It is an honour to speak here. While there will be much detail in what I have to say, four points stand out. The constant focus on a Border poll is destabilising and its impact on sentiment around the Northern Ireland protocol is damaging the chances of progress. Second, reconciliation within Northern Ireland, rather than constitutional change, should be the big priority now for the people of Northern Ireland and should be supported by the two Governments. Third, the failure to abide by the duty of impartiality as between the parties regarding the protocol by the British Government is in clear breach of the Good Friday Agreement, which I will elaborate on. Finally, the UK Government’s Bill to disapply the protocol also breaches the Good Friday Agreement, which requires the consent of Northern Ireland for major changes. This legislation also breaches international law, given it breaches an international treaty.
Turning to the historical and philosophical origins of partition, as I see it, both nationalism and unionism need to re-examine their underlying assumptions. I might first say a word about the assumptions underlying Irish nationalism. The failure of the Act of Union to integrate Ireland into a genuine union with England, Scotland and Wales after 1800 was partly due to the fact those nations were Protestant in religion, whereas Ireland, outside north-east Ulster, was predominantly Catholic. The disastrous potato Famine of 1845 to 1850, which cost millions of lives in Ireland and to which the laissez-faire economic policies of the Liberal Government in London were a totally inadequate response, added to the sense of alienation. From 1840, there was agitation in Ireland, either to repeal the union and restore the Irish Parliament or, at least, to grant Ireland home rule through a home rule parliament in Dublin with limited powers, excluding foreign affairs, defence and customs. Both these proposals envisaged Ireland having a single parliament for the entire island, without any exclusion of north-east Ulster. From early on, however, opponents of home rule argued that allowing a Dublin parliament to govern the four or six counties in north-east Ulster, where a majority Protestant population did not want to be ruled by a Dublin parliament, would be unfair or unworkable. Unionists in north-east Ulster did not at that time want to find themselves being continually outvoted in a Dublin parliament, in the same way that Irish Catholic MPs had become used to being continually outvoted in the union Parliament in London.
The first attempt to grant home rule to Ireland was put forward by William Gladstone in 1886. Nationalism, while not so popular in the 18th century, became a popular doctrine in the 19th and 20th centuries. John Bright, the leading British Radical and Liberal statesman, opposed Gladstone's home rule Bill for all Ireland on the ground that there were two nationalities, not one, on the island of Ireland. He stated, “Ulster may be deemed a nationality differing from the rest of Ireland at least as much as Wales differs from England”.
Charles Stewart Parnell also recognised there was a problem here. He stated, "It is undoubtedly true that until the prejudices of the [Protestant and unionist] majority are conciliated... [Otherwise] Ireland can never enjoy full freedom … can never be united”. He was not, however, in a position to put forward a solution to the dilemma he acknowledged existed. In a sense, that dilemma remains unaddressed to this day.
A third attempt to introduce home rule was made in 1912 by a Liberal Government led by Herbert Asquith. Responding to Asquith’s Bill, one of his Liberal backbencher MPs, Thomas Agar-Robartes, stated that Ulster unionists and Irish nationalists were two different nations with “different sentiments, character, history and religion” and that it would be impossible to fuse these two “incongruous elements” together. These differences of sentiment, character, history and religion are as relevant today as they were in 1911 or 1912, although the relative weight to be given to each of them has varied. They are nonetheless important constituents of a nationality. Agar-Robartes proposed an amendment to the home rule Bill that would have allowed certain Ulster counties to opt out of home rule and continue to be ruled directly from London.
A similar argument was made by the Conservative leader Arthur Balfour, who also opposed home rule for the whole of Ireland and said the unionists of north-east Ulster and the population of the rest of Ireland had “two [different] sets of aspirations, two sets of ideals, two sets of historic memories”. It is difficult to say Balfour was wrong. Shared aspirations and ideals, and shared historic memories, are what shape and sustain nations in difficult times.
Irish nationalists supporting home rule rejected these arguments. John Redmond described the notion that there were two nations on the island of Ireland as “revolting” and “hateful”. Neither he nor most Irish nationalists, however, devoted enough thought or imagination to devising ways in which the incongruous elements of Ulster unionists, and Irish nationalists might be fused into a single nation. In fairness to Redmond, it must be said, his support for recruitment to the British Army in 1914 and 1915 was a form of indirect response to unionist sensibilities. He wanted to show that nationalists and unionists had some aspirations and allegiances in common, for which they were willing to make the supreme sacrifice, as many did.
