonel visited many bomb sites in the North or in other countries and has he seen the same type of explosive devices used in any other situations?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No, I have not visited such sites in the North or in other countries. From time to time we would have samples of home-made explosive and would detonate it ourselves just to learn from it. This is where I would have gained most of my knowledge on that, visually, where we would put down 10 lb, 20 lb or 500 lb.

Deputy F. McGrath

Has he visited other jurisdictions to see the effects of an explosion or a bomb?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

No.

Senator J. Walsh

One question is troubling me. Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher mentioned, in answer to one of the questions, that he would be regarded as an explosives expert.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I would have an above average knowledge of explosives. I would consider myself an expert on military explosives.

Senator J. Walsh

So he is qualifying that a little.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Senator J. Walsh

He stated in his letter to us, under paragraph 2, that he was responsible for bomb crater analysis, that is, estimating the quantity of explosives used. This was done on the basis of commercial explosives, 50 lb and such like.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, based on the tables.

Senator J. Walsh

Would he have done an estimate on the basis of ANFO? The difficulty I have is that he stated, in answer to the question about the ratio of commercial explosives to ANFO, that the ratio of 1:4 was new information that he got today.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Senator J. Walsh

From my simple perspective, I would feel that is elementary when going to a crater to estimate. When one arrives, it may be or may not be all commercial explosives. So one must make an estimate of the quantity if it was commercial explosives.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Senator J. Walsh

If it was ANFO with a small amount of commercial explosives, then the quantity varies. Therefore, the co-relationship between the two must surely be known to somebody doing that analysis.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The table I used was based on detonated bulk TNT explosive, what is called "uncased", in other words, not constrained or in something like a cardboard box placed on the surface. One measures or paces out the maximum distance at which there is glass breakage, say, 300 metres or 350 metres, and then one goes back to the table. That tells one——

Senator J. Walsh

The quantity of TNT——

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Correct.

Senator J. Walsh

——which is the same as gelignite or dynamite. Is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, it is in the same scale.

Senator J. Walsh

Where the Lieutenant Colonel stated 50 lb, 150 lb and 100 lb - which was for Parnell Street, I think - those would all have been from the TNT table.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

They would have been from the TNT table, yes.

Senator J. Walsh

Therefore, they would be estimates of the quantities of commercial explosives used to create those types of craters.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I can see the Senator's point.

Senator J. Walsh

Is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes. There was the second factor of the shape and sharpness of the edges of the crater. This allowed me to come to my conclusion.

Senator J. Walsh

That is fine. That is all based on commercial explosives. At the time, he would have been familiar with ANFO-type explosives. I think he stated that in his comments to me.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Senator J. Walsh

Would he not have had to do a similar exercise to estimate the quantity of ANFO that might have been used?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

ANFO on its own?

Senator J. Walsh

ANFO will not work on its own without the assistance of some kind of detonation.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, it needs a small booster.

Senator J. Walsh

It would need a small amount of explosives but the volume would primarily be ANFO.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The velocity of detonation of ANFO on its own, or with a small quantity of booster,——

Senator J. Walsh

Just enough to set it off.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The velocity of detonation is not as high as with commercial explosive. It has a different effect on the crater in the ground. I have described it as gentler. It does not have clean edges.

Senator J. Walsh

My question is based on my surprise at the fact that Colonel Kelleher did not know of the co-relationship between ANFO and the commercial explosives. I have difficulty getting my mind around that.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Unless it is lost from my memory. I agree that I did not. I raised the point because of the 4:1 ratio as I had not heard of that until I discussed it with Colonel O'Sullivan. He raised it with me this morning. I had never heard that.

Chairman

When Colonel O'Sullivan appears before the sub-committee, he might be able to clarify it.

Senator J. Walsh

If it was an ANFO based bomb, would its volume have been a consideration in the investigation? That comes back to estimating the quantity of explosive used. Was everything co-related to TNT? That would seem odd.

Chairman

We are looking at sharp edges.

Senator J. Walsh

I am conscious of that. I am trying to square it.

Chairman

Would it not then be hypothetical to look at ANFO?

Senator J. Walsh

That is the point I am trying to come to. According to the evidence we have been given, it is clear that commercial explosives were used. However, the thesis in the Barron report is that the bomb was ANFO, assisted by a small amount of commercial explosive. If we are depending on the sharpness of the edges, which I think is what we are discussing, why was the volume of an ANFO device not estimated? We cannot have it both ways. It is either one or the other. If the device was suspected to be ANFO, the quantity should have been estimated as a matter of course.

Chairman

If it was suspected that it contained ANFO.

Senator J. Walsh

If not, I respectfully suggest that Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher's evidence would be that commercial explosive was used. He did not say that to me when I asked him. I am trying to get clarification.

Chairman

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher, do you have any comment on that, or will we leave it in abeyance? Will we stick with what you have said?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Chairman

Do you want to expand on the matter at this point in time?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I will think about.

Chairman

We will move on to another subject and come back to this matter later.

Senator J. Walsh

I assure the Lieutenant Colonel that I am not trying to catch him out. I am seeking clarification.

