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JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, EQUALITY, DEFENCE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS (Sub-Committee on the Barron Report) debate -
Wednesday, 4 Oct 2006

Public Hearings on the Barron Report.

This is the third day of the sub-committee's hearings on the Barron report on the bombing of Kay's Tavern, Dundalk. Last week the sub-committee heard from the families of victims referred to in the report, as well as other groups and witnesses. Today we will hear from two further witnesses to assist us in our consideration of the report. We will hear first from representatives of the Pat Finucane Centre and then Mr. James McGuill, solicitor. We are joined by the representatives of the Pat Finucane Centre, Mr. Alan Brecknell and Mr. Paul O'Connor. The sub-committee is grateful to the centre for its comprehensive written submission.

I remind witnesses that our terms of reference are to consider Mr. Justice Barron's report on the bombing of Kay's Tavern, Dundalk, for the purpose of making recommendations in relation to legislative or administrative provisions. As a result of the Supreme Court case regarding the Abbeylara incident, we are prevented from making any findings or expressions of culpability against individuals who are not Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas.

Mr. Alan Brecknell

I thank the sub-committee for inviting us to attend. I will not read our written submission which members have seen. I will make a number of points and then take questions.

It is our submission, first, that the fatal bomb attacks in Dundalk on 19 December 1975 and in Castleblayney on 7 March 1976 were carried out by loyalist paramilitaries acting in collusion with members of the Northern Ireland security forces. This gang were operating out of a base in Glennane, County Armagh. Second, the British Government continues to provide incomplete and at times misleading information regarding the activities of this gang and the extent to which the authorities were aware of their activities. Third, there remains a legal and moral responsibility on the Irish Government to establish all the facts surrounding these incidents.

One of the things that backs that up — members have seen a copy of a European court submission from the British Government to the solicitors for my family, where they tried to downplay the role of a member of the RUC and a civilian in the attack into Donnelly's Bar — is what Mr. Justice Barron states in his report, and he has seen copies of the daily record sheets which were kept by special branch. This makes what the British Government was saying a lie from our point of view. I do not want to go through the entire submission as members have the points we are making and if there are any questions we will go through them at that stage.

Members have all seen a copy of the ballistics and personnel links that we have pulled together. Without going through the whole chart, one will see that a 9 mm Luger pistol was used in the attack on the Rock Bar — at the bottom of the centre middle page. That was the type of gun used in the attack on the Rock Bar and was subsequently used in the attack on the Reavey family and the murders of Seán Farmer and Colm McCartney. As members will see there were a number of other incidents in the south Armagh area. Therefore, that particular gun was also involved in five murders. Police officers were charged and convicted in relation to the Rock Bar but were never charged and convicted for the attacks on either the Reavey family or Seán Farmer or Colm McCartney. If one follows from the Reavey family, the blue box to the left towards the 9 mm Sterling in the bottom left hand corner, one will see a bigger picture where the 9 mm Sterling was also used in Donnelly's Bar, the murder of Jim McLoughlin at the Eagle Bar, the murder of Patsy McNiece, which is all down into County Tyrone and Denis Mullan into Country Tyrone and Peter and Jenny McKearney. I do not want to go through the entire chart, but if anyone has questions it might be better to go through it at a later stage.

Mr. Paul O’Connor

I can follow on or does the committee wish to asks questions now of Alan?

Please go ahead.

Mr. O’Connor

I thank the committee for the invitation to appear before it today. Alan has adverted to the issue of the Rock Bar and last week you had Joe McGleenan and Michael McGrath here. I should emphasise that that was the first time that Michael McGrath had ever spoken publicly about what happened to him, even though he was shot at point blank range by a police officer but of course he never attended a trial.

We have always contended that the 1978 investigation was key to understanding what happened in the murder triangle at that time. We would point to the fact that according to Mr. Justice Barron, he has been informed by the Public Prosecution Service in the North that out of the 1978 investigation were to emerge 31 charges in connection with 11 very serious incidents, which included bombings, murders and so on. I am not going to name anybody. We have to ask ourselves what actually occurred and actually came out of the 1978 investigation. What actually emerged was one conviction for murder, one conviction for attempted murder, one conviction for kidnapping and a series of miscellaneous minor charges that were changed when the charges got to court to the point that — I am not naming anybody — it was facilitated that police officers could be given suspended sentences in court.

The issue of the Rock Bar came up last week and there was some discussion about who and how people were charged. To clarify the matter, four police officers were convicted of participation at one level or another in the attack but only one got a custodial sentence. The other police officers who were convicted of direct involvement got suspended sentences. As Alan has pointed out, we now know from Mr. Justice Barron that some of the weapons used in that attack had been used in multiple murders and that evidence was available at the time. We think it is quite important to examine the 1978 investigation. If one looks at footnote 113 of Mr. Justice Barron's report he makes the point that by the end of the 1978 investigation the authorities in the North were aware of the identities of those who were involved in 17 murders. Those 17 murders included members of the Reavey family, who were here last week, and at some point this morning Mr. Eugene Reavey will join us, Silverbridge and of Seán Farmer, Colm McCartney and various other incidents. Although those identities were known, and it was known that this included members of the UDR and RUC, we do not see people facing charges for those 17 murders.

We have also referred to a document entitled, Subversion in the UDR which came into our possession at the beginning of this year and I believe members have a copy. Let me give a sense of the provenance of this document. We discovered it at the Public Records Office in London when we were conducting research with Justice for the Forgotten earlier this year. The document was written by British army intelligence for the Ministry of Defence. Its title is quite helpful, Subversion in the UDR, and I will quote from some of the issues that were highlighted by British army intelligence in --

Which document is that?

