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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION debate -
Wednesday, 18 Nov 2009

Electoral System: Discussion.

We now proceed to our review of the electoral system. I welcome everyone to the meeting. The joint committee is continuing its series of hearings as part of its review of the electoral system. At its meeting today it will consider the implications of the current electoral system for the constituency role of Deputies. All Members regard constituency work as a most important part of their responsibilities as elected representatives. It is also a prerequisite for continuing to serve in the Dáil effectively, yet constituency work is often cited as a less desirable aspect of our electoral system, with claims that it results in relentless competition, not only between parties, but also between members of the same party; that it elects a Dáil, the Members of which are overly preoccupied with local issues and that it diverts Deputies' attention away from their role as legislators. With our panel today the committee will consider whether the type or scale of constituency service is a natural part of a parliamentarian's workload and whether a new electoral system would change the commitment needed and the importance attached to it. We will also examine the link between electoral systems and constituency service in a range of electoral systems, with a particular focus on the mixed Member proportional representation system as used in Germany, given that the MMP system is the electoral system most often proposed as an alternative by those who advocate reform.

I welcome the Minister for Transport, Deputy Noel Dempsey, Professor Michael Gallagher, department of political science, Trinity College Dublin, Dr. Thomas Lundberg, whom we thank for travelling, and Dr. Liam Weeks, who we very much appreciate has come from the real capital of Ireland.

I trust that view will be distributed in the local newsletter in the constituency.

Before commencing, I inform those present who are not Members that members of the joint committee have absolute privilege but this same privilege does not apply to those appearing before the committee. I recognise everyone is subject to time constraints but the Minister is subject to particular time constraints. The intention is to call on him to make a presentation which will be followed by questions. I will then call on the three academics to make their presentations which will be followed by more questions.

I thank the Chairman. I can stay until 10.30 a.m. To facilitate the joint committee, we can have the presentations first and then answer questions.

That is fine.

I am keen to stay and listen to my three colleagues, as I am here to learn as much as to make a presentation.

We will facilitate everyone in whatever way is possible.

I thank the Chairman and committee members for giving me the opportunity to speak and hear the presentations of Professor Michael Gallagher, Dr. Thomas Lundberg and Dr. Liam Weeks, all well established experts in political research. I emphasise that I speak on a personal basis and that I am not representing the Government per se.

I commend the committee for again opening up this very important discussion. There have been sporadic attempts in the past ten or 15 years to discuss the electoral system and our democracy and it is timely to discuss the matter again. I have long held the view that there is a need to change the system. Edmund Burke, the 18th century Irish statesman, author and political theorist, stated, "A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation." It is important that we are open to considering change and discussing and deciding on it rather than taking a peak at the possibility and then backing off for political reasons, whether party political or otherwise, as we have done in the past 15 or 20 years.

As a general comment, it is 20 years since the fall of the Berlin wall and all the changes that have taken place in eastern European countries. It is notable and remarkable that all of the democracies established in the past 20 years examined all of the electoral systems and none chose the system we have had in place since the 1920s. We have the distinction of sharing the same electoral system as Malta.

In his introduction to the meeting the Chairman put the question of the purpose of an electoral system, especially an electoral system for national parliaments. There are varying views on the matter. I believe the purpose is to elect a parliament and government representatives of the people. The idea is to try to have a stable government at the end of an electoral contest. The purpose of an elected public representative following an election is to form or be part of a government, as is the case in our democracy. Ultimately, because of the representative nature of politics here, the Parliament decides to form a government. Some have this role and I am lucky enough to be one such person. However, for the remainder, whether on the Government backbenches or in opposition, their role is to hold the Government to account by scrutinising its actions, to scrutinise and propose legislation, for example, during Private Members' time and to hold State, semi-State and other bodies and persons to account. They do so by representing the views of their constituents.

I will quote Edmund Burke again regarding his view on the role of a public representative. I believe everyone here is familiar with his famous statement:

It ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion, high respect; their business, unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.

This summarises what a public representative should be. He referred to representing the views of constituents. Our system has evolved to one in which we act not as public representatives per se but as the private representative of each constituent who contacts us. We pursue such individual issues as medical cards, housing applications, social welfare applications and so forth. We go through the bureaucracy to try to speed up the process. We do so because of our electoral system. Instead of making the bureaucracy more responsive and doing our job to ensure the system is delivering for the citizen, we do these tasks set for us by our constituents. Why do we do so? We do so partly because of the electoral system and partly because the multi-seat constituencies in the electoral system foster such inter and intra-party rivalry.

If we cannot distinguish ourselves in the House through our ability to shape and form legislation and to hold the Government to account, we will distinguish ourselves in our constituencies by the way in which we deliver for our constituents. The learned gentlemen will raise the question of whether this is the fault of the electoral system or public representatives or whether there is perhaps a wider fault. I do not blame the electoral system solely for the way we are. I blame many other systems, including our system of local government, which is neither local nor government. It is a system that has evolved. I note that Deputy Howlin who preceded me in the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government is sitting across the table from me. He started a process of reform, upon which I built, and he would probably agree that we have much further to go in that process.

We can talk all we like about reform of the electoral system but what is needed is total reform of our systems. The system of local government we have is not serving us well. It is too local and does not meet the needs of a modern democracy. Until we start reforming it in a serious way by introducing a more regional form of government we will continue to have our current difficulties.

It is now some ten years since I outlined my ideas for electoral reform at a summer school. They are not my bright ideas but I feel the system we have needs to be changed. The system which would best serve us is that which would give us single seat constituencies with a list system, something which I know witnesses will discuss. It would serve us better because it would help us to step back from the current system, release Deputies from the constituency work we have to do to get re-elected and help us to focus more on delivery on a broader basis for our constituents.

The usual line of attack when one advocates a change in the electoral system is that one wants to get away from the people and does not want to represent them or do constituency work. Constituency work, as we will probably hear from the experts, will form part of any electoral system. The question the committee has to ask — I have asked it and have come to my own conclusion — is whether the current system is the most effective one in terms of looking after our constituents.

We need to ask if we all need to be private representatives of individual constituents or whether a change in the electoral system will make us all better public representatives, allow us to better represent the views of our constituents and enable us to hold to account the people who are supposed to deliver services to the people. Those are the questions we need to ask. I have long come to the conclusion that there are better systems which will help our constituents much more.

I invite Professor Gallagher to make his presentation.

Before we proceed, if the Chairman outlines the academic credentials of all the witnesses will he use all the time we have before we have a chance to ask any questions? The Minister, Deputy Dempsey, has invited a few questions.

I am at the disposal of the members. If that is how they wish to proceed and everybody is agreeable to it, we will have questions of the Minister.

We should be focused.

Can we do it without generalities? I ask members to wait until after the presentations to make comments and ask specific questions which can be answered in a short period. We can come back to the generality of constituency work versus other things after the other presentations have been made.

It is refreshing to have a Minister here who is prepared to speak his mind. Even though I do not always agree with him, I appreciate someone who speaks his or her mind. The worst thing we can have is people who do not come out and talk. An issue such as nuclear energy, which is favoured by some people, is a sacred cow and cannot be discussed. I am glad the Minister is here.

I have a couple of questions. I do not agree or disagree with the views of the Minister. He referred to the need for a stable Government. Would he accept, contrary to what might have been the views of his party in previous times, that a coalition Government can be stable and we do not necessarily have to have a one-party Government?

On the issues he raised, such as holding semi-State bodies to account, would the Minister accept the electoral system is not at fault? There is a concentration of power in the hands of the Executive as opposed to the Parliament and a shelving of responsibility by the Executive on to semi-State bodies, which puts a buffer between it, semi-State bodies and the Parliament. Would the Minister accept that is the problem, rather than the electoral system?

On Edmund Burke and the quotation on judgment, I agree a Deputy should listen to his or her constituents but he or she, at the end of the day, is elected to use judgment on what is right for his or her constituency and country.

The Minister argued that the current system leads to inter-party and intra-party rivalry and an over-concentration to some degree on delivering to a constituency. When one hears the term "pork barrel" one immediately thinks of American politics. There seems to be more of an emphasis on the pork barrel approach, arising from the American political system which is totally different to ours. Is that related to our political system or is it a matter of rivalry between two members from the one party in the one constituency?

In regard to the general proposal for change, does the Minister propose to fully adopt the German system or some variation thereof? Does he propose to have single seat constituencies with PR? Perhaps he might expand more on that point.

