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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION debate -
Wednesday, 20 Apr 2005

Family Issues: Presentations.

The first item on the agenda is the presentation by the Women's Council represented by Ms Geraldine Luddy, director, Dr. Cecily Kelleher, chairwoman and Ms Alessandra Fantini, policy officer. The delegation is welcome.

I remind witnesses that members have absolute privilege but that same privilege does not extend to witnesses appearing before the committee. I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

We have got the presentation, which is excellent. Rather than rehash the entire presentation perhaps you could synopsise for the committee the important aspects you wish to raise with us on this issue, following which we can have a question and answer session. I invite the delegation to make a presentation of approximately six to eight minutes.

Ms Geraldine Luddy

I will outline briefly the synopsis for the committee following which we will accept questions.

In regard to family rights the Irish Constitution reflects widely accepted views of the role of women and men in society in post-independent Ireland. It is generally agreed that these views were influenced by the cultural ethos of our time. However, social practice is now broadly divergent from that envisaged in the Constitution as clearly evidenced by current statistics on marital status, living arrangements and women working outside of the home. While some legal experts have stated that constitutional change is unwarranted due to the courts' capacity to interpret the Constitution in an historically sensitive manner, the State and especially the Supreme Court have so far refused to read the Constitution in such a way in relation to the articles on the family and continue to understand its provision in a literal fashion. These provisions which adopt a biologically deterministic approach to women and men's role and proclaim marriage as the only valid family formation have had negative repercussions not only for women and children but also for men.

The belief that caring duties should be the responsibility of women has had a detrimental effect on the emotional well being of both women and men in their role of parents and also has been found to especially affect the physical and mental health of mothers. The definition of family as implied in our Constitution is that based on marriage and it no longer reflects the reality of society. Recent statistics clearly indicate a changed family landscape. I will not go through all the various statistics as I am sure the committee is well aware of them.

The Women's Health Council believes the family should be seen in terms of what it does, that is, caring, and the kind of relationships and values that compromise it, rather than seeing the family in terms of structure or a group of people who are defined by a legal relationship. If one agrees that the main purpose of family life is to care for close personal relationships and especially children then the State must encompass all family forms that carry out this task without discrimination on the basis of which they were constituted. The current constitutional and legal situation does not reflect the change in family formation. They have, instead, established a hierarchy among different kinds of family. This hierarchy discriminates against non-marriage based families in both tangible and not so tangible ways.

Real discrimination occurs in terms of taxation, legal recognition and social policy measures despite the fact the State is capable of recognising non-marital family units for the purpose of social welfare entitlements or denying social welfare entitlements. Discrimination also affects members of non-marriage based families on an emotional and psychological basis and lone parents have been found to be at a greater risk of experiencing mental health problems than any other type of parent. It is important to state also that children suffer from this hierarchy as they are well capable of evaluating whether their family is different from the model promoted by public policy and consent. They translate this convert discrimination into a negative perception of their family and themselves.

The Women's Health Council thinks it is very important that the difference in family forms is not perceived and understood as deficit, particularly by the children. International studies comparing parental outcome for families formed in different ways have found it is the quality of parenting rather than how the family came into being that has most influenced child development.

Legal and social provisions should be updated to end this official discrimination of families. A new provision should acknowledge and reflect the fundamental role family life plays in society, regardless of marital status, in order that it may adequately cater for the needs of all families within a contemporary context.

On whether gay couples should be allowed to marry, one of the questions posed in the joint committee's correspondence, the Women's Health Council believes being able to marry would reduce the inequality experienced by gay couples and go some way towards eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the realm of family formation. Equally, it would not be as satisfactory a solution as the legal position of gay marriages but the introduction of civil partnerships for some same sex couples would be a positive stepping stone towards equality. The case for establishment of civil partnerships of same sex couples has been comprehensively argued by two other Government agencies, the Equality Authority and the National Economic and Social Forum.

On the Constitution's reference to women's life within the home, the domestic role envisaged for women in the Constitution has been described as dated, patriarchal and offensive. De Valera defended these constitutional provisions on the basis of their protective aim. However, his intentions did not ever translate into practice in regard to tax or social policy measures, rendering them of no real assistance to women working in the home. Furthermore, the constitutional vision of a clearly defined and confined gender role was based on a biologically deterministic understanding of women and men. That vision was never fully accurate but social and economic changes in the past decade have further curtailed its relevance to society.

The constitutionally envisaged model family, based on a male breadwinner, is now hindering the ability of both women and men to embrace fully their many social roles. The expectation that women will remain in the home to care for their families on a full-time basis has also created a chronic under-provision of child care services. During a national public consultation process the reconciliation of work and family life was an issue more for women than for men because of the difficulty in balancing their many social roles. On the other hand, men, especially fathers, have also suffered at the hands of this descriptive family policy practice based on gender stereotypes. The definition of women as carers has underpinned the marginalisation of men as emotionally significant in their children's lives as well as discrimination in regard to social welfare entitlements as carers.

The Women's Health Council proposes that Article 41.2.1° should be altered to read:

The State recognises that family life gives to society a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. The State endeavours to support caring for others within the home.

The revised policy framework that would stem from such a constitutional provision would enable both women and men to embrace more fully their social role as carers and workers.

On the issue of whether the natural mother or the natural father should have expressed constitutional protection, the Women's Health Council believes the common understanding of the definition of "natural mother" or "natural father" could limit the rights of adoptive parents, parents in reconstituted families and women and men who become parents through the increasing use of assisted human reproduction procedures in which biological and social parenthood may be dissociated. Their children's rights may also be negatively affected. Great care should be taken in assigning primacy to the biological function of parenthood over its social one.

I thank Ms Luddy. It is interesting that the Women's Health Council formulated a particular amendment because most groups shy away from taking that risk. It also helps the joint committee in its deliberations.

The position of the Women's Health Council is clear but on the question of whether gay couples should be allowed to marry, it mentions that the NESC and the Equality Authority have suggested establishing civil partnerships. Would the council be of the view that the Bill published by Senator David Norris would go sufficiently far to meet its requirements or should we go the extra mile of attempting to legalise gay and lesbian marriages?

Ms Alessandra Fantini

The ideal would be not to discriminate against family formation and relationships on the basis of sexual orientation. If the gold standard of relationships is to remain marriage, it should apply to all relationships. Also, problems will arise regarding the freedom of movement of individuals in the European Union in so far as the Dutch and Spanish will soon allow gay marriages. It will be difficult, therefore, to legislate for a situation in which citizens of certain EU countries travelling in other EU countries would lose their rights on the basis of their residence.

Would the council suggest that the Constitution, as currently framed, does not cater for this? That is something I believe could not be dealt with by legislation; we would have to have a referendum on the matter. Do the representatives believe Irish society, despite all our progress in the past 20 or 25 years, would be ready for such a referendum?

Dr. Cecily Kelleher

The appropriate approach would be to have a referendum that encompasses the broader recommendations we make because it is clear we are talking not just about the position of gay and lesbian couples but about a variety of other family relationships. We are calling for a change in the Constitution but in broader terms. That would be more acceptable to our society.

I welcome the deputation and the presentation. I appreciate the opportunity given to the joint committee to examine the amendment the Women's Health Council has proposed in its submission but how can we link the council's genuine concerns about women's health with our deliberations on the Constitution? For example, Hayes's argument that children are more than able to evaluate whether their family is different from the model promoted by public consent is quoted on page 8 of the submission. Irrespective of what we insert in the Constitution, children will be able to evaluate, regardless of their family structure, whether they are different. Would inserting an amendment in the Constitution alter their ability to do so? I am trying to understand how alterations to the Constitution can be linked to the role of the Women's Health Council.

Dr. Kelleher

It is in the context of children experiencing discrimination in the type of family in which they live. We make the point that if the Constitution reflects the kind of society in which we live, it does not discriminate against any particular group. It is not just a matter of perceiving that one is different but that there is a disadvantage attached to that difference.

The Women's Health Council is looking at the matter from the perspective of what best promotes health and well-being for all demographic groups. The role of women, therefore, has to be linked in terms of the role of men and children. That is the position we are adopting.