Mr. O’Connor

It is entitled Subversion in the UDR. It is from the National Archives in Britain a DEF A 24 document.

Is it in the submission?

Mr. O’Connor

We told the staff we would be referring to it and footnoted it. If the Chairman does not have an actual copy of it, it is on the website.

We have it.

Mr. O’Connor

We can leave behind a number of documents for the committee. This is an original British army intelligence document for the Ministry of Defence, and according to it, "It seems likely that a significant proportion (perhaps 5% — in some areas as high as 15%) of UDR soldiers will also be members of the UDA, Vanguard Service Corps, Orange Volunteers or UVF". It further states that following an arms raid on a base in Belfast at Lisley Drive in October 1972 where a substantial number of weapons came into the hands of loyalist paramilitaries it subsequently transpired that the guard commander on the night of the raid had nine previous convictions for deception, had spent a period in jail and had been arrested in September 1972 for riotous behaviour outside Tennant Street RUC station following the shooting of two men by security forces in the Shankill and the arrest of an UDR-UDA leader. He had one UDA trace and three separate reliable reports indicated that he was a member of the UVF. That was the UDR guard commander in one of their important armouries in Belfast. It further states that there can be little doubt that subversion in the UDR has added significantly to the weapons and ammunition stocks of Protestant extremist groups. In many cases ex-UDR weapons are the only automatic and semi-automatic weapons in their possession. This is a Ministry of Defence evaluation.

What number is that item?

Mr. O’Connor

The last paragraph on page 11, at point B, sets out that the evaluation was that if at any time it became a feature of Her Majesty's Government's policy to encourage early and substantial progress towards the setting up of a powerful council of Ireland, which occurred a year later, or the achievement of a united Ireland, the reliability of elements of the UDR would be brought into serious question. The report states, on page 13, the third line, that despite the limited resources and evidence available to its compilers, a fair number of UDR soldiers were discovered to hold positions in the UDA, UVF and LDV. We are not sure what loyalist group the LDV was.

The final sentence of the 14-page document from British army intelligence states: "Any effort to remove men who in foreseeable political circumstances might operate against the interests of the UDR could well result in a very small regiment indeed".

What year is the report dated?

Mr. O’Connor

It is dated 1974. From the memos which accompany the document, we believe it was compiled in the first half of that year. We can supply the memos to the committee.

The relevant point is that by 1973 the British Government was aware at the most senior level that it had a serious problem with the UDR. It is marked on the memos that the document was for the Joint Intelligence Committee in Whitehall and 10 Downing Street. However, by 1974 other memos which we have and will leave with the sub-committee demonstrate that proposals were made by the Ministry of Defence to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to increase the intelligence gathering role of the UDR. Just one year later, it was official policy to increase the UDR's role on the ground in gathering intelligence, despite the fact that up to 15% of the regiment's members were believed to be loyalist paramilitaries. While one might argue that by 1974 the government had come to the conclusion that the UDR was no longer heavily infiltrated, the assertion would be contradicted by the minutes of a meeting held in September 1975 shortly after the Miami Showband murders and the murders of two GAA supporters at Altnamackin. By that stage it was known that the Miami Showband massacre had been carried out by UDR members.

A briefing was held with Airey Neave, opposition spokesman for the Conservative Party on the North; Margaret Thatcher, the future Prime Minister; Merlyn Rees, the Secretary of State, and Harold Wilson, the then Prime Minister. At the meeting the future Prime Minister was informed that the RUC was not to be trusted. The minute of Mrs. Thatcher's call on the Prime Minister on 10 September 1975 is dated 11 September of that year. It sets out on page 3 that the Secretary of State was more worried about sectarian murders than about the bombings in Belfast and that it was unfortunate that certain elements in the police were very close to the UVF and prepared to hand information to, for example, Mr. Paisley. It states the army's judgment was that the UDR was heavily infiltrated by extremist Protestants who could not be relied upon to be loyal in a crisis. This meeting was held between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State with a future Prime Minister in September 1975, post the Miami Showband and Altnamackin incidents. Following the killing of two GAA supporters at Altnamakin, the SDLP raised concerns at the highest level about UDR involvement. The regiment which could not be relied upon in a crisis was mobilised in south Armagh in the wake of the attacks at Donnelly's Bar, Kay's Tavern, on the Reavey and O'Dowd households and the Kingsmills massacre.

We have memos which record the preparation of the Prime Minister by his officials for a meeting with Gerry Fitt in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister was told that the issues of the UDR, the Altnamackin murders and other matters were likely to be raised and a series of possible responses were outlined for him, all of which denied any possibility that there was a widespread problem within the UDR. One must ask what, two years later, the British Government did about the problem of heavy infiltration. We have found various memos which reveal that the issue of joint membership was discussed and reference made to the possibility of dismissal where a person's loyalty to a loyalist group was so strong as to adversely affect their membership of the regiment. The UDA was not banned until 1992.

We understand it is highly likely the explosives used in Castleblaney, Dundalk and Silverbridge were of the same type. This fact is interesting, as we were told officially by the PSNI that it was not possible to ascertain what type had been used in Donnelly's Bar. We have a copy of an agreed minute of the meeting at which we were provided with this information. Mr. Justice Barron has found differently, which is possibly the result of the daily record sheets. We understand the explosives came from the same source. The sub-committee is aware of allegations of the possibility that captured IRA explosives were used in the attacks and Mr. Justice Barron leaves this possibility open. While we cannot help it by providing concrete information on the issue, we note that a British army intelligence document indicates that it was of the view that the major source of arms for loyalist paramilitaries was the UDR, which leaves open the obvious possibility that the security forces were another source of explosives.