Chairman

We will return to the matter if the Lieutenant Colonel has anything to add.

Deputy P. McGrath

As an amateur looking in from the outside in terms of explosives, perhaps I can help us to come to a conclusion. The Lieutenant Colonel referred to the tables of outline TNT equivalents designed and drawn up by him. Are they international standards?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

They are British tables compiled empirically after the Second World War through the disposal of a great deal of bulk German ammunition. The tables the Army uses are British tables.

Deputy P. McGrath

In effect, they are international tables. It would therefore be unlikely that the Army would localise them and say that 10 lbs of TNT is equivalent in Ireland to a different amount of ANFO than in another part of the world where a form of improvised explosive is used. Might that be the case?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes.

Chairman

We will come back to that.

Deputy P. Power

In his original letter to the sub-committee, Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher stated that the report provided a very accurate summary. It states clearly in the report that the then Captain Kelleher led the Army team investigating the sites, that he continues to be a serving officer holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and that he was interviewed by the inquiry on a number of occasions.

Chairman

Deputy Power is referring to the top of page 67.

Deputy P. Power

Reading that, it struck me that Mr. Justice Barron relied greatly on Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher's expertise in the area. The Lieutenant Colonel was interviewed on at least two, if not more, occasions.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I was interviewed by the late Mr. Justice Hamilton only, I was not interviewed by Mr. Justice Barron. I was interviewed only once.

Deputy P. Power

I do not doubt you in the slightest.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I missed that point.

Deputy Costello

In his submission, Nigel Wylde stated that in the first half of 1974, the British Army was not taught to look for ANFO. He told the sub-committee that as far as he was aware, the three bombs on 17 May 1974 were the first car bombs in the Republic that probably used large quantities of ANFO. He was not surprised that the neither the EOD teams nor the technical bureau officers knew what to look for even if ANFO remained at the scene when they arrived. Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher was trained in Britain. Was detection of ANFO part of the training? Where did he come to have knowledge of ANFO by May 1974?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The Army has an ordnance school where we instruct in the use of ammunition, weapons and EOD. I took a course there in 1965 and a refresher course three or four years later. I took the course in Britain in 1970 and would have taken another refresher course in our school between 1970 and 1974. In this, we would have studied the latest problems and may have conducted exercises in them. I do not know if I had come across ANFO in a find before 1974. I would have to check my records to confirm this.

Deputy Costello

Is the Lieutenant Colonel categorically saying that you had knowledge of ANFO as part of an explosive substance prior to 1974?

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes. I am sure of that.

Deputy Costello

Therefore, the Lieutenant Colonel would directly contradict Nigel Wylde when he said that neither the EOD team nor the technical bureau officers knew what to look for, even if ANFO remained at the scene when they arrived.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

From a forensic perspective, we would have primarily been seeking a timing device as this would give clues. We were also looking for any type of explosive. We were not focused on ANFO; we were seeking anything from the scene that would be of value.

Deputy Costello

ANFO was not on the Lieutenant Colonel's mind, it was just the crater and assessment of the scene.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

If I found something that looked like explosives, I would have bagged it and given it to the Garda. I would not have been specifically looking for ANFO or any other type of explosive.

Deputy Costello

The Lieutenant Colonel gauged that two of bombs contained 100 lbs and 50 lbs of commercial explosives respectively. If one looks at the upper end and the 4:1 ratio, it is 500 lbs. Would it be true to say that this quantity of explosive - if it comprised largely ANFO and a small detonating booster - would probably have filled the boot and most of the back seat.

Chairman

That would weigh down the car.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, it would weigh down the car. This is one of the techniques that was used in the North to determine if a car contained a bomb. If it was, it would ride low on its suspension and similarly, if a row of cars were parked and one was particularly low.

Deputy Costello

My point——

Chairman

We shall move on to Colonel O'Sullivan and come back to——

Deputy Costello

No, the point is that we have no evidence, or none of the witnesses has given any information, to the effect that there was a body of material in the back of a car. We have a statement from page 253 of the report that a journalist was told by somebody who had observed the bomber on South Leinster Street that he was, apparently, working at something inside the car before he got out. The likely explanation is that he was adjusting a timer but nobody has described any sign of a large quantity of anything in the car other than the individuals themselves? In some of the cars there were individuals sitting in the back seats. Is that not the evidence we have been given? If there was a large quantity of ANFO, would it have had to be stored not just in the boot but also on the back seat?

Chairman

I am sure that Colonel O'Sullivan, who has already given us a very detailed list of low explosives and high explosives, might have an answer to that question also. At that point, Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher can come back in if he feels there is something else he can add.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Okay.

Chairman

I very much thank Colonel O'Sullivan for coming. Could you give us a background on what your expertise is?

Colonel Joseph O’Sullivan

Like Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher, I am an ordnance officer. I have a university degree - a BSc in chemistry - and a Master of Science degree in chemistry from UCC. I was commissioned into the ordnance corp on the same day as Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher in December 1964. I have served almost half of my career in ammunition explosives, either in the ammunition depot for the first number of years or as staff officer in the directorate of ordnance, dealing with ammunition explosive matters for a considerable period during the 1980s.