I know from my dealings with members of the public over many years that they have only a slight knowledge of what is in the Constitution. People get on with their lives and do not read the Constitution every day; very few people even have a copy of it. It is stretching reality to envisage that matters in the Constitution can be linked to health.

Dr. Kelleher

All great social contracts between citizens such as a document like this are inherently part of the fabric of our daily lives irrespective of whether we read it. That is one aspect. Health as a resource and a value is profoundly determined by the social fabric of society and that, therefore, is a reason for the Constitution to reflect as fully as possible the reality of life in our society.

I accept Deputy's McCormack's point concerning the ordinary citizen's knowledge of the Constitution, but when an issue arises that would affect his rights, the Constitution is quickly invoked.

I welcome the delegation and thank the representatives for a clear and succinct presentation and for the document they sent earlier. It is useful to have the issues set out as clearly as they are in that document.

I want to pursue the question of what kinds of families, in the context of a broadened definition of the family in the Constitution, will be protected and what kind of protection will be given. In the section on the rights of natural mothers and natural fathers, the council refers rightly to the issue of adoption. I want to pursue the other aspect of the rights of natural mothers and natural fathers, particularly natural fathers who may want to be closely involved in the raising of their child but for one reason or another that may be made difficult for them. The Constitution defines marriage as a long-term relationship, even with the introduction of divorce. Should the Constitution promote long-term families, so to speak? There are many families where the make-up of its members change. Women may have a number of partners and may have children with a number of partners. To what extent should the Constitution be in the business of trying to promote a more long-term stable situation for children and families? That links to the issue of natural fathers. I would like if one of the representatives could take those two questions together.

Dr. Kelleher

We will deal with the specific operational points first.

Ms Fantini

The issue of how complicated it is to limit the technical definition of what unit represents a family was highlighted and addressing that will require considerable thought and effort. If one takes the approach, as Professor Lynch outlined, of the notion of who cares, of who are the people who perform the caring for children or other family members, it could help in putting together a framework in this regard. That might help us in formulating a framework to ascertain those who constitute a family and those who do not.

In relation to natural fathers, going back to the way the Constitution has enshrined a particular type of family, their rights in a sense are not being catered for. By changing that and making the idea of a family more encompassing, natural fathers would automatically get greater recognition and they would be catered for in that sense. Family life should be protected and there should be social policies that make it possible for families to endure stresses and provide child care so that gender roles can be balanced, children can be well looked after and there can be a work-family balance. There are all sorts of social and financial polices that can be delivered to encourage long-lasting relationships. However, from the point of view of legally differentiating between kinds of families, that is the part of the Constitution where family life should be protected and through policies, the aim of which is to protect the families in practical ways, perhaps families could be safeguarded in terms of ensuring they are based on long-lasting balanced relationships that would last in the future.

Ms Fantini referred to duties as well as rights, which is important.

Ms Fantini

Absolutely.

Ms Luddy

I agree with Ms Fantini. It is difficult to devise a wording that would facilitate the Deputy's wish in respect of the Constitution but it is important that we do not exclude people. That is one of the key issues. The Constitution excludes certain family forms. We would like to see that changed.

In terms of the word "natural", it is my understanding but I could be wrong that when the Deputy said "natural" she meant "biological". Difficulties can arise in that regard. The Deputy referred to a case involving the biological father but it could be the case that the biological father may not have seen the child for ten or 20 years and the social parent, the man fathering the child is not the biological father. We need to be careful about the terminology used in the Constitution, in particular in future examples concerning human reproduction. There are various definitions and relationships where there is a blur between biological and social parenthood.

I congratulate the council on its submission. It is one of the more succinct and well argued ones we have received. I hope the representatives do not expect us to read the entire bibliography they have supplied. They have done a great deal of research.

To return to an earlier point, the council lays great emphasis on the family. We accept there are different definitions of the family and not only the narrow matrimonial definition. There is the issue of cohabitees and representatives mentioned marriage and civil partnership for single sex unions. Leaving aside whether there should be a marriage or civil partnership because we can deal with that under law, the council's proposed wording in respect of Article 41.2.1 is as follows:

The state recognises that family life gives to society a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. The state endeavours to support caring for others within the home.

We need to explore whether cohabitees fit into that provision and how they would do so. I would say they should — that is my perspective. Does that provision cover them?

The other point that needs to be made is that much reference has been made to the social background to the 1937 document. I will not say fashion changes but norms changes. People could be doing this exercise in 70 years' time. Because of the norms of our time, we insert certain provisions in the Constitution which in 50 years' time would begin to appear a little bit out of date. From a practical point of view, I do not know how one could deal with such changes other than by reducing the provisions to very simple principles and statements of rights. Perhaps that can be done by reference to the European Convention on Human Rights or some other convention.

I also note the council has asked, as have many other groups, for the rights of children to be affirmed, to which I think Mr. Luddy did not refer in her presentation.

On the issue of the biological function and natural parents, several delegations made the point that the rights of each of the parents needs to be protected. The rebuttal to that might be that one parent has had absolutely no input, a second relationship has formed and the child is comfortable and very well loved in the second relationship. The issue is how to deal with that situation. The representatives have been novel in their presentation in referring to the social aspect rather than the biological aspect. Could they tease out that social dimension?

Senators Ormonde and Daly have questions, therefore, I ask the representatives to respond to all the questions together at the end.

I thank the representatives. There is a great deal of reading and reflective thinking in the submission. It reflects a caring approach. The group seeks an amendment to the Constitution which would provide guarantees and respect for family life. I am not convinced this would happen as a result of amending the Constitution. Perhaps we should start another way and examine updating our legislation and our education system with regard to the rights and responsibilities of people who bring children into the world. We are talking about the rights of children and how they can be protected.

No matter how much we change the Constitution, we might not get this right. I am concerned about diluting the Constitution to reflect new concepts which are evident in today's society. The issue is legislation versus amendment of the Constitution. I am more concerned that we update our legislation. We are doing that through the Law Reform Commission's proposals relating to cohabitees, maintenance, property rights and so forth. Should we consider thoroughly updating the legislation first and getting that right, before diluting the Constitution, which I believe might happen? That would dilute the fabric of society. While I do not condemn any way of life or family life, I am concerned that things might change again in future years.

I welcome the delegation and thank its members for the presentation. I wish to discuss the issue of children in same sex partnerships. What has the delegation's research shown with regard to the numbers of children being reared by same sex partners? I raised the issue of child poverty on a number of occasions with various delegations. The committee was given evidence yesterday that the gap is widening where child poverty is concerned. Would the new arrangement mentioned by the delegation exacerbate or help alleviate that situation? Second, why does the delegation believe that a referendum along these lines would be carried? It is more than likely that, in the present climate, such a referendum would be rejected. How would the delegation influence the public in the referendum campaign to vote as it suggests?

On the same issue, some same sex couples have the ambition to adopt children. What is the delegation's views on that?

Ms Luddy

I will deal with the questions regarding children in same sex relationships. There has been no research to date to show that living in same sex relationships has any detrimental effects on the child's welfare. As we stated in the submission, it has been proven that the quality of the parenting has had a significant impact on children's development, whether that is in a lone parent, marriage, cohabitees or same sex situation. We do not have evidence which proves that a child living with a gay or lesbian couple is any worse off than a child living in a marriage.

Does the organisation have any research on the numbers of children living in that type of relationship in Ireland?

Ms Fantini

We do not have numbers at present because those data are not being collected in Ireland. International research is mentioned in the references. Irish research did not specify same sex couples because that information is obviously hard to access. They could be already existing within reconstituted families in the sense that they might not have adopted a child but one of the two partners might be separated or divorced from a previous heterosexual relationship. They exist but there are no data on them.

Irish research by McKeown et al shows that if one removes the discrimination or the socioeconomic circumstances and just looks at the dynamics within the family, the children are not worse off. Of course, they might be worse off if they are experiencing external factors that might render their experiences more negative. However, with regard to the family unit and child development in the context of the parents raising them, these depend on the quality of the caring relationship as opposed to other factors.