That said, the overwhelming majority of nationalists believed no part of Ireland had a right to opt out. The argument was the following, for which they were prepared to make great sacrifices. Ireland was a geographic unit, an island, and ipso facto it should be one nation. This put physical geography ahead of human geography, territory ahead of people. The only Irish nationalist who took Ulster unionist concerns seriously was the vice president of Sinn Féin, Fr. Michael O'Flanagan, who admitted that “in the last analysis the test of nationality is the wish of the people" and that Ulster unionists “had never transferred their love and allegiance to Ireland.” He stated that Irish nationalists “claim the right to decide what is to be our nation” but then refuse Ulster unionists the same right. I am not sure how much influence Fr. O'Flanagan had on subsequent Sinn Féin policy, although he continued to be active in the party into the 1930s. He seems to have been a somewhat eccentric individualist but some of the statements he made bear thinking about.
Going back in time, many nationalists did not take Ulster unionist objections to home rule seriously at all.
They thought it was bluff, even when Ulster unionists, opposed to home rule, armed themselves and set up a provisional government to resist Dublin rule. They still consider that to be bluff. The working assumption of Irish nationalists seems to have been that the liberal government in London would coerce all of Ulster into accepting home rule. With hindsight, this seems somewhat unrealistic. The morality, practicality and wisdom of such a course does not seem to have been explored by nationalist thinkers. It was simply too difficult. Indeed, there are suggestions by some historians that liberals decided that they would not coerce Ulster, but they were trying to get as far as they could without doing so.
Nationalists argued that resistance to home rule was being fanned by elements of the British Conservative Party for domestic purposes. There was truth in this, but it was not determinative, in my opinion. Nationalists argued that partition was imposed by the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, passed at Westminster - not by anybody meeting here. This is true. If partition had been made the subject of consent on a county-by-county vote in 1920, Fermanagh and Tyrone might have voted for rule from Dublin, but there still would have been partition on a different line.
Irish nationalism also adopted a rhetoric that did not include Ulster unionist aspirations. For example, the language of the Irish, Gaelic, was to be the language of Ireland. While some Ulster unionists would have been able to speak Irish, they would not have seen this decision to make Gaelic the national language as part of a nation-building project that belonged to them. One nationalist writer, D.P. Moran, said the foundation of the Irish is the Gael, which excludes Ulster unionists, who are not of Gaelic stock, explicitly. Symbols like the monarchy, which meant and mean a lot to unionists, were explicitly rejected by republicans. Indeed, establishing an Irish Republic, and thus getting rid of the monarchy, seemed to be more important than avoiding partition. For example, Eamon de Valera, speaking in the Dáil in 1921 during the truce and before the treaty negotiations commenced, said that if the Irish Republic was recognised, he would be in favour of giving each county the power to vote itself out of the Republic. In such a scenario, it is probable, as I said earlier, that Antrim, Down, Armagh and Derry would have voted to exclude themselves, but Fermanagh and Tyrone would not.
In more recent times, insistence by some nationalists on commemorating acts that unionists regard as terrorism is counterproductive. Softness of tone does little to undo the underlying harm that such commemorations and rituals do.
Having spoken much about nationalist assumptions, I would like to say a word about unionist assumptions, which also need to be re-examined by them. It is probably not for you or me to suggest how Ulster unionism might rethink its assumptions; it is for them to do that. However, we could perhaps suggest themes for reflection. Unionism might develop a more comprehensive and inclusive definition of “Ulster” that recognises the contribution of people not of the so-called majority tradition to creating what is good about Northern Ireland today. Sometimes gestures can make as big a difference as concrete actions. Arlene Foster’s attendance at the Ulster Final in Clones was important. Commemorations can play a role. As well as remembering the losses of the Ulster Division at the Somme, unionists might also remember the sacrifices of the 16th Irish Division and notable Irish nationalist casualties, such as Tom Kettle and Willie Redmond.
Unionism might also try to lead the debate, rather than follow, that is starting in the UK about the nature of the union between Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The legacy of empire is not enough to keep the union together indefinitely. As the only part of the UK that has a land boundary with a non-UK entity, Northern Ireland surely has a special right to an input to UK foreign and border policy. Edwin Poots's recent intervention illustrates this. Unionists might ask whether the UK needs a written constitution to protect the smaller nations when big decisions, such as Brexit or attempting to disapply endorsed international treaties, are being considered?