As adverted to last week, the sub-committee must make a decision as to where one goes from here on the issue. There are many issues which have yet to be resolved. It is indicated at page 59 of Mr. Justice Barron's report that questions he asked about UVF bases in the murder triangle have not been answered by the authorities in the North. He notes at page 60 that he requested a statement which has yet to be provided from the person who owned the bomb car. At page 61 there is a list of a series of requests on ballistics, to which there has yet to be a response. At page 68 questions on fingerprints and proper DNA comparisons are listed as having failed to be addressed. At page 90 the report states that questions put to the then Director of Public Prosecutions whose office is now called the Public Prosecutions Service have not yet been answered. We argue that there is a series of issues which have yet to be resolved. Our own research shows that the information sought is available. We were told recently by a senior member of the Historical Enquiries Team that there was a very large library of information in the possession of the Special Branch in the North which he had seen.

When we met John Weir, we asked why there had been no retaliation for the Kingsmills massacre. His response was that a retaliation had been planned on the primary school at Beleek. He stated also the attack had not been carried out because the UVF leadership in Belfast had objected, rather than because those involved thought it would be a step too far. The UVF leadership believed the plan itself had come from a certain member of the Glennane gang whose name is known to us. That person was working for army intelligence. We were told that in essence the plan had been an army intelligence one. We were quite shocked to hear this, but have never publicised the fact that we knew. We did, however, suggest to the BBC a year and a half ago when it did a programme on the incident at Glennane, that it interview another member of the Glennane group and former member of the RUC and ask him about the accusation. That person admitted on air that the plan existed but had been abandoned because they felt it was a step too far. There have probably been many plans by all sides in Northern Ireland that would horrify us and that would best be put in the dustbin of history. However if a plan came from army intelligence, we have the right to know that. It is an example of the many issues that still require investigation.

I thank Mr. O'Connor. Does Mr. Brecknell wish to add anything? No. That was interesting and opens up many questions.

Everyone will have questions on this. The Pat Finucane Centre chart is well laid out and enlightening for those who are coming to the issue at this late stage. How early do the witnesses believe the British Government knew about this gang? It is wrong of me to single out this gang, although it is the focus of the attention here. How early did the British Government know about the infiltration of the UDR?

I asked my next question on the last occasion but did not receive an answer. I am looking at Detective Sergeant Eoin Corrigan's submission and he does not make it clear. If this was going on and people from the Border area of the Republic knew about it — which they clearly did or suspected — they would have made that report to their superior next in line and it would have gone through the ranks. Did the witnesses find anything to suggest that any senior Republic of Ireland politician at ministerial level brought this up at a meeting with the British Government? I do not refer to secretaries of state but to someone with no direct responsibility for Northern Ireland.

May I seek an answer to Deputy Lynch's question on when British intelligence first knew about the infiltration of the UDR? We will deal with one question at a time instead of banking them up.

Mr. O’Connor

In the Public Record Office we discovered a number of documents marked "weapon losses". I forget their exact titles. They detailed each occasion on which weapons were lost, beginning in 1971. Behind a significant number of those documents on the right hand side the words "collusion suspected" were marked. Some of the documents bordered on laughable. For example: "UDR officer lost his weapon, collusion suspected, son is in the UDA". Those documents are from 1971 onwards. This 14-page document also refers to the fact that by 1971 and 1972 the UDA in Belfast was already of some considerable strength and it was the general view that it had decided to send its people into the UDR to be trained. We have a video we can make available to the committee, showing an interview on an RTE programme from the mid-1970s with Mr. Andy Tyrie. In the interview Mr. Tyrie says the UDA decided to send its people into the UDR because then they would not be arrested when they were training. At the same time senior members of the UDR freely admitted to RTE that the reason they did not have any photographs of loyalist suspects at checkpoints was because their only job was to deal with republican terrorism. That is how they viewed themselves from the earliest stage.

Can Mr. O'Connor provide a copy of the video to the committee?

Mr. O’Connor

I can.

Our difficulty with that is that we think it was very early on, and included not just British intelligence. When did that information become available to senior members of the British Government?

Mr. O’Connor

The document dates from 1973 and it was for the joint intelligence committee at No. 10 Downing Street. We would be glad to provide the committee with all the documents we gathered on that occasion. There were memos from secretaries of state asking what to do about joint membership of loyalist groups. The answer was always that if their loyalty came into doubt, they should be dismissed. So it was being raised at a senior level. As I mentioned earlier, we are certain that the then Prime Minister and the Secretary of State were aware that it was the army's view that the largest regiment in the British Army, the UDR, the front-line regiment in the North, was seriously infiltrated by 1975, and that was also the view in 1973. It begs the question what happened in the meantime.

Has the centre come across evidence that senior politicians confronted other senior politicians?

Mr. O’Connor

I will not name names or be political. However I will refer to a very senior level of Republic of Ireland politics. I regret that the only documents we came across are memos, usually from the British side, referring to complaints from Ministers on the Irish side about Border closures in which roads were not closed properly and requests that the British authorities close them properly. This was because the improperly closed roads could be re-opened by locals, giving a propaganda victory to republicans. We came across no vigorous questioning of British officials around issues of infiltration of the security forces.

Mr. O'Connor mentioned the Historical Enquiries Team, HET, and the reference to the files in the Special Branch. Will the HET have access to those files? Much will hinge on their reports.