I have done the same courses as Rory. I did not do the course in England but I did the course within our own corps, which is an extensive 15 month course when you come in first on all aspects of our work. We have done refresher courses in between. I have run refresher courses in the area of anti-terrorist bomb disposal techniques and so forth. I have been involved in the development of certain areas of EOD over the years. I have served for most of my career in The Curragh, whereas Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher has spent most of his career in Dublin. We were not exposed in The Curragh to the urban bomb that they got in Dublin.

We did a lot of duty on the Border, both in Dundalk EOD post and Finner EOD post. I have served in both in my time and so would have that type of experience. I am now director of ordnance and I am responsible for the activities of the ordnance corps. One of our major activities is EOD, bomb disposal.

Chairman

Can you respond in general to the question that has arisen in regard to ANFO and high explosive?

Colonel O’Sullivan

I have for your information a short leaflet on explosives to clear up certain areas because there is a lot of confusion in the Wylde documents about explosives. ANFO is a commercial high explosive. It is ammonium nitrate, one of the most powerful explosives in the world. It is also a very good fertiliser. Ammonium nitrate is an extremely stable substance and requires a high power initiator to set it off. When it is set off in that way, it is a very powerful explosive in its own right and is used commercially as a high explosive. It is used extensively in this country as a high explosive. ANFO is created by mixing ammonium nitrate with a certain percentage of diesel oil. The inherent insensitivity of ammonium nitrate is reduced. It is made more sensitive. Therefore, by using a booster of less sensitive explosive, ammonium nitrate is used as a commercial explosive to start it off and detonate.

In the early 1970s when the bombing started, commercial explosives came under severe restriction from a security point of view, so the access of the subversives to commercial explosives was much reduced. Their use of commercial explosive was reduced gradually down to using the commercial explosive as a booster for their home-made explosives. They started off, first of all, with home-made explosive of sodium chlorate and nitrobenzene. Sodium chlorate, as many of you will remember, was a very good weedkiller but it was also an explosive compound. When you mixed it with nitrobenzene, an organic liquid used in certain chemical manufactures, in dyes and so forth, you got a high explosive which was very powerful. Once that was seen to be used, there was an order in 1972 which restricted the use and availability of sodium chlorate and nitrobenzene. That order also restricted ammonium nitrate, whereas up to that ammonium nitrate of almost 100% purity was on sale as a fertiliser. They found that if they reduced the percentage of ammonium nitrate in fertiliser to below 79%, it no longer acted as an explosive, so that was done. Ground limestone - calcium carbonate, a grey powder that was used as another fertiliser - was mixed with ammonium nitrate and was sold as a fertiliser called CAN - calcium ammonium nitrate. That was a common product at the time. The order of 1972 removed the sale of sodium chlorate and limited the sale of fertilisers containing ammonium nitrate to this new percentage. I believe that the Republican subversives tried to make ANFO from this fertiliser and did not succeed - it would not detonate.

It is a very simple process to take that type of adulterated ammonium nitrate and extract the ammonium nitrate from it. All it involves is dissolving the fertiliser in warm water. The ground limestone used in it is insoluble in water and settles to the bottom. You decant off the liquid, evaporate the water and you are left with crystals of ammonium nitrate. That is where they were getting the ammonium nitrate from. The problem with that, from a subversive point of view, is one had quite a lot of this grey sludgy stuff if you were doing it in quantity and that tended to give away the sites of this crystallisation to security forces who were hovering around in helicopters or searching on the ground. They would see this sludgy stuff and know that something was going on - that crystallisation was going on in the area. The subversives did use that.

It is basic kitchen sink chemistry. It is very simple chemistry. It is not chemistry at all really; it is just boiling water. They were able to get almost pure ammonium nitrate from that. In 1973 the Government inspector asked me if this was possible and I did it for him using kitchen sink methods. When he analysed the product I got in that way using simple kitchen sink methods, it was 98% ammonium nitrate. That is where the ammonium nitrate was coming from in the period we are talking about, the 1973 period, and continuing on to this day in many ways.

The fuel oil is easily available. It is only diesel oil. If you add a certain percentage of diesel oil and mix it up well with the crystallised ammonium nitrate, you now have this powerful high explosive. To set it off, you need a booster charge of a less sensitive explosive and it was usually, as Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher described, cartridges of gelignite - Frangex or Gelamex, the commercial gelignite nitroglycerine based explosives. That was put into the centre of a beer barrel full of this ammonium nitrate mix along with an electric detonator, and that was the bomb. It is a very simple object.

There is variability in the effect of that high explosive compared to TNT, the standard for measurement in the tables Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher described. The variability may be due to the quality control in the manufacture or crystallisation of this ammonium nitrate. Some groups of subversives would make good stuff; some would make bad stuff. It is like making poitín. If one did not run it properly, one would not get good poitín. The same is true with kitchen sink ammonium nitrate production. Some would make better quality stuff than others and it would require more of the poorer quality stuff to produce the same effect on the ground. I hope that clarifies some of the questions. Ammonium nitrate fuel oil is a very powerful commercial and subversive explosive.