Of course, reciprocity will be important to encourage any such rethinking. Unionists need to convince the increasing middle ground that the union is good for them. Harsh confrontations over the protocol do not help, especially when there will be a vote on the continuance of the protocol in the Northern Ireland Assembly on a regular basis anyway. There is no need to agitate about it now and cause further division.
I would now like to say a word about the background to the Good Friday Agreement, which is the principal focus of the committee. The Agreement was a culmination of many efforts by successive Irish and British Governments to devise a basis for the governance of Northern Ireland that would be seen as fair to both traditional communities in Northern Ireland.
The Stormont Parliament that provided internal governance for Northern Ireland from 1920 to 1972 operated on a basis of simple majority rule. Given that self-declared unionists were a majority of the electorate for that entire period, non-unionists were effectively excluded from government offices in Stormont. This meant that the Stormont Parliament was considered neither legitimate nor fair by a substantial section of the population.
The Sunningdale Agreement of 1974 was designed by the Irish and UK Governments and by a majority of the parties in Northern Ireland with the objective of fairness and inclusivity in mind. Unfortunately, it was undermined by the so-called Ulster Workers' Council strike and it was also vigorously opposed at the time by major elements within unionism, by Sinn Féin and violently by the IRA.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was another attempt to address the sense of exclusion of the nationalist minority by providing that the UK government would afford the Irish Government a formal policy input role in Northern Ireland with a right to receive answers to questions that it might raise. The agreement was used productively by the Irish Government to press for an even-handed and impartial administration in Northern Ireland. It much reduced the incidence of megaphone diplomacy by providing a mechanism for private diplomacy. The unionist parties were not included by the UK side in the preparation of the 1985 agreement, which is unfortunate, whereas the Irish Government had consulted the main nationalist party, namely, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, SDLP. This led to a great deal of unionist resentment. It also led to unionists refusing to have contacts with the Irish Government for a lengthy period, up until almost 1990.
Both the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements included assurances that the status of Northern Ireland as part of the UK would not be changed without the consent of a majority there. There was some tension between these assurances and the hard legal words of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, which appeared to make a claim, as of right, to the territory of Northern Ireland, without the wishes of the people living there being paramount.
I now turn to the origins of the peace process, which is a parallel but related development. John Hume of the SDLP, in talks with Sinn Féin, sought a way to remove the theoretical justification for the IRA campaign of violence by seeking a redefinition of the concept of Irish national self-determination. This was an act of genius on his part. Rather than self-determination being expressed by means of a single decision by a simple majority of the people of the 32 counties of Ireland, John Hume sought to frame a proposition that could be agreed in identical terms in simultaneous referenda in both jurisdictions. As long as the proposition put in both jurisdictions was the same and majorities were achieved in both, this would constitute an act of national self-determination by the Irish people as a whole. It would ostensibly satisfy the demands of the republican movement for national self-determination while simultaneously respecting the principle of consent.
This was the core concept underlying the Good Friday Agreement and the referenda approving it on both sides of the Border. However, the founding document of the present peace process was the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993. It was negotiated between the governments of Albert Reynolds and John Major with active involvement of both the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP. It acknowledged the legitimacy of both unionist and nationalist points of view. It contains some very important principles and, in a sense, the outworking of the Good Friday Agreement should be judged by reference to those principles.
One important part of the Downing Street Declaration was the following text:
The British and Irish Governments reiterate that the achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence. They confirm that, in these circumstances, democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in democratic politics and to join in dialogue in due course between the Governments and the political parties on the way ahead.
Access to the democratic process was conditioned on "a permanent end to the use of or support for paramilitary violence". The IRA was unwilling to say that their cessation violence was permanent; indeed, it was to prove not to be. Despite this, Sinn Féin wanted to participate in democratic politics on the same basis as parties that relied solely on persuasion and that were not supported by a private army. The idea of a gesture of weapons decommissioning - the famous "Washington 3" - was put forward as a symbolic and second best alternative to the IRA complying with the Downing Street Declaration and saying the end to its military operations was permanent.