Mr. O’Connor

We have been meeting with the HET for approximately a year and have facilitated a number of meetings. Any meetings last week about which the committee heard were facilitated by us. We are glad to do that and to test this to see if it works. The people involved are people of personal integrity. We do not know whether they will get the access and whether families will get the "maximum possible disclosure" promised by the HET to them all because no case has yet come to closure. No reports have been written on any cases. We are concerned by several issues. We are concerned that the HET has told us that before it can report to families, it must consult its stakeholders. Its stakeholders are MI5, Special Branch and army intelligence, among others. MI5 is to take control over all intelligence next year, so in a sense the HET, which is answerable to the Chief Constable, will be subservient to MI5. So we are concerned about issues of disclosure because the officers involved at senior level in the HET led the Stevens investigation. We do not know if we can fault the Stevens investigation because only 20 of its 3,000 pages have been made available to the Finucane family. If future reports receive the same treatment, it will not work. The jury is out. We await resolution of a number of cases.

What is the HET's brief? Is it only to report or can it bring prosecutions?

Mr. Brecknell

The HET is supposed to investigate all killings across the 30 years of the conflict to today's standards. The problem is that it relies on contemporaneous files. In many cases there are no witness statements. We have been told that there is no ballistics record on the attack on Donnelly's Bar, whereas Mr. Justice Barron is able to say he has seen information and knows what explosives were used. Its brief is to look at everything, but on an individual basis. It will report back to each family individually. It is not in a position to say it will look at the systems that may have been in place or the lack of systems.

There is another point to make about the Special Branch files. There will not be access. The HET cannot walk into a Special Branch filing cabinet, wherever it is, and pick out a file and look through it. It must ask for a specific file or for information regarding a specific incident. One would need to know the answer to a question before asking it. In the work we have been doing over the past five or six years we have found that one would need to know the answer to frame a question in such a way as to get a positive response. It has made it very difficult for us and for the families who have been affected by this that there is not a willingness to come forward and offer information. We wrote an article last year for the Human Rights Commission called Pulling Hens' Teeth. That is what it feels like.

One must ask the right question in the first place.

Mr. Brecknell

One must ask the right question to get an answer. That is the point we are trying to make in regard to the European Court. The British Government is being disingenuous in that regard. It is not prepared to come forward with information. It is giving information it thinks one already knows.

Despite all the investigations and despite the terrible tragedy, all the people who came before the committee said they did not want anyone to go to jail, that they just wanted people to take responsibility for and admit what happened. Has there been any change in the system? The reason I ask is that one can examine this case by case and regiment by regiment but it was the system in that section that allowed this to happen. Could it happen again? What safeguards are in place to ensure it does not happen again, or will that take much longer?

Mr. O’Connor

The Deputy raised this question on several occasions last week. From our point of view there was a very interesting discussion around why it happened. Why was the Reavey family targeted? Why were the O'Dowds targeted? They were not even within the republican community. Joe McGleenan who gave evidence on the Rock Bar was an SDLP councillor. It is necessary from our perspective to say we believe what was occurring was basically a Kitson strategy to instil fear within the Catholic Nationalist community so that they would withdraw support from the IRA. That was the plan. The question is how high up that went. Was it something local people thought of themselves or was there a degree of co-ordination? Certainly Colin Wallace's claims about how soon they knew about Glenanne, what was going on, what happened in the 1978 investigation, what happened in the 1980 trials and so on suggest something very different. I think it was a particular strategy at a particularly terrible time in the North. Today we have the IMC report and, by all accounts, people will say it is all over and we will move on. Whatever about that, and that large a political question, it would certainly be our view that one of the ways of ensuring that something is never repeated is to have full acknowledgement and accountability. It is a cliché we steal from others, but before there can be acknowledgement, there must be knowledge. We do not yet have the knowledge. As of 31 May this year the British Government was making a submission to the highest court in Europe which was factually incorrect. That is unacceptable. It is unacceptable that we all know, and could have told this committee two years ago, who the fifth police officer involved in the Rock Bar attack was, who never faced charges. I will not refer to him by name. It is in the Barron report. Why were the Brecknell family not told that the same type of explosives were used as in Castleblayney and Dundalk? Why, instead of giving this UDR document to Mr. Justice Barron, do we have to find it?

There are many unanswered questions. The best way of ensuring this does not occur again is to have full and complete public knowledge of what happened.

On logistics, the intention now is that we will break at 10.30 a.m. for Taoiseach's and Leaders' questions on a matter going on in the House. We will return at 11 a.m. sharp, at which time Mr. James McGuill will make his presentation and questions can be put. I ask that Alan and Paul Brecknell also attend at that time so that if, after questions with Mr. McGuill, there are further questions, they can be put. Is that acceptable to everybody concerned?

Mr. O’Connor

May we make a request in case it might be lost on the committee?

Mr. O’Connor

In the British Government's submission to Europe it is stated that repeated attempts were made to contact Mr. John Weir, something which we were totally unaware of because we have been in regular contact with him. Justice for the Forgotten is also unaware of that. It stated in its submission that it also contacted the secretariat to the Barron inquiry. We understand that is not the case or at least it cannot be confirmed to us that any such attempt was made. It is obviously very relevant if a police officer makes these allegations and says they are being followed up and we find out that has not been done. We would ask the committee is it possible to find out if such an approach was made?

Our senior counsel will talk with you about this matter afterwards. I propose we break now and come back at 11 a.m. sharp. Is that agreed? Agreed.

Sitting suspended at 10.30 a.m. and resumed at 11.10 a.m.