Chairman

Members asked if ANFO was used in the May bombs and Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher has responded. How much ANFO would have been needed to create the effect of 150 lbs of high explosive TNT?

Colonel O’Sullivan

Our experience of ANFO and this type of subversive bomb is that there was a tendency to put them in beer barrels, gas bottles or other metal containers purely as a means of carrying the material. Ammonium nitrate is a loose, crystalline powder. In its original form it is granular to make it more waterproof. The problem with ammonium nitrate is that it absorbs water. In a container such as I have described, it would be easy to ensure that the detonator was placed right in the middle of the charge. One could easily fit two beer barrels in the boot of an average sized family saloon car. I have seen that with IRA bombs in the Dundalk area over the years which were placed in Ford Cortina cars or similar vehicles. That is a couple of hundred pounds of explosive.

Chairman

In one beer barrel?

Colonel O’Sullivan

One beer barrel can take about 100 lbs of explosive. With good quality ammonium nitrate the ratio in question might only be 1.5:1 TNT. Once one detonates a high explosive, one gets the effect. It does not matter what original chemical is used as it is the high explosive which produces a huge volume of gas instantly at very high temperatures. The wave created is a shock wave which moves at a speed from 3,000 to 4,000 metres per second up to 7,500 metres per second. That can be measured scientifically.

Chairman

Will the wave travel faster if the ammonium nitrate is purer?

Colonel O’Sullivan

The speed of the shock wave depends on two things. The first is the type of basic bulk explosive one is using and the second is the impetus of the initial detonation, one's booster. If one uses a very high powered booster, as we tend to in the military, one will have a much higher speed of velocity within the bulk explosive than if one uses a lower powered starter. In the military we use 7,000 metres per second velocity boosters. If one uses a two volt battery to burn a little filament, it will take a long time to make it red, whereas with 50 volts it will get red straight away. The concept is similar. The greater the kick one gives an explosion, the greater the effect of the bulk explosive.

Chairman

Do we know what sort of booster was used in the May 1974 bombs?

Colonel O’Sullivan

Unfortunately, from all of the explosion sites in Dublin and Monaghan we have a lack of adequate chemical and physical analysis at forensic level and cannot tell with accuracy what explosive compounds were used in those bombs. The indications from Mr. Hall and Dr. Donovan are that there could have been ANFO ammonia-nitrate explosive and there could have been commercial nitro-glycerine, gelignite type explosives. Those are the indications, but, like Mr. Hall and Dr. Donovan, we cannot state anything with certainty. Our experience as ordnance officers and the thinking of British ordnance officers tends us to the belief that device was a combined bomb. It was a home-made explosive bomb which was set off with an amount of commercial, gelignite type explosive.

Nitrate is used in almost every explosive. Trinitrotoluene, nitro-glycerine, ammonium nitrate and sodium nitrate are all nitrates. Almost all the best explosives contain nitrate because combined with oxygen it provides a high velocity and a high amount of gas when it is detonated.

Chairman

I do not know whether Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher compiled a report in the days or weeks after the bombs. If a report was made, did you review and analyse it?

Colonel O’Sullivan

I would not have done this as I was a captain in the Curragh at the time. That would normally have gone to the command ordnance officer in Dublin. It would also have gone to the police.

Our function in bomb disposal is to save life. The gardaí will show us an object and ask us to deal with it. We render it safe and leave. Anything after this is their problem. The forensic scene examination is a Garda problem. However, the Garda may ask us for our opinion on something. In the case of post-explosion call-outs, one is presented with a scene and asked for an opinion on it. However, one has no competence in the gathering of forensic material, neither was the British Army trained in this type of activity.

Deputy Costello

I direct the Colonel's attention to page 68 of the Barron report. On that page, reference is made to the forensic examination of samples by James Donovan. He found traces of ammonium nitrate, sodium nitrate and nitro-glycerine in materials given to him on 20 May by Sergeant Jones. Particular mention was made of two blackened prills of ammonium nitrate discovered on scrapings. How would the Colonel interpret this with reference to the nature of the bomb?

Colonel O’Sullivan

If there were a mix of ammonium nitrate and nitro-glycerine, one would get nitrates and the residues of nitro-glycerine from forensic examination. Dr. Donovan is a very competent chemist.

Before ammonium nitrate fertiliser was reduced in strength, it came in prill form. Prills are little grains that are covered by a skin in order to better resist moisture. When it was denatured, that CAN was produced in prills. He does not say whether it is pure ammonium nitrate prills, or CAN prills. If prills existed and the entire explosive was prills - we do not know this - and there was no calcium ammonium nitrate in the analysis - the evidence referred to does not say this - then it would possibly indicate the original type of ammonium nitrate fertiliser, which was not denatured.

Deputy Costello

This would be a component of——

Colonel O’Sullivan

There is inadequate scientific evidence here to say what that was, except that it was ammonium nitrate prills.