In this context, when I became Taoiseach in December 1994, I was conscious of my obligations under the Constitution to the Houses of the Oireachtas. Article 15.6 of the Constitution states “The right to raise and maintains military or armed forces is vested exclusively in the Oireachtas”, that is, in these Houses, and adds that “no military or armed force”, other than one raised and maintained by the Oireachtas, “shall be raised and maintained for any purpose whatsoever”. Clearly the holding of arms by the IRA on the territory of this State was and would be a straightforward breach of Article 15.6. This was and remains fundamental to the democratic character of this State. As Taoiseach, an officeholder responsible to the Oireachtas, I was obliged, when asked by journalists, to say that I would welcome the decommissioning of such weapons, even as a symbolic gesture. To have given any other answer than that I would welcome it would have been to collude in a breach of Article 15 of the Constitution and to accept the legitimacy of a private army. I was not willing to do that and no Taoiseach should be.
I will now turn to the end of what proved to be a temporary cessation of violence by the IRA. On 31 August 1994, the IRA had announced “a complete cessation of military activities”. A loyalist ceasefire had followed on 13 October. As well as not being permanent, the IRA cessation of military activities was not complete either. I remember the following names because I was in office at the time: Frank Kerr, a post office worker, was shot by the IRA during a robbery on 10 November 1994; on 8 December 1994, 28 years ago today, Paul Dunne was shot by the IRA off the Lisburn Road; on 18 December, a date whose anniversary is a few days from now, Francie Collins was shot on Lepper Street and, on the following day, Chris Johnson was shot on Cooke Street; and on 1 January 1996, Ian Lyons was shot by the IRA. In the 14 months after the IRA announced its “complete” cessation of military activities on 31 August 1994, 148 punishment beatings were conducted by republicans. This was more than three times as many punishment beatings as the IRA had inflicted in the 14 months prior to its complete cessation of military activities in August 1994.
As Taoiseach, I was anxious to build on the work of my predecessor, Albert Reynolds. Notwithstanding our different party affiliations, I offered to keep Martin Mansergh, Albert Reynolds's excellent adviser, to advise me on a full-time basis on the North and on the peace process. He provided me with a very valuable initial briefing but he felt unable to accept my offer of a full-time position. I accepted and respected that decision.
Finding a way to involve Sinn Féin in political talks with other, unarmed, political parties was an inherently difficult question. The very existence of a heavily armed group associated with one of the parties carried an implicit political and military threat to the other parties in negotiations with it. The negotiating playing field would not be level, to put it mildly. However, on 28 November 1995, I persuaded John Major to agree in Downing Street to a formula to allow talks including Sinn Féin to get under way. This was known as the twin-track approach. The following is what we agreed:
1. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach met tonight. After intensive efforts by both Governments, and with the benefit of consultations with parties in Northern Ireland, the two Governments have agreed to launch a ‘twin track’ process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations.
2. Both Governments reaffirmed their commitment to securing the early launch of all-party negotiations. By way of the twin tracks, the two Governments have the firm aim of achieving this [the opening of the talks] by the end of February 1996. It is the two Governments’ considered view that, with cooperation from all the relevant parties in both tracks, that objective should prove achievable. Both Governments commit themselves to working, with others, to achieve it.
I believe this was a major diplomatic achievement. We also agreed at that meeting to establish the International Body on Decommissioning, chaired by George Mitchell. It was not all plain sailing after that. For example, the Ulster Unionist Party refused to meet the Irish Government as part of the twin-track approach. That party was willing to negotiate with elected representatives but declined to meet Sinn Féin outside the context of an elected body.
The international commission, having met all the parties, presented its report of 28 January 1996, about a month after we had launched the twin-track approach. It recommended six principles on the basis of which the decommissioning and political talks could proceed. The text read:
Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:
a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;
b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;
c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;
d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and [the final Mitchell principle added],
f. To urge that 'punishment' killings and beatings stop and to take effective [measures are taken to that end.]
In his response to the international body report in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, John Major, said that there was much in the report that he could welcome and endorse. However, the practical problem of how to bring all the parties together remained.
Self-evidently, the best way to generate the necessary confidence would have been for the paramilitaries to make a start on the decommissioning process. He saw no reason they should not do so, nor could I, especially as the paramilitaries had been so slow in complying with the Mitchell principles, as I have illustrated. Mr. Major and myself were agreed that we were not prepared to accept that any one group should, through its intransigence, stand in the way of peace and a comprehensive settlement.