There were some questions about the changing of social mores and how something might be fashionable at one stage and is not fashionable later. That is certainly the case. What has not changed, however, is the importance of the family in Irish society. It was important in 1922 and 1937 and it is important today. A way of overcoming the fear of changing social mores to make cohabitation popular and acceptable or unpopular and unacceptable is the fact that the family will always remain the important factor and we should focus on that.

I understand what you are saying but the family as enunciated in the Constitution refers to a family based on marriage, that is, a mother, father and children. It does not take into account cohabitees, same sex couples or single parents. In other words, the family as mentioned in the Constitution is narrowly interpreted, even by the courts. Do you believe the Constitution must be changed in that regard?

Dr. Kelleher

I will respond to that because it relates to all the contributions. We are suggesting the principle of simplifying the Constitution to reflect as closely as possible a universal reality, which is the family is a caring unit. We do not believe that principle will change either within this society or over time. That ought to be reflected in the Constitution in that way. The removal of the special provision regarding the marriage unit, therefore, allows for a more inclusive approach. This is an inclusive approach which could be carried in the Constitution because it is in the interest of everybody in society.

I have read the amendment you drafted. It would encompass the concept of same sex marriages.

Dr. Kelleher

Yes, it could be interpreted that way.

Senator Norris, who is a leading campaigner for gay rights, has said, both in his proposed Bill and in private conversation, that what he seeks is recognition and tax equity in terms of income and inheritance taxes. He said they are not interested in going further because one can see the current difficulties with it in America and so forth. Would that not be a flaw in the amendment? Would people not see it as a back door attempt to incorporate gay marriage into the Constitution, which might cause a problem?

Dr. Kelleher

Absolutely. The other point which we have been queried on is that this has to operate in both directions. Clearly, for practical purposes many situations would have to be legislated for, whether or not we change the Constitution. That is the only way to deliver clearly on the interpretation of the provisions. This would have to proceed in parallel. Many of the points that are being raised are obviously about very practical things.

Is the council satisfied that in the proposed amendment it has put before us, the wider dimension is covered, in other words, that cohabitees and single parent families are covered? Am I correct in saying the second part incorporates people who are not part of the nuclear family?

Ms Luddy

Is the Senator referring to the wording: "The State endeavours"?

Ms Luddy

Yes. The Senator can take it that we would see that as included.

Deputy McCormack wanted to come back in. I will allow Ms Luddy to clarify that later.

The Women's Health Council is a statutory body that was set up in 1997 to advise the Minister for Health and Children on all aspects of women's health. Ms Luddy referred to the legislation. What success has the council had in having legislation amended, adopted or introduced since its establishment in 1997?

Ms Luddy

Is the Deputy referring to changes in legislation?

Yes. If the council is there to advise, I am sure it is advising the Minister on anything that would advance women's health. Has it advised on any matters of legislation, rather than trying to solve this by constitutional amendment? What success has the council had since 1997 in advising the Minister as a statutory body?

The question could be put in another way. Has the council's work, to date, influenced the Minister or legislation?

Has the Minister sought a view from the council on issues, such as changes in the Social Welfare Act, which seems to be something that can be done?

It is up to the council's representatives if they feel the question is unfair. Anyhow, I want them to conclude — perhaps they have some final points to make — because we are well over time. I apologise that we were late in starting, which was not the fault of the council's representatives. We have given them more than their allotted time.

Ms Fantini

Of course, the Minister for Health and Children looks after health in the sense of a lot of related things, especially service delivery as well as health policy. However, much social legislation deals with many other issues that affect health. As we all know, transport, child care, education, housing and other issues affect women's health, as well as men's. We feel we should not just limit ourselves to looking at the things that are delivered within the Department of Health and Children, but all the other legislation that impinges on the health of the population, including women's health.

Ms Luddy

As regards our influence, obviously, we can advise but there is no obligation on the Minister or Departments to take our advice. We have advised in several areas. Our submission to the Oireachtas committee examining the Green Paper on Abortion, suggested that the Government should look at a national strategy to reduce crisis pregnancies and in that way, reduce the necessity for abortion. Some years ago the Government set up the crisis pregnancy agency to do just that. So, there has been influence there.

I would like to return to the question of same-sex couples, children and adoption. In all areas to do with children, the council feels the welfare of the child should be paramount to any social arrangements. That should be kept primarily in mind. The Equal Status Act states that discrimination relating to sexual orientation is prohibited. We are not quite sure how that will pan out concerning, for instance, assisted human reproduction. That is possibly work for another day for the committee. However, the council definitely feels the welfare of the child is paramount and, therefore, parenthood should be looked at from the angle of the best outcome of the child.

I thank the council for its presentation. Obviously, we will take it on board before we make our report. We are thankful for the clear and succinct manner in which the presentation was made.

Sitting suspended at 11.35 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m.

The next presentation is by the Adoption Board represented by Mr. John Collins, chief executive, Mr. Kiernan Gildea, registrar, Ms Patricia Smyth, senior social worker, and Ms Celia Loftus. You are all very welcome.

Before we begin I must remind visitors that members have absolute privilege but this same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. I apologise for the late start which was because we had some matters to deal with beforehand. However, we will allow you the allotted time, at least, in which to give your presentation. We have received your submission, which the members have read. I ask you, if possible, to synopsise in six or seven minutes the important aspects of your submission. We will then have a question and answer session.

We will be as brief as we can in order to allow time for questions. The Adoption Board welcomes the opportunity to appear before the All-Party Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution and to assist the committee in its examination of family rights in the Constitution. The key principle informing the work of the Adoption Board is that adoptions should always be carried out in the best interests of the child. This requirement underpins the written submission made by the board in response to the questions on the family set out for consideration by the Oireachtas Committee. Arising from this, the board would ask that the Committee on the Constitution place the rights of children to have their welfare and best interests assured on, at least, an equal par constitutionally with the rights of the marital family. Furthermore, in areas of conflicting rights under the Constitution, because of a child's greater vulnerability, the committee should consider giving the rights of the child particular protection having due regard to the rights and duties of parents in respect of the welfare of their children.

On the matter of how the family should be defined, the board takes note of the constitutional review group's preferred option to retain the protection of the family unit based on marriage, but also to guarantee individual rights to respect other family life, whether or not the family is based on marriage. The Adoption Board supports a broadening of the constitutional definition of the family in line with the UN convention's definition of the family, so as to more fully reflect the changing nature of Irish society in general and of adoption practice in particular.

On the matter of the balance between the rights of the family as a unit and the rights of individual members, the Adoption Board considers that Articles 41 and 42 place too much emphasis on the right of the family as a unit, as compared with the rights of individuals within the unit. One of the consequences is that children of marriage are not eligible to be adopted other than in exceptional circumstances.

The Adoption Board recommends that the welfare of the child be a primary consideration underpinning constitutional change and that all children, regardless of the marital status of their parents, be eligible for adoption in certain circumstances. This would recognise the right to alternative care for children who, for any reason, cannot remain with their natural families and the need to provide such children with special care and protection.

On the matter of constitutional protection for families other than those based on marriage, whether same sex couples should be allowed to marry and the role of mothers or other persons within the home, the Adoption Board wishes to see a broadening of the definition of "the family" in line with the UN definition to reflect more fully the changing nature of Irish society. In the area of adoption the issue of paramount concern in meeting the needs of children is parenting capacities which are not defined by marital status. The board wishes to see the word "woman" replaced by the word "parent" or "primary care giver" in Article 41.2.2°.

The Adoption Board considers that in cases of conflicting rights, the rights of the child need to be given particular protection under the Constitution because of the child's greater vulnerability, having due regard to the rights and duties of parents in respect of the welfare of their children. This is in keeping with the suggestion of the review group to include in the Constitution an express obligation to treat the best interests of the child as paramount in any actions relating to children. This would resolve any conflict in favour of the child.