I welcome the debate and the forthright comments of the Minister, much of which I agreed with. We need to move beyond a debate on the issue and come up with practical changes which can only be implemented if there is some measure of political agreement.

The Minister said Parliament has three functions, namely, legislation, holding the Government to account and minding the money, in other words, voting on budgets and ensuring they are spent in accordance with the mandate. The fundamental flaw, as I see it, is that Parliament has a very limited function to do any of those things. We do not allow Opposition parties or, very often, Government back benchers to legislate. Virtually all legislation comes from the Executive, unlike most other Parliaments.

There are very limited possibilities to hold the Government to account and there is very limited scope in terms of voted moneys. Ultimately, on 9 December the Government will propose a budget. I expect — although I have been surprised in the past — that it will pass. There will be notional discussion but there will be limited real engagement with the Opposition. We do not function as a Parliament.

In that instance, surely — to borrow a phrase from the Minister — the only way a Member can distinguish himself or herself is to hold on to his or her seat through constituency work? The most fundamental question is whether the Minister accepts that the only way we can have real reform is if the Executive re-balances itself and cedes power to Parliament, where it should be, and local government, an issue with which we have both grappled.

Local government will have no power unless it has the capacity to raise revenue independently of Government. The Minister and I will agree that there is no appetite at local government level to raise money for themselves. For decades their only function has been to spend money which is a nice little position to be in if one can spend money and blame others for not giving one enough. Does the Minister accept that if we are to have functioning local government it must have the authority to raise revenue?

Everyone wishes to ask questions so I would like everyone please to keep their questions brief.

I commend the Minister for always being frank whether saying "no" to representations or putting his views on the electoral system up front. I admire that in him. We all want better local government but it can work better only if it has money and the ability to raise money. We also need full-time councillors. Most are trying to hold down full-time jobs and do their political job part-time. People more often bring their problems to their local Deputies because they do not have as much access as they would like to their councillors or do not know their whereabouts or whether they are available in clinics.

Would the Deputy please ask a question?

I am asking the Minister whether he feels that local government should have the facility to raise money, and local councillors should work full time. The suggestion about Government backbenchers is reasonable but if I propose private Bills that conflict with Government policy that does not put me in the best odour with my colleagues. That is the challenge in parliament and it makes no difference who is in Government. It would be nice if I could propose a Bill without the Taoiseach or the line Minister hammering me because it is contrary to Government thinking. What are the Minister's views on that point?

That is a good question.

Has the abolition of the dual mandate improved local government? I am interested in the regional approach, that within each county the local authorities have different emphases. The issues vary from one area to another between large counties such as Cork and small ones such as Leitrim. Would the regional approach result in the merging of some local authorities, rather than defining them by the county boundaries to which we have been accustomed for the past 100 years?

Is it not the case that the unique power of the Executive is one of the consequences of our electoral system? I agree with the Minister about the competitive urge between candidates at election time not being defined by how assiduous they are at constituency work. Is it not likely, however, that the new fault lines between them will be on the kind of policy questions that the Minister mentioned and, dare I suggest, possibly on ideological grounds? I do not regard ideology as a dirty word.

Senator O'Donovan covered one of my questions. The Minister's point about local government being too local indicates where it should be geographically. The question is how to define regions and the place of the county system. I agree with the Minister that there are synergies in regional government that the current system does not permit. Would he accept, however, that there is also need for bread and butter local government, the district system, which is voluntary? Our present town council system leaves too many gaps at a sub-county council level. If it were changed it would encourage more people to get involved in political life.

Would the Minister favour any particular variation on the German system in the combination mentioned by Deputy O'Keeffe? In our deliberations to date we have heard different opinions about the value of open and closed lists. One way of getting over the German closed list system is to allocate seats to the best performing candidates in single seat constituencies who were not elected. That opens up the possibility of the electorate having a double vote in selecting members of parliament.

I thank the Minister for his forthright views. Reform of the electoral system must be tied to reform of the Dáil. It is an archaic institution bound by archaic rules which are totally out of touch with present reality. This is an eternal battle between the constituency and the legislative elements. Does the Minister believe that reform of the single seat constituency would swing the emphasis towards legislation or constituency representation?

How does the Minister see any list system, which he advocates, operating? Would it be on the basis of a political party or an individual?

I want to pick up on one of Deputies Howlin's and Devins's points about reform of the Dáil. I have been in the House for several years and have noticed that recently Ministers are less favourably disposed to accepting Opposition amendments in principle. As a result there has been a fall off in the number of people participating on Committee Stage or getting involved in the detail of legislation. In the past ten to 12 years far more power has moved to the Executive in dealing with the detail of legislation not to mention its initiation. That imbalance needs to be checked in reform of the electoral system and the Oireachtas.

The Minister can see from the questions that we do not have a perfect system. Would he like to respond?

I shall try. I am conscious of the three gentlemen beside me who have come to contribute to the discussion. I will answer as quickly as I can. I agree with the committee members that we have a very imperfect system. It is very adversarial and that goes back to the adversarial nature of the electoral system. If we change the electoral system we will have to change the way we operate in the Dáil. There is no question about that. In countries with other systems for example, Sweden and Germany, much of the parliament's work is done by consensus, by committees making recommendations to Government. We must be prepared to look at all of these changes, not just the electoral system. That is why we cannot just change the electoral system and continue the same way with everything else; it will not work.

Deputy Jim O'Keeffe asked about stable government. For a long time there was a view in my party, one I held until 1989——

A temporary little arrangement.

——that coalitions were inherently unstable. That proved to be the case until 2002, whether it was my party or others in government. A number of coalitions since have lasted five years. I have served with the Progressive Democrats, the Green Party and the Labour Party. It is a good idea to have different parties because it gives different perspectives. There are flaws that I will not go into now in case I am accused of criticising any of my previous colleagues.

The Minister can save them for his memoirs.

The Executive has a lot of power and wants to hold as much of that power as possible because it is in government and because of the adversarial nature of the system. I am not making a political point but with a few notable exceptions, across the House on the Opposition benches, it is not the merits of the policy that counts but getting the Minister.

Deputy O'Keeffe also asked about the pork barrel system in the United States. That is slightly different in that politicians try to deliver to their state rather than to individual constituents. No matter what system is in place, there will be those who want to deliver to their constituency. That will not be eliminated by changing the electoral system.

This reform would introduce a system broadly similar to the German system but I would use the current Irish PR system. It would not be a first past the post system. The list system deserves scrutiny and the options under it must be examined carefully. I agree that those who contest an election should have a priority on such a list but they cannot have total priority. That would negate another purpose of the list, to get people with specific skills into government.

In other words, to elect the unpopular in defiance of the people.

We think that because we are able to get elected and very popular, some who are unable to get elected are inherently flawed. They may not be as outgoing or have the hard neck we have. That does not mean, however, that they would perform worse as a Minister. It is important we get as many people in as possible. The list system could be used to compel parties, alongside a selection process, to ensure candidates include at least 40% men and 40% women or representation from minority groups. One could be accused of selective democracy but the current system is not representative of the population generally. It is representative of their views, but it does not represent the various groups in society.

Who would draw up the lists?

The secretariat or the elected leaders?

This amuses me sometimes. My own party is no different from any other. We have democratic conventions but at the end of the day the national executive or party leadership must endorse the decisions. In effect, the current system means that if someone should not get through, that person will not get through, no matter how democratic the party.

I do not disagree with Deputy Howlin. The current system is a chicken and egg scenario. Which does one change first: the electoral system or local government? These arguments can be made but at the end of the deliberations we should be able to say what we should change. Then the electoral commission could come forward and consider what best reflects all views.

Who are they going to be?

I would advocate learned gentlemen such as those on my left but also practical politicians who have been through the system and are genuinely interested in changing it.

The system of local government is, as Deputy Howlin outlined, one in which people spend money but have very little power. It delivers local services at the direction of national government. It is not, except in small areas, local democracy and it will remain like that until it has a revenue raising role.

Are full-time councillors necessary? My view is that there should be district and regional systems and then a national system. Our system of local government is based on 17th and 18th century English shires that have no part in a modern system. There should be a local system for local delivery that could be largely voluntary but at regional level it would be necessary to have full-time, paid councillors. In that situation Deputies elected under the system we are discussing would be more free in this House to do the things we want them to do.