Mr. Major said that one of the confidence-building measures taken up by the international body was the idea of an election to peace talks. The body made it clear that a broadly acceptable elective process, with an appropriate mandate and within the three-strand structure - east-west, North-South, and internal - could contribute to the building of confidence. Mr. Major said he believed an elective process offered a viable alternative direct route to the confidence necessary to bring about all-party negotiations. In that context, he said it was possible to imagine decommissioning and political negotiations going forward in parallel. He said the election to peace talks proposal had originated in Northern Ireland and, as recent opinion polls at that time had shown, had widespread cross-community support there. A number of parties, including the UUP, the DUP and the Alliance Party, had put forward proposals for some form of election.
I believed that accepting the holding of an election as an entry method to inclusive negotiations was hardly an exorbitant price for getting the UUP to sit down and talk with Sinn Féin. Unfortunately, neither Sinn Féin nor the SDLP was supportive of an election to a negotiating body for reasons I cannot fully explain. Events were to vindicate the electoral route to talks. Elections are a healthy part of democracy anyway. The road was then open to inclusive negotiations. That was the important point. Indeed, it was through this elective body and the talks it allowed that the Good Friday Agreement was reached almost two years later.
Ten days after Mr. Major’s suggestion of an elective body to activate twin-track talks, the IRA ignited a huge bomb in Canary Wharf in London, murdering Inan Bashir and John Jeffries, civilian victims of what by any standard was a war crime. The operation was in planning for weeks during the time Sinn Féin were talking to Senator Mitchell and presumably reassuring him of their bona fides. Regardless of the incident in Canary Wharf, Mr. Major and I successfully launched the talks on 10 June 1996, which was a bit later than planned. Those were the talks that led to the Good Friday Agreement. Sinn Féin did not take part initially because their associates in the IRA had recommenced a full-scale killing campaign. However, a venue for their participation had been created and they availed of it when they realised their armed struggle was getting them nowhere.
Others will have briefed the committee on the post-1997 process that led to the Belfast Agreement of 1998. I was leader of the Opposition at the time and not directly involved and, therefore, I will focus on the reaction to it after it was announced. The agreement was debated in the Dáil on 21 April 1998. As leader of the main Opposition party, I welcomed the agreement and commended all those involved. A few things I said then - though not too many, the committee will be glad to hear - bear repetition. I said history is what we make for ourselves and that there is nothing inevitable in it, and I added that we must replace the politics of often irreconcilable aspirations with the politics of accommodation. I said that if the two communities continue to define themselves in terms of mutually irreconcilable aspirations, as they are defined in the agreement for the purposes of parallel consent, there would always be difficulties in achieving full rapprochement. I said that the very nature of unionism and nationalism would have to change if there is to be a lasting settlement. Unfortunately, that has not happened. As I said earlier, both nationalism and unionism need to re-examine their underlying assumptions. That process of re-examining assumptions could take place at this committee. In fact, there is probably nowhere more suitable for that kind of re-examination, under the chairmanship of Deputy O'Dowd.
The Belfast Agreement allows for a poll to be called on whether Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the UK and join a united Ireland. It states that if the British Secretary of State is of the opinion that a majority in Northern Ireland would support unification with the rest of Ireland, he or she shall hold a poll in Northern Ireland to allow the electorate to make that choice. Apparently, this clause in the agreement about border polls was not the subject of close scrutiny in the final days of the negotiation in 1998. The focus in that week was on North-South institutions, decommissioning of weapons and prisoner releases. As a result of this lack of scrutiny, the agreement provides little guidance as to how, and on what criteria, the Secretary of State might make such a momentous decision. There is also little attention given in the agreement to the role of the Irish Government, which would have to absorb Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State is not even required to consult the Irish Government before calling a border poll. The Irish Government would have to decide what special arrangements, if any, it might make to ensure that both communities in Northern Ireland, especially the one that is currently in favour of union with Britain, are made to feel at home in a united Ireland. Symbolic issues, flags, emblems and anthems will need to be worked out. The agreement does not set out how the public finance and tax implications of such a move would be dealt with. Northern Ireland currently receives a net subvention from London, which, if voters opted for a united Ireland, would thereafter have to come from Dublin or be rendered unnecessary by spending reductions in Northern Ireland. I do not know if the Department of Finance in Dublin was even involved in the negotiations of this clause back in 1998.