Should the rights of a natural mother have express constitutional protection and what rights should a natural father have and how should they be protected? The courts have established that natural birth mothers have unenumerated rights, including a right to privacy. A natural or birth father is not considered to have any constitutionally protected rights or obligations to his child. The Adoption Board recommends that a new section be inserted into Article 41 giving everyone a right to respect for their family life in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This would include respect for non-marital family life between a natural or birth mother and her child and a natural or birth father and his child. Any necessary limitations on such rights would need to be clearly defined in law. For example, in the case of a natural birth father, any such rights would have to be in the context of an established relationship with the child in question, not simply by reason of biological link. The board also considers that natural or birth parents who consent to place their children for adoption should be informed in the event of a breakdown in the adoption placement and should be consulted about future care arrangements for the child.

Should the rights of the child be given expanded constitutional protection? The Adoption Board supports the review group's recommendation that Article 41 contain an express guarantee of those rights of a child which are not guaranteed elsewhere or are particular to children such as the right to be reared with due regard to his or her welfare. The board also supports the review group's recommendation that it is desirable to include in the Constitution an express obligation to treat the best interests of the child as a paramount consideration in any action relating to the child.

Does the Constitution need to be changed in view of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child? The Adoption Board considers that the Constitution should enshrine the welfare of the child as a first and paramount consideration in all decisions relating to the promotion of the welfare of the child who does not receive adequate care and protection. In regard to adoption, the board also recommends that children should have an equal right in the State, whether they are children of marriage, in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights.

Interestingly, Mr. Collins mentioned a matter raised yesterday that it is virtually impossible for a married couple to give their child up for adoption, irrespective of circumstances. How could this provision be changed? Could it be changed by way of legislation or would it require a constitutional amendment? Obviously, it would arise in unusual circumstances but should it be made possible since it is more or less impossible at present?

I gather from Mr. Collins's submission that the Adoption Board would have no difficulty allowing same sex couples to adopt. Mr. Collins has mentioned, as have other groups, that the board would like the position of the child enhanced in the Constitution. Does he believe that by giving the child "primacy" — a word used yesterday — or a central role in the Constitution, it could get over the current difficulties in that the Constitution refers to the family as being a married couple and excludes cohabiting couples, single mothers and single fathers or situations where people have entered new relationships?

The legal position in respect of a married couple giving their child up for adoption is that the family would have to be seen to abandon the child. Under the 1988 Act, one would have to go to the High Court to demonstrate the family had abandoned the child. The Act ensures constitutional protection of the family but presents a very serious difficulty in cases where it is clear family relationships have broken down. There are approximately 1,700 to 2,000 children of marriages in long-term foster care who would clearly benefit from the opportunity of stability adoption gives. That is a unique aspect of adoption in that it creates a permanent relationship as if the child was a child of marriage. We believe there are many children in care who would benefit from this. For instance, in the United Kingdom it would be more typical for the children of marriage to be adopted rather than those in long-term foster care.

The Adoption Board notes that the Minister has a proposal around which he is preparing legislation that will allow a child who has been in long-term foster care to opt to be adopted when he or she reaches the age of 21 years. The board's view is that it would be preferable for the stability of the child if the option of adoption was available earlier. Having said that, it is not saying adoption is the right answer in every case as clearly it is not and fostering has a role in terms of short-term care for families in difficulties. However, some children would benefit from adoption.

On the same sex couple issue, the Adoption Board's view is that there are two important aspects to successful adoption. The couple must have the parenting capacity. Therefore, it is parenting capacity rather than one's legal status which will determine whether one will raise children successfully. The stability of the relationship is another issue at which we look. Obviously, a gay couple cannot adopt. Only a married couple or a single applicant can adopt. Therefore, such a case has not arisen. We are not saying we are in favour or are against. What we are saying is that in making decisions in regard to adoption the issues around parenting capacity in certain types of relationship would arise and that the depth and effectiveness of the assessment of the couple, which is important, would be a major issue at which we would look.

Mr. Kiernan Gildea

The question might be examined in the broader context in that at present, the only couple which can adopt is a married couple. Even a heterosexual couple cannot adopt. Sole applicants apply, some of whom are in a heterosexual relationship.

How many children born in the State are offered for adoption on an annual basis?

Mr. Gildea

Approximately 300 domestic adoptions take place per year but there are two types. Approximately 80 are "stranger" adoptions which involve complete strangers to the children but the other 220 are step-parenting adoptions whereby a woman has a child and later marries a man other than the child's father. If he wishes, the man concerned has to adopt the child for the marriage.

The Adoption Board considers that the Constitution should enshrine the statement, "The welfare of the child is the first and paramount consideration". It has been difficult to adopt in Ireland in recent times because babies are not available and the board has stringent standards regarding parents who adopt. Significant protocol is observed before it eventually accedes to an adoption. The Dowse case which has put foreign adoptions in sharp focus resonated because the child who speaks English is alone in an orphanage in Indonesia after his parents changed their minds regarding his adoption. If the welfare of the child was enshrined in the Constitution, how could foreign adoptions be reconciled with this? The board observes stringent standards for domestic adoptions but the same parameters are not applied to foreign adoptions. Ireland has become multicultural and embraces various ethnic minorities but how can this be recognised in the Constitution?

There is a great deal of misinformation about the Dowse case. It is not an inter-country adoption. The Dowses, who were living in Indonesia, were allowed by the authorities to adopt under their law. That is where the difficulty arose. An inter-country adoption is an adoption between two countries. We are responsible for assessing the applicants as suitable parents to adopt a child. The assessment process that applies, whether it is a domestic or inter-country adoption, is as stringent in protecting the rights of children. The Minister is preparing legislation to ratify the Hague Convention on inter-country adoption and we strongly recommend that it be brought forward as quickly as possible because by ratifying it the Adoption Board will be given stronger powers to regulate inter-country adoptions. That would offer us a stronger position in the process.

Constitutionally, once a child is adopted abroad and the Adoption Board recognises the law of the other country has the same effect on the legal status of the child as Irish law, it is obliged to recognise the adoption. This means the child automatically becomes an Irish citizen and has all the protection that affords. Unfortunately, in the Dowse case, while the child has been entered in the adoption register, that is a recognition of his entitlement to citizenship which derives from Indonesian adoption law. The ambassador is in Indonesia trying to establish the legal status of the adoption because the Indonesian authorities have only latterly raised a question about whether it is legal. A legal court order was made in Jakarta to adopt the child. Therefore, as far as the board is concerned, the child is legally adopted.

That may change.

We must wait and see what the courts——

It is still sub judice.

Ms Patricia Smyth

I refer to domestic adoptions. Few children are eligible for adoption but the process is slightly different. First, more mothers are opting to keep their children which is right if they have support. Second, more mothers are involved in the adoption process. In other words, they have a say in the selection of the couple who adopt the baby. There is much more emphasis on openness in adoption. The Adoption Board supports this. We have made proposals regarding the new legislation whereby there should be a possibility of contracts being drawn up in order that even after the adoption order is made, there can be ongoing contact in the interests of the child, the birth mother and the adopters, if that is so wished.

I welcome the delegation. I wish to follow up Senator Finucane's question. In the light of the Dowse case, should the Adoption Board have a role in the assessment process where Irish citizens adopt under the laws of another state for the protection of the future Irish citizens?

I refer to the adoption of children of a marriage. Should the consent of both parents be needed in all circumstances? For example, if one parent did not have a caring role for a number of years and did not intend to have a future role, should he or she have the right to prevent an adoption?

I also welcome the representatives of the Adoption Board. Their appearance is timely, given the case in Indonesia and the confusion that still pertains regarding adoptions. I would not even consider amending the Constitution in regard to adoption because there is so much confusion. We need to put our house in order before contemplating an amendment. The rights and welfare of the child are the fundamental issues and have been clouded in the past. Many years ago nobody knew how adoptions were conducted because there were no assessment procedures. How can anyone be sure, no matter how professional, skilled and well trained the assessors are, that they can get it absolutely right? Our legislation should be updated and there should be a broader discussion of the issue. What are the views of the representatives on this? I would not dare to seek the amendment of the Constitution because I am not knowledgeable enough and not well enough equipped in my own thinking. However, I would like more information. Legislation should be introduced in the light of the discussion in the newspapers recently. We are not informed properly about adoption. We should have another meeting about whether the Constitution should be amended.