In answer to the question about the role of Government backbenchers, this would fundamentally change the roles of everyone elected to the House because they would be concentrating on policy issues. When I started to advocate the legislation to get rid of the dual mandate which was an attempt to start the reform process which I believed was necessary, a colleague who is still a Member asked me if I realised what I was doing. He told me that if I got rid of them from local authorities, they would be on the Government's back trying to ensure we did our jobs right. He said they would hold us to account to a greater degree in committees. I told him that was precisely the point. Was it a success? Others will have to judge. That is not giving a smart answer. That we are talking about changing the system, that there are more committees and more people active on committees than when I was Whip and started to expand the committee system, shows that it is working here. I am not so sure about others working at local government level.

It is up to county managers at local level.

Yes, there is that. This comes back to Deputy Kennedy's point because they are part-time councillors. We think geographically in all of this but the regional system would deal with strategic matters such as water, sewerage, waste and so on and the local authority would deal with the delivery of those services. I think I have covered the other points raised by members.

We are obliged to the Minister. I invite Professor Michael Gallagher to make his presentation.

Professor Michael Gallagher

I thank the Chairman for the invitation to appear before the committee. I sent a paper on Monday evening but I am sure Deputies were probably too busy with their constituency work to have time to read a paper on constituency work.

There are one or two other things such as the budget, NAMA and constituents.

Professor Michael Gallagher

There is a powerpoint here but it is too small almost for me to read and that probably applies to other members.

Each member has a powerpoint in front of him or her.

Professor Michael Gallagher

I will summarise the three main points I wish to make. Why is there such a heavy constituency load on Deputies in particular? There are many other reasons for that besides the electoral system. The causal connection between electoral systems and constituency role is perhaps not quite as strong as many people assume. There are two reasons for thinking that, first, MPs in many countries with a whole range of different electoral systems still have a very significant constituency workload and, second, electoral systems that have competition between members of the same party are quite widespread in the EU yet the constituency role of MPs varies a good deal in those countries. The third point is that, although this does not apply to people in this room, perhaps some people outside Leinster House are inclined to see constituency work as some kind of problem that should be solved and something TDs should not really be doing. Those are the main points and I will elaborate on them in detail as we proceed.

On the causes of constituency work, apart from whatever role the electoral system has it gives TDs a strong incentive to respond to the demand for constituency work that does not really generate the demand in the first place. There are other reasons for that, and three in particular, one of which is simply political culture. It seems that people in this country and in a number of other countries expect their parliamentary representatives to be in close contact with them but that varies from country to country across the world. It may be something that derives from the British heritage because the UK is an example of such a country and other former British colonies, Canada, Australia, as well. In this country people expect their TDs to perform what is sometimes called the "welfare officer" role, that is, dealing with individual problems and also the so-called "local promoter" role, that is, getting things for the constituency or the local area, securing private investment, helping to prevent factory closures, getting public spending for the area. Survey evidence demonstrates that.

Professor Michael Marsh, when he appeared before the committee earlier this month, made the point that when people are asked what determines their vote, they say the ability of the candidate to look after the local area is the most important criterion. As evidence that this is a political culture feature, we know that in the 19th century Irish MPs at Westminster were seen in that role. They were used as intermediaries between people in the State because in those days, understandably, people saw the State as being alien and remote and felt they needed an intermediary to intercede on their behalf with the central State machinery.

In a small country such as Ireland when the ratio of TDs to population is quite high we would expect a closer connection than in a country where there are 250,000 people per MP. People expect the MP to know more about them and their local area in smaller countries. Touching on an issue that is just being discussed, many people see no need for a regional or provincial tier of MP. Certainly there is no such tier at the moment. Given that local government is weak, it means that if people have a problem the local councillor cannot address, the only other place to go is to the national TD. There is no regional or provincial tier of MPs to take a problem to as there might be in some countries. That means that in this country TDs get all kinds of questions which in other countries might go either to local councillors if local government could deal with the issue or to any regional or provincial tier. I am not necessarily suggesting there should be a regional or provincial tier; I am merely saying that if there was national parliamentarians would get a lower casework load.

The third reason is that perhaps there is something about the administrative system that leads to people wanting help from TDs. People want "a helping hand and a friendly ear" as one TD, Deputy P. J. Sheehan, said in one of his interviews. Many people want and expect that. They think the TD can be of assistance to them not in any improper way by pulling strings but simply having the experience and expertise to know how to present a case well, the office to which it should be directed, and whether to present some additional evidence. From that point of view, if the relevant Departments and areas were to improve the quality of their service then, perhaps, the demand for TDs' assistance would diminish. Less than two weeks ago I was speaking to a TD who said that over the past couple of years he felt his constituency workload had decreased because many cases used to concern the Revenue Commissioners or the Department of Social and Family Affairs. He reckoned that in the past couple of years both areas had greatly improved their level of service and their responsiveness to people. Consequently he was getting fewer cases concerning them than he used to. If that is the case perhaps there is a lesson for other areas also.

Is there any causal link between the electoral system and constituency focus? At first it might appear there is a link but perhaps there are reasons for doubting that. I said earlier there were two reasons for this and now I will elaborate on each of them in turn. We find a significant constituency workload under a whole range of different electoral systems. In the paper that I have circulated I quoted Michael Mezey as saying that this is almost universal. MPs in nearly every parliament say they have an incessant flow of constituency demands and coping with them requires a substantial portion of their time. For example, in France, Deputies are seen as ambassadors from the constituency to central Government. They arrive in Paris on Tuesday morning and leave on Thursday evening and spend all the intervening time on constituency matters. Even some of the time they are in Paris they are engaged in constituency business — that probably sounds familiar. Likewise in the UK, constituency workloads have hugely increased during the past 30 or 40 years and MPs spend about half of their time on it. One analysis stated that:

Members of Parliament are preoccupied with endless meetings, ceaseless letters, difficult constituency problems... There is the sense of an "endless treadmill" of late nights and early mornings, perhaps allowing little time for reflection.

This probably sounds familiar. Even more striking, is the constituency role of MPs in Canada. Constituency work takes up more of an MP's time than any other activity in Canada, which, like Britain and France, uses single member constituencies. There is no intra-party electoral competition. In Canada, Parliament even adjourns for a week every month so that MPs can spend a whole week in their constituencies. It seems in Canada constituents benefit from contacting an MP because queries from MPs are dealt with by skilled and experienced civil servants, whereas constituents who operate under their own steam are diverted, presumably to the less prompt and efficient civil servants. These are just a few examples from various countries, and this is leaving aside the USA.

Another point to bear in mind is that if the direct accountability of MPs to voters was reduced, correspondingly, their accountability to the candidate selectors would be increased. It becomes very important to be picked as the candidate in a single Member constituency or high on the list in a list system. There are a number of cases referred to in the paper in Belgium and Israel which had electoral systems in which MPs were not accountable to voters, yet they still engaged in locally oriented behaviour because that is what the candidate selectors wanted. It is important to know who the candidate selectors would be and the behaviour they would want. They might prioritise parliamentary performance or they might prioritise being in close touch with the local constituency.

If this country was to adopt an electoral system based on single Member constituencies, as some have suggested, it could well be that those Deputies would still be under heavy pressure to be active locally. Any incumbent who wanted to retain his or her seat or any challenger hoping to win a seat might still believe intense local activity was the way to achieve this. It would be a brave move if, say, a Fianna Fáil Deputy elected in a single Member constituency took the view that the party vote would get him or her re-elected and, therefore, he or she did not need to do any constituency work. It would be a brave or perhaps foolish Deputy of any party who took that attitude, given that voters see constituency activity as so important. That could still be a key criterion, given the rather low level of solid party voting we now see in the country. If we had a closed list electoral system, the candidate selectors would become extremely important. They would be the ones who would determine who would be elected. We see constituency work in a range of electoral systems.

The other reason for thinking the link between electoral system and constituency work might not be as strong as some believe is that many countries use electoral systems with intra-party electoral competition between candidates of the same party. In the paper I quoted the former Taoiseach, Dr. FitzGerald, as saying that what is unique about the Irish system is that the electorate can choose between members of the same party. I felt a little guilty for picking him out as having been mistaken because I have a great deal of respect for him, as I am sure everyone does, but on this issue he is mistaken. Most member states across the European Union use such an electoral system. Ireland and Malta are the only two countries to use PR-STV but there are 12 other countries that use electoral systems in which candidates of the same party compete with each other. This is especially true among smaller countries. Among the largest six, Poland is the only one to use such a system but among the 21 smaller countries, 13 use such a system, which suggests it is not inherently a bad idea. Twelve countries use what are called open list systems in which voters can choose individual candidates. In the paper and the PowerPoint presentation there is an example of a Danish ballot paper. That is the sight facing Danish voters when they go to——

Does Mr. Gallagher have a bigger version of it?