It will not be easy to predict the issues that might sway voters in a referendum, as we have seen in recent cases. The National Health Service in Britain even became an issue in the Brexit referendum. Incidentally, while a large majority, 67%, of people in the Republic told opinion pollsters in 2021, they would vote for a united Ireland, only 41% said they would be prepared to pay higher taxes to accommodate it and even fewer would be willing to change the national flag or the national anthem to accommodate the British identity of the unionist population. Of course, answers to hypothetical poll questions about remote future possibilities are not reliable. Opinion poll questions often look only for a yes-no answer. It would be helpful if the intensity of divergent opinions could also be measured. For example, it might be a good idea to invite opinion poll respondents to answer the same question but in two or three different ways. A question could be posed as to whether respondents would vote for a united Ireland regardless of whether a majority of the unionist community was resolutely opposed to it. That is one formula. Another question could inquire whether a respondent would support a united Ireland if evidence suggested a significant proportion, say 45%, of the unionist population were prepared to go along with it on broadly agreed terms and would the opinion of the respondent change if only 30% of unionists were prepared to go along with it. If there were a significant difference in the answers to these questions, it might help the Secretary of State to make a wise decision on whether it was timely to have a border poll.
The Good Friday Agreement requires whichever government is sovereign over Northern Ireland to exercise its powers "with rigorous impartiality" and ensure "just and equal treatment" for the "identities, ethos and aspirations of both communities" in Norther Ireland. "Aspirations" is the key word. By definition, unionists and nationalists have different and contradictory aspirations.
One aspires to a united Ireland, while the other aspires to continued union with Britain. The provision in the Belfast Agreement for a border poll seems, in an important sense, to contradict the parity of esteem between aspirations that is part of the underlying motive force of the agreement. This is because it provides a one-way street to Irish unity, with no possibility of reversal of that decision. While there could be several border polls where the option of a united Ireland is offered and rejected, if that option is once chosen in the last of those polls, that would be it. There would be no going back and no further referendums. The decision in favour of a united Ireland would be final and, in that sense, there is no parity between the aspirations. I am surprised this anomaly did not get more attention in unionist circles. They probably had other problems on their minds.
If a majority in Northern Ireland voted for a united Ireland in a border poll, there would probably still remain a significant minority in Northern Ireland who might continue to aspire to rejoin the United Kingdom. That aspiration is thus treated less favourably in the agreement than the aspiration of nationalists for a united Ireland. One aspiration, once achieved, is irreversible. The other aspiration is reversible, no matter how many earlier border polls confirming it have taken place. As this is the way the agreement was drafted, it is hardly possible to change any of this now but voters, in casting their votes in a border poll, would need to bear in mind the one-sided way in which the proposal was framed. Voters, as citizen legislators, should exercise great caution. Their priority should not be so much the option they would personally like, as finding the option they believe all sides are most likely to be able to live with.
The border poll issue is, and will remain, contentious. Indeed, the constant publicity about it is unsettling. It heightens the tension around the Northern Ireland protocol, which Ulster unionists wrongly see as a stepping stone to a united Ireland. Calling for a united Ireland is seen as patriotic and popular in the Republic, even though repeating such calls may be a barrier to practical reconciliation between the communities in Northern Ireland. Under the border poll provisions of the agreement, a united Ireland could come about by a majority of 51% to 49% or even narrower. As I said, once it has happened, it would be irreversible, at least under the terms of the agreement.
This simple majoritarianism seems to me to run counter to something the then Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, said in the 1993 Downing Street Declaration: "Stability and well-being will not be found under any political system which is refused allegiance or rejected ... by a significant minority of those governed by it." If a united Ireland is carried by 51% to 49%, it is likely a significant minority in Northern Ireland would refuse allegiance to that decision. This minority would be geographically concentrated in parts of the province where they might constitute a substantial local majority. Experience suggests that policing and security in such areas could become very difficult for a united Ireland government. The framers of the border poll provisions of the Belfast Agreement do not seem to have taken sufficient account of Albert Reynolds's wise words in the Downing Street Declaration. He saw further than they did. He saw that winning the allegiance of minorities was important for political stability. Simple majoritarianism is not enough. Good governance requires minority consent - that is the lesson of Stormont - so unionists and unionism should be taken seriously.