Senator Ormonde referred to a married couple who might wish to give up their child for whatever reason. This is currently prohibited but legislation alone will not solve that problem. If one parent decided to challenge the Constitution, it would almost certainly be upheld.

Ms Smyth

While I am not an expert on the Constitution, the big difficulty is that it relates to children of a married couple. The special position of marriage within the Constitution limits a number of children in the care system who are being considered for adoption. We are not promoting adoption but it is an option in the long-term care plan. As the chief executive officer said, there are 2,000 children in long-term care who have a right to a family life just like the rest of us.

Is Ms Smyth talking about two years or more?

Ms Smyth

Yes, more than two years.

On the role of the board and Irish couples living abroad who adopt abroad, it is a little more complicated than Irish couples simply going abroad to adopt. For instance, many Irish people who adopt in America, and consider themselves Americans, are entitled to a passport. Their children may acquire that right and seek to obtain a passport. One of the reasons for a provision for the registration of foreign adoptions in the original legislation arose because of a case of an Irish couple living in England who adopted an English child and the child then sought to have its adoption recognised for the purposes of getting an Irish passport. This provision will allow for that to happen.

When people are living abroad and adopting under the legislation of other countries- this is what happened in the Dowse case — it is very difficult for us to get involved. The Minister has already indicated he wants to explore with us what, if anything, can be done. The purpose of the legislation is to protect the rights of the child. Once adopted, this is very difficult. The Deputy is correct in saying that we should be very calm and slow to change what has been proved in our own inter-country adoption system to be very effective in terms of protecting children.

Mr. Gildea

There have been more than 2,000 entries in the register since it was established in 1991, 341 of which took place last year. There are four ways to qualify. The vast majority of people who qualify are people who are assessed here, following a rigorous assessment process of 18 months to two years, go abroad, come back with a child, register and follow through on that. There is a special provision for people who are resident abroad. These amount to 20 or 30 cases a year, one of which is the Dowse case. It could include a couple who emigrated to Britain in the 1950s and adopted a child. The child who may now be in his or her fifties, and whose parents may be deceased, may have been adopted under British legislation, which we recognise, and may come to us for an entry in the register. It could also include an Irish couple who emigrated to America in the 1980s and adopted from Mexico. They may have Irish passports and wish to remain in the United States but they may wish to have an Irish passport for their child. Sometimes when one receives the application, the parents are dead and cannot be assessed. Why would one assess them if they are long gone? This is a special case of a domestic adoption in Indonesia, which was recognised by Ireland because we recognise the legitimacy of Indonesian law. It also affects a small number of other people.

Ms Celia Loftus

May I answer the constitutional legal questions that have been raised on whether legal change would be sufficient for children of a marriage? As Ms Smyth said, the main point we would like to get across is that adoption is part of another child care option in terms of the continuum of child care options. In reality, when one examines the constitutional definition, it is the second line, where it is defined by marriage, which causes the most difficulty. Every adoption is defined by marriage. It is a case of who can adopt, who can place for adoption and what children can go for adoption, which is very limiting. There are thousands of children in foster care who should have a right to family life. As happened in the 1988 Act, the law can change who can be placed for adoption. The Constitution needs to be changed to not just cherish and enshrine the family in marriage because otherwise the overarching structure will not allow the law to change.

I will now call on Senator Dardis and Deputy Morgan.

My question related to consent within marriage.

I think the delegates heard some of the earlier discussion on the family and so on. This probably relates to what the Deputy is saying about the nuclear family, cohabitees and so on. We all accept that the child must be the centre of attention and the focus has to be on the welfare of the child. I accept what Ms Smyth said earlier in regard to children in long-term fostering and that leading on to adoption.

The document refers to the balance of rights between the family as a unit and the rights of individual members. It states that the Adoption Board recommends that the welfare of the child be the primary consideration underpinning constitutional change in this area and that all children, regardless of the marital status of their parents, should be eligible for adoption in certain circumstances. I do not disagree with that approach.

It goes on to say that this recognises the right to alternative care for children who for any reason cannot remain with their natural family and the need to provide such children with special protection and assistance. It conjures up images for me of children being taken from their families and brought to institutional homes because it was deemed by the local parish priest that it was in their interest to do so. I am uncomfortable with this. Perhaps Ms Smyth will deal with my discomfort. There is a sort of half-way house such as guardianship. In other words, if fostering was long term, the foster parents could go on to be guardians.

Ms Smyth

That has been put forward as a proposal for new legislation. Once children are in foster care for five years, the foster parents can apply for guardianship of the child if the child is not eligible for adoption.

Does the guardianship deal with my discomfort?

The majority of cases of domestic adoption are step-parent adoptions where guardianship is available. It would not have the same status as adoption. The fact that there are so many applications each year from the public for adoptions where a guardianship option is available indicates that there is a public demand around the sense of the completeness and equality of the adopted child within the family. Frequently the situation would be that the birth mother will come in with the new husband and perhaps two children, one child whom she had prior to the marriage, and they are seeking to have all their children treated with equal esteem, and adoption is seen as the option for doing so.

To answer the concerns raised about what happened in child welfare services in the past, given our history, one would have to be concerned about this aspect. It is the view of the Adoption Board that the best place for a child to be brought up, whether an Irish child or a child in any other country, is in its natural family. This principle is enshrined in everything we do, as well as in the Hague Convention on inter-country adoption. It is a major issue in inter-country adoption in terms of ensuring that the children being put forward for adoption internationally are legitimately available and cannot be adopted in their own countries.

The difficulty arises where one has the power to arbitrate on the welfare of the child. It is not that there is a lack of desire to attend to the welfare of the child. Somebody must arbitrate on the issue and that is where the difficulty arises.

Currently the Adoption Board can dispense with the birth mother's consent to adoption, but we have to go to the High Court to do this. The High Court is heavily involved in adoption and appropriately so because we are dealing with constitutional issues.

I have not forgotten the question asked about the consent of birth fathers. For us——

I am not implying that it is always fathers that do this.

Perhaps that reflects our experience in the Adoption Board. Let us look at two cases, first in a situation where it is not a child of a marriage. The birth father has a right to be consulted, but that is as far as that right goes. We feel that the rights of a father in an adoption situation need attention. In terms of our proposal that more children of marriage should be made available for adoption, both parents should have an equal right to consent. We also feel that any safeguards put in which may involve the courts would apply in both cases. The Adoption Board would certainly welcome a greater involvement and more rights for both birth parents. We point out, however, that with regard to birth fathers this would not simply be based on biology but on the establishment of a relationship.

These cases can be quite complex. Frequently, one finds that while the birth father may no longer be involved with the child, the birth father grandparents are involved and have a relationship with the child. This is another situation where the Adoption Board would move slowly to ascertain the relationships important to the child and his or her development or to ensure that any action taken by the board supports those relationships rather than infringes them.

We are under pressure with regard to time, but I do not want to restrict anybody. We will take questions from Deputies Morgan and Andrews and then wind up as another group is waiting to come in before lunch.

I note the board's recommendation to amend Articles 41 and 42 and there is virtual universal consensus emerging with regard to the definition of the family. When considering those articles, did the Adoption Board reflect on the possibility of deleting them entirely and replacing them? Did the board consider that or would it consider that to be a more constructive way forward?

I had a number of other questions but this discussion has been excellent and has answered a number of issues on which I wished clarification. On the issue of whether same sex couples should be permitted to adopt, the board has not given a view. Given the board's status, does it not think it is important it should share its view on that issue with us or is it the case that the board cannot agree a position?

Mr. Collins did give an answer on that earlier. I am not sure whether it is appropriate for him to give a view. He may not be in a position to do so and I do not want him to entrap himself in a situation. However, if he can answer it, well and good.