We will now meet Mr. James McGuill, solicitor for the Waters and Rooney families. The sub-committee is grateful to Mr. McGuill for agreeing to assist it in its consideration of the Barron report. I am sure he is fully aware of the procedures, namely, that he does not have the same privilege as applies to members. Perhaps Mr. McGuill would like to make some remarks following which we will take questions.

Mr. James McGuill

On behalf of Margaret English, Maura McKeever and the Ludlow family I convey our best wishes for a swift recovery to Senator Walsh. The families have been particularly impressed by his contributions and pertinent questions in earlier hearings.

I am not sure if members have received a copy of the revised submission that I sent the Clerk. I do not propose to go through in detail the various observations made in the submission on behalf of the families as our time would be better used on questions relating, in particular, to the collusion aspect. I might add, as a point of principle, that the families maintain their position that the Dundalk bombing justifies a public inquiry and that there is no distinction, in principle, to be drawn between the kind of inquiry recommended by the Tánaiste in regard to Buchanan and Breen and the position Ireland has adopted in regard to the murder of Pat Finucane. These are important issues that justify a public inquiry. However, we accept the committee has not gone down that route in relation to earlier Barron reports and realise that rehearsing the argument in favour of a public inquiry would not be the best use of time. While we maintain that as a position of principle, we will not address the matter in detail. I will instead speak about the families' particular experience and then move on to the issue of collusion. I ask members, when considering the evidence they have heard during these hearings, to put themselves in the position of Margaret, Maura and their families.

One of the most important issues to emerge from the Barron report was the previously undisclosed information that the authorities had received a credible warning about the bomb either two days or four days before it happened depending on how one reads the report. Members heard Maura and Margaret's distressing evidence of how they were treated at the time, of the failure of the State to engage with them and to keep them informed either on the day of the bombing or subsequently. They made a heartfelt plea that this should not happen to other families. They were entitled to expect that official witnesses appearing before the committee would come before it with hard facts. Instead, members were treated to a series of "it would have happened" or "this would have been done". In fact, the evidence given has made their feeling of utter astonishment at the failure to act on the warning even worse. It is clear that the warning, as people identified, came from within approximately 250 yards of the main church in the centre of Dundalk, practically pinpoint to where the bomb went off. It appears that whatever would have happened would have happened at another part of the town. Nobody went to the bother of establishing where the patrols were supposed to have been, whether the individual gardaí were interviewed or what steps were taken. It is utterly astonishing that evidence was given on a "would have" basis to this committee in relation to a very specific concern identified on behalf of the families and that this has not been addressed. The committee must have regard to this when examining the evidence during its overall assessment of what was happening in the 1970s. It has to date been treated to casual observations, undocumented claims and an astonishing aside last week from one of the witnesses to the effect that one would not expect such information to be on files now because people do not like the freedom of information legislation. Deputy Lynch was rightly outraged in that regard. That is what we are dealing with. We are not talking theoretically about cover-ups in the 1970s we are talking about a culture of secrecy and a grudging handing over of information that pertains to this day. In that context, I would like to address some of the particular concerns on the failure to take steps to prevent the bombing.

Again, from the families' point of view, it is now established a warning was received from the RUC and that it was considered so urgent it had to be communicated first by telephone and then in writing. It appears even to this day that gardaí cannot establish when they received the warning. It is suggested that the warning was received on 15 December and confirmed in writing on 16 December. Yet, as of last week a statement claims it was given on 17 December. We have not been told, despite the fact that the committee has given him every opportunity to give the information, what steps were taken in reliance on that warning. Is there to this day a culture of secrecy and silence, an unwillingness to identify errors in the past? Is this something that could happen again? Failure by this committee to note that failure on the part of the authorities may support or contribute to failures in the future. To suggest that the warning could not be acted upon because it was vague without at the same time indicating whether any efforts were made to firm it up or to get more detail on it, is quite simply an affront to the families. If somebody warns you that something is about to happen but you do not feel there is enough information to prevent it, you ask questions such as "who do you think are plotting it?", "can we have photographs of them?" and, "can we put the Army, the Garda, the Civil Defence, the FCA on alert?" None of this was done. The people responsible do not believe they owe it to this committee to explain that failure. It is astonishing that lives could have been saved if action had been taken. The fact that people do not believe they have to account for this is, unfortunately, an affront to the families who are anxious that their personal concerns be put on record here today. They do not expect the committee to hold a public inquiry into their case only. They are however anxious to address the committee in detail on why there should be an inquiry to address all the questions of the families who have lost people through collusion whether by omission or by commission.

On the investigation, how on earth do two serving members of the Garda Síochána who find themselves in Crumlin Road RUC station to interview someone have that interview process terminated and do nothing about it? If any of us were taken out of our way for a purpose and that purpose was compromised at the last minute we would expect at least that there would be an expression of upset and annoyance. That did not happen. This raises the question — did nothing happen because there was a deliberate but unspoken, unwritten policy not to press on issues of collusion? Is the explanation for all the missing files the fact that nobody wanted this policy to ever come to light or to be acknowledged? Is it credible that somebody says "the reason I didn't report that up the line is I believed C3 was infiltrated by the British spies". Is that really credible? That is what the committee has been offered to consider. I think there can be only one answer to that, namely, that it is not credible. This should be explored in public in the context of whether this State and senior officials of the State condoned or at a minimum were inactive in the face of collusion that was established to them.