In looking objectively and clinically at the question of how we each, if we live long enough, should vote in a border poll, if it takes place, people on both sides of the Border should ask themselves some difficult questions. They must ask themselves why there are now 33 peace walls, whereas there were only 23 peace walls in 1998. What deeper truth does that reveal? They must ask themselves if the ideals, historic memories and allegiances of Northern unionists can realistically, at the point in time the decision is being made, be reconciled with the ideals, historic memories and allegiances of Irish nationalists. In the past seven years, has there been more or less integration across community lines? I believe, in fact, there has been less and the situation has disimproved. Voters will have to ask themselves, based on evidence at the time, if they can reasonably expect that disparate elements in Northern Ireland can be fused into a new, all-Irish, civic patriotism, and a new identity that a large majority can share and the remaining minority can live with. If people do not believe that is possible at the time, a united Ireland will not work, at least not at that particular point in history and, if so, people should not vote for it. It would, of course, be very difficult to take that decision. Voters will need great wisdom and prudence if we are to achieve the “stability and well-being” envisaged by Albert Reynolds in the Downing Street Declaration.
I believe we should try a different approach. The priority now should be reconciliation within Northern Ireland. The work of reconciliation must be done, in the first place, by the people of Northern Ireland themselves, but with the active support of the Dublin and London Governments. It should be seen as an end in itself and not as a preparation either for a united Ireland or continuance of the union. Indeed, part of the problem is that many nationalists have seen the Good Friday Agreement as a staging post on the road to a united Ireland, whereas many unionists saw it as a final destination and a full settlement. This difference of perception is crucial. Reconciliation requires the creation of a shared perception and shared achievements that become a basis for a shared allegiance. Political leaders in Northern Ireland need to work towards shared achievements, of which all of them can be proud, and that become part of a new shared historic memory, gradually replacing the divisive memories of the past. Shared ideals must be forged by negotiation, discussion and achievement at every level. Unionists must begin to imagine themselves into the minds of nationalists and nationalists into those of unionists. This requires a conscious and structured effort of the imagination among every group in Northern Ireland. Instead of being boosters for one side or the other in the constitutional debate, creative people - actors and so on - should lend their talents to this demanding exercise of the imagination, namely, forging a new shared identity that involves both sides in Northern Ireland.
As I read it, the Good Friday Agreement reflects two core values: rigorous impartiality by the sovereign governments as between the two traditions, and determination of their constitutional future by the people of Northern Ireland, that is, consent. Part of the wisdom of the Belfast Agreement is that it requires whichever capital is sovereign at the time, London or Dublin, to be rigorously impartial between the communities. This would apply even if Northern Ireland had voted to enter a united Ireland. The obligation of impartiality would then be on the shoulders of the Irish Government. The wording is as follows. The two Governments:
affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities...
The current UK Government, by promoting legislation to disapply almost the entirety of the Northern Ireland protocol, against the wishes of a majority of the Northern Ireland Assembly, is breaching its duties under the Belfast Agreement. It is being partial in favour of one party, the DUP. In so doing, it is placing the DUP in a difficult position and is using them for English political purposes.
I leave it to others to decide what legal remedies might be sought for this breach of impartiality and in what forum.
Quite simply, the current UK Government is not impartial. That is a breach of both the letter and spirit of the Belfast agreement. The UK Government's Bill to disapply the protocol also breaches the principle in the Good Friday Agreement to the affect that the people of Northern Ireland should be able to determine their own future, and that is the principle of consent.
The referendum decision by the people of Northern Ireland, accepting the Good Friday Agreement, was an act of self-determination on their part. The protocol to the withdrawal treaty preserves that sense of self-determination and consent by the people of Northern Ireland because in Article 18 of the protocol there is a provision for the protocol's continued application to be reviewed by the Northern Ireland Assembly every eight years.
It was on the basis of Article 18 that Prime Minister Johnson accepted the protocol. He fought and won a UK general election on that basis. Subsequently, he changed his mind and introduced legislation unilaterally to disapply the protocol. This legislation continues to be part of the UK Government's legislative programme. It has reached Report Stage in the House of Lords, which is a very advanced Stage on the way to signing into law. It is UK legislation which is to be imposed on Northern Ireland. There is no equivalent of Article 18 in the protocol disapplication Bill. The Northern Ireland Assembly has no right to review this decision. It will be imposed, indefinitely, by the British regardless of what a majority of the Northern Ireland people say. This legislation should be withdrawn. Of course the legislation also breaches international law because it attempts a unilateral revision of an international treaty.