Deputy Costello

While it also used prills, it was suggested to us that, by and large, the Provisional IRA used ammonium nitrate crystals. This suggests this was not stolen from Provisional IRA stocks. What is the most likely composition of a bomb using prills? Would it most likely be a combination of ammonium nitrate plus fuel oil? Can we be certain that those prills did not come from commercial explosive?

Colonel O’Sullivan

If it was pure ammonium nitrate prills, this would indicate that it came from the original stocks of almost pure ammonium nitrate fertiliser and fuel oil is required to set this off.

Deputy Costello

Therefore, it would have to be made up rather than being commercial.

Colonel O’Sullivan

The prills were commercial.

Deputy Costello

I know the prills were commercial. Did gelignite or any commercial bomb, other than one of the bombs made by the paramilitaries, have ammonium nitrate in either crystal or prill form?

Colonel O’Sullivan

The ammonium nitrate commercial bomb would not have been used much at that stage. Prilled ammonium nitrate as a fertiliser was removed from the market in 1972. That is not to say that certain subversive elements could not have had stocks of it left over. We were still finding stocks of sodium chlorate left over for about a year after the order came in. Until they ran down their stocks of the original ammonium nitrate pure fertiliser prills, they did not——

Deputy Costello

I know what the Colonel is saying but there is a clear indication from what Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher is saying that there was a strong element of commercial explosive. Is the presence of ammonium nitrate prills a strong indication that there was also an element of home made bomb?

Colonel O’Sullivan

Yes, it is. The presence of ammonium nitrate prills means that the ammonium nitrate would have been the bulk explosive, but one needs fuel oil to add to it and the commercial explosive as a booster.

Deputy Costello

In other words, if one finds, as James Donovan points out——

Colonel O’Sullivan

Two blackened prills.

Deputy Costello

Particular mention was made of two blackened prills. Must we not inevitably come to the conclusion that there had to be an element of a home made bomb here?

Colonel O’Sullivan

It would have been a home made bomb, yes.

Deputy Costello

There is no doubt about that?

Colonel O’Sulivan

There is no doubt about that. Once it contained ammonium nitrate it was a home made explosive.

Deputy Costello

If it is prills of ammonium nitrate, is ANFO the most likely type of bomb that would have been used?

Colonel O’Sullivan

When fuel oil is added to the prills they become ANFO. ANFO is ammonium nitrate fuel oil.

Deputy Costello

Perhaps I could direct the Colonel's attention then to the next sentence on page 68 of the report, which states: "Hydrocarbon oils or nitrobenzene were not detected in any of the samples." How do we tally that contradictory position?

Colonel O’Sullivan

I cannot. For a start, I would not have expected nitrobenzene to have been there at that stage. We could eliminate nitrobenzene from our calculations because it had totally been removed from the subversive inventory at that time. Distribution of it ended in 1972 and subversives had certainly run out of it by late 1973. That is why they moved on to ammonium nitrate fuel oil.

Dr. Donovan concluded that, "The results suggest the use of gelignite/dynamite as the explosive substance," but he does not say whether it is the main charge or the booster charge. This is where there is a lack of clarity. There is not enough scientific evidence to say exactly what was the composition. With adequate scientific evidence one would be able to find the residues of ammonium nitrate, fuel oil and commercial gelignite-type explosive if they were there. Unfortunately, however, we do not have, for any of the four bombs, a full suite of chemical and physical testing to allow us to say what the bomb was made from. We are speculating to a great degree on the basis of probabilities. The scientific evidence may be confusing the issue to a degree because it is insufficient.

Deputy Costello

I think we accept that. We do not know what the mix is. However, the witnesses have accepted that it had to be a mix. Nigel Wylde says that the mix was ANFO, and he is definitive about that. Colonel O'Sullivan is prepared to state that there was a mix, in other words, that there was a commercial element and a home made element, but that he does not know what the mix is and cannot say whether or not it was ANFO. Does that summarise his position?

Colonel O’Sullivan

First, it was a full high explosive that functioned fully in all four cases. No low explosive was involved in any of the four bombs. Second, they were all high explosive bombs that detonated fully as far as we are concerned because the evidence is that there were no residues of unexploded explosive left at the sites.

Third, on the basis of our experience and on the information, which is inadequate in ways, in the documents we have seen, the likelihood is that the main charge in all four bombs was a home-made explosive, most probably of the ANFO-type, most probably boosted by a commercial nitroglycerine-type explosive and certainly set off by an electric detonator. That is what we would say with reasonable confidence and certainty.

Chairman

Would the IRA or UVF have had nitroglycerine? You are saying they would not have had that.

Colonel O’Sullivan

The IRA certainly had ANFO, were making ANFO. They certainly had the nitroglycerine-type explosive, be it Frangex, gelignite and so forth. They had the electric detonators and they had full competence to make switches, the electric clock-type timers and firing units.