Again, it seems an extraordinary state of affairs that agendas of meetings between the RUC and Garda were not provided to Mr. Justice Barron's inquiry team. How can his report be considered complete when this documentation makes references such as "there would have been"? Nobody brought into this committee evidence which illustrated that two civilians lost their lives in Dundalk and that the matter was on the agenda every month as it would have to be. The "would have" culture remains a matter the committee needs to investigate closely. We have identified in the submission 15 specific criticisms of the Garda investigation in this case. They remain matters of concern to the families who are anxious that the committee consider them. As I indicated before, the families' real wish is to move on and to look more closely at the issue of collusion.

The committee received contradictory evidence as to whether there are written records maintained by C3 on the knowledge of the participants in the Glenanne gang. Mr. Corrigan stated he was aware of it. Mr. Justice Barron does not appear to have had the opportunity to establish when he became aware of it or what families have lost people at the hands of that gang on a date after its activities became known to the authorities in the North or the South.

At what level was the information about the Glenanne gang known? If it was known by the ordinary Garda officers on the street in Dundalk that this gang operated and that there were UDR and RUC personnel in it, one of two things happened: was it either recorded in a file or was purposely not recorded in a file. If it was recorded in a file and nothing was done, that is a disgrace. If there was a purpose behind it not being recorded in a file, it is a scandal.

The committee, in the public interest, should recommend that there be an inquiry into the attitude of the authorities here to what they knew to be collusion in the North. If, as Paul O'Connor pointed out earlier on, this information was available at Government level early in the 1970s in the North, and was available to an extent that should be alarming, that 15% of a military force were terrorist criminals, was that information known to the authorities here? Will we ever know that without a public inquiry? I do not think we will.

Mr. Justice Barron has tellingly found as fact that collusion existed and as fact that it was not a case of the rotten apple. This was an organisation rotten to the core but he does not have the resources or the time to examine it. With all due respect, this committee does not have the resources or the time to examine it. In its very first report the committee indicated that this is a matter that should be looked at in the context of an overriding inquiry, North and South, including the Government of the UK, and that remains the position. It cannot allow itself in the discharge of its proper parliamentary function to have a half baked solution, an inquiry that can only go so far because they will say that we did not have the witnesses or the documents and can only draw on inference.

This act of international terrorism justifies an international tribunal to inquire into it. People must be held to account. We have heard over and over again from families that they do not have an expectation of perpetrators individually going to jail but they have a legitimate expectation that states involved in this sort of crime, or in the case of the Irish State, closing their eyes to this sort of crime, will be named and shamed and held to account as an indication that no other State official can hope to conduct himself in this way in the belief that his conduct will be condoned by secrecy or otherwise.

That is the main point the families want to make today. Urgent work must be done to establish that this is a matter of colossal public concern because the committee has sat here and heard the evidence. We know the culture of permanent Government remains not to leave a paper trail and to conduct itself in a way where if a person is ashamed of his conduct, he does not record it. What is freedom of information about if it is not to establish what is going on in permanent Government? Is it enough to tell all the families who have lost people that the security forces wish to protect their sources of information or do not want to admit to the fact there was British state support for terrorist crime? All must be exposed and it is this committee's function to expose it.

I am happy to take any questions members have on the Dundalk bomb but the families are anxious to put this on the broader plane, that there are more families than just the Waters and Rooney families who have lost as a result of the failure on the part of the Irish State to tackle collusion at the time.

Thank you Mr. McGuill.

I welcome Mr. McGuill and the representatives from the Pat Finucane Centre. On the Garda files and the warnings that were given to the Garda and yet no action was taken, the Garda Commissioner on each occasion when he came into us assured the committee and the families of the availability of all files available to them. At one point he mentioned that an assistant would even be appointed within the staff to assist in any way possible. Where else can the information needed be found when all of those files are apparently available?

Mr. McGuill

One of the shortcomings of the whole Barron process is that none of the material was ever available to the families. We rely at second hand on what Mr. Justice Barron has seen and what he considers to be pertinent.

To take the warning as an example, we did get to see the document which was the claim of responsibility. On our reading of that document, when it was said that the bomb was made from material defused and retrieved from the IRA, that immediately suggested to us "collusion". Who retrieves bomb making material? The security forces retrieve it but Mr. Justice Barron did not read that in the same way and we did not have the opportunity of participating and debating the correct reading that should be given to it.

It was notable and disquieting last week that when the Chairman suggested that Mr. Mohan should see the Garda file, there was immediate retrenchment and a complete lack of willingness on the part of the Garda to make the files available. Assistant Commissioner Callanan even suggested that he would have to check with the PSNI whether a committee of these Houses could see a Garda file. I consider that an affront to the committee. These documents need to be examined publicly so that the families and other affected parties can pose their own questions and bring their own insight to bear.

When my clients heard the terms of the warning that was given to the Garda four days before the bomb, with their knowledge of the geography of Dundalk, it was crystal clear where the bomb was going to go but because it was not taken seriously at whatever level, any patrol, if there was a patrol, was sent to the wrong place. Dundalk today is not a particularly big place, and we are all very fond of it, but in the 1970s it was a small town. You could not move as a stranger in the town of Dundalk and plant a bomb if someone was looking for you. Again, however, without being able to participate and see and comment on the documents, the process is incomplete.

I asked that question because I was of the understanding, rightly or wrongly, that all the documentation in Garda Headquarters was being made available to the legal representatives of the families of not just the group here today but of all the families involved in the atrocities we have been considering under the Barron report. Can we receive clarification of that now? Is senior counsel in a position to do that?

Mr. Hugh Mohan

The position is, as I understand it, that where Mr. Justice Barron felt he had received all the documentation, we took that at face value. Where there were difficulties with documentation, that was addressed with either him or the individuals or bodies concerned. That was dealt with in our individual reports. There were issues about lack of documentation from various institutions or bodies which have been recounted in each of our reports. I do not think the documentation was made available to the families at any point.