Professor Michael Gallagher

It is to be found on page 9 of the full paper. It was a seven seat constituency and all the parties put up seven candidates. If someone wanted to vote for the Social Democrats, the seven candidates were listed in front of them and they voted by putting an "X" beside the name of any one of those seven candidates. If the Social Democrats won three seats in the constituency, they would go to the three candidates with the most "Xs" or preference votes. In other words, the seven candidates compete with each other for the votes of Social Democratic voters. There is the same level of internal party competition in Denmark as there is in this country.

Will Professor Gallagher, please, explain that in more depth? The public vote by placing an "X" beside the name of an individual or party.

Professor Michael Gallagher

That is right.

All of the votes are added and seats are allocated on the basis of a percentage of the total vote.

Professor Michael Gallagher

That is right. All of the "Xs" are added. On this basis the number of seats a party can have is first worked out. When it is worked out that the Social Democrats will have three seats, they are given to the individuals with the most——

That is first past the post in the case of individual MPs.

Professor Michael Gallagher

One could see it that way. The three with the most "Xs" are the three who predominate within the Social Democrats. That is the case in Denmark also. I included the full list in the paper but it also includes Belgium.

Technically, of the seven candidates, four could receive more votes collectively than the candidates who are elected.

Professor Michael Gallagher

They could. The fourth candidate might only narrowly lose out to the third and the fifth might be close behind him or her but that is how it is done. The same principle applies in Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Poland, Greece, the Czech Republic and Luxembourg. Twelve countries in total use the open list system. It is the norm across the European Union that countries allow voters to make a choice within parties and they have this intra-party electoral competition.

In the Danish system the voter places an "X" beside the name of one of the candidates of one of the parties.

Professor Michael Gallagher

That is right.

Does it then depend on the number of seats for which the particular party qualifies because of the accumulated number of votes within this, and which of the candidates receives the highest number or numbers, depending on the proportion of seats the party receives?

Professor Michael Gallagher

That is correct.

Is that on a small constituency basis or——

Professor Michael Gallagher

This was a seven seat constituency. Most countries using a system based on proportional representation use bigger constituencies than we do.

They just write one "X" on the ballot paper.

Professor Michael Gallagher

Yes. That is all that voters are allowed to do and not just in Denmark. Twelve countries throughout the European Union use this open list system. We might ask if that means in these countries Members do a great deal of constituency work too. In the ones with which I am most familiar, Denmark and Finland, it is important for candidates to have a high local profile because they want to be well known. They want people to vote for them specifically but they seem to achieve this only through the so-called local promoter role. They want to be visible in the locality. They want to be seen as individuals who secure public spending in the constituency but they are not expected to perform the welfare officer role because local government is much stronger in Scandinavia, where people are better able to deal with their own problems or government Departments are more responsive. The implication is that the electoral system is not a key determinant of MPs' focus. The electoral system can make a difference but issues other than the electoral system appear to be more important in determining the level of demand.

The third question is whether constituency work presents a problem. I am sure it is not seen that way within this room but among others who take part in a debate outside the political world there is a tendency to see constituency work as something Deputies should not be doing in the first place. In the paper I make the point that it should not be confused with clientelism which, at least in the academic literature, means something quite different. It does not mean constituency work generally.

Not all constituency work is valuable. I am sure every Deputy can think of cases — not to mince words — of time wasters, people who do not have bona fide cases and go to every Deputy in the constituency. They may also come across chancers who are looking for something to which they are not entitled but at the same time I am sure every Deputy can think of many cases of people with a genuine problem which they had tried various avenues to solve and which the Deputy was able to solve for them. In the paper I quote Deputy Róisín Shortall stating in 1995:

I represent an area with a very high level of unemployment, poverty, housing problems, and people who spend their lives in queues, trying to sort out social welfare issues. I get up to 250 letters a week, and the follow-up on all these takes time. I wish it were not so. I wish people were sufficiently empowered to sort out their own problems. I wish they could go to their citizens' advice bureau and get the help they need. But this doesn't happen.

I am sure no one would suggest that TDs should be protected from having to deal with people with genuine problems such as that.

Constituency work is not unambiguously a good thing. It has costs as well as benefits. One of the costs is that it takes up time TDs, in their national political role, might otherwise spend on, for example, Oireachtas committees. Even if it is beneficial in some ways, it can be taken to excess. However, if we want to reduce the amount of constituency work, perhaps a better way of doing that is to address the demand in the first instance by improving the responsiveness of State agencies rather than simply by making TDs less available. There are also benefits from constituency work that are sometimes neglected in the debate. One is that it ensures that TDs are kept in close touch with the ordinary lives of people, which is a benefit for constituents, but it also brings a benefit to TDs' work at national level. It means that when legislation comes before the Dáil, TDs are not only considering it in the abstract, they know how it will impinge on people on the ground. If a Government policy that looked great on paper is causing problems on the ground, TDs would be quick to realise that and pick up on it. Another benefit of such work is that it reduces alienation and encourages ordinary people to feel that someone at least is on their side. Even if a person has a low view of politicians generally, that person will know that his or her local TD is always receptive, helpful and active in the area, is approachable and will at least fight a battle on the person's behalf, even if other elements of the political system seem to be rather unhelpful. In that way it reduces alienation.

The job specification for MPs in every country will include defending and promoting the interests of one's constituents to the best of one's abilities. That in itself should not be seen as a bad thing. On the whole, TDs' responsiveness and their availability to their constituents should be seen more as a strength than as a weakness of the Irish political system.

I have a concluding section, but it reiterates my earlier points that the cause or connection between the electoral system and TDs' constituency activity is much weaker than some people might think. I will not make those points again and will finish on that note.

I thank Professor Gallagher for that. Would Dr. Lundberg like to make a presentation?

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

Yes. I will just wait for the system.

While we are waiting for that, is it possible for members to be supplied with a detailed description of the various systems that operate in Europe such as Professor Gallagher has outlined in regard to Denmark?

Our Oireachtas Library and Research Service would do that.

Clerk to the Committee

The background provided to the first meeting detailed different types of systems——

I might not have been a member of the committee at that time; perhaps the Clerk might——

We could get that for the Deputy.

With due respect, we could provide something more detailed than that. We might ask the Oireachtas Library and Research Service to provide the level of detail Professor Gallagher has provided in regard to Denmark, sample ballot papers, detail that a narrative description does not provide.

That is exactly what I am looking for and information on each country.

We might ask the Oireachtas Library and Research if it would be able to provide that for us.

Information on the systems throughout the European Union.

I now invite Dr. Lundberg to proceed.

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

I thank the committee for inviting me here. I would like to speak about the constituency role of representatives in regard to the mixed member proportional system or MMP. This is the electoral system we have for the Scottish Parliament. I come from the University of Glasgow and, therefore, I know something about this. I have done some research on this in conjunction with the Welsh Assembly, which uses this system, and two German state parliaments called Landtage. I will be speaking about the electoral incentive.

There has been some discussion on criticisms of the single transferable vote or STV. To summarise these criticisms, people who do not like the STV seem to argue that there are electoral incentives inherent in the preferential nature of the STV that foster too much constituency service, a distraction from the other roles of Deputies, in particular from legislation and scrutiny. In some countries there is also, what some people would say is, a reduction in party cohesion. We do not see this so much in the research done on Ireland but in other countries there is a concern that when there are candidates, especially from larger parties, standing against one another, this will enhance factionalism or whatever divisions there are in the parties. In general, even though in the Irish case that last point may not be so relevant, I tend to agree with the criticisms made against the STV.

There was an examination of the STV system in Ireland. The Constitution Review Group in 1996 rejected the principle of a majoritarian electoral system but left open the possibility of considering other forms of proportional representation. Thus, other systems would be considered as long as they are proportional. One that was examined later was what was called the additional member system but which, in most of the academic literature today, is called the mixed-member proportional system or MMP. I looked at the report of the committee in 2002 and am of the view that its members did not give the MMP system a fair chance. I believe the MMP is a good system overall. It gives one the possibility of getting the balance right between constituency work and the other roles of a representative. It is worth taking another look at the MMP system.