All I can say is that the Adoption Board's approach to same sex couples is in the context of the fact that only married couples and single applicants can adopt. In terms of the future we come back to the issue that what we focus on is the child and his or her best interests. The assessment of the potential parents then becomes the issue and whether they are suitable parents and have the capacity to nurture the child and provide him or her with a stable relationship. Clearly, the current context of the status of non-marital families and relationships is another issue. That is as far as I can go today because that is as far as the board has considered the matter. We must continue to focus on the child and his or her best interests.

With regard to Articles 41 and 42, we have not considered whether they should be deleted and I would not feel confident to give an opinion on the matter.

So the board did not look at that option.

Ms Smyth

Our stress is on the paramount interest and welfare of the child. That is where we come from.

Ms Loftus

I wanted to add another sentence to what Mr. Collins said. Another important issue in adoption practice is the matching of a particular child's needs to the selected parent. Many same sex couples have come through discrimination and therefore have major strengths in parenting at which we currently cannot consider openly.

I should have asked a question about foster care earlier. It was said that it is not possible for the foster carers to adopt them. Is this true across the board for children from a marriage that has broken down but not dissolved, children from a marriage that is dissolved, or children of a non-marital family? Does the type of family children come from determine whether their foster carers can adopt them?

Ms Smyth

It is not across the board. Some children in foster care are eligible for adoption. However, this relates to children of a marriage where, perhaps, there is still contact with the parent. The grounds for freeing children of married couples for adoption come under the Adoption Act 1988. There must be neglect and abandonment over a long period of time.

In other words the child of a non-marital family can be adopted without difficulty.

Ms Smyth

Yes.

Therefore, the Constitution, in a way, can create a danger for marital children and is of benefit to non-marital children. Is that the case?

Ms Smyth

Yes.

I thank the Adoption Board for its thought-provoking presentation. We will take the board's submission and today's presentation into account in our deliberations.

Sitting suspended at 12.18 p.m. and resumed at 12.20 p.m.

The next item on the agenda is the presentation by Treoir, represented by Ms Margaret Dromey, chief executive officer, Ms Margot Doherty, Ms Natalie McDonnell and Ms Eilish Craig, secretary.

I welcome the members of the delegation to the meeting. Before beginning proceedings I must remind visitors that members of this committee have absolute privilege but the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before it.

The committee has received the delegation's excellent submission which has been studied by the members. I ask the delegation to synopsise the submission and highlight its important points within a timeframe of ten minutes. Members will then ask questions.

I apologise to the delegation for the late start, due to an overlap and I will endeavour to allow the time specified.

Ms Eilish Craig

I am the secretary of Treoir which is a national federation of agencies working with parents who are not married to each other. It is the only organisation working exclusively with unmarried parents and their children.

The aim of Treoir is to promote the rights and welfare of parents who are not married to each other and their children, who live in Ireland. Treoir was founded in 1976 so this is not a new area for us. It has been actively campaigning for and with unmarried parents since that time. It has been involved in many of the changes that have happened over the years, not least of which was the Status of Children Act 1987.

The principles of Treoir are to recognise the diversity of family life in Ireland. Treoir recognises that all families, including unmarried families, have the same rights to respect, care, support, protection and recognition. Treoir supports and promotes the rights of all children as outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. It believes that all children have a right to know, to be loved and to be cared for by both parents.

The activities of Treoir include a confidential national information centre for parents who are not married to each other and those involved in working with them. Treoir has many publications available and promotes policy change, commissions research and holds conferences and workshops on a regular basis. Treoir has a special interest in working with young parents.

I refer to some relevant statistics showing the changes in family life in Ireland over the past 30 years which show the reason it has become an urgent matter that inequalities between families should be addressed. In 2003, 31.4% of births were outside marriage, involving 19,000 children. The 2002 census revealed 52,000 children were living with cohabiting, unmarried couples. This census also revealed 153,863 lone-parent families in the State. One statistic of great concern to Treoir is that approximately 22% of children of unmarried parents do not have the name of their birth father on their birth certificate. This is a significant number of children.

The delegation appreciates the opportunity to make this submission. Our brief is specifically to deal with parents who are not married to each other. The legal position of married and unmarried parents is very different and there are clear distinctions between children whose parents are married to each other and those whose parents are not married to each other.

Treoir is concerned with children whose parents are not married to each other, mothers who are not married to the father of their children, fathers who are not married to the mother of their children and parents who are cohabiting but not married to each other. There is a significant diversity of forms of family in Ireland which need to be recognised.

As a committee on the Constitution, considering Articles 40.3, 41 and 42 we are obviously concerned about constitutional change. Based on the submissions by Treoir, it would appear that the Constitution as drafted in 1937 does not reflect the aims of that organisation. Does the group feel it is either outdated or needs to be changed to recognise family units outside marriage only?

Ms Natalie McDonnell

I would like to take two or three minutes to go through some of the more substantive parts of the submission, which should address some of the questions asked. I am sure the members of the committee have heard that our submission places children firmly at the centre of reform of articles in the Constitution. They are explicitly absent at the moment and this needs rectifying.

For children's rights to be fully protected we believe there can be no discrimination between children depending on the family form into which they are born. Flowing from that is the notion of equality for all family types. At present the Constitution does not institute that in any way. The Constitution was drafted with the family based on marriage in mind and Article 41, as members will be aware, explicitly states that it is the family based on marriage to which that article gives protection.

We would favour the European Convention on Human Rights, which takes a broad view of family and employs the notion of family life to make sense of diverse family forms, essentially on the basis of family ties and on the basis of the relationship between people within that family rather than on the institutional basis on which the family was formed, for example, marriage.

On several occasions the European Court of Human Rights has required states to treat non-marital families with the same degree of respect as marital families. We would like to see that happen under the Constitution so all families would be given the same protection and respect. It is important to point out that those two words are not the same. In 1996 the review group on the Constitution recommended retaining a pledge to protect the family based on marriage. We would caution in terms of the difference between those two words. We would not like to see further inequalities on the basis of respect for all family types but protection for families based on marriage. We feel it is not sufficient to point to difficulty in defining a family because other conventions and states also need to define families in legal terms. Why should it be any more difficult for the Irish State and the Irish courts to do so on the basis of a Constitution which protected family ties as opposed to family forms?

It has been argued before the committee in recent days that a gaping hole exists regarding children's rights in the Constitution. We reiterate that point. We would like to see the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child used as a framework within which the Constitution could give effect in an enumerated way to the rights of children. This is particularly so since up to now, the rights of children from marital families regarding their parents have been privileged vis-à-vis the rights of children from non-marital families. This situation needs to be addressed urgently.

Before finishing I would like to speak about parental rights, which is where the discussion can get problematic. Natural mothers are considered to have personal rights regarding their children. This is not the case for natural fathers. The review group on the Constitution suggested that there did not appear to be justification for giving constitutional rights to every natural father simply by reason of biological links, with which we agree. Of course it should not necessarily be just by reason of biological links. Again the European Court of Human Rights has been able to distinguish between those cases where a firm relationship exists and those where no such relationship exists. We cannot support explicitly differentiating between the rights of fathers and mothers in the Constitution or between those of unmarried and married fathers. It should be sufficient to give a protection to family ties. We should trust courts to be able to interpret using proportionality and other aids, which they do extremely well, to give effect to those rights where necessary without injustice.

We therefore recommend that if parental rights are enumerated in the Constitution, they should apply equally to both parents, regardless of whether they are married and, most importantly, they should be subject to the principle that children's rights are paramount, notwithstanding parental rights.

Statistics indicate that in 2003 some 19,000 children were born outside marriage, which represents 31.4% of births. In 1937, that figure was only 3%. It has multiplied tenfold in that period. Treoir obviously feels that the Constitution as drafted, which was well intended and has served the nation well, no longer applies because of social change and developments in the past 20 or 30 years.

Ms McDonnell

The Chairman has expressed it even better than we could. We believe that social change merits revisiting this matter. It is obvious that even though 31% of births were outside marriage, cumulatively there are more families, as we believe the rate is higher for first-time births. This is a very complicated area. Obviously people are marrying later, which means that sometimes it is just a precursor to marriage. All the same, a significant number of families do not have constitutional protection, which needs to be addressed.