There was a question also about the investigation material being made available but the C3 material appears to be a different kettle of fish. That is what came out in the evidence the other day and it is something the committee is looking into at the moment.

Mr. McGuill

I am pleased to say that, in so far as the Garda Síochána is concerned, there has been a policy of absolute even-handedness. Not a single document of any category was given to the family.

Again, if we take Deputy Hoctor's point, the Garda cannot find the follow up letter to the warning. Mr. Reid summarised the document in a letter to Mr. Justice Barron in a context where Mr. Justice Barron found that Mr. Reid was not being particularly helpful. Mr. Reid did not make available the exact copy of the warning confirmation. Why on earth did somebody withhold a document he had sent to a recipient 30 years previously? This is one of the criticisms of the private inquiry mode: that affected persons do not get to ask the questions, we do not get to see the documents or to invite a fact finder to draw an inference. We would say an awful lot about the failure to make that letter of confirmation available today. It was a shocking thing to find out about and to find that Mr. Justice Barron could not even get the exact text. How on earth could he make a finding that the Garda did all it could without similarly saying that he did not get to see the confirmation letter, only a summary of it? That is a shortcoming in the process.

This is also a question for Justice for the Forgotten.

Was the name of a person given to the families by the Garda Síochána who would act as an assistant to them in their investigations? This committee was given an assurance by the Garda Commissioner that this would be the case.

Mr. McGuill

I do not recall the reference but I assure the Deputy we have had no contact, either during this or the Ludlow Inquiry, with any member of the Garda Síochána. During the period of preparation of the Barron Report we did not see any Garda files. We asked for access to Garda material but our request was refused.

I want to make it clear, lest there be any mistake, that this committee was assured by the Garda Commissioner that an assistant would be made available to the families. Am I correct? Perhaps the person was to be made available to the legal representatives of the families.

I believe a liaison person was to be appointed.

A liaison person was to be appointed and made available, not just to Mr. Justice Barron, but to the legal representatives of the families.

It was not so much that documents would be supplied but that a liaison person would deal with families' inquiries into the atrocities. I do not think any undertaking was given that specific documents would be released.

I was of the opinion that such documents would be made available to the legal representatives of the families—

—and that they would be permitted to look through the documents in the presence of the liaison officer.

Mr. McGuill

I assure the Deputy that has not happened. She should look to the reluctance on the part of the Garda Síochána to allow even the sub-committee's senior counsel to look at the documents to determine the state of mind with regard to external scrutiny of conduct.

We will follow up on that issue.

We must do so.

I thank Mr. McGuill for coming in. None of us is Rumpole of the Bailey and we do not have the type of skills that others clearly have. However, one issue is striking. A warning was given in such detail as to allow people in the area, with hindsight, to pinpoint where the incident would happen. Does that suggest that someone within the Glennane gang gave that information? If that was the case, it cannot have been just a once-off contact.

Mr. McGuill

I suppose in terms of the gangs we are concerned with, there may very well have been somebody in the Glennane gang who would go so far, but there were lines which he or she would not cross. He or she may not have wanted another Dublin and Monaghan bombing type outrage and may have passed the information on to the RUC. We know that the RUC received the information, from whatever source and communicated it to the Garda Síochána. It proved to be pinpoint accurate and two men lost their lives.

The point I am trying to make is that when this type of information is being passed on, the person involved is very vulnerable. He or she knows exactly what a dangerous group of people are doing and must, therefore, be very close to them. The informant is in a very vulnerable position when he or she talks to the authorities. It does not make sense that it would only happen once.

Mr. McGuill

I agree. If somebody within the gang with the special knowledge that only a gang member could have regarding the provenance of the explosives and the intended use of them passed on information, it is likely that information was also given with regard to other matters.

It is likely that there would be an individual within the police force who handled the informant exclusively.

Mr. McGuill

Even if we could excuse the use made of the information about the warning before the bomb was detonated, there is no evidence that after the bomb went off, anybody in this State contacted the letter writer stating that the information provided was pinpoint accurate and seeking an urgent meeting to ascertain who was behind the incident, in order to prevent a recurrence. There is no suggestion that such a step was taken. We were not there to ask those questions but that is the type of thing that should be examined further. Why was there an attitude, on the part of the Garda Síochána, that areas of collusion were a no-go sphere for investigation? Why was there an attitude, at governmental level, that this would not be protested about, either at meetings between the two Governments or publicly? Why did we not go to the UN with this matter? Acts of state terrorism were being perpetrated against this State and there is no file on the matter.

Is there any information regarding the identity of the person who was handling the informant? Obviously the evidence exists somewhere.

Mr. McGuill

Mr. O'Connor may be able to answer that question.

Mr. O’Connor

I can only speculate. I direct the committee to page 45 of the latest report, where Mr. Justice Barron makes the point that by 24 December, the Garda already suspected a very prominent loyalist was responsible for the Dundalk bombing. Our judgment of that person is slightly different from that expressed here last week. We would have seen that person as a key member of the gang, to whom approximately 50 murders have been popularly attributed. He has the nickname of an animal or bird. I think the committee members will know to whom I am referring. That person is now deceased but was suspected from early on. We have information about the activities of that person which indicates that charges were dropped in connection with other murders from 1973 onwards. I will not mention the specific case but it was an early one on which I can elaborate, while being cautious about the use of names. I point the committee in that direction. The person in question is widely regarded in Northern Ireland as having been an agent. Mr. Justice Barron asked people in the Special Branch in Northern Ireland if he was an agent. The reply was that they would be surprised if some approaches had not been made to him over the years. This is the same person who was arrested shortly before the Miami attack for possession of weapons. However, for some unknown reason, he was still on the street at the time of that attack.