The mixed-member proportional representation system is so called because representatives are elected in two different ways. Normally under the MMP system, there are single-member constituencies, therefore, some people are elected that way and other people are elected through a national or regional party list which normally is closed, although not in all cases. The system is proportional because the two tiers of representatives are linked and the overall outcome, on a partisan basis and in terms of seats, will come close ideally to each party's share of the list vote or party vote. It will not necessarily be perfect but, ideally, it is a compensatory system so it should be fairly close to a proportional result on a seat basis.

In New Zealand this system has been used since 1996. Voters will note from the ballot paper that they have two votes, the words "you have two votes" appear on the top of the ballot paper. It distinguishes between the party vote on the left-hand side and the electorate vote or the constituency vote on the right-hand side. Voters in New Zealand are allowed to split their votes if they wish to, they do not have to vote for the same party in both of those votes. This is the case also in Germany, although there the order of the vote is reversed. One the left-hand side of the ballot paper is the constituency vote and on the right-hand side is the party vote. Members will note that the New Zealand Electoral Commission advertises this very clearly in its promotional material headed "Two ticks? Too easy!".

The constituency vote is for the individual.

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

For the individual candidate in a single member constituency.

Do voters just mark a single X or is the system proportional?

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

In New Zealand they tick the box rather than putting an X in it.

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

Just one. The voter only gets one choice in each.

Is it a first past the post system for the single seat?

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

It is a first past the post or single member plurality system. Whoever wins the most votes wins that seat and everyone else loses. On the party vote there is a different way to tally these. In New Zealand, they are tallied nationwide and then there are closed party lists. They will look, first, at which parties are allowed to win seats based on the party vote by looking at those who win at least 5% of the vote. In New Zealand, if a candidate from a party can win an electorate or a constituency, there is a loophole which allows that party to win seats even if it has got less then 5% of the party vote. In Germany the same loophole exists except that three candidates have to win their constituencies and then parties can win seats even if they win below 5% of the vote.

How can one get even approximate proportionality if people can split their vote? There might be a very popular local candidate and then everybody votes for a party. A party would get a preponderance of the national vote but many local individuals might be elected to the seats. How does the top-up work from the list?

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

So far it has not been a problem, although in New Zealand there is a significant number, about 30% or so, of voters who split their vote. It has not been a problem, however, partly because there are so many allocated through the list.

What is the percentage?

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

I just checked recently and at the moment it is 57-43. Approximately 57% of the seats are through the constituencies and 43% are through the list. That is the same split that we have in Scotland. In Germany it is meant to be 50-50 but — I do not want to say there is a flaw in the electoral system — there is an aspect of the electoral system there called Überhangmandate, or overhang or surplus mandates, which allows the creation of extra deputies. The German Bundestag should have 598 deputies, but right now it has 622 after the last election.

I want to ask a question.

I will leave the questions until afterwards because I want to get to three other Deputies. I am sorry about that.

It is okay. The Chairman let the senior people in, but that is fine.

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

As regards MMP or AMS, as I said earlier, MMP is the term more commonly used by political scientists in the academic literature. The reason MMP is a better term is, in my opinion, because it distinguishes between the proportional and non-proportional variants of this kind of mixed system. The additional member system does not really indicate whether it is proportional or not because some of these systems — actually, most of them — are not proportional. If one looks at it worldwide, very few have that compensatory link between the two tiers. AMS, the additional member system, implies that those who are elected through the party list are somehow inferior. It is a value-laden term, which is another reason I do not like it. Also, it is a parochial term, which is not usually used outside the United Kingdom.

I will now move on to some more basic facts about MMP. As most members of the committee will know, its origins are in West Germany from the late 1940s. The concept of a mixed system spread globally, particularly in the 1990s. Most of these were what are called "mixed member majoritarian systems" where one does not have that compensatory link. Sometimes these are called parallel systems and Japan is one of the main examples of this. Successor states to the Soviet Union, like Russia and the Ukraine used MMM, but they got rid of it and both now have an entirely closed-list PR system.

MMP was the term coined in New Zealand. The system was recommended by an independent royal commission. They had two referendums and in 1993 New Zealanders chose MMP. The system is used today in New Zealand, Germany, Lesotho in Africa, Venezuela and Bolivia, Scotland and Wales, and for the Greater London Assembly. In a recent survey of the favoured options of electoral systems experts, MMP was the top choice. STV came in in second place.

As to the advantages of MMP, people like Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg say it offers the best of both worlds. One can have disciplined national parties whose individual legislators can then be held accountable for their articulation of local interests. The single member constituency representative is basically that human face of the party locally, while PR is achieved nationally. Other parties nominate candidates who might currently be list-selected and they will then shadow a representative in a targeted constituency. So there is competition over constituency service in MMP, but this occurs between the parties not within them. Dual candidacy facilitates this competition. It means that people are able to stand both in a constituency and on the party list. This is typically the case in mixed member systems.

I would like to respond to some of the criticisms of MMP. The main one that is seen quite often is the notion that somehow two classes of representative are created — the constituency members of the assembly versus list members. This notion arises from the idea that somehow those who are elected through the lists perhaps could not make it on their own as district or constituency representatives. They come from a closed party list and this is seen as a bad thing. In the UK — and in New Zealand, to a lesser extent — some politicians and journalists who have written about this have been particularly hostile to list representatives. In the UK, the Labour Party really seems to have it in for those elected through the list. Part of the reason for that is that very few Labour representatives are elected through the list. The vast majority are elected through single member constituencies. That is because MMP is seen primarily as being for the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, and historically Labour has been dominant in Wales and Scotland. That is my main response to that partisan issue.

In British political culture there is this strong constituency emphasis, as we discussed earlier. In addition to the British Labour Party's dominance at constituency level, some people in the Labour Party seem to have a zero sum notion of representation; it is really all or nothing. They seem to believe that they can speak for everybody in the constituency, even those who did not vote for them.

Looking at whether the second-class representative issue resonates with citizens, there is not much evidence to support this. Not much research has been done on it. All I have seen is a focus group that was done in Wales, but the result was not clear cut. A slight majority of the people in the focus group thought dual candidacy was a bad thing. They felt it was not fair for people who lost in a constituency to be able to win through the list. There was also an element of seeing two different classes of representative. However, almost as many people in the focus group thought this was not a problem. That is the only research I have seen which examined the class issue.

It is not an issue in Germany at all. In my research I found that German representatives themselves, if they were elected in constituencies, thought that they were better representatives, but it is not a public issue. It does not make it into the public sphere in Germany at all. Germany has used the system for many decades.

The idea that list representatives have nothing to do in terms of constituency service is another criticism that comes up. With dual candidacy, however, some representatives will shadow constituency representatives where they plan to stand. They are hoping to get their name recognition up and to have a better chance when it comes to election time. The parties also want their representatives to be active at constituency level, even if they are elected through the list. List representatives, as I found in my research, do actually serve constituents, but they tend to spend less time on this than their constituency-elected counterparts.

Another interesting thing I found was that those elected through the list tend to develop constituencies of interest and work with interest groups more than their constituency-elected counterparts.

My research also covered that portion of the work-time reported in surveys of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and two German Landtage, or state parliaments. Looking at the portion of work-time spent helping voters, a traditional constituency service, I found that in Germany less time is spent on this, as one might expect. In Britain there is more time, around 16% or 17%. I also found there was a difference in the time points. I looked at the year 2000, just after the first elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly in 1999. I looked at the representatives again in 2003, just after the second elections to both bodies. I found that the first time around there was not much of a difference between how much time the two different types of member spent in helping voters. Later however, in 2003, after the second elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, I found that constituency representatives do spend a lot more time on constituency service — about 21% of their work-time — compared to just under 14% of their time for their list-elected counterparts. I do not see a big difference when looking at Germany, but there is some difference there in that the constituency-elected representatives spend a bit more time on such work.

I also looked at how much time they spent working with interest groups. I found that it was around 13% of their work time across the board in Germany and the UK. In the UK, list elected members spent quite a bit more time in this regard than constituency elected members — approximately 17% of their time compared to 9%. If one looks at trying to get public spending, or what Americans call pork barrel spending, in their constituency or region, it is interesting because the first time round in the UK, I did not see too much difference — approximately 6% of their work time regardless of how they are elected. Looking at it the second time round, I saw that it was approximately 10% of the work time for the British representatives and only about half that — 5% — for the list representatives. That is the pattern I saw in Germany. There is other research which had similar results.