I understand that a child is a very central figure in Treoir's argument. Yesterday some of the groups indicated that a child, who was born outside the constitutional parameters of a family based on marriage only, seems not to be given the same status or level — I do not want to use the phrase "second-class citizen". In its experience, does Treoir feel this is the case?

Ms Margaret Dromey

Clearly children born outside marriage do not have the same rights under the Constitution as children born in marital families. One of the main distinctions is in the area of their right to have a relationship with a father. A very strong distinction exists. They have a right to a relationship with a mother but do not have a right to a relationship with a father, whereas children born within a marriage have the right to be cared for, etc., by their father.

When it comes to having the father's name on the birth certificate, it is automatically assumed that when a married woman has a child, her husband's name appears on the birth certificate as the father. In the case of unmarried parents, a mother registers the birth and the father's name appears if she wants it to. If she does not want it to appear she can block it. Indeed even if a father does not want to appear it can be quite difficult to put the name on the birth certificate. Those are examples of distinctions and I am sure others exist.

Ms Dromey has touched on an interesting point which I have come across several times in my legal life. I know a woman who was legally divorced in England and now lives here in another relationship. She has had three children in her new relationship and they are quite happy. As she is technically a married woman, when each of them was born, she was required to get her former husband, who is divorced and reluctant to do so, to sign a declaration that he is not the natural father. Does Treoir feel this should be changed?

Ms Dromey

Absolutely.

I am talking about a case involving a full decree of divorce and not one where they have simply split up.

Ms Dromey

I would have thought that if the divorce were recognised here it would be accepted that her husband was not the father of those children.

Apparently when she went to the registrar she was advised to have a form signed which was very inconvenient for her, as she had not seen her former husband for some time.

Ms Margot Doherty

Under the provisions of the law as it stands, I understood that in a case where a woman gave birth ten months or more after getting divorced, there was no longer a presumption that her ex-husband was the father.

While that may be the case, I have seen this happen in the past 12 months.

Strangely enough I have been struck by cases in which the children of non-marital families are more easily protected in vulnerable situations, for example when in foster care, about which we have just spoken to representatives of the Adoption Board. Yesterday we discussed various cases, including the famous North Western Health Board v. H.W. case, which would have been decided differently if the child had come from a non-marital family. It seems to swing both ways. Regardless of how we consider the matter, constitutionally there seem to be two different types of children. We try to avoid putting tags on these matters.

My first question relates to cohabitation. When does Treoir consider family law rights should accrue to two people who live together? I refer to two young people who move into the same flat together, for example. Should the State recognise the couple as a family? For how long should they cohabit before they are accorded such recognition? Should they need to register that they are cohabiting? When should family law rights start to flow? Maintenance contracts between cohabiting couples are not recognised in this country. If we amend the Constitution, how should such cases be resolved? How should decisions be made on such matters?

The delegation has also said children and parents should have enumerated rights. Does it suggest such rights should be outlined in the Constitution? Does it consider it would be more appropriate to include in the Constitution a general comment about parents and children and then allow the Legislature to enumerate the rights?

The members of the delegation have mentioned that the European Court of Human Rights has made a distinction between the cases of biological fathers who have a tie and those who do not. Can the members of the delegation give further details of the case in question? I would be interested in such details because the issue is central to the debate on the level of State interference in people's emotional ties. We need to discuss whether the State can enforce emotional ties and bonds. If the European Court of Human Rights has come up with some distinction in that regard, I would be very interested to know what it is and how it came up with it.

Ms McDonnell

The Deputy has highlighted the complexity of these issues. The articles as we are presenting them interact with each other. That is where the real complexity lies.

I am sure the Deputy is aware that the Law Reform Commission has done some work on the position of cohabitees. The commission recommended that family law rights should accrue to cohabitees with children after two years and to cohabitees without children after three years.

Must the cohabitees ask to be given such rights or do the rights apply automatically?

Ms McDonnell

The Deputy has asked whether it is a presumptive scheme and a registration scheme. Treoir recommended that both forms of scheme be implemented. It argued that rights should accrue automatically to cohabitees with children after a certain amount of time. It also recommended that a public information campaign be initiated to inform people of what they might or might not be getting into. The rights of individuals are affected as well. A person who is cohabiting might not realise that rights will accrue after a certain period of time. I understand the Law Reform Commission recommended a registration scheme, rather than a presumptive scheme. It depends on how that is played out. Treoir would like the Government to put in place a system whereby a couple can register their partnership, as well as a system whereby rights accrue to them automatically after a certain length of time. Treoir believes children should be at the centre of this process.

The current succession rights are not acceptable as they apply to issues such as maintenance and one's partner's housing. The division of family property, for example, is governed by archaic rules of equity, to the detriment of cohabitees. I do not think the family home petition Act has been changed for 150 years. There is a need for reform in this area. The UK Government has acknowledged the legislative difficulties in this regard, but it has decided to undertake a public information campaign while it is considering how to proceed. I do not think one needs to change the Constitution to give rights to cohabitees, which is interesting. Treoir would prefer changes to be made within the constitutional framework and a legislative scheme to be put in place to address the rights of cohabitees.

Deputy Andrews also asked whether the rights of parents and children should be enumerated in the Constitution. Treoir would like children's rights to be specifically enumerated. It does not have such strong feelings about parental rights because if one includes the Article 8——

I am interested in the right to child care, for example, and parents' right to support in that regard. Should such rights be enumerated in the Constitution? We have had problems on previous occasions when we tried to spell out things in the Constitution.

Ms McDonnell

Treoir is not thinking specifically about such socioeconomic rights. It is thinking about the right to be heard, the right to identity and birth information and the right to a relationship with both parents. The Deputy spoke earlier about the differences in the treatment of marital and non-marital families. If the rights I have mentioned were enumerated, it would make no difference whether a child's parents were married. Children would have such rights regardless of the rights of their parents. Treoir would like the anomaly identified earlier by the Deputy to be removed in that way. If one enumerates the rights of parents, one should give all parents equal rights. If one is not prepared to give equal rights, one should not enumerate parental rights at all. If one provides for the right to respect for family life, one would automatically provide for the rights of individual parents to family life. That would be an easier way of addressing the matter.

Treoir feels the rights of fathers need to be addressed. It would be fine if such rights were provided by providing for the right to family life. We should not create more inequities at the level of the Constitution, which is our broadest political instrument and should be as non-discriminatory as possible. I do not know whether I have answered the Deputy's question.

I also asked about the European Court of Human Rights.

Ms McDonnell

Page 2 of the document that Treoir submitted to the joint committee contains a list of the cases in question. One of the cases relating to fathers was Keegan v. Ireland, which was mentioned in the initial submission made by Treoir. The case of Barrehab v. The Netherlands was also mentioned.

Ms McDonnell said amendments could be made to the laws relating to cohabiting couples by means of legislation rather than constitutional change. The joint committee has studied the 1995 Ennis case, in which Mr. Justice Kelly refused to recognise the contractual arrangements between a cohabiting couple who had a child, on the basis that their relationship was not recognised by the Constitution. The High Court has said it cannot recognise such arrangements. Perhaps legislative changes would not stand up to challenge.

I welcome the members of the delegation. I thank them for the clear and precise manner in which they made their case. Treoir, which was established in 1976, represents 30 agencies. Can Ms McDonnell outline to the committee the issues which have arisen in respect of which action needs to be taken? If we were to place the provisions of the conventions — I refer in particular to the European Convention on Human Rights — in the Constitution, or to combine their provisions, how would it impact on the rights of children? I ask Ms McDonnell to respond on the basis of the information received by Treoir on foot of its inquiries. Would it make any difference?