We have certain knowledge about the loyalists - we shall call them loyalists for the lack of another name, for people who are not republicans. Within a week of the Dublin bombings we found a partially exploded device around Swanlinbar, under a bridge, where it had not adequately detonated for the simple reason that they had used too much fuel oil in the ANFO mix. This was not a republican device.

A month after that, in Clones, there was another bomb, which we and the police authorities were satisfied was not of republican origins. I have details of it here. It was 500 lb of ammonium nitrate prills and diesel mixture, 20 lb of gelignite, one electric detonator and 30 feet of cortex which is a detonating cord, and there was a clock timing unit on it. That was on 24 June 1974, four weeks after the Dublin bombings, and that was not a republican bomb.

Deputy Costello

What was the quantity of ammonium nitrate?

Colonel O’Sullivan

There was 500 lb of ammonium nitrate with diesel - ANFO. We have not got the original quantity for the other but it was in a Calor gas cylinder and it had not detonated fully. There was some small quantity of ammonium nitrate-fuel oil mix found inside the gas cylinder, so there was the competence in the non-republican groups to do that.

Deputy Costello

You would agree with the Barron conclusion that UVF or loyalist paramilitaries had the capacity to make bombs of this nature.

Colonel O’Sullivan

We feel the loyalist paramilitaries had the capacity, certainly to make ammonium nitrate crystals from the fertiliser. They had the capacity to make the home-made bomb with the ammonium nitrate, fuel oil and commercial explosive. They had the capacity to fire that using an electric detonator.

Deputy P. Power

When the Colonel states they had the capacity to make them, is there a distinction between this and the fact that there is evidence that they used them - the ANFO-type explosive with the detonator, timer, etc. - on this particular occasion? You may correct me if I am wrong but you are not in a position to say, or have no expert knowledge of, whether that was their capacity. You had no intelligence in that regard. All you can say - you said it with great conviction - is that you are certain it was an ANFO-type bomb, detonator and timer but you are not in a position to say they were in a position to construct that. Am I correct in that distinction?

Colonel O’Sullivan

It is our considered opinion that they had the capacity to purify the fertiliser. That is so simple a task that the competence of a community of people in the North of Ireland on the loyalist side was not less than the competence of the community of people on the republican side. To underestimate their capacity to do that would be very unsafe. We are saying that within a week of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings we saw a bomb of this type, which was definitely not of republican origin, used on our Border.

Deputy P. Power

I agree that it was a non-republican bomb. I am trying to find out the basis on which Colonel O'Sullivan makes the claim that the bombers had the ability to construct devices of this type as distinct from the fact that they used them on these occasions. The sub-committee has received a number of submissions to the effect that they did not have this technology or capability. That is what gives rise to the suggestion that there were outside influences at play and collusion. What is the basis of the Colonel's knowledge that these people had the capability to make these devices? Is it based on intelligence or Colonel O'Sullivan's great experience of ANFO type bombs?

Colonel O’Sullivan

There is a bald statement in one of the Wylde reports to the effect that the only people with the competence to crystallise explosives from fertiliser were the British Army and the IRA. That is a very unsafe thing to say. The process is so simple that any secondary school child could do it. A community of people on a particular side with huge intellectual academic connections into universities, technical institutes and factories would have more than adequate competence to acquire the knowledge and apply it. We feel that they had that knowledge because we saw what seemed to be its results within a month of the Dublin bombings. In one of his reports, Mr. Nigel Wylde says that if they had that knowledge, we would have seen it shortly after the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. We did. Those are his own words. It proves to us that the competence, capacity and ability was there to make the device. The question of whether they could deliver it to Dublin is another matter.

Deputy P. Power

I am not doubting the Colonel. I am glad to see the contrary view put forward that it was relatively easy to do this and required a low degree of technical ability. We have not seen that view put forward before. Am I correct?

Deputy P. McGrath

We did not hear about the unexploded bombs before.

Deputy P. Power

No, we did not.

Chairman

Deputy Costello wishes to speak.

Deputy P. Power

I need to come back on this, Chairman.

Deputy Costello

Mr. Nigel Wylde made his point as a practitioner in charge of explosive ordnance in 1974. He was the professional on the British side in the North. He stated that they did not see another loyalist bomb of this type until 1976, which is two years later. Colonel O'Sullivan is saying a non-republican bomb with these characteristics was used south of the Border within a week of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. Mr. Wylde was operating in a responsible capacity north of the Border. Do we have two contradictory positions which are not amenable to resolution?

While they were more likely to be used north of the Border, Mr. Wylde never came across devices of this type. If the technology, which Colonel O'Sullivan says is very simple, was available, why was it not used for the next couple of years?