Looking at the local promotion role, or trying to get businesses to locate or stay in one's area, again I found an interesting pattern. The second time round looking at the British representatives, I found they spent more than 9% of their work time on this role which is approximately twice that of their list elected counterparts. That is basically the German pattern as well.

In regard to another criticism of MMP, some people have said the largest party, Fianna Fáil, would dominate the constituency races.

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

Not in recent opinion polling. This is an important issue, that is, whether strong parties would dominate the constituencies. That could facilitate this whole second class problem.

There have been three Scottish Parliament elections since it was resurrected, or brought back into existence — in 1999, 2003 and 2007. If one looks at what has happened to the Labour Party which was historically quite dominant in Scotland, one will see that it went from having 53 constituency and three list seats in 1999 to 37 constituency and nine list seats in 2007. There has been a decline which somewhat reflects the party's decline in general in Scotland.

If one looks at the Scottish National Party, the second party in Scotland, it went from seven constituency and 28 list seats in 1999 to 21 constituency seats and 26 list seats in 2007. It is possible for competing parties to make some inroads in the constituencies. Part of the reason for that is the possibility of doing dual candidacy.

Another criticism was that parties have too much control over candidate nomination. Parties nominate candidates but they do so in all electoral systems at some level. The single member constituency nominations could be done by primaries, as is the case in some countries. Also, in terms of the list rankings, these do not have to be closed lists. One could have an open list system. This was recommended by the Arbuthnott commission which looked at the Scottish Parliament electoral system a few years ago. It is unusual to combine open lists with mixed member systems. The only empirical examples of which I know are in the German state of Bavaria and in Lithuania. It is unusual but it is possible to do that.

The last criticism was that MMP is difficult for independent candidates. Independents can stand in the single member constituencies and on the regional list portion of the system, if they want to. In Scotland, Margo Macdonald is a Lothians member of the Scottish Parliament. She is an independent and it is possible to win that way.

MMP as an alternative to STV should be considered. MMP offers incentives for constituency service but one does not have the potential problems of the really intense intraparty competition associated with STV and some other systems which allow intraparty preference voting.

Some representatives will focus more on policy matters, so one does not have to be a dual candidate. One could choose to stand on the party list. This is the case for some people. It will probably turn out that they will spend much more time doing other things — for example, doing more committee work. There is some evidence of that in the Scottish Parliament. Beware of this criticism of list representatives as somehow being second class. I consider the source. Much of the problem in the UK has been with the Labour Party which, sadly, brought this system into existence but seems to take any opportunity it can find to undermine it. Please do not call it the additional member system because it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that people will not like the system.

Thank you, Dr. Lundberg. That was very informative. It is interesting that your last comment before summing up was in regard to an independent. We move on to Dr. Liam Weeks who will talk about that same topic.

Dr. Liam Weeks

I thank the Chairman and members for the invitation to make my presentation. The overall theme for discussion today is constituency work. My two colleagues have established beyond doubt that constituency work is not unique to PR-STV, so I do not need to echo these claims. An aspect I wish to explore is a particular consequence of this emphasis on constituency work. It is a relatively unique consequence in the Irish context and it is the significant presence of independent parliamentarians. This relationship between PR-STV and the independent status adopted by some politicians will be the focus of my presentation.

First, I will indicate the comparative presence. The term "unique" should be used sparingly to describe features of the Irish political system but in the case of independent parliamentarians, no other liberal democracy has had such a significant proliferation of them as Ireland. In fact, there have been more elected to Dáil Éireann than the combined total elected to national parliaments in western Europe. Some 50% more independents have been elected to the Dáil since World War Two than the combined total in the other select democracies using a candidate-centred electoral system. Some 97 independents have been elected to the Dáil since World War Two. This does not mean 97 different independents. It refers to the number of seats. For example, the late Tony Gregory would have been elected on 11 occasions.

A figure circulated to members shows countries where independents are generally allowed to run and where they have a particular presence. It does not include states using list electoral systems where genuine independents are not permitted. For example, independents are not allowed to stand in Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Similarly, no independents were ever elected in Belgium, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg and in the Netherlands. In the Czech Republic, Portugal and Slovakia, independents can only run if they place themselves on a party lists. These are countries in which they have managed to win seats in national parliaments at some stage. If one sums up these countries, which include Malta, Australia, Canada, the UK, the US, New Zealand and Finland, it comes to approximately 64, so it is 50% less than the Irish total. This figure is made all the more striking by the relatively small size of the Irish Parliament in comparison to the likes of Canada, the UK and the US.

Such a presence in Ireland of independent parliamentarians is obviously the product of a significant vote. Another figure circulated indicates the level of support for independents in Ireland is quite an outlier. In fact, from a comparative perspective, it is only in Russia and Pakistan that independent candidates are stronger than in Ireland. By stronger, I mean they comprise a higher proportion of all candidates and receive a greater national vote.

Another figure indicates the national vote for independents in national parliamentary elections over the past six decades. In most countries, the figure has rarely gone above 1% or 2%, but it did so in the 1990s in Australia. There were a couple of prominent independent MPs there, including the late Peter Andren. The vote for independents in Ireland is the sum of the vote in these other systems. In fact, this aggregate vote for independents has been increasing steadily in the past three decades — in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.

What is also significant about independents and what should be considered in regard to the electoral system is that they do not have an insignificant role. For example, in the current House of Commons there are members such as Richard Taylor M.P., elected on behalf of the Kidderminster hospital concern. Members like him have a minimal concern in the role of the parliamentary system.

By contrast, in Ireland Independents have played an active role in the Government formation system. From 1922 to 2007, 40% of Governments formed in the State have been minority Administrations almost all of which have been dependent upon the support of Independent Deputies as is the case with the current Administration. In the past 30 years six Governments have depended on the support of Independents. The merits of this are a topic for discussion on a different day.

A slide in my presentation indicates the level of support for Independents since the foundation of the State. The line in the darkest bold indicates the level of votes and the line just below that indicates the proportion of seats they won. The thinnest line refers to the proportion of candidates comprising Independents, which, as the slide shows, has been rising steadily since the late 1970s. Today almost one in five candidates in Ireland at a national election comprise of Independents. Only Russia and Pakistan tend to have a higher proportion of Independent candidates.

To challenge some of the assumptions, one point often made outside of these circles is that this must be a product of our voting system. To return to constituency work, certainly the premium placed on this activity in Ireland means that a single candidate who cannot fall back on party loyalties, party resources or party policy to deliver votes, is not at a major disadvantage in Ireland and one need not be a policy expert or a party man or woman to engage in constituency work.

If we had a system where political competition revolved around national issues and where policy expertise was given greater priority, this would probably spell the end for Independents, the great majority of whom have a local focus. That being said, there are many other systems, as has been indicated earlier, where constituency service is an important function for parliamentarians and yet Independents are not elected. The possible difference in Ireland is that it exists alongside a favourable electoral system.

There are, perhaps, four possible reasons that would indicate why PR-STV helps Independents. There are few systems that are as attractive to an Independent candidate as PR-STV. The first reason on which we have elaborated is the facilitation of particularistic-style competition, that is, on constituency work.

The second reason STV might help Independents is because it is a form of PR. It is a proportional system, which, compared with non-PR systems, tends to help minor candidates like Independents. It is one of the few PR systems that both allows Independents to run on their own and ensures them a seat return approximately equitable to their vote and this proportionality is engineered by the presence of multi-seat constituencies. An Independent needs to attract only a fraction of the first preference vote to win a seat and does not need to beat all other party candidates, as would be the case under first past the post, for example.

The third reason PR-STV might help Independents is because unlike most other forms of PR that tend to be party centred, STV is a candidate-centred system that permits candidates to stand alone and not as part of a party. While there is no clear-cut evidence that this fosters candidate-centred political competition, PR-STV does not discourage its presence and it may support its continuing existence in the face of party competition.

The final reason STV may help Independents is because it helps centrist candidates, those who are acceptable to everyone, which is not true of other PR and non-PR systems, for example, candidates such as Mr. Ralph Nader in the US. Single transferable vote does this in two ways. The first is a product of its preferential nature, and STV is often called a preferential system in the academic literature. This preferential system in STV encourages sincere voting, by which we mean it lessens the likelihood of voters being discouraged from wasting their vote on Independents unable to win a seat, as regularly happens under first past the post where voters are free to waste their vote on a candidate who has no chance of winning a seat.