Ms McDonnell

It would make an enormous difference. It has been noted, for example in the context of the Kilkenny incest case, that the manner in which this country privileges marital parents and the marital family means that children's rights cannot be given full effect. I am sure Ms Craig and Ms Dromey will have something practical to say about this aspect of the matter. People have mentioned that if parents do not have equal constitutional rights, it is more difficult to effect the welfare principle and to put the child first. I am sure the Adoption Board has addressed the joint committee on this matter. It is difficult for marital children to be adopted. That is an example of the anomalies which exist. The provisions contained in the conventions mentioned by the Senator are much broader, although quite specific rights are set out for children. Parental rights would not be seen as superior to children's rights, which are paramount in the conventions.

Ms Dromey

Treoir views the Constitution as a set of principles under which it operates. It is not tenable to continue to discriminate, in principle, against groups of children or parents. We have to move on. While we may not always live up to them, if we start with an agreed set of principles, we will always have a goal to which to aspire.

How many complaints does TREOIR and the various organisations with which it works receive in a year?

Ms Doherty

Certainly, more than 4,000 complaints are received. Most complaints are made by parents and tend to be very complex queries about the operation of the law within itself. The Senator asked what was the practical difference for children whose parents were not married to each other. They do not have a right to a relationship or interaction with their fathers. There is a great deal of misinformation in circulation and unmarried fathers assume that because their names are on birth certificates they have the same rights as married ones, which is not the case. We would like to see this inequity addressed to ensure that children are treated equally by providing unmarried fathers with guardianship rights. All fathers should have the same access to rights.

Another practical difficulty arises under section 111 of the Succession Act which provides for the moral right of inheritance of a child. If a child cannot get access to his or her natural father, he or she will be deprived.

I am interested in pursuing issues similar to those raised by Senator Daly on the practical results of the inclusion in the Constitution of the right of a child to a relationship with both parents. In the course of their work, public representatives encounter cases in which parents of children live in separate accommodation and the father seeks local authority housing on the grounds that he cares for his children at weekends. Such fathers are only allocated one-bedroom accommodation by local authorities which do not allow for the fact that he needs a room for the child or children who come to stay with him. Does TREOIR see that such issues would be affected by a constitutional change?

I am interested in the social welfare code and the circumstances of lone parents. If social welfare officials find that a father has stayed overnight or see male shaving gear in the house of a mother, she will lose her lone-parent status. These are the practical issues which affect a child's right to be parented by both parents.

Ms Doherty

Absolutely. We must promote the involvement of both parents in their children's lives in whatever way possible. If the requirement is the provision of two more substantial houses, we must accept it. Hopefully, the longitudinal research study of children being initiated by the National Children's Office will reveal how long or short term tend to be the periods in which children are in families in which there is one resident and one non-resident parent. It may be the case that such circumstances are transitional. As people change and move on, we do not know how long such periods last.

I welcome this discussion which is providing us with much information on which we can reflect. The statistics on changing family structures in Ireland are very useful. As someone with a background in education, I notice a slight swing in the pendulum of younger thinking towards a style of life lived in the past. Should there be changes in the Constitution, or should we consider legislative provisions to protect the rights and welfare of children? While we must do everything we can for cohabiting as well as married couples and their children, I ask if that can be done through legislation rather than by amending the Constitution given that, as I maintain, attitudes will change again over the next 20 years. We may end up back here in 20 years to review the Constitution again. I am not sure, and in this regard I play the Devil's advocate. I would like to hear the delegates' comments.

Senator Ormonde has raised a number of times the issues of interfering with or diluting the Constitution too much. The difficulty, which was raised yesterday and does not only relate to children, is that the courts have in the last decade in landmark decisions stated that as cohabiting couples are unmarried, they do not have rights under the Constitution. If the Government attempts to legislate, it will be challenged and, in the current climate, a court may deem the Constitution to prohibit it from acknowledging or allowing the legislation. It is a catch-22 situation and I would like to hear the views of the delegates on it.

Ms McDonnell

The Chairman is referring to Ennis v. Butterly.

Ms McDonnell

There is definitely confusion about how the courts would or would not interpret legislation. We feel, therefore, that the best way to address the confusion is to provide constitutional protection to all family forms as we suggested based on the "family tie" approach. Such protection would mean that our social and other policy aims would be permissible under the Constitution at the very least. While it would remain the prerogative of the courts to decide the parameters of how to interpret the change, there would at least be no constitutional barrier to addressing those social policy aims.

Senator Ormonde asked if it was necessary to change the Constitution at all, but there is a lack of clarity on the issue. Some people believe it can be interpreted that the article in question does not refer to the family as based on marriage. The problem is that it is quite clear that the Constitution defines the family on the basis of marriage. We suggest the same level of respect and protection should be provided to all families rather than to marital families only. The process is not about taking rights away from marital families but about giving the possibility to enjoy rights to other families. The rights of cohabitees should also be addressed in this context. If one is to change the Constitution to provide rights to families, why not ensure that barriers no longer exist?

One assumes that the TREOIR view is that it cannot be done without changing the Constitution. Deputy O'Sullivan asked about socio-economic issues. I was not quite clear from the answer if TREOIR is strongly of the view that socio-economic rights should be enshrined also.

Ms McDonnell

We have seen other submissions which address socio-economic rights in a way which we have not. It is something we support, but we did not look into the matter in great detail. Deputy O'Sullivan asked about the social welfare code and housing. It is unclear that if one enumerates children's rights of access to their parents in the way we suggest, socio-economic rights will accrue. Other people with an interest in law might take a different view. While it is not clear that local authorities would have to pay more attention to fathers and their living arrangements from the change we suggest, if provisions were copper-fastened with a further constitutional article on socio-economic rights for children, the courts could interpret the Constitution in that light.

We see in the information centre every day problems with the social welfare code as it relates to cohabitees. Questions arise if certain shoes are under a bed or a shirt is in a house, which is an unacceptable way to approach family policy. We have maintained in our social policy submissions for a long time the need to establish a minimum income for all families and consider the working poor in the context of legal issues. I am not sure how rights could be made to accrue through the Constitution. Is that a little clearer?

Yesterday, we received an indication from the ISPCC that the poverty gap for children was broadening and their circumstances deteriorating. In light of TREOIR's information on child poverty, homelessness, begging and crime, how does it consider these issues can be addressed on the ground? Can they be addressed?

Ms McDonnell

How long is a piece of string? I imagine they can. Due to the difference between the rights of the health service and parental rights, which are focused on in the Constitution, child care cases arise in courts in which children's rights, including socio-economic rights are not honoured in the way they should be. Again, it is difficult in practical terms because, as we stated, the Constitution is the broad framework within which we legislate and work. If, however, it gives children rights which are paramount and independent of those of their parents, this will filter down and have a major effect on social work practices and traditions as well as on the way in which the courts can give effect to children's rights. How many times have we heard a judge, specifically Mrs. Justice McGuinness, state he or she would like to give children's interests priority but that his or her hands are tied by the Constitution?

Treoir's statement that marriage is no longer the primary or dominant gateway to family formation does not stand up. If 31% of children are born outside marriage, the other 69% must be born inside marriage or am I missing something?

Ms McDonnell

No, the Deputy is correct. The key, however, is that marriage is not the dominant gateway to family formation. We point to the fact that marriage is not automatically the way to enter the family unit.

When these statistics are thrown around, they are often repeated in the media and elsewhere. We should not lose sight of the fact that marriage is still the primary means of family formation, irrespective of the changes that have taken place in recent years. While I accept there are all types of families, it is clear married couples still constitute the dominant family type.

While the Deputy point is factually correct, in fairness to the representatives of Treoir, they have pointed out that their remit is primarily to represent families which are not marriage based. Obviously, therefore, the delegation will argue a case on behalf of those it represents to the best of its ability.

Ms Craig

Ms McDonnell has repeatedly made the point that we are not arguing for rights for unmarried parents over and above those of married parents but seeking equal rights.

I question the inclusion in the submission of technically incorrect statements given that they will be repeated elsewhere.

I thank the delegation for its interesting and well argued submission. It made its case cogently and fairly. I apologise for allowing the meeting to run a little late but I wanted to give the delegation sufficient time.

The joint committee adjourned at 1.05 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Thursday, 21 April 2005.

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