I also point the committee towards the fact that when it comes to knowledge, after Silverbridge and the attack on Donnelly's Bar, the investigating officer told us that he circulated a description of one of the key attackers internally, within the RUC, in the murder triangle and by the next morning the suspect had removed the beard which identified him. He felt that was very suspicious.

The last point is that another key member of the Glennane group, a UDR soldier, is regarded by a number of sources as having worked for army intelligence. I referred to that person earlier today. His family has stated that his death was linked to the role that he had as a link person for army intelligence.

There had to be someone within army intelligence handling these people. Perhaps we would not be able to contact the people involved directly, but there must be a trail within the army's secret service.

Is the Deputy referring to documentary evidence?

Yes, there must be such evidence.

We have looked for it without success.

It must be there.

Mr. McGuill

A feature here is that there seems to be a marked difference in approach. The UK authorities appear to have documented everything while the Irish authorities have documented nothing. Therefore, the paper trail that would make life very uncomfortable for some people exists and it is a matter of comity between nations. Can the UK legitimately refuse to co-operate in an investigation into State terrorism? Can it seriously do that? Is it compatible with their obligations within the European Union?

I have a related question regarding the advance warning. Mr. McGuill was very emphatic about it in his opening remarks on 26 September. When we questioned the Garda Síochána on the matter the impression given to us was that it was just one in a series of many warnings that had been received and that they had reacted to it in the same way as to previous warnings. However, what Mr. McGuill has said and the evidence that has been presented to us suggests that the warnings were much more substantial in this instance. Have we an awareness of the frequency with which the Garda Síochána was warned of impending attacks or bombs and of how this incident fits into that sequence?

Mr. McGuill

The Deputy is absolutely right. It was a glaring omission on the part of the Garda Síochána not to introduce that evidence. The Garda Síochána claimed that it got warnings every day, but one would have expected that it would have analysed how many of them came from the RUC. There are hoax bombers issuing warnings all of the time, but they are of a different category to warnings issued by the RUC. In this case, the RUC was saying, "We believe a bomb is going to go off." There was the potential for very significant loss of life. It was pure happenstance that only two people died on a Friday evening in a crowded shopping area. I would have thought, at a minimum, that out of respect for the families, the Commissioner would have introduced to the sub-committee the number of warnings the Garda received at the relevant period, the steps taken on warnings generally and the particular steps taken on the warning in question. We need to know if checkpoints were in place on the day and, if so, where they were. We do not believe they were. We have heard from the families that on the day of the bombing, they received no contact from the Garda. One would have expected that a senior officer would have said the Garda was terribly sorry and had done what it could. All of these questions should be documented. We should know what gardaí were on duty and where they were posted. Statements should have been taken from every garda on duty in Dundalk town on the day. We should have been told that photo-fits of suspects had been shown to the gardaí on duty and that they were briefed and told who to look for. The reason the sub-committee was not told these things was because none of them happened.

Does what happened in this instance contrast with normal Garda work practices and customs of the time and the steps taken in the investigation of other types of crime in the period? Is it the case that gardaí systematically failed to record and document the work they were carrying out throughout the State or was the failure co-incidental to the matters we are discussing?

Mr. McGuill

It is impossible to know without having an opportunity to put those questions to the Garda. It is clear from each of Mr. Justice Barron's reports that the Garda had the facility to take photographs and was receiving them. One would have expected that, had they assembled all members on duty indicated that a bomb warning had been received and charged them to look out for suspects it would have been referred to in evidence. We must, therefore, draw the conclusion that it did not happen. We know a C77 was written up in November which referred to the possibility of a bombing in Dundalk. We know that in October a businessman, whom we must take to be a republican businessman, recognised a loyalist bomber casing Dundalk town. There is nothing to suggest, however, that steps were taken to put ordinary gardaí, the Army, Civil Defence and others on alert to watch for suspicious activity. While we cannot say without asking what the prevailing practice was, the facility to put gardaí on alert for particular wanted persons has always existed. It is similar to the FBI's ten-most-wanted approach. While that was done generally at the time, we do not know if it happened in this case.

I thank Mr. McGuill for his contribution.

Mr. O’Connor

I have a question for the sub-committee which we are not qualified to answer. The issue of whether the PSNI should be consulted on a Garda file has been raised and it is a question for counsel to answer. The families of those who died in Dundalk believe and have made the case through counsel that there was collusion in the bombing by the Northern security forces and police through the Glenanne gang. Is it, therefore, a possible violation of the families' rights under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights to consult a force which, the families claim, was involved in either the attack or its subsequent covering up?

Mr. Mohan will look into the matter. The third day of our hearings is concluded. The sub-committee will continue with its detailed consideration of the report. On behalf of the sub-committee, I thank all those who have made written submissions and appeared before us. We will be in contact with the witnesses and groups to let them know when we are approaching the release of the final report.

I extend the sympathy of the members of the sub-committee to the victims and the families of victims of the awful atrocities which occurred over those horrible years, especially 1974-76. I thank the legal representatives, Mr. James McGuill, Margaret Urwin of Justice for the Forgotten, Cormac Ó Dúlacháin and the sub-committee's legal team, and those who assisted the sub-committee, including the Pat Finucane Centre, the family members and the individuals directly involved.

The sub-committee adjourned at 11.45 a.m. sine die.
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