The second reason is related to the system of transfers. Centrist candidates, such as Independents, usually profit from transfers because party voters are more willing to give them a lower preference than a candidate from a rival party. For example, Independent Deputy Finian McGrath was elected in Dublin North Central with just under half a quota in 2002 and just over half a quota in 2007.

With the possible exception of the Borda count, as used by the Green Party, no other known electoral system offers Independents as much of a fighting chance as PR-STV. When at debates in similar circles to this — as occurred in British Columbia before it considered adopting a new voting system and at the Scottish local government level when it also brought in PR-STV — there was consideration of the various merits and virtues of PR-STV, the role of Independents was put forward as one possible reason in favour of adopting PR-STV.

One might then ask why so few countries have adopted PR-STV. It could be simply because of the presence of Independents. Parties fear the destabilising tendencies of PR-STV and tend to prefer list electoral systems, among other reasons, to consolidate their dominance vis-à-vis Independents. That said, as I will indicate in the next section, one needs to be cautious in assuming that Independents are the direct product of the Irish electoral system.

On whether PR-STV results in the election of Independents elsewhere, a slide in my presentation indicates the particular comparative vote for Independents in other systems using PR-STV. To reiterate, PR-STV has been used not only in Malta and Ireland, but in a number of other democracies which, for want of a better term, one can call Anglo-American, including Australia, Northern Ireland, parts of Britain, the United States and Canada.

Only three of these systems using PR-STV have levels of support for Independents that come close to matching the comparative Irish figures. These are the Northern Ireland local councils, the Tasmanian state assembly and the Scottish local government level. However, all of these three cases comprise second-order regional elections where, from a comparative perspective, Independents often experience greater electoral success than at the first-order national level. For example, in Britain, Independents might regularly get 10% of the vote at the local government level but their vote is fairly minimal at the national parliamentary level.

The only comparable national assemblies using PR-STV have been the Australian Senate and the Maltese House of Representatives, neither of which have been hotbeds of Independent support. Indeed, since Malta gained independence in the 1960s, there has never been an Independent MP elected to the Maltese Parliament.

Scotland is an interesting case, however. Although the Kerling commission, which this decade looked into a new electoral system, recommended the adoption of PR-STV at the council level for one reason, to help Independents, the numbers of Independents elected when STV was first used in 2007 fell by 20% compared to the previous local elections under first past the post in 2003.

However, what makes the Scottish experience even more interesting is that the numbers of Independent candidates increased at those elections, from 485 to 551 candidates. Similarly, the proportion of wards contested by Independents also increased, from 31% to 75%. The Independent vote also increased, from 9.5% to 10.9%. Despite a falling seat share, Independents still won a bonus of seats over votes. They won 15.3% of seats with approximately 11% of the votes.

I suppose the question the committee is interested in asking is, would removing PR-STV remove Independents. Not surprisingly, this is quite a difficult question to answer. First, it depends on what alternative is introduced to replace PR-STV. Under plurality systems such as first past the post or the French two-ballot system, Independents' chances of election would be very remote. The Australian alternative vote, which to all intends and purposes is STV in single-seat constituencies as we use at by-elections, would be perhaps less painful for Independents as they have already won by-elections here under the alternative vote.

With a list system Independents could still compete under personalised lists but their electoral chances would depend on the size of the constituencies, which need to be quite large to guarantee proportionality. This would put Independents at a disadvantage, as they would then need to be known beyond their local area. For example, if we had a single national constituency, as Professor Gallagher indicated is used in Israel, and a similar-sized Parliament, an Independent list would need approximately 0.67% of the national vote to win a seat, and in Ireland, with an electorate of 3 million, this comprises approximately 20,000 votes. To put this in context, no Independent candidate has ever won 20,000 votes at a Dáil election, although the likes of the late Deputy Alfie Byrne did come fairly close.

All that being said, too often the capacity of electoral systems to change outcomes is exaggerated. While PR-STV certainly facilitates Independents, this particular breed of politician, and the particular breed of culture that supports the politician, had been present in Ireland long before STV was introduced. In fact, the relationship between STV and Independents seems to depend on the timing of the introduction of the former. PR-STV has facilitated Independents only where it was introduced before a modern party system had developed. This explains why very few Independents have won seats in areas that adopted PR-STV after the consolidation of party competition. It explains why when it was introduced in Malta, Estonia and the Northern Ireland Assembly elections, it did not result in a raft of Independents being elected. In contrast, in Tasmania, where PR-STV was first introduced as early as 1919, party competition had not been developed. That is why it helped Independents in that particular system. It also explains why Independents continue to win seats on Scottish councils, as the vast majority of their victories are in regional areas where there is a strong tradition of non-party politics.

The most we can say, therefore, is PR-STV is not a disincentive to Independents unlike plurality or list systems. It encourages Independent candidates to run and it provides an incentive to candidate-centred behaviour by both candidates and voters alike. However, it is important to emphasise it does not magically produce an Independent vote out of thin air. It facilitates its expression in a system where the nature of competition is not disadvantageous. A different electoral system operating in a political culture where an ability to engage in constituency work was not an asset would most likely debilitate against Independents. However, while changing the former — PR-STV — can be done in a relatively straightforward manner, the same cannot be said about a change in political culture.

I thank Dr. Weeks whose presentation was informative.

I refer to the analysis of what is an Independent. In the Irish system most of them have left the political party system and they are not true Independents. Has analysis been conducted on this? Is this similar in other jurisdictions?

Dr. Liam Weeks

I wrote about this recently in Irish Political Studies. Approximately 1,000 Independents have contested Dáil elections and one in ten had some links with a party. In the literature, it is difficult to classify what one means by Independent. Deputy Ring in the Dáil session defined himself as the only Independent in the Dáil. Independent does not imply one has no opinion whatsoever or one can sit on the fence. I just looked at it in terms of people who had links with parties. Outside of Ireland the only Independents who generally get elected tend to be those who have built up a particular name as a party politician first. However, the numbers in Ireland, surprisingly, are not as high as we might have expected in terms of the ones who get elected, certainly, but in terms of their overall independence it is approximately one in ten.

Has Dr. Weeks conducted analysis on those who were elected to the Dáil who had left political parties?

Dr. Liam Weeks

I conducted a survey of Independent candidates at the local elections in 2004. One third of them said they had been a member of a party at some stage, which is probably not unusual. I do not speak on behalf of Independents but if one is going to run for politics, one will be interested. If one is interested in politics, the obvious avenue is to join a party. Most of the current Independents would say at some stage they were members of political parties. It reflects the fact that parliamentary democracy is party democracy.

In other jurisdictions, would large numbers of Independents have had links with parties?

Dr. Liam Weeks

The ones who get elected. There have been exceptions. Martin Bell, the former BBC World journalist, was elected in 1997.

He was only elected once.

Dr. Liam Weeks

He promised to stand only once. The only reason he got elected was Labour did not run a candidate against him. An individual in Kidderminster was also elected on a local hospital issue. Few independents are elected across western Europe.

This issue has opened my eyes as I did not realise we had such an enormous proportion of Independents in Ireland as opposed to other countries. Deputy D'Arcy raised the issue of lumping them all together. In my time in the House, I have witnessed single issue independents, such as hospital candidates and so on who usually last one term and generally do not achieve anything, and independents from the party gene pool. For example, Deputy Healy-Rae is regarded as a Fianna Fáil Independent and Deputy Lowry is regarded as a Fine Gael Independent because of their backgrounds. There have been also genuine independent candidates such as the late Tony Gregory. That raises interesting issues which have opened my eyes.

I have a number of questions for Professor Gallagher and Dr. Lundberg. Most of my colleagues view constituency work as part of the job and part of the reason they are elected is to represent their people. Many get great satisfaction from helping their constituents. There is a dismissive approach from the cynics in the media who know the price of everything and the value of nothing and who say any Member helping a constituent is doing so merely to ensure the constituent will vote for him or her in the next election. That is not correct because it is a minor factor.

With regard to the complexity of constituency work, life has become more complex for people with many new grants systems and variations of systems under different Departments. Despite the higher educational standard among the electorate, people get lost in the complexities of these systems and very often they approach Members to find their way through them, which has contributed to the increase in constituency work.