Colonel O’Sullivan

It is our experience that bombs of this type were used by the non-republican side in the period in question. From the technical information we got at the time, they were aware of the crystallisation of ANFO in the North of Ireland. One of the things Nigel Wylde says is that from June to October 1974 he was operating as an EOD officer in Belfast and he says he did not come across any ANFO in Belfast but he also says there was an awful lot of home-made explosive in his bombs but we have no forensic analysis from him of what that home-made explosive was, even in bombs that were dismantled, that did not function. He does not say in his report what that home-made explosive was. He gives no indication of what it was. He has no forensic evidence that it was not ammonium nitrate, so there is a lack of hard fact coming out of Wylde in some respects. All we can go on is our own experience of the simplicity of the conversion of ammonium nitrate fertiliser into pure ammonium nitrate. We got those definitely non-republican bombs on our Border almost contemporaneously with the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

Deputy P. Power

You are making the assumption that because it was not claimed by republicans it was not republican. I quote from the transcript of the "Hidden Hand" programme, which forms part of Judge Barron's report: "Lieutenant Colonel George Styles was the former head of the British Army's bomb disposal network worldwide and he served in Northern Ireland in 1969 to 1972". Therefore, he was on the ground dealing with this and was the British Army's worldwide expert. He states, "I have no high regard for their skill in 1974. I don't think they were at a level that would equate to the sort of techniques that were used here in Dublin ... I don't think there was one. In my view, they had not done this sort of thing. This is, as I say, outside their field of technology."

What I am getting at is that you have a firm conviction as to the nature of the bomb. There is no doubt about this but you are making the conclusion that because it was claimed by the UVF, ispso facto it had the technology to make it. We are putting the contrary view to you. We have received quite a number of submissions, both in the report and directly to us, which suggest the contrary, that they did not have that. Your contention is based on supposition as distinct from intelligence or hard facts. You are deducing this.

Colonel O’Sullivan

There is a comment from Dr. Donovan in one of the reports - I do not have the exact page - quoted by Nigel Wylde. It says Detective Sergeant Jones told him that there was a UVF cell in County Fermanagh who had access to prilled ammonium nitrate.

Deputy P. Power

Okay.

Colonel O’Sullivan

This is not commented on or denied in any way in Nigel Wylde's script; it is mentioned by him specifically. As we know, Wylde was operating in urban Belfast, not in rural Northern Ireland. The likelihood of purification of fertiliser in a city is very unlikely because of the problem of getting rid of sludge, so it is quite possible that rural loyalists, if you would like to call them that, had ANFO. Also, there is no question that they knew how to make bombs. A clock portion was also found in the Monaghan bomb.

Deputy P. Power

You have said with a fair amount of conviction that, in your opinion, this was an ANFO based bomb. I am not trying to create a wedge; I am just trying to clarifying matters in my own mind because I am confused about this. Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher, you are saying a substantial proportion of this was commercial high explosive as distinct from non-commercial high explosive.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

I used the term commercial high explosive.

Deputy P. Power

You are not willing to speculate on a percentage but it is certainly more than 50%.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

Yes, a higher percentage than was necessary. In other words, it was more than a booster charge of commercial high explosive.

Senator J. Walsh

To summarise Colonel Joseph O'Sullivan's evidence, he is saying, effectively, that the 1974 bombs in Dublin were primarily of the ANFO type. I think he is going further in saying that no degree of skill was required in putting the bombs together or detonating them within the synchronisation achieved. He is saying any second level student would be able to do it. Is that correct?

Colonel O’Sullivan

There is one point I would like to bring out. People have got hooked up on a figure of 90 seconds. If we read the Barron report and the Garda investigation into the bombings, the first bomb went off on Parnell Street at 5.28 p.m.; the second bomb went off on Talbot Street at 5.30 p.m.; and the third bomb went off on South Leinster Street at about 5.32 p.m. There, in fact, a period of nearly five minutes, not 90 seconds, which makes the concept of a traditional clock much more plausible.

Senator J. Walsh

Do you want to answer my question?

Colonel O’Sullivan

Making that type of system of home-made explosive, commercial explosive, detonator and timing devise was well within the competence——

Senator J. Walsh

Of anybody.

Colonel O’Sullivan

——of both sides of the fence in this country.

Senator J. Walsh

You are saying it was primarily an ANFO bomb in Dublin.

Colonel O’Sulllivan

It seems that ANFO was used——

Senator J. Walsh

Were you involved in the investigations at all?

Colonel O’Sullivan

No.

Senator J. Walsh

You had no hand, act or part to play in them?

Colonel O’Sullivan

No.

Senator J. Walsh

The evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Ruari Gallagher with regard to the bomb would be somewhat contradictory to what you are saying to us. As I understand Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher, he has said that in all probability commercial explosives were used exclusively but that he would not rule out the possibility of the bombs being ANFO-based, with perhaps a higher degree than normal of commercial explosives. It is stated in the second paragraph on the top of page 246 of the Barron report that "Irish Army EOD officer Comdt Boyle, in conveying the results of the EOD bomb scene analysis in Dublin and Monaghan to the Garda investigation team, proclaimed himself satisfied that the explosive used in each case was commercial rather than home-made". Thus, we now have all bets covered. That is not helpful to us. I wonder if you could elaborate on this?

Colonel O’Sullivan

To say exactly what the bomb was, one would, from the very beginning, require detailed chemical and physical analysis. We are unfortunately unable to provide that. As I have said before, if a good high explosive is detonated and it is made up of pure ammonium nitrate with the correct amount of fuel oil and the booster from the commercial explosive, it will give the same type of effect as a bomb made primarily of gelignite and with a smaller amount of ANFO.