Professor Michael Gallagher

MPs in most countries recognise this is an important part of the job and the aspect of complexity is relevant. The Deputy is correct that the State is becoming ever more complex. I came across a debate in the Seanad between Senators Norris and O'Rourke. He said TDs should not waste their time on clientelism and sorting out potholes while Senator O'Rourke, as she then was, said it was all very well for him to say that but he should put himself in the position of someone trying to find his or her way around a county council bureaucracy without the assistance of anyone who knows how it works. If people look at a 19th century book on how government works, it makes no mention of constituency work but in the real world for real people and parliamentarians in most countries, it is an important part of their jobs. MPs in most parliaments take it for granted that representing their constituents and constituencies to the best of their abilities is part of the job.

TDs enjoy and get satisfaction from it. I have seen this mentioned in studies of several parliaments. Members feel they can spend their lives making fantastic speeches in the Dáil and sitting on committees and they sometimes wonder in moments of gloom whether anyone notices what they are doing, yet if they can engage in constituency work, they can feel at the end of the day that they have solved someone's problem. If a widow, for example, is having difficulty figuring out how to get her pension, the Member will contact the relevant office and sort it out and for one of his or her constituents, life is better as a result of what he or she has done. They get genuine job satisfaction from doing that.

I thank the delegates for their presentations. What is Professor Gallagher's opinion on the abolition of the dual mandate? My party campaigned for this for a long time and I continue to support it, although I suspect it was a factor in ensuring I was not re-elected in 2007. On the effect of breaking that link, I suspect the ability to be on a local authority is still one of the prime advantages when looking for election to the national Parliament. We need to break that link and have more people coming from other backgrounds otherwise we will not achieve improvements or changes in the national Parliament.

I am interested in Dr. Lundberg's opinion. The MMS systems are proportionate and effective and allow for representation of smaller parties in both Scotland and New Zealand, and the Green Party has benefited from such systems. However, in Scotland they chose an STV model for local elections even though the constituencies are smaller. What were the political decisions behind that choice?

I have a question for Dr. Weeks on the definition of independent candidates. He showed a graph of those who had been elected to national parliaments as opposed to those who had stood for election. This included people such as a subsequent leader of Fine Gael, and a very prominent Fianna Fáil Minister who claimed the party had left him rather than the other way around. I refer to the example of the late Tony Gregory who chose to become an Independent Deputy because his preferred political party option would not have seen him elected and it was not a mainstream party. "Independent candidate" needs to be defined quite strictly because it seems to be more party political dissident than truly independent in the case of Ireland. He referred to 1,000 candidates and only one in ten had a political party background. I suspect many of the 90% are people who would have contested elections in a multiform way. I remember a candidate called William of the Holy Cross who used to contest 20 constituencies at a time in the 1980s. This might slightly distort the figures. I await the delegates' comments.

I have a question for Dr. Lundberg. I am not sure of the situation in Scotland but here in Ireland there is among all parties a total distrust of headquarters. They are usually referred to in terms which parliamentary procedure would not allow me to fully describe here. This applies to all parties. I am quite interested in the MMP system and the issue of parties having too much control over the candidate nomination. A way to deal with this might be that list rankings could be done by party members as is the case to some extent in Scotland. Such a system might defuse some of the distrust of headquarters.

I invite Professor Gallagher to respond.

Professor Michael Gallagher

Senator Boyle asked about the dual mandate. This is not an area I have studied so I may have recourse to the old line about the effect of the French Revolution, that it is still too early to say. My impression is that many TDs believe it is expedient to keep in pretty close touch with local councils. There were complaints a couple of years ago from some TDs that councils were too unreceptive to them. It is true in this country that the great majority of TDs — approximately three quarters of their number — have previously been councillors before entering the Dáil. This is not at all unusual in a comparative context as it is a pretty well trodden route around the world to get elected first at a lower level and then go into the national parliament. This is a way of socialising TDs into thinking this role is appropriate for a public representative.

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

To answer Senator Boyle's question about local elections in Scotland which use STV. I am not an expert on this subject but so far as I know there was an arrangement in the coalition agreement between Labour and the Liberal Democrats who governed Scotland for the first eight years of devolution. The Liberal Democrats insisted on PR for local elections. They did not achieve this in the first term of office but one of the Liberal Democrat MSPs I spoke to said that if in the second term they had not been able to achieve PR, the coalition would have ended. They were going to bring down the coalition if they did not achieve PR. It is ironic because under STV, the Liberal Democrats did slightly worse in the previous local elections under the system of first past the post. On the question of why STV as opposed to MMP or some other kind of PR system, two commissions of inquiry looked into this. They considered MMP at one point and MMP is used for the London Assembly elections which to some extent is a local form of government, although it may be more of a regional form of government. They did not choose MMP but went with STV, in part because they may have thought it was more amenable to local issues and perhaps better for representing local people. One must take into account the number of seats available under the local elections and with an MMP system, one is looking at somewhere between half and two thirds of the seats being allocated in constituencies and then the rest from the list. This could mean the wards will be too big for one person to cover a ward if the council is not very big to begin with. I am not sure how closely they looked at MMP but they went with STV. Part of the reason could simply be that the Liberal Democrats really like the STV system. I refer the committee to the published reports of two commissions.

On the question from Senator O'Keeffe about——

I am Deputy O'Keeffe.

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

I apologise, Deputy.

We regard Senators in a slightly different aspect than perhaps they do in America. I remember a Deputy lost his seat and went to the Seanad. He subsequently went to America and they were all over him and congratulated him for being a Senator.

Dr. Thomas Lundberg

To answer the Deputy's question about anti-party sentiment, this is an important aspect. For Scottish Parliament elections the parties can do what they want in terms of their selection of candidates as this is not very well regulated. It is really up to the party organisations. All the parties I can think of, except the Labour Party, involve their membership. The party members residing in a particular electoral region of the Scottish National Party, the Conservative and Unionist Party, the Liberal Democrats, and I think, the Greens, but I am not sure, are invited by postal ballot to rank the candidates nominated. The nominations are made by the party organisation and candidates must be on an approved list. The postal ballot is for those residing in a region and this is what determines the final ranking of the candidates on a closed list. The Labour Party does not use this system unless there has been a very recent change. It certainly was not the case earlier on. Much of this depends upon how centralised the organisation is and the party's attitude towards the role of the membership. It is not something that is determined by the electoral system itself but it is really up to the party organisations. I do not think it is entirely fair to say that closed list systems are entirely undemocratic; it is really up to the parties to decide how democratic the list ranking process is.

Dr. Liam Weeks

With regard to the types of independent candidates, I agree there is a significant difference in terms of the types of independent candidates elected. The late Frank Sherwin, an Independent TD, described these differences as chalk and cheese. It could be argued the label "Independent" is just a common catch-all term but from the point of view of being independent, it could be said in some cases a party label is simply also a catch-all term. There are many differences within the same party between different TDs who have the same party label but could be as different as chalk and cheese.

There are dependents in each party as well.

Dr. Liam Weeks

Deputy Michael Ring has stated as reported in the Official Report that he is the only Independent in the Dáil. I have done a study of these 1,000 independents and have grouped them into six categories. The first is the apostate independents who flit in and out of party status. The second is the vestigial independents who are simply remnants of a former party. I am thinking of people like the old IPP candidates such as Alfie Byrne. The third is corporatist independents who represent interest groups or are business or farming candidates. The fourth group is ideological independents. The fifth group comprises what I call quasi-parties, including people like Oliver Flanagan, who had his Monetary Reform Association. The sixth is the community independents.

While we can get into a debate about what is a pure Independent and what is a party independent, regardless of how close to a party they are the fact is that in Ireland there is life outside the party. These people do not have a party label or a party machine behind them. In most other systems a person leaving the party would have no chance of election whereas in Ireland they do have a chance.

It improves it.

Dr. Liam Weeks

In some cases it could be the case. That is the point I wanted to stress as opposed to the particular types of these independents.

The only other similar STV system to ours is the one in Malta. I am led to believe the reason independent candidates do not exist there is that the two parties, the National Party and the Labour Party often run more candidates than the number of seats in a constituency to swamp the votes and ensure that smaller parties and independent candidates cannot come through — not that I want to give anyone any ideas.

Does this mean no Green Party candidates get elected there?

I believe the total vote outside the two main parties is approximately 2%.

We will need to look more closely at that system.

I thank Professor Gallagher, Dr. Lundberg and Dr. Weeks.

The joint committee adjourned at 11.40 a.m. until 9.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 9 December 2009.
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