Senator J. Walsh

That is not quite the evidence we got from——

Colonel O’Sullivan

There is not necessarily a conflict between the two of us.

Senator J. Walsh

One is saying commercial; you are saying it was home-made, and I thinkLieutenant Colonel Rory Kelleher is saying it was probably commercial but might have been otherwise. While I can understand the difficulty, I am trying to get some clarity from our point of view. We have had three different explanations from the Army. My understanding of what Lieutenant Colonel Rory Kelleher said is that the definition of the crater would have signified whether the bomb had been home-made or commercial. His interpretation of the crater was that the definition was so precise that it certainly looked to him like commercial explosive had been used.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher

The definition of the crater was, as I said, quite sharp and that led me to believe, in particular in what I call the South Leinster Street one, that there was a very high percentage of commercial explosive. That is the crater I remember, in particular. The other craters were also sharp and the construction of the road, six feet underneath, seemed to be slightly different than on South Leinster Street. In the other ones, the crater led me to believe that a high quantity of commercial explosive had been used, say, 80% or 60% - I am only guessing - and the rest would have been of a home-made nature. In other words, the South Leinster Street one, due to the sharpness of the crater, appeared to be almost 100% but, again from memory, the other ones were not as sharp. Hence there would have been a slower detonation with a less sharp cut.

Senator J. Walsh

I do not think we are going to get further than that but may I take a different line, Chairman?

Chairman

A number of members are very stuck for time. We have found today that the Barron inquiry has addressed the issues. We are not here to inquire into or decide what sort of a bomb was involved. Please make it as short as possible, Senator, because we are finishing as soon as we possibly can.

Senator J. Walsh

Colonel O'Sullivan, you mentioned the subsequent Swanlinbar bomb, within a month or two, where they used too much fuel oil. It was, therefore, an unsuccessful attempt.

Colonel O’Sullivan

Correct.

Senator J. Walsh

The Clones one, presumably, was detected before it exploded. Is that correct?

Colonel O’Sullivan

It was actually Ballyconnell but it was north of Swanlinbar. That is why we call it Swanlinbar. There was——

Senator J. Walsh

They are all one. Is that correct?

Colonel O’Sullivan

That was the one where there was too much fuel oil and it did not go off properly.

Senator J. Walsh

It was a 500 lb bomb. That was an unsuccessful attempt.

Colonel O’Sullivan

They were both unsuccessful. The one in Clones was not set off at all. I do not know why. I have no indication of why it was not set off. The other one functioned partially because the mix was wrong.

Senator J. Walsh

How can you then draw the conclusion that they had the expertise? Three bombs went off in Dublin within a short period of each other, it seems very professionally. You actually compare them with two instances which you say show the expertise but both of which were failures.

Colonel O’Sullivan

One could have been intercepted. They just ran away and left the device there. The other one did not function. I do not know.

Senator J. Walsh

Your submission to us refers to Lieutenant Colonel Wylde as relying very much on hearsay and states that "his knowledge of explosive theory appears suspect". The information we have on Lieutenant Colonel Nigel Wylde is that in 1970 he was trained as an ammunition technical officer specialising in guided weapons. Part of the role of the ammunition technical officer is terrorist bomb disposal and explosives ordnance disposal of ordinary conventional munitions. From 1974 onwards, he spent the summer, from June through to October, as the officer in command of No. 1 section of the unit in Belfast where he was responsible for all terrorist bomb disposals in that particular area. Given his responsibilities, you seemed to dismiss him rather lightly.

Colonel O’Sullivan

The hearsay is in the area of the capacity of the loyalist grouping to have access to explosives - certainly explosives from outside the State. He makes a statement that a William Fulton was captured and somebody told him he had 10 kg of sodium nitrate.

Chairman

Thank you very much. We are going to stop. There are a number of items which obviously have to be considered. We will have to look, in committee, at all of the submissions.

Senator J. Walsh

May I ask one further question?

Chairman

No, we have to stop. Already, two members have left. We will consider in committee all of the submissions which have been made to assess whether and how this matter has been addressed. At this point no conclusions have been arrived at. We will only do that following further deliberation and consideration of all of the submissions sent in.

I thank Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher and Colonel O'Sullivan for coming today. It has been most useful. In particular, your expertise in explosive ordnance disposal matters has been very helpful to us for which I thank you. You are excused. Thank you very much.

Colonel O’Sullivan

I cannot speak for Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher because of his distance from the committee but if there is any further assistance my staff or I can offer, we will be more than happy to provide it.

Chairman

I am very grateful for those comments.

Colonel O’Sullivan

It is the wish of the Chief of Staff as well that we give you every assistance possible.

Chairman

I appreciate that. Thank you very much. The next hearing is at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 17 February 2004 when the sub-committee will start module 5 of its programme.

The sub-committee adjourned at 4.50 p.m. until 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 17 February 2004.